the european union at the united nations: intersecting multilateralisms (palgrave studies in...
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The European Union atthe United Nations
Intersecting Multilateralisms
Katie Verlin Laatikainen andKaren E. Smith
Edited by
Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics
Edited by: Michelle Egan, American University USA, Neill Nugent, ManchesterMetropolitan University, UK, William Paterson, University of Birmingham, UK
Editorial Board: Christopher Hill, Cambridge, UK, Simon Hix, London Schoolof Economics, UK, Mark Pollack, Temple University, USA, Kalypso Nicolaïdis,Oxford UK, Morten Egeberg, University of Oslo, Norway, Amy Verdun,University of Victoria, Canada
Palgrave Macmillan is delighted to announce the launch of a new books serieson the European Union. Following on the sustained success of the acclaimedEuropean Union Series, which essentially publishes research-based textbooks,Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics will publish research-drivenmonographs.
The remit of the series is broadly defined, both in terms of subject and academicdiscipline. All topics of significance concerning the nature and operation of theEuropean Union potentially fall within the scope of the series. The series ismultidisciplinary to reflect the growing importance of the EU as a political andsocial phenomenon. We will welcome submissions from the areas of politicalstudies, international relations, political economy, public and social policy andsociology.
Titles include:
Heather GrabbeTHE EU’S TRANSFORMATIVE POWER
Lauren M. McLarenIDENTITY, INTERESTS AND ATTITUDES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Justus SchönlauDRAFTING THE EU CHARTERRights, Legitimacy and Process
Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (editors)THE EUROPEAN UNION AT THE UNITED NATIONS
The European Union at the United NationsIntersecting Multilateralisms
Edited by
Katie Verlin LaatikainenAssociate Professor of Political ScienceAdelphi University, USA
and
Karen E. SmithReader in International RelationsLondon School of Economics, UK
Editorial matter, selection, introduction and conclusion © Katie Verlin Laatikainen, Karen E. Smith 2006All remaining chapters © respective authors 2006
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.
No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP.
Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright,Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2006 byPALGRAVE MACMILLANHoundmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010Companies and representatives throughout the world.
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries.
ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–9534–6 hardbackISBN-10: 1–4039–9534–6 hardback
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The European Union at the United Nations : intersecting multilateralisms / edited by Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith.
p. cm. – (Palgrave studies in European Union politics)Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 1–4039–9534–6 (Cloth: alk. paper)1. United Nations – European Union countries. 2. European Union.
3. International cooperation. 4. International relations. 5. Security,International. I. Laatikainen, Katie Verlin, 1965– II. Smith, Karen E., 1965 July 19– III. Series.
JZ4997.5.E87E87 2006341.23—dc22 2005055335
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 115 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06
Printed and bound in Great Britain byAntony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne
Contents
List of Tables and Figures vii
Notes on the Contributors viii
List of Abbreviations xi
1 Introduction – The European Union at the United Nations: Leader, Partner or Failure? 1Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith
Part I Background and framework 25
2 EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations 27Mary Farrell
Part II The Politics of National Interest and EU Policy Coordination in the UN 47
3 The European Powers in the Security Council: Differing Interests, Differing Arenas 49Christopher Hill
4 Pushing Soft Power: Middle Power Diplomacy at the UN 70Katie Verlin Laatikainen
5 Returned to Europe? The Central and East European Member States at the Heart of the European Union 92Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués
Part III The EU in UN Policy Arenas 113
6 Effective Multilateralism and Collective Security: Empowering the UN 115Sven Biscop and Edith Drieskens
7 The EU in Geneva: Coordinating Policy in the Economic and Social Arrangements of the United Nations System 133Paul Taylor
v
8 The European Union, Human Rights and the United Nations 154Karen E. Smith
9 EU-UN Environmental Relations: Shared Competence andEffective Multilateralism 175Chad Damro
Part IV Conclusions 193
10 Intersecting Multilateralisms: The European Union and Multilateral Institutions 195Knud Erik Jørgensen
Bibliography 212
Index 227
vi Contents
List of Tables and Figures
Tables
1.1 EU member-state voting cohesion during UN General Assembly roll-call votes, 1991–2000 11
2.1 EU coordination at the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council 34
2.2 EU statements at the UN 2000–05 353.1 EU states elected members of the UN Security
Council, 1985–2006 604.1 Nordic cohesion on Roll-Call Votes in the
General Assembly 794.2 Joint Nordic statements before the UN General
Assembly and its Main Committees, 1990–2005 807.1 European Commission cooperation with UN bodies 1358.1 EU statements and explanations of vote/position 1588.2 Resolutions introduced by the EU 159
Figures
1.1 Organizational chart of the United Nations 65.1 Temporal evolution of the percentage of agreement
between the EC/EU majority and selected CEECs (EC/EU � 100 per cent) for the period 1983–2003 98
8.1 EU voting cohesion in the CHR 1648.2 EU voting cohesion in the Third Committee 164
vii
Notes on the Contributors
Sven Biscop is a senior research fellow in the Royal Institute forInternational Relations (IRRI-KIIB), a Brussels-based think tank associ-ated with the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is professor ofEuropean security at the University of Gent, associate lecturer in the MAin international politics at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, and co-coordinator for IRRI-KIIB of the Higher Studies in Security and Defence,co-organized with Belgium’s Royal Defence College. He has publishedThe European Security Strategy – A Global Agenda for Positive Power(Ashgate, 2005).
Chad Damro is Lecturer in Politics and Co-Programme Director of theMSc in International and European Politics at the University ofEdinburgh. He received his BA in international studies and political sci-ence from the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, an MA in InternationalRelations from Syracuse University, and a PhD in political science fromthe University of Pittsburgh. He worked in the European Program at theCenter for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC.In 2000, he was an EU Fulbright Scholar at the Vrije Universiteit Brusselin Brussels, Belgium. Most recently, he was a Jean Monnet Fellow at theEuropean University Institute’s Robert Schuman Center for AdvancedStudies in Florence, Italy, in 2002–03. He has written a number of jour-nal articles and contributions to edited volumes. His current researchfocuses on the European Union in international affairs and transatlanticeconomic (in particular trade and competition) and environmentalrelations.
Edith Drieskens is working at the Institute of International andEuropean Policy at Leuven University (KULeuven), Belgium. She holdsmasters degrees in Political Sciences, European Studies and AmericanStudies. Her PhD research focuses on the representation behaviour ofthe EU member states in the UN Security Council, especially regardingthe creation of multilateral economic sanctions regimes for securitypurposes.
Mary Farrell received her PhD in 1996 from the London School ofEconomics, Department of International Relations. She is currentlySenior Research Fellow at Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches
viii
Internationales, and Associate Professor at Sciences Po, Paris. She is theauthor of Global Politics of Regionalism and editor of the special editionof European Foreign Affairs Review, Winter 2005, on ‘Exporting the EUModel of Governance?’. Her research interests include the reform ofglobal governance; world order and regional order; the internationalrelations of the EU; African regional integration.
Christopher Hill has held the Sir Patrick Sheehy Professorship ofInternational Relations at Cambridge University since October 2004.From 1991 to 2004, he was the Montague Burton Professor ofInternational Relations at the London School of Economics. He is theauthor of 70 scholarly articles and book chapters, as well as the author,joint author or editor of nine books, including Cabinet Decisions onForeign Policy (CUP, 1991), and (joint editor with Pamela Beshoff), TwoWorlds of International Relations: Academics, Practitioners and the Trade inIdeas (Routledge, 1994). The most recent are: (joint editor with KarenSmith) Documents on European Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2000);The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Palgrave, 2003).
Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués is a researcher at the Institut Universitarid’Estudis Europeus, at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. She holds aMaster’s degree and is working on a PhD in International Relations fromthe same university. Her most recent publications include: ‘A “Ring ofFriends”? The Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy forthe Mediterranean’, Mediterranean Politics; ‘The Fifteen and the AccessionStates in the UN General Assembly: What Future for European ForeignPolicy in the Coming Together of the “Old” and the “New” Europe?’,European Foreign Affairs Review; and with Esther Barbé (eds) BeyondEnlargement: The New Members and New Frontiers of the Enlarged EuropeanUnion, Bellaterra: Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus, 2003.
Knud Erik Jørgensen is Jean Monnet Professor in European Politics in theDepartment of Political Science at the University of Aarhus. He is the edi-tor of Cooperation and Conflict. He has previously edited (with KarinFierke) Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation (Armonk,NY: M.E. Sharpe Publishers, 2001); (with Thomas Christiansen and AntjeWiener) The Social Construction of Europe (London: Sage, 2001); EuropeanApproaches to Crisis Management (The Hague: Kluwer International, 1997);and Reflective Approaches to European Governance (Basingstoke: Macmillan,1997). He has published in journals such as Journal of European PublicPolicy, European Journal of International Relations, Cooperation and Conflict,Journal of International Relations and Development, and Journal of Common
Notes on the Contributors ix
Market Studies. He has also contributed numerous book chapters.Currently he is preparing a handbook on EU politics.
Katie Verlin Laatikainen (co-editor) is an Associate Professor ofPolitical Science and International Studies at Adelphi University in NewYork. Adelphi has NGO status at the United Nations and she serves as itsrepresentative. She has written a number of articles and book chaptersrelated to EU and Nordic politics. Her current research focuses on therole of the EU at the United Nations, and recent relevant publicationsinclude ‘Norden’s Eclipse: The Impact of the European Union’sCommon Foreign and Security Policy on Nordic Cooperation in theUnited Nations’ in Cooperation and Conflict and ‘Assessing the EU as anActor at the UN’ in CFSP Forum, vol. 2, no. 1, 2004.
Karen E. Smith (co-editor) is Reader in International Relations, andDirector of the European Foreign Policy Unit, at the London School ofEconomics and Political Science. She has written extensively on the for-eign relations of the European Union. She is the author of The Making ofEU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe (2nd edition, Palgrave, 2004;1st edition, Macmillan, 1999), European Union Foreign Policy in aChanging World (Polity, 2003), co-editor (with Margot Light) of Ethicsand Foreign Policy (Cambridge University Press 2001), and co-editor (withChristopher Hill) of European Foreign Policy: Key Documents (Routledge,2000). She is the editor of CFSP Forum, the online newsletter of theFORNET research network on European foreign policy (www.fornet.info).
Paul Taylor is Professor of International Relations, and, until July 2004,Director of the European Institute, at the London School of Economics.He specializes in international organization within the European Unionand the United Nations system. Most recently he has publishedInternational Organization in the Age of Globalization (London:Continuum, 2003, paperback version, January, 2005); The EuropeanUnion in the 1990s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), andInternational Organization in the Modern World (London: Pinter, 1993).His earlier work includes International Cooperation Today: The Europeanand the Universal Pattern (London: Elek Books, 1971) and The Limits ofEuropean Integration (London: Croom Helm, and New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1983). He has edited and contributed to a number ofbooks on international organization, with A.J.R.Groom, and with Dawsand Adamczick-Gerteis (Documents on the Reform of the United Nations,Ashgate, 1997), and was editor of the Review of International Studiesbetween 1994 and 1997.
x Notes on the Contributors
List of Abbreviations
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific countriesASEAN Association of South-East Asian NationsAU African UnionCANZ Canada, Australia, New Zealand (caucus group)CEECs Central and East European countriesCHR Commission on Human RightsCFSP Common Foreign and Security PolicyCOHOM Council Working Group on Human RightsCOP Conference of the PartiesCSD Commission on Sustainable DevelopmentCSP Country Strategy PaperDG Directorate-GeneralDPA Department of Political AffairsDPKO Department of Peacekeeping OperationsDRC Democratic Republic of CongoEC European CommunityECHO European Community Humanitarian OfficeECJ European Court of JusticeECOSOC Economic and Social CouncilEEG Eastern Europe GroupEFTA European Free Trade AssociationEP European ParliamentEPC European Political CooperationESDP European Security and Defence PolicyEU European UnionEUPM European Union Police Mission (Bosnia-Herzegovina)FAO Food and Agricultural OrganizationG-77 Group of 77 (developing countries)GA General AssemblyGATT General Agreement on Tariffs and TradeGNI Gross National IncomeGRULAC Latin America GroupJHA Justice and Home AffairsJUSCANZ Japan, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand (caucus group)IAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
xi
ICC International Criminal CourtIFAD International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentILO International Labour OrganizationIMF International Monetary FundIMO International Maritime OrganizationISAF International Stabilization Force (Afghanistan)ITC International Trade CentreITU International Telecommunications UnionKFOR NATO Kosovo ForceMDGs Millennium Development GoalsMONUC United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of
CongoNAC New Agenda CoalitionNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNYLO New York Liaison OfficeOAU Organization of African UnityOCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian AssistanceOECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and
DevelopmentOHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human RightsOIC Organization of the Islamic ConferenceOSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in EuropeP-5 Permanent Five (Members of the Security Council)PBC Peacebuilding CommissionPHARE Poland/Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring EconomiesPSC Political and Security CommitteeTEU Treaty on European UnionUK United KingdomUN United NationsUNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDSUNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and
DevelopmentUNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUNDCP United Nations International Drug Control ProgrammeUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNECE United Nations Economic Commission for EuropeUNEP United Nations Environment ProgrammeUNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
OrganizationUNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change
xii List of Abbreviations
UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population ActivitiesUNGA United Nations General AssemblyUNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundUNIDO United Nations Industrial Development OrganizationUNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near EastUNSC United Nations Security CouncilUS United StatesUSSR Union of Soviet Socialist RepublicsWEOG Western Europe and Other GroupWFP World Food ProgrammeWHO World Health OrganizationWIPO World Intellectual Property OrganizationWTO World Trade Organization
List of Abbreviations xiii
1Introduction – The European Unionat the United Nations: Leader,Partner or Failure?Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith*
As the United Nations approached its sixtieth anniversary, bothsupporters and critics of the UN were sounding grim warnings about thefuture of multilateralism and collective security. On 20 November 2004,The Economist ran an article on the United Nations entitled ‘Fighting forSurvival’, which began ‘The United Nations and the rule of internationallaw are in crisis. Their relevance is being questioned as never before.’One year earlier, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan reported: ‘Rarely inits fifty-eight year history have such dire forecasts been made about theUnited Nations’ (United Nations, 2003, p. 1). He convened a High-LevelPanel on Threats, Challenge and Change, composed of eminentdiplomats and politicians, to consider reforms to the UN system ofcollective security. Annan himself published a comprehensive assessmentof the challenges facing the UN and his proposed reforms in a reportentitled In Larger Freedom that would frame the discussion of UN reformat the 2005 session (United Nations Secretary General, 2005a). His effortto demonstrate the interdependence of collective security, developmentand human rights was understood as an effort to foster commitment tothe reform project by constituents with widely divergent interests andassumptions about the proper priorities of the world organization.
Perspectives on the origins of this crisis of multilateralism differ: oneview suggests that the ‘crisis’ was generated by American unilateralism(the war against Iraq being the pre-eminent example of this) whileanother contends that it is the result of the sheer ineffectiveness ofmultilateral institutions to deal with security threats (terrorism, spreadof weapons of mass destruction and so on). For some observers of theUN, the despondency might seem misplaced – after all, there has rarelybeen a time when there hasn’t been intense dissatisfaction with the UN.From paralysis during the Cold War to concern over peacekeeping
1
overstretch in the early 1990s, from the periodic scandals over waste andcorruption within the UN to complaints about its anachronistic andossified institutional structure (particularly the Security Council – UNSC),from profound disgust at UN failures in Rwanda, Somalia and a host ofother horrifying humanitarian disasters to profound disillusionmentabout its role in inter-state conflicts such as the Middle East … thesuccess stories seem few and far between and ‘crises’ never-ending.1 Buteven the UN’s most ardent supporters insist that ‘this crisis of multilat-eralism is different’ (Ruggie, 2003a).
One thing that certainly is different is the recent emphasis that theEuropean Union (EU) – itself the world’s most successful case ofmultilateralism – has placed on strengthening the UN and themultilateral system in general. The EU declared in its December 2003European Security Strategy that it will assume some responsibility forensuring ‘effective multilateralism’, and supporting internationalorganizations, above all the UN. And in the past few years, there havebeen numerous EU communications on strengthening the EU’s relationswith the UN in a variety of areas, and several declarations on enhan-cing EU–UN cooperation, in areas from development aid to crisismanagement.
‘Effective multilateralism’ for the EU seems to imply making interna-tional organizations and agreements more effective.2 With regard to theEU at least, Kofi Annan’s appeal for effective UN reform is akin topreaching to the choir. The EU’s submission to the High-Level Panelmentioned above declared:
In the view of the EU, multilateral institutions can remain effectiveonly if they adapt to changing conditions, so that they remaincapable of mounting an effective response to new threats andchallenges as they emerge. At the same time, they must persist intheir efforts to address long-standing challenges, taking into accounton-going economic and social change as well as lessons learnt(Council of the European Union, 2004a).
The EU submission recognized the diversity of challenges facing the UNat the beginning of the twenty-first century. In a later paper, it hailed theSecretary General’s reform proposals. The EU committed itself to thereform project, arguing that ‘it is crucial to agree on a package ofdevelopment, human rights, security and United Nations reforms. Theresult should be a strengthened and more effective [UN] betterable to address the interconnected and multidimensional threats and
2 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith
challenges to international peace, security and development’ (Councilof the European Union, 2005b). The question we pose in the book iswhether the EU, the smaller, regional multilateral institution, can beeffective enough to act within, have influence on, and even lead thelarger multilateral institution of the UN, and ensure that the UN does‘remain effective’. Can the EU ‘rescue’ the UN? (Hannay, 2005).
This of course depends very much on the EU’s capacity to reachinternal agreement on what it will do within (and for) the UN, to musterthe necessary resources to carry out that agreement, and then to carrythrough with implementation. The extent to which the EU can actas one – or ‘speak with one voice’ – within the UN is an importantindicator of its development as a foreign policy actor. Yet the UN’smultilateral context poses interesting dilemmas for the EU as a globalactor. While UN multilateralism involves bloc and regional politicalgroupings in its institutional and political processes, it is foremost anintergovernmental organization premised upon, and protective of, statesovereignty: states are the key members, states control decision-making,and membership is a reflection of the sovereign equality of memberstates. This is interesting terrain for the EU, which has its own approachto multilateralism: the EU seeks to pool sovereignty and create acommon foreign policy in many policy arenas, though many EUmember states have traditionally viewed the UN as an arena for nationaldiplomacy. This book analyses whether or not EU member states areincreasingly conducting their UN diplomacy through the EU, and howthe different approaches to multilateralism of the EU and UN intersect.
Furthermore, a study of the EU at the UN is one of ‘intersectingmultilateralisms’ in another sense – one multilateral, regional organizationis interacting with another, universal multilateral one. Much theoreticalwork has been done on the possible synergies of, and limits to, theintersection of global and regional organizations, and this book focuseson whether the world’s most integrated regional organization caneffectively act within the universal organization, and what impact suchcollective action has on both organizations. The book thus seeks toanswer key questions, including: Can and does the EU lead within theUN? Can it promote ‘effective multilateralism’? Is regionalism compatiblewith global governance, as exercised through the UN system? Thisvolume provides evidence of the growth of the EU as a foreign policyactor in addition to identifying important qualifications of the EU’scoherence and effectiveness as an actor within the UN context.
This is of particular significance now because the UN’s future maydepend on strong, supportive action by members and regional
Introduction 3
groupings. The UN has previously looked to regional groupings to shareits burden – particularly in the early 1990s (examples include mandatingNATO to enforce UNSC resolutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, contro-versially, approving a peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth ofIndependent States in Georgia) – and the experience was not always ahappy one.3 Many regional groupings may be incapable of sharing theburden; others may not be desirable partners because they mask theinterests of powerful regional actors. Regional groupings themselvesmay hesitate to act as the UN’s ‘subcontractor’, and prefer to maintaintheir autonomy of action even if this may undermine the UN. Will theEU–UN relationship display similar problems?
One of the empirical puzzles addressed by this book is whether the EUis an actor in its own right within the UN or whether the EU merelyserves as a diplomatic forum for member states. There is a great deal ofambiguity regarding the EU’s role within the UN because the EU has nolegal standing within the main political bodies and the EuropeanCommunity (represented by the European Commission) has onlyobserver status. Most EU member states were members of the UN beforethey were members of the EU (West Germany joined the UN only in1973) and they have developed variant diplomatic relationships withinthe UN that existed long before the EU sought to create a common voiceat the UN. Thus, the EU’s attempt to act in concert must be understoodwithin the framework of group politics within the UN. There is a long-standing practice within the UN to have regional member-ship groups that elect members to limited body organs but whosemembers do not attempt to otherwise align their policies. Perhaps moreimportantly, there are caucasing groups such as the G-77, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Nordic Group, the Arab League and so on,which exist for political purposes and whose membership oftentranscends the above-mentioned formal regional groups. The EU hasambition to be more than a caucasing bloc for its members, but thislong-standing UN practice of caucasing blocs certainly colours how theEU is perceived by others. The EU’s effort to be an international actorpromoting multilateralism occurs in a resolutely intergovernmentalcontext in which such ambitious multilateralism is highly unusual. Theambiguity of the EU’s role within the UN is heightened by the rotatingCouncil Presidency in which the ‘voice’ of the EU is represented by adifferent EU member state every six months.
Even if the EU’s actorness remains ambiguous, its preferences may beexpanded and reinforced within the political bodies of the UN. Normsand principles of the EU may find purchase within the official discourse
4 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith
of the UN, in particular the concepts related to UN reform, and EUpriorities may shape the UN agenda even if the EU is not an identifiableactor as such. By examining discrete policy issues, this volume measuresthe degree to which the EU influences UN politics and policies.
The scope of this book is on the central political organs of theUnited Nations, including the General Assembly (UNGA) and its maincommittees, the UNSC and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)and its subsidiary bodies such as the Commission on Human Rights. TheUN system is of course much broader than this and includes a vast arrayof specialized agencies and programmes (see Figure 1.1). There have beena few studies of the EU’s relationship with some of these organizations(see for example Lorenzo Smaghi, 2004, on the EU and the IMF), but asystematic analysis of the EU’s approach to the central political bodies ofthe UN has been lacking and comprises the scope of the present volume.Finally, because the effectiveness of the UN is dependent upon theeffectiveness of its Secretariat to implement the decisions of memberstates, where possible the chapters in this volume assess the degree towhich the EU has influenced and bolstered the capacity of theSecretariat.
Theoretical and conceptual issues
This volume analyses the EU’s approach to UN politics through three the-oretical and conceptual lenses: multilateralism, Europeanization and effec-tiveness. Multilateralism is both an institutional form and a policyobjective (or principle). The classic definition of multilateralism is JohnRuggie’s: an institutional form which coordinates relations among three ormore states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct (Ruggie,1992).4 Both the EU and UN can be classified as multilateral organizations.The ‘multilateral system’ is the universe of multilateral organizations,international law, and multilateral principles, norms and politics. Broadlyspeaking, this corresponds to the vision of liberal institutionalists or inter-dependence theorists, though some observers have gone further and eithersee in this system the incipient emergence of, or argue in favour of, ‘globalgovernance’.5 It is the invocation of principles and norms defining suchinteraction, however, that distinguishes multilateralism from bilateralcooperation which places national interest front and centre, though ofcourse interests are not absent from multilateral interaction.
Multilateralism is often also used to describe the policies of statesthat are inclined towards cooperation with other states including (ormostly) through international organizations. ‘Among the principles of
Introduction 5
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multilateral politics are an unlimited prohibition on the use of force inthe pursuit of political goals, and the recognition that national interestscan be better realized through co-operation than through nation-statecompetition’ (Gareis and Varwick, 2004, p. 244). In contrast, unilateralismis less often defined and is usually seen as anti-multilateralism which inturn seems to mean at the very least scepticism about internationalinstitutions and law – a classic realist vision (see, for example, Pollack,2003).
One of the most trenchant critiques of multilateralism is that it doesn’twork very well if at all: the process of reaching agreements is laboriousand often results only in lowest-common-denominator solutions, andenforcing agreements is difficult and largely depends on voluntarycompliance.6 States routinely violate international agreements, deviatefrom international norms, abuse exceptions and opt-out clauses builtinto lowest-common-denominator agreements, or are simply incapableof complying with international obligations, resulting in what John vanOudenaren (2003) calls ‘dysfunctional multilateralism’. The UnitedStates, for instance, is widely perceived to have given up on multilateralismbecause it is too messy, slow or inconvenient. In the current context, theone state that could have ensured ‘effective multilateralism’ appearsinstead to have opted out of a number of international agreements aswell as violated a number of international norms.
The US rejection of multilateralism is unfortunate because a consider-able body of literature in international relations has emphasized theneed for a powerful hegemon to ensure that multilateralism works. Onlya hegemon can ensure that states will cooperate with each other and notdefect from agreements, thus only a hegemon can guarantee thecontinued provision of public goods via the multilateral system. But asRobert W. Cox has noted, for the UN at the end of the Cold War, theproblem shifted from concern about losing US financial and politicalsupport to concern about being seen to function only as the instrumentof US foreign policy (Cox, 1992, p. 165). Arguably both concerns co-exist today.
An underlying theme that recurs throughout this volume is the degreeto which a harmonious or at least functional trans-Atlantic relationshipis necessary for the United Nations to be effective. The contrast betweenthe US and EU perspectives on multilateralism could not be more stark.While the EU has embraced effective multilateralism as a cornerstone ofits foreign policy, the United States has embraced an aggressive policy ofpre-emption and a diplomatic tone that is sceptical of and impatientwith UN multilateralism. This is perhaps best exemplified by the
Introduction 7
George W. Bush Administration’s nomination of John Bolton as USAmbassador to the UN. Bolton is (in)famous for once having suggestedthat if ten floors of the UN Secretariat disappeared, it would have noimpact. The assumption of EU policymakers appears to be that its ownsuccessful experiment in multilateralism is sufficient to revitalize theUN even with (or despite) US ambivalence.
Those concerns about the US–UN relationship are to some extentreplicated in the debates about the relationship between regionalism(and regional groupings) and universalism (and the UN system). Doesstrong and growing regionalism threaten universalism, or potentiallysave it? Does the EU’s own successful regional multilateralism replacethe need for hegemonic commitment to international order, or does theEU’s hesitance to utilize coercive tools weaken its ability to supporteffective multilateralism (Smith, 2003)? The issue, as Andrew Hurrelland Louise Fawcett (1995) point out, is how the regional and globallevels can reinforce each other or come into conflict. While the UNhas urged regional groupings to assume greater responsibility formaintaining peace and security (thus alleviating the UN’s burden), thereare disadvantages to relying on regional groupings to do this. Regionalorganizations can lack the necessary internal cohesion to be able toundertake international responsibilities, and the necessary resources;and they may provide a cover for a regional ‘bully’ to exercise influence(Boutros-Ghali, 1992, paragraph 64; Rivlin, 1992, pp. 100–4). Andduring the Bosnian war, for example, the relationships between the EUand UN, and NATO and the UN, were not always productive. But sincethen, there has been a much better relationship on the ground in south-eastern Europe, indicating that a modus vivendi can be reached.In other areas, too, the EU and UN have worked well together as partners –as in the ‘Quartet’ (along with the United States and Russia), whichhas tried to push a ‘road map for peace’ in the Middle East. Certainly,many commentators are optimistic: the new regionalism, with EUsupport, could represent an open ‘post-modern’ model of a ‘renewedinternational system’ (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2000, p. 579). But thereis nonetheless the risk that strong regional groupings (such as the EU)prove able to protect and promote their own interests, and that of theirmembers, in opposition to universalism/multilateralism. This has longbeen debated within the field of international trade policy, but the corequestions are valid throughout the multilateral system. Will the EU actwithin the UN to promote and protect its own interests and thus poten-tially undermine universalism and the UN? Or will it act in the interestsof a wider community?
8 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith
The EU’s embrace of ‘effective multilateralism’ also highlights thedynamics involved in ‘Europeanization’ of foreign policy. Johan Olsenreviewed how the concept has been used to describe different dynamicsof both widening and deepening European integration. These conceptu-alizations are not always consistent. Europeanization can refer to:(1) changes in the external boundaries of the European governancesystem; (2) development of institutional capacity at the European level; (3) penetration of EU norms and policies in national systems ofgovernance; (4) external diffusion of European norms and forms ofpolitical organization; and (5) a political unification project (Olsen,2002, pp. 923–4). While enlargement and the EU’s constitutional project,reflective of the first and last conceptualizations of Europeanizationrespectively, have bearing on the EU’s ability to pursue and bolstermultilateralism within the UN, the other three types are most relevantfor this volume.
This book explores how the growth of an EU voice within the UNinvolves the three types of Europeanization. The pursuit of a concertedEU approach within the UN system requires the development of institu-tional capability for coordinating the policies of 25 member states whoare the de jure members of the UN. To pursue a common policy amongst25 members will require an intensification of institutional coordinationby expanded participation of European level institutions such as theCommission and the Council. Because individual member states remainthe decision-makers within the UN’s multilateral context, an EU voice atthe UN would thus also entail adaptation by individual members’foreign policies at the UN to ensure consistency, at least if the EU voice isto be effective. Thus, we would expect to find changes and convergenceamong EU members in their individual diplomacy within the UN.Finally, Europeanization as used in this volume entails an externaldiffusion process of European ideas and/or institutions. Are Europeanideas and practices of multilateralism being reflected in the UN broadly?Are EU norms and principles related to human rights, security, andsocio-economic cooperation being promoted and embraced by otherswithin the UN context?
Finally, this volume also critically assesses the concept of effectiveness.There are at least four ways in which ‘effectiveness’ could be defined inthe context of EU–UN relations:
● EU effectiveness as an international actor (in this case within the UN):do the member states want to act collectively at the UN through theEU (and do they prefer EU action to independent national action),
Introduction 9
can they reach agreement on positions, policies, statements, etc., andis there therefore EU ‘output’? We label this dimension ‘internaleffectiveness’. This entails more than just demonstrating cohesion invoting on UN resolutions: although there is evidence of suchcohesion (see Table 1.1), it is only one indication of internaleffectiveness.
● EU effectiveness at the UN: does it achieve its objectives, does itinfluence other actors at the UN or the general debate at the UN, is ita leader or ‘frontrunner’ at the UN, is it seen to be a unitary andinfluential actor? We label this dimension ‘external effectiveness’,and argue that it depends in the first place on internal effectiveness.This is related to the idea of Europeanization as external diffusion,mentioned above.
● EU contribution to the UN’s effectiveness: does the EU strengthenthe UN’s capacity to act and have influence? We consider this to beone important goal under the rubric of ‘effective multilateralism’,though note that all four definitions given here could arguably fallunder the same rubric.
● UN effectiveness: is the UN influential in international relations?Does it reduce security threats, protect human rights, foster develop-ment, and so on? Given all the current doubts about this, and thecalls for reform, there is obviously much to explore here.
This book deals with the first three definitions; the last would widen thescope of the book too much, though the issue is one that permeates alldiscussions of EU–UN relations (arguably ‘effective multilateralism’would not be an EU strategic goal if UN effectiveness was not in ques-tion). Knud Erik Jørgensen has usefully distinguished between the EU’saspiration to be an actor and play a role in international organizations,rather than just be an international organization (see Chapter 10). Weare interested in this book to explore how and whether the EU fulfilsthat aspiration, and what impact it has on the UN (and therefore theUN’s potential effectiveness), but not to engage in too much analysis ofthe UN itself.
Outline of the book
The book begins with a chapter by Mary Farrell, which provides the nec-essary background to understand and conceptualize the intersectingmultilateralisms of the EU and UN. The second part then examinesmore closely the key actors in both the EU and the UN: the EU member
10 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith
11Ta
ble
1.1
EU m
embe
r-st
ate
voti
ng
coh
esio
n d
uri
ng
UN
Gen
eral
Ass
embl
y ro
ll-c
all
vote
s, 1
991–
2000
1999
–19
91–9
219
92–9
319
93–9
419
94–9
519
95–9
619
96–9
719
97–9
819
98–9
920
0020
00–0
120
01–0
220
02–0
3(%
)(%
)(%
)(%
)(%
)(%
)(%
)(%
)%
(%)
(%)
(%)
No.
of
vote
s73
7363
6569
7469
6169
6767
73
Au
stri
aN
on-
Non
-N
on-
95.4
97.1
93.2
95.7
96.7
95.7
98.5
95.5
93.2
mem
ber
mem
ber
mem
ber
Bel
giu
m97
.310
098
.495
.494
.294
.698
.698
.498
.698
.510
097
.3D
enm
ark
8993
.293
.798
.510
097
.395
.798
.498
.698
.595
.598
.6Fi
nla
nd
Non
-N
on-
Non
-93
.894
.295
.994
.293
.498
.695
.598
.595
.9m
embe
rm
embe
rm
embe
rFr
ance
8990
.379
.475
.479
.789
88.4
86.9
84.1
86.6
86.6
84.9
Ger
man
y93
.2N
o d
ata1
No
dat
aN
o d
ata
95.7
97.3
98.6
98.4
95.7
97.0
98.5
93.2
Gre
ece
75.3
83.6
8195
.489
.9In
suff
icie
nt
97.1
98.4
98.6
100
98.5
95.9
dat
a
Irel
and
83.6
86.3
87.3
92.3
94.2
91.9
94.2
95.1
92.8
94.0
91.0
91.8
Ital
y98
.610
010
095
.495
.798
.697
.110
098
.697
.095
.594
.5Lu
xem
bou
rg10
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.697
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0N
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erla
nd
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.310
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.895
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.497
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093
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rtu
gal
91.8
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95.2
98.5
98.6
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98.6
98.4
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Spai
n78
.184
.982
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Un
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8176
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.186
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ingd
om
Ove
rall
52.7
54.8
60.3
63.1
66.7
77.0
78.3
85.2
78.2
79.1
76.1
69.9
Co
hes
ion
*
Not
es:
*T
he
over
all c
ohes
ion
sco
re r
efle
cts
the
nu
mbe
r of
vot
es in
wh
ich
all
mem
bers
vot
ed e
xact
ly t
he
sam
e w
ay. N
atio
nal
fig
ure
s re
flec
t th
e p
erce
nt-
age
of v
otes
in
wh
ich
a c
oun
try
vote
d w
ith
th
e EU
maj
orit
y. W
hen
tw
o m
embe
r st
ates
dis
sen
ted
on
th
e sa
me
vote
, th
is w
as o
nly
cou
nte
d a
s a
sin
gle
non
-com
pli
ant
vote
in
ove
rall
coh
esio
n. N
on-v
otes
by
mem
ber
stat
es w
ere
cou
nte
d a
s n
on-c
omp
lian
t.1
Dat
a m
issi
ng
for
Ger
man
y fo
r en
tire
ses
sion
in
th
e In
dex
to
Proc
eed
ings
.
Sour
ce:
UN
In
dex
to
Proc
eed
ings
, 199
1–20
03.
states. The EU’s effort to speak with one voice in the UN runs up againstthe traditions of national diplomacy by member states, reflectingdifferent national interests and prerogatives. Within the UN’s multilateralcontext, there are long-standing roles that member states play;reconciling these and crafting a European role within the UN ischallenging. Three chapters assess how member states’ national interestsand prerogatives promote or obstruct EU goals and objectives within theUN, thereby supporting or undermining the EU as an internationalactor. In chapter 3 Christopher Hill focuses on the more powerful of theEU member states, the permanent members of the UNSC (France andthe United Kingdom – UK), while in chapter 4 Katie Verlin Laatikainenfocuses on the so-called middle powers (the Netherlands and the Nordiccountries), and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués on the Central and EastEuropean countries in chapter 5. We have obviously left out numerousmember states, both new and old – even though some of them (Austria,Ireland) have been active at the UN. We did this principally for reasons ofspace and because these three groups of states highlight, sometimes quitedramatically, the tensions created by the intersecting multilateralisms ofthe EU and UN. Because these states have identifiable diplomatictraditions within the UN, they provide important test cases for theEuropeanization of national diplomacy in the UN context.
The third part of the book takes a more detailed look at the EU’srelations with the UN in four policy areas that are arguably the core ofthe UN’s activity: security (Sven Biscop and Edith Drieskensin in chapter 6),economic and social development (Paul Taylor in chapter 7), humanrights (Karen E. Smith in chapter 8), and environment (Chad Damro inchapter 9). We have not included a chapter on trade or finance issues fortwo reasons. First, these issues are primarily dealt with not by the centralUN system but by other UN agencies such as the World TradeOrganization and International Monetary Fund. Second, there is alreadya considerable body of literature on the relationship between the EU andthese agencies, as well as the EU’s role in international trade and financein general (see, for example, Young, 2002; Lamy, 2004; Smaghi, 2004).
Each of the chapters in this part analyses the capacity of the EU to actwithin specific policy arenas at the UN, and assesses the success of the EUin defending and promoting its common positions. Contributorsconsider which UN bodies the EU interacts with, and how that interac-tion is organized; the extent to which the EU produces common posi-tions to present to the broader UN community, votes in the same wayon resolutions presented in UN bodies, or otherwise manifests a com-mon identity within the UN; and the EU’s effectiveness in this policy
12 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith
area at the UN. These chapters present the degree of Europeanization asreflected by the diffusion of EU preferences, norms and principles in thevarious policy arenas of the UN.
The final chapter, chapter 10, by Knud Erik Jørgensen, sets out aresearch agenda for further exploration of the EU’s relationship with theUN. His overarching question is: why do states and other actors, such asthe EU, choose to pursue multilateralism? He provides several possibleexplanations, based largely on the literature on the United States andmultilateralism, stemming from internal factors, external factors, andperspectives that mix the two.
Findings
Europeanization
The results of the study in this book show that Europeanization isoccurring in varying degrees across the UN system. With respect to thefirst dimension of Europeanization, Mary Farrell’s chapter traces thestriking build-up of EU institutional capacity at the UN, especially inNew York. While there is no single EU ambassador or seat in the UN’spolitical bodies, the system of the rotating EU Presidency supported bythe Council Secretariat has become entrenched. The growth of thePresidency speaking on behalf of member states is also striking. This isbolstered even further by the Commission which raises the EU flag in itsareas of competence. This system of consultation and coordination hasresulted in greater coherence in EU positions in the UNGA (seeTable 1.1) and in ECOSOC as Paul Taylor’s chapter demonstrates. Andwhile Christopher Hill reveals how the UNSC permanent membersFrance and the UK protect their prerogatives and uphold their‘responsibilities’ in that body, he also acknowledges that a system ofconsultation among the 25 has emerged since the Amsterdam Treatyobliged these members to consult with other EU members on UNSCissues. Broadly speaking, the means and institutional mechanisms forEU action in the UN are in place even if there is no single seat orindividual such as an Ambassador to represent the EU in UN diplomaticprocesses. While broader studies of common foreign and security policy(CFSP) tend to focus rather intently on the institutional arrangementsfor policy-making in Brussels,7 by contrast the UN context of intergov-ernmental bloc caucasing proves to be rather conducive for the EU’sexisting, messy institutional architecture for foreign policy. Indeed, thefact that member states are the decision-makers within the UN contextserves to streamline some of the institutional inertia that afflicts foreign
Introduction 13
policy-making in Brussels. There are certainly fewer participants than isthe case in Brussels where the Council of Ministers, Council Secretariat,Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), Political andSecurity Committee, Commission (and various directorate-generalswithin it), and Parliament – among others – may all weigh in on policy.At the UN, member states’ foreign ministries are the privileged playersand remain central to the process. EU institutions such as theCommission serve supporting roles here, though as Paul Taylor demon-strates the Commission through its observer status tries to push forwarda ‘logic of synthesis’ among member states.
Turning to the second dynamic of Europeanization, nationaladaptation, the chapters by Hill, Laatikainen and Johansson-Noguésreveal considerable variation in the degree of adaptation of nationaldiplomacy toward a European or EU diplomacy. One simple factoraccounts for this: power. Power remains a divide among the EU-25wherein the more powerful states, the British and French members ofthe UNSC, continue to protect national proclivities to a degree that middle powers and smaller states are unable to. Christopher Hill notesthat their permanent position on the UNSC forces the UK and Francetogether, but not necessarily to pursue a substantive EU agenda in theUNSC. One of the most salient characteristics of French and Britishapproaches to the UNSC is their respective efforts to preserve theirprivileged national positions – the source of their power and influence – onit. Hill details how these two have rejected out of hand any effort tocreate an EU seat on the UNSC that would force them to give up theirown. In fact, they pre-emptively announced their support for apermanent seat for Germany rather than open this debate within the EUcontext. However, Hill argues that the UK and France are not aboveusing their EU credentials and drawing upon the EU’s weight in the UNin their negotiations with other states. In this limited way, the EUshapes their behaviour, but it most certainly does not constrain it. TheUNSC is a locus of hard power and high politics, of tough choices and‘special responsibilities’ in authorizing military force. Despite thelanguage of human security and the multidimensional nature ofsecurity threats that have been endorsed by the EU and its memberstates (as Biscop and Drieskens detail in their chapter), the UK andFrance see their responsibilities as more important than a common EUpolicy. The privileged position of France and the UK on the UNSC isperhaps the most important political fault-line within the CFSP at the UN.
By contrast, Laatikainen demonstrates in her chapter how the EUmiddle powers have adapted their diplomacy rather extensively to
14 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith
conform to the growth of EU policy at the UN. Middle powers aremultilateral stalwarts and the EU’s embrace of UN multilateralism is intheir view most welcome. The degree of adaptation is most readilyapparent when examining the decline of the Nordic voice in favour ofan EU position among the Nordic middle powers. Middle powers areamong the most active in promoting an EU voice at the UN and their EUPresidencies are among the most vigorous. The only areas in whichmiddle powers retain an independent role is in the few areas where theEU cannot reach consensus, such as questions of UN reform or the rightsof indigenous peoples. In addition, because of their long-standing pol-icy of meeting the UN’s 0.7 per cent GNI target for development assis-tance, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries have resisted effortsto have an EU approach in policies related to the UN specialized agen-cies, programmes and funds. This too, may change if the EU eventuallyreaches 0.7 per cent of EU GNI by 2015. The middle powers registersome ambivalence about the lack of bold initiatives and the prevalenceof least-common-denominator positions taken by the EU, but they stillsupport a greater role for the EU on the UN stage. The middle powerssee great consistency between their traditional diplomacy and theEU’s embrace of ‘effective multilateralism’, though Laatikainen raisesquestions about the viability of the EU embracing middle powermultilateralism.
The new EU member states from Central and East Europe are the mostcompliant. In this their diplomatic tradition has not changed dramatically,although the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) have tradedthe coerced cohesion of the Soviet era for the negotiated cohesion of EUforeign policy cooperation in the UN. Johansson-Nogués demonstratesthat the new members have exhibited a great degree of convergencewith the EU particularly in the UNGA. She also reveals how membershiprequires these states to take positions and pursue policies that arenot part of the typical CEEC portfolio (for example, developmentassistance). While there is unmistakable evidence that the CEECs haveconverged toward the EU in their voting records, Johansson-Noguésnotes that convergence may reflect dual processes of Europeanization.Certainly the new members have had to meet the political expectationsof older EU members, but she highlights how the CEECs have forced theEU to pay more attention to certain global issues such as humantrafficking because these problems are much more salient for the newmembers. Furthermore, Johansson-Nogués notes that the EU is notalways a consistent ‘norm sender’ especially in the area of security as theIraq war debate demonstrates. In general though, these states follow the
Introduction 15
EU lead in UN politics when the EU is in fact providing leadership or atleast a common position.
Finally, Europeanization is also the externalization of Europeanvalues, policies and norms. While we address the Europeanization of UNpolicies in the next section on external effectiveness, we note the impactof the EU on UN politics more generally here. Taken together, thecontributions show a varied impact of the EU across the UN. The EU is adominant player within the UNGA both in terms of diplomacy and theability to muster significant numbers of votes, but it is less of an actorthan it arguably should be in ECOSOC given the collective financing ofthe EU and its member states to a wide array of agencies, funds andprogrammes. The EU dances awkwardly around the status of the twopermanent members of the UNSC. Aside from these standing bodies,the EU can make a difference in conference or summit diplomacyconducted under the auspices of the UN. Chad Damro makes preciselythis case in his examination of the important diplomatic role played bythe EU in the recurrent climate change negotiations related to the KyotoProtocol. The EU’s dominance in UN bodies (aside from the UNSC) issuch that one ambassador remarked that if the EU is united, they cannotbe defeated.
Effectiveness
So what have the contributors found with respect to the threedefinitions of effectiveness which are outlined above? The chapters bySven Biscop and Edith Drieksens, Paul Taylor, Karen E. Smith and ChadDamro – on four policy areas – deal most directly with the issuessurrounding effectiveness. What comes through quite clearly is that theEU’s effectiveness varies – not just across policy areas, but within them.
The internal dimension of effectiveness, that is, the ability of EUmember states to agree and put forward common statements andpositions, is clearly linked to the EU’s internal decision-makingstructures and procedures, but not as tightly as one might commonlyassume. As Farrell illustrates, two factors in particular arise in this respect –competence (or authority to make policy) and the pillar division(primarily between the supranational European Community and theintergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy). There is,however, no neat correlation between internal effectiveness and a moresupranational policy-making process. In fact, this volume does notcover trade policy (the most supranational, though not completely so,policy area), and the policy areas covered here are all areas where eitherthe European Community and the member states share competence, or
16 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith
the member states alone have competence and must choose tocoordinate their positions within the EU context. Only in the environ-mental policy area, as Damro shows, has the EU largely overcome thechallenges posed by shared competence, and the European Commissionasserted itself and played a major role in coordinating the member statesand putting forward joint EU positions in UN environmental fora.Taylor’s chapter illustrates that in the UN’s economic and socialorganizations in Geneva, the European Commission is trying to designand pursue strategies to augment its role within both the UN and theEU, but still encounters resistance from the member states. Elsewhere,the Commission is either not a major player, particularly in security, asBiscop and Drieskens demonstrate, or is persistently sidelined, as withrespect to human rights, as Smith argues. In these areas, member stateseither cooperate within the CFSP framework, or they go their separateways. The EU is certainly not a unitary actor within the UN, and to dealwith the UN it must overcome the limitations of its own multilateralsystem, mixed as it between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.
Thus in all four policy areas, the production of EU ‘output’ dependson the extent to which the member states, prodded more or lessvigorously by the rotating Presidency, can coordinate their views andcome up with common positions. Perhaps surprisingly, the four chaptersshow that the member states can produce common output – andincreasingly do so. There are more and more EU statements andsponsored resolutions put forward in UN contexts, and fairly cohesivevoting patterns (though this is quite variable, and the trend is notunambiguously towards common agreement on all resolutions, inany area). The EU can get its act together, and can speak with a singlevoice – on occasion, not always – even in the UNSC. Outsiders, however,remain confused about who speaks for Europe (a perennial challenge forthe EU). And when the member states are divided, EU institutionalmechanisms are not strong enough to force them to agree, though, asSmith notes, there is certainly socialization – Europeanization – takingplace. Taylor argues that there are two ‘logics’ at work, one of synthesis(and common action) and one of diversity, and that of synthesis doesnot always trump that of diversity. Member states still want to actindependently at the UN, particularly to express divergent nationalinterests.
As for external effectiveness, the EU is clearly a major force in the UN.Outsiders simply cannot ignore a grouping that comprises not just25 member states (including two permanent members of the UNSC)but usually draws into its orbit neighbouring countries as well. But
Introduction 17
exercising leadership, acting as a frontrunner, does not automaticallyfollow from this impact. In fact, the EU’s size even acts as a brake: theamount of energy and time that is required to forge 25 nationalpositions (assuming that each member state has a single, nationalposition!) detracts from the energy and time that can be spent bothpresenting EU positions to the UN, and engaging in diplomacy withother UN actors to push those positions through.
In the environment field, as Damro argues, the EU has mostsuccessfully overcome the challenges created by a system of sharedcompetence, partly because environmental concerns have been such apriority for EU member states and they recognize that acting collectivelythey can increase their influence on international environmentalnegotiations. The EU thus has acted an influential frontrunner in UNenvironmental politics: for example, it was crucial in enabling the entryinto force of the Kyoto protocol, by using its leverage to encourageRussia to ratify it.
But in the other policy areas covered here, the EU’s influence variesmore considerably. In the economic and social development field, PaulTaylor concludes that the EU tends to be reactive, not proactive. Theproblem is that the EU is not yet ‘good enough at multilateralism’ to actas a leader, much less counter US anti-multilateral tendencies.
Biscop and Drieskens note that in addition to the familiar problemsposed by diverging national interests, the EU (and the member states) issimply not punching its weight in international security matters. EUand member state contributions to international peacekeepingmissions – those led directly by the UN and those conducted on behalfof the UN – are not as large as one might expect given the EU’s economicand political power internationally. The EU is not fulfilling a collectivesecurity role worthy of a leading actor in the UN – and thus its externaleffectiveness is not as great as it could be.
In addition, Biscop and Drieskens point out that the EU may notnecessarily want to be seen as a leader: avoiding the perception ofEuropean/western dominance in discussions of UN reform in thesecurity field is important, since such perceptions might provokeoutsiders to resist European positions and ideas. Smith finds this too: acommon EU stance can even spark the automatic opposition ofdeveloping countries, because they perceive the EU as domineering andneo-colonial.
What then about the EU’s impact on making the UN more effective?Again, contributors point to a mixed record. In environment, the EU haschalked up a considerable success in pushing for the ratification of the
18 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith
Kyoto protocol, even in the face of US hostility. In economic and socialdevelopment, the EU has worked closely with UN agencies and bodies tofoster policies and programmes, though it could certainly contributeeven more. The EU has successfully lobbied countries and increasedsupport for, in particular, its resolution in UN human rights bodiescondemning the use of the death penalty. And its contribution tosecurity – both military security and civilian aspects of security – is notwithout impact. Certainly in all these areas, without active EU support,the UN would struggle to be effective at all.
But, curiously, the EU has taken a back seat position with respect toUN reform. It has not been actively pushing ideas for reform, and itssupport for specific reforms has sometimes been quite muted. There isno EU stance on UNSC reform so the EU cannot play much of a role inthat respect, but its reticence to lead the reform agenda in other areas ismore surprising. Yet, the varied national diplomatic roles of memberstates explains some of the EU impotence on reform: EU troopcontributing countries demand a greater presence in the nascentPeacebuilding Commission which generates counter-demands by thosethat fund such peace operations; generous contributors of developmentassistance block EU efforts to ‘take over’ their areas of expertise. Whileless prominent than the dispute over UNSC membership, the variedtraditions of member states are reflective of different visions andmultilateral priorities. There remains a considerable gap between the EUintention to reform effectively the UN, and the actions and compromisesby member states necessary to advance forcefully the reform agenda.
Intersecting multilateralisms
There is no doubt of the EU’s good intentions to make the UN matter.The EU takes the UN seriously, and when it reaches consensus itsposition can command 25 votes of member states and an additionaldozen or so from candidate and other states. The EU’s size andcoordination mechanisms have made it a formidable presence in annualUNGA sessions as well as in protracted negotiations such as over climatechange. Emergency or crisis situations pose greater difficulties for theEuropean Union and consequently the EU has had less success in beinga presence in the UNSC. However, there are important limitations in theintersecting multilateralisms of the EU and UN.
There is a gap between the EU’s intention to make UN diplomacyeffective and the impact that the EU actually has on UN politics. Invenues such as the UNGA where the EU is most coordinated, the EU in
Introduction 19
fact may be contributing to the dysfunctional politics in at least twoways. First, the EU contributes to the rigidity and stylized diplomacy ofthe UN which undermines effective multilateralism on the global level.Because of the need to foster consensus among 25 member states, the EUspends most of its time negotiating with itself. Once the EU takes aposition, it rigidly maintains that position to preserve the carefullywrought consensus. Obviously, this makes the EU rather inflexible innegotiations. Because of its collective weight, others must bend to the EUfor negotiations to proceed. But because the EU has to find consensusamong its own 25 members, the position that others are accommodatingis often a timid, vacuous position. This does nothing to enliven thedebate within the UNGA which is already stultified and formulaic.Interestingly, however, the rigidity and inflexibility that the EU exhibitsdraws none of the fire that regularly rains down upon the United Stateswhen the US takes an inflexible position. Whereas US inflexibility, forexample on issues related to the UN reform project, is criticized roundly,EU inflexibility is accepted with minimal complaint outside of thedisgruntled non-EU middle powers. Because EU inflexibility is the resultof multilateral processes rather than unilateral diktat as with the UnitedStates, other states seem to be less offended even if the outcome is thesame: the absence of vibrant, meaningful debate over challenging issues.
A second consequence of the EU approach to diplomacy is that itundermines the value of state membership in the UN. The EU, basedupon its own approach to blended sovereignty, seeks to replicateregionalism within the UN. Diplomats have noted how the EU prefers towork with other blocs, especially the Latin American bloc, the Africanbloc, or even in a grand coalition, the G-77. This has a curious effectwithin the political space of the UN. Because the United States is notpart of any effective bloc, the EU approach tends to crowd out theUnited States from those UN organs, such as the UNGA, where numbers(votes) count. This provides some explanation for why the EU drawssupport (though sometimes opposition) from various blocs comprisingthe G-77 such as the Africans and the Latin Americans. However,Europeans should ask themselves whether a UN that continues tomarginalize the United States is one that will ever be effective orwhether further alienating the United States from the UNGA will doanything to boost the much maligned, stultifying debate that character-izes it. This EU approach to negotiations also has the consequence ofmarginalizing those individual states that would be natural allies to theEU because they do not participate in the internal EU deliberations.Non-European middle powers that also support the UN and effective
20 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith
multilateralism are sidelined by the EU even as the EU strikes grandbargains with blocs of developing countries. If EU multilateralismmarginalizes the champions of UN multilateralism, then the intersec-tion of EU and UN multilateralisms is dysfunctional indeed.
Jozef Bátora has raised the question of whether the EU transforms theinstitution of diplomacy, based as it is on Westphalian norms andprinciples. He examines the diplomacy of member states with oneanother, in the context of the Council and with third states, andconcludes that ‘owing to its non-state nature and supranational character,the EU as a legitimate member of the global diplomatic field could implythe introduction of completely new [diplomatic] standards’ (Bátora,2005, p. 62). Bátora claims that socialization among the diplomaticcorps in Brussels and the adaptation of national ministries of foreignaffairs challenge the Westphalian state order and modern diplomacy.Our examination of the EU within the UN diplomatic context comes tostarkly different conclusions. The EU is neither unique in its collabora-tive processes at the UN (the Nordic states were arguably as coordinative)nor is it transcending the Westphalian order. Our contributors revealhow power continues to shape the progress and limits of EU diplomacy.When issues of high national priority emerge on the UN agenda, eachmember state has the capacity to reject a common EU approach and themost powerful among them are the most likely to take advantage of thatpotential. Knud Erik Jørgensen expresses some surprise in his chapterabout how well intergovernmental, realist explanations appear toexplain choices for multilateralism particularly given the penchantamong EU scholars to accentuate the post-modern nature of EU foreignpolicy. While such post-modern accounts may hold true for the policiesemanating from Brussels, it is indeed surprising the degree to whichintergovernmental and even ‘realist’ theoretical approaches continue tohave relevance in understanding EU diplomacy at the UN.
We can question whether the EU – with its own remarkable internalintegrative processes of multilateralism – is contributing to a moreeffective UN multilateralism. Like other members, the EU and itsmember states are opportunistic, self-interested and self-promoting,they cajole and harangue, though on occasion the coincidence ofinterests can move the system. But the authors here show that the EUmost often fails to make the UN as effective as it should be in addressingglobal challenges. In this they are little different than other powerswithin the UN. This failure to make multilateralism matter wasabundantly clear in the 2005 reform process. The lack of EU unity onissues such as Security Council reform and disarmament meant that the
Introduction 21
EU could not provide forceful, committed leadership on either issue norpromote UN effectiveness. But even in areas where the EU memberstates were in agreement, such as on proposals for a Human RightsCouncil, they could not bridge the diplomatic divide among UNmembers. The short-term picture, then, is quite dark: the EU is failing tolead within the UN, and is still developing itself as a credible and reliablepartner for the UN. The abortive reform effort of 2005 was a missedopportunity for the EU to provide leadership and critical support for thebattered and bruised UN organization at a crucial moment in the UN’shistory. Kofi Annan implored the EU to lead in the reform effort and toserve as an essential partner to the UN. The EU stumbled, providing toolittle leadership far too late. It is certainly the case that the EU’s invest-ment in UN multilateralism is in its infancy. This book has traced thestrengthening of the EU’s institutional capacity at the UN, the – albeit halting – process of Europeanization of the member states, and the EU’sgrowing visibility at and even impact on the UN. Should these processescontinue, the intersecting multilateralisms of the EU and the UN mightproduce more effective governance if the UN emerges from the reformshambles with any credibility. Neither the EU nor the UN will disappearfrom the multilateral stage, but both appear likely to reflect multilateralprocesses that muddle through rather than blaze new trails of effectivemultilateralism for the foreseeable future.
Notes
* The editors thank especially Roy Ginsberg and Wolfgang Wessels for providinghelpful comments on many of the draft chapters, which were presented at the2005 EUSA conference in Austin, Texas.
1. On a previous ‘crisis of multilateralism’ (in the late 1980s and early 1990s), seeCox, 1992, pp. 163–6. For example, he cites a 1988 book entitled The UN UnderAttack, edited by J. Harrod and N. Schrijver (Aldershot, 1988).
2. For Sven Biscop (2004, p. 27), ‘effective multilateralism can best be understoodas an effective system of global governance, i.e. a system able to ensure at theglobal level access to the core public goods that at the national level the Stateprovides – or is supposed to – to its citizens: stability and security, an enforce-able legal order, an open and inclusive economic order and global welfare in allof its aspects (such as access to health, a clean environment, education, etc.)’.
3. Under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, ‘regional arrangements or agencies’should try to settle disputes peacefully before referring them to the UNSC, andcan be utilized by the UNSC for enforcement action. The EU does not consideritself to be a chapter VIII organization (nor does NATO), but the Organizationfor Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) does. As Kennedy Graham andTânia Felicio (2005, p. 91) argue, the distinction between being a regionalagency under Chapter VIII or not is of little significance right now: ‘any
22 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith
international organization … may be called upon by the Security Council forpacific settlement activities and, as appropriate, for enforcement of theCouncil’s decisions’. The EU is closely involved in discussions at the UN onthe relationships between the UN and regional organizations, but clearlyconsiders itself a rather sui generis organization. Formalizing the relationshipbetween regional organizations (including the EU) and the UN may in future,however, be desirable.
4. Successful cases of multilateralism generate expectations of diffuse reciprocityamong the members (that is, aggregate benefits are equal over time).
5. More radical conceptualizations of multilateralism would focus on economicmultilateralism (the institutional arrangements for ‘managing’ the globalcapitalist economy) and the inequalities and stability (or stasis) that itproduces; or on the mismatch between economic multilateralism and‘political multilateralism’ (as in the UN and other international organizationswhere states are the main actors). See Cox, 1992, and Bøås and McNeill, 2003,pp. 4–11.
6. Realists, of course, would add that multilateralism only masks the power ofstates, and cannot by definition ‘work’ if powerful states do not want it to.
7. Brian White (2001), for example, focuses on the ‘comitology’ surrounding thearrangements in Brussels for making foreign policy, with the myriad array ofcommittees and councils such as COREPER and the Political and SecurityCommittee, along with the Parliament, Council Secretariat, General Affairsand External Relations Council, and Commission.
Introduction 23
2EU Representation andCoordination within the United NationsMary Farrell
The European Union (EU) may be considered to have reached a highpoint in its evolution as a political community with the recentenlargement that created a union of 25 countries, stretching from theIberian peninsula to the borders of Russia. This latest stage of Europeanintegration coincides with the expressed intention of the EU to play amore influential role in global affairs, seeking to overturn the long-heldview of the Union as a sui generis political entity that is an economicgiant yet a political dwarf on the world stage. Despite the apparent diffi-culties associated with the limitations on its power to act coherently andspeak with one voice on the international stage, the EU nevertheless hasdeclared the collective will to enhance its international status.
One illustration of this is its commitment to multilateralism asreaffirmed in the 2003 European Commission communication, ‘TheEuropean Union and the United Nations: The Choice ofMultilateralism’, and the 2003 European Security Strategy (EuropeanCommission, 2003; European Council, 2003a; see also EuropeanCommission, 2001b). The focus here is the changing nature of EU mul-tilateralism in the context of the Union’s relations with the UN. Howdoes the principle of multilateralism operate in the EU’s actions at theUN? The chapter examines the relationship between the EU and the UN,tracing the institutional relationships that currently operate to linkthe EU’s different institutions to the multiple institutions that comprise thecore UN system. The following sections concentrate primarily upon themechanisms for representation and coordination between the Council,European Commission, and six-month rotating Presidency on theEuropean side, and the General Assembly, Security Council, andEconomic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on the UN side.1
27
While the recent interest in multilateralism provides a good reason forexamining how the EU is represented at the United Nations, there is alsothe empirical question of how two quite different organizations interactin practice. The UN is an intergovernmental organization of independentstates, where the principle of respect for national sovereignty wascontained in the UN Charter and continues to be reflected in itsdecision making. While blocs and groups are active within UN politics,only states have the right to vote within the UN’s main bodies. There areofficial regional groups that elect states to UN bodies and organs withlimited membership: the EU-15 (through 2004) plus Malta are membersof the Western Europe and Other Group (WEOG),2 while the eightCentral and East European countries belong to the Eastern EuropeGroup (EEG)3 and Cyprus is in the Asian Group. There are also unofficialcaucusing groups, such as the Group of 77 (developing countries), theOrganization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Non-AlignedMovement, or the Nordic Group,4 but individual states are stilloverwhelmingly the primary actors in the UN system. In the UN context,sovereign prerogatives of membership remain crucial, since it is countriesrather than regional organizations or groups that have voting power.
In contrast, the EU combines both supranationality and intergovern-mentalism in a community of states that has agreed to balance nationalsovereignty with supranational decision making in some policy areas,and where Community (that is, supranational) law takes precedenceover the national legal order. European integration has evolvedinstitutionally since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which created theEuropean Economic Community, the most important of the threeEuropean Communities.5 In this evolution, politics played its part, asdid the legal order, and often the two interacted to create a dynamicprocess of integration.
The European Union officially came into being on 1 November 1993,when the Maastricht Treaty entered into force and encompassed theEuropean Communities. The Maastricht Treaty created a Unioncomposed of three pillars or policy areas, with different decision-makingrules associated with each: the European Community (EC), CommonForeign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Justice and Home Affairs.6 TheCommunity pillar contains amendments to the treaties of the threeoriginal European Communities. The second and third pillars have rootsin frameworks for intergovernmental cooperation among the memberstates that were established in the 1970s. The Maastricht Treaty onEuropean Union has since been revised twice, with the 1999 AmsterdamTreaty and the 2003 Nice Treaty.
28 Mary Farrell
In the Community pillar, the main decision-making bodies are theCouncil of Ministers, the European Commission, and the directlyelected European Parliament (EP). The European Council, composed of theheads of state or government, does not have a formal decision-making rolein the EC pillar but has increasingly become the main arena in whichdecisions are ultimately endorsed or even settled. Every six months, adifferent member state assumes the Council Presidency, and is in chargeof running the Union and managing its business. Most, but not all, EClegislation is proposed by the European Commission, passed by theCouncil by qualified majority vote, and approved by the EuropeanParliament. Legislation is binding on the member states. The EuropeanCourt of Justice (ECJ) interprets Community law. The European Communityhas legal personality, and can thus conclude agreements with otherinternational actors.7 The Community pillar is thus clearly supranationalto a great extent.
Pillar two, the CFSP’s institutional structure as set up under theMaastricht Treaty, is slightly different. The European Council sets thebroad guidelines; the Council of Foreign Ministers takes decisions toimplement them. The Council’s work with respect to CFSP items isprepared by the Political and Security Committee (PSC, composed ofambassadors). The PSC relies on the work of European Correspondents(foreign ministry officials) and CFSP working groups. The EuropeanCommission is fully associated with CFSP but does not have votingrights. The Parliament is informed of CFSP issues, and can makerecommendations, but its views do not have to be incorporated intoCFSP decisions. The CFSP does not fall under ECJ jurisdiction. Virtuallyall CFSP decisions are taken unanimously. The intergovernmentalnature of the second pillar is thus obvious.
These complex institutional arrangements influence EU–UN relations.The perennial issue for the EU is how to speak with one voice in theglobal forum, and to channel the political forces that have so successfullyblended intergovernmentalism and supranationalism within Europeonto this global stage, where intergovernmentalism predominates. Allthe EU member states are members of the United Nations in their ownright, and each has one vote in the General Assembly. Together, the EU-25 represents 13 per cent of the UN membership and is therefore apowerful voting bloc when the 25 are united. Because candidate andneighbouring states often associate themselves with EU statements andresolutions in the General Assembly, an additional dozen or so countriesincrease the EU’s influence. The Security Council is the most powerfulorgan within the UN system; membership is comprised of five permanent
EU Representation within the UN 29
and ten non-permanent members, and each of the five permanent mem-bers holds a veto. Two EU member states (France and the UK) have per-manent member status; other EU countries are elected to the SecurityCouncil from the regional groups on a revolving basis.8 The next sectionexamines the evolution of the EU’s relations with the UN.
The evolving institutional and legal basis of EU relationswith the UN
The theoretical framework for analysing EU–UN cooperation is sparseand diffuse, scattered throughout a variety of viewpoints andperspectives in the literature on international relations, internationalorganizations, and integration theory (see Hix, 1999; Rosamond, 2000;Christiansen et al., 2001; Wiener and Diez, 2004). There are very fewstudies that examine the EU’s role in the UN, and in particular how theformer coordinates its position on the many issues that come up fordebate and discussion (Hill, 1993; Whitman, 1998; Ginsberg, 1999;Bretherton and Vogler, 1999).
Yet as the EU gradually evolves towards deeper integration, the issueof policy coordination in its external relations has become much moreimportant. The member states have been ambivalent about the EU’spresence in international organizations since such membership mightreduce their own role and significance in them, but they have nonethelessstrengthened provisions for an EU ‘voice’ in other organizations.However, to most people inside and outside the EU, the question of‘who speaks for Europe’ remains unclear. The confusion is compoundedby the increasing complexity of the issues to be addressed at theinternational level. EU member states may be unwilling to delegateauthority to the Commission or even the Presidency in matters overwhich they prefer to retain influence and direct participation. Indeed, areading of the treaties serves to illustrate just how complex the situation is.
On the Community side, the Treaty of Rome originally providedfor the Community to establish relations with the UN (and otherinternational organizations). Article 302 of the Treaty on EuropeanUnion (1993) stipulates that the European Commission is to ensure themaintenance of all appropriate relations with UN organs andspecialized agencies. But this is the case primarily in matters of ECcompetence. The Community has exclusive competence most notablyin external trade policy, and some areas of agricultural and fisheriespolicies and the internal market. This essentially means that themember states do not have the power to act on a purely national basis
30 Mary Farrell
in those areas. In cases of exclusive competence, the EuropeanCommission usually speaks on behalf of the EC; in cases wherecompetence is mixed (in brief, the Community can act, but so may themember states), the Presidency usually represents the EC (sometimesalso in conjunction with the Commission). The EC is an observer at theUN and several UN agencies (see Table 7.1 in this volume), and a fullmember of the Food and Agricultural Organization and the World TradeOrganization alongside the member states (MacLeod et al., 1996,Chapter 7).9
As far as representation of the EU (and not the EC) at the UnitedNations is concerned, the treaty does not provide for a single institutionto represent the EU on matters relating to CFSP. Member states mustcoordinate their positions to try to arrive at a common stance, andusually the Presidency is responsible for presenting that stance to therest of the UN, with a more circumscribed role for the Commission.
From the beginning of European Political Cooperation (EPC), theCFSP’s precursor, in 1970, the member states declared that they shouldtry to coordinate their positions in international organizations andconferences. The 1973 Copenhagen Report on EPC stated: ‘thepermanent representatives of the Member States to the major interna-tional organizations will regularly consider matters together and, on thebasis of instructions received, will seek common positions in regard toimportant questions dealt with by those organizations’ (Hill and Smith,2000, p. 87).
By the time of the 1987 Single European Act, this aspiration wasacquiring the tone of a commitment. Hence Article 30 (2d) declared, ‘TheHigh Contracting Parties shall endeavour to avoid any action or positionwhich impairs their effectiveness as a cohesive force in internationalrelations or within international organizations.’ Article 30 (7) stated,
(a) In international institutions and at international conferenceswhich they attend, the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour toadopt common positions on the subjects covered by this Title.(emphasis added)
(b) In international institutions and at international conferences inwhich not all the High Contracting Parties participate, those whodo participate shall take full account of positions agreed inEuropean Political Co-operation.
By the time of the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, there was virtually an injunc-tion to cooperate within international organizations, especially with
EU Representation within the UN 31
respect to issues that the member states had already agreed on withinCFSP. Article J.2 declared, ‘Member States shall coordinate their action ininternational organizations and at international conferences. They shalluphold the common positions in such forums. In internationalorganizations and at international conferences where not all theMember States participate, those which do take part shall uphold thecommon positions.’ And Article J.6 stated, ‘The diplomatic and consularmissions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in thirdcountries and international conferences, and their representations tointernational organizations, shall cooperate in ensuring that thecommon positions and common measures adopted by the Council arecomplied with and implemented.’ The Amsterdam Treaty did not alterthese provisions – though they were renumbered Articles 19 and 20respectively.
The UN Security Council poses a specific problem, because not all EUmember states serve on it. Article 19 (2) of the Treaty on EuropeanUnion aims to force the UN Security Council members from the EU tocoordinate their actions and to speak with one voice:
member states represented in international organisations orinternational conferences where not all the member states participateshall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest.Member states which are also members of the United NationsSecurity Council will concert and keep the other member states fullyinformed. Member states which are permanent members of theSecurity Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure thedefence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prej-udice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the UN Charter.
The peculiarity of the EU division of competence between nationaland supranational level and the pillars has confused politicians anddecision-makers in many countries and international organizations, andthere is an ongoing problem of ‘who to call’ as well as the equallyperplexing question of the capacity in which any one of the Europeanactors (the Commission, the Presidency, the member states) might bespeaking. If a country holding the rotating six-month Presidency of theEU speaks on an international forum, the listeners have to assesswhether that country is speaking in its capacity as EU representative, oron its own behalf. Proposals have been made for the EU to have a seat atthe UN (primarily by individual European Commissioners), though atthe moment there is little support from the member states for this idea,
32 Mary Farrell
and in any event, Article 4 of the UN Charter provides that membershipis open to states only.
Despite the challenge of these contrasting approaches to multi-lateralism, EU–UN relations are strengthening. The EU now meets theUN Secretary General at ministerial level annually in New York as part ofan agreed format for regular EU–UN meetings. The UN Deputy SecretaryGeneral and other senior UN officials also visit EU institutions inBrussels (where 16 UN specialized agencies, funds and programmes nowhave offices), Luxembourg, and Strasbourg. Regular meetings of seniorUN officials with the PSC (under the CFSP pillar) are also beingdeveloped. The European Parliament is also included in the growingEU–UN coordination effort, with a growing number of high-level visitsby members of the EP to attend major UN events.
The issue of EU and UN reform will be addressed later in the chapter,but we turn now to the specifics of representation and coordinationinvolving the rotating Presidency, the Council Secretariat, and theEuropean Commission. EU representation at the UN undoubtedly offersmany practical and political challenges as far as the coordination ofnational positions is concerned.
The role of the Council Presidency
The six-month rotating Presidency gives each of the member states theopportunity to run the European Union for a brief period and torepresent the Union internationally. The Presidency expresses the EU’sposition on CFSP matters and can do so with respect to matters of mixedcompetence in the first pillar, and can speak on behalf of all the memberstates in international organizations and international conferences.The country holding the Presidency chairs EU coordination meetings, andrepresents the EU in discussions with other UN member states and/orregional organizations. Roughly 1300 EU coordination meetings areheld annually in New York, 1000 in Geneva (See http://www.europa-eu-un.org, accessed 14 July 2005). During the UK Presidency in the secondhalf of 2005, British officials planned for over 450 internal coordinationmeetings and nearly 60 meetings with other regional groups andcountries.
Statements by the EU to the UN are presented by the Presidency (seeTable 2.1 on procedures). There has been a gradual increase in thenumber of EU common positions and statements presented to the UNGeneral Assembly. This is partly due to the progress made in formulatingagreed positions in the area of foreign and security policy and, on
EU Representation within the UN 33
34
Table 2.1 EU coordination at the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council
UN General Assembly1. Agenda of the General Assembly is approved by member states and topics are
considered either in one of the six main committees of the GA or in the GAPlenary
2. Debate takes place on a particular subject:– UN Secretariat or UN representative introduces the subject.– UN groups (EU, G77) make statements, on a first come-first served basis.– The EU Presidency makes its statement.– Individual UN delegations make statements.– Observers may make statements.
3. Introduction of Resolutions:An individual or group delegation provides a draft text.– Delegations and groups prepare amendments (in informal consulta-
tions/bilateral contacts/in writing). EU Presidency, assisted by theCouncil Secretariat, coordinates with the Commission and EU memberstates which consult their capitals. EU must reach a consensus or no EUposition is taken.
– Discussions on text of draft resolutions in GA committee sessions andin informal caucasing.
– Delegations that wish to mark their support for a resolution become‘co-sponsors’.
4. Voting on Resolutions in GA Plenary– Adoption in the General Assembly Committees by either consensus or
vote.– Brought to Plenary.– Adopted by the Plenary where there might be a public vote.
a. EU partners (including the Commission) may sit in on these(formal or informal) meetings to follow the procedures, but thediscussion is conducted by the Presidency except on issueswhere the EC has competence.
b. The EU Presidency may designate another EU delegation torepresent the EU if it is not available.
UN Security CouncilThe EU has no status at the Security Council. Member states act individually andseparately. Two member states have permanent seats (UK and France) and oftenat least two others have non-permanent seats on a rotating basis. At EU weeklymeetings chaired by the Presidency, EU member states sitting on the SecurityCouncil take it in turn to brief the other EU member states on the previous week’sSecurity Council activities. The High Representative of the EU may be invited tospeak to the UN Security Council on behalf of the EU. EU member states on theSecurity Council incorporate EU views and positions when they can in theirstatements.
Source: web-site of the EU at the UN, http://www.europa-eu-un.org, accessed 12 July 2005.
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occasion, to the persistence and skill of individual Presidencies inshaping consensus on the issues that come up during the term of office.The degree of UN activity by an individual EU member state is notdirectly related to the size of that state and its diplomatic mission – therecent Danish, Dutch and Italian Presidencies were particularly active inpresenting common positions to the General Assembly, and exceededthe diplomatic activity of the French Presidency. Small states can be assuccessful in securing the agreement of their partners to a commonposition as the larger, and often better-resourced, national delegations.National interests clearly play a part in both the agenda setting ofindividual Presidencies and decisions to commit to a common position.There may also be issues that arise in the international arena on whichthe EU member states can either reach agreement without much effort(such as the Middle East peace plan or the need for a unified front indealing with international terrorism) or which are significantly divisive,such as the US war against Iraq. As Table 2.2 shows, the greatest numberof EU statements is made to the Security Council and the GeneralAssembly.10
It is comes as no surprise to note that by far the largest number ofstatements covers peace and security matters, followed by economic andsocial development and, some way behind, human rights. This isinteresting because the greatest degree of activity by the EU at the UN(across the rotating Presidencies) is precisely in the areas whereEuropean integration has lagged thus far. In the area of peace andsecurity, there is no common policy and no supranationality. Rather,decisions are made on the basis of intergovernmentalism, and policyinitiatives are gradual and limited in scope. The EU’s identity as a
Table 2.2 EU statements at the UN 2000–05
By Venue By Presidency By Subject
Security Council 185 France (2000) 112 General 280General Assembly 172 Sweden (2001) 92 Human rights 811st Committee 70 Belgium (2001) 149 Peace/security 4082nd Committee 111 Spain (2002) 99 Environment 603rd Committee 97 Denmark (2002) 126 Economic/Social 2524th Committee 27 Greece (2003) 76 Humanitarian 605th Committee 139 Italy (2003) 136 International law 516th Committee 54 Ireland (2004) 75 Trade 18ECOSOC 131 Holland (2004) 149 Culture 1Other 118 Luxembourg (2005) 83
Source: EU@UN web-site, http://www.europa-eu-un.org, accessed 12 July 2005.
security actor is still evolving, and has not been fully embraced bymember state governments, political elites, or national publics. Outsidethe EU, there is an equally sceptical view of the Union as a security actor,notwithstanding its recent peace-keeping operations in the WesternBalkans and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The high level of EUengagement in security issues through the UN forum can help tocounter this negative attitude and doubt over its capacity to play ameaningful role in international security.
The Presidency also aims to get an EU consensus prior to voting onthe resolutions before the Assembly. While this does not always happen,the divisions are less rancorous and less frequent than might beexpected. During the 58th session of the General Assembly (2003–04),EU voting cohesion was 89.75 per cent, including consensus votes(See http://www.europa-eu-un.org, accessed 14 July 2005). EU memberstates were divided on 32 resolutions before the General Assembly,including some on nuclear weapons and disarmament, decolonizationand human rights (see also Table 1.1 in this volume). Paul Luif in 2003reported an increase of identical votes by EU states in the UN GeneralAssembly in parallel with the development of the CFSP, although therewere sometimes quite considerable variations across issue areas. Luiffound that there was high agreement among EU member states on theIsrael–Palestine conflict and matters relating to human rights. On issuesrelating to questions of international security, disarmament and nuclearweapons, there was significant disagreement; even more so on issuesrelating to decolonization (Luif, 2003, p. 51). Luif also found that thevoting patterns of the East European states that became members in 2004moved closer to the EU position. Thus in terms of voting in the UNGeneral Assembly, the EU appears to be emerging as an international actor.
The Council Secretariat
The Council Secretariat services the Council, which is comprised ofrepresentatives of all the member states and is the primary decision-making body in all three pillars. Once the CFSP was instigatedin the Maastricht Treaty, it was evident that some form of coordinationof the member states’ positions would be required to give effect tothe proposed common positions and joint actions. Two decades afterthe Commission delegation to the UN was officially set up (see below) theEU member states agreed in 1994 to open a liaison office of the Councilsecretariat in New York, to help ‘represent’ CFSP. This, somewhatsurprisingly, was already preceded by a Council secretariat office in
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Geneva that had been established in the late 1960s to deal mainly withnegotiations within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffsand Trade. Both offices are headed by an ambassador and a deputy headof office.
According to the website of the New York liaison office, the CouncilSecretariat office is to
1. To provide information, reports and analyses on UN activities to theSecretary General/High Representative for CFSP, to the GeneralSecretariat of the Council, and to Council bodies;
2. To assist the Presidency and the member states in the day-to-dayrunning of EU business and in the representation of the CFSP inNew York;
3. To assist the Secretary General/High Representative for CFSP in carry-ing out his activities;
4. To help in ensuring consistency and continuity across the rotatingPresidencies (See www.europa-eu-un.org, accessed 14 July 2005).
The Council liaison offices host many coordination meetings, though asPaul Taylor points out in his contribution to this volume, not all coor-dination meetings in Geneva are held under Council auspices.
In examining the coordination framework for the conduct of EU–UNrelations, we could ask whether a new office was really necessary. It hasbeen suggested that there is little spirit of cooperation between thetwo European institutions in New York (the Council office andthe Commission delegation), and between the Council office and thePresidency (Creed, 2005). However, the sense of alienation andfrustration about its position in the EU coordination framework must beunderstood in the context of the nature of the office as a liaison andinformation bureau rather than as a political institution. So far, it is theindividual member states that call the shots as far as foreign policy ini-tiatives are concerned and there is still much division among the mem-ber states as to the degree of delegation they are willing to make to thesupranational level. By contrast, the European Commission is wellresourced and has the capability to expand the scope of its activities inthe areas for which it has competence by interpreting broadly suchresponsibilities. The Commission also has observer status and is a par-ticipant at the main meetings. This role is not open to the Council liai-son office that performs, in this context, a more typical back officefunction. Presence counts for a lot in international diplomacy, becauseit provides the opportunity for a more distinct profile and influence as
EU Representation within the UN 37
an actor. However, profile raising seems to have been less of a priority inthe minds of decision-makers when it came to the opening of theCouncil Secretariat liaison office. Rather the idea seems to be confinedto maintaining an information bureau that supports member states’coordination efforts.
The European Commission at the UN
The European Commission presence at the UN began with the openingof an information office in New York in 1964, which became an officialdelegation office on 11 October 1974 when the UN General Assemblygranted observer status to the EEC. The delegation is headed by anambassador and effectively functions as an embassy with a core staffinglevel of around ten and a small number of locally engaged employees.Commission delegations now exist at all the major UN sites, includingNew York, Geneva, Vienna, Rome, Paris and Nairobi.11 Observer statusallows the Commission, on the EC’s behalf, to participate in theproceedings of the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council(ECOSOC) and its functional commissions, and the specialized agencies,in line with the responsibilities allocated to it under the treaties.
In Brussels, the External Relations and Development Directorates-General (DGs) coordinate relations between the Commission and theUN, while many of the sectoral DGs also have close working relationswith individual bodies in the UN system in their areas of competence.The general rule is that the European Commission has special responsi-bilities in areas where there is exclusive Community competence, whichallows it to push for a common position and then represent theEuropean Community (though not the EU as a whole) in the UN onsuch matters.
In other areas of the first pillar where the EC does not have exclusivecompetence, the Commission tries to reinforce the coordinationprocess and support the Presidency, particularly by helping to draftstatements and foster EU unity in voting. The European Commissionitself presents approximately 5–7 statements a year to the GeneralAssembly – on areas for which it is directly responsible – compared tothe hundreds issued by the Presidency (Creed, 2005, p. 6).
Through European Commission representation, the EuropeanCommunity has taken part as a (special) ‘full participant’ in many majorUN conferences, notably the 1995 Copenhagen Summit for SocialDevelopment; the 1995 Beijing World Conference on Women; the 2000World Food Summit in Rome; the 2002 Monterrey Financing for
38 Mary Farrell
Development conference; and the 2002 Johannesburg World Summitfor Sustainable Development.12 In 2001, the EU hosted a major UNconference, the Third UN Conference on Less Developed Countries, forthe first time. This participation at global conferences establishes Europe’sprofile as a global actor, and brings the EU’s voice to a global forum.
Its presence in New York places the European Commission delegationat the heart of the UN system. And as the UN’s work has broadened inscope, so too have the areas of involvement for the EuropeanCommission. This enables the Commission to enhance its stature in theforeign policy arena through its engagement in the activities of thedifferent UN entities. The Commission attends the regular meetings andhigh-level political dialogue between the UN Secretariat, the Council(EU) and the High Representative of the CFSP. The EU and the UN worktogether on development policy and humanitarian aid, areas in whichthe European Commission has significant responsibilities.
The Commission’s relations with ECOSOC are important. Themajority of the EU statements to ECOSOC are made by the Presidency,though the European Commission frequently plays a prominent partin the drafting of texts. ECOSOC is one of the most important organs ofthe UN system for the European Commission, since it promotes a broad-based agenda of economic and social development embodyingsignificant synergies with the European policies and values.
While European development policy is undertaken at both nationaland Community levels, the European Commission has taken a large roleand growing profile on these matters in the UN framework. The resulthas been favourable to the Commission in terms of both profile andinfluence. The EU strongly supports the UN Millennium DevelopmentGoals and the Council in May 2005 adopted a series of ambitious newcommitments, including collectively meeting an aid target of 0.56 percent of GNI by 2010, while all EU-15 undertook to achieve the assistancetarget of 0.70 per cent of their GNI by 2015, and the new member statesagreed to achieve a target of 0.33 per cent; policy coherence (in terms ofpolicy synergies between development, trade, environment, agriculture,migration and security); and a specific focus upon Africa. This outcomewas shaped in large part by the leadership role played by the EuropeanCommission, and the long-standing support that this institution hasgiven to UN efforts in the area of development assistance. In this regard,the European Commission Communication ‘Building an EffectivePartnership with the UN in the field of Development and HumanitarianAffairs’ (2001) moved relations with the UN into a new phase. Sincethen, five strategic partnerships in the field of development and
EU Representation within the UN 39
humanitarian assistance have been concluded between the Commissionand the UN bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme(UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food andAgricultural Organization (FAO), the International Labour Organization(ILO), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR). As a result, policy dialogue and cooperation have intensifiedat both strategic and operational levels. The UN forum offers theEuropean Commission a good way to pursue its own developmentagenda at a global level, while promoting European values ofdemocracy, human rights, good governance and the rule of law – but thecoordination system keeps the member states in firm control of both thesubstantive nature of the European case and how it is presented toUN bodies.
Although there may not be agreement over which European institu-tional body should take the credit for bringing the two internationalorganizations into closer cooperation, the European Commission hascertainly moved into the spotlight as a result of the efforts over theyears. It is now well entrenched in the international diplomatic circle,and can justifiably claim international presence – one of the keyprerequisites to actorness in the international system. But whileactorness by the European Commission raises the EU’s profile it adds toconfusion over who speaks for Europe.
Intersecting reform agendas?
Both the European Union and the United Nations are currentlyundergoing internal debates over the future of their respective multilateralsystems. What are the possibilities for implementing reforms, and towhat extent are the two international organizations impacting uponeach other’s reform agenda?
Since 1958, the EU has successfully implemented reforms to thedesign blueprint set out in the Treaty of Rome. Reform has beenincremental at times – the gradual shift in the status and powers of theEuropean Parliament; or the informal meetings of the European Council(a body not even included in the Treaty of Rome) beginning in 1974 andsubsequently formalized through treaty change. At other times, radicalreform was preferred, such as replacing national currencies with theeuro. Yet the most radical reform of all was made with hardly a murmurfrom the member state governments – the two 1960s decisions by theECJ that gave rise to the principle of direct effect (European law has tobe incorporated directly and without adaptation by the national
40 Mary Farrell
administration) and the primacy principle (giving EU law precedenceover national law).
The power of law and the pragmatism of national political actors (andthe European Commission) together contributed to the EU’s success atachieving reform. In recent years, proposals for reform only succeeded ifgiven the full backing of member states, and with a clear rationalelinked to very concrete objectives – market integration, monetaryunion, democratic representation (in the case of the EuropeanParliament). The extension of supranationality (and strengthening ofthe institutional framework) was facilitated through a combination ofEuropean leadership and national willingness to share sovereignty topromote common interests. From the beginning of the EC, there was theshared understanding among political elites, governments and citizensthat the community was necessary for (re)establishing peace andsecurity. This rationale no longer holds true and the beliefs that boundthe post-war European leaders together are not evident amongcontemporary political leaders. What is the rationale for the contemporaryEU? Where is it going, and what kind of future does the Europeancommunity want? The lack of consensus about the purpose of the EU ora shared vision of Europe’s future were not rectified by the draftconstitutional treaty, so it is perhaps not surprising that Europe’s latestreform effort was rejected in several national referenda.
The question of UN reform has also moved to the top of theinternational debate – in large part, a debate that arose out ofdissatisfaction and criticism over its effectiveness and relevance in thetwenty-first century. The UN has had its critics from the beginning,though the voices have become louder in recent years, attacking theineffectual bureaucracy, corruption and waste, and a general perceivedlack of capability to deal with the conflicts, wars and ethnic rivalries thaterupted over the past two decades. Conflict resolution, peace-keeping,the protection of human rights, and the reduction of poverty have allcrowded the UN agenda in recent years. The failure to address thesechallenging issues undermines the UN’s reputation. Reform proposalshave emerged from a variety of sources, including the High-Level Panelon Threats, Challenges and Change and Secretary General Kofi Annanhimself.
Central to the reform proposals is the notion that security threatshave multiple origins, including international wars, civil violence,organized crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. But otherdangers emanate from poverty, infectious diseases and environmentaldegradation. The conclusion is for the global community to adopt a
EU Representation within the UN 41
more comprehensive view of what constitutes a security threat, andthen construct a collective security system that can embrace themultiple causes of global insecurity.
The UN reform debate has produced a set of proposals on institutionalchange, and also advocated strengthening the normative framework.Collective security is once more brought to centre stage as a coreorganizing principle in cooperative relations between states. Anotherprinciple, collective responsibility, is given stronger emphasis, while theSecurity Council’s role as the formal arbiter on the use of force againstanother country is emphasized. In the words of the Secretary General,‘we need long-term, sustained engagement to integrate human rightsand the rule of law into all the work of the UN. This commitment is ascritical to conflict prevention as it is to poverty reduction, particularly instates struggling to shed a legacy of violence’ (Annan, 2005, p. 69).
What are the prospects for realising these institutional changes at theUN? Currently, at least two proposals for reform of the Security Councilhave been put forward to address the representation deficit that exists atpresent; neither, however, has attracted sufficient support. One proposalis to expand the current membership, to have six new permanentmembers and three new non-permanent members; the second proposalis for nine new non-permanent seats. Both proposals leave the existingveto power currently enjoyed by the five permanent membersunchanged. At best, it will take a long time for some consensus to formamong the existing group of countries that hold the pivotal positions onthe Security Council. A proposal for an EU seat on the Security Councilis rejected outright by the two European states with permanent seatsand it is difficult to imagine their willingness to give up their right toexercise the veto. Beyond this, the proposal for a European seat on theSecurity Council would have to be accepted by the other members ofthis organ and ultimately the members of the General Assembly. Therehas also been some discussion within the UN of whether the officialregional groups should be reformed, and whether as part of such areform all EU member states should be in the same group. While an ‘EUgroup’ would neatly coincide with actual on-the-ground coordinationand activity within the UN, there is little enthusiasm to go down thisroute within the EU. With EU member states spread out across threegroups, the potential for feeding more information into EU coordinationis thus greater, as is the potential for electing more EU member states toUN bodies.
Certain proposals on the UN reform agenda, however, have beengiven strong support by the EU. It welcomed the Secretary General’s
42 Mary Farrell
intention to further improve the coordination of the UN systemincluding the grouping of the various agencies, funds and programmes intomore tightly managed entities. Since the EU is a major contributorto the UN funds, paying around 38 per cent of the regular budget and40 per cent of peace-keeping operations, it has consistently sought toimpose fiscal discipline and greater responsibility for budgetary control(European Commission, 2003, p. 3). It supports a new securityconsensus, including criteria for the use of force, the notion of theresponsibility to protect, and the inclusion of economic, environmentaland social threats next to the so-called hard security threats.
The EU supports the proposal for a Peace-Building Commission, onthe basis that there is a need for a body to ensure long-term post-conflictreconstruction involving all major actors, international financialinstitutions, relevant UN entities and major donors. Similarly, there isEuropean support for the Human Rights Council, as a way of making theUN human rights machinery more relevant and efficient. The strongerfocus on democratization issues in UN reform proposals also meets withEU support and, in the development field, the EU strongly endorses theMillennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Furthermore, the UK Presidency (July–December 2005) has called fora strengthening of ECOSOC, and for this committee to play a centralrole in the follow-up and implementation of the outcomes of major UNconferences and summits in the economic, social and environmentalfields, and with reference to the work on the MDGs. The Europeanproposal also recommended that ECOSOC could meet as a high-leveldevelopment cooperation forum, where global, regional and nationalstrategies and policies for sustainable development cooperation could bereviewed; ECOSOC could also become a voluntary MDG peer reviewmechanism, and contribute to post-conflict situations and humanitariancrises, to ensure coherence with long-term development goals. The EUasserts that the role of ECOSOC should remain at the level of policycoordination and review – there is no proposal to allow the ECOSOC tointervene directly in operational management.
Many of the reform proposals were accepted in principle by the UNsummit in September 2005 (a notable exception was UNSC reform), butthe devil is as always in the details and negotiations on those wereongoing at the time of writing. While the reform process will yield somefruitful results, it is not at all certain they will be wide-ranging oreffective in practice.
To what extent have the EU and UN positions on multilateralismcoalesced? In some respects there is evidence of shared positions. Both
EU Representation within the UN 43
the EU and the UN give priority to the protection of human rights. Onstate sovereignty, the two organizations have their respective positions,but the UN has come closer to the notion that absolute sovereignty isnot defensible on all occasions. The EU has endorsed the emergingnorm of the ‘responsibility to protect’ which may permit interventionwhen states prove unable or unwilling to ensure the human security oftheir citizens (International Commission on Intervention and StateSovereignty, 2001; see also the Biscop and Drieskens contribution to thisvolume, Chapter 6). Although the use of force was prohibited underthe UN Charter except in cases of self-defence or under authorization bythe Security Council, recent action by the United States, justified on thebasis of threat prevention and pre-emption, raised questions aboutwhen legitimate force might be used pre-emptively by the SecurityCouncil. The US case for intervention in Iraq was based upon anexaggerated notion of self-defence in the face of imminent threat, andjustified on the basis of ‘a coalition of the willing’. But American effortsto push forward with military action without the approval of theSecurity Council ultimately raised opposition in the EU, and divided themember states in their understanding of reasonable force and the role ofinternational law in determining how and when to use force.
In the law and practice of European integration, the principle of statesovereignty has long been subsumed under the broader principle of theprimacy of EC/EU law, and the notion of shared sovereignty. Theserecent proposals on UN reform imply the acceptance of limitations tosovereignty, not least in the new norm concerning the ‘responsibility toprotect’. Yet the EU record on such issues as humanitarian interventionremains ambiguous at best. Even though the political rhetoric andpolicy documents reflect the European commitment to humanitarianintervention, at a practical level the EU is restrained by the limitationsof its CFSP and limited military capability. The EU’s slow response to theproblems in the Balkans over the course of the 1990s underscored theambiguities in its position on humanitarian intervention.
At a more general level, the institutional changes at the UN advocatedor supported by the EU do not imply radical challenges to the nationalsovereignty of the European member states. It would seem that there arelimitations to the sovereignty-sharing that European nation-states arewilling to consider, even when they continue to support the principlesof multilateralism. But we may also be witnessing limits to Europeanintegration, a combination of political, geographical, social and culturalconstraints configured by the diversity of aspirations among politicalleaders, the unwillingness of citizens to support grand projects that have
44 Mary Farrell
not been subject to the rules of democratic accountability, and that failto offer a convincing rationale and distinctive unifying vision. Thecontemporary European malaise needs to be considered not just withinthe frame of balancing intergovernmentalism and supranationality. Itgoes beyond the issue of institutional over-reach to the heart of thequestion – what is Europe?
Conclusion – the challenges ahead
There is no doubt about the EU’s commitment to strengthen relationswith the UN, and the recent European Commission documents andPresidency statements can be regarded as a commitment towards inter-secting multilateralism that has the support of both the intergovern-mental and the supranational elements of the EU. The two multilateralsystems have shared values – the protection of human rights, the respectfor international law, the concern with democracy promotion, and abelief in the role of international institutions in fostering internationalcooperation. But effective participation by the EU in the UN multilateralsystem remains restricted by the peculiarities of the EU system, its mixof intergovernmentalism and supranationality that variously enhancesthe power and influence of individual member states and at other timesplaces limitations on the supranational institutions, including theEuropean Commission. In this regard, the European Commission pro-duces the policy documents on multilateralism, while the Presidencyacts as the voice of the EU states (when coordinated). Given that itappears that the draft EU constitutional treaty will not be ratified, andthus the institutional reforms proposed in it will not be enacted anytime soon, it would seem that for the foreseeable future the EU effort topromote greater coordination within the UN system will rely upon themechanisms that are already in place and the member states will con-tinue to shape the relations with the other multilateral system. There isan inevitable and perpetual tension between the UN as an organizationof sovereign states and the EU as an evolving political community ofsovereignty-sharing member states.
Notes
1. The Economic and Social Council covers the broadest areas of activity in theUN system, the majority of expenditure, and more programmes and fundsthan any other part of the UN. The UN Charter established a wide remit forECOSOC, including the coordination of the economic and social activities ofthe gamut of specialized agencies (ranging from the ILO, WHO, FAO, IMF, and
EU Representation within the UN 45
World Bank), conduct of research on economic and social issues, making rec-ommendations and writing reports, preparing conventions, and conveningconferences. With this broad agenda and a reach that extended across theUN system, ECOSOC represented an important strategic partner for aEuropean Union in search of closer relations and an enhanced profile ininternational governance.
2. WEOG also includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand Andorra, Iceland,Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway and Switzerland; the US is normally anobserver but participates as a full member for the purpose of elections.
3. Until 2004 Estonia was not a member of any group; it has now joined theEastern Europe Group.
4. JUSCANZ ( Japan, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), meets occasion-ally to coordinate positions, somewhat more often in the CANZ formation.The EFTAns (Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Switzerland) will sometimesoperate with JUSCANZ.
5. The other two are the European Coal and Steel Community and theEuropean Atomic Energy Community.
6. The third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs until recently has had little directrelevance for the EU’s relations to the UN system. As the UN increasingly andauthoritatively addresses issues such as human trafficking and terrorism, thispillar will grow in importance.
7. The draft constitutional treaty proposed giving legal personality to the EU itself.8. There are two non-permanent seats on the Security Council that are filled by
countries elected from the WEOG; one non-permanent seat is elected bymembers of the EEG; two non-permanent seats are filled by the LatinAmerican Group and five non-permanent seats are filled by the Africa/Asiagroups. Given this distribution, and the distribution of EU members amongWEOG, EEG and the Asian group, it is possible though unlikely that in addi-tion to the UK and France as members, there could be as many as four EUmembers elected to non-permanent seats. More common since the EU’s 2004enlargement is two non-permanent Security Council members from WesternEurope and one from Eastern Europe.
9. The Community is also a full member of several fisheries organizations,UNCTAD’s Integrated Programme for Commodities, and the European Bankfor Reconstruction and Development.
10. The General Assembly is comprised of a number of Committees: the FirstCommittee covers Disarmament and International Security; SecondCommittee – Economic and Financial; Third Committee – Social, Humanand Cultural; Fourth Committee – Special Political and Decolonisation; FifthCommittee – Administrative and Budgeting; Sixth Committee – Legal.
11. In Geneva, European Commission delegations are accredited to a number ofUN bodies, including the OHCHR, UNHCR, UNCTAD, ILO, WHO, WIPO,ITU, UNECE and the Conference on Disarmament; in Paris, UNESCO; inNairobi, UNEP; in Rome, the FAO, World Food Programme, and theInternational Fund for Agricultural Development; in Vienna, the UN Officeon Drugs and Crime, UN International Development Organization, and theInternational Atomic Energy Agency.
12. In these cases, the European Community participated in debates on an equalbasis with member states at these meetings, but did not have the right to vote.
46 Mary Farrell
Part II
The Politics of National Interestand EU Policy Coordination inthe UN
3The European Powers in theSecurity Council: DifferingInterests, Differing ArenasChristopher Hill
If the United Nations is the universal form of multilateralism, theSecurity Council (UNSC) is its zenith. Within the UNSC resides the P-5(the permanent, veto-bearing members) while within the P-5, Britainand France are themselves members of a formidable multilateral institu-tion, the European Union. Our subject, then, presents us with a series ofChinese boxes, which need careful delineating and distinguishing.The UNSC is central to any understanding of the UN, and the fivepermanent members (Britain, China, France, Russia and the UnitedStates) are the motor of the UNSC. Yet the unity of the P-5 cannot betaken for granted, and the pull of wider European solidarity is a signifi-cant factor in shaping the positions of Paris and London. Furthermore,while the two European members have much in common, they oftenpublicly disagree, preferring alignments with other UNSC members, asthe 2003 Iraq crisis graphically demonstrated. Thus there is no way inwhich a reductionist approach to explaining political outcomes in theUN could ever be justified; even the innermost box, occupied by the US,does not hold the key to its behaviour.
While the focus of this book is on identifying and explaining thenature of the interaction between the EU and the UN, this chapterfocuses specifically on the role of the two permanent Europeanmembers of the UNSC. The analysis here revolves around three inter-related debates: that over national interest, in the sense that Britainand France continue to stress their separate UNSC membership and topursue distinctive concerns; that over the EU’s Common Foreign andSecurity Policy (CFSP), in terms of how far it is able to function withouta single voice in the UNSC; and that over the reform of the SecurityCouncil, which began with the suggestion of German member-ship in 1993, has continued with proposals (from Italy inter alia) for
49
rotating membership, and has persistently hinted at the idea of a singleEU seat. These three perspectives are examined in turn with a view totracing the interconnections between them, and to drawing conclusionsabout the importance of the European dimension to the UNSC, andconversely of the UNSC’s place in the foreign policies of the EU, collec-tive and national. Before commencing, however, it is importantto sketch the historical background of the European presence inthe UNSC.
Historical background
Britain and France are founding members of the UNSC, although theformer’s status as an unambiguously victorious power in 1945, togetherwith French problems in Algeria and Indo-China during the 1950s,meant that Britain carried the greater weight in the UNSC during thefirst two decades of the Cold War. In the Gaullist and post-Gaullistphase, however, it is arguable that France saw itself as a re-established‘puissance mondiale’, while the United Kingdom (UK), at least forthe period 1967–82, adjusted to its loss of primacy by taking refuge inthe self-image of being a ‘medium power of the first rank’ (EdwardHeath’s phrase, cited in Boardman and Groom, 1973, p. 6.). Morerecently, both powers have responded to the collapse of the SovietUnion by stabilizing their positions as amongst the most significantplayers in world politics after the US, while awaiting the rise to power ofChina, India and other large developing states. This has also meantvigorous opposition to the very idea of losing their status as membersof the P-5.
The two European states have much in common in their UNSCdiplomacy and they shared a traumatic experience at the hands of theSecurity Council in 1956 over Suez. The invasion of Egypt which theylaunched with the connivance of Israel led to a US resolution in the UNSCdemanding a ceasefire. This was vetoed by both London and Paris – andremains the only occasion on which either government has vetoed anAmerican resolution.1 The US response was to use the ‘Uniting for Peace’mechanism – first deployed during the Korean war to circumvent Sovietvetoes – to bring the matter before the General Assembly, which thencondemned the Israeli-Anglo-French action by a majority of 65 to 4(UN General Assembly Resolution 997, 2 November 1956, reaffirmedon 4 November by UNGA Resolution 999, http://www.mfa.il/MFA).This isolation, together with heavy pressure from the superpowers,convinced the two European states to withdraw their forces. The failure of
50 Christopher Hill
such an ill-advised venture had various long-term consequences forBritish and French foreign policy, including damaging their status at theUN, both with the emerging group of newly independent states and in theUNSC itself, dominated by the superpowers for the rest of the Cold War.
It thus became even more important to the two Europeans thatthey should retain nuclear weapons as an emblem of power. Their mili-tary posture was, however, largely defensive, in that there was littlepossibility (and no wish, in the case of the UK) of representing a thirdforce in the Cold War, or even of constraining either superpowerthrough action in the UNSC. This was partly because the UN as a wholehad become paralysed as a forum for dealing with issues of peace andsecurity, and partly because of the disparity between the enormousthermonuclear capacity of each of the superpowers and that of the otherthree permanent members. And if proactive diplomacy provedimpossible in crises such as Cuba and Vietnam, even the negative powerof the veto had evident limits. Up to the end of 2002, out of a total of245 vetoes cast in the UNSC, Britain had been responsible for 30 andFrance for 18 (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2003a). The majorityof these were in relation to post-colonial issues, notably in southernAfrica, and not infrequently in conjunction with the US. In the caseof the Arab–Israel dispute during the 1970s and 1980s it was more acase of Washington vetoing resolutions sympathetic to the Palestiniansthan of the Europeans facing choices over the veto, as the status quofavoured Israel and its American ally. Britain and France were unwillingto take a lead on a national, or even a bilateral basis.
After 1985 the veto became apparently less important as its usebecame more infrequent, and British and French positions moresignificant, in the second wave of détente which eventually led tothe end of the Cold War. Mikhail Gorbachev’s early wish to rejuvenatethe UN as part of his acceptance of the idea of an international commu-nity led to hopes that the P-5 would provide united and wise leadershipin world politics, enabling the UN to resolve many problems along thelines of those settled in central America and southern Africa. The highpoint of this sense of cooperation occurred during the first Gulf War,when UNSC unity provided legitimacy for the expulsion of SaddamHussein from Kuwait, and in the subsequent smooth transfer ofpermanent membership from the Soviet Union to its successor, theRussian Federation.2 Given the vacuum created by the implosion of thecommunist bloc, Britain and France suddenly assumed a critical role andseemed to have new responsibilities in helping to fashion a newinternational order.
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Whether coincidentally or not, this was also the time of maximumaspiration within the EU towards a common foreign policy, expressed inthe Maastricht Treaty in the format of the CFSP. In fact, the EuropeanCommunity had already been working for 20 years towards this project,in its previous incarnation of European Political Cooperation (EPC).There had not been much talk within EPC of the possibility ofcoordinated positions within the UNSC (let alone a single Europeanseat) but this had nonetheless been the unstated hope of many of thesmaller and/or integrationist member states.3 Indeed, despite many fitsand starts, the Europeans had shown themselves capable of graduallyconverging in their voting patterns within the General Assembly, and inpractice holding to common positions on many of the key issues whichcame before the UNSC, especially in relation to the Middle East. ThusBritain and France moved imperceptibly, in the eyes of the internationalcommunity, in those of the West European and Other Group (WEOG),and perhaps most importantly in their own, towards a position wherethey were both independent sovereign members of the UNSC andinformal mouthpieces for a collective European view, however unspecifiedand ephemeral. It was just at this point that the end of the Cold Warbrought forth new and contradictory possibilities, of Security Councilreform to reflect the new geopolitical realities on the one hand, and the‘quick fix’ proposal for making Germany and Japan into permanentmembers on the other. And from this point on the three debates coveredin this chapter come into sharper focus. The three have taken centrestage, at least for European observers, for nearly 15 years now, and showno immediate signs of being resolved. It is to the first of them, on thenational interests of Britain and France in the UNSC, that we now turn.
The debate on national interests
Any multilateral forum poses a dilemma for its members: do they see itsimply as a framework in which the defence and assertion of nationalinterests is played out, and indeed as a springboard for the projection ofnational concerns? Or is it to be treated mainly as the institutionalexpression of the need to constrain national egoisms, resulting in thecompromises and acts of self-restraint so necessary if collective goods areto be achieved and some notion of community to be fostered? Thisdilemma is particularly sharp in the case of the UNSC, which deals withthe most threatening of issues for states, that of security. Sovereigntyitself often seems to be at stake, while the hierarchy of power in theinternational system is nowhere more painfully evident than in the
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procedures of the Security Council, which institutionalizes three classesof states: permanent members, elected members, and states which havefew chances of ever serving on the UNSC.4
As permanent members of the UNSC, Britain and France haveobligations to uphold the Charter, but they also protect their own vitalinterests and promote the interests they hold in common with their EUpartners. As the key players in European foreign policy cooperation theyare naturally pushed together, but the pressures of Security Council busi-ness also expose important divergences between the two states’ views ofthe world. Iraq is the most recent and dramatic case in point.
The dispute over Iraq in 2002–03 illustrated how the high responsibilityimplied by permanent membership can lead states into dramaticposition-taking – even grand-standing. Among the P-5 only China hasmanaged to resist this temptation over the years, preferring a lowprofile. Although many of the discussions in the UNSC take place inprivate – to the frustration of non-members – the issues attract a greatdeal of publicity, with the result that a state’s (and more pertinentlya leader’s) image before domestic and world opinion is at stake.Furthermore the UN and the international law it embodies do not justconstitute a set of constraining rules and procedures; they also representa set of opportunities for powerful governments to mobilize support fora preferred policy, isolate opponents, promote a new norm or appease adomestic lobby. Thus during the Iraq crisis the Blair government saw theUNSC as an indispensable means of squaring the circle between its wishto support the US desire to overthrow Saddam Hussein and the need bothto sustain domestic support within the Labour Party and to encourageother European states not to break ranks. Unfortunately for London, theFrench government had almost the opposite imperative: quite apartfrom the merits of the argument over weapons of mass destruction,terrorism and regime change it did not wish to alienate a domesticopinion which was clearly opposed to American policy; indeedPresident Chirac saw a good opportunity to bolster his flagging politicalposition. France had also been consistently of the view that, wherenecessary, Europe should balance US power as part of a multipolarworld, rather than accept the inevitability of US leadership.
These competing concerns led to a dramatic showdown in March2003, when Chirac announced that France would veto any proposed‘second’ resolution which might be introduced in order to legitimise amilitary attack on Iraq. The Blair government, angry that it had thusbeen forced into the position of choosing between illegality and backingaway from its support of President Bush, launched a hostile publicity
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campaign against its French ally, accusing Paris of irresponsibility andbetrayal. The freeze which then came down over Anglo-French diplo-macy lasted at least a year and spilled over damagingly into intra-EUaffairs.
The Iraq case was exceptional in the degree of animosity which itgenerated between Britain and France, but there is a persistent tendencyon the part of each of the two states to see the UNSC as a key platformfor promoting their foreign policy priorities. That is why the position ofambassador to the UN is one of the most important and prestigious intheir respective diplomatic corps, and why Foreign Minister Dominiquede Villepin chose the Security Council for his statement that the use offorce was unacceptable over Iraq – a statement which Colin Powell sub-sequently regarded as an ‘ambush’, and which gained the attention ofthe world for France’s leadership of the anti-war party.5
The importance of the UNSC to Britain and France (proportionallymuch greater than its role in US foreign policy) does produce someshared interests, notably their determination to hold on to permanentmembership at almost any cost. In particular, it may be surmised that asignificant reason for both states holding to their nuclear weaponscapacity, is to avoid calling into question their right to membership.This is paradoxical, or at least circular, in that rather than the UNSCreflecting military realities, we have a situation whereby two of the P-5are shaping their force postures in part so as to preserve their position atthe UN. London and Paris face some difficult choices within the nextdecade over the possible renewal of their current, ageing deliverysystems, given the huge costs involved and the declining strategicrationale (Clarke, 2004).
Another key shared interest which London and Paris have in thiscontext is privileged access to the other members of the P-5, and the rightto meet in conclave with them without necessarily being answerable totheir European partners. They can thus have their cake and eat it withregard to the CFSP, by enjoying the benefits of group membership, suchas ‘speaking for Europe’ (albeit in competition with each other at times),without suffering significant constraints. As a result, neither has anyintention of giving up permanent membership, and each can count onthe other for support of their historic positions on the UNSC.
Accordingly the two European states also emphasize the importanceof the UNSC as the main source of legitimacy for international action,and worry about any tendency to sideline it, which only exposes theirlack of unilateral strength. There are, however, two caveats here: first,neither state would be prevented from pursuing what it regarded as a
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vital interest by lack of UN authorization – the UK was delighted to havea UNSC resolution in its favour over the Falklands in April 1982, but afailure to get one would not have inhibited Mrs Thatcher from sendingthe task force to recapture the islands. Likewise, France pursued a policyof support for the repressive government in Algeria throughout the1990s while actively trying to keep the issue from being discussed ineither the UN or the EU. Second, Britain under Tony Blair has made aconcerted effort to revise the norm of non-intervention containedwithin the UN Charter, as the result of the Kosovo experience, when aUNSC consensus over military action against Slobodan Milosevic couldnot be obtained. This attempt to establish a new right of humanitarianintervention has so far failed but it is revealing that Britain was anxiousto change the rule rather than blithely ignore it (Wheeler, 2005). Thereis naturally a desire, especially for middle range states, to avoid the hardchoice between on the one hand obeying the dictates of the Chartereven if it prevents measures which might seem of vital importance, andon the other sidelining the UN in order to act, albeit in a proclaimedinternational interest. France, in contrast, while more sensitive tohuman rights criteria for foreign policy since the Great Lakes tragedy in1994, has so far shown itself far less enthusiastic about the ‘respon-sibility to protect’ agenda, seeing it as a cover for US-led interventions.Conversely, it has increasingly sought to use the Security Council as ashield when entering the lists against American foreign policy. TheEuropeans are thus active within the UNSC, but by no means in harness.Since their common interest there is historically based, this particularforum has little or no ‘Europeanizing’ effect on their foreign policies.
By comparison to Britain and France the US barely experiences thechoice between legality and independence as a dilemma, such is itsmassive coercive power – and scepticism about the UN. Washingtonlikes multilateralism under its own leadership, but is otherwise dis-missive (Dunne, 2003). This opens up a space between US policy andthat of the Europeans, even with a pro-American government in powerin London. Britain and France therefore acquire another potential roleby virtue of their UNSC membership – that of diplomatic balancers tothe US. If this role tends to embarrass London, it is not wholly un-welcome in Paris. There is no question, of course, of making commonpurpose with Moscow and Beijing against Washington. Rather this is amatter of attempting to reinforce the multilateralists within the USpolicy-making system, and of providing an alternative point ofreference within the society of states, in particular within the Westerncamp. The (perfectly rational) assumption here is that not every policy
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decided in Washington is ipso facto desirable or should be followed outof loyalty towards an ally.
The period since the Cold War has been one of rising confidenceamong the Europeans in their ability to contribute to the making ofinternational order on multilateralist principles. At the same time,individual EU member states, Italy, Germany and Spain, as well asBritain and France, have become much less defensive about their ownnational profiles and distinctive contributions. For the UNSC per-manent members, as well as for the regularly elected, such as Italy andGermany, New York thus represents a simultaneous opportunity forconsensus-building and for self-promotion. The discourse is that ofrational cooperation – and discourses are not mere fig-leaves – but someof the reality is that of rational instrumentalism. Furthermore identitypolitics are at stake, in the sense that on a vital issue like Iraq, France andBritain differed partly because of genuine contrast between their visionsof themselves and of world politics (Macleod, 2004). Those who thinkthat the French position in 2003 was mere opportunism should bear inmind that France and Britain had been differing since at least 1998 onthe question of Iraqi sanctions and the ‘no-fly zone’, ‘thereby treatingthe rest of the world to a permanent exhibition of European disunity’(Mortimer, 2000, p. 9). It is the coincidence of the instrumental andsymbolic sources of behaviour which causes confusion in the publicdomain, and sometimes tension with allies – whether the US inside theSecurity Council or EU partners outside it.
The debate about Europe’s voice in the UNSC
Article J.5 of the Treaty of Maastricht states that
Member States which are also members of the United NationsSecurity Council will concert and keep the other Member States fullyinformed. Member States which are permanent members of theSecurity Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure thedefence of the positions and interests of the Union, without preju-dice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the UnitedNations Charter (Hill and Smith, 2000, p. 156).
This statement was retained unaltered in the Treaty of Amsterdamversion, although the relevant article is numbered J.9 (Hill and Smith,2000, pp. 175–6). It is also contained in the draft Treaty establishing aConstitution for Europe (Article III-206), although sandwiched between
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references to the need to keep informed on matters of common interestnot only member states not represented in the UNSC (or otherinternational gatherings) but also the proposed Union Minister forForeign Affairs.6
The Maastricht formulation was included at the behest of Britain andFrance who wanted to ensure that there was no room for misunder-standing over the freedom of national manoeuvre which they intendedto continue enjoying in the UNSC. They had no objection to consulting,informing and coordinating with their EU partners, but saw their UNstatus as representing a higher calling and would not be bound even byexisting commitments to common European positions. Because EUforeign policy documents are also liberally sprinkled with references tothe need to uphold ‘the principles of the UN Charter’, and because (aswe have seen) Britain and France are themselves persuaded of the valueof the legitimacy denoted by UN resolutions, some see no contradictionin the two halves of Article J.5 – in principle, ‘responsibilities underthe provisions of the United Nations Charter’ should not contradictEuropean positions and interests. Yet if the two permanent membershad been so sure that practice would resemble the theory, they wouldnever have insisted on drafting this article in the first place: anindependent role in the UNSC is seen as a vital interest in both Londonand Paris.
This means that the idea of a single European seat in the UNSC, longcanvassed by both integrationist states within the EU and those in theoutside world who wish to see reform of Security Council membership,has no chance of being implemented in the foreseeable future. Thenotion has been in the air since the end of the Cold War and the evidentneed for another round of reflection about the composition of theUNSC, but one reason for Britain and France acquiescing in both theRussian seat and the idea of German and Japanese accession in the early1990s was the wish to prevent – by a ‘quick fix’ – a groundswell ofdemands for change building up, inside and outside the EU. As we shallsee below this was successful in preventing the idea of a single EU seatever getting on to the main agenda, but backfired inside the EU in thatit provoked Italy into a furious campaign against the inside track forGermany. If the EU were to have a single seat in a radically restructuredUNSC, as many (but not all) of the smaller member states, plus quiteprobably Germany and Italy, would prefer, it would actually reduce theEuropean weight in the Security Council, given that at present there areusually one or two elected EU member states present (plus sometimes anon-EU ‘European’).
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The arguments from the viewpoint of European influence thus tosome extent run contrary to those derived from an integrationiststandpoint. In fact, there has been little attempt made to thinkthrough the tensions between these two sets of arguments. The draftConstitutional Treaty, for example, provides for a new EU President anda Union Foreign Minister without saying how these personalities couldfunction without the right to speak in the UNSC. The current situationat least allows the rotating Presidency to give the Union’s view, which isamplified when the Presidency is held by one of the two permanentmembers or the elected member usually present from the EU. If the newproposals are actually implemented, the appointees will presumablyhave to speak to the UNSC through the medium of the EU memberstates present, which defeats the purpose, or by invitation.
In any case, as former US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrookehas pointed out, the EU is unlikely to have the single foreign policywhich would necessitate a single seat, precisely because of the positionof Britain and France: ‘For those two, Security Council membership is thedefinition of their global role … they are not going to give it up in ahurry’.7 For London and Paris it is impossible to disentangle the globalscope of their foreign policies from their UN status; the one implies theother, in a circular relationship. Conversely, if a solid CFSP is to develop,it will have to be based on agreement between these two major powers,which stand out among the EU-25 for more reasons than their UNSCrole. They are nuclear weapon states, major ex-imperial powers, andstates with the physical and political capacity to project militaryforce beyond their frontiers, as they have shown in the Balkans andsub-Saharan Africa. When they disagree fundamentally that not onlyinhibits consensus in the UNSC but also splits the CFSP down themiddle.
Given that one of the key fault-lines within European foreign policycooperation is the issue of whether the EU should aspire to a global role,beyond its ‘near abroad’, the uneasiness of the relationship between theonly two global players among the EU member states is a serious obstacleto the CFSP’s further development. A British minister remarked recentlythat ‘there is no bit of the globe now which we can neglect from oursecurity viewpoint’.8 There are accordingly important elements ofconvergence, such as the quiet defence dialogue, including on nuclearweapons, which has taken place for more than ten years, and whichculminated in the St. Malo initiative of December 1998 (Forster andWallace, 2001, pp. 142 and 151). Also notable is the cooperation in westAfrica, for so long a zone of intense rivalry, which even led to a joint visit
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by foreign ministers Cook and Védrine in 1999 (Hill, 2001, p. 347), andthat on debt relief for the poorest countries (Chirac, 2004). Taking actionall around the world, however, is another matter, in terms of resources,effectiveness and consensus. For example Britain and France have lessthan half the number of professional staff in their permanent missions ofthe UN than their fellow members of the P-5, and struggle to meet all thedemands made on them (Global Policy Forum 2004, cited by Prantl,2005, p. 569). Furthermore, the desire and capacity for shared leadershipbetween London and Paris are never more than intermittent. This is why,whatever the theoretical and legal possibilities, the relationship betweenFrance and the UK in the UNSC falls well short of the ‘enhancedcooperation’ prefigured in the Treaty of Nice ( Jaeger, 2002, p. 301).
What do the other EU states think of the privileged role of Britain andFrance in the UNSC? The short answer is that few are content, whethertheir preference is for a single seat or more opportunities for rotatingseats. They know that the status quo inhibits EU solidarity in foreignpolicy. It is no accident that the tendency towards ever greater solidarityin voting in the General Assembly, for example, is qualified by the‘dissident’ position of Britain and France. From the enlargement to 15 in1995 until the end of the 1999–2000 session, Britain’s average figurefor voting with its partners stands at 88.26 per cent, and France’s at85.62 per cent. Most member states have a figure similar to that ofGermany, at 97.14 per cent (Laatikainen, 2004, Table 1, pp. 7–8; see alsoJohansson-Nogués, 2004, p. 89). On the other hand, there is no lack ofunderstanding of the price for global activism which the bigger statespay, not just financial and material but in terms of lives lost and politicalfallout. Even Germany, which wishes to become a permanent memberof the UNSC, would continue its post-war policy of caution over majormilitary commitments, once joined. Most EU member states are morecontent than they might admit to have Britain and France accepting the‘responsibilities’ of the UNSC.
It has been argued recently that the EU qua EU has significantlyincreased its presence in the UNSC through an increase in speeches,statements and documents presented (from 15 in 1990 to 86 in 2000),and through the creation of an ‘EU caucus’ consisting of the twopermanent members plus the regular EU elected member(s), who seemincreasingly to be states of some weight (Laatikainen, 2004, Table 3, p. 9;see also Dedring, 2004, pp. 1–3). Juergen Dedring says that:
Whereas in the more distant past the two permanent UNSC membersrefused to consult or even inform the other EU member states on
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Security Council matters, they have had a much more accommodatingattitude as it became clear to all concerned that the issues before theUNSC were of paramount importance for all EU member states andtherefore needed to be aired in the wider circles of the EU group(2004, p. 3).
Given the development towards a European Security and Defence Policy(ESDP) after 1998, as David Hannay points out, it certainly ‘would notmake sense, politically or practically, if Europe’s security policy becamea kind of Anglo-French preserve’ (2002, p. 367).
Be that as it may, the fact remains that until there is a reform of UNSCmembership, even the enlarged EU cannot always hope to have morethan two elected members serving at any time on the Council, and theywill often be small states, at odds with the trend towards a de facto for-eign policy directoire of Britain, France and Germany, as evidenced in thediplomacy over Iranian nuclear weapons from 2003 on. It should not beforgotten that were Germany to join as a permanent member, as Londonand Paris had wished, that would institutionalize the directoire to thepoint where it would be difficult for the other member states to rein it in(Keatinge, 1997, p. 29). In practice, the directoire has existed in variousforms from the founding of the western Contact Group on Namibia in1977, through the G7 to the Contact Group and the Quint in the Balkansduring the 1990s (Gegout, 2002; Prantl, 2005, pp. 575–8). Since 1987, tenmember states have served a total of 30 years – or an average of threeyears each – as elected members of the UNSC (see Table 3.1). Given that
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Table 3.1 EU states elected members of the UN Security Council, 1985–2006(total years served in brackets)
Germany (6)Italy (4)Belgium (2)Spain (4)Portugal (2)Sweden (2)Netherlands (2)Ireland (2)Denmark (4)Greece (2)
Note: A normal term is two years; thus Germany has served three terms. States have onlybeen included if they were EU members when serving on the UNSC. For example Austria,which was elected onto the latter in 1991–92, has not been included as it did not join the EUuntil 1995.
in the same period the elected members of the Council have served atotal of 200 years, it can be seen that the EU presence (15 per cent of thetotal, but only 12 per cent if we discount Germany), and its capacity forcaucusing, is limited. The Union is still heavily dependent on Britain andFrance for representation in the unreformed UNSC.
It is also important to remember that while an increasingly largenumber of states takes part in the public meetings of the UNSC, this hasthe effect of driving much of the critical discussion into informalmeetings and/or behind closed doors (Prantl, 2005, pp. 571–2). What ismore, while the UK and France do not usually spurn European positionsdeliberately, they have a noticeable tendency to ignore them in theprocess of their own global self-projection. An examination of thespeeches made in 2003 and 2004 on UN-related issues by PresidentChirac and Prime Minister Blair revealed few references to the EU, and notendency to see themselves as following a European flight-plan. Therewere frequent references to their respective G8 presidencies, and tonational initiatives, but the EU figured only instrumentally, or as context.9
The debate on Security Council reform
As we have seen, the issue of the membership of the UNSC (which isonly one dimension of the reform agenda) surfaced once more after theend of the Cold War. It had been in hibernation since the expansion ofthe elected members from six to ten in 1965. Given the sense ofhistorical watershed, and the talk by President George H. Bush andothers about a ‘new international order’, it was inevitable that questionswould be raised about how far the structure created by the victoriouspowers in 1945 was still suitable for a system in which the number ofmember states had more than tripled and new powers were emergingfrom the shadows of the past. It is striking, but not surprising given theveto power exercised by the existing permanent members, that 15 yearslater no reform has been achieved. The debate which has taken placeover that period has, however, often been fierce, with unpredictableconsequences for relations inside the EU. Britain and France have,accordingly, found themselves both caught in the crossfire and uneasyabout its implications for their own contested positions in the UNSC.The question of Europe has been central to the debate over SecurityCouncil reform, but neither the EU nor its main representatives havebeen able to lead that debate in a constructive way.
The discussions about changing the UNSC membership began in1992, with the idea floated by the US, and discreetly encouraged by the
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blushing candidates themselves, that Germany and Japan should simplybe added to the P-5, largely on the grounds of their wealth andcontributions to UN funding, but also as a sign of their reinstatement inthe community of nations. This was the so-called ‘quick fix’. It led to thecreation in 1993 of the ‘Open-ended’ GA Working Group on how toproceed, which is still meeting (Winkelmann, 1997, pp. 1–48; see alsoHanson, 2004, pp. 3–10). It met more than 30 times in 1994–95 andcollected a number of views from interested parties. Most accepted theprinciple that membership of the UNSC should be expanded, but therewas little consensus on exactly how. From the European viewpoint, themost significant development was the rapidly rising discontent of Italyat the German candidature, which Britain and France had seemed toaccept as unproblematic.
By 1997, Italy had translated its anger at the idea that Germanyshould acquire the same status as Britain and France, regardless ofthe fate of other EU members – particularly Italy and Spain – into counter-proposals and an effective campaign among Third World statesto prevent such an outcome. The aim was to create a new set of rotatingseats, to be elected by the General Assembly, on a regional basis. Thiswould naturally allow middle range powers such as Italy, andpresumably Spain, to sit in the UNSC at regular intervals. The primemovers in this campaign were Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini and theItalian Ambassador to the UN, Paolo Fulci, without whose personalenergy and lobbying skills Italy would have made much less of animpact (Fulci, 1999, pp. 7–16).10
This is not the place for a critical analysis of the various possibilitiesfor UNSC reform. The central issue here is the attitude of the twopermanent European members to the evolving debate. Their originalpreference was for a rapid German and Japanese accession. This wouldhave spread the responsibilities for international peace and securitymore evenly among the tier of powers below the US while still leavingBritain and France with a leadership role among the western states,given the continued diffidence of Berlin and Tokyo over military action.They were dismissive of the pretensions of Italy to a more frequentpresence in the UNSC, and probably underestimated Rome’s capacity toput together a blocking coalition. After all, at much the same time theyhad been collusive in excluding Italy from the Contact Group onthe Balkans, despite its proximity to the conflicts raging there(Holbrooke, 1999, pp. 136–7). By the time they woke up to the facts itwas too late to stop the bandwagon which the Italians had got rolling inthe General Assembly.
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Britain and France have on the whole not disagreed significantly onthe issue of UNSC reform, given their evident common interests in thatparticular forum. This applies to the acceptance of more transparentprocedures and more effective ties with European efforts at conflictprevention/resolution, as well as to the dispute over membership. Suchconsensus has been maintained despite the special Franco-Germanrelationship, and the regular difficulties in other areas of Franco-Britishdiplomacy. Indeed, given the stalemate over membership, and thecontinued existence of the Open-ended Working Group, the focus hasinevitably been more on pragmatic measures designed to make theUNSC work better and to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of themajority of states. Such a development cannot help but be welcomed inLondon and Paris as it implies accepting the status quo rather than amajor re-evaluation over membership.
The United Nations Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats,Challenges and Change dealt with the whole range of problemsconfronted by the UN, but kept the issue of UNSC reform to the fore(2004; Berdal, 2005). Nonetheless it too took care not to make themembership issue the sole litmus-test of change, giving far moreattention to the implementation of UNSC decision making in conjunctionwith the rest of the international community.11 The Panel offeredmember states, meeting in New York in autumn 2005, two options, onewith new permanent members and one with rotating seats, togetherwith a full review in 2020 – by when European foreign policy might justhave evolved closer to the point of envisaging a single seat. It stressedthat the veto should neither be repealed for the current P-5 norextended to new permanent members, which suited Britain and France.Instead the report made sensible suggestions for hemming in the actualuse of the veto by making it inapplicable to cases such as genocide andthrough a round of ‘indicative voting’ to precede the final ballot (2004,paragraphs 244–60).
This is a brave attempt to rescue the UNSC membership question fromthe stalemate into which it has fallen. But the only effect seems to havebeen to provoke a further round of competing proposals, in particularone from the ‘G4’ of India, Brazil, Japan and Germany. These states haveagreed to support each other’s candidatures, and have also called for twopermanent African seats. Britain and France are willing to support theG4, but this initiative seems no more likely to succeed than itspredecessors (Price, 2005, pp. 8–9). Those with opposing interests,including Italy, have already mobilized and it will be difficult for anyproposal to get both a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly and
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ratification by two-thirds of the membership including all the permanentmembers. London and Paris have almost certainly discounted this(im)probability and factored it into their current behaviour – for example,they can afford to make some cheap promises of support to Germany,Japan, and other ‘rising powers’ in the knowledge that the cheque is notlikely to be cashed in the near future.
In December 2003 the British Foreign and Commonwealth Officepresented a paper to Parliament on ‘the UK’s International Priorities’. Itcontained a more sophisticated analysis than most such publicdocuments, but still found little space to do more than skim over thecomplexities of UN reform. It asserted that ‘our permanent membershipof the Security Council will remain a crucial asset’, and also that ‘the UKwill continue to advocate reform. Our priority will be to improve theCouncil’s ability to act promptly and effectively to maintain internationalpeace and security’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2003b, p. 24).In other words, Britain is more concerned with what the UNSC doesthan with what it looks like, not least because the status quo onmembership suits it very well. In a long speech on the UN in September2004, all that Foreign Secretary Jack Straw had to say about the issue ofa larger membership for the UNSC was that: ‘we should be guided notjust by a concern for representation, but by a recognition of theresponsibilities which membership entails’ (Straw, 2004). By mid-2005,after the publication of the High-Level Panel’s Report, Straw was readyfor a clearer commitment – to the inclusion of the G4 as permanentmembers, plus representation for Africa. Indeed Straw envisaged aSecurity Council of 25, one more than in the two models put forward bythe Panel (Straw, 2005).
In its own ‘Report on activities in 2003’, the French Foreign Ministrymade plenty of reference to the UNSC, but always in a particularregional context. There is not one reference to the reform of the UNSC,let alone to the issue of membership, in the 68 page long document. By2005, however, it had come up with a specific, if short, paper – ‘theFrench position’ – on the reform of the UN. This asserts the importanceof reform and applauds the work of Kofi Annan. Like Britain, it stressesthe need for a more ‘effective’ UN, but through strengthened ‘authorityand legitimacy’ rather than the ‘credibility’ referred to in London. Itmakes the link to the EU’s increased cooperation with the UN, and tothe goal of ‘effective multilateralism’ set out in the EU’s Security Strategyof December 2003. It points out that France had midwifed the first EUmilitary operation, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as a way ofsupporting the eventual UN action. But only one sentence tackles the
64 Christopher Hill
issue of membership: France supports ‘Security Council enlargement inboth categories, permanent and non-permanent members, for thebenefit of developed and developing countries’ (Reforming the UnitedNations).
The two big European states have thus moved their positions inresponse to the serious attempt of the Secretary General finally to getthe process of UN reform started. But as big contributors to the UNbudget (at a share of 6 per cent each they are fourth equal behind theUS, Japan and Germany) they are most concerned to get better value fortheir money without sacrificing a structural position of influence. Theymay well succeed in the second goal while failing in the first, whichwould mean the UN will once again be paralysed by competinginterests. But at least they have seen the advantages of no longerstanding aloof from their European partners when discussing the issueof UN reform. Both states are now keen to make the two forms ofmultilateralism, the universal and the regional, complementary wherebefore they tended to be competitive. This is because the legitimizationand economies of scale provided by the UN represent a major potentialasset in a world where Europe seems ever more vulnerable, whether toterrorist outrages or US hegemony. The reform agenda offers Londonand Paris a way of taking the strategy of ‘effective multilateralism’forward, notwithstanding the important differences of emphasis in theirrespective foreign policies. As Jeffrey Laurenti says, Europeans ‘have aninterest in a Security Council that can decide and then implement’(2005, p. 71).
Conclusions
Institutions and roles do make a difference, as a great deal ofInternational Relations scholarship has demonstrated. The fact thatBritain and France among EU member states serve as permanentmembers of the UNSC undoubtedly gives them a distinctive set ofpreoccupations and creates a fault-line in the CFSP. The converse is alsotrue, in that their positions as embedded and leading players in the EUshape their behaviour in the UNSC, pushing the two together,suggesting links between European foreign policy and the UN, andthrowing up occasional sharp tests of obligation and loyalty. TheSecurity Council itself exerts pressures towards conformity which maybe at odds with those deriving from EU membership. Then there is theP-5, which despite being barely institutionalized still represents animportant inner group which may at times be given priority over EU
The European Powers in the Security Council 65
conformity by both Britain and France. And lastly there are theimportant bilateral ties represented within the UNSC, such as the UK’sleaning towards the US, or France’s historic ties with Russia. Thesediverging sets of privileged relationships all testify to the importance ofinstitutional frameworks in pulling states in particular directions, and tothe fact that differing arenas do generate differing interests. Since‘multilateralism’ subsumes memberships of multiple groupings it is lessa single process than a set of overlapping and cross-cutting obligations.
The issue then arises in the particular case of the Europeans in theUNSC, of whether the push to follow the Security Council agenda causesproblems for the pull of EU concerns. Is the inherently global focus ofthe UN in tension with the regional priorities (and capabilities) of theCFSP? The analysis here points towards a two-pronged answer. On theone hand, the status of permanent membership reinforces the back-ward-looking tendency which has been observed in both British andFrench foreign policies since the end of the Second World War. On theother, it provides opportunities for constructing new forms of coopera-tion across the regional and global divide.
Continuity is not always synonymous with conservatism, let alonedysfunctionality. It is both inevitable and desirable in life, includingforeign policy. It is only when continuity becomes an end in itself,turning into mere nostalgia, that the problems begin. Britain and Franceare particularly susceptible to this danger, given the importance ofhistorical thinking in both countries, the relatively short time that haselapsed since the loss of empire – and their unchanging status in theUNSC (Hill, 1988).
It is arguable that this inability to climb down from the pinnacle ofinternational affairs has not done either country any favours, in thatthey still spend more time and resources on external policy than othersimilar states. They have persisted with an identity, or view ofthemselves, which has fuelled complacency over domestic problems.That is a discussion for another place. Here the main point is about howthe role of Britain and France in the UNSC constitutes one part of apackage which perpetuates, for good or ill, a sense of nationalexceptionalism in international affairs. This exceptionalism interfereswith processes of Europeanization, at least in the UNSC. As arguedabove, the possession of nuclear weapons is intimately tied up with theveto power in the UNSC, and neither issue can easily be considered onits merits. The default position is, understandably, to continue the statusquo in both aspects for fear of a wider unravelling of nationalforeign policy. The other side of this exceptionalism, however, is the
66 Christopher Hill
assumption that, despite significant changes in world politics andnational positions over the last 60 years, Britain and France shouldretain a leadership function in the world, whether as part of a western-dominated quasi executive, as in the G8, or (in the French view) in theform of a ‘soft balancing’ towards the US.
Whatever the virtues of the Franco-British approach to the UNSC andthe question of its reform, it undoubtedly represents a major challengefor EU unity in foreign policy. For one thing, there is the pulltowards the global perspective which many of the 25 simply do nothave as part of their foreign policy traditions. If Britain or France haveentanglements in Africa, the Pacific or the Gulf there will not necessarilybe the will elsewhere in the EU to go along with them. Moreoveragreement between London and Paris cannot always be taken forgranted over such issues, as with Zimbabwe and Iraq. Then there is thecapabilities gap: if Britain and France are to be the vanguard ofan increased European commitment to peacekeeping and peaceenforcement activities around the globe it will make severe demands onfinancial and military resources when the EU is already stretched tomeet existing commitments. The biggest weakness of the ESDP is theunwillingness, or political inability, of member states to increasedefence spending, Together the EU states contribute about 38 per cent ofthe UN’s budget, and just under 7 per cent of the troops and civilianpolice involved in UN peacekeeping. Given the existing commitmentsof Britain and France, the two major European powers, and the inherentproblems over P-5 states being too heavily involved in UN operations,this is unlikely to change significantly. It is why the EU continues tostress conflict prevention and other forms of soft power. But itshumanitarian agenda is equally important, and if the UK and Francecontemplate further actions under the ‘responsibility to protect’heading, this will bring the issues of political resistance and limitedEuropean capabilities to a head.
There is a more positive way of looking at the European connection tothe UNSC. Britain and France can be seen as states which have nowrecovered their confidence after the traumas of decolonisation, andwhich have significant contributions to make to the building of a morejust and orderly international system – indeed, vital contributions giventhe trough into which post-Soviet Russia has fallen, and the continuedpolitical introspection of China. The two European states are relativelyrich, stable, and in a class of their own compared even to Europeananalogues such as Italy or Spain, which do not as yet have either thewish or the capacity to project force significantly beyond their borders
The European Powers in the Security Council 67
or to act outside the collective European context. Thus London and Pariscan provide leadership of the European caucus and stitch together thevarious complex forms of multilateralism in which the EU memberstates participate, notably the EU, the UN, the OSCE, the OECD and(variously) the G8. If they are able to achieve German membership ofthe Security Council, plus rotating membership for other Europeans,this will institutionalize the European G3, or directoire, in foreign policy,while attempting to ensure that the big three do not become detachedfrom their hinterland.
Such a vision almost certainly corresponds to the definition of‘effective multilateralism’ prevalent in Paris and London. Whether sucha top-down understanding of a process which by definition is pluralist ispractical, or likely to be shared by the other members of the EU, isdubious. Rather more likely as a scenario is a period of continuedferment in both the UN and the EU, with continuing struggles forposition and influence. Britain and France are well placed to protecttheir own interests in both institutions, but they should not imaginethat this is the same as promoting collective goals or the institutionalconsolidation of either organization. While their discourse is that ofcooperation tous azimuts, the practice is one of disjointed multilateralismand it is likely to remain so.
Notes
1. France would have vetoed the so-called ‘second’ Anglo-American Resolutionover Iraq in 2003, but it was never formally presented.
2. It has been argued that Britain and France had an interest in not raising ques-tions over Russia’s inheritance of the Soviet seat, as they did not wish to stirup a debate about the overall composition of the UNSC (see Bourantonis andKostakos, 2000).
3. It is revealing that an authoritative survey of EPC in the UN written in 1992did not even refer to the UNSC, talking instead of voting convergence in theGeneral Assembly (Boselli, 1993, pp. 77–9).
4. Out of the 191 members of the UN by June 2005, there were still 64 whichhad never served on the UNSC (Wikipedia on-line encyclopaedia, ‘ElectedMembers of the UN Security Council’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elected_members_of_the_UN_Security_Council, accessed 25 August 2005).
5. At the press conference after his formal speech. Quentin Peel, Robert Graham,James Harding and Judy Dempsey, ‘How the US set a course for war with Iraq’,Financial Times, 26 May 2003.
6. It should be noted that the Union Foreign Minister-in-waiting, that is HighRepresentative Javier Solana, is already in close touch with both the Europeanpermanent members of the UNSC and Secretary General Kofi Annan. This rep-resents a significant change in links with the EU over the situation in the 1990s.
68 Christopher Hill
7. Quoted in Quentin Peel, ‘A Breach in the Entente Cordiale’, Financial Times,30 October 2002.
8. Adam Ingram, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, in a talk to the Centreof International Studies, University of Cambridge, 4 February 2005.
9. See http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page5.asp; http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/francais/bienvenue_a_1_elysee.2.html (accessed 13 September 2005).Ironically, the bilateral Franco-British summits produced not only much talkof cooperation between the two states, but also more references to the EUthan in the UN-focused speeches. Like horses for courses, it is a matter ofspeeches for places.
10. See also Lamberto Dini, ‘L’ONU è invecchiata: Roma può aiutarla’ [The UNhas aged: Rome can help her], in Corriere della Sera, 3 December 1997, inwhich he talked of a ‘harsh’ but necessary dispute, even between traditionalfriends and allies on the future of the UNSC.
11. It should be noted, however, that the report devoted only 16 paragraphs outof 300 to the UNSC.
The European Powers in the Security Council 69
4Pushing Soft Power: Middle PowerDiplomacy at the UNKatie Verlin Laatikainen
For decades, a group of countries known as middle powers have soughtto bolster United Nations capacity for collective action. The Nordiccountries as well as the Netherlands are among the best-known middlepowers, like-minded about making multilateralism matter long beforethe EU sought to craft a common policy at the UN. Middle powers arebridge-builders and consensus-seeking interlocutors seeking to embedmultilateral solutions across a range of UN activities. This traditionalmiddle power role has conferred greater legitimacy and influence onthese states within the UN context than their modest size and powermight otherwise suggest. This chapter assesses the tradition of middlepower diplomacy within the UN with a special emphasis on Dutch andNordic middle power roles. The chapter then explores the ‘Europeanization’of middle power diplomacy and the impact that EU multilateralismhas had on the practice of middle power diplomacy for EU and non-EUmiddle powers. While the EU’s embrace of multilateralism and supportfor the UN appear to be compatible with the traditions of middlepower multilateral diplomacy, the chapter concludes with an examinationof some of the constraints that the EU faces in its embrace of effectivemultilateralism.
Middle power diplomacy at the UN
Middle powers have been strategically important and they enjoy a greatdeal of credibility within the UN. Interestingly, it is easier to identifymiddle powers than it has been to define the concept. Traditionalmiddle powers are widely understood to include countries such asCanada, Australia, the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland,Norway and Sweden), the Netherlands and New Zealand. Non-Western
70
middle powers include countries such as Brazil and India. But whatexactly is a middle power?
As the very name ‘middle power’ implies, there is a connotationrelated to the structural division of power in the international system.The earliest definitions of middlepowerdom rested upon a typology ofgreat powers, middle powers, and small powers based upon capabilitiesto act and influence others in the international sphere. While thenotion of great power or even superpower remains widely used, theother two categories have been rife with operational difficulties, andthe structural approach to defining middle powers has been largelyabandoned. This type of structural definition, as Cooper, Higgott andNossal contend, ‘has its problems, particularly its dependence onquantifiable measures of power, but it does satisfy the intuitive desire todifferentiate between those states which are clearly not great powers butare not minor powers either’ (Cooper et al., 1993, p. 17). Other concep-tualizations of middle power based on geographical location have notwithstood critical scrutiny and there has been little consensus on whatthe term means in the broader sweep of international relations.Nonetheless, while scholars have not agreed on the utility of theconcept in international relations more generally, it is a commonly usedconcept among observers of UN politics.
The middle power approach is unmistakably Canadian in origin andfrom the outset it was related to the UN system. Ravenhill notes that‘only the persistent Canadian claims to middle power status after 1945popularized the concept’ when Canadians argued for a special status formiddle powers at the San Francisco conference based upon thenormative approach that middle powers took toward multilateralism(Ravenhill, 1998, p. 309). Unlike smaller powers that were exposed andvulnerable, middle powers had options, and they chose to pursue amultilateralism reflective of the ideals of liberal internationalism.Middle powers in this way are seen as more virtuous and wiser thansuperpowers or lesser powers because they struggle to make the worldmore peaceful. ‘Because of this, countries located “in the middle” areportrayed as taking their responsibilities to the creation andmaintenance of global order seriously; indeed, they have as a resultappeared often less selfish than other states’ (Cooper et al., 1993, p. 18).As Gene Lyons has described, middle powers ‘do not pose a threat toweaker countries, they can run interference for stronger countries whosesupport for certain policies might be viewed suspiciously as a move forself-aggrandizement, and they can usually provide material and humanresources that are required to implement operating programs’ (Lyons,
Pushing Soft Power 71
1995, p. 267). During the Cold War, middle powers served as mediatorsbetween the ideologically divided Soviet Union and United States aswell as between the newly decolonized South and their wealthier peersin the North.
Within UN politics, middle power diplomacy is perhaps best definedas a mode of statecraft rather than a particular ideological or philosophicalposition in world politics. Cooper et al. focus on a particular behaviouraldefinition of middle power multilateralism that was first championed byJohn Holmes. ‘According to this approach, middle powers are definedprimarily by their behaviour: their tendency to pursue multilateralsolutions to international problems, their tendency to embracecompromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency toembrace notions of “good international citizenship” to guide theirdiplomacy’ (Cooper et al., 1993, p. 19). A prominent characteristic ofmiddle powers is their commitment to strengthening the globalinstitutional order that provides them – and others – with greatercommon security. This has been manifest in middle power support formultilateralism. In the post-Cold War era, middle power behaviour hasbecome more multifaceted. By the mid-1990s, ‘middle power leadershipand initiative-taking have been based on non-structural forms of powerand influence associated with the imaginative and energetic use of theirdiplomatic capabilities’ (Cooper et al., 1993, pp. 23–4). Middle powerdiplomacy in this sense is understood to be a method of interactionrather than a position in the international distribution of power – adistinction which might even have relevance for the European Union.
The European middle powers
Neither as powerful as the superpowers during the Cold War nor ascapable as the US in the twenty-first century, even the most powerfulEuropean states would be considered middle powers on the world stageunder a structural definition of the term. But within the UN, Britainand France have permanent seats and veto power within the UNSecurity Council and hence qualify as the equals of the superpowers inthis context. German aspirations to join permanent members of theSecurity Council suggests something greater than a middle power, evenif Germany is not yet among the P-5 (permanent five) members of theSecurity Council. Spain and Italy are certainly among the more powerfulEuropean states if their voting weights in the EU’s Council of Ministersare any indication, but behaviourally they have not been as active in UNpolitics. They are not usually perceived by UN observers to be amongstthe middle power group.
72 Katie Verlin Laatikainen
There are several candidates for UN middle power status among theEU-15. The neutrals, such as Austria and Ireland, were deeply involvedin peace-keeping during the Cold War when their neutral security statusuniquely qualified them to serve as impartial peacekeepers trusted byboth the Soviets and the West. Others such as Luxembourg have beengenerous donors of development assistance and have met or exceededthe UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNI devoted to aid. Spain has a fairlyhigh profile in the area of international law. Many of the EU-15 arecandidates for ‘niche’ middle power roles because in one way or anotherthey have supported multilateral policies at the UN.1 However, muchthe same could be said of any member state at the UN – even thefamously ambivalent US supports UN action in a few areas such asdemocracy promotion. If every country can be included in thebehavioural definition of middlepowerdom, then the concept does nothave much utility.
A more stringent definition for inclusion into the middle power club,and one that is consistent with the traditional understanding of middlepower diplomacy, would require actively supporting multilateralismacross a broad range of UN activities. As a consequence, only a handfulof European states qualify for inclusion into this club of ‘like-minded’states: the Netherlands and the Nordic countries are foremost amongthe so-called good guys club which also includes Canada and Australia.The Nordic countries and the Netherlands have been activists at the UNin brokering compromise, seeking consensus, and supporting UN effortsacross the full range of UN policy, including those covered in thisvolume: the Dutch and the Nordics are frequent troop contributorsfor peacekeeping operations as well as innovators in the areas of peace-building and civilian police functions; they have for many yearsmet or exceeded the UN development assistance targets; they have beenardent promoters of human rights protections within the UN system;and they have enthusiastically embraced and integrated the concept of‘sustainable development.’ While the EU declared its intention to makemultilateralism (and the UN) matter only in the last few years, thesemiddle powers have sought to do so for decades.
The Dutch tradition of middle power diplomacy
The Dutch approach to middle power diplomacy in UN politics must beread through the prism of the twentieth century Dutch history. TheDutch have simultaneous global, Atlanticist and European orientationsin their foreign policy. At the century’s start, the Netherlands becamesynonymous with international law as the International Court of Justice
Pushing Soft Power 73
was established in The Hague. A preference for international law andorganization was evident from that point on, and the Dutch were activein the League of Nations. However, the experience of the Second WorldWar and the German occupation injected a sense of insecurity aboutinternational organizations, and the Dutch in their own security policyembraced an ‘Atlanticist’ orientation by joining NATO’s regionaldefence community and created enduring links with the US. As RoelJanssen notes, ‘Keeping a balanced distance from the larger Europeancountries has roots going back to the 17th century’ ( Janssen, 1995,p. 38). But this approach was ill suited to the post-war integration effortsthat were seen as critical in preventing another European war. So addedto the global and Atlanticist orientations was a commitment to fosterregional European integration. For most of the Cold War period, then,the Netherlands pursued UN multilateralism to reduce tensions on theglobal level; in their own neighbourhood they fostered regionalintegrative efforts while sheltering under the umbrella of Americansecurity supplied via NATO.
The Netherlands’ global approach can best be termed liberal botheconomically and politically. Dutch commercial power was at its heightin the seventeenth century, but a proclivity for trade persists and theNetherlands has consistently supported the growth of multilateralfree trade internationally through GATT (and later the WTO) whilesupporting market access for developing countries. The Netherlands wasalso a noted champion of human rights. Norwegian diplomat JanEgelund remarked that ‘The Netherlands has probably become the mosteffective human rights advocate today’ (Egeland, 1984, p. 210). Known fortheir tradition of tolerance, the Netherlands has sought to promotehumanism and human rights in an era of rapidly advancing globalization.
At the same time, the Dutch favoured extensive aid to developing andnewly independent nations to integrate those societies into theinternational system. High expenditures on development aid arepublicly supported in the Netherlands and the Dutch are proud of thequality of their aid with its high proportion of soft loans and grantcomponents. Dutch blue helmets have served in some of the mostchallenging peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, such as in Srebrenicaand Kosovo. Dutch diplomats have frequently been found at the high-est levels of the UN Secretariat, Ruud Lubbers being a poor but promi-nent recent example.
Observers of Dutch foreign policy highlight three constants in Dutchforeign policy: maritime commercialism, pacifism and neutralityand international idealism (Voorhoeve, 1979). These substantive
74 Katie Verlin Laatikainen
orientations may come into conflict with one another, but Kleistra andMayer suggest that the Netherlands ‘traditionally plays two roles on theinternational stage: as a Calvinist minister and as a salesman. In mostcases the two roles are combined pragmatically and this results in acarefully negotiated historical compromise and thereby continuity’(Kleistra and Mayer, 2001). In other cases, however, there may be adichotomy between bilateral and multilateral policy in which either theDutch minister or the Dutch salesman prevails. Baehr, Castermans-Holleman and Grünfeld have reservations about the Dutch middlepower reputation (presumably represented by the minister persona)when they note, for instance,
in meetings of the UN Commission on Human Rights it is humanrights that have the central focus of attention of the Netherlands andother countries. In bilateral relations, human rights have always hadto compete with other objectives of foreign policy such as theprotection of national security and promotion of economic relations.This may help explain the good reputation of the Dutch in the fieldof human rights at the United Nations (Baehr et al., 2002, p. 994, italicsadded).
The Nordic tradition of middle power diplomacy
That the Nordics have been deeply committed to the success ofmultilateral cooperation on the global level is clear to even the mostcasual observer of the UN. The first two Secretary Generals of theorganization, Norway’s Trygve Lie and Sweden’s Dag Hammarskjöld, wereNordic. Since the late 1970s, Nordic citizens have accounted for about10 per cent of all executive leadership positions at the UN, including SpecialRepresentatives and Assistant/Under-Secretary Generals (Hansen, 1991).
In all of the areas of middle power diplomacy, the Nordic countrieshave a high profile (Resnick, 1995, pp. 34–40). For example, the Nordiccountries are among the most prominent contributors to the specializedagencies and programmes; they have long supported international andmultilateral efforts to ensure international peace and security, andduring the Cold War Nordic forces made up 25 per cent of all peacekeeping operations; and the Nordic countries were among theearliest advocates of environmentalism, and the first UN environmentalconference was held in Stockholm in 1972.
Despite their varying regional affiliations in NATO and the EuropeanCommunity, in the UN the Nordic middle powers displayed a unique
Pushing Soft Power 75
approach to multilateralism. For decades the Nordic countries sought topresent a common Nordic position on a variety of issues across the UNagenda. While the positions of most middle powers are remarkablysimilar, the Nordics were unique for the level of integration that theyexhibited in their foreign policies toward the UN (see especially Andrén,1967 in the special edition of Cooperation and Conflict devoted to Nordicintegration). They looked first to one another in collaborating andnegotiations. This system of cooperation evolved over three decadesand was so effective that observers thought of this group of countries asthe Nordic group. Any mention of middle powers invariably included theNordic countries – as Nordic countries, not individual states. Between1983 and 2004, there were nearly 750 joint Nordic statements presentedwithin the various bodies of the UN, most notably the General Assembly(see Table 4.2), while about 10 per cent of these were in Economic andSocial Council (ECOSOC).2 Nordic statements to the Security Counciloccurred much more rarely.
The positions taken by the Nordics and other middle powers are quitesimilar, and voting cohesion3 between the Nordics and the Netherlandsfor instance exceeds that of EU cohesion and hovers around 90 percent.4 While middle powers cooperated with one another, the Nordiccountries coordinated in a degree matched only by the EU presently. Theextensive interaction of Nordic foreign ministries before and during UNsessions meant that substantial national differences were smoothedover. The Nordics did not employ a rotating presidency as the EU does;rather, each Nordic state would speak on its own behalf, and the countrydesignated as lead on that particular agenda item would rise and speakon behalf the Nordic states, with each Nordic state being named.5 Whilethere is considerable harmony of interest among the Nordics in a widerange of areas, disagreements did occur and national perspectives oftenprevailed. Nonetheless, an identifiable Nordic identity emerged amongthe middle powers and this group identity became the centralcharacteristic of the foreign policies of these countries at the UN. TheNordic countries worked out a system of mutual support for election toleadership and limited membership bodies of the UN system whichenabled the Nordic countries to be present in nearly every body and todisseminate a Nordic position. The sum effect of these arrangements wasextensive representation on a ‘Nordic’ basis for even if only one of themwere present in a particular body, frequent and institutionalizedconsultations across all levels of the foreign ministries ensured that allwere on the same page. This collaborative process created relationshipsand practices that extended into new areas as the UN agenda evolved.
76 Katie Verlin Laatikainen
The practice of consultation, harmonization and coordination of Nordicpolicies within the UN became the norm. The ease and automatic natureof consulting Nordic colleagues was described by one Nordic delegate as‘as natural as breathing’.6
Finally, the Nordic middle power identity that developed within thecontext of the UN was based on being distinct from the rest of the West(or North). The role that the Nordics occupied was that of neutral bridge-builders and mediators separate from all others in the industrializedworld; in geo-political terms the Nordics were bridge-builders betweenEast and West during the Cold War, and in geo-economic terms theymediated between the North and South during the divisiveinternational economic debates of the 1970s. While the Netherlandscould be included among the ‘like-minded’ in the latter global divide,they were certainly firmly planted in the West in the East–West conflict.The Nordics stood apart, even though three were part of that mostWestern of organizations, NATO.7 Fundamentally, while the Nordicstates have exemplified western values – a commitment to democracy, afree market economy, rule of law – their effectiveness and reputationwithin the UN have rested on a perception of the Nordics as beingdifferent from the rest of the West (or North). Metzger and Piasecki foundthat ‘observers were united in their opinion that member states’perception of the Nordic states as honest brokers, committed multilater-alists, and even “model member states” was the Nordics’ greatestpolitical asset’ (Metzger and Piasecki, 1991, p. 2). The perceiveddistinction between the Nordics and the rest of the North (or West) inthe UN, their bridge-building and honest-broker role, their internationalpursuit of a just, secure world in which poverty is eliminated, reflects aparticular Nordic self-understanding. Of course there are importantdifferences between the Scandinavian states, but the sense of being partof an exceptional family of nations is apparent throughout the region.As Ole Waever succinctly puts it, ‘Nordic identity is about being betterthan Europe’ (cited in Lawler, 1997, p. 571).
The Europeanization of middle power diplomacy
In 2003, the European Commission produced a report on the UN whichproclaimed that the EU had made a ‘choice of multilateralism’(European Commission, 2003; see also European Council, 2003a). A fewmonths later the EU published its first security strategy which stated thatthe EU’s premier foreign policy objective is to bolster multilateralismgenerally and the UN in particular. Thus, the EU has professed a
Pushing Soft Power 77
commitment to multilateralism, peacekeeping and peace-making aswell as the promotion of social and human development. The EUappears to be making a serious, concerted effort to pool the influence ofmember states to make a difference at the UN. To do so requiresextensive coordination practices that have been detailed elsewhere inthis volume. It is important to note however that these efforts arehaving an impact. As the table in Chapter 1 revealed, there has beenconsiderable growth in EU voting cohesion across the UN GeneralAssembly. This embrace of effective multilateralism and the growth ofthe EU role within the UN had a dramatic impact on the traditions ofmiddle power diplomacy.
The Europeanization of the Nordic middle powers
The impact of the EU’s effort to speak with one voice is most apparentfor the Nordic middle powers because they had such a well-developedcoordination process with considerable output in terms of votingcohesion, joint statements and co-sponsored resolutions. Duringaccession negotiations, Finland, Sweden and Norway insisted that theywould continue traditional Nordic cooperation (Stenbäck, 1995, pp. 4–9).8
But a survey undertaken by the Nordic Council of Ministers afterFinnish and Swedish membership recognized that Nordic cooperation‘should continue and become closer where this is feasible. … However,the EU’s aim of maintaining a common EU leadership leaves less scopefor joint Nordic action’ (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997). TheNordic position within the UN was a clear casualty of the growing effortby the EU in the late 1990s to have a single voice within the UN. TheNordics have not radically altered their beliefs or positions, and theirvoting cohesion across the UN agenda has not fallen below 85 per centdespite the expansion of Nordic-EU membership as Table 4.1 shows.However, these positions are no longer seen or are presented as Nordic.While Nordic cohesion is high, it exists now under the guise ofEuropeanization. Even non-EU Nordic states get caught in the EUslipstream within UN debates as Iceland and Norway frequentlyassociate themselves with EU Presidency statements.
More visible outputs of a joint Nordic approach within the UN havedeclined. The Nordic countries have not had a single joint statement inECOSOC since the 1995 Nordic accession whereas in the period1983–94 there were more than 70. As Table 4.2 shows, the number ofjoint Nordic statements and documents fell from more than 50 in theGeneral Assembly and its main committees in the years before expandedNordic membership of the EU in 1995 to ten or fewer in recent years.
78 Katie Verlin Laatikainen
79
Tabl
e 4.
1N
ord
ic c
ohes
ion
* on
Rol
l-C
all
Vot
es i
n t
he
Gen
eral
Ass
embl
y (%
)
1991
–92
1992
–93
1993
–94
1994
–95
1995
–96
1996
–97
1997
–98
1998
–99
1999
–200
020
00–0
120
01–0
220
02–0
346
th
47th
48
th
49th
52
nd
51st
52
nd
53rd
54th
55th
56
th57
thSe
ssio
nSe
ssio
nSe
ssio
nSe
ssio
nSe
ssio
nSe
ssio
nSe
ssio
nSe
ssio
nSe
ssio
nSe
ssio
nSe
ssio
nSe
ssio
n
Tota
l n
o. o
f V
otes
(73)
(74)
(63)
(63)
(64)
(73)
(69)
(61)
(69)
(67)
(67)
(73)
Den
mar
k97
.310
098
.410
096
.998
.698
.510
010
010
098
.598
.6(7
1)(7
4)(6
2)(6
3)(6
2)(7
2)(6
8)(6
1)(6
8)(6
7)(6
6)(7
2)Fi
nla
nd
90.4
94.6
92.0
95.2
96.9
97.3
100
95.9
98.6
97.0
95.5
95.9
(66)
(70)
(58)
(60)
(62)
(71)
(69)
(58)
(68)
(61)
(68)
(69)
Icel
and
98.6
100
98.4
95.2
100
98.6
100
96.7
98.6
100
100
100
(72)
(74)
(62)
(60)
(64)
(72)
(69)
(59)
(68)
(67)
(67)
(73)
Nor
way
98.6
98.6
98.4
96.8
98.4
95.9
92.7
98.3
95.6
98.5
98.5
98.6
(72)
(73)
(62)
(61)
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The decline in joint Nordic statements is most notable in the Third andFifth Committees of the General Assembly. These are precisely thecommittees in which the EU is increasingly active in presenting a commonposition (Laatikainen, 2004). In the Third Committee for instance, theNordics present a common position only on issues where there is no com-mon EU position, such as on the rights of indigenous peoples. Overall,common Nordic positions on a range of issues have been undermined bythe growth of common EU positions. The Nordics now only present acommon position on issues in which there is little chance of EU consensusor where the EU remains less active. For instance, the Nordic countriesindividually continue to champion nuclear disarmament while the EUposition on nuclear disarmament is constrained by the UK and France. Inrecent years the Nordic countries have had a common position on SecurityCouncil and UN reform and have spoken jointly on these topics before theGeneral Assembly as well as during the 2005 deliberations on UN reform.
The Europeanization of Dutch middle power diplomacy
Simultaneous to the EU’s effort to begin coordinating member statepolicies at the UN, the Netherlands reassessed its foreign policy in themid-1990s, which culminated in a greater emphasis on ‘enlightened self-interest’. Janssen notes that the Netherlands would incorporate a strongersense of national interest in the formulation of policy: ‘Instead of preach-ing moral principles in foreign relations, more attention will be given toeconomic and national interest. It may sound incredible for outsiders, butthe very notion that foreign relations should be an expression of nationalinterests came as the biggest political challenge’ (Janssen, 1995, p. 39). In1995, the Dutch visited China, and while they mentioned human rights intheir bilateral talks, the mission included a large contingent of bankers andbusiness people. The ‘minister’ has given way to the ‘merchant’ in Dutchpolicy: moral sentiments would become the provenance of EU statements.
The impact of the EU on middle power diplomacy appears to be lessacute overall for the Dutch than it is for the other EU middle powers.Indeed, the middle power role was worn more lightly by the Dutch thanby the Nordics. With their colonial history and long association withEuropean integration, Dutch foreign policy was not as dominated by theUN sphere as it was for some of the Nordic countries. Nevertheless, oneDutch diplomat interviewed expressed some frustration with the EUemphasis on the Presidency speaking on behalf of all members:
Middle powers usually say the same things, but they said it in theirnational capacities. This advertised the middle power position in
Pushing Soft Power 81
UN debates. What the EU does is speak in a single voice, and often ifan EU representative speaks, no one else speaks in their nationalcapacity [which may weaken the EU position]. … Another problemthe EU has is the nature of what is said. Because it involves consensusamong 25 states that are not so like-minded, EU positions are oftenwatered down. There are few crisp, strong statements that couldreally send a message or take a bold stand. Middle powers could[traditionally] take more strongly worded stands.9
Finally, the Dutch along with the Nordics have sought to protectthose areas of middle power dominance where the EU has not managedto act or contribute authoritatively. For instance, because they areamong the most significant contributors to the specialized agencies andfunds devoted to development, the Netherlands and the Nordiccountries have opposed EU common policies in those areas because notall EU member states have met the target of 0.7 per cent of GNI devotedto development assistance. While the EU in 2005 committed to havingall member states reach this target by 2015, the Dutch and the Nordicscontinue to pursue traditional middle power diplomacy in thosecontexts until all EU member states meet the target.
Europeanization of other middle powers
Europeanization has usurped Nordic processes of coordination andmiddle powers’ policies have become part of EU multilateralism. Inaddition however, there has been an external element to thisEuropeanization and the EU’s effort to speak with one voice hasenmeshed even non-EU middle powers. The response to EU multilateralismby other middle power states is decidedly mixed.
Perhaps the most difficult adjustment has been required of the Nordicmiddle powers that remain outside the EU. The Norwegians initiallystruggled to find a new mode of operating within the UN when theNordic coordination system was abandoned in 1995. Former Nordicpartners now have considerably busier schedules, and Norwegiansremarked that the biggest struggle was getting information and havinginfluence on European policy-making. Norwegian diplomats now spendmore time caucasing with non-EU middle powers such as theCanadians.10 Most often, however, the Norwegians work with the EUand associate themselves with EU statements. Norway does not have aplace at the EU negotiating table, but as one Norwegian diplomat noted,‘this is a situation we in Norway have chosen’. There is a missing tool inthe Norwegian foreign policy toolbox: ‘We can write wonderful
82 Katie Verlin Laatikainen
speeches, and we do. But does it lead anywhere?’ The answer forNorwegians seems to be that it does not lead anywhere unless it isconnected to the EU. In general, the Norwegians are supportive of theEU’s efforts at the UN, suggesting that ‘it is good for the EU and it is goodfor the UN’. Norwegian diplomats would prefer a little moretransparency in the EU deliberation process, but caution that this is stilla relatively new process for the EU, one with which they seem proud toassociate.
Non-European middle powers tend to be more critical of the EU’simpact on middle power diplomacy. There is a keen awareness amongthe non-European middle powers of the growing size and importance ofthe EU that comes at the cost of their own tradition of middle powerdiplomacy. One delegate to the UN from Eastern Europe noted thetraditional middle power mediating role has been undermined by theEU: ‘The EU is more consolidated and integrated. There is a cleardisappearance of the Nordic bloc, and Norway, standing alone, is nomatch for the EU.’ Another non-EU diplomat acknowledged that the EUhad taken on an enlightened approach reminiscent of middle powerdiplomacy, but that
The EU dominates the UN system in a way middle powers neverdid. … If there were a pure expression of middle power left it wouldbe New Zealand. But even New Zealand has something like 100 percent voting agreement with the EU. So middle powers have beenpushed aside by the EU. Even Norway gets swept up into thatbecause her Nordic neighbours are now EU members. It is hard tomake a name for one’s national approach by following the middlepower path.
In the UN system of regional memberships that are used for elections toleadership positions and limited membership bodies in the UN, the EUis increasingly dominating the regional Western Europe and OtherGroup (WEOG). A non-EU middle power diplomat expressed frustrationat EU dominance of WEOG and supported reform of the regional groupsbecause non-EU members had a difficult time overcoming unitedEuropean actions and the electoral group was ‘too preponderantlyEuropean’. Several non-EU middle powers supported an initiative of theHigh-Level Panel to reallocate the regional groupings to fit the newrealities of regional politics. The effort failed for a variety of reasons, butthe reality is that it leaves the EU with extensive influence over at leasttwo regional blocs within the UN.11
Pushing Soft Power 83
Middle powers, particularly the Nordic group, have been deeplyaffected by the EU’s effort to craft a single voice at the UN. The ranks ofmiddle powers have been thinned considerably as several have beendrawn into the EU’s orbit. One non-EU middle power diplomat notedwith dismay that
In the past, there were a dozen or so potential countries to seek out topromote a middle power agenda. Canada and Australia were veryactive with a number of states that are now trapped within the EUprocess. So that has disappeared. There is no common agendabuilding with the EU (by outsiders). Instead, the EU negotiate amongstthemselves and present the EU position as a fait accompli – take it orleave it. It is therefore hard to be a bridgebuilder when you are notinvolved in the debate. What we find is that the EU reaches out toother blocs – the G-77, the African bloc – and leaves other like-minded countries behind.
Compatibility of EU multilateralism and middle powerdiplomacy
The key components of middlepowerdom include multilateralism,compromise presumably through consensus, and a pre-disposition toemphasize shared normative values rather than narrow nationalinterests. From EU positions and early efforts to define its profile, the EUindeed appears to seek an identity that is not based upon power astraditionally defined. In practical terms, this involves distinguishingthe EU from the US within UN politics. An aversion to power, or thenotion of EU civilian or normative power, is consistent with the prac-tices of the middle powers (on civilian power, see Duchêne, 1973; onnormative power, see Manners, 2002). Schirm sees this approach asmore viable than one in which the EU develops military or traditionaldefence policy strengths because it ‘reflects the character of the Union asan organization promoting stability and wealth through the manage-ment of interdependence’ (Schirm, 1998, p. 79). Middle powers havetraditionally premised their mediation efforts on the recognition ofinterdependence.
Additionally, the normative orientation attributed to middle powers isemphasized by EU diplomats as Knud Erik Jørgensen details in thisvolume (Chapter 10). The EU has been called a ‘community of values’rather than a state-like actor: foreign policy then is an externalization of
84 Katie Verlin Laatikainen
the values that have developed in the European integration process(Richardson, 2002). These values are not the result of balancing ofinterests among member states but an expression of ‘fundamental values’such as the rule of law, democracy and human rights, open market eco-nomics, social solidarity, environmental and economic sustainability,and respect for cultural diversity. In this perspective, EU foreign policy isessentially about values, while member states may continue to haverealpolitik interests. These values often dictate EU policy in the UN as inits support for the International Criminal Court, increasing activity inthe Third Committee, support for the WTO, support for developmentand humanitarian assistance, enthusiasm for the Kyoto Protocol, andsympathy to the Culture of Peace project. This value orientation isconsistent with ‘normative power’ (see Manners, 2002). This normativeorientation shares with the middle power tradition a rejection ofrealpolitik or the use of coercive foreign policy instruments.
The Europeans in the EU appear to be crafting a presence in the UNwhich in substantive ways is similar to the middle power precepts(Laatikainen, 2003). It is clear that middle power statecraft could easilyapply to the EU; while Cooper and others have conceptualized middlepowers to apply to the behaviour of individual states, they note that astate-centred analysis ‘does not exhaust the potential for alternativetypes of niche-building diplomacy in the post-Cold War era’ (Cooper,1997, p. 20). The EU’s commitment to creating and maintaininginternational order certainly applies, as does the idea of ‘goodinternational citizenship’.
In the post-Cold War era, the middle powers may be less visible ininternational relations and in fact there may be less of a need for abalancing bloc of small, neutral, wealthy countries within the UN toplay a bridge-building role. While less visible, middle powers may in factbe more influential as the values that they have traditionally promotedfind resonance in EU common policies in the world body. Several Nordicdiplomats insist that their core values have not changed with EUmembership. Rather than adjusting their policies toward someEuropean position, it is common for Nordic diplomats at the UN to notethat ‘Europe has become more Nordic’. This is precisely the prescriptionof Göran Therborn (1997) whose ‘Scandinavian Europe’ would promotehuman rights and democracy within the UN. Middle powers werealways respected for the positions and principles that they held, but asMetzger and Piasecki have noted, they were criticized for having verylittle influence in convincing more powerful countries to invest inmultilateral solutions. Middle power multilateral principles may gain
Pushing Soft Power 85
greater currency as the middle power role wanes within the UN. As oneSwedish diplomat reflected, ‘There is still a need for bridge-building inthe UN, and perhaps Sweden can lead Europe there’. But will the EU beany more successful than the middle powers at generating broadersupport for multilateralism and the UN?
Incompatibilities: too powerful and too ambitious for middlepower credibility
Ravenhill and others have identified the attributes that contribute tomiddle power credibility: middle powers have strong diplomaticcapabilities; they lead not by force of authority but by the force ofideas; they build coalitions of like-minded countries; and their credi-bility is based in part on their relative weakness and disinterestednessin the issues at hand. These attributes of middle power diplomacy‘provide a plausible means of distinguishing middle powers from bothsmall powers and superpowers’ (Ravenhill, 1998, p. 313). How effec-tive can the EU be as it embraces middle power multilateralism withinthe UN?
The EU certainly fulfils the first criterion of middle power multilater-alism and has extensive diplomatic capacity. Overall, there are morethan 40,000 EU diplomats around the world and more than 1500diplomatic missions (Cameron, 2004). All member states maintain theirown missions to the UN as does the European Commission, while theCouncil Secretariat provides important diplomatic support in New York.The ability to mobilize 25 missions to support a particular policy in aforum of 191 member states should not be underestimated.
However, there are some real challenges for EU multilateralism toreflect the normative middle power approach to multilateralism. Onesuch challenge is to create coalitions of like-minded states. As the EU isso pervasive among the wealthy, industrialized democracies within theUN, there are not very many choices for building coalitions becausemany like-minded countries have been either subsumed by EUmembership or alienated by the pervasive power of the EU in the delib-erative process. Given the similarity of values between the EU and theUS and industrial democracies, it is likely that the like-minded partnersmight include great powers or even the hyper-power itself. The commu-nity of (universal) values shared by the members of the powerful Westmay in fact impede broader coalition-building within the UN that is typ-ical of traditional middle powers. For instance, middle powers tradition-ally often seek partners from other regions. A good example of this is theNew Agenda Coalition (NAC). Promoted by Sweden, the NAC includes
86 Katie Verlin Laatikainen
more than a dozen countries such as Mexico and South Africa that haveagreed to reinvigorate the nuclear disarmament agenda. Individualmiddle powers have an ability to foster these sorts of collaborations,while EU preponderance may impede them.
Nor does the EU exhibit the sort of entrepreneurial diplomacy charac-teristic of middle power diplomacy. Whereas middle powers wereflexible in framing the debate in order to bring divergent states togetherin consensus, the EU notably lacks this flexibility. The EU-25 work sohard to come to consensus that they are inflexible negotiators. Onediplomat described a lumbering colossus with good intentions which,when it moved at all, it ‘lurched’ because it could not take the calibratedsteps that successful negotiations require: ‘They can’t negotiate so theycapitulate’. This inflexibility will impair the EU’s ability to fostereffective multilateralism.
Structurally, the power and influence of the EU is growing within theUN. While Cooper and others have rejected a structural definition ofmiddle power diplomacy, it is not irrelevant. The relative weakness ofmiddle powers is central to their credibility as interlocutors, but theEU is not weak within the UN. The EU dominates WEOG, and withthe accession of eight members from Central and Eastern Europe, theinfluence of coordinated EU policy within the UN expands to theEastern Europe Group (EEG). Indeed, Lithuania lobbied to be transferredto WEOG in order to cut associations with others from the defunctSoviet bloc. The EU opposed such a change. These regional UN groupsmay not be important politically for caucasing purposes, but they do mat-ter administratively within the UN because they influence candidacies forleadership positions within the UN and determine representation onlimited membership bodies such as the Security Council, ECOSOC andthe Commission on Human Rights. This tremendous influence overoutcomes undermines the typical middle power role of mediation.
Another indication that the EU reflects great power modalities ratherthan middle power modesty is the financial clout that the EU brings tobear. In aggregate, the EU is the largest financial contributor to UNoperations, with the EC alone providing more than 300 million euroannually to the UN budget. The EU and its member states provide themajority of global development assistance. Given the importance thatthe EU places on good governance and democratic conditionality in aidchannelled through the UN Development Programme, the EU’s‘disinterestedness’ is called into question. In the past middle powerswere generous in their aid programmes, but not nearly as dominant asthe EU is today. This is a real and important source of structural power.
Pushing Soft Power 87
If the EU’s intention is to rally support for multilateralism and the UN,then the mode in which it conducts its diplomacy is at odds with thetraditions of middle power diplomacy. Whereas middle powers in thepast sought to mediate between antagonistic blocs by building broad-based coalitions of individual states that would commit tocommon action, the EU’s approach tends to be the reverse. The EUnegotiates only amongst itself and creates a common position which itpresents to other blocs such as the G-77. EU diplomacy introducesrigidity into diplomatic negotiations by promoting such inter-blocnegotiations instead of cultivating the commitment of individualmember states to multilateral action. This tends to discount theimportance of ‘small states’, even those that might be like-mindedmiddle powers. Again and again, non-EU middle powers objected to notbeing able to participate in internal EU negotiations. As a non-EUdiplomat described it,
The EU approach reduces the value and visibility of [my owncountry] because we are not involved. So we have looked for alterna-tives but they are only marginally successful. … I don’t want to saywe are implacably against the EU in the UN. We do cooperate withthe EU on some issues, but this is really based on the EU’s agenda. Wemostly end up supporting their agenda.
Said another:
The EU is effective at promoting itself, but I don’t know whether thisis good for the UN. One problem is that when the EU speaks onbehalf of all, there are fewer voices reflecting similar liberal values.
Perhaps the most damning limitation on the EU embracing middlepower multilateralism is the disconnect between the universalisticvalues and principles approach that the EU espouses and the middlepower means of consensus-building. There is no doubt that the EU canbuild consensus because its foreign policy is premised upon buildingconsensus among its 25 members. However, the values and principlesunderpinning this approach are largely shared among the Europeansand those in the West more generally. But within the broader confinesof the UN with all its cultural diversity, a process of consensus-buildingat least as related to promoting values is problematic. Middle powersgenerally attempt to build consensus diplomatically throughcompromise. However, if the objective of the EU’s foreign policy is
88 Katie Verlin Laatikainen
broader embrace of the universal values and principles that Europeanshold dear, then how is compromise possible? Compromising onfundamental, universal values would undermine the credibility of theEU’s normative approach. One does not compromise on values andprinciples. Traditional middle powers were deemed as moral actors for whatthey did – the EU’s ‘values diplomacy’ suggests that Europe’s normative powerstems from what Europeans believe. In the end, the EU’s embrace of avalues-based foreign policy is not matched by appropriate means. Themiddle power mode of diplomacy is inconsistent with the absolutistvalues orientation of EU policy at the UN. The modest, middle powermultilateralism as the EU’s mode of statecraft is not matched by thebounded interests typical of middle powers.
Conclusion
This chapter has suggested that the growth of EU foreign policy at theUN has overshadowed the tradition of middle power multilateralism.Among all the EU states examined in this book, the middle powersshould feel the most comfortable with the EU’s embrace of the UN andeffective multilateralism. Substantively the nascent EU approach to theUN is consistent with middle power diplomacy, and both the Nordicsand the Netherlands have supported the EU embrace of multilateralism.Because of this, these middle powers have had a fairly easy timetransitioning from middle power diplomacy at the UN to the EUcoordination process.
Ultimately, however, the EU may prove to be less effective at fosteringsupport for UN multilateralism than traditional middle powers. Middlepowers are states that engage in cooperation and coordination becausethey recognise interdependence. The EU as a foreign policy actor isarguably a different animal altogether – a post-modern, sovereignty-pooling, values-espousing, financially powerful entity. This EU isdisconcerting for non-EU middle powers for its insular approach, and itis structurally and financially powerful in ways that are all too clear tothe developing world. The EU’s approach to UN diplomacy threatensthe sovereign prerogatives of both groups and this undermines EUefforts to make the UN matter.
To a considerable degree, the EU is caught in a dilemma between its pro-motion of values and its diplomatic interests. When it promotes universalvalues, the EU appears to be very much part of the larger West alongsidethe US, and this undermines middle power bridge-building in the North-South divide. But for the EU to acknowledge a power-balancing
Pushing Soft Power 89
role vis-à-vis the US (which would increase its legitimacy with thedeveloping world) would certainly undermine its normative orientation.
Whether the nascent EU multilateral approach to the UN, crafted incomparison against the stingy and unilateralist depiction of the US,remains credible is questionable. As Clapham argues, ‘because theEU represents an ideological and powerful bloc, other blocs may have toredefine their identity and ideology in counterposition to the EU. Thereis division in the debate not despite EU consistency but because of EUcoherence’ (Clapham, 1999, p. 649). Many of the traditional Europeanmiddle powers, particularly the Nordics, defined their middle power rolein opposition not only to the USSR and the US, but also Europe (seeRudebeck, 1982; Hansen, 1991). However, traditional middle powerswere little guys, just like those they sought to influence. Like the lesspowerful, middle powers looked to the UN to protect their sovereignty.Their moral authority flowed from their relative lack of hard power.The Nordics were untainted by the colonial sins of the great powersof the twentieth century. For the Netherlands, middle power diplomacyin the UN was distinct from its ‘regional’ foreign policy engagement inbuilding a powerful EU through the European integration process. Asthe EU becomes more assertive in the UN, the Dutch and Nordicscannot compartmentalize any longer. For less developed countries, thepreponderance of EU power in the UN sits uncomfortably withmemories of European colonial history, with the financial leverage theEU wields, and the universal values it hopes to project. As the middlepowers disappear into the EU’s shadow, they continue to voice the sameideals and promote soft power in the EU’s diplomacy. The middle powermantle, which fit the lean middle powers so well, is a bit tight for themuch bigger and much more inflexible EU.
Notes
1. Cooper, Higgot and Nossal argue that the concept of middle power has grownto include a number of new entrants in the aftermath of the Cold War,including countries such as Malaysia and South Africa, which increases thediversity of interests and behaviour of middle power entrepreneurs. Andinstead of brokering in the interest of compromise or conflict resolution,middle power activity begins to smack of competition for influence among‘self-interested’ middle powers. This is quite different from the diplomaticmodes of the so-called ‘good guys’ club.
2. Overall numbers for this period were obtained through the UNBISNET Indexto Speeches section found on the UN documentation website. Electronic dataavailable on UNBISNET currently covers only the period from 1983 onward.
90 Katie Verlin Laatikainen
3. In this chapter, voting cohesion is measured by the absence of any divergenceamong the states listed. One dissenting vote or a split vote are bothcalculated as a dissenting vote.
4. In 1998, Nordic-Dutch cohesion was 86.9 per cent; in 1999, 86.9 per cent; in2000, 91.3 per cent; in 2001, 94 per cent; in 2002, 89.6 per cent; in 2003, 86.3per cent.
5. By contrast, the EU’s approach to joint statements is increasingly to haveonly the Presidency speak on behalf of EU member states (which are not thennamed) and to have other state refrain from making a statement in debate inorder to highlight the fact that the EU is an ‘actor’ in its own right. TheNordic joint statements, by naming all five states in every statement, insteademphasized that these were individual countries engaged in a voluntary,coordinative process.
6. Interview, Stockholm Foreign Ministry, 1991.7. During the 1970s and 1980s, Denmark and Norway were known as resistant
NATO members, and they held firm against placement of any nuclearweapons materiel by any NATO member within their boundaries in order tomaintain a Nordic Nuclear Free Zone.
8. Iceland did not enter into accession negotiations. Norway concluded negoti-ations with the Union successfully but a no vote in the popular referendumscuttled Norway’s bid for membership. Sweden and Finland joined Denmark,which had been a member of the European Community since 1973.
9. Verbatim material in this section was obtained from participant interviews. Iinterviewed several diplomats from the EU member states, Commission,non-EU middle powers, and non-Western states in New York during theperiod 2003–05. Interviews were conducted on the basis of non-attributionin order to obtain maximum candour. I have identified by national identityonly those who agreed to be so identified.
10. For example, in May 1997, Norway and Canada signed the LysoenDeclaration pledging to work together in nine different areas on the human-itarian agenda.
11. Because Cyprus is the only EU member in the Asian group, it is unlikely thatthe EU would wield the same influence there as it does in the EEGand WEOG.
Pushing Soft Power 91
5Returned to Europe? The Central and East European Member States at the Heart of the European UnionElisabeth Johansson-Nogués
On 1 May 2004, ten Central, Eastern and Mediterranean Europeancountries became members of one of the world’s most influentialregional cooperation projects – the European Union. However, althoughthe day was significant for its ceremonial aspects, in essence WelcomeDay marked a continuation of a process of politico-economic harmo-nization that had begun many years before through the adoption of theacquis communautaire and the more informal ‘acquis politique’ of theEuropean Union.1 Indeed, as Poland and Hungary (in 1991), Romania,Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (in 1993), and Estonia, Latviaand Lithuania (in 1995) signed their Europe Agreements with theUnion, they committed themselves to a gradual convergence with theEU, through the means of a regular political dialogue on ‘bilateral andinternational issues of mutual interest’, which was to be establishedwith the aim of, among other objectives, bringing about ‘better mutualunderstanding and an increasing convergence of positions on interna-tional issues’ (Preamble, Europe Agreement).
The present discussion examines the evolution of nine Central andEast European countries’ (CEECs’) foreign and security policy over thepast decade and a half in the setting of the United Nations. The chapterfocuses on the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as it is thebody where the CEECs have been the most active, taking independentinitiatives, while activities in other UN bodies will be touched upon asrelevant to provide a more nuanced picture of the presence of theCentral and East European member states, Bulgaria and Romania at theUN. The chapter will especially examine the UNGA voting records of
92
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,Poland, Romania and Slovakia, to see how these compare over time withEU member states prior to 2004.2 This inquiry is particularly relevant ifone takes into account that Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary andPoland once constituted the very core of the anti-Western Soviet bloc inthe UNGA during the Cold War, together with their USSR patron andother territories that were subordinated to Moscow in terms of foreignand security policy. The break-up of the Soviet-controlled vote hasbeen deemed as one of the most dramatic re-alignments in the UNGAin the history of the organization, and at the forefront of this mostremarkable change one finds the Central and Eastern EU member states(Holcombe and Sobel, 1996, pp. 17–34).
This chapter centres its discussion on a quantitative analysis of thevoting behaviour of the EU member states in the UNGA and exploressome of the individual, national motivations behind this behaviour inspecific policy areas. However, the text does not presume to cover alltopics on the agenda in New York, nor to provide more than a superfi-cial insight into the functioning of the UN system. Rather this chapterpoints to general trends of the EU-25, with a particular focus on theseven Central and East European member states and two candidates,Bulgaria and Romania.
A dual-flow Europeanization process?
The early 1990s affirmed a remarkable transition in the CEECs. Comingout of a semi-sovereign situation (or complete dominion, as in the caseof the Baltic states) where everything about the recent past seemedunacceptable in new international circumstances, the newly instatedCentral and East European democratic governments began to search formodels on which to anchor their new status. The early years of theCEECs’ transformation were very much linked to a need to redefinetheir foreign and security policy. They had to confront the simultaneouschallenges to achieve international diplomatic recognition as a sover-eign state, to build up the foreign and security establishment (creatingministries and hiring competent personnel), and to formulate anadequate foreign and security policy programme in the changing inter-national climate. In such a state of flux, the West thus became an impor-tant reference point to which they could fix their transition in the fieldof foreign and security policy as they were feeling around for a way for-ward after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Moreover, by aligning the country’sforeign policy with the West, a newly democratic government gained
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popularity in its domestic constituencies, in that such alignmentseemed to mark in a most definite way that the country was well on itsway away from its communist past.
For most CEECs the way forward meant above all setting their sightson a ‘return to Europe’, which essentially translated into undertakingthe cumbersome process of implementing the legal and politicalmembership criteria set out by the European Union. The convergenceprocess that followed, as Radaelli has described, was composed of
processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalizationof formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles,‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are firstdefined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and thenincorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, politicalstructures and public policies. (Radaelli, 2000)
For the CEECs this process of ‘Europeanization’ has essentially meant asituation where the individual national systems of the CEECs becamepenetrated by EU structures and the obligation to take on the acquis com-munautaire and politique. However, this is not to say that the CEECs haveEuropeanized, or adapted, unreflectively, and pressured themselves toconform to some kind of abstract European foreign and security policyideal, if indeed such an ideal exists. Prior to 2004 EU enlargement hasshown in many ways that policy harmonization for new member statesdoes not equal the extinction of a foreign policy with national charac-teristics. The CEECs have managed both to converge with the EU major-ity and to display signs that they are continuously acquiring a graduallymore distinct foreign policy profile. The processes of institutionalchange in this set of countries are thus seen as complementary ratherthan exclusive.
It is also worth noting that the very complexity of the Europeanization/political unification process makes it a patchy or disjointed one.Europeanization is far from a uniform development, extending homo-geneously to all public and political spheres of activity at once. Rather,the process may be uneven or fragmented, with some areas of socialactivity more Europeanized while others are to a lesser extent or evenonly marginally so. As we will see, the degree of Europeanization canalso differ between different areas of international politics. As shownbelow, while on the whole CEECs’ records on environmental or devel-opmental matters in Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) or onhuman rights in the UNGA appear rather well fitted to the EU majority,
94 Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués
on some matters of international security the match seems less clear.The explanation may partly be found in the fact that the norm-sender(EU) does not send equally strong and unambiguous signals in all fieldsof security, as it does, for example, in the fields of environmental issuesor human rights. It may also be the burgeoning national interests of theCentral and East European member states that account for divergence.
From a cursory glance into the empirical evidence of the past decade’senlargement process, the CEECs have clearly changed and adapted themost to the demands of the European Union rather than the inverse.However, on a much more subtle level, on several issues the CEECshave in the past decade also influenced the Union’s agenda and the waythe European Union’s foreign policy is made. In certain cases thedirection of the policy signals is inverted and the periphery takes on therole of norm-sender while the centre becomes the receptor.
For example, the majority of the Central and East European memberstates are countries of complex minority compositions. It is thus notsurprising that some of them show a measured reticence in view ofdebates on self-determination in the UNGA; while others, having ethnicdiasporas beyond their borders, are passionate advocates for humanrights, anti-discrimination, racism and minority rights. While hitherto arather taboo subject for most EU member states, minorities, their treat-ment and rights, have during the last decade slowly seeped into theUnion’s foreign agenda and become a regular feature in the EuropeanUnion’s external action, not only in the shape of the 1993 Copenhagencriteria or initiatives such as the 1994 Stability Pact for Central andEastern Europe, but also, to a very limited extent, in the UNGA.3 As theformer head of the European Commission delegation to the UN noted,‘The emphasis on minority rights within the Human Rights policies ofthe European Union and in the Copenhagen criteria can also be seen asan expression of solidarity with minority groups, who might otherwisefeel disadvantaged by the operation of democratic decision-making atnational level. It is currently playing an important role in ensuring thatproblems of minorities do not lead to unrest within some candidatecountries’ (Richardson, 2003).
In addition, priority issues for most CEECs such as those related tointernational security, have in different ways modified or added to theexisting agenda of the European Union. The CEECs’ more exposedgeographical position, at the fringe of integrated Europe, brings with ita host of concerns. For this reason these countries continue, to someextent, to feel a lingering concern over their freedom of action, sover-eignty and stability in relation to their neighbours, particularly relations
Returned to Europe? 95
with Russia and/or post-armed conflict Western Balkans. They also showconcern over the growing illicit flows across their relatively porousborders, such as the trafficking of small and light fire arms, humanbeings or narcotic substances, which is a ceaseless font of domesticinsecurity in their countries. The national tradition, state formation andhistorical inclination of the CEECs have therefore naturally come toimpinge on European policy in terms of adding new matters to the EUagenda. Many of these topics, which were either formerly absent fromthe European Union’s policy attention or largely ignored, have thustaken on a growing centrality in the European Union’s internationalactivities, whether in the UNGA, ECOSOC or Security Council.
It is thus fairly obvious to conclude that we are facing a scenario inwhich two actors are co-evolving simultaneously. This creates a space forinterpreting Europeanization as a feedback process, where impulses ofadaptation are issued both from the centre (EU) and from the periphery(national). Consequently, even for such a potent actor as the EuropeanUnion the feedback loop of Europeanization/adaptation cannot beavoided. As Olsen has pointed out, it would indeed be difficult forthe European Union to resist change, in that ‘[i]n complex and dynamiccontexts like the European one, purposeful actors influence theprocesses and structures within which change takes place. Yet, no singlegroup of decision-makers has the insight, authority and power to designand reform institutions at will and achieve pre-specified objectives’(Olsen, 2002, p. 926). The Europeanization process must thus be under-stood in a dual sense, both of fomenting the recreation of EU norms andregulations at national level, as well as part and parcel of a politicalunification project that also moulds the centre.
The CEECs in the UNGA
The 45th session of the General Assembly, inaugurated in the fall of1990, marked a sea change for international relations and, as a conse-quence, for the UNGA as well (Holloway and Tomlinson, 1995).4 The col-lapse of the communist regimes across Europe in 1989 through 1991, thedisintegration of the Soviet Union, the newly independent countriesapplying for membership of the UN, as well as the first shots fired inwhat was to be a set of drawn-out armed conflicts in the Western Balkans,would all be reflected in the work of the UNGA during the course of thesession.5 It would mark a distinct before and after in more ways than one.
The 45th session also presented a distinctive turning point for theCEECs. The Soviet-aligned East European regional group had constituted
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the most homogenous bloc in the UN system during the Cold War. TheSoviet-dominated bloc included the USSR, all the Central and EastEuropean satellite countries, Afghanistan, Cuba, Syria and Vietnam.From the late 1940s onward, the coincidence in UNGA voting of theSoviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany andPoland was consistently one hundred per cent, or very nearly so. Thiscoherence was mainly a tribute to Moscow’s imposition of a tight reignon foreign and security policy for its eastern bloc satellite countries andto the USSR’s capacity to perpetuate its grip over these countries, withfew slip-ups, for more than four decades. The sole exception to the ruleof this tight-knit East European group was Romania, which gradually,from 1975 onwards, appeared to increasingly embrace the cause of theG-77 in the UNGA (Holloway and Tomlinson, 1995).
As the CEECs broke out of their Soviet straitjacket in the early 1990s –symbolized above all by the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 –they would abandon their former voting loyalties in the UNGA,although the East European group as a feature of the UN systemformally did not disappear. Indeed the Eastern Europe Regional Groupcontinues today in the UN system, although it has reportedly ceased tobe a medium of (effective) coordination of the positions of the region’snations in the UN (Matuszewski, 1999, p. 46). The CEECs instead beganto look around for new models for their incipient foreign policy and therest of the decade of the 1990s was devoted to attempts to elaborate andconsolidate such a policy, both regionally and in international organi-zations. Western Europe and the United States would automaticallybecome two important reference points in this quest, primarily as aconsequence of the Central and East European aspirations to NATO andEU membership. However, there were also attempts to find an individu-alized ‘third-way’ by some of the CEECs in the early to mid-1990s, as wewill see below.
The post-Cold War era has thus entailed a major re-alignment andcomplex adaptation for the CEECs under study here. The changingdomestic and international circumstances of the CEECs are clearly visi-ble in their voting record in the UNGA as compiled in Figure 5.1. Therecord presented here stretches back to the early 1980s, in order to bet-ter put the dramatic shift starting from the 45th session into relief. Thefigure shows the trend of convergence of the candidates’ voting patternswith that of the EU during the period 1983–2003. Also noted for thesame years in the figure is the trend for the Soviet Union/the RussianFederation, as an additional measure of comparison of change in relationto the European Union.
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In general, the rate of convergence of the CEECs in terms of their vot-ing record with the European Union has been quite dramatic. If in the43rd session (1988) the CEECs would score a below-40 per cent coinci-dence rate with the EC, only three years later, in 1991, a majority ofthem had shot beyond 80 per cent.7 This trend would continue upwardthroughout the remainder of the decade. Between the 45th and 55thsession there was a steady trend of alignment to the EU majority vote,peaking at a 95 per cent plus in 2000. The convergence rate has oscil-lated slightly in the years since, but in general the current convergencerate for the CEECs taken as a group – above 90 per cent – is well withinthe limits of the European Union’s voting record taken as a whole( Johansson-Nogués, 2004).
The most notable change has been the case of the Czech Republic,Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (Visegrad-4), which quickly strayed fromSoviet voting patterns in the UNGA and moved to align themselves withthe EU member states. It is curious to note that even during the chilliest
98 Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués
Figure 5.1 Temporal evolution of the percentage of agreement between theEC/EU majority and selected CEECs (EC/EU � 100 per cent) for the period1983–20036
Source: UN Bibliographic Information System (UN BIS).
0
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80
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58(1983)
40 5654525048464438 42
Lithuania Estonia Latvia Poland Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary Bulgaria Romania
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(1987) (1991) (1995) (1999) (2003)
% o
f agr
eem
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ith E
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UNGA session (Year when session started)
5852 5654
years in the relations between Brussels and Bratislava – as the Meciargovernment grew increasingly undemocratic in the mid-1990s and theEuropean Union’s subsequent diplomatic protest against the same in1997 – the overall Slovakian foreign policy convergence with the Unionin the UNGA did not alter substantially. This observation contrasts withthe post-1989 trend of Bulgaria and Romania, as in the case of the threeBaltic states, where the foreign policy alignment has been more gradual,even hesitant at times, but nevertheless also eventually closing in to theEU norm.
Bulgaria (at least initially) and Romania tended to be laggards inconverging with the European Union because of the fragility and weak-ness of their internal reform processes compared to Central and EastEurope. The first post-communist elections in these two countriesreturned revamped communist technocrats and their old political alliesto power. As a consequence, the rhythm and commitment to socio-economic and political reform, as well as international adaptation to anew global order, was a bit slower and less steady compared to othercountries in the region (Linden, 1997). Soon after democratizing,Bucharest and Sofia stated their interest in joining the European Union,but there seemed to be no rush to press for high rates of convergencewith the European Union at the UN.
In the case of the Baltic trio, their records from the early 1990s showan even more distinct sluggishness in their voting alignment with theEuropean Union’s majority voting pattern in the UNGA. This fact can,to some extent, be attributed to the specific factors related to theirlingering concern for their territorial integrity and sovereignty. TheBaltic states, perhaps more than Central or East European states,have been caught between their wish to join the European Union andtheir security dependence on the United States. The Baltic states, whichsince the early 1990s have had troubled relations with their Russianneighbour, sought security through maintaining good relations andmilitary cooperation with Washington while not losing sight of the eco-nomic promise of European markets and their goal of EU accession.Since Baltic independence, Russia has linked the treatment of Russianminorities in Estonia and Latvia to the final resolution of territorialdisputes – a matter which is yet to be resolved.8
Another way to consider how Europeanized the Central and EastEuropean member states, Bulgaria and Romania have become in thecontext of the UNGA is to consider them in relation with other individ-ual EU members. Upon examining the past decade’s EU voting record inmore detail one can discern the former EU-15 situating themselves
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along a continuum, where some member states are a little more closelygrouped than others (Luif, 2003, p. 5). One might infer from such exam-ination that there are four discernable EU voting clusters. The first groupis the traditional EU core group, composed of Benelux and Germany, towhich Denmark and Finland increasingly have aligned themselves.A second group, which is close to the first, but can still be denoted asdistinct for their differentiated vote on certain issues, is composed ofGreece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Then we have neutral Austria, Irelandand Sweden, which show a divergent trend of voting pattern in thatthey tend to have very special views in regards to several issues of inter-national security when compared to their fellow EU members (whichare also in NATO). The remaining two countries – France and the UK –are more difficult to group together in that on some issues they concur,while on others they do not, but for all purposes they can be consideredto constitute the fourth and final group. France and UK’s relative close-ness in vote has been recorded in several studies, among them the bynow classical work by Leon Hurwitz (1975). Both France and the UKhave tended to diverge from the EU mean vote due to their more globaloutlook on international security, or as a consequence of their past ascolonial powers. However, as previously noted, both France and the UKhave in the past five years situated themselves closer to EU majority,thus benefiting the overall coherence of EU voting in the UNGA.9
As for the Central and East European member states, as well as the twocandidates Bulgaria and Romania, there is no evidence that they simplyjoined the existing EU caucus haphazardly. Rather there is evidence ofshopping around, shifting coalitions, and pragmatism in trying outwhat would serve the national interest best. In relation to the pre-2004EU members, Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Hungaryhave in the five years past increasingly aligned with the group which isconsidered the traditional core of the European Union: the Benelux andGermany. Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia situate themselvessomewhere in between the first and the second groups described above,although the statistics indicate that prior to 2000 the Central and EastEuropean states tended to coincide with greater frequency with thesouthern EU member states – Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain – inrelation to the issues raised in the UNGA.10
If this is the relative positioning of the CEECs vis-à-vis the existingmember states, however, it should not be overlooked that the greatestvoting concurrence of the Central and East European member states(with the exception of Hungary) and the Balkan twosome has in the pastdecade been with each other.11 This should not be a surprise given these
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countries’ similar recent history and parallel post-communist evolution.As always it is worth noting, however, that a similar vote may havemany different rationales to why it happens to coincide. In other words,one should not automatically assume that the policy makers in thesecountries necessarily tend to think alike, or always act according to thesame motivations, just because their votes coincide. However, this noteof caution aside, one must insist that their fairly homogeneous recordreveals that they have a set of interests in common. The regional andhistorical trajectories since formal independence in the early 1990s arepartially responsible for such convergence.
The essence of political unification: bridging convergent and divergent votes in the General Assembly
The Central and East European member states, together with Bulgariaand Romania, have thus successfully adapted their national foreign andsecurity policy in the UN setting to a degree that they have situatedthemselves more or less at the traditional core, or the ‘heart’, of Europe.As noted previously, strong Europeanization processes of Central andEast European adaptation on many issue areas are surely one of theexplanations which lie behind such successful convergence with theEuropean Union in the UNGA. However, as seen below, there are also anumber of issue areas in which the Central and East European memberstates, Bulgaria and Romania contribute to the EU agenda at the UN.The following discussion principally derives from the UNGA votingrecord presented above, but to give a more complete picture, Centraland East European activity in other UN bodies, such as the SecurityCouncil and ECOSOC is also considered.
The issue areas discussed here – environment/development, humanrights and international security – reveal an interest and capacity con-tinuum. On environment and development issues the eastern Balkantwosome and the Central and East European member states have shownrelative little interest and generally can be characterized as EU followers,while they have shown greater or lesser degree of willingness to press theEuropean Union to address issues of human rights and internationalsecurity.
Environment and developmental issues
The environment and developmental cooperation are traditionally twoissues that the European Union member states have taken special
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interest in, both on the continent as well as internationally, and overthe years the Union has cultivated rather strong trademark policies inreference to these issues. For the CEECs, however, joining the rathercohesive and well-established European Union majority position interms of these issues has not presented them with much of a problem.
Environmental protection was largely a non-topic for the communistcountries during the Cold War. Since the central priority of the East blocwas rapid economic development, the environment and naturalresources were taxed heavily to achieve that goal. This was a trend thatwould continue during the early 1990s as the CEECs were trying torecover from the economic recession they had suffered from after thefall of the Berlin Wall. The reorientation of priorities in this sector wouldnot begin until the prospect of European Union accession became moretangible in the mid-1990s. The first sign of Europeanization on the envi-ronment would thus not come until 1997 when the Commission’sAgenda 2000 Communication launched an environmental strategy forthe CEECs and the PHARE financial assistance programme financed itsimplementation (Inglis, 2001, p. 307).
As a part of the enlargement process the CEECs also had to adjust tothe EU acquis in terms of international conventions and regulationsrelated to enlargement. The first big international test for the EU hope-fuls would be immersing themselves into the 1995–97 negotiation forthe Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention onClimate Change, where they would learn the ‘hard way’ the difficultiesof intersecting multilateralisms as the Kyoto negotiations proceeded inparallel both within the Union and within the UN system. However, inthe absence of a properly formulated policy strategy of international cal-ibre on environmental issues (indeed most of the CEECs lacked a min-istry or even specialized governmental department dealing with issuesof environmental protection), and due to the very complexity of all theins and outs of the issue of CO2 emission reductions at hand, the Centraland East European governments inevitably came to accept the EuropeanUnion taking the lead. Since then there has been ample evidence thatthe Central and East European member states are taking more of aninterest in environmental issues, readily supporting European Unionviews on fresh water supplies, land degradation, forests and oceans, andlooking for new and additional sources for funding environmentalclean-ups. However, one might infer that the environment is still farfrom being a national priority for most countries in the region,something which is well evidenced from the patchy implementation ofenvironmental regulations and the recurrent low level of institutional-ization of environmental protection in these countries.
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International development cooperation, in contrast to environmentalissues, is not a new topic for the Central and East European memberstates, Bulgaria and Romania. Together with the Soviet Union thesecountries were net donors to lesser developed countries during the ColdWar. However, if the financial aid of the pre-1989 era was tied to ideo-logical logics, in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the economiccrisis in these countries, Central and East European development coop-eration aid almost completely ceased for the remainder of the decade.The late 1990s did, however, see a revival in Central and East Europeaninterest for development cooperation matters, mostly at the EuropeanUnion’s prodding. Moreover, and also mostly as a consequence of insis-tence from Brussels, slowly governmental agencies or special budgetlines dealing with development issues have been set up in most of thenew member states. This has translated into greater Central and EastEuropean activity in terms of bilateral aid and in international organiza-tions such as the UN, although few independent initiatives have beenlaunched so far.
The willingness to follow EU leadership on developmental issues andthe awareness among the CEECs of their responsibilities as new EUmembers vis-à-vis the world despite their economic limitations, wereperhaps well captured in the words of the Czech Deputy Prime Ministerand Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Kavan, speaking before the gathereddelegates at the UN Conference on Financing for Development inMonterrey, Mexico in 2002:
The Czech Republic, as a candidate for European Union accession,accepts its share of responsibility when solving the problems of theinternational community and is prepared to contribute to their reso-lution. As an emerging donor the Czech Republic intends to activelyengage in international co-operation. (UN International Conferenceon Financing for Development, 2002)
The Europeanization of the Central and East European developmentcooperation activity is also well illustrated from the geographical ambitwhich it now spans. Formerly limiting financial assistance to theirclosest neighbours in the post-Soviet space or the Western Balkans,the CEECs’ remit has now extended to include traditional EU develop-ment partners such as the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries(ACP), Mediterranean or Latin America. This is reflected both in bud-ding Central and East European bilateral and multilateral assistanceprogrammes, as well as in their readiness to support, with only a few
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exceptions, the EU Presidency’s statements in the relevant UN bodieswith regards to any of these of the European Union’s more far-flungpartners.
Human rights
The Central and East European convergence with the EU majority interms of human rights has also been smooth, although, as we will see,here some of these countries have profiled themselves a bit more.Although in the past required to adhere to a Soviet concept of humanrights which centred on labour and economic rights, the CEECsembraced without much ado the European Union’s differentiated viewon human rights. The European Union’s human rights focus in theUNGA has over the decades predominantly emphasized political rightsand the rights of the individual (so-called ‘first generation rights’, orfreedom and participation rights). The European Union has in this senseput much emphasis on the formal attributes of a state and its institu-tions to guarantee the civic rights of their citizens (democracy), as wellas insisted on a de jure adoption of human rights norms (such as minor-ity rights, gender equality and so on). While it has been generallysympathetic in terms of most of the issues plaguing developingcountries, it has always sided with the West in carefully avoiding givingother dimensions of human development the status of a full-blown‘human right’.
This (rather limited, some critics would say) EU interpretation ofhuman rights has been relatively easy for the majority of the CEECs toadapt to. Overall, the degree of their human rights convergence with theEuropean Union was so spectacular as to become a bit unsettling forsome erstwhile Soviet allies. For instance, on some occasions, one orother CEEC has willingly co-sponsored resolutions by EU member statesin matters related to former allies as Cuba and North Korea. One suchinstance resulted in a stern admonition from the Cuban delegationwhen, in the general debate inaugurating the 58th UNGA session, theCzech Republic’s foreign minister advocated, along with some EuropeanUnion countries, the release of political prisoners in Cuba (CzechMinistry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). In a similar vein, the Central and EastEuropean member states, as well as Bulgaria and Romania, have loyallysupported other human rights related resolutions of great importanceto the EU, such as for example, the battle between Brussels andWashington over the American wish to have its soldiers exempted fromthe International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction or over the abolition ofthe death penalty.12
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If these are but a few examples of human rights issues on which theCEECs have supported the EU line, there are also a number of matters onwhich this set of countries, their situation and their national concernshave to some extent come to shape the Union’s agenda. It is worth not-ing that a general criticism of the EU majority stance on human rights –the Union’s fervent and formal embrace of political and civic values – isthat it overshadows or neglects other human rights areas (Sano andLindholt, 2001). There is, however, some activity registered on the partof the Central and East European member states in regard to these mat-ters. For example, in the 55th session three out of six UN Committeesemphasized the need to urgently address the situation of women intransition countries, in particular their vulnerability as victims ofhuman smuggling, in response to joint Central and East European andEU insistence. As Sarunas Adomavicius, Under-Secretary of Lithuania’sMinistry of Foreign Affairs, stressed to the UN Human Rights Committee(which monitors implementation of the International Convention onCivil and Political Rights), ‘more international cooperation was neces-sary to ensure protection of victims’, adding that developing and coor-dinating a single Europe-wide strategy to combat trafficking should beseriously considered (United Nations, 2004).
Another area of human rights which has registered some activity onthe part of the Central and East European member states is, as previouslynoted, the matter of minorities. Perhaps the most active of all of thenine countries here under review in terms of human rights has beenHungary. The UNGA has become one of several international outlets forits aspirations in terms of the protecting minority rights. The Hungariangovernment has been vigorously promoting the rights of Hungarianminorities living beyond its frontiers (especially in Romania, Ukraineand Western Balkans), although careful to couch its ambitions in alanguage showing concern for minority rights all around the world.Hungary has thus consistently argued in the UNGA and in relevantspecialized committees that ‘the international community should payattention to the human rights situation of minorities not only whengenocide or other tragic events were already taking place but muchearlier, when catastrophes could be prevented’ (UN Information Service,1999). As Janos Martonyi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, speak-ing before the UN Commission for Human Rights, has argued the ‘timehad come for the United Nations to meet its historical debt with regardto the elaboration of the legally binding Convention on the rights ofminorities’ (UN Information Service, 1999). Eastern enlargement has inthis sense brought home the issue of minorities to the West European
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states and the international agenda of the European Union in terms ofthese issues are increasingly coloured by the state of the matter in theCentral and East European member states, Bulgaria and Romania.However, while EU member states are now quite aware of the importanceof minority rights generally, several are still reticent to back Hungary’sdiplomacy within the UN on this issue (primarily because they do notwish to implement international and European conventions on minorityrights in their own countries).
International security
The activity of the Union on matters of security and disarmament hasincreased in the past decade. International security is a highly divisiveissue in the different UN bodies and thus the divergence among EU coun-tries is not surprising. The urgency of peace and security at the GeneralAssembly and Security Council is also felt in Central and East Europeancapitals. The European Union has in the past decade focused much of itsactivity in terms of international security on issues such as the ban of anti-personnel landmines (Ottawa Convention), working to eliminate theuse of chemical and biological weapons, and contributing to peace-keeping/peace-building missions. On these matters Central and EastEuropean delegations have lent their solid support to the EU majority andhave generally followed the line marked by the rotating EU Presidency ineach UNGA session. Bulgaria and Romania have shown particular interestfor the matter of anti-personnel landmines and been quite active inefforts by the UN to eradicate these artefacts in the Balkan area. Bucharest,for example, hosted in February 2004 an international workshop on‘Progress in meeting the aims of the Ottawa Convention in South EasternEurope’ together with others in the region, illustrating a dedicated regionaland European interest for the unwinding of the Western Balkans wars.
However, there are also a few areas in the field of internationalsecurity that are of special importance to the CEECs, and where theyhave chosen to mark a rather distinct profile compared to some of theirEU counterparts. This is an example of the ‘patchy’ Europeanizationreferred to at the beginning of this chapter. This patchiness is especiallytrue for matters related to nuclear weapons, proliferation and/or theirde-commissioning. It is perhaps in terms of resolutions related tonuclear matters in which one best can see the continued cohesionamong Bulgaria, Romania and the Central and East European memberstates. At the 53rd General Assembly in 1998, Belarus introduced a mav-erick proposal to create a nuclear weapons-free zone in Central andEastern Europe. Belarus submitted its resolution in the face of categorical
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opposition from the majority of states in the region and it was unani-mously rejected (Matuszewski, 1999, p. 48). The matter of a nuclearweapons-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe is a sore point for mostcountries in this region. The Central and East European member states,together with Bulgaria and Romania – all NATO members – would preferto keep their options open for the future in terms of whether nuclearweapons should be stationed on their territory. On this, they are broadlysupported by EU and NATO member states. But the issue illustrates howsensitive these countries are about their security, and particularly theperceived lingering threat from Russia. With a long and conflictual his-tory with their great power neighbour to the east, the Central and EastEuropean governments at least for now want to hedge their bets againstthe return of a belligerent Russia. In that respect, the CEECs worry abouta disturbing penchant among many EU (and NATO) members (forexample, Germany) for a ‘Russia-first’ policy. This perceived favouritismtowards Moscow is to some extent unsettling for a group of countriesthat have persistently in the past decade felt different gradients ofinsecurity in terms of their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In other areas related to international security, common ground hasbeen easier to find between new and old EU member states. The Centraland East European UN representatives have, together with the rest of theEuropean Union, become quite active in UNGA in terms of reducingconventional weapons, such as small and light arms. Being the ‘gate-keepers’ between the European Union and the outside the growingtrend of small arms smuggling has become a disturbing phenomenon inthese areas, with resulting destabilizing domestic effects. Some of theformer Yugoslav republics in the Western Balkans have become veritablehavens for buyers to acquire weapons of all kind, whether by mercenariesor by terrorists. Lithuania, for example, has argued for urgent interna-tional efforts to curtail proliferation of small arms – echoing strong EUsupport for international action in this area. Oskaras Jusys, the DeputyMinister of Foreign Affairs of this Baltic country, in the connection withthe 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and LightWeapons, has urged the international community ‘to address criticalissues in the field of transparency, legitimate transfers, accountability,enforcement of sanctions, and observance of moratoria. A commitmentto elimination of land-mines [through the Ottawa Convention] shouldnow be coupled with an effort toward putting small arms off-limits tobelligerent cause’ (Lithuanian Permanent Mission to the UN, 1995).
A final consideration worth making in the field of internationalsecurity is the highly ambiguous relationship that it generates between
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Central and East European capitals, Brussels and Washington, as is wellillustrated if one compares Central and East European voting records inthe UNGA and Security Council. The Central and East European memberstates, Bulgaria and Romania have at times seen themselves torn betweenloyalties, being both aspirants to join the European Union and NATO aswell as dependent on Washington for military assistance. Statistics revealthat, out of the nine countries under consideration, Bulgaria, Poland andthe Baltic states have been the most consistent supporters of US policyin the UNGA and Security Council in the past decade (most recently onIraq, but also on a host of other matters). However, the Bulgarian,Estonian, Latvian (as of late), Lithuanian and Polish vote, put in perspec-tive, have on average not tended to be much more pro-United Statesthan, for example, Benelux, Germany and/or the UK.
Perhaps part of the explanation for the Central and East Europeanambivalence between the European Union and the United States is alsodue to a tendency to view a close alliance with the United States as notonly essential in terms of security, but also as a potential leverage whichcan be used, if needed, to enhance their individual position vis-à-visother European partners (being small countries). As Zaborowski (2004)has argued ‘[t]he Poles as well as many other Central and East Europeannations are reconciled with the notion that they are unable to providefor their own security, consequently, they accept a hegemonic interna-tional system, so long as the hegemon is liberal-democratic and is not anearby state’. However, the Central and East European governments arealso readily aware of the necessity of performing a delicate balance act.As Ker-Lindsay (2003) has said of Bulgaria, and it can be extended as avalid argument for all the CEECs, ‘[i]t knows that it cannot afford to beseen as little more than a US mouthpiece within Europe, blindly accept-ing American positions. As a result it has taken steps to show that itunderstands and readily accepts the EU position on issues where the USholds a differing view’. The Central and East European member states,and the two candidate states have, in other words, found themselves ina similar position of delicate equilibrium as the other ‘Atlanticists’ in theEuropean Union.
Conclusions
The Europeanization processes which have worked to integrate theCentral and East European member states, and are on the verge of alsoincorporating Bulgaria and Romania, into the European mainstream interms of international politics must be deemed as successful, if yet not
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concluded. The UNGA voting convergence between the new memberstates and the old ones has been well beyond expectation. If there wereever concerns that a group of countries with such a different back-ground were to successfully adopt the norms and policies of theEuropean Union such as the CEECs, these concerns must now have beenirrefutably proven otherwise. However, the argument presented heresuggests the Europeanization process is a two-way street; the EuropeanUnion has inevitably been touched by the international concerns of thenew member states. Evidence points to new sensibilities for the formerFifteen in terms of issues related to exploitation of women and theproblems related to minorities, among others.
It should also be noted, however, that the continued, lingeringpreoccupation for sovereignty and, in the case of Estonia, Latvia andLithuania, territorial integrity, together with the historical view of thefailure to enforce multilateral agreements have left the countries inCentral and Eastern Europe a bit sceptical about the United Nations. Inparticular their wariness stems from the limited capacity of the GeneralAssembly to make a difference in terms of international security. Thus,while they ably ‘play the UN game’, for a majority of the Central andEastern member states the UNGA is not where the main decisions onsecurity will ever be taken. Their ‘docile’ stance vis-à-vis other EU mem-bers, and the ease with which they fit into the EU continuum ofnational positions in the UNGA, could thus on another level be inter-preted as a certain indifference against the UN as a forum. There is cer-tainly an awareness in Central and East European capitals that, on issuesthat really matter to these nine countries, they have to seek alternativeinternational fora to satisfy their foreign and security objectives.
Notes
1. The acquis communitaire is the body of European law and the acquis politique isthe body of all EPC and CFSP decisions that new members are obliged toaccept as a condition of membership.
2. Slovenia is not included in this study because it has had a highly particularforeign policy trajectory (due mainly to the Yugoslav wars) over the pastdecade and a half.
3. For example, at the 55th Session (2000) of the UN Commission on HumanRights, Austria introduced a resolution on the rights of persons belonging tominorities, which was co-sponsored by other EU members of CHR, but notsupported by all EU member states. The resolution expresses concern aboutthe ‘victimisation or marginalisation of minorities’ and the tragic conse-quences of the growing frequency and severity of conflicts regarding minori-ties in many countries, UN Commission on Human Rights, 1999. Another is
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the inclusion of references to minorities in such key documents as EuropeanCommission, 1999 and 2001d.
4. Holloway and Tomlinson situate the year of change in terms of the 46th ses-sion, although they acknowledge that change had already begun in the 45th.
5. During the Cold War era, the share of UNGA resolutions adopted by a votewas approximately half of the total number of resolutions introduced, whichreveals the tense political climate that prevailed in the Assembly duringthose years. In the early years of the 1990s, nevertheless, the share of resolu-tions voted upon in the UNGA dropped to about a quarter of the total num-ber of resolutions and has currently found a plateau at roughly 20 per cent ofall UNGA resolutions.
6. The lines, each with their respective indentifying symbol as according to thelegend provided, represent the individual countries’ voting pattern. The linesare pictured as relative to EU majority vote, represented graphically as100 per cent. Each stage of the curve has been considered for the number ofEU members and thus the EU majority varies between EU-10, EU-12 and EU-15. In terms of EU-15, the majority vote equals unanimity or n � 8 in alltwo-way split, in a three-way split situation the majority may be at n � 6.A two-way split refers to when at least one of the member states abstains,while the rest vote either ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ A three-way split, on the other hand,stands for a situation where at least one member state in the group voted ‘no’while the rest voted ‘yes’, or a situation where at least one member statevoted ‘no’ while the rest vote ‘yes’ and/or abstained. All cases where one orseveral member states have been absent, and thus not participated in thevote in question are not included in this survey. However, this fact does notsignificantly skew the final results, in that, for example, of the total votes inthe period 1997–2002 (Sessions 52–56) approximately only 1.5 per cent ofthese votes were affected by one or more EU countries’ non-participation.
7. Note that all years indicated here are the year when the UNGA session wasinaugurated. The session, however, is biennial and runs from September/October to September every year.
8. Bilateral border treaties formalizing Estonia’s and Latvia’s borders with theRussian Federation were negotiated in 1996 and 1997 respectively, butneither has yet been signed and ratified by Moscow. Attempts to do so in2005 failed. Lithuania signed a border treaty with Russia in 1999, but it stillawaits ratification by the Russian duma.
9. Prior to George W. Bush taking office in the White House in 2000, Franceand the UK’s coincidence with the US vote had reached heights of nearly75–80 per cent. Today, although they both remain the most pro-UnitedStates General Assembly voters of the EU-25, this coincidence is down at 50.7and 57.1 per cent respectively. US State Department, Bureau of InternationalOrganization Affairs, ‘Voting Practices in the United Nations’, annual.
10. This voting alignment stands in sharp contrast to the pre-2000 period wherethe Central and Eastern European voting coincidence was the highest withthe southern EU member states (second group).
11. Hungary has consistently voted in agreement with Germany and Beneluxsince 1996.
12. The ICC was created to defend against crimes committed against humanrights. The matter became particularly sore between the United States and
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Europe as the Bush Administration in 2002 took the dramatic step of ‘unsigning’the treaty, which the Clinton administration had signed in December 2000.However, even after considerable political pressure from the StateDepartment, all Central and Eastern European candidate states refused tosign a bilateral treaty which would have the prosecution of US troops oper-ating in a determined country in Central and Eastern Europe exempt fromthe court’s competence. ‘Brussels could intervene in ICC row,’ EU Observer,4 July 2003.
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6Effective Multilateralism andCollective Security: Empowering the UNSven Biscop and Edith Drieskens1
In 2003, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan launched a major debate on therules and mechanisms of multilateralism by appointing a High-Level Panelto evaluate the challenges to collective security. This debate over collectivesecurity built on earlier UN reports produced by independent commissionsand panels evaluating humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping oper-ations (see United Nations, 2000; International Commission onIntervention and State Sovereignty, 2001). Simultaneously, in the wake ofthe Iraq crisis, the EU was grappling with debates over crafting acommon defence and security policy. This chapter assesses the EU’scontribution to the UN debate over the future of collective security.After outlining the organization of EU–UN relations in the field ofsecurity, the chapter looks at how the EU is pursuing the EuropeanSecurity Strategy’s ambitious objectives at the UN. It then looks at thecontribution which the EU is willing to make to UN actions in the fieldof security, notably in the fields of early warning/conflict preventionand crisis management, inter alia through the partnership for crisismanagement between the Commission and the UN Secretariat and theavailability of EU forces for operations at the request of the UN. Finally,the chapter assesses the extent to which the EU has been able to realizeits ambitions to be a major actor in the area of peace and security in thecontext of the UN.
Intersecting multilateralisms: a comprehensive definition of collective security
At the European Council meeting of 12 December 2003, EU memberstates took a significant step forward in the development of their
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Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), adopting for the first timea common security strategy. The European Security Strategy, entitled‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, established effective multilateralismas the defining principle of the EU’s external relations. Building-blocksare the development of a stronger international society, well function-ing institutions and a rule-based international order (European Council,2003a). The document states that international organizations, regimesand treaties can only be effective if the EU is ‘ready to act when theirrules are broken’, and that ‘there is a price to be paid’ when countriesplace themselves outside the bounds of international society. Inother words, for the EU, effective multilateralism implies enforceablemultilateralism.
The European Security Strategy clearly indicates that for the EU, theUN is the central actor in achieving effective multilateralism. Yet, it doesnot explicitly say that the EU should seek a mandate from the UNSecurity Council (UNSC) for coercive military action. The absence ofsuch requirement could be read as allowing for a Kosovo scenario, thatis, military action without explicit prior UNSC authorization. However,whereas the European Security Strategy states that ‘the United NationsSecurity Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance ofinternational peace and security’, the ‘EU Strategy against Proliferationof Weapons of Mass Destruction’, adopted at the same EuropeanCouncil meeting, explicitly refers to the UNSC as ‘the final arbiteron the consequences of non-compliance’ (European Council, 2003b). Incase of non-compliance, when political and diplomatic instruments fail,‘coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and interna-tional law’, including the use of force, can be considered. In otherwords, the EU recognizes military intervention as a real option, but as alast resort, to be used only with UNSC authorization.
The EU confirmed this position through its contribution to the workof the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The ‘EUPaper for Submission to the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challengesand Change’ of May 2004 repeats the mantra that if there are no other‘valid options’, military action is permitted, but ‘military action goingbeyond the lawful exercise of the right to self-defense should be takenon the basis of Security Council decisions’ (Council of the EuropeanUnion, 2004a). Accordingly, the December 2004 European Council wel-comed the High-Level Panel’s final report, which reaffirmed the positionof the UNSC as the ‘international community’s collective security voice’,stating that it is not a matter of finding ‘alternatives to the UNSC as asource of authority’ (United Nations Secretary General’s High-Level
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Panel, 2004). Moreover, the EU not only saw its attachment to collectivesecurity echoed in the Panel’s recommendations, but also its compre-hensive approach to security, looking beyond traditional politico-military confines.
According to the Panel, the security threats we face today ‘go farbeyond states waging aggressive war’. Unlike in the early years of theUN, threats no longer originate from ‘state actors’ only but also from‘non-state actors’, and not only endanger ‘state security’ but the ‘humansecurity’ of individuals as well. The Panel concluded that a ‘new securityconsensus’ is needed, based on a ‘comprehensive vision of collectivesecurity’. This view was embraced by the reform proposals whichSecretary General Kofi Annan presented on 21 March 2005 (UnitedNations Secretary General, 2005a). Arguing that present-day threatsinclude not just war and conflict, but also poverty, deadly infectious dis-eases and environmental degradation, Annan recognized that security(‘freedom from fear’), development (‘freedom from want’) and humanrights (‘freedom to live in dignity’) are intertwined. Incorporating thepolitico-military dimension in such a global, integrated framework,Annan’s view meshed perfectly with the integrative approach tosecurity which the EU has been following for years (Biscop, 2005b).Consequently, it was no surprise that the EU welcomed Annan’s reportat the March 2005 European Council meeting, calling it a ‘prime contri-bution’ to the preparations of the UN Millenium Review Summit inSeptember of that year.
Summarizing, since the 2003 Iraq crisis and throughout the ensuingdebate on the role and position of the UN, the EU has emerged as one ofthe staunchest supporters of multilateralism. By drafting a number ofcommon strategic documents, declarations and communications, andthrough its support for the recommendations made by the High-LevelPanel and Kofi Annan, the EU has confirmed its belief in collective secu-rity. At the same time, its comprehensive approach has been endorsedby both the reports of the High-Level Panel and Kofi Annan. Yet, thisdoes not necessarily imply that UN thinking has been Europeanized interms of an ‘exportation’ of the European security model to the UN(Olsen, 2002). Undoubtedly, the European members of the High-LevelPanel and the various EU documents have influenced the reports,reflecting a sort of external effectiveness. However, because of the confi-dential nature of the proceedings one cannot provide a decisive answerabout whether or not the ‘export/import balance’ is positive, indicatingthat the EU has been able to exert more influence than others (Olsen,2002, p. 924). Moreover, from the EU perspective, overemphasizing the
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similarities could be counter-productive. In order not to provoke resist-ance in other parts of the world, it is better to present the Panel’s andAnnan’s proposals as the result of a broad consensus and avoid theperception of European – or western – dominance of the proceedings.Perhaps as important as the question to which degree the EU has beenexternally effective in shaping UN thinking is the conclusion that theUN redefining itself has been an excellent opportunity for the EU tofurther position itself as a foreign policy actor and consolidate the inter-nal consensus on collective and comprehensive security. Discussions onUN reform have contributed to the process of Europeanization of secu-rity within the EU, with the exception of UNSC reform, on which the EUremains internally divided.
The question then is whether the EU has been successful in translat-ing its support for the UN at the strategic level into policy practice. Inthe introduction to this volume, Laatikainen and Smith argue thatinfluence on UN decision-making or external effectiveness requires notonly an institutional capability for coordinating the policies of the EUmember states – its internal effectiveness – but also a certain degree ofpolicy adaptation or Europeanization by member states themselves. Inwhat follows, we analyse to which degree these conditions are fulfilledwhere security policy is concerned. Moving beyond the conceptuallevel, by analysing the status-quaestionis of EU actorness in the UNSC, wedemonstrate the institutional constraints on effective multilateralism.Although we also discuss the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the mainfocus is the UNSC, as it remains the primary decision-making body inthe field of peace and security. We conclude this chapter by focusing onhow the EU applies effective multilateralism in practice, assessing itscontribution of civilian and military capabilities to the UN.
Institutional constraints on effective multilateralism: about principals and agents
On 24 March 2003, in an interview with Die Welt, the EU’s CFSP HighRepresentative, Javier Solana, alluded to the creation of a permanentseat for the EU in the UNSC. According to Solana, as differences of opin-ion had been running exactly between the four EU members of theUNSC, a possible explanation for the Iraq saga in the spring of 2003could have been the lack of a single EU representation: ‘The EU is notrepresented by one seat in the UN. Yet, the problems started in the UN.What makes it difficult for the EU and me is that the EU has four mem-bers in the UNSC. (…) Imagine what influence Europe could have had if
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it had spoken with one voice. The lesson we learnt is that Europe islosing influence when it does not speak with one voice.’2 One year later,Solana put it as follows: ‘If France and the UK do not reach a commonposition, there will be no common EU position. Therefore, I advise allpermanent and non-permanent members of the UNSC to be aware thatthey are not just representing their own country but also the spirit of theEU – or at least should be representing the spirit of the EU.’3 As auniform EU representation is expected to increase the bargaining powerof the EU in the UNSC, Solana’s suggestion is illustrative of the ongoingdebate about how to increase the EU’s international presence.
Following Allen and Smith (1990), presence refers to ‘the ability toexert influence, to shape the perceptions and expectations of others’. Inrecent years, scholars have often enclosed this notion in a broaderframework, applying the concept of actorness to describe and evaluatethe EU as an international actor (see Hill, 1996; Jupille and Caporaso,1998; Ginsberg, 2001; Vogler, 1999 and 2002; Joleka, 2002; andLaatikainen, 2003). To answer the question whether the EU can be con-sidered an effective international actor in the dossiers tabled in theUNSC, we apply the ‘actor capacity’ criteria established by Jupille andCaporaso (1998, pp. 214–21): recognition, authority, autonomy andcohesion. As for the first criterion, Jupille and Caporaso note that thirdparties recognizing EU competence is a ‘minimum condition’ for actor-ness. Yet, such recognition does not necessarily imply diplomatic recog-nition under international law or formal EU membership of aninternational organization (de jure or formal recognition). It can also bethe result however of third parties interacting with the EU rather thanwith the individual member states (de facto or informal recognition).
Today, the EC and EU do not have the legal competence or authorityto act on behalf of the EU member states in the UNSC, nor do they havea formal status as members or observers. Yet this is not to say that thepositions and representatives of the EC and EU are completely absentfrom the UNSC. Indeed, the fact that the EU does not have a seat in theUNSC or formal authority does not mean that there are no legalimpulses for the EU member states in the UNSC to speak with a com-mon voice. Here, Article 19 (2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)stipulates that EU members of the UNSC should ‘concert’ and keep theirfellow member states ‘fully informed’ about their activities. In addition,those EU member states that are permanent members of the UNSCshould ‘ensure the defence of the positions and the interests ofthe Union’, be it ‘without prejudice to their responsibilities under theprovisions of the United Nations Charter’.
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Within this context, the degree to which the EU is recognized as aninternational actor can be positively influenced by the interactionbetween the other two criteria of actorness, cohesion and autonomy,which can create a situation of indirect authority. Recognition dependson whether the relationship between the 25 EU member states in theCouncil and the EU members of the UNSC as defined by Article 19 (2)TEU can be characterized as a relationship between principals and agents,that is, the degree to which the agents loyally resound the coordi-nated position of the principals. More specifically, the so-called ‘perfect’principal–agent relationship can create a situation of de facto pooledinternational representation. If the EU member states reach a coordinatedposition at the level of the EU and the EU members of the UNSC echo thisposition at the UNSC, states like the US, China and Russia are sittingaround the UNSC table with a number of European discussion partnerswho strike the same note, creating a negotiation context of bilateral coop-eration between the EU and these states in a multilateral context. By con-trast, when internal EU coordination does not result in a coordinatedposition, they face a number of European discussion partners who allstrike different notes, resulting in a situation of multilateral cooperationin a multilateral context. This may also be the case if the EU memberstates do reach a coordinated position at the level of the EU, but the EUmembers in the UNSC do not echo this. In other words, for a ‘perfect’principal–agent relationship, two conditions have to be fulfilled, referringto the criteria of cohesion and autonomy respectively: first, the principalshave to succeed in reaching a common position at the level of the EU; sec-ondly, the agents have to resound this position at the UNSC.
In comparision to external trade negotiations, for example, in whichthe EU member states mostly delegate negotiation authority to theCommission according to a legally established procedure, when applyingprincipal–agent concepts to EU decision-making in the UNSC, two thingshave to be kept in mind. First, as appears from Article 19 (2) TEU, the del-egation of negotiating authority by the Council, and in practice by thePolitical and Security Committee (PSC), is neither formalized nor institu-tionalized. A formal negotiating mandate is not provided for in the TEU.As any delegation is an informal one, the agents may not only have thepossibility to act autonomously, but also the ability to do so because thereare no sanctions mechanisms. Second, whereas in the case of externaltrade negotiations there is mostly only one agent, here, there are a num-ber of EU member states in the UNSC that could be assigned the role ofagents. In addition, being a subset of the principals, that is, the Council,these member states are always part of the decision to delegate negotiating
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autonomy. For this reason, they could be in a position to develop a defacto initiating right in the Council, becoming first movers in EU decision-making.
The question therefore is whether EU members in the UNSC viewtheir seats as instruments of EU foreign policy rather than as expressionsof national sovereignty, and themselves as European rather than asnational agents. In answering this question, we will answer the questionsif and to what degree the EU has developed internal effectiveness byestablishing coordination mechanisms in the frameworks of the UNGAand UNSC, whether through Europeanization the EU member statestend to adapt their policy preferences to ensure a common EU voice atthe UN in security dossiers, and to what extent the EU is externallyeffective in influencing UN decision-making.
Effective multilateralism in UNGA and UNSC: a single voice on security issues?
Voting records of the UNGA reveal that towards the end of the twentiethcentury, EU member states have moved progressively towards speakingwith a single voice. Overall EU voting cohesion in the UNGA increasedfrom 74 per cent in the second half of the 1980s to 95 per cent in thesecond half of the 1990s, including consensus votes.4 Yet, the samevoting records show the difficulty of bringing the EU member states,and especially France and the UK, into line on international securityissues. Between 1995 and 1999 the General Assembly’s First Committee(Disarmament and International Security Committee) displayed themost two- and three-way split votes, with France and the UK often tak-ing a different view than their fellow member states. Voting behaviourin the GA’s Fourth Committee (Special Political and DecolonzsationCommittee), responsible for decolonization and the Middle East PeaceProcess, confirms the difficulty of speaking with a single voice onCommon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) issues. Indeed, a gradualconvergence notwithstanding, in the second half of the 1990s two-and three-way split voting proved to be unavoidable (Wouters, 2001,pp. 387–404). In addition, for international security and disarmamentdossiers, during the 1990s a core group of member states includingBelgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Spain,Greece and Denmark often constituted the EU majority in the UNGA(Luif, 2003, pp. 33–49). Since the mid-1990s, France and the UK havebeen more distant from this majority than other member states.Moreover, mainly because of similar policy preferences on nuclear
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weapons issues, in comparison to the other EU member states, the vot-ing behaviour of France and the UK has been relatively close to the US.
In its Communication ‘The European Union and the United Nations:The Choice for Multilateralism’ of 10 September 2003, the Commissionnotes that while the practical implications of these split votes are gener-ally ‘marginal’, their impact on the EU’s credibility is ‘disproportionate’(European Commission, 2003). This is especially the case whencommon positions exist on the issues in question. According to theCommission, as they are ‘the result of a lack of consensus in Brussels’,split voting should be addressed by intensifying the coordinationbetween member states at the level of the EU, improving its internaleffectiveness. European Union member states have been streamliningtheir actions within the UNGA under the coordination of thePresidency. Since 1994, the Council’s Liaison Office in New York (NYLO)has been assisting the Presidency, providing not only secretariat services,but also functioning as institutional memory. To ensure consistencybetween the EU and UN levels, according to the Commission, the great-est possible use should be made of the relevant Council bodies. The PSCcould perform a steering function to ensure cohesion between CFSPpositions and the positions taken by the EU member states within theUN. As for coordination in the UNSC, the Commission argues that the‘practical implementation’ of the obligations under Article 19 TEU couldbe improved ‘substantially’. Here, the text explicitly mentions that incase a common position exists on an issue under discussion in theUNSC, France and the UK could ensure that at least one of them presentsit. The Commission also states it to be the future EU foreign minister’stask to ensure consistent common positions within the EU, as well as topresent them at the UN, including in the UNSC.
Today, in most scheduled UNSC debates, the country holding the EUPresidency is invited to participate in Security Council deliberations anddirectly represents the EU. In practice, it usually makes a statement onbehalf of the EU, to which the other EU Security Council member statesroutinely refer. Most of the time not only the candidate countries, butalso the countries participating in the Stabilisation and AssociationProcess and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries alignthemselves with these Presidency statements, which is one indicator ofthe EU’s external effectiveness. In 2004, the Irish and Dutch Presidenciesissued 39 such statements to the UNSC. In line with the comprehensivesecurity approach the EU stands for, the topics included conflict regionslike the Balkans (8), West and Central Africa (5), the Middle East (4),Timor-Leste (4), Afghanistan (2), Sudan (1) and Haiti (1), as well as
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horizontal issues including terrorism (5), non-proliferation (2) and con-flict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction (7).Moreover, the EU Presidency also invited Javier Solana twice. Solanadelegated European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) DeputyDirector-General Peter Feith to speak on his behalf on cooperationbetween the UN and regional organizations on 20 July 2004, butattended the discussion on civilian crisis management on 22 September2004 himself. While EU member states are full participants in the UNSC,neither the High Representative nor Presidency (as such) has votingrights. Moreover, the majority of the negotiations on draft resolutionsare conducted by the UNSC members in the caucasing sessions or ininformal meetings outside of formal UNSC sessions (Smith, 2005,pp. 223–4). As a result, notwithstanding the fact that the EU has beenincreasingly visible in the UNSC, the degree to which the EU is presentin actual UNSC decision-making remains dependent on the degree towhich the EU member states in the UNSC allow for this. Indeed, whenGermany and Spain announced their intention to offer a seat to the EUPresidency within their delegation during their UNSC membership(2003–04), this was blocked by France and the UK. As Laatikainenalready noted, there is a difference between presenting the Europeanview on certain issues before the UNSC and joint European decision-making in the UNSC (Laatikainen, 2003, pp. 409–41).
For many years, France and the UK have given their obligation underArticle 19 of the TEU to provide information about the developmentswithin the UNSC a minimalist interpretation, limiting themselves toanswering questions at the weekly meetings of the EU heads of missionin New York (Luif, 2003, pp. 16–19; Sucharipa, 2003, pp. 773–97). InJanuary 2001 this changed as the practice of Article 19 briefings wasestablished. In these weekly briefings, chaired by the Presidency, one ofthe European UNSC members informs the permanent missions of theEU member states at the UN about the ins and outs in the UNSC. TheIraq crisis, during which these briefings were organized on a daily andeven hourly basis in an attempt to settle the intra-European disputes,has given this development a new impulse as EU member states are nowmostly briefed at an earlier stage. In addition, briefings are now forward-looking, as the upcoming agenda and draft resolutions are tabled.According to an unwritten rule, when EU members in the UNSC distrib-ute documents in the UNSC, they are also circulated among their fellowEU members. Yet, in comparison to the weekly meetings of the deputyheads of missions and the informal contacts in the corridors andantechambers of the UNSC, Article 19 briefings do not often provide
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new information. What is more, even if since 2002 the missions haveappointed UNSC coordinators, these meetings are still devoted toinformation-sharing rather than coordination. Indeed, with theexception of the EU member states having agreed in the spring of 2005to consult extensively on UNSC resolutions providing for the possibilityof economic sanctions against individual Al-Qaida and Taliban members,systematic ex ante coordination on UNSC matters is, especially for thepermanent members, still out of the question.
An additional problem is that EU common positions, declarations andstatements rarely present the right framework for representing the EU inthe UNSC, as they are often too general in nature. At the same time, asthe practice of EU participation in UN conferences reveals, too detailedand too rigid EU positions limit room for negotiation in the UNSC,which would be unworkable and unacceptable for the EU member stateson the UNSC, specifically France and the UK, who greatly value theirposition as permanent members. The declaration that the LuxembourgPresidency issued on ‘The Report by the International Commission ofInquiry on Darfur’ on 8 February 2005 is a good example of the oftendifficult balancing exercise between direction (cohesion) and flexi-bility (autonomy) (European Union Presidency, 2005). Whereas Francewanted a strong declaration in favour of the International Commission’srecommendation to involve the International Criminal Court (ICC), theUK preferred more flexibility in view of the need to negotiate withthe US, as the latter had expressed its opposition to the implication of theICC. The declaration adopted confirms the standing EU position, but atthe same time can be interpreted as leaving considerable leeway to themember states on the UNSC:
The Commission of Inquiry recommends that those responsibleshould answer for their acts before the International Criminal Court.In this context, the EU reaffirms its constant support for theInternational Criminal Court, and reiterates its common position onthe ICC, while noting that it is for the United Nations SecurityCouncil to take a rapid decision on this matter.
Moreover, although on occasion France in particular attempts to obtaina fixed position from the PSC as a function of its own needs, notably incases when it can be expected that the view of Paris will be differentfrom that of London, the agenda of the PSC is insufficiently alignedwith the agenda of the UNSC. As a result, although member states’permanent representatives in New York, who are often among their
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most senior diplomats, are not always looking forward to receive whatmay look like ‘instructions’ from their mostly junior colleagues in thePSC, it would be useful, when issues are up for discussion in the UNSC,to include them on the agenda of the PSC in order to frame the debatein New York, even if only by recapitulating EU positions formulated inBrussels.
In conclusion, there appears to be substantive consensus between theEU member states on the long-term strategy of conflict prevention andstabilization, and the actions that this entails. As indicated by thePresidency Statements and the voting behaviour of the member stateson such issues, despite imperfect coordination mechanisms (internaleffectiveness) the EU finds it possible to act in a coordinated and cohe-sive manner at the level of the UN, including the UNSC. Moreover, itsvoice is heard by the other UNSC members. But in crisis situations, thedegree of Europeanization and effectiveness are not a matter of course.As the Iraq crisis demonstrated, recourse to national approaches is notuncommon. While consistent with the EU position on conflict preven-tion and stabilization, recent French and British involvement in IvoryCoast and Sierra Leone respectively reveals the continued proclivities ofnational action as opposed to multilateral action. The problem with thisfor the EU is when member states look to the other side of the Atlanticfor confirmation and guidance rather than promote a EU response. Thefact that these countries not only see the US as their point of referencebut also consider EU foreign policy to be a function of US foreign policymakes it difficult for the EU to develop into the determined and credibleactor with the ‘strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when nec-essary, robust intervention’ that the European Security Strategy calls for.As such, the conditions for establishing EU actorness in the UNSC donot differ from the conditions for establishing general EU actorness inthe framework of the CFSP/ESDP.
Effective multilateralism in the field: contributing EUcapabilities
As it has proclaimed itself the defender of collective security, and withtwo of the permanent members of the UNSC in its ranks, the EU hasbeen considered a primary addressee of the High-Level Panel’s andAnnan’s reports, including by high-level UN officials. As Kofi Annansaid to the December 2004 European Council: ‘As we move ahead, fullEuropean engagement will be essential. […] the world now looks to youto support a global multilateral framework’ (United Nations Secretary
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General, 2004). Because ‘the fit between the Panel’s proposals and EUobjectives is astonishingly close’, Lord David Hannay, the Britishmember of the High-Level Panel, identified the challenge these highexpectations pose to the EU: ‘Can its foreign policy move beyond warmwords and fine-sounding communiqués to action; and can it deploy itsinfluence to convince less enthusiastic members to move forward’(Hannay, 2005)?
These expectations for an EU–UN partnership in the field of securitywere fostered by the earlier adoption, by the June 2001 GöteborgEuropean Council, of a ‘Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in ConflictPrevention and Crisis Management’, which named three priority areasof cooperation: conflict prevention, the civilian and military aspects ofcrisis management, and particular regional issues (the Balkans, theMiddle East, the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and West Africa).Moreover, on 24 September 2003 both organizations signed a ‘JointDeclaration on Cooperation in Crisis Management’, with the aim ofincreasing coordination and compatibility of mission planning units,training, communication and best practices. A Steering Committee atworking level was established in February 2004 to further these goals.Regular meetings now take place between staff from both organizations,involving, on the side of the EU, the Policy Planning Unit, the MilitaryStaff, the Council Secretariat and the Commission, and, on the side ofthe UN, the Secretariat’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Departmentof Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and the UN Situation Centre. TheEU’s NYLO acts as support for these contacts. While there are three for-mal, high-level meetings between the EU and the UN per year, workingcontacts are almost daily. In a way, this cooperation has also served as aneye-opener for the UN, providing insight into the functioning andpotential of the EU.
The EU member states contribute about 40 per cent of the UN’s peace-keeping budget, the largest contribution by far (European Union, 2004),but their contribution in terms of manpower is rather smaller. In April2005 the EU-25 provided 4533 military observers, civilian police andtroops for UN operations or only about 6.8 per cent out of a total ofabout 66,500. In recent years, the absolute numbers of EU troop contri-butions have not varied that much, but the overall number of UNoperations and of troops engaged has risen enormously, as a result ofwhich, the relative weight of the EU contribution has greatly dimin-ished. This is a distorted image however, since these figures only takeinto account operations under direct UN command. EU member states
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further contribute in much more substantial numbers to operationsmandated by the UN but undertaken by the EU and NATO: about7000 troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EU operation Althea), over 16,000 inKosovo (about 70 per cent of NATO’s KFOR) and about 4000 inAfghanistan (over 60 per cent of NATO-led ISAF). If these operations arecounted as well, EU member states are on average deploying some32,000 troops in support of the UN, which represents about half of theaverage total deployment of European forces at any one time in2003–05. Moreover, most EU member states seem to prefer such UN-mandated operations, rather than contributing troops to UN operationsdirectly under the command of New York. The motivation appears to bethe experiences of Bosnia and Rwanda, when communications betweenthe UN Headquarters and the force command on the ground, and hencedecision-making, proved to be slow and cumbersome increasing therisks for the troops in the field. In all cases the political authority mustremain with the UNSC, but in practice the exact nature of the relation-ship between the UNSC and a regional organization implementing anoperation on its behalf is often far from clear.
The first ESDP military operation which the EU implementedcompletely autonomously, that is without the use of NATO assets, wasin fact at the request of the UNSC. Resolution 1484 (30 May 2003)authorized the deployment of an ‘interim emergency multinationalforce’ in Bunia (DRC), where armed militias threatened the security ofthe local population and humanitarian aid workers, in order to allow theUN time to reinforce the military presence in the region by MONUC,the UN mission. The EU operation, code-named Artemis, was of limitedscope, in terms of duration (12 June – 1 September 2003) and scale(about 2000 troops deployed, including 400 at the support base atEntebbe airport in Uganda to secure the town of Bunia), but it certainlywas a high-risk operation in an extremely volatile environment under-taken at very short notice at a great distance from the EU. Its successfulimplementation served to boost Europe’s confidence in ESDP. Artemiscan be seen as an expression of the EU’s commitment to the UN, as wellas of its special interest in helping to maintain peace and security inAfrica. The operation also, however, highlighted the need to detail therelations between the UNSC and the EU when the EU acts on behalf ofthe former (Tardy, 2004). On a practical level, the EU and leading nationFrance at first appeared reticent to communicate all information regard-ing the deployment. At the political level, the EU apparently did notaccept any subordination of the PSC to the UNSC, though it did reporton the implementation of the mandate as stipulated in Resolution 1484.
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Artemis subsequently served as a model for the so-called ‘battlegroup’concept. In 2004, the EU decided to create 13 national and multina-tional 1500-strong battlegroups, which must be able to deploy no laterthan ten days after an EU decision to launch an operation and be sus-tainable for 120 days until the termination of the operation or relief byanother force. By 2007 the EU aims to be able to undertake two concur-rent battlegroup-sized operations. The explicit intention is to deploy thebattlegroups primarily at the request of the UN, for small-scale stand-alone operations, as the initial entry force pending the deployment ofa longer-term UN operation (or an operation by another regionalorganization, such as the African Union), or as an interim force betweentwo such operations – the so-called ‘bridging model’. As the UN’s forcegeneration process tends to be rather cumbersome, this would representa welcome addition to the UN’s capabilities and is a critical example ofhow the EU is contributing to the UN’s effectiveness.
However, a military contribution equal to its economic and politicalweight – and its share in the UN’s peace-keeping budget – seems todemand a greater effort from the EU than the implementation of thebattlegroup concept. For example, one would expect an effectivecommitment to peace in the DRC also to be translated into long-termparticipation in peacekeeping, as in the case of MONUC. Even whentaking into account the participation of member states’ forces in‘subcontracted’ operations, the current contribution of about 32,000troops does not seem proportionate to their combined capacity or to theposition of the EU in the UN. In comparison, in April 2005, Pakistan,Bangladesh, India, Ethiopia, Ghana and Nepal – countries that do notexactly have the same wealth or sophisticated military capabilities as theEU – together provided over 32,000 personnel for ongoing operations. Itmust also be noted that the UN-mandated EU and NATO operations areeither taking place on the European continent, or, as regards Afghanistan,as a follow-up to an initial operation of self-defence. The EU thus seemsto assume only a limited part of the UN’s responsibility for the mainte-nance of worldwide peace and security, apart from its financial contri-bution to the peacekeeping budget. Mainly financing other states’troops falls short of the burden-sharing that can be expected from oneof the most powerful global actors. Likewise, highly commendableefforts to empower other regional organizations to undertake peacesupport operations, such as the African Union (AU) through the AfricanPeace Facility, do not absolve the EU from its own responsibility,certainly not while the AU’s capacity is still far from fully fledged(Gowan, 2004, pp. 8–17). Until then, a nucleus of European troops and
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EU logistic support would greatly enhance the effectiveness of anyAU force.
An increased EU contribution of military and police forces is thus ofparamount importance if the UN is to fulfil its collective security role,for in view of the number of crises, ‘there remains a glaring gap betweenthe demand and the supply of capable peacekeeping forces that theinternational community can mobilize’ (O’Hanlon and Singer, 2004). Ithas to be recognized, however, that currently the EU is constrained bythe limited deployability of a large share of the member states’ armedforces and by capability gaps in the fields of intelligence, command andcontrol, and strategic transport – exactly the fields in which the UNitself is lacking. It is recommendable therefore that in the framework of‘effective multilateralism’ the EU would include a future larger-scalecontribution to UN-led or UN-mandated peace support operationsaround the world in the objectives of the capability-building process inESDP. While it is sometimes feared in New York that fewer EU troops willbe available for UN operations, the further development of ESDP shouldprecisely increase the number of deployable troops and thus enable theEU to contribute more (Guéhenno, 2005, pp. 7–12).
Assigning forces to UN-led operations remains a national decision, ona case-by-case basis, and several member states have bilateral stand-byarrangements with DPKO in which they commit to maintain specificcapabilities on stand-by in order to be able to react rapidly to requestsfrom the Secretary General. This does not mean, though, that themember states cannot jointly undertake to increase their contribution,agree a quantitative objective and take that into account when planningcapability needs and defining requirements in the framework of ESDP.In its June 2004 ‘Declaration on EU–UN Cooperation in Military CrisisManagement Operations’, the European Council further launched theidea of a ‘clearing house process’ as a complementary role for the EU inthis regard, with the aim of providing a framework for member statesto exchange information and coordinate their national contributions toUN operations.
Similarly, a quantitative objective could be set, looking beyond thebattlegroups and including both military and civilian capabilities, withregard to EU operations at the request of the UN, defining how manyoperations of which type – including peacekeeping – and at which scalethe EU would be willing to undertake. These could be short- and long-term EU-led operations, such as Artemis in Congo and Althea in Bosnia,under EU command and under the political control of the Council andthe PSC and only indirectly of the UNSC. Perhaps specific components
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or modules within the structure of a broader UN mission could also beenvisaged, with an EU force commander in the field, but under theoperational command of UN Headquarters in New York and underthe direct political control of the UNSC. A specific type of high-intensityoperation in which the UN is interested, but with regard to which theEU is very reluctant, is that of a ‘strategic’ or ‘over the horizon reserve’or ‘extraction force’, that is, an EU reserve force that would be on stand-by if rapid response were required in support of a UN operation, such asto support or evacuate peacekeeping forces in the event of an escalationof violence (Tardy, 2005, pp. 49–68).
To an increasing degree, the EU also has civilian capabilities tocontribute to integrated civil–military operations or exclusively civilianmissions. This is particularly relevant in the light of the High-LevelPanel’s recommendation to establish a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC),to fill a gap in the institutional architecture of the UN and create abody that can identify states at risk of collapse and to coordinateinternational assistance to frail states and states in post-conflict situa-tions (Biscop, 2005a, pp. 17–30). In view of its collective political andeconomic weight, it is advisable that the EU as such would be among the‘standing members’ of the PBC, rather than a range of individual memberstates, in order to contribute in a coherent way its expertise and assets inmany different relevant fields and maximize internal effectiveness. Thisexpertise concerns inter alia the military and civilian ESDP missions,including in the field of the rule of law, an area specifically mentionedby the Secretary General for inclusion in the PBC, as well as in the fieldof security sector reform, a new area for the EU. In Bosnia, the EU hasalready taken over the police operation (EUPM) from the UN InternationalPolice Task Force. Returning to the conceptual level, another area withgreat potential for cooperation is the development of doctrines andconcepts for integrated civil-military missions, in which both the EUand the UN are engaged.
Finally, an issue meriting particular attention is the exchange of infor-mation on specific countries. Like the UN, the EU collects a wide rangeof country-specific data. The Commission’s Conflict Prevention andCrisis Management Unit assesses the conflict indicators in its ‘CountryStrategy Papers,’ for which the Commission delegations in the field area vital source of information. In close cooperation with the CouncilSecretariat and the Joint Situation Centre, the Commission thusprovides a watch list of potential crisis states (International CrisisGroup, 2005). The watch list is confidential, but in the framework of EUparticipation in the PBC, an arrangement could be established to allow
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for the complete sharing of available information in order to ensure itsoptimal use. Ideally, joint action plans integrating different actors’programmes for specific countries could eventually be drawn up.
Conclusion
In view of its political and economic weight, and of its actual financialcontribution to the UN, the EU as such enjoys the recognition of boththe other members of the UN and the UN bodies as an indispensablepartner in the field of peace and security. Since the Iraq crisis of early2003, this recognition has increased as a consequence of the expression,throughout the debate on the future of the UN, of strong EU supportfor the collective security system. This recognition is an important part,though not in itself sufficient, of the EU’s external effectivness ininfluencing UN decision-making. EU member states have also shown agreater willingness to increase internal effectiveness and cohesion bycoordinating their actions within the UN and contributing to the UNboth financially and militarily. Still, more could be done and in thelatter area an enhanced contribution of troops, be it through UN-mandated but EU-led operations, is required to fully reflect the EU’sweight in the world body. The larger the material contribution of the EUin any given field, the more it is recognized as a significant player andthe larger its external effectiveness.
On the whole, on issues of long-term stabilization and conflictprevention, where Europeanization is strongest, the EU does usuallyspeak with a single voice in the UNSC, in spite of the imperfections inthe system of EU representation. The effect of these imperfections arerevealed when the EU fails to achieve a common position. In such casesof a lack of cohesion, which is most likely to occur with regard to crisisresponse, the individual member states are then free to defend theiroften contradictory national positions and the EU as such is left withoutpresence. A strong EU foreign minister could potentially stimulatecohesion, but only a single EU seat in the UNSC would completelyresolve the issues of authority and autonomy. However, EU presence inthe UN(SC) suffers from the same lack of Europeanization as EU pres-ence does in general: the unresolved fundamental debate about thedegree of ambition and autonomy vis-à-vis NATO and the US. Anincreased contribution of military and civilian capabilities is meaning-less without the political will to make use of such assets when the needarises. Only when this political issue is finally settled will the EU be ableto emerge as a resolute international actor in the field of long-term
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conflict prevention and crisis management and be a true partner ineffective multilateralism for the UN.
Notes
1. The authors wish to thank the various national and EU officials whom theyinterviewed for their kind cooperation and Valéry Arnoud, Tom Delreux, RoyGinsberg and Bart Kerremans for their welcome intellectual input.
2. ‘Solana: Einheit Iraks muss erhalten bleiben’, Die Welt, 24 March 2003(authors’ translation).
3. ‘Die EU ist ein wichtiger Mitspieler’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 May 2004(authors’ translation).
4. Data based on Wouters, 2001. When consensus votes are excluded, the cohe-sion figures are much lower. See the table in the Introduction to this volume.
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7The EU in Geneva: CoordinatingPolicy in the Economic and SocialArrangements of the UnitedNations SystemPaul Taylor1
This chapter considers the arrangements for coordinating the policies ofthe European Commission, EU member states, and EU Presidencyin those social and economic organizations of the UN system that arelocated in Geneva. The member states have long established mechanismsat the UN in New York to discuss, and, as far as possible, harmonize theirpolicies towards issues that are under consideration in the GeneralAssembly and Security Council. These arrangements largely fall withinthe context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but theextent to which they apply to economic and social matters was rarelyaddressed directly. According to the Commission there had been only‘low-key EU co-ordination on United Nations policy and operationalissues in the fields of development and humanitarian issues’.2 But inthe early years of the new millennium, the EU member states and theCommission began to address the question of the EU’s relations with theUN’s economic and social institutions more directly and energetically(European Commission, 2001c and 2003).
The EU and its member states have been committed to strengtheningtheir coordination on economic and social questions in the UN systemalong two linked pathways: that of the intergovernmental CFSP mecha-nisms and that of Commission involvement. The two pathways implyan increasingly solidarist tendency with regard to EU positions and thoseof its member states in the economic and social arrangements of the UNsystem: on the one hand the member states are committed to enhanc-ing mechanisms for coordinating their policies and activities; but on theother the Commission is seeking to expand its capacity to act in pursuitof agreed EU policies, and to represent the Union in these areas. This
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process follows what might be called a logic of synthesis. Yet there are alsopressures in the opposite direction which might be called – using the tra-ditional term as coined by Stanley Hoffmann – a logic of diversity.
This chapter looks first at the European Commission’s activities andpositions, and then at those of the member states. It then analyses thetwo logics affecting coordination of EU member states and institutionsin Geneva.
The Commission
In some areas, the European Commission acts as the EU’s agent in theorganizations of the UN system, though its status and powers variesfrom institution to institution (see Table 7.1). The expansion of theCommission’s role has followed a principle enunciated in 1971 by theEuropean Court of Justice, according to which it has the right to actexternally if it has been allowed a competence in the area under consid-eration in the Treaty of Rome, and has actually exercised that compe-tence (Hartley, 1981, p. 155). With amendments to the Rome Treaty thisprinciple has been overlain by specific grants of external competence tothe Commission. By the late 1990s the range of the Commission’sresponsibilities had expanded, but it is still a moving frontier – whichinevitably causes some problems, such as the lack of clarity about who isresponsible for what.
The Commission as the organizational embodiment of the EU has twomajor, related ambitions in its approach to the organizations of the UNsystem. First it is preparing for enhanced participation with selectedorganizations. The Commission has the ambition, supported by a rangeof experts and governments – though resisted by others – to upgrade itsmembership in the ILO and to become the EU’s main representative inother organizations (see especially European Commission, 2003). Thiswas important though in practice behaviour was not necessarily con-strained by treaty limitations. The Commission behaved ‘like a govern-ment’ in the ILO even though its status was that of observer and itformally could only speak when invited.3 The Commission aims tomove up the hierarchy of forms of involvement from observer, to activeobserver, to privileged observer, to full member.
Various concerns are related to this ambition. These include findingsatisfactory financial arrangements with the UN organizations, so thatthe Commission can satisfy stringent EU auditing requirements,especially as they were tightened after the budget scandals of the late1990s. The Commission has developed a ‘standard grant agreement with
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Table 7.1 European Commission cooperation with UN bodies
UN body or EC funding, 1999, EC representation inspecialized agency million euro governing bodies
UN Development 70.1�4.9 from Active observerProgramme (UNDP) ECHO
UN Fund for Population 3.1 ObserverActivities (UN FPA)
UN High Commissioner 76�84.3 from EU coordination for Refugees (UNHCR) ECHO for annual
Executive Committeemeetings (on Presidencyand Commissionstatements)
Office for the 0.44 ObserverCoordination of Humanitarian Affairs(OCHA)
UN Children’s Fund 20�15.7 ECHO Observer(UNICEF)
World Food Programme 184�18.3 ECHO Privileged observer(WFP) (Commission sits at table
of Executive Board; itsparticipation is deemednecessary for consensus)
UN Conference on Trade - Active observerand Development(UNCTAD)/InternationalTrade Commission (ITC)
UN Environment - Active observerProgramme (UNEP)
Food and Agricultural 21 MemberOrganization (FAO)
International - Active observerTelecommunicationsUnion (ITU)
World International - ObserverProperty Organization(WIPO)
International Maritime - ObserverOrganization (IMO)
International Labour 7.8 Active observerOrganization (ILO)
Continued
international organisations’ (December 2000) that puts into contractual,operational terms the clauses and principles set out in this agreement. Itconcluded that ‘this standard grant agreement … has, to the satisfactionof various UN entities, already substantially simplified and acceleratedthe preparation and conclusion of the specific grant agreements for theoperations concerned’ (European Commission, 2001c). The EU wishesto have effective control over the way its money is spent, and to agreean appropriate financial process with the UN organizations with whichit cooperates as a condition of a closer relationship, as was made clear inthe Prodi Commission’s pronouncement that ‘the Commission is pre-pared to reduce or even suspend its support to UN partners, which fail to
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World Health 4.5�6.7 ECHO Active observerOrganization (WHO)
International Civil - ObserverAviation Organization(ICAO)
UN Educational, Scientific - Observerand Cultural Organization(UNESCO)
UN Industrial - ObserverDevelopment Organization(UNIDO)
International Fund for - ObserverAgricultural Development(IFAD)
UN Relief and Works - ObserverAgency for PalestineRefugees in the Near East(UNRWA)
UN International Drug 1.4 Active observerControl Programme(UNDCP)
Notes: Active observer entails participation in and contribution to the work of governingbodies including contribution to decision-making. Observer entails participating in meetingsand reporting on the proceedings to headquarters.
Source: European Commission, 2001c, Annex 2.
Table 7.1 Continued
UN body or EC funding, 1999, EC representation inspecialized agency million euro governing bodies
perform to an acceptable standard’ (European Commission, 2001c,section 2). However, the costs of auditing and controlling EU budgetarycontributions to UN, and other external organizations, has since becomean unusually high percentage of the net contribution compared withthose of other donors.4 A further EC–UN Financial and AdministrativeFramework Agreement was signed on 29 April 2003, which allowed formulti-donor UN operations.
The Commission has insisted that its role depends upon finding waysof adding value to the UN projects and that it does not wish to have itsfunding substitute for that of member states of the UN organizations,even when they are EU member states. The EU also has to choosepartners that work in areas relevant to EU interests and consider wherethe EU can add value derived from its participation as a distinct organ-ization. The Commission believes that there are some UN organizationswith which it could be particularly promising to seek cooperation, suchas the UNDP, IFAD, UNAIDS, UNCTAD, ILO and UNIDO. There are alsoindications that in the areas of EU–UN cooperation the Commissionwill act more often on behalf of the EU, that is, it has expressed anambition to take over from the member states in areas where it hascompetence.5
The Commission sees its greater involvement in the planningprocesses of the UN organizations as a necessary contribution to this.Greater involvement is conditional on the UN organization offering‘the Commission some form of permanent representation in the pro-gramming and administrative organs of its agencies and in their exter-nal audit arrangements’.6 Again an ambition is expressed to become anessential, if not primary, EU actor in these areas.
For example, in the area of development the Commission has devel-oped country strategy papers with partner states in the developing worldand is aware that the UN system has similar strategic planning instru-ments, such as the UNDP Country Strategy Plans and the DevelopmentAssistance Frameworks of the UN Development Group. TheCommission has realized that its plans and those of the UN need to fittogether. This need also applies to the Consolidated Appeal arrange-ments which the UN’s Department for Humanitarian Affairs, laterrechristened as the Office of the Coordinator for HumanitarianAssistance (OCHA), had long conducted. Thus, to further the process ofachieving closer cooperation with the UN system the Commission hasto set about identifying ‘strategic UN partners’ where there is policyconvergence, increasing programme funding to those bodies, andstrengthening dialogue with them on programming and policy-making.
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But a second way in which the EU, through the Commission, canenhance its involvement in the UN organizations is a somewhat differ-ent one. In this the concern is to establish the EU as an effective partic-ipant in the decision-making of the international organization, so thatit becomes more like an ordinary member, with more wide-rangingresponsibilities regarding the activities of the UN organization. Thiswould not be limited to the role of developing projects in which the EUcould have programmatic or operational interests, but would includehelping the UN organization to formulate and discharge its own man-date. In this area the Commission would be charged with following poli-cies which reflected the positions agreed by the member states in theEuropean Council or the Council of Ministers, or formulated by itselfwith the explicit or implicit support of member states. This input wouldimpact upon what the UN organization did, but not necessarily involveEU involvement at the operational level, or EU funding. But after nego-tiations with the UN, the EU would also be committed to following andapplying the agreed resolutions of that organization.
The member states
There have been two tracks that enhance EU member-state cooperationin the UN’s economic and social organizations in Geneva. The first is theenunciation of principles of policy to which all members are expected toadhere. These are expressed in declarations or conclusions resultingfrom the meetings of the member states in the relevant EU institutions –Council of Ministers, European Council, Intergovernmental Conferences.These principles are to be respected in general, both in the bilateral andthe multilateral context. These include declarations about developmentpolicy in September 2001, the commitment to move together towardsthe goal of providing 0.7 per cent of GNI in development aid, as agreedin the UN development programmes, and agreement on the principlesof development support to which all member states should adhere, aswell as the conditionality of aid programmes with respect to democrati-zation and the support of human rights. Such common declarationsimply a commitment to coordinating EU member-state policies in UNorganizations, but they cannot be seen as constituting a legal obligationto do so. There are also areas where the EU member states have workedtogether to develop international arrangements, or alter existing organ-izations, as with the pursuit of changes in the working arrangements ofthe Economic and Social Council in the 1980s and 1990s (see Taylor,2000).
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The second track is more explicitly related to tightening the coordina-tion of the activities of the EU members of specific UN organizations,and part of the requirements for improving this process is improvingcoordination within the EU itself. Even in the context of the preparationof the EU’s Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) there has been scope forimproving consultation between the Commission and EU memberstates. Joint consultation between the European institutions (theCommission and the European Investment Bank) and the memberstates concerning country analysis should be strengthened as CSPs areseen as a major tool to ensure the complementarity of the co-operationactivities of the Community and the member states. Strategy papershave become a standard coordination instrument in the UN and it is aproblem that the two levels of organization have duplicated rather thanconsolidated such plans. But in the EU it is progress that the Commissionand the member states have agreed to share their analysis of the politi-cal, social and economic context of the target country at an early stage.This is a labour-intensive process and its success depends on good initialplanning, maximized exchange of information, of expertise and labourinput, and rapid and relevant on-the-spot feedback. Active data sharingwith multilateral agencies is also an essential part of the process.
On 18 May 2000 the Council of Ministers presented recommendationson the basis of the evaluation of development instruments andprogrammes by the Commission and the member states.7 As regardsinternal coordination, it asked the Commission and the member statesto take advantage of the potential for complementary action on a country-by-country and sector-by-sector basis [italics added]; to adapt the partnercountry strategy documents taking account of the need for a povertyreduction strategy; to pinpoint obstacles to more frequent use of co-financing among member states and draw up proposals for harmonizingprocedures and financial rules; to strengthen the coordination ofhumanitarian aid; and to step up the exchange of information. TheCouncil of Ministers stressed the importance of strengthening the partnercountry’s ability to assume responsibility in working out developmentprogrammes and strategies. But clearly the main concern was the weak-ness of coordination with regard to development policy among EUmember states and between them and the Commission.
Coordinating EU action in practice in Geneva
In this section the practice of coordination of EU policy in Geneva isexamined more closely. The argument focuses on a policy nexus, rather
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than on particular international institutions, involving labourstandards, trade, human rights and poverty reduction.
The development of the coordination of the policies of the EU and ofits member states in forums such as the UN specialized agencies inGeneva can be examined from two opposing perspectives, that of thelogic of diversity and that of the logic of synthesis. The analytical task hereis to trace the line between these two opposing tendencies. This involvesdelineating the interrelationships between one coordinated multilateralsystem, the EU and its member states, and a set of other multilateralsystems, the UN agencies, with imperfectly overlapping membershipsand various degrees of internal and system coordination.
The logic of diversity
The pattern of EU involvement in external forums often illustrates a logicof diversity, in contrast to the linear process of enhancing EU cohesive-ness in external frameworks implied in the first part of this chapter.In practice the external involvement of the member states takes the formof a large number of overlapping and differentiated multilateralisms.
There is an aspiration, reflected in the doctrine of Community liturgy,to coordinate members’ policies, and an ambition to play a stronger rolein this on the part of the Commission. But against that is an irresistibletendency to differ, symbolized, first, by the lack of effective coordinationat the national levels among the different parts of national bureaucracies,each with multiple, divergent departmental interests and varying linkswith particular international organizations, and, second, by the differentways in which member states relate to their international environment.In the UK there have sometimes been disagreements between theDepartment for Development and the Department of Trade andIndustry: for ILO matters these two departments tend to a divided man-date. One official commented that on social, development and tradematters ‘it was hard to get an integrated view out of a country’.8
The logic of diversity is encouraged in this world of overlappingmultilateralisms by the wish of member states that contribute morefinancially to the budgets of the UN specialized agencies and pro-grammes to get full credit for their contribution in each policy frame-work.9 They object to other EU members’ ‘free-riding’ and getting creditfor contributions which they have not made. And they lack the mutualconfidence to balance a credit in one policy dimension against a deficitin another. Diversity is also encouraged by EU member states’ reflectingthe views of outsiders in diplomacy between member states, and, at itsstrongest, entering into alliances with outsiders against insiders, though
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this is less common in the ILO and more common in OECD. This is anatural consequence of the fact that the EU is a multilateral organiza-tion made up of sovereign states which are of necessity free to pursuetheir interests with outsiders as well as insiders. For instance the UK in2002 supported a Canadian proposal on humanitarian policy in SierraLeone in defiance of an EU alternative. In the absence of an exclusivecommitment to cooperate with those inside the EU, it is always on thecards that there could be dalliance with non-members.
What has been lacking here is an effective mechanism for enhancing anEU collective presence in international organizations. There is, forinstance, no agreed strategy between EU states on their membership of theexecutive committees of other international organizations. The pattern ofintense disagreement with regard to membership of the Security Councilamplifies a general discord with regard to membership of any outsideforum. For the limited-membership executive boards and committees thatdirect the UN specialized agencies and programmes, the EU has not agreedupon a common strategy for mutually supporting EU member-state elec-tion.10 Similarly there are no strong methods for coordination of policy onEU initiatives and on the other organization’s own agenda.
A comparison of coordination between a principal organ of UNsystem – the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) – and the EU isrevealing. In its coordinating function, the ECOSOC defines agendas fordevelopment in particular countries. By the early twenty-first century,this process tended to embed multilateralism.11 In this case, there areways of strengthening the commitment of participants, companies,states and individuals to an agreed agenda and the programmes towhich it leads. This is achieved by effective monitoring in a commonframework and the range of pressures that derive from an anxiety aboutthe provision of finance. This is a way of working which might also befound in the EU pattern of involvement in an agency such as the ILO, andindeed the EU had an additional element of coordination in the collectiveinstitution of the Commission. The latter is potentially a far more power-ful agency of coordination in the EU context than ECOSOC and its subor-dinate bodies. One view in Geneva is that integration is helped by thetendency for the same people to crop up in different policy contexts. Butthis argument, that informal networking is a valuable coordination asset,is indicative of the weakness of the integrative mechanisms. The commoninstitutions, particularly the Commission, have yet to get a hold on thecoordination mechanisms in Geneva.
This is also indicated by what can only be judged as a major structuralproblem of the EU in its dealings with the outside world: the problem
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that outsiders have in finding any single representative of the EU whichcan be judged to have the responsibility to deal. Being effective in areasof external relations, in the whole range and not just in that of CFSP, isa real problem and the lack of an authoritative foreign policy represen-tative causes Europe to punch below its weight. But the problem alsoreflects the absence of a strong mechanism for policy coordination innon-EU multilateral frameworks. The Commission has tried to developa logic of synthesis. There is often an awareness, among officials anddiplomats, of commitment to general policies, but an inadequateauthoritative direction about how these generalities work out in partic-ular policy and institutional contexts. This combination of a knowncommitment to a generality, but uncertainty about detail, is bound to bedebilitating in dealing with outsiders.
It is understandable that outsiders should find difficulty in identifyingthe right person from the EU to talk to in Geneva. One problem is thatof the differentiation of competences between the Union, in the form ofthe Commission, and the member states. EU and member-state officials(insiders) can steer delicately round areas of responsibility of theCommission and the areas of member-state responsibility; outsidershave greater difficulty in doing so.
A linked problem is irregularity in Commission and EU member states’involvement, which surely appears impenetrable to outsiders. There is anabundance of informal and formal meetings among national officials inGeneva. There are formal meetings of individuals from national missionsto discuss particular business, such as proposals for the preparatorycommittees of agencies such as the WHO and ILO, annual meetings,meetings of executive boards, meetings of plenary assemblies, ECOSOCcommissions. The Commission might or might not take part. The lines ofresponsibility of the Commission and the Presidency are steadily beingredrawn in Geneva and it is hard for outsiders to be sure how thingsstand. It was pointed out that the Commission tended to be more stridentwhen its status was less certain, therefore the volume of the Commission’svoice at times might be misleading.
The question of who is responsible for what is a difficult one and onthe intergovernmental side it is answered by EU insiders on pragmaticgrounds. In the last few years the Presidency had tended to initiate moreand more specialist meetings for political questions, or in times of crisis.More technical questions, such as the business of the Universal PostalUnion or World Intellectual Property Organization tend to be left tomore expert committees, and dealt with more frequently in a technicalway. Indeed, in the latter area of work the self-identification of the EU
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member states as an international actor tends to be at its weakest. In thisway the formal arrangements move from higher to lower level, frommore to less expert, from active to little Commission involvement,according to judgements made on the hoof, rather than according toany overarching principle of responsibility. Certainly there is no principlewhich might be understood by someone who lacks the arcane knowledgeof the EU insider.
The difference between the EU’s intergovernmental arrangements andthe arrangements proposed by the Commission is, however, clearenough. The former tends to diversity, whereas the latter tends tosynthesis and is often resisted by member states precisely because ofthat. In Geneva, the appeals to organize EU meetings coming from theBunker, a name given by government officials to the EU CouncilSecretariat’s liaison office reflecting member-state resistance, are oftenignored or rejected.
The Council Secretariat is in charge of organizing meetings of EUrepresentatives in Geneva, though there are also meetings which are notorganized in that framework. It was reported in 2003 that the Secretariatwas unhappy with the holding of such extra-mural meetings, but foundit impossible to stop them happening in the course of the hectic busi-ness periods of the various institutions. Officials in the CouncilSecretariat took on the job of counting the meetings not held undertheir auspices after January 2001. While between the mid-1990s and2002 the total number of meetings of EU representatives increased froma mean of around 450 to around 650 in each Presidency, the numberorganized by the liaison office went up less noticeably.12 In January–June 2002 there were 422 meetings of this type, while in January–June1997 there were 390. The policy sectors where the increase in meetingsorganized by the Bunker was most striking were that of human rightsand humanitarian affairs, though meetings for the WTO were consis-tently the most numerous. The EU members did at least emerge as agroup within which mutual consultation was expected in the conduct ofbusiness in Geneva, but not necessarily in a framework of leadership bythe common institutions.
In the absence of strong coordination mechanisms it is always likelythat the logic of diversity would be sustained by the lack of effectivecoordination within the administrations of the separate states. And thelack of coordination in that context is reflected in the lack of coordina-tion between the three EU pillars. One official regretted that the foreignpolicy offices, and the CFSP procedure, were not more directly involvedin, for instance, the discussions about core labour standards in the
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ILO: ‘There was a need for multi-pillar committees.’ The inconsistenciesamong the policies of different parts of national administrationsinevitably reinforce the differences between the member states in thedifferent multilateral frameworks in which they are involved.
There is a logic of diversity here which can only be defeated by aqualitative change in the way the EU relates to these forums, by havingboth an agreed EU mode of participation – agreed membership on com-mittees including the executive committees – as well as coordination onpolicy which includes effective coordination within governments aswell as between them.
The logic of synthesis
On the other side, however, there is a logic of synthesis which issupported by the overlapping agendas of the EU and UN systems inthese fields as well as the interest among the EU’s common institutionsin having stronger coordinating procedures which will enhance theirown role. One interesting nexus of agendas is that linking humanrights, labour rights, trade and the work of the ILO. Former TradeCommissioner Lamy was anxious to promote more liberal internationaltrade arrangements but realized that such arrangements would have tobe deliberately shaped to avoid the kind of severe social costs that hadplagued neo-liberal market strategies. These had both a moral dimensionas well as an economic one, as lower social costs outside Europe couldlead to lower production costs for competitors. This concern alsoworried the European Parliament. Accordingly these two EU institutions,which are commonly understood to support greater supranationalism,were clear that they needed to develop their own strategies on suchquestions as human rights and core labour standards. But they alsoneeded to work with the ILO to form an alliance for a socially responsi-ble liberalization of trade in the WTO. Hence Lamy cultivated closerelations with the ILO, and the European Parliament produced the GilligReport on promoting core labour standards and improving socialgovernance in the context of globalization (European Parliament, 2002,paragraph F, p. 7).
This is also a way of enhancing the roles of the EU’s supranationallyinclined institutions, the Commission and the European Parliament,within Europe. It is part of a more widespread evolution of machineryand activities to promote social codes in an important area of the wideragenda of human rights. In this context it is likely that any aspects ofcore labour standards, and more refined human rights will redound tothe benefit of the common institutions. As a general rule, when external
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standards are approved requiring Commission supervision, theEuropean Parliament would also play an enhanced role in overseeingand shaping the agreed policies. The codes of the ILO are ratified by gov-ernments not the Community, but the Commission has a strong interestin the question of their application. In this way increasing standards inthe external context is also a valued strategy for them, not only becauseit goes along with the further liberalization of international trade, butalso because it contributes to greater integration within the EU.
A number of points have frequently been placed together by theCommission: the need for higher international standards, the need forEuropean businesses and governments to be bound to uphold thosestandards in their work in third countries, the need for all EU memberstates to ratify the agreements concerning these standards, and theprimary role of the Commission in promoting and supervising the sys-tem. The formal mandate for the Commission to act for the EU-25 in thesocial area is not strong, as social policy is a late addition to the list of areaswhich involve Community competence, and is not spelled out in detail.Nevertheless the external activities could have implications for the exten-sion of Commission competence. Even if there are no direct conse-quences for enhancing the Commission’s executive capacity, there wouldcertainly be more to do: there would be an expanding agenda of work.
The Commission would be involved in monitoring the standardsoutside the Union and seeing that they were applied within. And theprimary responsibility of the Commission for the Union’s external trademakes it easier to expand its competence externally and internally withregard to an expanding agenda. This also makes it seem logical that theCommission should be the Union’s representative in an increasingnumber of institutions.
The pursuit of higher standards externally could be linked with arenewal of efforts to improve them internally. The Gillig report madethe point that the Commission ‘mainly concentrates on the strategyneeding to be implemented in the developing countries at the risk ofover-estimating the level of application of the core labour standards inEurope. … it is therefore necessary to guarantee the actual application ofthese standards in Europe’ (European Parliament, 2002, paragraph G, p. 7).The report also called on member states and candidate countries whichhad not yet ratified the ILO conventions on core labour standards to adoptthem ‘as soon as possible’ (European Parliament, 2002, paragraph 4.1,p. 8). Here is a case of an external agenda driving an internal one. TheEU states need to make more explicit their commitment internally tostandards that they need to apply externally.
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The point here is an important one – that it is becoming more appar-ent that the strengthening of international standards and machinerycould have the effect of expanding the role of the common institutionswithin a region like the EU. In this way regional integration can followfrom the strengthening of international governance, which now seemsall the more necessary because of globalization. The EU strategy reflectsmoral concerns, but is also a way of avoiding some of the costly effectsof its own more advanced welfare systems. It can conceal its economicself-interest by linking its efforts to a global movement.
The Commission can even take advantage of these overlappingagendas in pursuit of its own interest. For instance, the Commission hasa motive for working closely with organizations like the ILO not only inthe context of trade liberalization, but also in the accession process. Thelevel of coordination as regards the latter may be described as enhanced,since the ILO developed a specific office (in Budapest) to work with theCommission on the development of core labour standards, as well as theSocial Dialogue, in Central and Eastern Europe. This is a form of inter-institutional collusion which some Central and East European statesfound objectionable.13 Enlargement had rightly been made subject toconditionality: the accession states had to meet standards in their socialand labour standards which had been defined in successive EUdocuments. But there is a tactical advantage in having outside organiza-tions like the ILO involved in this, since it means that the Commissionhas a neutral organization by its side to judge deficiencies. It would thusbe less vulnerable to the charge of acting as judge and jury.
This phenomenon also appears in the case of international trade. TheGillig Report asserted that those states which do not respect core labourstandards could be subject to trade sanctions by the ILO – which it isallowed to do under its constitution – and that the WTO should agreethat such sanctions would not be incompatible with its own foundingTreaties. It was stressed, though, that a shortfall in labour standardsshould not be used as a justification for protectionism, and the EU stateswere very anxious to make this point. The Union has an interest inworking with global organizations, such as the ILO, the IMF and theWorld Bank, that are committed to higher standards in labour practicesand human rights, fundamental social rights and poverty reduction,because through such alliances it is easier to maintain and extend itsown high internal standards.
The logic of synthesis illustrates the way in which regions may beginto express themselves in global forums. It suggests that the processes bywhich regions can embed themselves as actors in other forums is a
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complex one. It is not just that regions form and then act in the otherforums, but that, in addition, dynamic processes appear among thevarious representatives of the regions in the other forums which them-selves promote greater regional coherence. There are, of course,pressures the other way, which will be discussed below, but the logic ofsynthesis is nonetheless real. The regional secretariat may also take onthe role of promoting among members within the region policies whichthey have helped to approve in the global organization. This is anotherroute by which globalization might be promoted but also reconciledwith regional preferences, and illustrates the symbiotic relationshipbetween regionalization and globalization.
EU strategies for increasing policy coordination
Two strategies may be identified by which the Union, through its commoninstitutions, seeks to pursue its policies in outside forums. The memberstates, in contrast with the common institutions, are broadly in favour ofan extensive, rather low-key, multilateral process in Geneva which fallsshort of anything that could be called ‘enhanced’. National representativesin Geneva often complain about particular procedures and proposedamendments to these. For instance, the EU Presidency is often overloadedand other EU ambassadors are seen as not doing enough. EU ambassadorsin Geneva usually meet no more than once a month. The PortuguesePresidency tried to solve the problem of being overburdened by employingan individual, chosen on the basis of ability and status rather than nation-ality, to take responsibility for a particular area of policy coordination(a procedure used in the Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope – OSCE). But such proposals are adjustments in the existing low-key multilateralism rather than attempts to go beyond it.
The first strategy used by the common institutions to increase coordi-nation can be described as one of incorporation. This is rather like theprocess of embedded multilateralism in the UN, previously mentioned.It contains, as has been reported elsewhere (European Parliament, 2002,paragraph F, p. 14), a series of steps. The first is agreement of a generalstatement of position and principles by the member states, such as theCouncil conclusions of October 1999 on trade and labour, whichindicated strong support for the protection of core labour rights, andagreed that the ‘WTO should encourage positive incentives to promoteobservance of such rights’ (European Commission, 2001f, Annex 1).
The next step is to develop more detailed proposals which have theeffect of incorporating the member states in a common effort to apply
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the principles in specific contexts and policy areas. The Commission hastaken on the task of pushing a more focused and proactive role by mem-ber states in the ILO/WTO policy nexus: member states had alreadyunanimously suggested that the WTO set up a working party to look atthe relationship between international trade and working conditions(European Commission, 2001f, p. 7), but the Commission has now pro-posed seven specific actions in support at the international level, andeleven actions at the EU level. The former include specific injunctionson behaviour in the ILO to seek to reinforce the effectiveness of ILOsupervision, and respect for core labour standards, as well as a review ofsocial policy at the country level in all international organizations ofwhich they were members. At the EU level, specific recommendationswere made to member states to increase the range of incentives offeredto non-members, in, for instance, the context of the General System ofPreferences (GSP), to respect the new standards. The Union would seekpolicy coherence among its members in this area, and the Commissionexplicitly identified four instances where member states and theCommission would have to act, such as policies of social labelling indeveloping countries in order to get ‘premium market access opportuni-ties in the EU’ (European Commission, 2001f, p. 22). In this way theCommission has attempted to tie the member states down to the impli-cations of their own commitments in the same way that UN memberswere tied down to the agendas of the global conferences by proceduresinvolving the reformed ECOSOC.
The Commission has considerable resources to help it with thisstrategy – much more than the functional commissions aroundECOSOC, or, indeed, ECOSOC itself – but its success depends on theconstant reiteration of the policy agenda and its implications. TheCommission hopes to socialize governments into a habit of goodpractice externally, and matching good practice internally with a clearlegal basis.
The second strategy may be dealt with more briefly. It is that of theCommission deliberately building inter-institutional linkages as appro-priate to the particular policy nexus, a strategy which has two dimen-sions. First the Commission identifies international institutions whichare active in the area of the policy agenda it is pursuing, and attempts tomanage the related processes in the different frameworks. In this casethe two primary institutions to be linked are the ILO and WTO, but oth-ers include UNCTAD and the World Bank. Secondly the Commissiondoes as much as possible to ensure that positions of members and the EUin the various UN institutions are compatible and mutually reinforcing.
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It has no formal powers to achieve this, but could set out often and atlength the implications of policy positions in one context for those inother contexts, and the costs of holding contradictory positions. TheCommission could reinforce the overall rationality of the diplomacypursued by EU members in different multilateral frameworks.
This process is similar in many ways to that in the UN system itselfwhich I have described as one of embedded multilateralism. It involvesrelating collective intentionality to collective action (see Taylor, 2000,pp. 134–8). In this case, however, there is the additional problem foranalysis caused by the need to deal with relationships between a clusterof multilateral frameworks with overlapping memberships, one ofwhich is a relatively strong regional framework with two kinds ofparticipating actors, collective institutions and member states.
Conclusion
In conclusion it would be useful to summarize the main arguments con-cerning the logic of synthesis and the logic of diversity. Concerning thelogic of synthesis there have been a range of positive developmentsincluding
● Commitment to enhanced coordination and the definition ofcommon policies has been expressed in the amended EU treaties andin the various agreed codes and targets.
● The Commission is involved in an increasing range of UN institu-tions and is seeking to expand its role. There is explicit commitmentby member states to an active role for the Commission in enhancingcoordination between members in the non-EU institutions. Twostrategies are available: incorporation and institutional linkage.
● The Commission is helped by the role it was given explicitly in anumber of areas to prepare policies for the implementation of theagreed codes; it could also use the implicit assumption that a code ordeclaration logically implies particular policies which it articulates.
● One interesting aspect of the logic of synthesis is that the strength-ening of global governance is positively related to the strengtheningof regional governance in a system of overlapping mulilateralisms,since norms and procedures agreed for the outside world also need tobe reflected in the norms and procedures of the inside world. Thisimplies a stronger role for the regional executive, the Commission.
● There has developed a greater need for cross-sector and cross-pillarpolices, for example on trade, labour standards and human rights,
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which again presents an opportunity for the EU institutions toenhance their role, since they are well placed to achieve an overviewof policy sectors across institutions.
● The next steps include the coordination and pursuit of EU positionsin the agendas of the external international organization, not just onimmediate EU issues and interests.
● Enhanced policy linkage in the external frameworks is likely toincrease pressure on national administrations to enhance their owninternal bureaucratic coordination. The EU has an opportunity hereto leverage national administration coordination.
But, concerning the logic of diversity, there are various disincentivesto coordination:
● The outside forums are themselves political systems which generateoutcomes that are not necessarily coordinated with EU positions, andmight reinforce the problems of coordination in the EU by attractingthe support of some member states but not others. These are contextswhere external alliances can be formed which then get in the way ofinternal coordination. Similarly: ‘very often the agenda of bilateralmeetings between the EU and its partners does not reflect the objec-tive pursued by the Union in multilateral forums and vice versa’(European Commission, 2003, paragraph 1.2 (b)). This is the result ofa lack of coordination in at least three directions: between the statesand the EU, between the departments of the individual states, andbetween the pillars of the EU, especially CFSP and the social andeconomic areas.
● There is a lack of capacity for deciding priorities across the range ofpolicy sectors – and instead reliance on informal arrangements andthe chances of one or other government taking the lead.
● There is no agreement on the appointment strategy. EU membershiparrangements in most external institutions are more or less disputed,this despite the advantages that having an agreed EU team couldbring.
● Member states also pay little attention to the voting behaviour ofother EU states in the executive and plenary meetings despite thepublication of the voting records in the outside institutions andpointing to infidelities. They had agreed to take partnership seriouslybut in this matter at least did not seem to do so!
● The EU representations in Geneva are either overwhelmed with work,as with the Presidency, or short of business, as with the other EU
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ambassadors, or they are battling to keep themselves up with thegame, as with the Council Secretariat’s liaison office (the Bunker). Butamong officials there is a certain pride in the informal reactive systemin Geneva which member governments are reluctant to change byplacing under a single authority. One defence of the status quo is thatthere is indeed agreement about a wide range of the social andeconomic issues that come up. But in some ways this is debilitating,since it leads to a less proactive stance.
● There is weak EU coordination of its response to the agendas of theGeneva institutions in their executive committees, or plenarymeetings, be they agencies, funds and programmes, especially whenthe link with current EU policies from Brussels is not obvious andimmediate – for example, the EU is not proactive in relation to theagendas of the other institutions, including the World Bank andthe IMF. In the latter there is a weakness in the EU states’ capacity andwillingness. This has been acknowledged by some US officials whoprefer a single EU seat in the Washington institutions because if theEU states vote together the US will always be out-voted!
● There is no clear locus of EU responsibility for particular policiesvisible to non-members: the system is one of opaque informality.Henry Kissinger would still have the problem of whom to call if hewanted to know the EU policy on an ILO debate on core labourstandards.
● The budgetary arrangements are also dysfunctional from the point ofview of coordination. EU contributions are carefully managed toavoid duplication of national contributions to international institu-tions. This tends to preserve a situation in which states seek topromote national rewards for what they put in and see EU contribu-tions as getting in their way. The budgetary system is a pluralist oneand contains a self- perpetuating element, which can only be avoidedby setting up an EU system for UN system budgetary contributions.(The US government hates this idea as it emphasizes that the EU pays38 per cent of the UN-assessed budget as opposed to the US contribu-tion of 22 per cent).
Turning to the notion of effectiveness as an indicator of the impact ofthe EU in the UN system, the editors specified three ways in which tojudge effectiveness. First, they asked whether there was an EU output.The evidence here suggests that in the sectors discussed there is a con-siderable output in terms of codes, declarations and the like, and someachievement in developing and implementing more specific policies.
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Second, does the EU get its way in the UN system? The conclusion hasto be that the EU is not a unitary actor in the UN system though thelogic of synthesis suggests there is a move in that direction; nor is it afront-runner. The conclusion has to be, rather, that the EU tends to bereactive in the outside institutions, and to respond to their agendas andtimetables rather than imposing its own.14 The arrangements in Genevaencourage this; the Presidency is often overloaded, many meetings takeplace outside the framework of the EU, and there is too much relianceon informal meetings. There is, in other words, no clear EU agency inGeneva.
Third, the question was put of whether the EU contributed to the UN’seffectiveness. The answer to this must be strongly positive. The abovediscussion contains many examples of the two working together inspecific policy sectors and territories.15 The question however has to beput of whether the EU could contribute even more, and the answer tothat has to be ‘yes’. Hence the long list of recommendations proposedby the Commission in 2003 (European Commission, 2003, especiallyAnnex 1).
The system is a weak multi-centred one, without a unified mechanismfor producing EU policy, and no obvious organizational direction, noruncontested management centre. Hence the EU tends toward weakcompromise, and is opaque to those who are not insiders, including thegovernments of non-members. It lacks capacity for EU proactivity, andis dominated by a habit of reaction to the agendas of others.
These shortcomings are clearly relevant to contemporary discussionsabout the relative power and world role of Europe and the United States.Joseph Nye (2005) made a useful distinction between soft power andhard power, the latter being military capacity and coercive, and theformer being non-military, especially economic, and persuasive. Theargument was that Europe was good at soft power but not at hard power,whilst the US forte was hard power. In the words of Robert Kagan (2003),Europe was from Venus and the US from Mars. But he misleads in assert-ing that Europe is good at multilateralism: in fact the opposite is thecase. Europe is not good enough at multilateralism, as the behaviour ofthe EU in Geneva reveals. Hitherto the US could afford to downplay therole of the multilateral institutions, in the UN system and outside it,because it had been able to do enough unilaterally to frustrate anypolicies or actions of which it disapproved. The US never faced a united,purposeful group of states in any of the multilateral frameworks inwhich it was involved. If the EU member states consistently actedtogether in the multilateral institutions they would consistently get
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their way, even if opposed by the US. The EU problem is not that it isnecessarily weak, even at the present level of military spending, butrather that it is wilfully ineffectual.
Notes
1. Research for this chapter was carried out in the period 2000–03 and includedextensive interviews with national and EU officials in Geneva. I am gratefulto them for their help.
2. Bulletin of the EU, no. 5, 2000 at paragraph 1.6.56.3. A comment made to the author by an official in Geneva.4. Interview with UN official, Geneva, 2002.5. Bulletin of the EU, no. 5, 2000 at paragraph 1.6.56: ‘the Commission recom-
mends … extensive devolution of project management to the Commission’sdelegations’.
6. Ibid.7. Bulletin of the EU, no. 5, 2000, paragraph 3.9. See also Council of the
European Union, 1997, point 1.4.53, and Council of the European Union,1998, point 1.3.41.
8. Interview with an official, Geneva, 2002.9. See the Laatikainen contribution (chapter 4) to this volume which highlights
this position taken by the Netherlands and the Nordic EU member states.10. By contrast, the Nordic states have traditionally supported a Nordic electoral
strategy.11. A term coined by John Ruggie, who also discussed the entrenchment of
multilateralism with regard to the Global Compact (see Ruggie, 1998 andTaylor, 2003, pp. 135–66).
12. Data shown to the author by an official in Geneva, January 2002.13. I am indebted for this point to my colleague Abby Innes.14. The situation is captured neatly in the Commission’s own recommendation:
‘Opting for a front-runner approach would make it necessary for the EU toestablish common positions as early as possible in major UN events and meet-ings, including those of the Security Council, and to build alliances with itspartners so as to create the ‘critical mass’ necessary for the success of impor-tant multilateral initiatives’. European Commission, 2003, paragraph l.1.
15. A range of EU contributions are outlined in European Commission, 2003,paragraphs 1.1. a, b, c.
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8The European Union, HumanRights and the United NationsKaren E. Smith
For several years now, the European Union has repeatedly andprominently declared that it seeks to promote human rights issueswithin the United Nations, in line with its commitments to the UN andto promoting respect for human rights in third countries. This chapteranalyses the EU’s activity to promote human rights at the UN, andspecifically in the two main intergovernmental bodies on human rights,the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly’s ThirdCommittee. It also considers the EU’s support for the Office of the HighCommissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and its position on thereform of the UN’s human rights machinery. Throughout, the chapteraddresses the core questions at the heart of this book: To what extent isthe EU a unified actor at the UN in this area? How ‘Europeanized’ are themember states? What sort of ‘output’ does the EU produce at the UN?How effectively does it promote its positions on human rights at theUN? Does it play a major role at the UN in this area?
The EU and the UN’s intergovernmental human rights bodies1
The UN’s two most important human rights bodies are the GeneralAssembly Third Committee, which meets every autumn in New York,and the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), which meets everyspring in Geneva. The Third Committee and CHR are made up of states,as opposed to the committees created by the international human rightstreaties, which are composed of independent experts. Human rights-related resolutions for the General Assembly are initially considered bythe Third Committee, on which all UN member states sit.2 The CHR is apermanent subsidiary body of the UN Economic and Social Council
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(ECOSOC); ECOSOC elects 53 states to serve on the CHR, so not all (oreven a majority) of the EU member states serve on it at any one time.3
The CHR discusses human rights violations in particular countries aswell as broader human rights issues, and standard setting. For JackDonnelly, ‘the commission has been the single most important institutionof the global human rights regime’ (Donnelly, 1998, p. 52).
The EU’s General Affairs and External Relations Council has statedthat ‘EU priorities in human rights policy include a strong performancein and valuable contribution to the main multilateral human rightsfora, the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and the ThirdCommittee of UN General Assembly (UNGA)’ (Council of the EuropeanUnion, 2004c). The Third Committee and the CHR have been theprimary fora in which the EU acts; the EU’s human rights policy is, asAndrew Clapham points out, almost completely sealed off from thediscussion of human rights in the UN Security Council (Clapham, 1999,p. 682).4 The EU has also presented initiatives at human rights confer-ences, including the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights inVienna, and the 2001 World Conference against Racism in Durban. ButEU coordination on human rights issues across the UN system is notalways attempted or successful. The EU did not have a unified stance onthe drafting of the statute of the International Criminal Court, althoughit did push to make conscripting or using children in war a recognisedwar crime (Clapham, 1999, fn. 65; Council of the European Union,1999).
Although the EU’s external human rights policy is carried out by thefirst and second pillars, its implementation through UN bodies andconferences is mainly a matter for the Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy (CFSP) pillar. Coordination of member state voting positions andagreement on presenting EU positions, resolutions and statements, alltake place in ‘coordination meetings’ in Geneva and New York, withsome preparatory work done in the Council working group on humanrights (COHOM) in Brussels. The rotating Council Presidency is incharge: it chairs all coordination meetings (and COHOM), tries to fosterEU unity, and speaks and presents resolutions on behalf of the EU. ThePresidency also leads EU discussions with other actors at the UN.5
A strong (committed, efficient, effective) Presidency can project a strongposition, a weak one can be ignored. The European Commission, in con-trast, plays only a small role in EU–UN relations in the area of humanrights: it participates in coordination meetings, but tends not to saymuch although some Presidencies ask the Commission for help in draft-ing statements – particularly to add the Community’s angle – or finding
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a consensus. The Commission has observer status at the CHR andGeneral Assembly, and delivers a statement on Community humanrights initiatives to the Third Committee and CHR.6
The EU framework is not the only collective framework in which themember states could choose to act at the UN – assuming they do not acton a purely national basis. For a start, there are the official regionalgroups: the EU-15 (through 2004) plus Malta are members of theWestern Europe and Other Group (WEOG), while the eight Central andEast European countries belong to the Eastern Europe Group (EEG) andCyprus is in the Asian Group.7 Other regional groupings also acttogether in the UN, and of particular relevance here is the Nordic Group(Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden), which has traditionallybeen very visible in the UN. Thus a key issue is the extent to which EUmember states choose to work through the EU, through other groupingsor with other UN states, or alone.
Coordination of member-state positions and presentation of EuropeanPolitical Cooperation (EPC) statements in the Third Committee began inthe early 1980s, a decade after EPC (the precursor of the CFSP) waslaunched. At the same time, there was little EPC coordination and noEPC statements were made in the CHR, because there was ‘an estab-lished pattern of WEOG consultations there’ (Dutch Presidency, 1986,p. 160). The first Presidency speech to the CHR did not occur until 1990.The first time the EU-12 introduced a joint resolution to the CHR was in1989; to the Third Committee, in 1992.
What is striking now is the sheer amount of time member-statediplomats spend in EU coordination meetings, and their dedication to theprocess. During the Third Committee, they meet for at least two hours aday; during the CHR in Geneva, they can meet for five or more hours aday.8 Though coordination meetings can be tiresome, requiring line-by-line negotiations on draft statements or resolutions, EU diplomats regu-larly attend meetings and take them seriously. According to participants,there is massive pressure to converge on a common position, even if alowest common denominator or unsatisfactory position is the result.9 Formany, there is a ‘consensus reflex’ (not just a coordination reflex) and aculture of EU unity is developing via what some even described as aprocess of socialization. EU diplomats interviewed claimed that most oftheir work on human rights at the UN is conducted through the EU; someestimated that the percentage of space for national initiatives and diplomacyat the UN in this field was 15–25 per cent – the rest was EU.10
Why the devotion to EU coordination? In addition to theapparent socialization effects taking place, diplomats cited typical
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intergovernmentalist reasons for the dedication to EU coordination:coordination meetings are an incredible pool of information andexpertise, especially for small and/or new member states. The EU is seento carry more weight than individual member states, which magnifiestheir own influence: the ‘politics of scale’ (Ginsberg, 1989) are clearly atwork. Furthermore, agreeing an EU position can provide a convenientshield against criticism from outsiders (and domestic public opinion).There is thus much evidence of Europeanization, in the sense ofboth penetration of EU norms in national systems of governance,and the development of institutional capability. But, as discussed below,this does not necessarily translate into consistent and effective EUpolicy.
What does all this coordinating produce? Three EU ‘outputs’ arepresented here: the statements and explanations of vote or positiongiven in debates on behalf of the EU; resolutions introduced on behalfof the EU; and voting cohesion – all three in both the CHR and ThirdCommittee.11 The first two indicators are clearly and directly related tothe coordination process: without EU coordination, there would be noEU statements, explanations of vote or position, or EU-sponsoredresolutions. The last, however, is less clearly the outcome of coordination.After all, there is evidence to suggest that well before EPC was created in1970, the member states tended to vote the same way most of the timeon human rights issues within the UN General Assembly.12 But it isreasonable to expect that coordination would bring that record to closeto 100 per cent cohesion.
Statements and explanations of vote/position
In both bodies, the Presidency makes numerous statements andexplanations of vote/position on behalf of the EU (see Table 8.1), includ-ing a general statement in which it comments on the EU’s position onthematic issues and on the human rights situation in a wide variety ofcountries. Explanations are most often given when the EU memberstates are either all voting against a resolution or are abstaining: the EUexplains why it could not support the resolution. Sometimes even whenthere is a split vote (that is, the member states vote differently), the EUwill issue an explanation. While the number of EU statements hasincreased over time, it must also be stressed that the EU member states(including even the Presidency13) also make their own statements andexplanations of vote, and what is EU and what is national are notnecessarily obvious to observers.
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EU resolutions
The EU introduced the same number of resolutions in the ThirdCommittee (four or five) for several years until 2004 when it presentedseven, while the number of EU resolutions introduced at the CHRincreased quite dramatically through 2003, but has more recentlydecreased (see Table 8.2).14
The subjects of resolutions tend to be fairly steady over time: for a fewyears now, the EU has always presented a resolution (together withGRULAC) on the rights of the child to both the Third Committee andthe CHR, and on the death penalty to the CHR. Most EU resolutionscover countries, most of which are put forward at the CHR, and there isremarkable consistency over time in the countries that the EU focuseson. The EU is quite conservative in that it does not push ‘new’ issues.
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Table 8.1 EU statements and explanations of vote/position
Commission on HumanRights Third Committee
EUexplanations
EU statements of vote or EU(made during position (made explanations
general at the time of of vote orYear debates) voting) EU statements position
1990 3 1 6 91991 5 1 6 71992 5 8 6 61993 9 4 5 101994 11 0 10 81995 11 5 9 41996 11 4 9 71997 10 5 6 21998 10 11 11 51999 11 18 15 92000 12 24 12 62001 14 32 9 72002 12 33 12 82003 10 30 10 82004 14 32 23 202005 14 24
Source: United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1990–2005; United Nations GeneralAssembly, Third Committee, 1990–2004; Council of the European Union, ‘EU Annual Reporton Human Rights’, from 1999 to 2004.
159
Table 8.2 Resolutions introduced by the EU
EU-sponsored resolutionsYear CHR Third Committee
1990 China —IranIsraeli settlements
1991 Iran —Israeli settlements
1992 Albania IranChina IraqIran Plight of street childrenIraqIsraeli settlements
1993 China IranEast Timor IraqIran Street childrenIraqIsraeli settlementsFormer YugoslaviaPlight of street children
1994 China IranIran IraqIraq Street childrenIsraeli settlementsStreet children
1995 China IranIran IraqIraq NigeriaIsraeli settlements Strengthening the OHCHRNigeriaMyanmarZaireCentre for Human RightsRights of the child
1996 China IranIran IraqIraq NigeriaIsraeli settlements Strengthening the OHCHRMyanmarNigeriaZaireOHCHRRights of the child
Continued
160
1997 East Timor IranIran IraqIraq NigeriaIsraeli settlementsMyanmarNigeriaZaireCentre for Human RightsRights of the child
1998 Democratic Republic of Congo Democratic Republic of Congo(former Zaire) IranEast Timor1 IraqIran Rights of the ChildIraqIsraeli settlementsMyanmarNigeriaRights of the child
1999 Democratic Republic of Congo Democratic Republic of CongoIran IranIraq IraqIsraeli settlements SudanMyanmar Death penalty (withdrawn)Sudan Rights of the childRights of the childDeath penalty
2000 Chechnya Democratic Republic of CongoDemocratic Republic of Congo IranIran IraqIraq SudanIsraeli settlements Rights of the childMyanmarSudanRights of the childDeath penalty
2001 Chechnya Democratic Republic of CongoDemocratic Republic of Congo IranIran IraqIraq SudanIsraeli settlements Rights of the childMyanmarSudanRights of the childDeath penalty
Table 8.2 Continued
EU-sponsored resolutionsYear CHR Third Committee
Continued
2002 Chechnya Democratic Republic of CongoDemocratic Republic of Congo IraqIran MyanmarIraq SudanIsraeli settlements Rights of the childMyanmarSouth-eastern EuropeSudanZimbabweRights of the childDeath penalty
2003 Chechnya Democratic Republic of CongoDemocratic Republic of Congo MyanmarIraq TurkmenistanIsraeli settlements Rights of the childMyanmarNorth KoreaSudanTurkmenistanZimbabweRights of the childDeath penalty
2004 Belarus Democratic Republic of CongoChechnya MyanmarIsraeli settlements SudanMyanmar TurkmenistanNorth Korea ZimbabweTurkmenistan Religious intoleranceZimbabwe Rights of the childRights of the childDeath penaltyReligious intolerance
2005 BelarusMyanmarNorth KoreaSudan (withdrawn)Rights of the childDeath penaltyReligious intolerance
Note: Those in italics were not adopted.1 This resolution became a Chairman’s statement.
Source: United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1990–2005; United Nations GeneralAssembly, Third Committee, 1990–2004; Council of the European Union, ‘EU Annual Reporton Human Rights’, from 1999 to 2004.
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Table 8.2 Continued
EU-sponsored resolutionsYear CHR Third Committee
In fact, the Dutch failure to push a new resolution on violence againstwomen through the 2003 Third Committee, and the recent Brazilianfailures to get a resolution on human rights and sexual orientationpassed by the CHR reinforce the views of some within the EU that theEU should not take risks. The EU is thus inhibited from being innovativewithin the UN.
The yearly decisions to introduce new resolutions or to dropresolutions are motivated more often by member state interests than bychanging priorities in the EU’s external human rights policy or its for-eign relations in general. For example, the resolution on Zimbabwe atthe CHR in 2002 resulted from the pressures of one member state in par-ticular, the UK; it sought an EU initiative because a national initiativewould have been counterproductive (given the tensions between the UKand Zimbabwe), and a Commonwealth initiative was extremelyunlikely.
According to several EU diplomats, they consider whether the EU hasa dialogue on human rights with the third country; if not – and allavenues of influence have been exhausted – the EU will run a resolution.And they will consider how successful the EU has been in winning it inthe past: resolutions which the EU loses are more easily dropped. Butwhile the selection of countries as ‘targets’ of resolutions is certainly jus-tifiable on the basis of their human rights records, the same cannot besaid about those countries dropped from the list of resolutions intro-duced by the EU (not to mention those that have never been the subjectof EU-sponsored resolutions).
China was an early and notorious case of this. Following disagree-ments between member states in 1996 and 1997 over whether the EUshould sponsor a resolution condemning China at the CHR, in 1998,the British Presidency brokered a deal allowing the EU to achieve unityon one point. The EU would not table or co-sponsor a resolution onChina at the CHR, but EU member states would vote against a no-actionmotion (General Affairs Council, 1998). This has been the stance eversince. More recently, the EU has dropped several resolutions that havenot been successful at the CHR: since 2003, it no longer runs a resolu-tion on Iran; in 2004, it shunted the resolution on Sudan off to theAfrican Union;15 in 2005, it dropped resolutions on Chechnya andZimbabwe. In none of those cases did the human rights situationimprove enough to justify dropping the resolutions; in fact, the EUre-introduced a resolution on Sudan to the 2004 Third Committee – anindication that dropping at the CHR was not justified. Furthermore, inthose countries with which the EU has a human rights dialogue (China,Iran, Russia), the dialogue has produced little of substance to justify
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dropping resolutions (General Affairs and External Relations Council,2005). And in the cases of China and Iran, commercial interests werewidely felt to be behind the reticence of some member states to pushEU-sponsored resolutions condemning those states.16
The decrease in the number of country resolutions sponsored by theEU at the CHR contrasts with a declaration by External RelationsCommissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner that ‘the likelihood of defeatdoes not, in itself, constitute an overriding reason to refrain from run-ning a resolution: as human rights defenders constantly attest, the veryact of tabling a draft resolution sends a clear signal to the governmentand people of the country concerned’ (Ferrero-Waldner, 2005). Yet thelikelihood of defeat seems in fact to be a key reason the EU refrains fromrunning a resolution – to the dismay of human rights organizations. ForHuman Rights Watch, the EU’s contribution to the 2005 CHR was ‘terri-bly disappointing’.17 It certainly appears that the EU, by not pushing forthe condemnation of glaring examples of human rights abuses in theface of opposition, has been complicit in ‘dysfunctional multilateralism’in the area of human rights.
EU member states also present their own resolutions – some are veryactive in doing this, others much less so – indicating that they still con-sider it their prerogative to act outside the EU framework. Examplesinclude: France and extreme poverty, arbitrary detention and involun-tary disappearances; Portugal and economic and social rights; Austriaand minority rights; Nordic group members and indigenous people’sissues; Denmark and torture. Occasionally a national resolution at theCHR has become an EU resolution, such as on the death penalty (ini-tially introduced by Italy), Mynamar (France), rights of the child(Sweden), and religious intolerance (Ireland). In the case of France andIreland, the switch coincided with their Council Presidencies.
Voting cohesion
Despite EU coordination, voting cohesion is not visibly improving,though fears that the 2004 enlargement would lead to much less cohe-sion have not, as yet, been realized.18 Figures 8.1 and 8.2 show thetrends in the percentage of ‘split votes’ since 1990. The issues whichdivide the member states range from the obviously controversial (theMiddle East) to the mundane (the Cuban resolution on mercenaries:every year until the 2004 CHR the member states split on it). No one ishappy with the splits, and there are intensive discussions to try to avoidmost of them.
Why, then, are there splits? EU diplomats offered a variety of explana-tions, not all of them consistent with each other. First, there are issues
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164
Figure 8.2 EU voting cohesion in the Third Committee
Sources: United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1990–2005; United Nations GeneralAssembly, Third Committee, 1990–2004; Council of the European Union, ‘EU Annual Reporton Human Rights’, from 1999 to 2004.
Figure 8.1 EU voting cohesion in the CHR
Sources: United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1990–2005; United Nations GeneralAssembly, Third Committee, 1990–2004; Council of the European Union, ‘EU Annual Reporton Human Rights’, from 1999 to 2004.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Spl
it vo
tes
as a
per
cent
age
of to
tal v
otes
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
Spl
its a
s a
perc
enta
ge o
f tot
al v
otes
on which the member states are traditionally divided, and are unlikelyever to reach agreement in the near future, such as prostitution orindigenous peoples’ rights. These are fundamental disagreements, overbasic principles. The member states will not even hold discussions ifthese issues arise in resolutions. Second, there is the simple lack of timeavailable in EU coordination to try to heal the splits. Not only are EUcoordination meetings overloaded, but the member states must operateaccording to UN schedules and react to others’ initiatives. If they hadmore time, the diplomats on the ground might be able to overcome theintra-EU divisions.
Third, there is ‘interference’ – or not – from national capitals. Somediplomats said the lack of interference from capitals has a negativeeffect, because impetus from capitals forces everyone to privilege EUunity. Others said that when capitals intervene, they give instructionsthat prevent EU unity because they reflect national interests. Fourth, inNew York and Geneva there has been a trend towards more voting onresolutions, rather than passing them by consensus, which reflects anincreasingly disputatious atmosphere in both fora. When there is actualvoting, the splits appear because the details of the language used in theresolutions become more important. For example, at the 2003 ThirdCommittee, member states split on a resolution on self-determination,which had been passed by consensus since 1995 (and through 1994 haddivided the member states). This means that we should take previousevidence of unity in voting with a pinch of salt.
Fifth, several EU diplomats pointed out that it is not so obvious inGeneva or New York (in contrast to Brussels) that there should be EUunity. The UN has traditionally been an arena for national diplomacy,and the EU diplomats are not always ‘CFSP minded’ enough (but seebelow for a contrasting view). Finally, the overall political atmospherewithin the EU can play a role. The difficult relations between themember states in 2002–03 over Iraq and the US – especially evident atthe UN – were not conducive to healing splits within the ThirdCommittee or CHR.
Nonetheless, diplomats (from within and outside the EU) are adamantthat the EU is seen as an influential, united bloc within UN. The EUcertainly has the potential to lead within the UN, because it consists of25 states and heavily influences the positions of states in its ‘orbit’:aspiring EU members, EFTAns, and countries with whom member stateshave close relationships. But this does not mean that the EU is seen as aforce for good in the UN system – in fact, some view it as neo-colonialand domineering, and the EU can spark the automatic opposition of
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developing countries to its statements or initiatives. In 2002, relationswith the Africa group were particularly problematic; in 2003, relationswith the Arab group were difficult. As Andrew Clapham argues, ‘becausethe EU represents an ideological and powerful bloc, other blocs mayhave to redefine their identity and ideology in counterposition to theEU. There is division in the debate, not despite EU consistency, butbecause of EU coherence’ (Clapham, 1999, p. 649).
Nearly all resolutions introduced by the EU are adopted, though itshould be noted that the vast majority of all resolutions introduced atboth fora are approved.19 It has, however, lost more resolutions in thepast few years at the CHR, and for the first time in 2004 at the ThirdCommittee. Majorities for many of its resolutions at both fora have beendeclining, a reflection also of more contentious ‘North–South’ relationswithin the UN.20
The colossal investment of time spent in EU coordination takes a toll:as a result, the EU has little time for ‘outreach’, for working with othergroups or states or lobbying them to support particular resolutions.21
One diplomat said the problem is that some member states have onlythe goal of EU unity in mind and not the EU’s effectiveness within theUN. The Council admitted that at the 2001 CHR, collective action bythe EU ‘required very intensive internal coordination’, which meantthat ‘the time for consultation with other non-EU delegations remainedvery limited’ (Council of the European Union, 2001, p. 58). The timespent in coordination also means that the EU can be extraordinarilyslow and inflexible: whatever EU position emerges from the process can-not easily be altered. Outsiders can get frustrated with the lumberingEU, and EU diplomats have been studying and recently implementingways to stream-line coordination, to make it more efficient. Time is onecommodity that the EU cannot control at the UN: it must fit into theUN’s schedule, not vice versa. Furthermore, it must act according to anagenda fixed by others (several EU member state diplomats noted thatthe EU does not have much influence at all on the agenda of UN meet-ings), and often must react to the initiatives of others. As numerous aca-demic observers have noted, the EU in reactive mode is much lesseffective and cohesive than the EU in proactive mode (see, for example,Tonra, 2001).
There are two additional obstacles to EU’s effectiveness. First, there isnot always much concrete support for EU diplomacy at the UN fromBrussels and national capitals, such as asking third countries’ capitals toback the EU’s stance. A strong Presidency can be better at this than aweak one, but it still depends on the member states’ will to expend the
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necessary resources. Sometimes the EU will remind third countries ofhow much aid they are receiving from the EU, but explicit threats toreduce that aid (for example) if support is not forthcoming are nevermade. The Commission has urged that the EU’s bilateral politicaldialogues reflect the objectives pursued by the EU in the UN (EuropeanCommission, 2003, pp. 10–11), which could back up the diplomacy inthe UN.
Second, there is little time in coordination meetings or COHOM todevote to the broader picture. Some Presidencies try to do this, but theirwork is rarely continued into the next few Presidencies. This is not justabout better linking what the EU does in the UN with what it doesoutside it, but about deciding what the EU’s priorities will be, where torun resolutions (and why), and who to work with on the EU’s and others’resolutions. All of the EU diplomats want this problem to be addressed,and the General Affairs and External Relations Council (2003) acknowl-edged ‘the need for a more focused and strategic approach in the speedyidentification of its objectives and in developing a leading role inachieving them through more effective and result-oriented coordination’.
The EU’s influence within the UN’s intergovernmental human rightsbodies is thus rather disappointing: internal coordination leaves littletime for outreach, and the EU machinery is not geared up to exercisingthe sort of leverage that might increase the EU’s influence – such asarranging for coordinated demarches to third countries to ask them tosupport EU resolutions. It does not appear that the EU could easilyassume a leadership position (or what the European Commission (2003)terms a ‘frontrunner’ position) within the UN without fundamentallyreforming the coordination process.
The EU and the OHCHR
In 1993, the post of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights wascreated, accountable to the Secretary General. The office of the highcommissioner (OHCHR) is based in Geneva, and, among other activities,engages in dialogue with and/or establishes field presences in particularcountries. Its finances come from UN member states and other non-stateactors – including the EU, which strongly supported its creation fromthe outset.
Until recently, the relationship between the European Commissionand UN in the field of human rights was minimal. The EU channelledvery little political assistance through the UN (and other multilateralorganizations). Gordon Crawford found that in 1993, 1.7 per cent of EU
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political assistance was channelled through multilateral organizations,which rose only to 3.9 per cent in 1994 (Crawford, 2001, p. 134). In1995, the Commission recommended developing cooperation with theUN (European Commission, 1995, pp. 24–5). But the report on theimplementation of the European Initiative for Democracy and HumanRights in 1996–99 says virtually nothing about cooperation with UN,except – notably – to indicate that cooperation with international organ-izations depends on the Commission identifying activities of interestwith due regard to the Community’s visibility (European Commission,2000b, p. 82).22
Greater participation by the EU in UN human rights activities hasbeen hampered by concerns to ensure EU visibility, and demands thatthe UN account for how it spends EU funds. In August 1999, theEuropean Commission and UN Secretariat concluded an overallagreement on contractual issues, which allows cooperation on a moresystematic basis on human rights issues. But the European Commissionhas indicated that that it will seek cooperation strategies with the UNthat are coherent with the EU’s strategic plans, and on issues identifiedas a priority for the EU (European Commission, 2001d, p. 19). In 2003,the Commission agreed a cooperation plan with the OHCHR, whichidentifies thematic priorities for cooperation under the EIDHR(European Commission, 2004b, p. 17). That year, the Commissioncontributed just over USD 4.2 million (making it the third largest donorto the OHCHR); in 2004 it pledged almost USD 6 million (the secondhighest), but contributed USD 540,437; as of May 2005, it hadcontributed over USD 1.1 million in 2005.23
As Clapham points out, EU funding can be critical for UN humanrights activities, but if the UN cannot attract those funds, then UNoperations could go unfunded. Therefore, UN missions have to be pop-ular with the EU (and perceived as consistent with EU interests). So, forexample, UN human rights field offices for Liberia, Angola, Sierra Leone,Sudan and Somalia have attracted little attention from the EuropeanCommission (Clapham, 1999, pp. 651–2).
The EU and UN reform in the area of human rights
In 2004–05, discussions on UN reform included proposals for radicallychanging the CHR and strengthening the OHCHR. Reforms of the CHRwere initially suggested by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challengesand Change in its report of December 2004, and were picked up andmodified by Secretary General Annan in his report ‘In Larger Freedom’
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in March 2005 (United Nations Secretary General, 2005a, especiallyaddendum 1).
The High-Level Panel noted that the CHR has been undermined byeroding credibility and professionalism, and that enlarging the CHR’smembership to the entire UN membership would be one way to foster agreater commitment to protection of human rights by all states. Anadvisory council or panel of 15 independent experts could support theCHR’s work (United Nations Secretary General’s High-Level Panel, 2004,pp. 89–90).24 Annan’s report noted that the CHR had been underminedby ‘the politicization of its sessions and the selectivity of its work’, andproposed that the CHR be replaced by a smaller Human Rights Council(United Nations Secretary General, 2005b). The Human Rights Councilwould be a permanent, standing body, elected by a two-thirds majorityof the General Assembly, and charged with evaluating the human rightsrecords of all states. Those elected ‘should have a solid record of com-mitment to the highest human rights standards’. Thus the Councilwould ‘allow for a more comprehensive and objective approach’.
These proposals have been broadly supported but were not putforward by the EU: its paper for submission to the High-Level Panel,agreed on 17–18 May 2004, emphasized the importance of respect forhuman rights, but did not suggest changes to the UN’s institutionalframework to try to ensure this. Instead, it suggested that the UN neededto assess better the human rights situations in internal conflicts, andthat the OHCHR and CHR special rapporteurs could help do that(Council of the European Union, 2004a).
After Annan’s report was published, the European Commissionrecommended that the EU fully support the proposal for a HumanRights Council, and suggested that prospective members of it should ‘beexpected to demonstrate a readiness to examine and improve their ownhuman rights record’. The Human Rights Council should measureprogress against a wider range of human rights standards, not just thoseinstruments ratified by particular states, and should be able to censurestates if they do not measure up. In addition, it should be able to drawattention to sudden and significant deteriorations of the human rightssituation in a particular country, rather than wait for that country togo through a peer review process (European Commission, 2005c,pp. 12–13).
During informal consultations on CHR reform in June 2005, the EU(and acceding and associated countries) was one of only four groups ofstates that made formal statements (the others were the Africa Group,the Arab Group and the Organization of the Islamic Conference)
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(United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 2005; see also Councilof the European Union, 2005a). The EU supported the strengthening ofthe OHCHR and its role in interactions with other UN bodies, andsupported the elevation of the CHR to a standing Human RightsCouncil, based in Geneva, as a principal and autonomous body. Itsmembership should be elected by a two-thirds majority of the GeneralAssembly on the basis of fair geographical balances, and candidate statesshould commit themselves to upholding the highest human rightsstandards. The EU supported retaining the special procedures systemdeveloped in the CHR framework (rapporteurs, special representatives,and so on). While it would consider the proposed peer review mechanism,it emphasized that this should not enable states to avoid consideringurgent and acute human rights situations.
The June 2005 Brussels European Council, infamous for the falloutover the budget and the future of the draft constitutional treaty,nonetheless approved conclusions on UN reform. It welcomed ‘theprominent place given to human rights, the rule of law and democracyin the reform proposals’, and supported the establishment of a HumanRights Council and strengthening the OHCHR. It shared ‘the concern toplace human rights on the same footing as development, peace andsecurity matters’ (European Council, 2005, point 37). Thus there seemsto be broad agreement among EU institutions and member states onreforms to the UN’s human rights machinery. And while the EU doesnot appear to be leading the way on reforms in this particular issue area,its support will be crucial (but not sufficient in and of itself) if change isto occur. Although the September 2005 UN summit agreed in principleto set up a Human Rights Council, it could not agree on the details. Andat the time of writing (autumn 2005), the prospects for UN agreementon a strong Human Rights Council did not appear to be bright.
Conclusion
The commitment of the member states to act together within the UNis unquestionably impressive, a consensus reflex has clearly developed,and there is evidence of increasing EU ‘output’ at the UN since theearly 1990s. But limits to the EU’s unity are posed mainly by conflictingnational interests and the persistent desire of member states to actindependently at the UN. Furthermore the energy required to reachinternal agreement restricts the EU’s influence within the UN system.The implications of this in the divisive political climate at the UN aredepressing.
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The impact of enlargement on EU coordination could be negative,given these weaknesses. There are clearly already socialization effects,and increasing alignment of positions between the acceding countriesand the rest of the EU (Luif, 2003; Johansson-Nogués, 2004). But withmore participants, EU agreements will take more time to negotiate andEU positions will become even more inflexible. Enlargement brings withit the potential for more vetoes, more split votes, and more national‘pets’. The EU could be even less able to do outreach. But EU diplomatsargue that with new streamlined procedures, more advance preparationin Brussels, and strong leadership, the potential problems posed byenlargement could be minimized. And the desire of EU diplomats,echoed in policy recommendations by the Council and EuropeanCommission, for a stronger and more effective role at the UN indicatesthat there is much will to redress the difficulties the EU faces when inter-acting with the UN. But if the EU is to be frontrunner on human rightsissues at the UN, the member states must also be less inward-looking(and therefore more engaged with outsiders) and more willing to inno-vate and push EU initiatives. This requires a fundamental strengtheningof the CFSP, not just on the ground in Geneva and New York, but inBrussels and national capitals too.
Two further issues arise with respect to EU action within the UN onhuman rights. First, the EU wishes to retain considerable freedom ofaction in the field of human rights, has the policy goals and instrumentsto promote human rights, and has the capacity to act vis-à-vis humanrights violators, when action at the international level can often proveillusory. For example, as part of its human rights policy, the EU imposespolitical conditionality (albeit inconsistently). The EU may thus sus-pend aid or diplomatic relations with other states, but does not seekauthorization or legitimation for such actions from the UN. For KatarinaTomasevksi (1993, p. 122) donors that impose bilateral conditionalityact as prosecutor and judge, and therefore undermine the UN multilat-eral system. As Crawford points out, however, the UN system itself is notimpartial or consistent, and frequently takes no action whatsoevertowards human rights violators (Crawford, 2001, p. 34). But the EU’sautonomy may not help that system become less partial and inconsis-tent. Preserving the EU’s freedom of action while strengthening thecapacity to enforce standards at the international level remains a coredilemma.
Second, the EU is not subject to international scrutiny of its ownhuman rights record. The EU is not a party to any international humanrights treaty. Human rights within the EU are protected principally by
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the member states, not the EU. The member states have subscribed tothe major international human rights instruments, allowing outsidescrutiny of their human rights records. EU statements to the UN haveaddressed internal EU developments in the area of human rights, butthere is still no formal scrutiny of the EU’s record. The draft constitu-tional treaty (Article I-9) would have allowed the EU to sign up to theEuropean Convention on Human Rights, but did not specify any otherinternational human rights treaty. Members of the proposed HumanRights Council are to supposed to prove their human rights credentials:while the EU would not be a member of the Council itself (should onebe set up), if it wishes to play a major role in it, its own house must beseen to be in order too.
Notes
1. This section draws on and updates material in Smith, 2006.2. The Third Committee deals with social, humanitarian and cultural issues;
human rights questions dominate the agenda, but it also considers issuesrelating to social development, crime prevention and cultural heritage. Thischapter covers only the human rights questions.
3. States are elected to the CHR from the regional groups; now that EU member states are spread across three regional groups, the proportion of EUmember states within the CHR could increase.
4. Human rights are often discussed in the Security Council: the obviousexamples are discussions of how to respond to cases of massive human rightsviolations (as in Sudan).
5. In 2000 the Portuguese Presidency set up a system of burden-sharing, to allowthe Presidency to allocate tasks, such as lobbying UN members, to othermember states. It also created two clusters of issues for coordination in NewYork, so that now two coordination meetings can be held in parallel. InGeneva, there are three clusters. This creates a dilemma for small memberstates with fewer diplomats available to attend all the cluster meetings.
6. It will also make similar statements to human rights conferences, such as the2001 World Conference against Racism in Durban.
7. Not much coordination on substantial issues goes on in most regional groups,although WEOG, the Africa Group and the Latin America group (GRULAC)have been quite active in the CHR. Other groupings, such as the NordicGroup, the Group of 77 (developing countries), the Organization of theIslamic Conference (OIC), and the Non-Aligned Movement, are also active inthe human rights fora discussed here. An informal grouping of non-Europeanwestern countries, JUSCANZ ( J apan, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand),meets occasionally to coordinate positions, somewhat more often in theCANZ formation. The EFTAns (Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland andSwitzerland) will operate with JUSCANZ on procedural issues but are wellknown for aligning themselves politically to EU positions, statements, and forco-sponsoring resolutions with the EU.
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8. Although only some of the EU member states are CHR members at any onetime, all EU member states participate in coordination meetings. ThePresidency speaks even if the member state holding the Presidency is not afull member of the CHR; non-member states are observers, and can participatein debates.
9. I conducted several interviews with diplomats from the member states, EUinstitutions, and non-member states (the then candidate states and otherthird countries) in London, New York and Brussels (almost all of whom alsohad experience at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva).Because the community of diplomats involved in EU coordination in thisarea is so small and all those interviewed wished to remain anonymous,I have not revealed their names or national affiliations. All interviews tookplace between December 2003 and April 2004.
10. And for the Nordic members, this has meant that Nordic Group activity –statements, sponsored resolutions – has distinctly declined as a result.
11. An additional ‘output’ is EU co-sponsorship of resolutions introduced byother states, but there is as yet no policy on co-sponsorship though in the lastfew years have there been attempts to have an EU position on co-sponsoringparticular resolutions. EU diplomats realize that they could exercise leverageif they promise to co-sponsor resolutions together. For example, at the 2003Third Committee, the EU held intensive discussions with Japan over itsresolution on Cambodia, and when Japan took into account EU suggestions,the EU member states all agreed to co-sponsor it. Several EU diplomats, how-ever, treasured the opportunity allowed by co-sponsorship to stake out anational position, and every single one of them said that the priority shouldbe to get rid of the split votes before tackling common EU co-sponsorship ofresolutions.
12. Leon Hurwitz found that the ‘index of voting cohesion’ on human rightsissues of the original EEC member states from the 3rd session of the GeneralAssembly (1948–49) to the 27th (1972–73) was 93.44 (out of a maximum100), which Hurwitz classified as ‘high’ (the average level, across all issueareas, was 84.14). This does not include West Germany (which did not jointhe UN until 1973), and includes Ireland and Italy only from 1955, whenthey joined the UN (Hurwitz, 1975, pp. 231–2, especially Table 1).
13. When the Presidency made statements or explanations, and it is not explic-itly stated in the UN record that this was on behalf of the EU, I have notcounted this in the EU figures. The UN record may be incomplete or thePresidency may have neglected to state that it was speaking for the EU, but italso may have been speaking purely in a national capacity. EU diplomatshave recently agreed that national explanations of vote or position should beavoided.
14. However, it is not always clear in the CHR documents that a resolution wasintroduced on behalf of the EU: this can be inferred, if the Presidencyintroduced it and all member states co-sponsored it, but only the EUrecords confirm it. This is obviously, then, a factor that has limited the EU’svisibility in the CHR. The Third Committee records are clearer about EUinvolvement.
15. The EU acquiesced in watering down the resolution which stopped short offormally condemning Sudan; only the US voted against the resolution. Anne
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Penketh, ‘UN Criticism of Sudan “Watered Down” ’, The Independent, 24 April2004.
16. Of course, Iran has also been the subject of European diplomacy on thesensitive issue of nuclear weapons proliferation, which might have been afactor in the decision not to press Iran on human rights at the UN.
17. David Cronin, ‘Can Annan Rescue the UN’s Champion for Human Rights?’,European Voice, 14–20 April 2005.
18. But cohesion on human rights issues is higher than that on other issues. Luifcompared EU voting cohesion on recorded votes in the General Assembly onfour topics, and found that between 1995 and 2002, there was more often anEU consensus on human rights issues (between 72.7 and 92.9 per cent ofvotes) than on security (between 52.9 and 76.9 per cent) and decolonization(between 37.5 and 70 per cent), but not as often as on the Middle East(between 84 and 100 per cent) (Luif, 2003, pp. 28–9, 55).
19. At ad hoc conferences, the EU has also had some success. At the Viennaworld conference on human rights in 1993, the EU’s position paper providedmuch of the basis for the final document of the conference, especially theappointment of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (EuropeanCommission, 1995, pp. 7–8).
20. An exception to this is the resolution on the death penalty, which has beenthe focus of considerable EU diplomatic activity – arguably then reflectedin increasing votes in favour of it within the CHR (Council of the EuropeanUnion, 2004b, p. 54).
21. During the Italian Presidency in fall 2003, 132 coordination meetings involv-ing Third Committee experts were held, only eleven of which were meetingswith other UN member states (mimeo from the Council secretariat liaisonoffice, New York).
22. The EU has, however, been a regular contributor to international tribunals,including the UN tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and theInternational Criminal Court: its contributions are around euro 6 million ayear (European Commission, 2001e and 2004d).
23. These figures are available on the OHCHR fundraising website: http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/fundraising.htm (accessed 30 June 2005).
24. One of the most notorious incidents illustrating the CHR’s lack of credibilitywas the election of Libya as chair of the 2003 session, which was opposedvociferously by the US but not overtly by the EU.
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9EU-UN Environmental Relations:Shared Competence and EffectiveMultilateralismChad Damro1
The most important international initiatives to protect the globalenvironment have been negotiated in the United Nations (UN) system.Despite the absence of environmental protection provisions in itsCharter, the UN has brokered a number of multilateral agreements toaddress various international environmental concerns.2 The UN’s abilityto advance an international environmental agenda has depended onsupport and pressure from many of its influential member states, notleast, the members of the European Union (EU).
The EU is now frequently considered a ‘frontrunner’ or leading – ifsomewhat complex and uncertain – actor in international environmen-tal initiatives within the UN system.3 The EU’s role in internationalenvironmental affairs has been rather confusing for non-members whohave not always perceived the Union as a unified actor. Much of theconfusion surrounding the EU as a negotiator within the UN systemstems from its unique legal competencies in international environmen-tal affairs. The EU is neither a state nor a traditional internationalorganization, which creates legal and practical questions about whois negotiating, signing, ratifying and implementing internationalenvironmental agreements on behalf of the Union.
Unlike some other policy areas, the institutions of the EU and itsindividual member states share legal competence to engage in interna-tional environmental affairs. Given this shared competence, one mightwonder how the EU could ever become an effective proponent forchange in international environmental politics. Therefore, this chaptersets out to answer the following question: To what extent has the EUovercome the obstacle of shared competence to pursue effective
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multilateralism in UN environmental politics? In answering this ques-tion, the chapter reveals important insights related to the central themesof this volume, in particular, the capacity of the EU to act within envi-ronmental politics at the UN and the success of the EU in defending andpromoting its common positions. The analysis speaks directly to thecentral question raised in the volume: can the EU be effective enough toact within, have influence on, and even lead the UN?
This chapter assesses the EU’s effectiveness along internal and externaldimensions.4 The EU’s internal effectiveness is discussed in terms of thehistorical, legal and political development of its system of shared com-petence. The exact division of this legal competence determines thepractical means through which the EU participates in UN environmen-tal negotiations. This participation is broken down into the EU’s abilityto represent the Union at international negotiations, to sign and ratifyagreements reached at the negotiations and to implement the domesticmeasures necessary to meet commitments under such agreements.
The EU’s external effectiveness is discussed in terms of the Union’sinstitutional relations with the UN system via two of its key bodies fordealing with environmental issues: the United Nations EnvironmentProgramme (UNEP) and the Commission on Sustainable Development(CSD). External effectiveness is also assessed in terms of the Union’sability to attain its objectives and to manage lengthy UN negotiationson climate change.
The chapter first investigates the shared competence of the EU in thispolicy area in order to reveal the historical, legal and political founda-tions of the Union’s internal effectiveness. Second, it discusses the EU’sinstitutional relations with the UN system, in particular, the UNEP andCSD. Third, the chapter investigates the EU’s external effectiveness inUN environmental negotiations, focusing in detail on developments inthe ongoing international policy debate on climate change. This casereveals the EU’s ability to manage the challenges of shared competenceand to become a frontrunner in the pursuit of effective multilateralism.Finally, the chapter offers concluding remarks on the EU’s ability topromote effective multilateralism in international environmentalaffairs.
The EU’s shared competence in international environmental affairs
The EU engages quite frequently with the UN system in internationalenvironmental affairs. This should not be surprising given the integrative
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nature of the EU and the cross-border nature of global environmentalchallenges. These features tend to create a complementary relationshipbetween the EU and UN. As Eeckhout points out, ‘It is of course in thenature of many environmental problems that they cross bordersbetween States, and increasingly such problems are of a global character.Therefore, much of [the EU’s] involvement is logical’ (Eeckhout, 2004,p. 119). As the EU deals with cross-border environmental protectionwithin the Union, so too does it engage in environmental protection ini-tiatives that are increasingly pursued through multilateral environmentalagreements. The UN also offers the EU a forum through which it canincrease its international profile and enhance its credibility in the eyesof its member states and European citizens. The work programme of theUN bodies also encourages EU participation in international envi-ronmental affairs because it complements the Union’s active, public,pro-environment advocacy and reflects a shared emphasis on the needfor sustainable development.5 However, this seemingly natural, logicaland somewhat symbiotic relationship has not always been the norm,and even today, EU–UN relations in environmental affairs are notwholly unproblematic.
The 1957 Treaty of Rome did not explicitly cover cooperation inenvironmental policy, an omission that restricted the EU’s ability tooperate in international environmental affairs. Nevertheless, theEuropean Commission gradually acquired authority in internationalenvironmental politics. The acquisition of this authority was based on anumber of legal and political decisions that created a system of shared,or mixed, competence. The European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) 1971 ERTAdecision provided an important, but not specifically environmental,legal basis upon which the Commission could begin to Europeanizeenvironmental policy and act in international environmental affairs.According to this ECJ decision, when the European Community (EC)has the right (that is, acquires legal competence) to legislate internally,it also has the right to act externally in matters that might affect thatinternal legislation.
During the early 1970s, the European Commission also began includingenvironmental cooperation with third parties in its EnvironmentalAction Programmes, the first of which was issued in 1973. The Com-mission linked its competence over environmental policy with itscompetence in trade policy by arguing that implementation of interna-tional environmental agreements could affect EU competitiveness.Consequently during the 1970s, the EC became a party to a number ofinternational environmental agreements, such as the 1974 Paris
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Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution, the 1976 BarcelonaConvention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea and the 1979Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution.
While the EC’s involvement in international environmental agree-ments in the 1970s resulted from the ERTA case and ad hoc politicaldecisions, the Single European Act (1986) incorporated environmentalpolicy for the first time into the EU’s treaty structure (Eeckhout, 2004,p. 40). The Maastricht Treaty (1992) then afforded the EC competence‘to conclude international environmental agreements, which then arebinding on the institutions of the Community and on the MemberStates’ (Krämer, 1995, p. 84). Under the current arrangement, both theEC and the member states are legally competent to act in internationalenvironmental affairs. Within the international community, this legalsystem of shared competence creates immediate questions about theprecise extent to which the EU can be effective in the UN because itraises three important questions related to international negotiations:Who represents? Who signs and ratifies? Who implements?
To answer the first question, the EU has developed a system of dualrepresentation in UN environmental negotiations. Both the Commissionand the member state holding the Presidency are responsible for repre-senting the Union in different instances. This stands in stark contrast topolicy areas that fall under the exclusive competence of the EC, such astrade policy. Under shared competence, member states and the ECcould, in principle, each negotiate independently in those areas fallingunder their respective competences. In practice, however, it is ‘rare forthe Community and the Member States to negotiate independently, andco-ordination, or at least consultation, among the Member States andthe Commission generally takes place’ (Macleod et al., 1996, p. 152).The Commission speaks for the EU when areas under the EC’s exclusivecompetence are being discussed and the member state holding thePresidency speaks for the Union when areas of shared competenceare being considered. Despite this legal distinction, the Commission canbe asked and frequently does represent the EU when areas of mixedcompetence are being discussed (Sbragia, 1998, p. 293).
Representation in international negotiations often requires member-ship in the associated international organization or at least recognitionby negotiating partners. The EU’s institutional relationship with the UNsystem is based on a General Assembly Resolution that grants the EConly permanent observer status, including participation rights, in theGeneral Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).6
Thus, the EC (represented by the European Commission) and not the
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EU, formally possesses permanent observer status. The reasons for thislimited status ‘are as much located in resistance by international organ-izations themselves and by third countries, as in traditional concernsover sovereignty in the [EU] Member States’ (Eeckhout, 2004, p. 224).
The answer to the second question must consider the competencies ofboth signing and ratifying international environmental agreements. TheEU treaties do not specifically designate responsibility for signing interna-tional environmental agreements. Environmental agreements negotiatedunder shared competence are known as ‘mixed agreements’. Because theyoften touch upon a number of different policy areas, such mixed agree-ments must be signed by both the EC and the individual member states.
Regarding ratification, shared competence also requires the involve-ment of both the EC and the member states. Prior to ratification, theCouncil will make a formal statement – a Council Conclusion – ‘ofthe legal bases upon which the agreement is concluded, involvingcitation of the relevant Treaty articles’ (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999,p. 96). As Vogler notes, ‘Implementing legislation, if this is required,must be on the table at the same time [as ratification]. The process canextend over two years or more, but it involves the EU, through itscommon legal system and the supervisory role of the Commission,operating as a single actor’ (Vogler, 1999, p. 38).
For the actual ratification of the agreement, procedures differ betweenthe EC and the individual member states. According to Macleod et al.,
The procedures by which the Community and the Member Statesapprove or ratify agreements depend on their respective institutionalrequirements. For the Community, conclusion of an agreement willrequire the adoption of an act in accordance with the appropriatelegal basis approving or authorizing the conclusion of the agreementon behalf of the Community, and authorizing the Commission or thePresidency, or both, or some other representative of the Community,to communicate the fact of the Community’s approval to the otherparty or parties to the agreement by arranging for deposit of theinstrument of approval with the depositary, or otherwise as providedin the agreement. Each of the Member States would likewise have toarrange for formal approval of the agreement in accordance with itsown constitutional procedures. (Macleod, et al., 1996, p. 154)
The answer to the third question – who implements – varies dependingon whether the Union and/or the member states have competence overthe policy area in question. This is so because the implementation of UN
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environmental agreements can potentially touch upon a number ofpolicy areas that move beyond traditional environmental policy and donot fall under the EC’s exclusive competence – for example, industrialpolicy, consumer policy, overseas economic development policy, sci-ence and research policy, agricultural policy, marine/fisheries policy,technology policy, fiscal policy, energy policy, transport policy andhumanitarian assistance policy.
Under shared competence, the EC and the member states have toagree internally how they will implement any international commit-ments adopted at UN or international environmental conferences thatmight affect these various policy areas. This can be a time-consumingprocess that typically requires the creation of new legislation. Based onthe ECJ’s Ruling 1/78, the EC can only implement those provisions of amixed agreement that come under its legal competence. Provisions notunder EC competence can only be implemented by the member states.Similarly, the European Commission can only monitor member statecompliance with mixed agreements in those areas that come under ECcompetence (Eeckhout, 2004, p. 220).
The implementation of mixed agreements can create problems for theEU in UN environmental negotiations. Third parties tend to dislike theuncertainty caused by negotiating with a partner who offers confusingand complex implementation and monitoring arrangements. And evenif that partner professes vigorous implementation and monitoringarrangements, ongoing suspicion may linger.
Despite these legal complexities and the suspicions they can engender,the EU has engaged in active implementation of a number of multilateralenvironmental agreements, some of which have required the creation ofquite extensive new legislation. According to Vogler, the EU’s recordacross these agreements ‘does not indicate that national differences andproblems of implementation result in inertia or acquiescence in the lowestcommon denominator in terms of environmental protection’ (Vogler,2005, p. 848).
Because of the EU’s shared competence, the Union may encounter dif-ficulties at UN environmental negotiations over who represents, signs,ratifies and implements agreements. Despite this apparent limitation,the EU has seemingly become an important, if not leading, participantin UN environmental negotiations. Much of the EU’s success in thisregard follows from the internal effectiveness generated by the system ofshared competence. The end-product of the legal and political develop-ment of this system now provides the institutional basis through whichthe EU participates in UN environmental negotiations.
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The EU’s institutional relations with the UN system
The EU’s external effectiveness in this policy area depends in large parton the internal effectiveness generated by its system of shared compe-tence. However, the external effectiveness can also be discussed in termsof the EU’s ability to establish formal relations with various UN bodies.The EU’s environmental relations with the UN system rely heavilyon institutional links with two key bodies: the United NationsEnvironment Programme (UNEP) and the Commission on SustainableDevelopment (CSD).
UNEP
The UN’s role in international environmental politics has becomeparticularly important since 1972, when the UN Conference on theHuman Environment established the UNEP. The UNEP is a subsidiarybody of the General Assembly (GA) whose Governing Council consistsof 58 members that are elected by the GA for four-year terms, taking intoaccount the principle of equitable regional representation. In 2005, tenmembers of the EU were members of the UNEP Governing Council.
While the EC is a major donor to a number of UN-related funds forenvironmental protection, ‘collectively the EU Member States are thelargest donor to the UNEP’s Environment Fund’ (European Commission,2005d, p. 39).7 In addition to the substantial funding provided by itsmember states, the EU also has a physical presence at UNEP. The ECdelegation responsible for relations with UNEP is located at the institu-tion’s headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya. The head of delegation isaccredited to UNEP as the EC permanent representative with observerstatus and the delegation is in the process of securing the accreditationof the Rural Development and Conservation Advisor as deputy perma-nent representative (European Commission, 2001a). In addition, theCommission recently announced that, in order to express its commit-ment to and increase cooperation with UNEP, it ‘has also decided topost a senior official to its Delegation in Nairobi … to follow UNEP’sday-to-day activities’ (European Commission, 2004c).
For its part, UNEP also maintains a physical presence in the EU. It hasan office in Brussels that produces a newsletter (EU Environment News)every two weeks. The stated goal of this office is to identify linksbetween UNEP and EU environmental policies. This example suggestsintersecting multilateralisms can create synergies among interactinginternational institutions which effectively further distinct institutionalprogrammes and agendas.
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The EU’s status in the UNEP has been modified ‘to allow regularconsultation and exchanges of documents between the Commissionand UNEP’ (Vogler, 1999, p. 33). In September 2004, EU EnvironmentCommissioner Margot Wallström and UNEP Executive Director KlausTöpfer signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the stated intentof strengthening ‘their cooperation to fight global threats to theenvironment more effectively’ (European Commission, 2004c). Thiscooperation is intended to support implementation of a number ofcommitments, including
● ‘Sustainable production and consumption;● Capacity building in developing countries and countries in transition
to assist them in reaching sustainable development and environment-related targets, enforcing international environmental agreementsand integrating environmental considerations into their tradepolicies;
● Supporting the implementation of multilateral environmental agree-ments, with an initial focus on the 1992 Convention on Biodiversityand agreements on regional seas; and
● Providing global access to clean water and sanitation and sustainableenergy’. (European Commission, 2004c)
The EU and UNEP are also considering possibilities to widen theirfinancial cooperation.
The Memorandum provides a framework for structured and consis-tent collaboration that envisages regular meetings at senior and expertlevels, strategic policy discussions and financial cooperation. Accordingto the Commission, ‘these activities are expected to intensify the part-nership between the two institutions, increase the effectiveness of theirwork, and strengthen international environmental governance’(European Commission, 2004c).
The first High Level Meeting to take place under the Memorandumwas convened in Brussels in May 2005, and was co-chaired by KlausTöpfer and Catherine Day (Director-General of DG Environment). Themeeting produced a Joint Work Programme to reinforce EU–UNEPpolicy dialogue and collaboration and to support commitments onsustainable development (European Commission, 2005b).
Both sides at the High Level Meeting ‘also discussed the desirability ofupgrading UNEP into a specialized UN Environment Organisation’(European Commission, 2005b), a position echoed soon afterward in theEuropean Commission’s ‘Strategy for Successful UN Summit’ (European
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Commission, 2005d).8 Therefore, both the EU and UNEP are collaborat-ing closely not only on substantive environmental matters, but also ontrying to shape the future of environmental governance – a processthrough which the EU could significantly influence the UN’s organizationand effectiveness.9
CSD
The United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)was created in December 1992 to ensure effective follow-up of the agree-ments reached at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment andDevelopment in Rio de Janeiro. The CSD is a functional commission ofthe ECOSOC. It has 53 members who are elected for a three-year term byECOSOC. As of its thirteenth session (CSD-13) in April 2005, the CSD’smembers included nine member states of the EU.
The EC is not a member of the CSD. In fact, its exact status in this UNbody was quite controversial – ECOSOC argued over the participation ofthe European Commission and the EC’s status in the CSD for two years(Vogler, 1999, p. 34). In the end, the EC was granted special ‘fullparticipant’ status, which confers significant rights of participationwithout the voting rights afforded by ‘full member’ status.
The EU exercises a significant presence at the annual CSD meetings,which are convened at UN headquarters in New York. For example,participants at CSD-12 (April 2004) included numerous EU member-state delegations and a 19-member EC delegation comprised ofEnvironment Directorate-General (DG) and other Commissionofficials.
Prior to CSD-13, in March 2005, the EU Environment Council met inthe presence of the CSD-13 Chair, Dr John Ashe, to exchange views onthe preparation of the conference. The Luxembourg Presidencyexpressed the main positions of the EU for CSD-13:
● The need for CSD-13 to pay more attention than in the past to inter-sectoral questions;
● A requirement for CSD-13 to set out a clear position and to insist onthe environmental dimension of each of the Millennium Objectives;
● The need for governments to reach agreement on operating politicalguidelines, that can be translated into concrete actions to be put intopractice by clearly identified stakeholders;
● The crucial necessity for the CSD-13 to adopt follow-up and controlmechanisms. (United Nations Environment Programme, 2005, p. 4)
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During CSD-13, the Luxembourg Presidency spoke on behalf of theUnion. It is notable but not uncommon that, in the opening remarks,the representative from Luxembourg mentioned that not only was shespeaking on behalf of the EU, but that the
Acceding Countries Bulgaria and Romania, the Candidate CountriesTurkey and Croatia, the Countries of the Stabilization and AssociationProcess and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro,and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, membersof the European Economic Area, align themselves with this declara-tion. (Colotte, 2005)
It is also notable that EU Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimasmade two interventions during High Level Panel discussions at the CSD-13 to address the impact of natural disasters and the ways in whichthe EU was meeting its commitments to sustainable development.10
The EU clearly participates actively in the work of the CSD. Inconformity with the procedures of shared competence, the Presidencyplays a particularly prominent role at the annual conferences. And whilethe EC is not a member of the CSD, its hard-fought status allows theCommission to make its presence felt. Ultimately, such formal arrange-ments with the CSD – like those with UNEP – provide the EU institu-tional avenues through which to exercise its own external effectivenessand promote its desire for effective multilateralism within the UNsystem.
The EU’s role in UN environmental negotiations – the case of climate change
This section provides a case study of the EU’s role in UN climate changenegotiations. Climate change is a useful case because it sheds light onthe EU’s engagement with a long-term, deliberative process from 1992to the present. The EU’s internal and external effectiveness and itsability to become a frontrunner can be judged more accurately from anempirical analysis of this lengthy process. The case reveals the EU’sability to manage the challenges of shared competence and to promoteeffective multilateralism in this policy area. It also illustrates how the EUactually represents itself and signs, ratifies and implements agreementsreached at a series of UN conferences that took place outside of UNinstitutional bodies such as UNEP and CSD.
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Launching the climate change negotiations
The most significant and comprehensive advance in internationalenvironmental negotiations since the 1972 Stockholm Conferenceoccurred in 1992 at the UN Conference on Environment andDevelopment (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. This ‘Earth Summit’,which was attended by over 100 heads of state, launched the UNFramework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).11
The UNFCCC also raised a number of questions about the EC’s legalability to represent the Union in such negotiations. Despite lackingexclusive competence over the myriad policy areas to be addressed atUNCED, the Council of Ministers decided that the EC should participatewith the member states on equal grounds (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998,pp. 213–29). Thus, UNCED’s draft rules of procedure were amended andthe EC ‘briefly acquired rights equivalent to those of participating states,except for voting and the submission of procedural motions’ (Vogler,1999, p. 33). The international community, therefore, acknowledgedthe EC’s internal effectiveness and potential contribution to the workprogramme of the UNFCCC.
The UNFCCC generated a number of UN negotiations on climatechange during the 1990s. These UN negotiations were driven by afollow-up working group – known as the Conference of the Parties(COP) – also established at the Earth Summit. The COP’s first annualmeeting, COP-1, was held in Berlin in 1995. At this conference, theBerlin Mandate was agreed: Annex-I (industrialized) states would nego-tiate real cuts in their greenhouse gas emissions, to be concluded by theend of 1997, when the COP-3 was scheduled to be held in Kyoto, Japan.
Representing the EU position
Due to shared competence, the EU’s representation of its position wasinfluenced throughout the UNFCCC by the Commission, the ‘Troika’,the EU Presidency and individual member states.12 Despite these numer-ous actors, the EU’s position was undertaken in accordance with guide-lines decided by the Council of Ministers and likely seen by third partiesas representing the Union’s position (Sbragia with Damro, 1999, p. 61).These pre-negotiation positions, which follow coordination meetingsand signal the extent to which the member states agree to Europeanizetheir positions, may contribute to EU coherence. As Bretherton andVogler argue, after some early problems,
Once a coordination meeting has taken up a position all are boundby it. Both Member State and Commission sources have attested to
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the improvement in Community/Member State consistency atnegotiations. One Member State negotiator observed to us that overthe past three years, in which he had been an active participant, therehad been a notable ‘tightening up’ allowing Member States ‘less spaceto go their own way’. (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999, p. 95)
Thus, in practice, these pre-negotiation positions and subsequentCouncil decisions (see below) may actually help to establish internaleffectiveness and provide a degree of certainty for COP negotiatingpartners.
This characterization, however, of internal effectiveness is disputed.For example, some questioned the EU’s ability to negotiate/represent atKyoto because of internal divisions. EU climate policy was still contro-versial and the EU spent much time negotiating with itself: ‘The coher-ence of the US administration contrasted with … the unwieldy (andintrospective) morass of EU decision making during the negotiatingprocess’ (Grubb et al., 1999, p. 112). Also, the optimism created in Kyotowas short-lived and the EU demonstrated no impressive leadership atthe next COP. In fact, it has been noted that the EU was not able topresent one single proposal at COP-4 in Buenos Aires in 1998 due tointernal strife (Hovi et al., 2003, p. 17; see also Tangen, 1999).Notwithstanding these examples, it is best to judge the EU’s effectivenessat these negotiations in light of the entire process and the resultsachieved. As will be discussed below, the empirical record to date sug-gests considerable EU effectiveness despite its relative incoherence andpossible shortcomings at individual COPs.
The Kyoto Protocol
The COP-3 meeting was held in Kyoto in December 1997. Prior to themeeting, the EU Council of environment ministers adopted a pre-negotiating position in which they called for an ambitious emissionsreduction target of 15 per cent below 1990 levels by the year 2010(European Commission, 1997). In response, the US announced its lessambitious plan to reach 1990 levels by 2010 and obtain a further 5 percent reduction by 2015. After eleven days of negotiating at Kyoto, theparties compromised and adopted a set of legally binding greenhouseemissions targets: Annex-I countries would reduce emissions of sixgreenhouse gases from 1990 levels by at least 5 per cent during theperiod 2008–12.
As a ‘frontrunner’, the EU committed to the highest reduction targetof 8 per cent. Eleven other (at-the-time) non-EU European countries also
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committed to an 8 per cent reduction, which suggests the pressure feltby EU applicants to Europeanize their positions. The US agreed to a 7 percent reduction. Developing countries were temporarily excluded fromthe reductions largely based on the argument that they had not beenresponsible, as yet, for significant greenhouse gas emissions.
The Kyoto Protocol was opened for signature on 16 March 1998, butnegotiations over the agreement were far from finished. The agreementonly provided basic features and outlines of the Kyoto mechanisms andcompliance system; it did not elaborate the precise rules for how theywould operate.
At COP-6 in The Hague in 2000, negotiations broke down largely overdisagreements between the EU and US about how they could meet theiremission reduction targets. In March 2001, the new George W. BushAdministration announced that the US would not ratify the Protocol.13
In July 2001, the COP-6 was reconvened in Bonn. The parties eventuallyadopted the Bonn Agreements and agreed to pursue the ratification ofthe Protocol by 2002. The US had effectively pulled out of the Kyotoprocess by this point and failed to contribute to continuing negotiationsin the run-up to COP-7 (Environment Watch, 2001, pp. 1–2). The scenenow appeared set for the EU to assume a leading role in the Kyotoprocess.
At COP-7, held in Marrakech, Morocco, from 29 October to 9 November2001, the parties adopted the Marrakech Accords, a comprehensive setof detailed rules for implementing the Protocol. In order to persuadeother Annex-I countries to participate in the final stages of the Kyotoprocess, the EU conceded a number of requirements demanded byAustralia, Canada, Japan and Russia, including issues upon whichthe Union had previously refused US demands (Hovi et al., 2003, p. 19).The signing of the Marrakech Accords marked a milestone in the Kyotoprocess. The next major cycle in this negotiation saga began with theonset of the ratification process.
Ratifying Kyoto
According to the Kyoto Protocol’s ratification requirements, at least55 Parties to the Convention were required to ratify the agreement for itto come into force. In addition, those 55 parties had to include enoughAnnex-I countries to account for at least 55 per cent of total globalgreenhouse emissions from that same group of states in 1990.
The EU signed the Kyoto Protocol on 29 April 1998. In 1999, at theCOP-6 in Bonn, the EU urged all Parties to ratify the Kyoto Protocol assoon as possible (European Commission, 2000a). After the US’s
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withdrawal from the process in March 2001, the EU decided it would setan example for other Parties by heading for its own swift internal ratifi-cation of the Protocol (Hovi et al., 2003, p. 18). By setting an earlyexample, the EU acted as a frontrunner, hoping to persuade enoughfollowers to ratify for the Protocol to come into force.
In October 2001, the implementation process began in earnest as theCommission issued its proposal for the Council to approve the KyotoProtocol (European Commission, 2001g). In December 2001, the LaekenEuropean Council announced that the EU wanted the Kyoto Protocol toenter into force ahead of the World Summit on Sustainable Developmentto be held in Johannesburg in August–September 2002. To that end, theCouncil approved the Protocol on behalf of the Community in April2002 (Council of the European Union, 2002). The member states were tocoordinate their action to deposit their instruments of ratification at thesame time as the Union by 1 June 2002. The EU met its deadline andratified the Protocol on 31 May 2002.
The extent to which the EU actually acted as a frontrunner in theKyoto process is, of course, open to debate. Many countries signed andratified the Kyoto Protocol before the EU. However, the EU’s actionsshould be assessed in relation to other Annex-I countries. Of all Annex-Icountries, only one signed the Protocol before the EU and four ratifiedbefore the EU – two of which (Iceland and Norway) ratified only a weekbefore the EU.
By its sheer number of signatories, the EU has contributed signifi-cantly to the signing and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. When the15 members of the EU originally signed the Protocol, they represented27 per cent of the 55 countries necessary for the agreement to come intoforce. They also represented 24.2 per cent of the emissions necessary tomeet the 55 per cent threshold of gas emissions necessary for the agree-ment to come into force. After the EU’s enlargement in 2004, theUnion’s contribution to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol increasedsubstantially. At present, the EU-25 represents 45 per cent of the55 countries necessary for the agreement to come into force. The EU alsonow represents 30 per cent of all Annex-I emissions of greenhouse gases,which accounts for over half the 55 per cent threshold of emissionsnecessary for the agreement to come into force.
Without ratification by the US – the world’s largest emitter of green-house gases – the final fate of the Protocol remained in limbo. To meetthe thresholds required for the agreement to come into force, it soonbecame clear that Russia would be the pivotal state. By 2004, 124 coun-tries had ratified the agreement, but they only represented 44 per cent of
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global greenhouse gas emissions. If Russia, representing 17.4 per cent ofgreenhouse emissions, were to ratify the Protocol, the thresholds wouldbe achieved, and the agreement would come into force.
Courting Russia
Initially, Russia expressed scepticism toward the Kyoto Protocol as aform of potentially growth-threatening environmental regulation. Inorder to cajole Russia into supporting the agreement, the EU needed toemploy leverage from another policy area.
The EU found this leverage in linking Russian support for Kyoto to EUsupport for Russian membership in the World Trade Organization(WTO). The EU did not officially announce the linkage of its support forWTO membership with Russian support for Kyoto. However, manysignals suggest this linkage was clear in the minds of negotiators fromboth the EU and Russia. In May 2004, EU environment ministers down-played, in a rather transparent manner, the linkage between the twoissues. British Environment Secretary Margaret Beckett said ‘I don’tthink that you would ever find that the one is a trade-off for the other.On the other hand, there is no doubt that there are economic advan-tages to Russia. … They’re part of the same overall picture. That’s not thesame as saying they’re part of the same negotiation.’ Another ministeradded ‘The Russians see a very tight connection there. … We wouldnever speak of a link. We believe that we can solve both on a parallelbasis.’14
The ‘linkage’ negotiations began to intensify in late April 2004, inMoscow, during a meeting between European Commission PresidentRomano Prodi and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Prodi urged Russiato ratify the Protocol, and Kyoto and WTO membership were discussedas part of a possible package deal to be agreed at an upcoming EU–RussiaSummit to be held one month later.15 On 21 May 2004, at the EU–RussiaSummit, the deal was sealed when the EU announced its support forRussia’s WTO accession, and President Putin announced that he would‘speed up’ the process for Russia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.16 Moredirectly, Putin declared ‘The EU has met us halfway in talks over theWTO and that cannot but affect positively our position on the KyotoProtocol’.17
Notably, the formal agreement reached at the EU–Russia Summitincluded only provisions on WTO membership. But Putin’s promise tospeed up the ratification process was fulfilled in October 2004, when theRussian State Duma gave its first reading of the draft law on the ratifica-tion of the Kyoto Protocol. On 18 November 2004, Russia ratified the
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Protocol, which put the number of parties (141) and the total emissionsoutput they represented (61.6 per cent) beyond the required thresholds.On 16 February 2005, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force.
The EU’s active efforts to court Russian support for Kyoto are clearlyevident. However, the extent to which Russia really conceded much isquestionable. Russia desired and won EU support for its WTO member-ship bid. In addition, the emissions trading system envisaged under theProtocol offered potentially lucrative gains for Russia.18 The agreementlimits emissions to 1990 levels, a time when the remnants of inefficientSoviet industry were still producing very high levels of greenhousegases. Since 1990, Russia’s economic slowdown has reduced dramati-cally its emissions levels, which means that, in effect, it has alreadyexceeded the reduction targets under the Protocol. As a result, Russiawill have an excess of emissions quotas that it can sell for billions ofdollars within the emissions trading system.19 Thus, Russia’s decision toratify the Kyoto Protocol appears to be entirely consistent with nationalpreferences rather than bending to European priorities. But, regardlessof Russia’s motives, this decision also reveals the importance of issue-linkage as a tool available to the EU for increasing its external effectivenessin international environmental negotiations.
Conclusions
This chapter set out to investigate the extent to which shared compe-tence limits the EU’s ability to pursue effective multilateralism in UNenvironmental politics. Ultimately, the EU does seem to have overcomethe obstacle of shared competence to become internally and externallyeffective in this important policy area.
Internally, environmental policy has been Europeanized through legaldevelopments and policy decisions. The EU’s internal effectiveness isreflected in the resulting Council decisions, Commission communica-tions and the ability of the Council, Presidency and Commission tocoordinate international representation and sign, ratify and implementmultilateral environmental agreements. Without such Europeanizationof domestic policies and positions, the EU would be a hopelessly inef-fective actor at the UN. But through these changes, the EU is able toincrease its internal and, therefore, external effectiveness to the extentthat it has become an influential – though not unitary – frontrunner inUN environmental politics.
Externally, the EU has pursued and attained a number of its commonobjectives and, thus, has been able to Europeanize certain aspects of
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environmental policy in the UN system. The EU has developed formalinstitutional relations with a subsidiary body of the General Assembly(UNEP) and a functional commission of the ECOSOC (CSD), throughwhich it maintains an active role in the UN system and endeavours topromote effective multilateralism and influence the institutional struc-ture of international environmental governance. It has also employed anew tool of issue-linkage to obtain its objectives in the decade-long UNnegotiations on climate change. The EU’s ability to act as a frontrunnerbecomes clear in the Kyoto process where, despite occasional setbacksduring the lengthy negotiations, the Union ultimately managed toencourage Russia to ratify the Protocol.
To be sure, the EU does remain a complex and sometimes confusingactor in UN environmental politics. And even its apparent success in theKyoto process can only really be judged once the agreement becomesfully operational in 2012. Despite these caveats and the potentialproblems arising from shared competence, the EU’s capacity to act ininternational environmental affairs must now be taken seriously by theUN’s institutions and member states. And while questions shouldremain about its ongoing effectiveness, the EU does seem at this point tohave become effective enough to act within, have influence on, andeven lead the UN in international environmental politics.
Notes
1. The author would like to thank Caroline Bouchard for research assistance onthis chapter.
2. For a useful treatment of the UN’s role in global environmental politics, seeElliott, 2004.
3. While the EU is often referred to as a ‘leader’, it is important to note that thischapter does not employ the concept of ‘leadership’ for analytical purposes. Foruseful discussions of the concept of leadership in international negotiations, seeHovi et al., 2003, p. 16; Andresen and Agrawala, 2002; and O. Young, 1991.
4. For a useful discussion of more general means of assessing the effectiveness ofinternational organizations in international environmental politics, seeBiermann and Bauer, 2004, pp. 189–93.
5. The link between environmental protection and development has becomeparticularly salient since the early 1990s. The European Commission hasadopted development-specific action plans on both climate change and bio-diversity (European Commission, 2005a). The EU has also been an active par-ticipant in discussing the linkages between environmental protection anddevelopment at the UN’s Millennium Summit in 2000, and the World Summiton Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. For example, theUNGA agreed that one or more representatives of the EU could participate andbe included in the list of speakers for the plenary meetings of the MillenniumSummit (UNGA resolution A/RES/54/281).
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6. UNGA Resolution 3208 (XXIX), 11 October 1974. In 1979, the EC was alsogranted the status of Regional Economic Integration Organization (REIO),which allows it to participate in multilateral environmental negotiations.
7. In terms of funding, the EU has clearly taken a prominent role in interna-tional environmental initiatives: ‘The EU Member States are also major con-tributors to the Montreal Protocol Fund [UNDP], the Global EnvironmentFacility [UNDP and UNEP], and the UN Forum on Forest [ECOSOC, UNDP,UNEP]. Together with the Community, the Member States provide almosthalf of the basic funding for the major Rio Conventions (Desertification,Climate and Biodiversity) and an even higher proportion of the financingmade available through these Conventions to assist developing countries’(European Commission, 2005a, pp. 39–40).
8. Similarly, at the 23rd session of UNEP’s Governing Council (February 2005),the EU pushed for transformation of the 58-member UNEP GoverningCouncil into a universal body, but was opposed by the US, Russia, Japan andother members (UNNGLS 2005, p. 3).
9. For a useful discussion of the EU and international environmentalgovernance, see Vogler, 2005, pp. 835–50.
10. For more on the EU’s role in the daily negotiations at CSD-13, see the EarthNegotiations Bulletin, 2005.
11. The Earth Summit was also notable for the launch of the Rio Declaration,Agenda 21, the Convention on Bio-diversity and the establishment ofthe CSD.
12. Until the Amsterdam Treaty was ratified, the Troika was comprised of thepast, present, and future holders of the EU Presidency. In the case of the 1997Kyoto Summit, the Troika consisted of the Netherlands, Luxembourg, andthe United Kingdom. After 1999, the Troika comprised the present andfuture presidencies and the High Representative for the CFSP (withCommission involvement).
13. The Bush Administration withdrew its support over questions aboutthe accuracy of scientific evidence supporting climate change, the strainsthat emission reductions would put on the US economy and the fact thatdeveloping countries were not obligated to participate in emissionreductions.
14. Jeff Mason, ‘EU Sees Russia Ratifying Kyoto – Environment Mins’, Reuters,16 May 2004.
15. ‘EU, Russia Extend Trade Deal, Discuss WTO, Kyoto Protocol’, Bridges WeeklyTrade News Digest, vol. 8, no. 15, 28 April 2004.
16. ‘EU Suggests Terms for Russia’s WTO Entry, Putin Signals Support for KyotoProtocol’, Bridges Weekly Trade New Digest, vol. 8, no. 19, 2 June 2004.
17. ‘EU Supports WTO Membership for Russia’, Associated Press Newswire, 21 May2004.
18. For more on Kyoto’s emissions trading system, see Damro and Méndez, 2003.19. Anders Aslund, ‘Kyoto Could Be Russia’s Ticket to Europe’, International
Herald Tribune, 6 April 2004.
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10Intersecting Multilateralisms: The European Union andMultilateral InstitutionsKnud Erik Jørgensen
Introduction: a new research agenda
According to an EU pamphlet, ‘the European Union believes in seekingmultilateral solutions to global problems. It therefore attaches greatimportance to effective multilateralism, with a strong United Nations atits heart. The UN, with its universal mandate and legitimacy, is uniquelyplaced to respond to our common challenges’ (European Council,2003a, p. 16). Ambassador John Richardson, former head of theEuropean Commission delegation to the UN, argues that two paradigmsof international politics are competing to become the ordering principleof world order. The first is associated with interest-based power politics,whereas the second ‘points to the growing economic and ecologicalinterdependence of our societies and the necessity of new forms ofglobal governance to complement national action. … The experience ofthe Union with the sharing of state sovereignty is clearly related to thesecond paradigm and also to the EU’s firm support for the developmentof the United Nations as well as other elements of multilateral gover-nance’ (Richardson, 2002, p. 13). For Robert Cooper, Director-General ofExternal and Politico-Military Affairs for the Council of the EU,‘Multilateralism and the rule of law have an intrinsic value. We valuepluralism and the rule of law domestically, and it is difficult for demo-cratic societies – including the USA – to escape from the idea that theyare desirable internationally as well. … Those who want pluralism andmultilateralism to survive have a duty to make the United Nations effec-tive (as the leaders of the democracies strikingly failed to do in the caseof the League of Nations)’ (Cooper, 2003, pp. 164, 168). According to
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Espen Barth Eide, ‘the EU is in many ways becoming the UN’s mainWestern partner’ (Eide, 2004, p. 3). Most contributors to the presentvolume suggest that EU–UN relations have become a key feature in theglobal web of influence.
Though pamphlets, diplomats and analysts should not always betaken at face value, the quotations (and other indicators) suggest that itis worthwhile to explore why pluralistic, liberal societies choose topursue multilateralism. To specify the subject matter, I begin by expli-cating different meanings of the key notion ‘intersection’. This isfollowed by an outline of an agenda for research on the relationshipbetween the EU and multilateral institutions, including the UN. Thecurrent unsatisfactory state of affairs – characterized by the absence ofsuch an agenda – implies that we lack comprehensive and systematicresearch. At least two avenues of inquiry are capable of contributing tosuch an endeavour. The first begins with the rich literature on globalgovernance which takes as its starting point a complex internationalsystem in which multilateralism is but part of a global governancesystem (for overviews, see Rosenau, 1995; Weiss, 2000; Fomerand,2002). In this literature, the state-centric character of the multilateralsystem is often bemoaned and multilateralism is at best regarded as theWestphalian system’s cooperative face, as a mechanism which consoli-dates state sovereignty and represents unequal power relationships. Incontrast, the global governance perspective is claimed to represent thevision and realities of a globalized twenty-first century in which bothstate and non-state actors engage in world politics. Though all sorts ofactors have been included in the category of non-state actors, the EU hasfor some reason been systematically excluded.
The aim of this chapter is not to explain the exclusion of the EU inanalyses of global governance but to understand the EU’s policy ofsupporting ‘effective multilateralism’ and to ‘try on for size’ a number ofpotential factors explaining EU policy making. For this reason, it seems tome that a most suitable source of inspiration for such research is theextensive and analytically rich literature on the US and the multilateralsystem (see Karns and Mingst, 1990; Ruggie, 1993, 1998; Luck, 1999;Patrick and Forman, 2002; and Foot et al., 2003). Whereas each work hasits own core assumptions and agenda, that is, preferred questions to askand answer, each shares an interest in exploring a range of common coreissues. While mechanical application should never be attempted, this lit-erature provides a wealth of information and inspiration. Hence, I exam-ine the proposed explanations – internal, external and constitutive factors– for why the EU and its members might have made a choice for effective
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multilateralism. In the third section of the chapter, I pay special attentionto the issue of the EU’s impact on multilateral institutions. In short, mul-tilateralism will be assessed from an (unusual) actor perspective.
Intersections
Three major perspectives on the nature of intersecting multilateralismavail themselves for our inquiry. The first is an EU perspective: the EUitself is or has been a prominent example of multilateralism. Accordingto Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘the institution of multilateralism, which in thepostwar era has given rise to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT), the European Community (EC), or even the North AtlanticTreaty Organisation (NATO), represented a demanding organizationalform that is quite at odds with the simple bilateralism which we wouldexpect if (structural) realism were indeed the sole organizational modelfor international politics’ (Kratochwil, 1994, preface). Intersecting mul-tilateralism comes into play in two different ways: partly due to differentpreferences within the EU regarding the institutional infrastructure ofan ‘ever closer Union’; partly due to member states and EU institutions’conceptions of global multilateralism. In this respect, Lisbeth Aggestampoints out that the EU’s flagship initiative of supporting global multilat-eral institutions has been preconditioned by a fairly recently emergedconsensus among key-EU member states (see Aggestam, 2004; for theopposite view, see Krause, 2004). Others argue that perhaps the EU hasbeen an important example of regional multilateralism in the past, butthe Constitutional Treaty would have implied a qualitative leap, essen-tially moving the EU beyond the sphere of inter-state relations and intothe sphere of domestic hierarchical order. When exploring this issue weneed not subscribe to simplistic formulae, because ‘the simple dichotomybetween horizontal and vertical forms of organization (anarchy versushierarchy) may need refinement if we want to explain both order andthe variety of organizational forms that we encounter in the internationaland domestic arena’ (Kratochwil, 1994, p. x).
The second major institutional perspective on intersecting multilater-alism focuses on the relationship between a regional multilateralinstitution, the EU, and the most universal of all multilateral institutions,the UN, and the multilateral system more generally. This perspectivealso comes in two versions. Scholars working within the first versionbelieve the EU basically is an international organization, perhaps aspecial organization but nonetheless an international organization(Foot et al., 2003, p. 15; Guigner, 2006). In such a perspective, important
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issues on the research agenda comprise the development of inter-organizational networks as well as cooperation, conflict and competi-tion among multilateral organizations. Scholars working within thesecond version take as their point of departure the EU’s aspiration to actin international organizations not to be an international organization.They tend to conclude that the EU sometimes displays a capacity to liveup to its ambitious global aspirations (Ginsberg, 2002). There is no needto make an a priori choice between the two kinds of relationship, partic-ularly because both kinds may prove relevant to varying degrees acrossissue areas.
The EU and the UN display a range of intersecting and contrastingmultilateralisms. While the UN has universal membership, the EU has alimited (regional) membership open to European states only.Furthermore, apart from apartheid no kind of political regime has beena hindrance to UN membership whereas for the EU democratic rule is astandard of civilization. Finally, the EU combines two distinct modes ofbeing: on the one hand, a (dense) multilateral system of states and, onthe other hand, a hierarchical (domestic) order. For these reasons, theprojection of the EU’s self internationally has to be a mixed andsomewhat vague message.
A third, political, perspective focuses on the intersecting multilateral-ism of the EU and the US respectively, pointing to the more or lessdiverging conceptions that inform European and American policymaking. It is significant that ‘multilateralism’ has become a contestedconcept, in particular if it indicates that the US and the EU have differ-ent visions of world order and consequently different ideas concerningwhich means to apply in order to achieve desirable political ends(Kupchan, 2002; van Oudenaren, 2003; Eide, 2004; Koops, 2004).According to the 2003 European Security Strategy, one of the Union’skey objectives is the pursuit of effective multilateralism and support forinternational organizations, above all the UN. This illustrates well thedeeply embedded differences between US and EU conceptions of multi-lateralism. For the Union, multilateralism is both a means and an end inits own right, hence a key component of world order, understood as thedomestication or the legalization of world politics. For Union policy-makers it is difficult if not impossible to conceive of world order withoutthe UN (reformed or not).
The three types of intersection are analytically distinct, but overlapping.In this chapter, I will primarily focus on the second perspective, that is,the relationship between the EU and multilateral institutions, which isthe main theme of the present volume. However, due to the presence of
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overlaps, comments on the two other perspectives will be sprinkledthroughout the chapter.
Explaining EU policy concerning multilateral institutions
First of all, to understand fully the rationale of specific studies, it iscrucially important to pay attention to the context in which they havebeen prepared. Margaret P. Karns and Karen Mingst explore patterns ofchanging instrumentality and influence in the light of the image ofdeclining US power. In the late 1980s, it was a fairly common perceptionthat American power was declining and Karns, Mingst and their teamanalyse how the US handled this decline as regards multilateral institu-tions (Karns and Mingst, 1990).1 The context of both Stewart Patrick andShepard Forman’s Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy and RosemaryFoot, S. Neil MacFarlane and Michael Mastanduno’s US Hegemony andInternational Organizations is the unilateralism/multilateralism schism,which was lurking during the Clinton Administration and rapidly sur-faced during the George W. Bush Administration. These volumes raisequestions about the relationship between power, perceptions of power,and support for multilateralism or unilateralism. The context of thepresent volume is also the unilateralism/multilateralism schism but itfocuses on the EU and the UN.
Power remains a key dimension. At a general level, scholars havemixed messages concerning the EU. Some foresee The End of Europe thusdemonstrating that the EU has got its own decline of power literature(Ferguson, 2004). Others argue that Europe is weak and thereforepursues multilateral strategies (Kagan, 2003). Still others argue that theimage of increasing international clout is what adequately characterizesthe contemporary role of the EU in world politics (Moravcsik, 2002;Reid, 2004). In any case, a research agenda on the EU and multilateralismshould take the contested assessment of European power into consider-ation. The question remains: why does the EU choose multilateralism?In the three following sections, internal, external and constitutivefactors will be examined as potential factors capable of explainingemerging EU practice concerning multilateral institutions.
Internal factors
Concerning changing patterns of US engagement, Karns and Mingstconclude that domestic political factors explain changing support formultilateralism significantly better than external factors, such as
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variation in the international distribution of power. Foot, MacFarlaneand Mastanduno also find that domestic factors determine policytowards multilateral institutions, most notably American exceptional-ism, ‘when based on a definition that emphasizes US beliefs that itsnational values and practices are universally valid and its policy posi-tions are moral and proper and not just expedient’ (Foot et al., 2003,p. 268; on American exceptionalism, see Ruggie, 2003b). John Ruggiealso highlights the role of domestic values, images and principles as wellas domestic institutions (Ruggie, 1993).
Interest groups and private companies constitute a factor that shouldnot be dismissed. Foot, MacFarlane and Mastanduno (2003, p. 9) believethat the influence of ‘interest-groups’ is ‘potentially considerable yetlikely to be most significant in the economic and environmental areas’.This is a reasonable expectation. In a comparative perspective, however,it is intriguing that exactly the economic and environmental areasconstitute the field where the EU plays the role as ‘front-runner’, that is,has assumed varying levels of global leadership, as Paul Taylor and ChadDamro demonstrate in this volume (though Taylor shows that EUleadership is somewhat shaky in the broad economic and developmentfield ). Hence, one may wonder how two domestic processes – in the USand the EU – can have such different outcomes. To be sure, Europeaninterest groups have to lobby both national and EU officials, yet suchbifurcation of lobbying should not have a significant impact becauseinterest groups have adapted their strategies.
Traditionally, the political system of an international player has beenamong the most popular and most significant factors explaining foreignpolicy. What would this look like from a European perspective? The EU’spolitical system is notoriously complex and dynamic (Hix, 1999).2
Furthermore, the EU polity is itself characterized by elements of multi-lateralism, and presumably these elements are most widespread inthe field of foreign affairs. This kind of intersecting multilateralism is aconvenient fact, particularly when policy-makers present reasons forpolitical action, and not least when such political action consists ofsupporting the UN and the multilateral system. It is equally convenientwhen self-images are contrasted to images of others. Then the argumentgoes: we support the UN because we have multilateral genetic codesor important experiences with multilateral processes. Others, and par-ticularly the one significant other, have no such codes and no suchexperiences.
Fraser Cameron notes that the EU’s preference for multilateralism pre-dates the Iraq crisis: ‘Partly because of its own history and constant
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intergovernmental negotiations, Brussels has been more willing thanWashington and many other countries to work through multilateralinstitutions. The EU itself is an example of multilateralism at work’(Cameron, 2004, pp. 157–8). Indeed, in most examples of official EUreasoning, this domestic–international linkage is a recurrent theme. Theformer Development Commissioner, Poul Nielsson, provides an illustra-tive example, ‘The European Union knows better than most thatmultilateral processes tend to be slow and difficult, and rarely do theirresults satisfy every participant’ (cited in Jørgensen, 2003). Could it bethen that the mode of diplomacy – multilateralism – rather than specificEuropean values and principles, is at the heart of the EU’s foreign policyidentity?
The role of the political system comes in a second version. It is wellknown that the projection of domestic institutions and practices inforeign policy is a common phenomenon. The constitutional treatynegotiations displayed many examples of member states trying toproject their domestic institutions. Historically, France, for example, hasproposed the Fourth Republic as a model (strong executive and a weakparliament). With respect to the US and multilateralism, it has beenargued that the multilateral system launched after the Second WorldWar was modelled on US domestic institutions (Goldstein, 1993).Similarly, the EU has consistently been presented as a model for otherregional groupings. The argument has been, ‘We have been successful increating a security community, an integrated economy and a system ofdense political coordination. Imitate us and you – ASEAN, Mercosur, etc. –will be successful too.’ From time to time, and increasingly so, the EUhas also been presented as a model for the emerging world polity and forglobal governance: ‘Copy this successful regional arrangement andintroduce it at the global level’ (see Jørgensen and Rosamond, 2002).
Divisions within the executive branch are pronounced, not leastbecause the executive branch is bifurcated in Europe. That is, apart fromthe EU institutions characterized by their internal divisions, the EU has25 ministries of foreign affairs, 25 ministries of defence and 25 primeministers/heads of state. If seen as a comprehensive system, this iswonderland for bureaucratic politics. The fact that not even the traditionalengine of European integration, France and Germany, has managed tomake the structures of the ministries of foreign affairs Euro-compatiblesuggests the persistence of significant bureaucratic politics at the mem-ber state level (Güssgen, 2002; Hocking and Spence, 2004). At the sametime, the multilateral system is inherently an inter-state institution, cre-ated by and for states. From time to time most EU member states, some
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more than others, forget about their multilateral genetic codes andenjoy the power, pride and prestige resulting from being an interna-tional actor. Changing configurations of mixed, exclusive and absentcompetence as regards representation in international institutionsmakes a most difficult exercise – as all the chapters here show again andagain. This suggests the usefulness of liberal intergovernmentalism, notleast if the third component – institutional design – concerns memberstate preferences on multilateral institutions. Chapters by ChristopherHill, Katie Laatikainen and Elizabeth Johansson-Nogués demonstratehow variations in these preferences remain considerable.
The notion of political culture is one of these ubiquitous notions thatare intuitively relevant yet difficult to catch in terms of substance.Nonetheless, let us try to focus on two different but overlapping aspects.Both have important things to say about the relationship betweendomestic politics and EU behaviour towards international organiza-tions. First, discursive structures have been identified as a strongexplanatory factor, that is, discourses about the UN and internationalorganizations are relatively stable structures determining legitimate andillegitimate political speech. In Europe, the UN is part of a discursivestructure on international cooperation and development connotingsomething positive. Hence, political reasoning questioning the basicvalue of the UN has a hard time whether such reasoning takes place atnational, EU or international level. Similarly, international law andtreaties are regarded as constitutive elements of international society.The notion of global responsibility and obligations that cannot bequestioned because they are owed to both one’s self and others, plays akey role in European discourse, and part of the multilateral system isseen as instrumental for achieving the objective of internationaldevelopment (on the EU’s lack of response to such responsibility, seeKaragiannis, 2004).
Second, the role of values, images and principles in EU foreign policyhas been analysed and could help illuminate EU behaviour in interna-tional organizations (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006). When RobertCooper points out that ‘multilateralism has intrinsic value’, and JavierSolana claims that European values inform foreign policy making, bothillustrate perfectly well how values, images and principles have a functionin reasons for political action.
From a different perspective, Robert Kagan argues that multilateralstrategies reflect power or, rather, the absence of power, that is, weak-ness. Because Europe is weak, Europe pursues multilateral strategies:‘Their tactics, like their goal, are the tactics of the weak’ (Kagan, 2003).
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Joseph Grieco (1997) also argues that small (weak) states prefer multilat-eralism. Kagan’s is a somewhat flawed argument. First, he overlooks thefact that the US was not particularly weak when multilateral strategieswere introduced after the Second World War (Nau, 2002; Schake andBecher, 2002; Ruggie, 2003b). Second, he overlooks the fact that the EU,along with multilateral strategies, also cultivates bilateral relations andoccasionally engages in unilateral action. It is somewhat surprising thatKagan takes rhetoric coming out of Brussels at face value. In essence,Kagan presents a version of the well-known dispute between realism andidealism-liberalism. He employs realist arguments against idealism andclaims that Europe plays the part of idealism-liberalism (coming fromVenus), whereas the US plays the part of realism (coming from Mars),without critically examining actual policy. John Mearsheimer (1995)uses a similar approach directed against liberal thinking of all sorts(see also Krauthammer, 2004).
Patrick and Forman (2002) have a particularly strong interest inexplaining why the US has an ambivalent attitude to multilateral coop-eration, and they want to assess the costs and benefits to the US of thisambivalent engagement. While there seem to be good reasons to asksuch questions concerning contemporary US politics it is an openquestion whether it is equally relevant concerning the EU and multilat-eral institutions. Perhaps ambivalent engagement is not an exclusiveAmerican feature: after all, EU member states are often highly ambiva-lent concerning the question of whether or not to give the EU a strongrole in the multilateral system and, furthermore, whether multilateralsolutions to global problems should be tried. This kind of ‘squared’ambivalence is likely to have its own pattern of costs and benefits, butdue to limited research we do not know precisely what the balance is inthe EU case. It is clear however, that the inability to reach a Europeanagreement on UN reform significantly harms the EU’s efforts at promot-ing effective multilateralism, in particular because it demonstrates thatthe EU’s own multilateral machinery is far from being ‘effective’ (Ortega,2005).
External factors
Findings that emphasize the explanatory power of internal factors havea logical flipside. They point to the relatively weak power of externalfactors. However, this should not dissuade us from including externalfactors in our ‘factor portfolio’ because the EU case might lead to differ-ent findings. Among external factors, the international distribution ofpower is often the first that comes to mind. In explanations of state
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behaviour informed by structural realism, the change from Cold Warbipolarity to post-Cold War polarity plays an important role. However,neorealists have great difficulty in reaching a consensus position asregards the key independent explanatory variable: do we now have aunipolar or multipolar world (Waltz, 2000). This problem apart, andthough it is one of the state-centric approaches par excellence, it maynonetheless be possible to factor in the EU, for instance asking whetheror not the end of the Cold War constitutes the permissive variable thatallows the EU to significantly upgrade its international engagement,including the sponsorship of multilateral institutions.
The distribution of power may also assume other forms. Presumablyneither multilateral organizations nor multilateral systems constitute apower-free zone. According to John Ikenberry, the United States ‘hassystematically used multilateral agreements as tools of grand strategyand world order building’ (Ikenberry, 2002, p. 122). In other words, it ismisleading to separate issues of grand strategy from issues related tomultilateral institutions. Furthermore, he emphasizes US ambivalenceabout multilateral institutions precisely because multilateralism for aleading state is about losing something and winning something else.Then he asks a significant question, ‘Why did the United States seek toestablish order after World War II in Western Europe through multilat-eral commitments while pursuing a series of bilateral security agree-ments in Asia?’ The essence of his answer is that power relationsbetween the leading state (the US) and the subordinate states differed:‘The basic difference between Asia and Europe … was that the UnitedStates was both more dominant in Asia and wanted less out of Asia’. (…)‘In Europe, the United States had an elaborate agenda for uniting theEuropean states, creating an institutional bulwark against communism,and supporting centrist democratic regimes’ (Ikenberry, 2003, p. 58).During the last decade, all three US rationales for Cold War transatlanticmultilateralism have disappeared: communism has gone, democraticregimes have been consolidated in Western Europe (and introduced inCentral and Eastern Europe). Furthermore, if Europe were to becomemore united politically, Europe would constitute not only a strongpartner but also a potential rival to the United States.3 It is tempting tosuggest that in the future the US will handle the world more equally,that is, Asia in the past (and present) provides a model of the futureworld order.4 Ikenberry argues in this way that multilateralism reflectsasymmetrical power relations.
When applying Ikenberry’s argument to the EU, we should ask fourkey questions: What does the ends–means relationship look like? To
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what extent, if at all, is the EU ambivalent about multilateralism? Howdominant is the EU? What does the Union want from the major worldregions? In this perspective, the European Union’s promotion of‘effective multilateralism’ may be based on a fatal misreading of oppor-tunities. It does not have a grand strategy or, rather, it has too many(multiple member-state determined strategies) and, consequently, theycannot be ‘grand’. There is no clear hierarchy between strategy andtactics. It follows that the Union cannot use multilateral agreements astools of grand strategy. In short, when applying Ikenberry’s argument tothe EU, all sorts of problems emerge. Further analysis is required todetermine whether these problems are worse for the EU or forIkenberry’s argument. Essentially the jury is still out: the chapters in thisbook demonstrate both increasingly close ties between the EU and UN –something that is an anomaly in Ikenberry’s state-centric world – andthe continuity of member states’ ambivalent attitudes to effectiveEuropean representation at the UN. Spanish and Italian opposition toGerman permanent membership of the Security Council can also beinterpreted as a relative gains logic that is alive and kicking.
Foot, MacFarlane and Mastanduno point to the possible influence ofother governments on US behaviour towards multilateral organizations.In explanations of EU foreign policy concerning international organiza-tions, the external factor, ‘other governments’, also seems highlyrelevant. Furthermore, we may also include ‘other organizations’, as inefforts by ASEAN to influence EU policy on Myanmar, or OAU efforts toinfluence EU policy on the Sudan/Darfur crisis. Among other govern-ments, the US can be singled out as a particularly important other. AsIvo Daalder notes, the US veto in 2000 of the EU’s IMF director-candidatedemonstrated instant American power yet had also more lasting effects.According to the German diplomat Michael Steiner, ‘The way this casewas handled tells us something about how the United States now thinksit can throw its weight around as the world’s most powerful nation. … Itreally is a demonstration of how the United States lacks sensitivitytowards its allies, and the response has been to unite the Europeansmore than ever against American bullying’ (cited in Daalder, 2001).5 Ingeneral, the EU’s embrace of effective multilateralism may have beencaused by the Union’s own genetic codes, yet the Bush Administration’spreference for selective multilateralism has been instrumental inactivating these codes. However, the war over Iraq and many other casesdemonstrate that US pressure on Europe does not always breedEuropean unity. Hence, it is an important analytical objective to deter-mine under what circumstances the European Union opts for unity and
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diversity, when feeling the diplomatic efforts of other governments ororganizations.
Alexander Wendt (1999) has forcefully pointed to the importance ofinternational social structures in explanations of state behaviour. In amore precise manner, Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and PeterKatzenstein (1996) have argued for the existence of an important causalimpact flowing from the international cultural environment to policy viaidentity and interest. The application of their theory to the case of EUpolicy making amounts to a research agenda in its own right. The reasonfor including their theory in the present context is that it raises someintriguing questions about explaining the EU’s policy on supportingmultilateral institutions by reference to some foundational multilateralidentity. The theory leads one to expect that international interactionduring the last decade has prompted the EU to make a priority of themultilateral system. In other words, the hypothesis is that had the US notbeen ambivalent or excessively instrumentally minded, the EU would nothave launched its high-profile endeavour in support of multilateralism.
Finally, EU policies and policy-making processes may have beeninfluenced by international organizations. Martha Finnemore (1996)has demonstrated how international organizations can ‘teach’ stateswhat they want, and influence the definition of national interests orstate preferences. Her cases include UNESCO, the International RedCross and the World Bank, yet her book is otherwise state-centric, whichimplies that the EU is excluded from her analysis. However, based onFinnemore’s approach and findings, we may expect that internationalorganizations can also teach the EU. In several policy fields, the EU hasbeen an inexperienced newcomer for whom teaching and nursing is cru-cially important in the process of defining European interests. Examplesinclude relations between the EU and the WHO (Guigner, 2006), or thefact that EU conditionality has been copied from the World Bank. Inother policy fields, the EU has experienced a ‘melt down’ of a policy andsubsequently received advice on best practice from international organ-izations. One example is EU development policy which in 1998 wasseverely criticized by the OECD and subsequently reformed. Another isthat NATO has served as a very experienced teacher, and the transfer ofJavier Solana from NATO to the EU has been instrumental in facilitatingthe process of learning (de Witte, 2004).
Constitutive factors
Our search for explanatory factors has so far been structured by theinside/outside dichotomy. The distinction may still be relevant and it
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may also be applicable when analysing EU behaviour towards multilateralinstitutions. However, if there is anything to studies of globalization andEuropeanization, then the distinction is in severe trouble and the searchfor complementary perspectives should begin. At an abstract level,Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall have made a plea for constitutive,structuration approaches in studies of relations between internationalinstitutions and states. Instead of beginning with the ‘interest, powers,and choices of already constituted state actors’ they suggest integratingagent-centric and institution-centric approaches, preferably by means ofbracketing (Duvall and Wendt, 1989). It should be possible to translatethis abstract reasoning into a concrete research agenda that is capable ofconceptualizing the EU as actor, institution and arena. In the following,I present three illustrative examples of constitutive factors before I arriveat tentative conclusions.
First, Foot, MacFarlane and Mastanduno regard the performance ofmultilateral institutions to be as much an internal as an external factorto the US (Foot et al., 2003, p. 13). While performance as such is anexternal factor, US perceptions of performance constitute an internalfactor. This solution raises two important issues. Is it possible to analyseperformance as such? And, is it possible to factor out a constituentmember of an institution, for instance the US, when analysing the per-formance of the institution as an external factor? While there are prosand cons to solutions to these problems, a possible third way might becomparative studies. In a comparative perspective, the performance of,say, the UN may be perceived in significantly different ways. Researchon the EU and multilateralism could contribute to such comparativestudies and thereby reduce the risk of case-biased findings.
Second, Ben Rosamond (2006) has demonstrated how discourses onglobalization often have an EU-domestic origin, yet they frame global-ization as an external factor that we should either greet or fear. Forinstance, former Commissioners Chris Patten and Pascal Lamywelcomed, even praised globalization, whereas Directorate-General (DG)Agriculture regards globalization as an external threat against which theEU should build a protective shield. When officials at DG Trade take anissue to the level of international multilateral organizations, they influ-ence at the same time the domestic balance of power between promotersof and protectors against globalization. The launch of the 2001Everything But Arms initiative thus influenced simultaneously the posi-tion of both domestic and international actors in trade and agriculture.
Third, whereas various multilateral institutions have been teachingthe EU what it wants, there have been cases in which the relationship is
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more complex. The relationship between the WHO and EU has for yearsbeen highly asymmetrically in favour of the WHO, yet the balance ofpower seems to be changing. Furthermore, when the OECD reviewed EUdevelopment policy in a very critical fashion, was the study anautonomous OECD initiative or did (some) EU member states ask theOECD to evaluate the performance of DG Development? Intersectingmultilateralism is often an intricate phenomenon, and third partiesoften play key parts.
In conclusion, we should take note of the serious problems andchallenges that flow from attempts at assessing multilateralism from aconstituent actor perspective. Most scholars in their effort to evaluateeffectiveness or influence of a particular actor tend to dichotomize theinternational organization and the actor whose influence they want toexplore. Yet, international organizations are constituted by these verymember states. When we analytically split off constituent parts from theorganizations, we are in some sense erasing an important, fundamentalpart of (intersecting) multilateralism. These problems are even furthercomplicated when we begin analyzing the EU. On the one hand the EUis not formally a constituent part of the UN and does not have legalpersonality. On the other hand, the EU can in practice be regarded as ade facto constituent member of the UN that has been recognized as suchby both EU member states and other members of the UN.
Analysing external effectiveness?
In the introduction, the editors defined effectiveness in four differentways, one of which is the influence of the EU on the UN itself – ‘externaleffectiveness’. This is frequently referred to in the literature as ‘impact’,and with reference to this, it has often been suggested that the US has an‘instrumental’ mindset and the EU a ‘process’ mindset. Instead of rejectingsuch views with reference to their political-ideological nature, we shouldinclude them in our research agenda. It is highly relevant to includemeasurement of impact. At the same time, one may wonder if we havehere an example of ‘we become what we study’? That is, if the US ispredominantly instrumental, scholars tend to search for the US impacton the UN. In any case, the instrumentality/process distinction can beseen as a hypothesis that can be examined by means of empiricalanalysis and subsequently rejected or confirmed.
In US-centric studies, a key concern is measurement of the impact onmultilateral institutions, that is, the degree to which the US influenceseither concrete policy making or broader institutional dynamics, for
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example, the design, reform, or (rarely) closure of organizations.Multilateral institutions are analysed ‘as instruments of American poli-cies’ (Karns and Mingst, 1990, pp. 6–8). Impact is also very present inJohn Ruggie’s explication of the concept of multilateralism, though thekind of impact he has in mind is more indirect and institutional thandirect and policy instrumental in character, ‘it was the fact of anAmerican hegemony that was decisive after World War II, not merelyAmerican hegemony. And that in turn makes the role of multilateralismin the current international transformation of even greater interest’(Ruggie, 1993, p. 31). Others pay close attention to ‘The Impact of theUnited States on Multilateral Organizations’, and emphasize that‘America’s decisions to cooperate in multilateral forums will bedetermined predominantly by the extent to which any specific organi-zation is perceived by important US domestic actors to be an effectiveand congenial vehicle for the promotion of America’s objectives (Footet al., 2003, pp. 14–19). As for multilateral institutions themselves, theywill continue to operate within the direct and indirect constraints thatUS instrumentalism imposes’ (Foot et al., 2003, p. 272).
Turning to the EU, we can observe that according to the 2003European Security Strategy, one of the EU’s key objectives is to supportmultilateral institutions and the UN in particular, as if support alonewere the objective. Such phrasing suggests the kind of disinterestedpublic service approach that is legion in EU documents and speechesgiven by EU officials. However, why not look for the EU’s impact andinfluence on UN politics? A policy or issue specific approach can berecommended. The case of UN financing may serve to illustrate thispoint.
Among intersections between the EU and the UN system, the financialflow is very significant. The EU and its member states are the biggestfinancial contributor to the general UN budget and many of the special-ized agencies. However, the EU has seldom proved capable of translatingfinancial means into political ends. In other words, the power that couldpotentially flow from this source, evaporates in the hands of the EU andits member states. Concerning international financial institutions, theEU has for years aimed at strengthening its impact. These institutionsare somehow special in the sense that both the IMF and the World Bankoperate on the basis of weighted voting. While the US is the singlelargest state contributor, the EU-25 collectively contribute about twicethe amount of the US but collectively control one-third of the votes. Inaddition, the EU’s voting power is diluted amongst several voting con-stituencies that include non-EU contributors. However, the financial
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input pattern is not reflected in political impact: the design of the inter-national financial institutions as well as concrete policy making aregrossly determined by the US and the launch of the euro has notchanged this. The structural inability of the EU-25 to make use of finan-cial power is a mystery that cries for explanation. However, with a fewnotable exceptions, the topic has not caught the attention of scholars(McNamara and Meunier, 2002; Horng, 2004; Smaghi, 2004).
Conclusion and perspectives
In Europe, multilateralism has predominantly positive connotationsand is related to images of international cooperation and world order.Similarly, it is considered a fact of life that international society ispluralist in the sense of being constituted by all sorts of regimes. Thisbasic belief is being reflected in European approaches to the multilateralsystem.
To specify the prime focus of the chapter, I introduced three differentkinds of intersection and made relations between the EU and the multi-lateral system a priority. This choice is justified by the main themes ofthe volume but also by the kind of sequencing that is at play: without asignificant degree of consensus among member states and EU institu-tions, the EU’s aspiration to play a role in the multilateral system willhave a hard time; without such a role, there will be no potential conflictwith the US concerning the deeds and vices of multilateralism. Hence,the three kinds of intersections are three distinct fields of study andtheir relative relevance is consequently determined by the researchquestion of specific studies. In the second part of the chapter, I begansearching for explanatory factors. Existing studies of the US andmultilateralism serve as a powerful point of departure. It has been trulyastonishing to realize the degree to which it makes sense to use suchstate-centric studies as a source of inspiration for analysing the EU’sforeign policy objective of effective multilateralism. Among internalfactors, I focused on five promising factors (interest groups, the politicalsystem, the executive, political culture, military weakness). Amongexternal factors, the chapter examined four potential factors (distributionof power, other governments, international interaction and interna-tional organizations). In order to escape the inside/outside dichotomy,I included a section on so-called constitutive factors. They contribute toa potentially more nuanced understanding, but more conceptual andtheoretical reflection is necessary before we can arrive at solid conclusions.It is difficult at this stage of research on the intersecting multilateralisms
210 Knud Erik Jørgensen
of the EU and the UN to conclude which factors work and which do notwork in explaining the choice for multilateralism – they have to be triedout in further empirical studies.
The final part of the chapter addressed the issue of impact. Althoughthe notion of European interests is absent from the official vocabulary,analysts should assess the degree to which the EU influences multilateralinstitutions. The EU declares that in several UN policy fields, it is afrontrunner. Against this background one wonders whether the theoryof hegemonic stability is going to experience a renaissance amongEuropean policy-makers and policy-analysts. In a broader perspective, itis the significant variation of impact across policy fields that shouldattract attention and analytical energy – as demonstrated in thisvolume.
Finally, while I acknowledge the usefulness of existing analyticalframeworks designed for studies of state behaviour towards multilateralinstitutions, I would like also to point to some of their limits. One suchlimit is not inherent to the studies as such, but refers to the need toadapt existing analytical frameworks for research on EU policy onmultilateral institutions. A second limit is perhaps most pronounced instudies of the US and multilateralism. Comparative studies of a range ofactors would alleviate some of the limits and biases, particularly if newstudies were based on a plurality of conceptions. In other words, theapplication of the European formulae – unity in diversity – withinresearch would potentially make a valuable difference.
Notes
1. To be sure, the image of decline was contested (Nye, 1990) and the disappear-ance of the Soviet Union did much to enforce his argument.
2. If the EU’s political system was a federal system, it was probably as decentral-ized as it could be without losing its essence as a system.
3. According to William Pfaff, ‘A prominent theme of neoconservative writingand television talk is that a Franco-German-dominated European Union,rebuilt according to the new Giscardian constitution currently under debate,threatens to become “superpower Europe” and a mortal danger to the UnitedStates’ (International Herald Tribune, 2 July 2003). See also Ash, 2003.
4. By contrast, Nau (2002), makes a plea for transforming US–Asia bilateralrelations into a multilateral relationship.
5. After leaving Auswärtiges Amt, Michael Steiner joined Solana’s office and wasclosely involved in outlining the European Security Strategy.
Intersecting Multilateralisms 211
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226 Bibliography
actorness, 4, 40, 118–20, 125Adomavicius, Sarunas, 105Afghanistan, 97, 122, 127, 128Africa, 39, 51, 58, 63–4, 67, 122,
126–7Africa Group, 20, 46, 84, 166,
169, 172African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
countries, 103African Union (AU), 128–9, 162
see also Organization of AfricanUnity
Albania, 159, 184Amsterdam Treaty, 13, 28, 32,
56, 192Annan, Kofi, 1, 2, 22, 41, 64, 68, 115,
117–18, 125, 168–9In Larger Freedom report, 1, 168–9see also United Nations Secretary
GeneralArab Group, 166, 169Arab League, 4Ashe, John, 183Asia, 204, 211Asian Group, 28, 46, 91, 156Association of South-East Asian
Nations (ASEAN), 201, 205Australia, 46, 70, 73, 84, 172, 187Austria, 11, 12, 60, 73, 100, 109, 163
Balkans, 36, 44, 58, 60, 62, 96, 103,105–7, 122, 126
Beckett, Margaret, 189Belarus, 106, 161Belgium, 11, 35, 60, 121Blair, Tony, 53, 55, 61Bolton, John, 8Bonn Agreements, 187Bosnia-Herzegovina, 4, 8, 127,
129–30, 184Brazil, 63, 71, 162, 185Bulgaria, 92–3, 97–101, 103–4,
106–8, 184
Bush, George H., 61Bush, George W., 8, 53, 110–11, 187,
192, 199, 205
Canada, 46, 70, 73, 84, 91, 172, 187
Canada, Australia, New Zealand group(CANZ), 46, 172
Central and East European countries(CEECs), 15, 92–109
see also under individual countries’names
Chechnya, 160–2China, 49–50, 53, 67, 81, 120, 159,
162, 163Chirac, Jacques, 53, 59, 61climate change, 16, 19, 102, 176,
184–6, 191–2collective security, 1, 18, 42, 115–18,
125, 129Commission on Human Rights (CHR),
109, 154–74Commission on Sustainable
Development (CSD), 176, 181,183–4, 191–2
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 13–14, 16–17, 28–9, 31–3, 36–7, 39, 44, 49, 52,54, 58, 65–6, 109, 116, 121–2,125, 133, 142, 143, 150, 155–6,165, 171
Commonwealth of IndependentStates, 4
comprehensive security, 118, 122
Conference of the Parties (COP),185–7
conflict prevention, 42, 63, 67, 115,123, 125–6, 130–2
conflict resolution, 41, 63, 90Constitutional treaty, 41, 45–6, 58,
170, 172, 197, 201Cook, Robin, 59
227
Index
Council of Ministers of the EU, 9, 14,21, 23, 27, 29, 32, 39, 72, 120–1,129, 138–9, 155, 166–7, 171, 179,183, 185–6, 188, 190, 195
Presidency, 4, 13, 17, 27, 29–39, 43,45, 58, 76–7, 81, 91, 104, 106,122–5, 133, 135, 142–3, 147,150, 152, 155–7, 162, 166,172–4, 178–9, 183–5, 190, 192
Secretariat, 13, 23, 33–4, 36–8, 86,122, 126, 130, 143, 151
Council Working Group on HumanRights (COHOM), 155, 167
Country Strategy Paper (CSP), 130,137, 139
crisis management, 2, 115, 123, 126,129–30, 132
Cuba, 51, 97, 104, 163Cyprus, 28, 91, 156Czech Republic, 92–3, 98, 100, 103–4
Day, Catherine, 182death penalty, 19, 104, 158, 160–1,
163, 174decolonization, 36, 80, 121, 174democracy, 40, 45, 73, 77, 85, 104,
170Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
36, 63, 127–9, 160–1Denmark, 11, 35, 60, 70, 79, 91, 100,
121, 156, 163Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO), 6, 126, 129Department of Political Affairs (DPA),
6, 126development, 1, 2, 3, 10, 12, 15,
18–19, 35, 38–40, 43, 73–4, 78,82, 85, 87, 94, 101, 103–4, 117,133, 137–41, 170, 172, 180, 200,202, 206, 208
see also sustainable developmentDimas, Stavros, 184Dini, Lamberto, 62disarmament, 21, 36, 46, 80–1, 87,
106, 121
Earth Summit, 185, 192East Timor, 159–60
see also Timor-Leste
Eastern Europe Group (EEG), 28, 46,87, 91, 97, 156
Economic and Social Council(ECOSOC), 5, 13, 16, 27, 35,38–9, 43, 45–6, 76, 78, 87, 94, 96,101, 141–2, 148, 155, 178, 183,191–2
effectiveness, 3, 5, 12, 16, 22, 31, 41,59, 77, 125, 128–9, 148, 151–2,166, 176, 182–3, 186, 191, 208
definition of, 9–10external, 10, 17–18, 117–18, 122,
131, 176, 181, 184, 190, 208internal, 10, 16, 118, 121–2, 125,
130–1, 176, 180–1, 184–6, 190Estonia, 46, 92–3, 98–100, 108–10European Commission, 4, 9, 13–14,
17, 23, 27, 29–34, 36–41, 43,45–6, 77, 86, 95, 102, 115, 120,122, 126, 130, 133–53, 155–6,167–9, 171, 177–85, 188–91, 195
European Community (EC), 4, 16,28–31, 34, 38, 41, 44, 46, 52, 75,87, 91, 98, 119, 135–7, 177–81,183, 185, 192, 197
competence, 13, 16–18, 30–4, 37–8,119, 134, 137, 142, 145,175–81, 184–5, 190–1, 202
European Council, 29, 40, 115–17,125–6, 129, 138, 170, 188
European Court of Justice (ECJ), 29,40, 134, 177, 180
European Free Trade Association(EFTA), 46, 122, 165, 172, 184
European Parliament (EP), 29, 33,40–1, 144–5
European Political Cooperation (EPC),31, 52, 68, 109, 156–7
European Security and Defence Policy(ESDP), 60, 67, 123, 125, 127,129–30
European Security Strategy, 2, 27,115–16, 125, 198, 209, 211
European Union (EU)coordination at the UN, 9, 13, 19,
27, 30, 33–4, 36–8, 40, 42–3, 45,78, 89, 97, 120–2, 124–5, 133–5,139–44, 147, 149–51, 155–7,163, 165–7, 171–4, 185, 201
228 Index
European Union – continuedfrontrunner, 10, 18, 167, 171,
175–6, 184, 186, 188, 190–1, 211
see also Council of Ministers of theEU, European Commission,European Court of Justice,European Parliament
European Union Police Mission(EUPM), 130
Europeanization, 5, 9, 10, 12–17, 22,66, 70, 77–8, 81–2, 93–4, 96,101–3, 106, 108–9, 118, 121, 125,131, 157, 190, 207
Everything But Arms initiative, 207
Ferrero-Waldner, Benita, 163Finland, 11, 70, 78–9, 91, 100, 156Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO), 6, 40, 45–6, 135France, 11–14, 30, 34–5, 46, 49–68,
72, 81, 100, 110, 119, 121–4, 127,163, 201
Fulci, Paolo, 62
General Agreement on Tariffs andTrade (GATT), 74, 197
General Assembly (GA), see UnitedNations General Assembly
Georgia, 4Germany, 4, 11, 14, 52, 56–7, 59–65,
72, 97, 100, 107–8, 110, 121, 123,173, 201
Greece, 11, 35, 60, 100, 121Group of 4 (G-4), 63–4Group of 8 (G-8), 61, 67–8Group of 77 (G-77), 4, 20, 84,
88, 97
High-Level Panel on Threats,Challenges and Change, 1, 2, 41,63–4, 83, 115–17, 125–6, 130,168–9
Holbrooke, Richard, 58human rights, 1, 2, 5, 9–10, 12, 17,
19, 22, 35–6, 40–5, 55, 73–5, 81,85, 87, 94–5, 101, 104–5, 110,117, 138, 140, 143–4, 146, 149,154–74
Human Rights Council, 22, 43,169–70, 172
Human security, 14Humanitarian affairs, 35, 80, 133, 141,
143, 172Humanitarian aid, 39, 40, 85, 127,
139, 180Humanitarian intervention, 44, 55, 115Hungary, 92–3, 97–8, 100, 105–6, 110
Iceland, 46, 70, 78–9, 91, 156, 172,184, 188
International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA), 6
International Civil AviationOrganization (ICAO), 6, 136
International Criminal Court (ICC), 6,85, 104, 110, 124, 155, 174
International Fund for AgriculturalDevelopment (IFAD), 6, 136–7
International Labour Organization(ILO), 6, 40, 45–6, 134–5, 137,140–2, 144–6, 148, 151
International law, 1, 5, 35, 44–5, 53,73–4, 116, 119, 202
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 5,6, 45, 146, 151, 205, 209
International Maritime Organization(IMO), 6, 135
International Stabilization Force(ISAF), 127
International TelecommunicationsUnion (ITU), 6, 46, 135
International Trade Centre (ITC), 6, 135Iran, 60, 159–63, 174Iraq, 1, 15, 35, 44, 49, 53–4, 56, 67–8,
108, 115, 117–18, 123, 125, 131,159–61, 165, 200, 205
Ireland, 11, 12, 35, 60, 73, 100, 163, 173
Israel, 36, 50, 51, 159–61Italy, 11, 35, 49, 56–7, 60, 62–3, 67,
72, 100, 121, 163, 173
Japan, 46, 52, 62–5, 173, 187, 192Japan, US, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand (JUSCANZ), 46, 172see also Canada, Australia and New
Zealand (CANZ)
Index 229
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), 28, 46
Jusys, Oskaras, 107
Kavan, Jan, 103Kosovo, 55, 74, 116, 127Kyoto Protocol, 16, 18, 19, 85, 102,
186–90
Lamy, Pascal, 144, 207Latin America Group (GRULAC), 20,
46, 158, 172Latvia, 92, 93, 98–100, 109, 110Libya, 174Lithuania, 87, 92, 93, 98, 100, 105,
107, 109, 110Lubbers, Ruud, 74Luxembourg, 11, 33, 35, 73, 121, 124,
183–4, 192
Maastricht Treaty, 28–9, 31, 36, 52,56–7, 178
Malaysia, 90Malta, 28, 156Marrakech Accords, 187Martonyi, Janos, 105Mexico, 87Middle East, 2, 8, 35, 52, 121–2, 126,
163, 174Millennium development goals
(MDGs), 43Multilateralism, 1–4, 7, 8, 9, 13,
15, 18, 20–2, 27, 28, 33, 43–5, 49, 55, 65–6, 68, 70–1,77–8, 82, 84, 86, 88–9, 115, 117, 141, 147, 149, 152, 163,195–7, 199–211
definition of, 5–7dysfunctional, 7, 163effective, 2–3, 7–10, 15, 20, 22,
64–5, 68, 70, 78, 87, 89,116–19, 125, 129, 132, 176,184, 190–1, 195–6, 198, 203,205, 210
intersecting multilateralism(s), 45,197–200, 208
middle power multilateralism, 15,72–5, 86, 88–9
Myanmar, 159–61, 205
NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR), 127Netherlands, 11, 12, 15, 60, 70, 73–7,
81–2, 89–90, 121, 153, 192New Agenda Coalition (NAC), 86New York Liaison Office (NYLO)
[Council of the EU], 37New Zealand, 46, 70, 83, 172Nice Treaty, 28, 59Nielsson, Poul, 201Nigeria, 159–60Non-aligned movement (NAM), 4,
28, 172Nordic Group, 4, 28, 75–7, 84, 156,
163, 172–3North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), 4, 8, 22, 74, 75, 79, 91,97, 100, 107, 127–8, 131, 197, 206
North Korea, 104, 161Norway, 46, 70, 75, 78, 79, 82–3, 91,
156, 172, 184, 188Nuclear weapons, 36, 51, 54, 58, 60,
66, 91, 106–7, 174
Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Assistance (OCHA),6, 126, 135, 137
Office of the High Commissioner forHuman Rights (OHCHR), 46, 154,159, 167–70, 174
Organization of African Unity (OAU),205
see also African UnionOrganization for Economic
Cooperation and Development(OECD), 68, 141, 206, 208
Organization of the IslamicConference (OIC), 28, 169, 172
Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE),22, 68, 147
Organized crime, 41Ottawa Convention (landmines), 106–7
Patten, Chris, 207Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), 19,
130Peacekeeping, 4, 6, 18, 36, 41, 43, 67,
73, 74, 75, 78, 106, 115, 126,128–30
230 Index
Permanent Five (P-5), 49–51, 53–4, 59,62–3, 65, 67, 72
see also United Nations SecurityCouncil
Poland, 92–3, 97–8, 100, 108Poland/Hungary: Assistance for
Restructuring Economies(PHARE), 102
Political and Security Committee(PSC), 14, 23, 29, 33, 120, 122,124–5, 127, 129
Portugal, 11, 60, 100, 121, 163Presence, 19, 30, 37–40, 59,
61, 85, 119, 131, 141, 181, 183–4
Prodi, Romano, 136, 189Putin, Vladimir, 189
Religious intolerance, 161, 163‘responsibility to protect’, 43, 44,
55, 67Rights of the child, 158, 159–61, 163Romania, 92–3, 97–101, 103–8, 184Russia, 8, 18, 27, 49, 66–8, 96,
98–9, 107, 110, 120, 162, 187–92
see also Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics (USSR)
Rwanda, 2, 127, 174
Security, 1–3, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17–20,21, 35–6, 39, 41–4, 51–2, 60–1,72, 74–5, 77, 92–3, 95, 97, 99,100–1, 106–9, 115–18, 121–3,126–31, 170, 201, 204
see also collective security,comprehensive security, humansecurity
Security Council, see United NationsSecurity Council
Single European Act, 31, 178Slovakia, 92–3, 98, 100Slovenia, 109Solana, Javier, 68, 118–19, 123, 132,
202, 206, 211Somalia, 2, 95South Africa, 87, 90Soviet Union, see Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Spain, 11, 35, 56, 60, 62, 67, 72, 73,100, 121, 123
Straw, Jack, 64Street children, 159Sudan, 122, 160–2, 168, 172, 173,
174, 205Suez Crisis, 50Sustainable development, 6, 39, 43,
73, 176, 177, 181–4, 188see also development
Sweden, 11, 35, 60, 70, 75, 78, 79, 86,91, 100, 156, 163
Switzerland, 46, 172
Terrorism, 1, 35, 41, 46, 53, 123Third Committee, 46, 81, 85, 154–62,
164–6, 172–4Timor-Leste, 122
see also East TimorTöpfer, Klaus, 182Treaty of Rome, 28, 30, 40,
134, 177Turkey, 184Turkmenistan, 161
United Kingdom (UK), 12, 13, 14, 30,33, 34, 43, 46, 50–6, 59, 61, 64,66, 67, 69, 81, 100, 108, 110, 119,121–4, 140–1, 162, 192
United Nations (UN), 1–22, 27–31,40–6, 49, 51, 53, 55, 63, 65–8, 70,75, 83, 92–3, 97, 102, 105, 109,115–18, 121–32, 133–8, 141, 144, 147–9, 152, 154, 156, 162,165–8, 170–3, 175–6, 181, 190–1,195–6, 198, 199–200, 202–3, 205,207–9, 211
UNAIDS (Joint United NationsProgramme on HIV/AIDS), 6, 137
United Nations charter, 56, 57, 119Chapter VII, 116
United Nations Children’s Fund(UNICEF), 6, 135
United Nations Conference onEnvironment and Development(UNCED), 185
United Nations Conference on SmallArms, 107
Index 231
United Nations Conference on Tradeand Development (UNCTAD), 6,46, 135, 148
United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP), 40, 135, 137, 192
United Nations EconomicCommission for Europe (UNECE), 46
United Nations Educational, Scientificand Cultural Organization(UNESCO), 6, 46, 136, 206
United Nations EnvironmentProgramme (UNEP), 4, 46, 135,176, 181–4, 191–2
United Nations FrameworkConvention on Climate Change(UNFCCC), 102, 185
United Nations Fund for PopulationActivities (UNFPA), 6, 135
United Nations General Assembly(UNGA), 5, 13, 15, 19, 20, 50,92–109, 118, 121–2, 155, 158,161, 164, 174, 191
Uniting for Peace Resolution, 50see also Third Committee
United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees (UNHCR), 6, 40, 46, 135
United Nations IndustrialDevelopment Organization(UNIDO), 6, 136, 137
United Nations International DrugControl Programme (UNDCP), 6, 136
United Nations Mission in theDemocratic Republic of Congo(MONUC), 127–8
United Nations Relief and WorksAgency for Palestine Refugees inthe Near East (UNRWA), 136
United Nations Secretariat, 5–6, 8, 34,39, 74, 126, 168
United Nations Secretary General, 1,2, 5, 33, 41–3, 65, 68, 75, 115,117, 129–30, 167–8
see also Annan, Kofi
United Nations Security Council(UNSC), 6, 32, 43, 49–69, 56, 116, 118–25, 127, 129–31
Authorization of the use of force,44, 55, 116, 171
EU seat, 14, 42, 50, 57, 131, 151Reform, 19, 43, 61–5, 118Vetoes, 50, 51, 171
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics(USSR), 50, 51, 72, 90, 93, 96–8,103, 211
see also RussiaUnited States (US), 7, 8, 13, 18, 19, 20,
22, 35, 44, 46, 49–51, 53–6, 58,61, 62, 65–8, 72–4, 84, 86, 89–90,93, 97–9, 108, 110–11, 120, 122,124–5, 131, 151–3, 165, 168,172–4, 186–8, 192, 195–6,198–211
Védrine, Hubert, 59Vietnam, 51, 97Visegrad-4, 98
Wallström, Margot, 182Weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
1, 41, 53, 116see also nuclear weapons
Western Europe and Other Group(WEOG), 28, 46, 52, 83, 87, 91,156, 172
World Food Programme (WFP), 6, 46, 135
World Health Organization (WHO), 6, 40, 45–6, 56, 136, 142, 206, 208
World Intellectual PropertyOrganization (WIPO), 6, 46, 135, 142
World Trade Organization (WTO), 6,12, 31, 74, 85, 143–4, 146–8,189–90, 192
Yugoslavia, 159, 174
Zaire, 159–60Zimbabwe, 67, 161, 162
232 Index