The Groningen Model United Nations 2016

The European Council

Image Source: Huffington Post

Stabilizing EU Relations with Ukraine/Russia

Dear Delegates, We are delighted to welcome you to our simulation of the European Council (EC) at this edition of GrunnMUN 2016. We hope that you find this background guide helpful and informational in aiding and guiding your research. Please begin to formulate an idea of your desired implementation of policies and amendments in addition to strategically conceptualizing where your possible alliances may lie. If there are any questions or comments, do not hesitate to contact us for additional sources or to clarify any concerns you may have. We look forward to meeting you all at the conference! Kind regards, Melissa Novotny and Ray Hardono Your EC Chairs

Introduction The relationship between the West and Russia has experienced periods of stability and tension throughout history. Yet, even after periods of siege, revolution, war and collapse, Russia today has re­established its image undeniably as being a strong political player as well as a world power. With the United States, Europe and Russia and their respective institutions in a continuous balancing act of power, conflicts and divides add to the risk of escalation between Russia and the West. Therefore, there is great a need to handle these conflicts with care to ensure peace, especially in the case of the State of Ukraine. Though technically considered European, Ukraine, a non­EU state, shows signs of a cultural divide between the more “European” West and the Soviet influenced East. Tensions escalated in February with the 2014 Ukrainian revolution that began to tear Ukrainian territory and identity apart in civil war. In the wake of Eastern Ukraine’s disapproval of the interim government put into place following the fleeing of ex­President, Viktor Yanukovych, Russia saw the controversial opportunity to seize the peninsula of Crimea in the East. Outrage ensued around the world at this power play, feared to be the reemergence of Russian imperialist expansionism. Russia backed its acquisition of Crimea with its historical claims over the territory and the large Russian minority population, whilst unofficially seeing a chance to gain back the port city of Sevastopol on the Black Sea. Justified or not, this act was seen as an attack on the national sovereignty of Ukraine as well as an exhibition of an unlawful acquisition of territory under International Law. (BBC 2014) The United Nations Charter Chapter I

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Article 2:4 explicitly states that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

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Consequently, Russia’s claims to sovereign Ukrainian territory might well be seen as non­compliant to the peacekeeping fundamentals that the United Nations seeks to abide by, and have thus created controversy. Many countries in the West and around this world to this day still do not recognize Crimea as lawful Russian territory. The General Assembly held a vote following the annexation in support of Ukrainian sovereignty under the resolution titled, the “Territorial Integrity of Ukraine”, which concluded overwhelmingly not to recognize the Crimean acquisition with 100 votes in favor, 11 against and 58 abstentions. Such a vote reflects the attitude

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that an abundance of Member States had towards Putin’s referendum and the seizure of The Crimea.

1 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world­europe­26481423 2 http://www.un.org/en/sections/un­charter/chapter­i/index.html 3 http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm

More so than the US, Europe must proceed carefully to ensure that peace remains throughout the region of Eastern Ukraine, while containing Russia, aiming to keep the alliance stable for continuous economic and political gains. Essentially Europe must revive its role as an intermediary of the continuous tensions that plague the US and Russia following the Cold War. European­involved institutions such as the European Union and NATO must take into account the future of Ukraine and their role in further EU expansion, much to the dismay of Russia. Here, the European Council must come to a consensus on how to move forward with this conflict in the long­term in such a way as fosters cooperation between all States involved. Historical Background The Ukrainian­Russian conflict lies behind geopolitical, historical and cultural tensions dating back to before the control exercised over Ukrainian territory by the Soviet Union. These two nations are closely linked by cultural ties and a common Russian language spoken by a large Russian minority in the East of Ukraine. In the case of the annexation of Crimea, an overwhelming percentage, 95.7% of Crimeans according to Russia Today, opted out of staying with Ukraine and were in favor of joining Putin’s Russia. This percentage in itself embodies the

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complications of a divided Ukraine, which have become an ongoing predicament. To analyze the current conflict in relation to the EU, the importance of understanding the ties that bind Ukraine and Russia together must be broken down historically first and then politically. Until 1918, Ukraine and Russia shared an empire that endured over many centuries. The Revolution in 1918, backed by military response, prompted a governmental split that led to an independent Ukraine. With the promotion of peace and stability in mind, the Central powers of WWI drew up a treaty, Brest­Litovsk, which successfully quelled tensions until the Russian Revolution added fuel to the fire during WWI. Under the

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formation and establishment of the Soviet Union, following the end of the Revolution, Ukraine and Russia became joined again under the sovereignty of the USSR. In 1991, both Russia and Ukraine became fractured due to an overall economic deprivation that quickly led to the Soviet Union’s collapse led by a series of cascading independence movements. Certain territorial claims in former USSR satellite states, relevant in the case of Ukraine, had still been left unresolved. The independence of Ukraine allowed for the citizens of Crimea to vote on their own independence and with a marginal percent of those in favor, roughly 52.6%, Crimea and the city of Sevastopol were allowed to stay with Ukraine. Though divided after the fall of the USSR, Ukraine

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4 https://www.rt.com/news/crimea­vote­join­russia­210/ 5 http://www.britannica.com/topic/treaties­of­Brest­Litovsk 6 http://russia­insider.com/en/2015/03/11/4376

maintained a heavy reliance on Russia for goods and oil, both sides are still very heavily connected through economic ties.

The new millennium saw bold moves from Ukraine, especially with its attempts to join the EU and NATO, that have proved to be testament of Ukraine’s desire to join with the West and further remove themselves from the grasp of Russia. Joining a European institution such as the EU or joining a militaristic US­backed alliance such as NATO, would not only challenge Russia’s power, but also take away the buffer­zone that Ukraine serves as between Russia and the EU. Gains for Ukraine joining the EU also extends to the economic sector, the European Free­Trade Agreement (2014) being the first step in the direction of integrating markets with the intention of shifting Ukraine away from Russian trade. Yet moves such as

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this will only aggravate Russia’s skepticism of Ukraine’s intentions leading towards further distrust and making peacekeeping more complex. Russian skepticism of Ukraine and potential plots against the state of the Russian Federation have existed since the fall of the USSR, yet, as recently as 2008, Russia became infuriated by rumors that alleged Ukraine was selling Georgia arms to aid Georgia in its war against Russia. Russia also accused Ukraine of selling them discounted tanks and anti­aircraft systems. Outraged, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin

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condemned these actions as a “crime against the Russian and Ukrainian people”. Russian President, Dmitri A. Medvedev, followed Putin’s

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backlash with a general warning to Ukraine about future implications of these actions: “We will never forget this, and, for sure, we will consider this when formulating policy.” The divide and mistrust between Russia

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and Ukraine only reinforced building tensions between the two countries. Russia has since warned the U.S. and its allies that the discord would be significant for the European “balance of power” as well as the minority Russian population if Ukraine was to join NATO or the EU. This

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expressed the building concern that Russia had regarding Ukraine’s pivot to the West. The bid for Ukraine to join NATO in 2008 was then rejected. The Current Conflict Years later in 2014, the escalation of tensions and economic decline brought about a revolution in Ukraine that caused a changeover in government from pro­Russian Sergey Aksyonov to Oleksandr Turchynov. Putin, with the approval of parliament, sent military reinforcements into Crimea on behalf of Aksyonov. Outrage over this action engulfed the Western media and invited a strong response that condemned the “invasion”. The annexation of Crimean territory was predated by a 2010

7 http://www.rt.com/business/168856­ukraine­europe­trade 8 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/world/europe/30ukraine.html?_r=0 9 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/world/europe/30ukraine.html?_r=0 10 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/world/europe/30ukraine.html?_r=0 11https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/04/that­time­ukraine­tried­to­join­nato­and­nato­said­no/

Crimean parliamentary vote in favor, 78/100, of an independence declaration that was said to have “paved the way” for the 2014 public referendum. With 60% of the Crimean population being ethnically

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Russian, the overwhelming majority of 97 % in favor of joining the Russian Federation is far from inconceivable. It is rather a question of

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legitimacy and recognition that now plagues the territory of Crimea, which is still considered by a majority of United Nations Member­States as a disputed territory.

Image Credit: Before It’s News

The United States along with other Western nations have since imposed sanctions against Russia in retaliation to their invasion. Restrictions and bans have been placed on Crimea by the EU, barring economic investment and the promotion of tourism; the port of Sevastopol is now forbidden for European Union cruise ships to dock at. Economic

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sanctions, the most devastating, have targeted the defense sector and other sanctions have been applied against the energy sector and state­owned banks. The specifics of the sanctions include various

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embargos and prohibitions on military equipment imports and exports

12 https://www.rt.com/news/crimea­parliament­independence­ukraine­086/ 13http://www.businessinsider.com/crimean­parliament­votes­unanimously­to­become­part­of­russia­2014­3?IR=T 14http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special­coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm 15 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/world/europe/30ukraine.html?_r=0

including dual use goods, with certain exceptions. This include EU 16

Member States forbidding loans with a maturity of more than 30 days to be provided to the aforementioned sectors. It has been confirmed that the sanctions have greatly impacted the Russian economy by means of inflation that has propelled Russia into a recession. The sanctions can

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therefore be viewed as a success by the West in punishing Russia for its action in Crimea. Shortly following the Crimean power shift, civil war broke out leaving the country divided between pro­West Ukrainians and pro­Russian separatists in the East. Fighting and protests reached their peak in the summer of 2014 by the Eastern border with Russia in the Donetsk Region. Heavy losses had already taken place on both sides, but the accidental downing of civilian aircraft MH­17 shocked the world on July 17th, 2014. Malaysia Airlines 17, around three hours from its initial departure from Amsterdam, suddenly broke apart in mid­air tragically killing all onboard. Immediate speculation surrounded eye­witness reports claiming that the plane had been shot down by a surface­to­air missile. Ironically, both Russia and Ukraine expressed their sympathies whilst political officials pointed fingers at the opposition, each laying blame on the other. To this day, both sides refuse to take accountability. Two conflicting reports have since emerged from the Dutch and Russian investigation boards. The Dutch authorities have confirmed that “MH17 was shot down by a Russian­made BUK missile fired from eastern Ukraine.” Due to the fear that the downing of

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MH­17 could be, “prosecuted as a war crime”, Russia strongly denies any involvement. Ultimately, the failure to close the airspace over this area

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of Ukraine has been seen as the greatest error. The conflict has quieted down since, yet the political implications of leaving this conflict open is detrimental to the state of Ukraine as well as to the neighboring EU and Russia. Eight thousand have died at the hands of this conflict since April 2014. There has been a virtual ceasefire as of

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September 2015, which has yet to be officially confirmed, although the fighting is at an all time low. While an official agreement is desirable,

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demilitarizing the border should also be seen as a major step in peacekeeping through de­escalating the risk of another crisis. Peace, stability, and lawful sovereignty must be at the forefront of future negotiations surrounding these two actors. Minsk Protocol and the Minsk II

16 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/world/europe/30ukraine.html?_r=0 17http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Russia/sanctions­after­crimea­have­they­worked/EN/index.htm 18http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015­10­13/dutch­authorities­deliver­final­report­on­crashed­flight­­mh17/6851490 19 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/world/europe/30ukraine.html?_r=0 20 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world­europe­34236464 21 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/world/europe/30ukraine.html?_r=0

Following the annexation of Crimea, and the continued military unrest of Pro­Russian separatists from Donetsk to the Luhansk region, on the 5th of September 2014, the Minsk Protocol was presented by the Trilateral

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Contract Group on Ukraine, signed by a representative from the Organization for Security and Co­operation in Europe (OSCE), Russia, Ukraine and separatist forces that have agreed on a mutual ceasefire. To the regret of the contracting States, the agreement was not sufficient to stop the violence. The Second Battle of Donetsk Airport broke out, and forces continue to accuse each other of ceasefire violations. On the 12th of February 2015, Germany and France, alongside Russia

and Ukraine agreed on the Minsk II Protocol , which is aimed at 23

revitalizing and further enforcing the previous agreement. After its implementation, there has indeed been a reduction in hostilities.

(Battle of Donetsk Airport ­ Intense Combat Footage and Heavy Clashes

Fighting) The Minsk II agreement was meant to be fully implemented by the end of 2015, with the main purpose of Ukraine taking control over its borders and cease all hostilities. It aims to alleviate the conflict in the Donbass and Luhansk regions in Ukraine, and furthermore to ease relations between Ukraine and Russia. It will be extended into 2016, and many question whether this “package deal” can end the conflict that has left about 8,000 people dead.

22 "Ukraine Ceasefire Agreement Signed in Minsk." CCTV America. CCTV, 5 Sept. 2014. Web. 14 Jan. 2016. 23 "Ukraine Ceasefire: New Minsk Agreement Key Points ­ BBC News." BBC News. http://www.bbc.com/news/world­europe­31436513, 12 Dec. 2014. Web. 14 Jan. 2016.

In the last few months of 2015, there have been no, or almost no conflicts in the hot zones. However, OSCE has noted that there have been several ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Specifically, there has been shelling in the areas of Horlivka and its surrounding areas. This proved that some parties have not truly fulfilled the terms of the agreement. 24

Photo Credit: Business Insider

Major conflict zones in Ukraine and the surrounding Donbass and Luhansk region, as of August 2015 In addition, several other complaints of violations of the Minsk II agreement were presented. The Ukrainian President, Petro Porshenko, held that OSCE was not given full access to the entire region of the separatist­held area, which he also accused of forging elections. Throughout the conflict, Russia has maintained that no Russian troops have been present in Ukraine. However, in early December during an annual press conference in Moscow, President Putin made a controversial statement, saying, “We never said there were no people there who were carrying out certain tasks including in the military sphere. But that does not mean there are Russian [regular] troops there. Feel the difference.”

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24 "OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine." Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, Based on Information Received as of 19:30hrs, 14 January 2016. OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 16 Dec. 2015. Web. 16 Jan. 2016. <http://www.osce.org/ukraine­smm/reports>. 25 "Putin Admits Russian Military Active in Ukraine." Ukraine Today. Ukraine Today, 17 Dec. 2015. Web. 17 Jan. 2016.

If the statement were indeed correct, it would likely impede the peace process in Ukraine and contradict the very basis of the Minsk II Protocol. Recently, from an economical standpoint, both Ukraine and Russia have increased tensions. Russia held it would implement a new tariff on Ukrainian goods starting in January as a response to the new trade deal agreed by Ukraine and the EU. The full list of banned goods was posted on the Russian ministry's website several days before the decision came into force on January 2, 2016. On the other hand, Ukraine has declared

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that it would ban Russian goods in retaliation. The Ukrainian government has planned to enter the measure into force from January 10th which would last until August 5th or until Russia withdraws its ban on imports from Ukraine.

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In the upcoming months, several European States, including France and Germany, will speak again with Russia and Ukraine to discuss further implementation of the Minsk agreement. European Union’s Current Relationship between Russia – Ukraine Tier Three Economic Sanctions Subsequent to the hostilities in Ukraine, the European Union in 2014 presented the Council Regulation No. 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilization of the situation in Ukraine.

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The measure aimed to reduce Russia’s capabilities to inflict more harm to the region, such as capital market restrictions on Russian Firms, stated in Art. 1 (f) of the Regulation. The sanction proved to be quite effective;

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after the closing of European investments to Russia, the Ruble had dropped to half its value. Nevertheless, the sanctions have also impacted Europe’s gas and energy supplies; therefore is it still beneficial, necessary and proportional to keep these sanctions implemented?

<http://uatoday.tv/politics/putin­admits­russian­military­active­in­ukraine­555866.html>. 26 "Russia Bans All Transit of Ukrainian Goods." UNIAN News. UNIAN, 5 Jan. 2016. Web. 15 Feb. 2016. <http://www.unian.info/economics/1229314­russia­bans­all­transit­of­ukrainian­goods.html>. 27 "Trade War with Moscow Reveals Another Unpleasant Surprise for Kiev." RT International. Russian Today, 14 Jan. 2016. Web. 15 Feb. 2016. <https://www.rt.combusiness/328943­ukraine­russia­transit­ban/> 28 Concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's Actions destabilizing the situation in Ukraine [2014] OJ 2 229/01 29 Concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's Actions destabilizing the situation in Ukraine [2014] OJ 2 229/01, art. 1 (f)

The European Union’s Energy Market Relations with Russia The European Union’s dependency of Russian oil and gas is a key issue. However, at the moment, the EU is keen to reduce energy reliance on Russia, as proposed by The President of the European Council Donald Tusk. Energy uncertainty in the European Union has several gaps, and there are a number of problems in regions such as Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, if the Union is less reliant on energy markets from Russia, it could have more political leverage.

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Nevertheless, Russia continues to make sure that the EU will always be dependant. For instance, the Russian energy giant, Gazprom, is keen to regain its share of Europe's gas market using "greater flexibility in export contracts," which was presented by company officials. Gazprom alone

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supplied Europe with 161.5 billion cubic meters of gas in 2013. If the EU 32

would push to diversify energy markets, it comes at a risk. Ukraine – EU Relations After several EU Members reduced tensions after the Russian­backed secessionists reluctantly accepted the Minsk peace accord negotiated by Germany, the European Union has continued to support Ukraine in both in an economical and a political standpoint. Several significant trade agreements have been signed, such as the Ukraine – EU Association Agreement, which is committed to co­operate and congregate in several policy areas, such as economic policy, legislation, and regulation across a broad range of areas. In addition, to assist Ukraine, especially the areas affected by the conflict, in 2015 the European Commission is pledging an additional €15 million in humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, the question is whether or not, since Ukraine has been striving towards integration into the European Union, this could be

30 C., J. "Paying the Price." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 29 Apr. 2014. Web. 15 Feb. 2016. <http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/04/donald­tusks­energy­union>. 31 "Gazprom Prepares for 'gas Price War in Europe." DailySabah. ANADOLU AGENCY, 7 Feb. 2016. Web. 15 Feb. 2016. <http://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2016/02/08/gazprom­prepares­for­gas­price­war­in­europe>. 32 "Europe." Gas Marketing In Europe. Gazprom, 01 Sept. 2014. Web. 15 Feb. 2016. <http://www.gazprom.com/about/marketing/europe/>.

perceived by Russia as the EU posing a threat, damaging relations between the Union and Russia futher. The Role of Germany and France Germany in particular has been a frontrunner in the conflict itself. In retaliation for the actions of Russia, the German government managed to persuade businesses and firms to accept the financial sanctions over Russia. Over 6,000 firms did so. However, even though these sanctions are currently in place, Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany, had conducted several talks, and bilateral agreements (e.g. The Minsk Agreements) with the Russian President Vladimir Putin, alongside French President, Francois Hollande. Although both States’ national interests are not entirely aligned, both Germany and France have taken considerable steps to ensure the Minsk II agreement is enforced. Furthermore, both States have pressured Russia to make sure that the Donetsk People’s Republic, Luhansk People's Republic and the Ukrainian army to withdraw forces and arms to an equal distance from the conflict area with the aim of creation of a security zone, as proposed in Minsk II Agreement. Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMS): 1. What would be the appropriate EU response and future action plan regarding the matter? 2. How can the ceasefire, Minsk II, be securely enforced and what further implementations are needed? 3. What can be done by the EU to secure a stable gas market even in times of conflict? 4. Should the EU further continue placing economic sanctions on Russia, how severe should they be and how long should they last? 5. Regarding the bilateral economic bans between Russia and Ukraine, what is the EU’s and member state’s position to these bilateral bans? 6. What is the role of regional organizations and non­governmental organisations in easing tensions between Russia and Ukraine? And how would this affect the European Union?