the eudaimoinia problematic

The Eudaimonia Problematic: Aristotle’s or Aristotelian?

Ray ann Cagampang* & maximo gatela, o.p.

Humanhappinessorfulfillmenthasalwaysbeenperplexing.Sinceancienttimes,theproblemofhumanflourishinghasbewilderedpeasantsaswellastheorists,hopingtospellouttheintricatecomponentsthatunderliesuch situations. Some have held that virtuous action is necessary andsufficient for human fulfillment.1Others havemaintained that, importantthough virtue is to man’s happiness, it is not all there is to it; externalconditionssuchashealth,wealthandavoidanceofdisastersmattertoo.Stillothershavethoughtthatvirtueisgenerallyinimicaltohumanhappiness.2 *TheauthorisMentorinPhilosophyattheFacultyofPharmacy,UniversityofSantoTomas,Manila,Philippines. 1ThesufficiencyofvirtueforhappinessisassertedbySocratesandPlatoinApology, Charmides and Crito,seeTerenceIrwin,Plato’s Ethics(Oxford:OxfordUni-versityPress,1995),58-60.AnancientschoolofthoughtknownastheStoicsheldasimi-larpointofview,however,theygreatlyvaryintheirapplication.TheCynicAntisthenes(444-368B.C.),forinstance,insiststhatvirtuealoneyieldshappiness,buttakesanarrowpracticalviewofvirtue.TheCynicsandStoicsgomuchfurtherthananyoftheschoolsoftheWestinreducinghappinesstoself-disciplineandself-control,seeV.J.McGill,The Idea of Happiness(NewYork:FrederickA.PraegerPublishers,1967),51-54.

2J.P.Griffin, “Happiness,”Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed.EdwardCraig,vol.4(London:Routledge,1998),227.ThisviewofhappinessisaverredbytheEpicureanswho repudiatemilitary ambitions and the zest for honor and reputation, sohighlyesteemedbytherestoftheworld;buttheygiveallencouragementtodesiresforgentle,amiablepleasures,seeV.J.McGill,The Idea of Happiness,227.ThesameviewisimpliedbytheimmoralistThrasymachuswhosoughttodiscreditmoralitybyarguingthatitpreventstheachievementofhappiness,seetheRepublicinThe Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters,ed.EdithHamiltonandHuntingtonCairns(NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress,1989).

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RAYANNCAGAMPANG&MAXIMOGATELA,O.P.

A traditional Hellenistic conception of happiness and the goodperson finds the ideal life in a Homeric hero, displaying strength andbravery in battle, leadership in political life and receiving honor3 as hisreward.TheancientGreekscall thislifeaeudaimōn lifeoreudaimonia.4AlthoughHomer’s5idealsandthoseofthemenhewroteforwere,ofcourse,antiquatedby the timeofPlatoandAristotle,still thehonorable lifewasthatwhichwastobeenvied–themostchoiceworthy.However,thislifeisdangerous;successisprecarious,liabletothesortofreversaloffortunelike those of Priam.6 Hence, the Greek moralists wanted to encouragejusticeandconcernforothersasavirtuethatisnolessfineandadmirablethanbraveryandstrength.Thismayrequirerestraintonthesingle-mindedpursuitofsuccessandhonoraswellassacrificeforone’sowninterestforthesakeofotherpeople’sinterest.Tobejustwastobehighlydesirable;toberighteouswastobepraiseworthy.7

Withinthiscontext,Aristotlediscusseshistreatiseoneudaimonia.He tackles the issue of humanhappiness in his discussion regarding thefinalgoodofman thatbecamea central concept inhis ethical treatises.8

3Honor(timê),asHomerconceivesit, includes,primarily,otherpeople’sgoodopinion,andsecondarily,thematerialandsocialhonorsthatarebothcausesandeffectsofthisgoodopinion,seeTerenceIrwin,A History of Western Philosophy: Classical Thought(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998),8.

4Eudaimonialiterallymeans“havingagoodguardianspirit,”seeC.C.W.Taylor,“Eudaimonia,”Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,ed.EdwardCraig,vol.3(London:Routledge,1998),450.

5Homer,thenametraditionallyassignedastheauthoroftheIliadandOdyssey,thetwomajorepicsthathavesurvivedGreekantiquity.ForfurtherdiscussiononHomerandhisworks,see“Homer,”MicrosoftEncartaEncyclopedia2007,DVD(Redmond,WA:MicrosoftCorporation,2006).

6InHomer’sIliad,PriamwasthekingofTroyduringtheTrojanWar.AsayoungmanhefoughtwiththePhrygiansagainsttheAmazonsbutbythetimeoftheTrojanWar,hewastoooldtofight;anxiouslywatchinghisson,Hector,gruesomelyslainbyAchilles,andthepainfulsightofthefallofTroy.Consequently,hewaskilledbyAchilles’son,Ne-optolemus.See“Priam,”MicrosoftEncartaEncyclopedia2007,DVD.InBookIofNE,AristotlemadementionofPriamtoexemplifytheroleofvirtueandfortuneinthehappylife,seeNicomachean Ethics,I,10,1101a6.

7TerenceIrwin,introductiontoNicomachean Ethics,(Indiana:HackettPublish-ingCompany,Inc.,1985),xvii.

8TheethicaltreatisesofAristotleincludetheNicomachean Ethics (NE),theMag-na Moralia (MM)andtheEudemian Ethics (EE).ThisisadivisionclassifiedbySirDavidRossamongtheextantworksofAristotle;seeSirDavidRoss,Aristotle (London:MethuenandCo.,Ltd.,1923),14-15.Tofacilitatethediscussion,theaboveabbreviationswillbeusedinthesucceedingnotations.

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THEEUDAIMONIAPROBLEMATIC:...

Likehispredecessors,Aristotleexamines theordinarymoralopinionsofhistime;andtheproblemsarisingfromtheseopinionsinfluencedhisviewof the important questions to be discussed.Hewas born in 384B.C. atStagirainMacedoniabuthespentmostofhislifeasastudentandteacherofphilosophyinAthens.FortwentyyearshewasamemberofPlato’sAcademybutlaterhefoundedhisownphilosophicalschool,theLyceum,ofwhichthesite’scolonnadedwalk(peripatos)conferredonAristotleandhisgroupthename“ThePeripatetics.”Duringhis lifetime,hepublishedphilosophicaldialogues,ofwhichonlyfragmentsnowsurvive.The“AristotelianCorpus”isprobablyderived from the lectures thathegave in theLyceumandofwhich contains contributions tomanydifferentdisciplines including thatofethicsandthepracticallife.Asoneofthemostimportantphilosophersoftheancientworld,Aristotlewassimplyknownas“ThePhilosopher”tomanygenerationsofthinkers.

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle begins his discussion ofeudaimonia by postulating that “all knowledge and choice aims at somegood,”andthatpoliticalscience9aimsat“whatisthehighestofallgoodsachievable by action.”10 However, at the outset of his discussion in theNicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is quick to warn his readers that ethicscannotbeanexactscience.WhereasPlatopointedtoabodyofabsoluteandcertainknowledgeaboutthegoodandtheright,attainableatleastbythephilosophers,11Aristotleremarksthathisdiscussionwillbeadequate“ifithasasmuchclearnessasthesubject-matteradmitsof;”however,politicalscienceandethics,hesays,“investigatesactionsandgoodswithregardtowhichjudgmentsvaryandfluctuatesomuch.”12Wemustbecontentthen,hesaid,toindicatethetruthofsuchsubjectsroughlyandinoutline.13Hethencontinuestopurportthat:

Asfarasitsnamegoes,mostpeoplevirtuallyagree[aboutwhatthegoodis],sinceboththemanyandthecultivatedcallithappiness,9The supremepractical science– that towhichall others are subordinate and

ministerial–ispolitics.Ofthisscienceethicsisbutapart,andaccordinglyAristotleneverspeaksofethicsasaseparatescience,butonlyofthestudyofcharacterorourdiscussionsofcharacter.Aristotle’sethics,nodoubt,aresocial;andhispoliticsareethical.SeeSirDavidRoss,Aristotle,187-188.

10NE,I,4,1095a14-16.11SeeT.Irwin’sdiscussionofPlato’sRepublicV-VIIinPlato’s Ethics,262-280.12NE,I,3,1094b15.13NE, I,3,1094b18-22.

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andsupposethatlivingwellanddoingwellarethesameasbeinghappy.Buttheydisagreeaboutwhathappinessis,andthemanydonotgivethesameanswerasthewise.Forthemanythinkitissomethingobviousandevident,e.g.pleasure,wealthorhonor…and indeed the same person keeps changing hismind, since insicknesshethinksitishealth,inpovertywealth.…[Amongthewise,]however,someusedtothinkthatbesidesthesemanygoodsthereissomeothergoodthatissomethinginitself,andalsocausesallthesegoodstobegoods.14

Aristotle,thus,wantstoanswerthecriticismsaswellastomodifythe traditional virtues that make them irrelevant to a rational person’sconceptionofhumanhappinessoreudaimonia.15

“Thewordeudaimoniaandthecorrespondingadjectiveeudaimōnare derived from eu ‘good’, ‘well’ and daimon ‘spirit,’ giving the literalsense‘havingagoodguardianspirit,’hencebeingblessed,havingthelifeofonewhoenjoysdivinefavor.”16ItisimportanttotakeintoconsiderationthatAristotle did not attach any religious meaning to it. “InAristotle’susage it does not carry any such supernatural connotation, but it doesimplymeetinganobjectiveethicalstandard.”17“Topossesseudaimoniaistohavealifewhichisobjectivelydesirableandtherebytohaveachievedthe most worthwhile of conditions available to humans.”18 Althoughgenerally translated as “happiness,” Aristotle’s notion of eudaimoniaoverlapssubstantiallywith themodernconceptofhappiness.19 InBookI

14Aristotle,NE,trans.TerenceIrwin,I,4,1095a16-27.15T.Irwin,introductiontoNE,xvii.16C.C.W.Taylor,“Eudaimonia,”Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,vol.

3,450.17LeslieStevensonandDavidL.Haberman,“Aristotle:TheIdealofHumanFul-

fillment ,” inTen Theories of Human Nature,4th ed. (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004),96.

18C.C.W.Taylor,“Eudaimonia,”Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,vol.3,450.

19G.B.Kerferd,“Aristotle,”The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,ed.PaulEdwards,vol.1(USA:MacmillanPublishingCo.Inc.,1967),161.“Happiness”isamisleadingren-deringofeudaimoniaifweidentifyhappinesswithpleasureorwithastateofmind,e.g.eu-phoria.SeeT.Irwin,trans.NE,Glossary,407.Kraut,however,defendsthemostcommontranslation(happiness),forthefollowingreasons:itisnottrue,hemaintains,thatwhenwe,today,speakofhappiness,wemeanonlyastateofsubjectiveandlastingcontentment,anditisnottrueeither,headds,thatAristotle’snotionofeudaimoniadoesnotincludealso

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oftheNicomacheanEthics,Aristotlethenbrieflydefineseudaimoniaasthe“activityofthesoulinaccordancewithvirtue,andiftherearemorethanonevirtue,inaccordancewiththebestandmostcomplete,”and“inacompletelife.”20Moreover,Aristotle also adds that the activity is accompaniedbypleasureandthattheremustbeenoughexternalgoodsandgoodfortunetoenablemantoliveouthislifeinsomeleisureanddignity.21Hence,wecouldinferthateudaimonia,forAristotle,canaptlybetranslatedas“livinganddoingwell,”orsimply“humanfulfillment”or“humanflourishing”ratherthanthemisleadingtranslationof“happiness.”“Sotosaythatsomebodyiseudaemonistheverysamethingastosaythatheislivingalifeworthliving.”22

However,Aristotlewasnot that clear in proposingwhat really istheeudaimōnlifeorthefulfilledhumanlife.AlthoughAristotlewasclearenough to delineate that eudaimonia is the highest or the final good forwhichmanseeksforitsownsakeandneverforthesakeofanythingelse,23hisdiscussionon thekindof life thatmanshould lead to livehappily isambiguous. He lists down three widely accepted lives that men usuallylead: the life devoted to pleasure, the life of themanof affairs; and thelife of study and contemplation.24 Nonetheless, in the first book of theNicomacheanEthics,Aristotlemaintainsthateudaimoniaconsistsinalifeofactivityinaccordancewithvirtueorexcellence,25andifthereareseveralexcellences,theninconformitywiththebestandmostcomplete.26ButinBook10,heappearstodividethislifeintwo:alifeofcontemplativeactivity

asubjectivepsychologicalstate,inadditiontoanobjectivecondition.SeeRichardKraut,“TwoConceptionsofHappiness,”Social and Personal Ethics,ed.WilliamH.Shaw,3rded.(USA:WadsworthPublishingCompany,1999),225-231.Inanycase,itseemsthatAris-totle’snotionisrathercloseinmeaningtowhatwewouldcalltoday“humanfulfillment”or“self-fulfillment,”asintheexpression“tofindfulfillment,”whichisaccompaniedalsobyasenseofjoy,butwhichisnottheexperience,foralimitedperiodoftime,ofasensa-tionof intensecontentment.Nonetheless, theterms“eudaimonia,”“humanfulfillment,”“self-fulfillment,” “humanflourishing,” “self-actualization,” “self-realization,” and “hu-manhappiness”or“happiness”willbeusedinterchangeablyinthisstudy.

20NE,I,7,1098a17-18.21SeeRhetoric,I,5,1360b14-18.22J.O.Urmson,Aristotle’s Ethics(Oxford:BlackwellPublishersLtd.,1988),11.23SeeNE,I,7,1097b1-6.24SeeNE,1,5;EE,1,4.25Aristotle’sconceptionofvirtueiswiderthanmoralvirtue.Insomecases“excel-

lence”isthebestrenderingofaretē,seeT.Irwin,trans.NE,Glossary,431.26NE,I,7,1098a16-18.

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that he calls perfect or final happiness, and a “secondary degree” happylifeofethicallyvirtuousactivityinapoliticalcommunity.27Furthermore,amajorpartoftheNicomacheanEthicsimpliesthatgoodactionis–orisamajorelementin–man’sbestlife.ItisonlyinBook10,Chapters7and8thatpurelycontemplativeactivityissaidtobeperfecteudaimonia;andAristotledoesnot tell ushow to combineor relate these two ideas.TheEudemianEthicsexhibitsasimilarindecision,althoughitislesselaboratelyexpressed.This is evident in the last part of the treatisewhereAristotleasserts that thechoiceorgood thatwillmostproduce thecontemplationofgodisbestandthenobleststandard.However,theforegoingdiscussionstressesthatnobilityandgoodnessisperfectexcellence.28

With this indecision and ambiguity with regard to Aristotle’sdiscussionofeudaimonia,therehavebeentwoopposingviewsorconceptionsregarding the best life forman to lead – the eudaimōn life according toAristotle. In the compilation edited byAmelieOksenbergRorty entitledEssays on Aristotle’s Ethics, twoconspicuousarticleswrittenbyThomasNagelandJ.L.Ackrillbothentitled“AristotleonEudaimonia”epitomizetheseconceptions.Thepriordefendstheintellectualistordominantaccount29whilethelatterdealsonacomprehensiveorinclusiveaccountofhappiness.AccordingtoThomasNagel,“theNicomacheanEthicsexhibitsindecisionbetweentwoaccountsofeudaimonia–acomprehensiveandanintellectualistaccount.”30ThesamelineofthoughtisbeingendorsedbyW.F.R.Hardieinhisarticle“TheFinalGood inAristotle’sEthics.”Heclaims that“theconfusionbetweenanendwhichisfinalbecauseitisinclusiveandanendwhich isfinalbecause it is supremeordominantaccounts formuch thatcriticshaverightlyfoundunsatisfactoryinAristotle’saccountofthethoughtwhichleadstopracticaldecisions.”31However,inthearticle“TheProblemoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics:TheHumanGoodandtheBestLife

27NE,X,7-8,1177a12-1178a22.28SeeEE,VII,15.29Somecommentatorswouldclassify thisviewas“exclusivist,”seeLawrence

Nannery,“TheProblemoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics:TheHumanGoodandtheBestLifeforaMan,”International Philosophical Quarterly,vol.21(NewYork:FordhamUniversityPress,1981),278.

30ThomasNagel,“AristotleonEudaimonia,”inEssays on Aristotle’s Ethics,ed.AmelieOksenbergRorty(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1980),7.

31W.F.R.Hardie,“TheFinalGoodinAristotle’sEthics,”inAristotle: A Collec-tion of Critical Essays, ed.J.M.E.Moravcsik(London:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1967),302.

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forMan,”LawrenceNanneryfairlyconcludes that though the inclusivistviewsexpresssomeofthespiritofAristotle,neithertheexclusivist’snortheinclusivist’sconceptiontakesintoaccountAristotle’sidealsofahappylife.32Hence,with these two contending accounts of happiness, an ambivalenttension has been created with regard to the interpretation ofAristotle’sconceptofeudaimonia.SincetheoriaorcontemplationandvirtuousethicalactionarebothvaluableformsofactivityforAristotle,thedifficultywithregardtothebestpossiblecombinationofthefacultiesofmanstillremainsunresolvedthattheanswertothebestpossiblerecipeofhumanhappinessstillremainselusive.

Taking into consideration the unresolved problem regardingAristotle’saccountofthehappylifeintheNicomachean Ethicsaswellasinhistwootherethicaltreatises, thisstudy,therefore, isanexpositionofAristotle’sconceptofeudaimonia,aptlytranslatedashumanfulfillmentorhumanflourishing.ByindicatingthemainelementsofAristotle’sprofoundconsistencyonthesubjectofhumanhappinessfoundinhisethicaltreatises,this paper aims to provide a contribution to the debate with regard theinterpretationofAristotle’sconceptofeudaimonia–thatis,withregardtothebestlifeformantolead.ItwishestoelaboratefurthertheunderstandingoftheconceptbytakingintoconsiderationthedynamicandintegralaspectofhumanlivingassuggestedbyAristotleinhisethicaltreatises.

The Eudaimonia Problematic

Atthebeginningofchapter4ofBookIoftheNicomacheanEthics,AristotleresumesthetreatmentofthefinalgoodfromthepointreachedattheendofChapter2.Afterconsideringthatallknowledgeandchoiceaimsatsomegood,hepurportsthatmengenerallyagreethatthefinalandthemostdesirable end is eudaimonia; butwith regard towhat eudaimonia is, thegeneralrunofmenandpeopleofsuperiorrefinementvirtuallydisagree.33

Thus, tosay that thesupremelydesirableend iseudaimoniadoesnot settlewhat it is that is supremely desirable.Moreover, the solutions

32SeeLawrenceNannery,“TheProblemoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics:TheHumanGoodandtheBestLifeforMan,”International Philosophical Quarterly,vol.21,278-282.

33NE,I,4,1095a15ff.

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proposedbythedifferentcontendingviewsregardingAristotle’sconceptofeudaimoniahavenotsatisfactorilyresolvedtheissue.Hence,theprincipalquestion is thus stated: What could be a resolution with regard to theinterpretationofAristotle’sconceptofeudaimonia?

Tofurtherelucidate,wewillexaminethecontendingviewsregardingtheinterpretationofAristotle’saccountofeudaimonia,theformalconditionspostulatedand their implications,and the thoughtelementssuggestedbyhimasexpressedinhisethicalpremises.

There have been various contending propositions regardingAristotle’saccountofeudaimonia.Somewouldargue thateudaimonia isrealizedintheactivityofthemostdivinepartofman;whileotherswouldclaim that it essentially involves not just theoretical contemplation butincludes all the activities of human life done in excellence and virtue.However,thedebateremainsunresolved.

ToofferacontributiononthedebateregardingAristotle’sconceptionoftheeudaimonlife,thepresentstudyproposesthefollowingstatement:AdynamicandintegralunderstandingofAristotle’saccountofaeudaimōnlifecouldbearesolutiontotheproblemontheinterpretationofAristotle’sconceptofeudaimonia.Thisisthemainissuethispaperwishestoexpound.Andtosubstantiatethisclaim,wewillpursuethematteraccordingtothesub-problemswehaveenumeratedabove.

Exploring the Texts

We will involve ourselves with the interpretation of Aristotle’sconceptofeudaimoniabasedonhisethicaltreatises.ThisdoesnothowevermeanthatwewillcompareAristotle’sunderstandingofeudaimoniafromonetreatisetoanother,asforinstance,thatoftheNicomachean EthicsfromtheEudemian Ethics; the treatises are taken as a whole comprehensiveaccountofAristotle’seudaimonia.Hence,theproblemontheauthorshipofthesaidtreatisesisnotwithinthescopeofthisstudy.Moreover,wedonotendeavortogiveafullaccountoftherelationshipbetweenthePhilosopher’saccountofhumanhappinesswithhisHellenisticpredecessorsaswell assubsequentphilosophers;nordowepretendtoresolvethecontendingviews

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onAristotle’seudaimonia.Also,theargumentswithregardtoactionandvirtue,akrasia(incontinence)andpleasureaswellasfriendshipandtheoria(contemplation)whicharekeythemes inAristotle’sethicsarewithin therangeofour scope;however, theywillnot tobe treated individuallybutonlyinrelationtothediscussiononeudaimonia.

Furthermore, this paper primarily covers Aristotle’s textual dataon ethics, namely, the Nicomachean Ethics, the Magna Moralia andthe Eudemian Ethics. Although some topics in the Politics, Rhetoric,Metaphysics andOn the Soul are of significant value to his concept ofeudaimonia and are sometimesquotedor cited in this paper, thepresentstudywillnotengagethesetreatisesbeyondourobjectives.Ontheotherhand, secondary sources such as commentaries and explanatory notesfrom authoritativeAristotelian commentators and authors, including thatofSt.Thomas’Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethicsarereviewedandanalyzedtoformthebackgroundofthestudyaswellastoprovidecriticalsupporttoissuesthatwillbeexpoundedanddefendedfromtheanalysisoftheprimarysources.

SincethiswriterhasinadequateknowledgeofGreeklanguage,thepresentstudyislimitedtoarelianceontheEnglishtranslationsofAristotle’sethical treatises– theNicomachean Ethics, theEudemian Ethics and theMagna Moralia – onwhich his treatment of the concept of eudaimoniaare primarily concentrated. Nonetheless, the English translations thatare being used in this paper are authoritative translations of eminentAristoteliantranslatorsandscholars,suchforinstance:W.D.Ross,St.G.Stock,J.Solomon,B.JowettandTerenceIrwin.Sometranslationscontainextendedandcriticalnotesregardingtheoriginal texts;other translationshave dividedAristotle’s longer andmore complex sentences, andmakesexplicit thepoints thatheconveyedbyhintsandallusions.Furthermore,thesetranslationsarecross-referredandsupplementedbyvitalsecondarysourcesonthetopic.

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Aristotle’s Outline In The Ethics34 And The Two Accounts Of Eudaimonia

Time and againAristotle’s inquiry starts with a review of whathis predecessors had to sayon the subject to be discussed.Thus, beforepresenting Aristotle’s outline discussion of eudaimonia in his ethicaltreatises,primarily,intheNicomachean Ethics,andbeforeconsideringthemajorcontendingviewsheldbymodernAristotelianscholarswithregardtothenatureofeudaimoniainhisEthics,itisbutnoteworthytotakeintoconsideration the conventional Greek beliefs of eudaimonia as well asthoseheldbyancientGreekthinkerswhobothhadinfluencedAristotle’sconception of human happiness. Hence, this chapterwill briefly discussat the outset the traditionalGreek conceptions of eudaimonia aswell asthe pre-Aristotelian development of its meaning brought about by themoraltheoriesofGreekphilosophers,beforepresentingAristotle’soutlinediscussion.These two sections aim toprovide thenecessary informationandpremisesthatwouldserveasavitalbackgroundinunderstandingthepresentinquiry.Nonetheless,theargumentspositedwillbeexposedbytherespectiveaccountsaswellasthelimitationandobjectionsposedtotheseaccounts.Thisdiscussionwillclarifyandillustratefurthertheunresolvedtension between these two conceptions ofAristotle’s eudaimonia; thus,vindicatingthepresentproblem.

34TheAristotelianEthicswouldspecificallyincludethetwoethicaltreatisesofAristotle:theNicomachean EthicsandtheEudemian Ethics;theMagna Moraliaissimplyacollectionofexcerptsfromthetwootherworks.ForfurtherdiscussionontherelationshipbetweenthetwoEthics,seeWernerJaeger,Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development,229-258.TheoldestcatalogueofAristotle’sworks(thatofDiogenesLaer-tius)refersonlytooneEthics,towhichassignsfivebooks;thiscanonlybetheEudemian Ethicswithoutthedoubtfulbooks.ThenextoldestcataloguecontainsonlyoneEthics,towhichitassignstenbooks;thiscanonlybetheNicomachean EthicsorTa Ethikawiththedoubtfulbooks.SeeD.Ross,Aristotle,15,187-234;seealsoAnthonyKenny,The Aristo-telian Ethics: A Study of the Relationship between the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1978),chapters8-9.TheNicomachean Ethicsisalsooftencalled“Aristotle’sEthics,”(seeT.Irwin,introductiontoNE,xxi);however,inthispresentwork,theresearcherwillinclude,tosomeextent,theMagna MoraliaamongtheEthics,thoughspecialreferencearegivenprimarilytoNEandsecondarilytoEE.

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The Term

Theetymologicalbackgroundofthetermευδαιμονία(eudaimonia),one of a constellation of closely related terms that includes eutychia(lucky), olbios (favored), and makarios35 (blessed; happy; blissful). Thewordευδαιμονία (eudaimonia)and thecorrespondingadjectiveευδαιμον(eudaimon)arederivedfromtheprefixεύ(eu)“good,well”andthenounδαίμον (daimōn) “spirit,minor deity,” giving the literal sense “having agood guardian spirit,” hence being blessed, having the life of one whoenjoysdivinefavor.36Itisbasicallythepossessionofagooddaimōn,agoodguardianspirit,whichisusedbyextensiontomeanone’slotorfortune.Incolloquial terms, tobeeudaimonwas tobe lucky, for inaworld fraughtwith constant upheaval, uncertainty and privation, to have a good spiritworkingonone’sbehalfwastheultimatemarkofgoodfortune.“Evenmoreitwasamarkofdivinefavor,forthegods,itwasbelieved,workedthroughthedaimones,emissariesandconductorsoftheirwill…Tofallfromdivinefavor–ortofallundertheinfluenceofanevilspirit–wastobedysdaimonorkakodaimon–‘unhappy’(dys/kako=bad).”37Inthepre-Socraticworld,thiswasthekeytohappiness.Hence,inpractice,ευδαιμον(eudaimon)wastheequivalentof‘lucky;’andevenifsomepowerwerethoughtresponsiblefortheluck,whetherTuchē38orthegods,itwastoocapricioustoservethepurposesof amoralphilosopher, or anyone seekingwhatgoodswere inhispower:luck,assuch,isnotobtainablebyanyeffortofman.39Thetermeudaimonia and its corresponding adjective, therefore, originally meant“watchedoverbyagoodgenius,”but inordinaryGreekusage thewordmeansjustgoodfortune,oftenwithspecialreferencetoexternalprosperity.

35Makarios is especially closely associatedwith the life of the gods (seeEE, 1215a10;NE,1178b9),inwhichhappinessisentirelystableandimmunetothelimitationsofthehumancondition.Forfurtherexplanation,seealsoT.Irwin,trans.NE,Glossary,388.

36Taylor,“Eudaimonia,”Routledge,450.37DarrinM.McMahon,“FromtheHappinessofVirtuetotheVirtueofHappi-

ness:400B.C.-A.D.1780,”Daedalus,ed.StevenMarcus,vol.133,no.2(USA:AmericanAcademyofArtsandSciences,2004),7.

38Tuchē isgenerally translatedas“fortune”or“fate.”In theNE, tuchē isusedmorebroadlyasamatteroffortunethatbenefitsasubjectoutsidehiscontrol.However,itisnotonlyinvolvedineventsentirelyuncontrolledbyasubjectbutalsoinprocessesinitiatedbythesubjectinwhichsomethingoutsidehiscontrolisneededforsuccess.Forfurtherdiscussion,seeT.Irwin,trans.NE,Glossary,402.

39StephenR.L.Clark,Aristotle’s Man,146.

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The Evolution of Meaning till Plato

TheGreekculturewasacultureofexcellence,inthesensethatyoungmenwerewidelyencouragedtocompetewithoneanotherinmanyareasof life, including, of course, athletic, intellectual and aesthetic activity.40Furthermore, it is also a fundamental principle in ancient Greek ethics,sharedbynearly all parties, thatwhatpeoplewantmostof all is to livewell,toleadahappylife.Thisgoesbythenameeudaimonia.Nowonder,eudaimoniaisoftenidentifiedwith“livingwell”and“faringwell.”41

AtraditionalconceptionofeudaimoniaandthegoodpersonfindstheideallifeinaHomerichero,42displayingstrengthandbraveryinbattle,leadershipinpoliticallifeandreceivinghonorashisreward.Heisarulerandiswealthy,beautiful,excellentatfighting,excellentatcounsel,excellentinleadership,brave,strong,generoustofriendsandharshtoenemies,reverenttothegods,awareofhisworthandofhispositioninsociety,andanxioustomaintainandimproveit.Inpopularusagethetermhasstrongconnotationofmaterialprosperity,regardedasoneofthesignalmarksofdivinefavor.However,thiskindoflifeisdangerous;successisuncertain,liabletothesortofreversaloffortune.Furthermore,therapidchangeinGreeksocietyintheArchaicandClassicalperiodscalledfornewconceptionsoftheidealman and the ideal human life.43At the same timeGreekmoralistswanttoencouragejusticeandconcernforothersasavirtuethatisnolessfineandadmirable thanbravery and strength.44Thismay require restraintonthesingle-mindedpursuitofsuccessandhonor,andsacrificeofone’sown

40RogerCrisp,“Aristotle:EthicsandPolitics,”Routledge History of Philosophy: From Aristotle to Augustine,ed.DavidFurley,vol.2(London:RoutledgeTaylorandFran-cisGroup,1999),110.

41SeeNE,I,4,1095a19;MM,I,3,1184b7-9;EE,II,1,1219b1-5.42TheHomericmoraloutlookoftheideallifeismosteasilyunderstoodfromits

conceptionoftheidealpersonascharacterizedbytheheroesofapastage,likeforinstanceAchillesandOdysseus.ThemostadmiredHomericmanwiththehighestvirtuesdisplaysacertainnarrowrangeofexcellencessuitableforanaristocratandawarrior,seeT.Irwin,A History of Western Philosophy: Classical Thought,6-19.

43RichardD.McKirahan,Jr.,Philosophy Before Socrates(Indianapolis:HackettPublishingCompany,Inc.,1994),358.Theperiodfrom750to480B.C.traditionallyiscalledtheArchaicAgebecauseitwasconsideredarchaicorold-fashioned,incomparisonwiththeClassicalPeriod(480-323B.C.).SeeThomasR.Martin,“AncientGreece,”Mi-crosoft Encarta 2007.

44T.Irwin,introductiontoNE,xvii

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interestsforthesakeofother’sinterests.Whenappealstodivinerewardsandpunishmentsseemedunconvincing,moralistslookedforsomereasonto persuade someone concerned with his own happiness to be just andvirtuous.45 Greek moral philosophers, then, were concerned to map therelationsofeudaimoniaandvirtue.

Among these thinkers46 who tackled the relationship betweenhappinessandvirtueisPythagoras.47Pythagorastaughttheimmortalityandtransmigrationofthesoulandrecommendedawayoflifeinwhichthroughasceticpractices,dietaryrulesandethicalconduct,thesoulispurifiedandis brought into harmony with the surrounding universe.48 “The practiceof silence, the influenceofmusicand the studyofmathematicswerealllookedonasvaluableaidsintendingthesoul.”49Furthermore,Pythagoreanphilosophers,drawingonmusicaltheoriesthatmaygobacktoPythagoras,expressed the harmony of the universe in terms of numerical relationswhichbecameforthemtheultimateprincipleofallproportionandorderintheuniverse.Evenethicalprincipleswereassignedtodefinitenumbers.ThusAristotlecomments,“Pythagorasfirstattemptedtospeakaboutvirtue,butnotsuccessfully;forbyreducingthevirtuestonumbershesubmittedthevirtuestoatreatmentwhichwasnotpropertothem.Forjusticeisnotasquarenumber.”50

45Ibid.46Thesucceedingpre-Aristotelianschoolsofthoughtthatwillbediscussedinthis

paperarethoseofPythagoras,SocratesandPlato.TheseschoolsareexplicitlydiscussedbyAristotleintheopeningchapteroftheMagna Moralia;seeMM,I,1.

47PythagorasofSamos(c.570-497B.C)wasanearlyGreeksageandreligiousinnovator.Hedevelopedoneof theearliestmoralphilosophiesfromtheGreekmysteryreligionOrphism.Believing that the intellectualnature issuperior to thesensualnatureandthatthebestlifeisonedevotedtomentaldiscipline,hefoundedasemireligiousorderwithrulesemphasizingsimplicityinspeech,dress,andfood.ForageneraldiscussiononPythagorasandPythagoreanism,seeHermannS.Schibli,“Pythagoras,”Routledge Ency-clopedia of Philosophy,vol.7,855-860.Seealso“Ethics,”Microsoft Encarta2007.

48H.S.Schibli,“Pythagoras,”855.49FrederickCopleston,S.J.,A History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome,vol.1,

bk.1(NewYork:Doubleday,1962),31.50MM,I,1,1182a11-14.

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AfterhimcameSocrates,51whospokebetterandfurtheraboutthesubject.52Socratesclaims that ifwewant to livewell andhappily, asheassumedweallwanttodomorethanwewantanythingelse,wemustplacethehighestpriorityonthecareofoursouls.Thatmeanswemustaboveallwanttoacquirethevirtues,sincetheyperfectoursoulsandenablethemtodirectourlivesforthebetter.Ifonlywecouldknowwhateachvirtueis,wecouldthenmakeanefforttoobtainthem.53Thishastheimplication,asradicalthenasnow,thatthepersonwhoperformsaviciousactiondoessooutofignorance.Hebelievedthatallviceistheresultofignorance,andthatnopersoniswillinglybad;correspondingly,virtueisknowledgeandthosewhoknowtherightwillactrightly.Thus,forSocrates,knowledge,virtueandeudaimoniawereverycloselyrelated,and,indeed,wereputdramaticallyintopractice.GiventhechancetoescapethedeathpenaltyimposeduponhimbythecityofAthens,hechose toremain,believingvirtue tobe themostpreciouspossessionamancanhave.54However,althoughhispositionwithregardtotheidealhumanlifewastenable,evenhewasnotsuccessful.

Forheusedtomakethevirtuessciences,andthisisimpossible.Forthesciencesallinvolvereasonandreasonistobefoundintheintellectualpartofthesoul.Sothatallthevirtues,accordingtohim,aretobefoundintherationalpartofthesoul.Theresultisthatinmakingthevirtuessciencesheisdoingawaywiththeirrationalpartofthesoulandistherebydoingawayalsobothwithpassionandmoralcharacter;sothathehasnotbeensuccessfulinthisrespectinhistreatmentofthevirtues.55

51Socrates(469-399BC)isanAthenianGreekofthesecondhalfofthefifthcen-turyB.C.whowrotenophilosophicalworksbutwasuniquelyinfluentialinthelaterhistoryofphilosophy.MostofwhatweknowofSocratesisthroughthedepictionofhiminPlato’sdialogues.Hisphilosophicalinterestswererestrictedtoethicsandtheconductoflife,top-icswhichthereafterbecamecentraltophilosophy.MostlaterGreekschoolsofmoralphi-losophywerederivedfromtheteachingsofSocrates.Foursuchschoolsoriginatedamonghisimmediatedisciples:theCynics,theCyrenaics,theMegarians,andthePlatonists.ForageneraldiscussiononSocrates,seeJohnM.Cooper,“Socrates,”Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,vol.7,8-25.AdetaileddiscussionontherelationofvirtueandhappinesscanbeperusedinTerenceIrwin,Plato’s Ethics,52-63;seealsoGregoryVlastos,Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991),200-232.

52MM,I,1,1182a15.53J.M.Cooper,“Socrates,”8.54SeePlato,CritoinThe Collected Dialogues of Plato,27-39.55MM,I,1,1182a16-23.

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Plato56 continued the Socratic tradition, identifying dikaiosune(usually translated as “justice,” though the term covers morality morebroadly)withanorderingofthepartsofthesoulinwhichreasongovernsdesireandtheemotions.57AccordingtoPlato,goodisanessentialelementofreality.InhisDialogues,hemaintainsthathumanvirtueliesinthefitnessof a person to perform that person’s proper function in the world. Thehumansoulhasthreeelements—intellect,will,andemotion—eachofwhichpossessesaspecificvirtueinthegoodpersonandperformsaspecificrole.Thevirtueof intellect iswisdom,orknowledgeof theendsof life;thatofthewilliscourage,thecapacitytoact;andthatoftheemotionsistemperance,orself-control.Theultimatevirtue,justice,istheharmoniousrelationofall theothers, eachpartof the souldoing its appropriate taskandkeepingitsproperplace.58Platomaintainsthattheintellectshouldbesovereign,thewillsecond,andtheemotionssubjecttointellectandwill.Hence, thejustperson,whoselife isorderedinthisway, is thereforethegoodandeudaimonperson.ForbothSocratesandPlato,then,virtuewasan extremely necessary component in human happiness. However, forPlato,eudaimonia, isnotsimplyacquired throughknowledge, it requirestheproperorderingofthesoul:therationalpartmustgoverntheirrationalpart,therebycorrectlyleadingalldesiresandactionstoeudaimoniaandtheprincipalconstituentofeudaimonia,virtue.“Butafterthishewentastray.Forhemixedupvirtuewith the treatmentof thegood,whichcannotberight,notbeingappropriate.For inspeakingabout the truthof thingsheoughtnottohavediscourseduponvirtue;forthereisnothingcommontothetwo.”59

56Plato(427-347B.C.)wasanAthenianGreekofaristocraticfamily,activeasaphilosopherinthefirstofthefourthcenturyB.C.HewasadevotedfollowerofSocrates,ashiswritingsmakeabundantlyplain.Nearlyallarephilosophicaldialogues–oftenworksofdazzling literarysophistication– inwhichSocrates takescenter stage.ForageneralintroductiontoPlato,seeMalcolmSchofield,“Plato,”Routledge Encyclopedia of Philoso-phy,vol.6,399ff.AthoroughdiscussiononPlato’sconceptofvirtueandhappinesscanbeexaminedinT.Irwin,Plato’s Moral Theory;seealso,T.Irwin,Plato’s Ethics.

57GilbertRyle,“Plato,”Encyclopedia of Philosophy,vol.5&6,329-331.58Ibid.,330.59MM,I,1,1182a25-29.AristotlewasalludingPlato’sconceptoftheUniversal

IdeaofGood.

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Aristotle60 is most plausibly seen as working within the sametradition,askingthesamesortsofquestionsandemployingthesamesortsofconcepts,thoughhisaccountisofcourseinformedbythephilosophicalapparatus he developed in other areas of his own thought. Hewants toanswer thecriticismof the traditionalvirtues thatmakes them irrelevantto a person’s conceptionof happiness.Hedoes not retain the traditionalviewsunmodified;butbravery,restraintofappetites,concernforhonorandother-regardingaimsarealldefendedaspartsofeudaimonia.61Havingthusconsideredthepopularopinionsaswellasthoseofthecultivatedperson,Aristotleproceedstogiveanaccountofhisownideaofeudaimonia.

Happiness as the Highest Good and End of Human Life

Aristotle introduces his own theorywith a teleological62 view onthe good.He says that every pursuit, art, science, action or choice aimsatsomegood.63Thus,thegoodisanend–“thatatwhichallthingsaim.”Butthereisadifferenceintheendsaimedat:insomecases,theendisanactivity;inothercases,theendissomeproductbeyondtheactivity.Incaseswheretheendliesbeyondtheactivity,theproductisnaturallybetterthantheactivity.64

Now, all other goods are desired for the sake of something else.Evenhonor,pleasure,reason,andeveryvirtue,Aristotlesays,arechosen

60Aristotle(384-322)ofStagiraisoneofthetwomostimportantphilosophersoftheancientworld.HewasnotanAthenian,buthespentmostofhislifeasastudentandteacherofphilosophyinAthens.FortwentyyearshewasamemberofPlato’sAcademy;laterhesetuphisownphilosophicalschool,theLyceum.Duringhislifetimehepublishedphilosophicaldialogues,ofwhichonlyfragmentsnowsurvive.The“Aristoteliancorpus”isprobablyderivedfromthelecturesthathegaveintheLyceum.ForageneraloverviewonAristotleandhisphilosophy,seeT.H.Irwin,“Aristotle,”Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,vol.1,414-432.

61T.Irwin,introductiontoNE,xvii.62Teleology (Greek telos, “end”; logos, “discourse”), inphilosophy, is thesci-

enceordoctrinethatattemptstoexplaintheuniverseintermsofendsorfinalcauses.InAristotelianphilosophy,theexplanationof,orjustificationfor,aphenomenonorprocessistobefoundnotonlyintheimmediatepurposeorcause,butalsointhe“finalcause”–thereasonforwhichthephenomenonexistsorwascreated.Forageneraldiscussiononteleol-ogy,see“Teleology,”Microsoft Encarta 2007.

63NE,I,1,1094a1-2;I,4,1095a13.64NE,I,1,1094a5.

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forthesakeofsomethingelseforthoughwewouldchoosethemfortheirownsake,eveniftheydidnotserveanyotherend,yet“wechoosethemalsoforthesakeofhappiness,judgingthatthroughthemweshallbehappy.”65AristotleherepartswaywithPlatoandtheStoics,whosaythatvirtueisthehighestgood;andalsopartswaywiththehedonistswhosaythatpleasureisthehighestgood.66Virtueandpleasurearebothgoodinthemselves.Theylackhowever, the furtherqualification– thatofnotbeingchosen for thesakeofanythingelse.Thereisagoodhigherthanvirtueandhigherthanpleasure,becausethesearechosenforit,whileitisneverchosenforthem.Menagree,Aristotlesays,thatthishighestgoodiseudaimonia,happiness.“Everyindividualmanandallmenincommonaimatcertainendwhichdetermineswhattheychooseandwhattheyavoid.Thisend,tosumitupbriefly,ishappinessanditsconstituents.”67Thuseverymanandgroupofmenwants tobehappy, seekshappiness continuously, andbelieves theyoughtto.

Aristotledoesnot, of course, claim that suchanargumentwouldprovethatthereisonlyonesuperlativegood.Maybethereareseveralgoodsthataredesiredforthemselvesbutnotforthesakeofanythingelse.Aristotleiscautiousinapproachingthisquestion.Hestatesthat“ifthereismorethanone,themostfinalwillbetheoneweareseeking.”68Heobviouslybelievesthatthereisonlyonefinalend,andhedoesgiveareasonforholdingthisview, namely: all the candidates for the status of highest good (honor,pleasure,reasonandvirtues)excepthappinessisnotchosen,eveninpart,assomethinginstrumentaltoanotherend.69

The Definition of Happiness

Wehaveseenthatthehighestorfinalgoodmustbe“desiredforitsownsake,andnever for thesakeofanythingelse.”Aristotleasserts that

65NE,I,7,1097b1-6.66V.J.McGill,The Idea of Happiness, 13.67Rhetoric,I,5,1360b4-5.68NE,I,7,1097a28-30.69Whethertheexistenceofasinglehighestgoodcanbeprovenornot,ithasusu-

allybeenassertedortakenforgrantedinthehistoryofWesternphilosophy;andhoweverdifferently this highest goodmay be described, it is almost always called “happiness,”orthenearequivalentinotherlanguages,thoughsometimes“welfare,”“well-being,”or“felicity,”ortheirequivalents,arepreferred.SeeV.J.McGill,The Idea of Happiness,14.

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it ishappiness, andhappiness alone, thatmeets this requirement.Honor,pleasureandreasonaredesiredfortheirownsake,buttheyarealsodesiredforthesakeofotherthings;whereaswedesirehappinessforitsownsakeonly.Nowhefurtherclarifieshisaccountofeudaimoniaasthechiefgoodby considering the function ofman.ToAristotle’smind, all things havespecificfunctionsoractivities,andthe“good”andthe“well”resideintheperformanceof thesespecificfunctionsoractivities.Thefluteplayer,forinstance,hasafunctiondifferentfromthatofthesculptor,oranyexpertforthatmatter.Man,too,hasafunction.Justastheeye,hand,footandeveryothermemberof thebodyhave functions,manalsohasa functionapartfromallthese;itisafunctionpeculiartomanasman.Todeterminewhatthisfunctionis,weneedtoknowthenatureandpowersofthesoul.70

Aristotlethinksthatthesoulischaracterizedbycertainpowersthatenableittoperformcertainactivities;71andthatitiscomposedoftwoparts–rationalandirrational.Hethennowaskswhichofthefunctionsofthesoulismostpeculiar toman.Thisfunctioncannotbethelifeofnutritionandgrowthwhichhealsoshareswiththeplants,norisitthelifeofperceptionwhich man shares with other animals. “There remains, then, an activelifeof theelement thathasa rationalprinciple;…andas this toocanbetakenintwoways,wemuststatethatlifeinthesenseofactivityiswhatwemean;for thisseemstobe themorepropersenseof the term.”72Thefunctionpeculiartoman,therefore,forAristotle,is“anactivityofthesoulin accordancewith, or notwithout, rational principle,”73 i.e., an activityregulatedbyreason.Thefunction,then,ofthegoodmanisthegood,nobleandexcellentperformanceoftheactivitiesregulatedbyreason.

70Forourpurposeinthispaper,weneedonlytopointoutsomeessentialfactsconcerningman’ssoul.Thetwobroaddivisionsinthehumansoularetheirrationalandtherational;theformerincludesthevegetative,overwhichreasonhasnodirectcontrol,andtheappetitive,partiallyamenabletorationalguidance.Therationalpartincludesthecalculativeandscientificfunctions.Correspondingtoeachofthesearevariouskindsofexcellencerangedunderthetwomaintypes,moralandintellectualvirtues.SeeAristotle,On the Soul,II,1,412a1ff;seealsoNE,I,13,1102a15ff.Foraconciseexplanationonthismatter, seeMasterpieces of World Philosophy: In Summary Form, ed.FrankN.Magill(NewYork:HarperandRowPublishers,1961),147-152;157-162.

71On the Soul,II,2,413b11.72NE,I,7,1098a1ff.73NE,I,7,1098a8

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Thus forAristotle, eudaimonia, brieflydefined, is “activity of the soul in accordance with excellence[virtue],and if there are more than one excellence[virtue],in accordance with the best and most complete”and“in a complete life.Neitheroneswallowmakeasummer,nordoesoneday;andsotoo,oneday,orashorttime,doesnotmakeamanblessedandhappy.”74Aristotlealsoadds that theactivity isaccompaniedbypleasure,and thattheremustbeenoughexternalgoodsandgoodfortunetoenableamantoliveouthislifeinsomeleisureanddignity.75Amanishappy,then,ifhecontinuestofunctionwellintermsofnaturalteleologyuptotheendofhislife,providedhe is furnishedwithsufficientexternalgoodsanddoesnotsuffergreatmisfortunes.

Thisdefinitionofhappinessas“activityofthesoulinaccordancewithvirtue”isrepeatedseveraltimesinBook1oftheNicomachean Ethics,and occurs also inMagna Moralia andEudemian Ethics.76However, inBookXoftheNicomachean Ethics,theformulaundergoesachange:

Ifhappinessisactivityinaccordancewithvirtue,itisreasonablethatitshouldbeinaccordancewiththehighestvirtue;andthiswillbethatofthebestthinginus.Whetheritbereasonorsomethingelsethatisthiselementwhichisthoughttobeournaturalrulerandguideandtotakethoughtofitthingsnobleanddivine,whetheritbeitselfalsodivineoronlythemostdivineelementinus,theactivityofthisinaccordancewithitspropervirtuewillbeperfecthappiness. That this activity is contemplative we have alreadysaid.77

InBookX,Aristotlemightseemtobesayingthatitiscontemplationalonethatyieldseudaimonia; this ishowheisofteninterpreted.Wefindhimarguingthat,sincetheoreticreasonisthemostdistinctivepartofthehumansoul,itisalsothehighestandbest,anditspropervirtuewillbethecrownofhumanlife.Moreover,“wethinkhappinesshaspleasuremingledwithit,buttheactivityofphilosophicwisdomisadmittedlythepleasantest

74NE,I,7,1098a17-19;seeMM,I,4,1184b22-1185a1ff;EE,II,1,1219a28-39.Thebracketedword“virtue”andtheboldemphasisonthedefinitionisbytheresearcher.

75NE,I,8,1099a31ff.76SeeMM,I,4,1184b35ff;EE,II,1,1219a28-39.77Aristotle,NE,inThe Works of Aristotle,trans.W.D.Ross,X,7,1177a11-17.

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of virtuous activities.”78 Philosophic activity, or contemplation, is alsomoreself-sufficientthantheexerciseofthemoralvirtues.Itistruethatthephilosopher,likeothermen,musthavefood,shelter,andthelike,butoncetheserequirementsareassured,heisindependentofothermen.

Happiness and Virtue

Sincehappinessisactivityofthesoulexpressingcompletevirtue,Aristotle examines virtue for he supposes that it may help the study ofhappinessbetter.79Aristotlerecognizestwodifferentkindsofvirtues–theintellectualandmoralvirtues.Theformerowesitsoriginanddevelopmenttoteaching.Forthisreason,theyacquireexperienceandtime.Themoralvirtues,ontheirpart,arenotinnateinus;therearenospecialexcellencesendowed at birth, but althoughmoral virtues are not implanted in us bynature,theyarenotopposedtonature;forweareequippedwiththeabilitytoacquireand receive them.Thiscapability isbrought toperfectionandfulfillmentbyhabit,i.e.,byrepeatedlydoingsomethingwell.Webecomejustbydoingjustacts,temperatebyexercisingself-control,andcourageousbyperformingactsofcourage.80Thus,forAristotle,moralvirtuescomeasaresultofhabit,i.e.,byrepeatedlyactingwell;inthesamemanner,vicesareacquiredbyrepeatedlyactingbadly.

Furthermore, Aristotle contends that virtue or excellence givesperfection to the thing itselfofwhich it is theexcellenceandcauses thethingtoperformitsfunctionwell.81Forexample,theexcellenceoftheeyemakesboth theeyeand its functiongood.Likewise, thevirtueofamanwillbe thestateofcharacterwhichmakeshimgoodandenableshim todohisworkwell.More specifically,Aristotle says that virtue lies in themean.Hepurportsthat“inanythingthatiscontinuousanddivisible,itispossibletotakemore,lessorequalamountandthat,eitherintermsofthethingitselforrelativelytous.”82Here,“equal”istheintermediatebetweenexcess and defect. By the intermediate of the thing itself is meant that

78Ibid.,X,7,1177a24-25.79NE,I,13,1102a5ff.ForAristotle’sotherdiscussionofvirtue,seeMM,1185b13-

1204a18; EE,1220a13-1234b13.80NE,II,1,1103a19ff.81NE,II,6,1106a16-20.82NE,II,6,1106a26-28.

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whichisequidistantfromeachoftheextremes;thisisthe“absolutemean”whichisthesameforall.However,the“meanforus”cannotbedeterminedin thisway.Themean is relative toaman’snature,position,wealthandcircumstances–thatwhichissuperfluousanddeficient.Anaturallytimidmanandanaturallyrashoneshouldbothaimatthemeanofcourage,butneednotreachthesamepointofexcellence;oneman’svirtue,sinceitmustbewithinhispower,cannotandneednotbethesameasanother’s.83

To Aristotle, then, virtue or excellence is a state of characterconcernedwithchoice,lyinginthemean,i.e.,themeanrelativetous,thisbeing determined by a rational principle and by that principle bywhichthemanofpracticalwisdomwoulddetermineit.Itisameanbetweentwovices,thatwhichdependsonexcessandthatwhichdependsondefect;andagain it is amean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceedwhatisrightinbothpassionsandactions,whileexcellencebothfindsandchoosesthatwhichisintermediate.Hence,asfarasitssubstanceandtheaccountstatingitsessenceareconcerned,itisamean;butasfarasthebestandthegoodareconcerned,itisanextremity.84

Itisimportanttobearinmindthat,forAristotle,“wheretherearethingstobedonetheendisnottosurveyandrecognizethevariousthings,butrathertodothem;withregardtoexcellence,then,itisnotenoughtoknow,butwemusttrytohaveanduseit,ortryanyotherwaytheremaybeofbecominggood.”85Wearenotinquiringinordertoknowwhatexcellenceorvirtueis,butinordertobecomeexcellentandvirtuous.

Happiness and Pleasure86

Aristotledisavowsboththeideasofthosewhoheldthatnopleasureisgoodeitherinitselforcoincidentally,thatsomepleasuresaregoodbutmostarebadandthatevenifallpleasuresweregood,pleasurecouldnot

83NE,II,6,1106a30-1106b35.84NE,II,6,1107a1-6.85NE,X,9,1179b1-4.86Aristotlediscussespleasure in twoseparateparts in theNicomachean Ethics

(Book7,Chapters11-14andBook10,Chapters1-5),butbothareintegratedhereforclar-itysake.

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bethesupremegood.87ThemaininteresthereliesinAristotle’sdiscussionof the relationbetweenpleasureandeudaimonia.According toAristotle,pleasure(whichincludesintellectualpleasure)isnotsimplycausedbylackofpainorrelieffrompain.Infact,theuseofpleasuresolelyasanantidotetopaincanleadtoaddictionandaworthlesspersonality.Rather,pleasureisagood.“Thefactthatall,bothbeastsandhumanbeing,pursuepleasureissomesignofitsbeinginsomewaythebestgood.”88Moreover,pleasureisanunimpededactivity.This iswhyall think thehappy life ispleasantandweavespleasureintohappiness,quitereasonably,sincenoactivityiscompleteifitisimpededandhappinessissomethingcomplete.89Pleasureiscertainlyinseparablefromeudaimoniaorhappiness.Itislikesatisfaction,asapositiveeffectwhichreinforcesanactivity.Itisakindofglowwhichcompletesandperfectsanactivitywhenever it represents theunimpededandbestuseofourfaculties.Sointimateisthebondbetweenpleasureandtheoptimumuseofourfacultiesthatmen,indesiringlifeanditsactivities,mustalsodesire thepleasure thatcompletes them:“For theyseem tobeboundup togetherandnot toadmitof separation, sincewithoutactivity,pleasure does not arise and every activity is completed by the attendantpleasure.”90

While somepleasures lead tohappiness,othersdonot.Therearegoodandbadformsofpleasuredependingonthesortofactivitytheyareassociatedwith.Sinceactivitiesdifferindegreesofdecencyandbadness,andsomearechoiceworthy,sometobeavoided,thesameistrueofpleasure;for each activity has its own pleasure. Hence the pleasure proper to anexcellentactivityisdecentandtheonepropertoabaseactivityisvicious;for, similarly, appetites forfine thingsarepraiseworthyandappetites forshamefulthingsareblameworthy.91Moreover,eachkindofanimalseemstohaveitsownproperpleasure,justasithasitsownproperfunction;fortheproperpleasurewillbetheonethatcorrespondstoitsactivity.

87NE,VII,11,1152b8-11.ForAristotle’sotherdiscussionofpleasure,seeMM,II,7,1204a19-1206a35.

88NE,VII,13,1153b25-26.89NE,VII,13,1153b10-16.90NE,X,4,1175a20.91NE,X,5,1175b25.

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Hencethepleasuresthatcompletetheactivitiesofthecompleteandblessedlyhappyman,whetherhehasoneactivityormorethanone,willbecalledthehumanpleasurestothefullestextent.Theotherpleasureswillbehumaninsecondaryandevenmoreremotewayscorrespondingtothecharacteroftheactivities.92

The Place of Fortune and Worldly Goods

Solon’s93sayingthatamancannotbecalledhappyuntilheisdeadcannotbetrue,Aristotlesays,becausehappinessisanactivity.Yetthereissometruthinit,forhowcouldwesaythatamanhadahappylifeifafterhisdeathhischildrenaredestroyedordisgraced?Aristotle’sanswercouldbeputasfollows:

Nowifwemustsee theendandonlythencancallamanhappy, not as being happy but as having been so before,surelythisisaparadox,thatwhenheishappytheattributethat belongs to him is not to be truly predicated of himbecausewe do notwish to call livingmen happy, on theaccountof thechanges thatmaybefall them,andbecausewehaveassumedhappinesstobesomethingpermanentandbynomeanseasilychanged,whileasinglemanmaysuffermanyturnsoffortune’swheel…[But]successorfailureinlifedoesnotdependon these,buthuman life,aswesaid,needstheseasmereadditions,whileexcellentactivitiesortheiroppositesarewhatdeterminehappinessorthereverse.94

Reversals of fortunewithin aman’s lifetime, however, can crushhishappinessiftheyaregreatenough,“fortheybothbringpainwiththemand hinder many activities. Yet even in these nobility shines through,when amanbearswith resignationmanygreatmisfortunes, not through

92Aristotle,NE,trans.T.Irwin,X,5,1176a26-29.93Solon(638-559B.C.)isanAthenianstatesmanandlegislatorwhoisconsid-

eredtobethefounderofAtheniandemocracy.In594B.C.,Solonwaselectedarchon,orchiefmagistrate, to reform theoppressivecondition.His regulations rangedover everyprovinceoflife,includingmarriage,adoption,clothing,farmingandthecalendar.ForageneraloutlineonSolon,see“Solon,”Microsoft Encarta2007.

94NE,I,10,1100a33-1100b10.

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insensibility to pain but through nobility and greatness.”95 Since it isactivitiesthatcontrollife,Aristotlecontinues,nohappypersoncouldeverbecomemiserable,sincehewillneverdohatefulandbaseactions.Foratrulygoodandintelligentperson,wesuppose,willbearstrokesoffortunesuitably and fromhis resources at any timewill do thefinest actionshecan,justasagoodgeneralwillmakethebestuseofhisforcesinwarandagoodshoemakerwillproducethefinestshoehecanfromthehidesgivenhimandsimilarlyforallothercraftsmen.96Virtue,thus,isnottantamounttohappiness,thoughitenablesustobearmajorreverseswithdignity,forfortunestillaffectshumanhappiness.Thehappyperson, then, is theonewhoexpressescompletevirtueinhisactivities,withanadequatesupplyorexternalgoods,notforjustanytimebutforacompletelife.Hewhohasandwillkeepthegoodsmentionedisblessed,butblessedasahumanbeingis.97

Friendship and Happiness

Ahumanbeing,Aristotleclaims, isapoliticalanimal insofarashumancapacitiesandaimsarecompletelyfulfilledonlyinacommunity;theindividual’shappinessmustinvolvethegoodoffellowmembersofacommunity. “In awarding the happy person all the goods itwould seemabsurdnottogivehimfriends;forhavingfriendsseemstobethegreatestexternalgood…Fornoonewouldchoosetohaveall[other]goodsandyetbealone,sinceahumanbeingispolitical,tendingbynaturetolivetogetherwith others.”98Aristotle does notmean that everyone always desires thegoodofothersaswellashisowngood.Hemeans thatsomeone lacksacompletelife,fulfillinghumannature,withoutsomeconcernforthegoodofotherpeople.Ifweareindifferenttothegoodofothers,wedenyourselvestherelationsofcooperationandmutualconcernandtrustthatarenecessaryforthefulfillmentofhumancapacities.

Toexplainwhyconcernforthegoodofothersandforacommongoodispartofthelifethataimsatone’sownhappiness,Aristotleexaminesfriendship.99All three of themain types of friendship (for pleasure, for

95NE,I,10,1100b29-33.96NE,I,10,1100b34-1101a5.97NE,I,10,1101a15-20.98Aristotle,NE,trans.T.Irwin,IX,9,1169b10ff.99See,NE,VIII,IX;EE,VII.

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advantageandforthegood)seekthegoodoftheotherperson.However,onlythefriendshipofthebesttype(friendshipofgoodpeoplewiththesamevirtue) requires concern for another person for his own sake; andwhenwe act on this concern, we are capable of concerns, achievements, andcooperativeactivitiesthatwouldotherwisebedeniedtous.Byexpandingthe range of one’s concerns, cooperative altruism expands the range ofone’spossibleactivities,andtherebyallowsonetoachievethegoodmorecompletely.Sinceeudaimoniarequiresacompleteandself-sufficientlife,andsinceasolitarypersonwithaimsconfinedtohimselfcannotachievesuchalife,thehappyliferequiresfriendship.100

Inthebestsortoffriendship,thefriendis“anotherself.”101Aristotleinfersthatfriendshipispartofacompleteandself-sufficientlife.Itinvolvessharingtheactivitiesonecountsasespeciallyimportantinone’slife,andspeciallythesharingofreasonandthinking.Friendscooperateindeliberation,decisionandaction;andthethoughtsandactionsofeachprovidereasonsforthefuturethoughtsandactionsoftheother.“Thecooperativeaspectsoffriendshipmorefullyrealizeeachperson’sowncapacitiesasarationalagentandsopromoteeachperson’shappiness.Hencethefulldevelopmentofahumanbeingrequiresconcernforthegoodofothers.”102

The Role of Contemplation

In Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle takes up onceagainthesubjectofhappinessandthehighestlife.Ifhappinessisactivityaccordingtovirtue,hesays,itisreasonablethatitshouldbeaccordingtothehighestvirtue,butthehighestvirtuewillbethatofthehighestpartofthesoul,thatisreasonorunderstandingandtheactivityofwhichisherecalled“contemplation.”103

Thehighestlifeandthetrueendformanis,then,thecontemplativelifeorthelifeofthephilosopher.Indeedthis isnotonlythehighest life,butalsothemostpleasantandthemostself-sufficient.Likeeveryoneelse,the philosophermust be providedwith the necessities of life, at least in

100NE,IX,9,1169b16-23.101NE,IX,4,1166a1ff;IX,8,1168b10102T.H.Irwin,“Aristotle,”Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,vol.1,429.103NE,X,7,1177a11ff.

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moderation.Tobe just, for example,oneneedspeoplewhom tobe just,whilethephilosophercancarryonhisactivitybyhimself–althoughitmaybebetter,Aristotleadds,ifhehasfellow-workers.104

Theexerciseof reason is thehighest formof activitybut reason,Aristotlesaid,isdivineincomparisonwithman;anditisnotinsofarasoneisamanthatonewilllivethelifeaccordingtoreason,but“insofaras there is somethingdivine inhim.”105This famouspassage shows thatalthoughAristotlemakes frequent references to the common sensepointofviewwhenitcomestoexpressinghisideasconcerninghappiness,heiscapableofhighlyidealisticsentiments.HewritesonthelifeaccordingtoreasoninamannerwhichimmediatelyputsoneinmindofPlato.“Yettheconception of happiness he puts forward differs in certain respects fromPlato’sanditisnotonlyconsistentwith,butfollowsnaturallyfromhisownviewsonthenatureofthesoul.106

The Intellectualist Account of Eudaimonia

The Definition: Activity of the Most Divine Part

Accordingtotheintellectualistaccount,statedinBookX,Chapter7oftheNicomachean Ethics,eudaimoniaisrealizedintheactivityofthemostdivinepartofman,functioninginaccordancewithitsproperexcellence–thisistheactivityoftheoreticalcontemplation.107Thisviewisalsousuallyreferredtoastheexclusivistinterpretation108orthedominantview.109Theterm“dominant” suggests the contrast between a groupwhosemembersareroughlyequalandagroupwhoseoneofitsmembersismuchsuperiortotherest.Hence,“by‘adominantend’mightbemeantamonolithicend,anendconsistingofjustonevaluedactivityorgood,oritmightbemeant

104NE,X,7,1177a20-1177b1.105NE,X,7,1177b26ff.106G.E.R.Lloyd,Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His Thought (Cam-

bridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1968),239.107ThomasNagel,“AristotleonEudaimonia,”7.108SeeLawrenceNannery,“TheProblemoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics,”

278;seealsoW.F.R.Hardie,Aristotle’s Ethical Theory,23109SeeJ.L.Ackrill,“AristotleonEudaimonia,”17;seealsoRogerCrisp,“Aris-

totle:EthicsandPolitics,”Routledge History of Philosphy: From Aristotle to Augustine,vol.I,114.

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thatelementinanendcombiningtwoormoreindependentlyvaluedgoodswhichhasadominantorpreponderatingorparamountimportance.”110

The dominant or intellectualist view of eudaimonia, therefore,generally identifies happiness with philosophical contemplation. Sucha man will make theoretical knowledge, his most godlike attribute, hismainobject.Atalowerlevel,asmanamongmen,hewillfindaplaceforfulfillmentwhichcomesfrombeingacitizen,frommarriageandfromthesocietyifsuchactivitieswouldonlycontributehiscontemplativeactivity.The“exclusivist’ interpretations,” thus,“maintain thatno individualmancanlivemorethanoneofthese‘lives’atthesametime”111andatthesamelevelofexcellence.Therefore,heshouldliveaccordingtothemostdivineelementinhim.

The Three Main Variants112

Therearedifferentformsofexclusivistinterpretationsasisimpliedintheword“dominant.”Inthissection,threemainvariantswillbedelineated:thestrictintellectualistview,thepoliticalviewandthedevelopmentalview.

(a) Strict Intellectualism113

ThisexclusivistinterpretationtakesthepositionthatAristotleidentifiedeudaimoniawiththelifeofstudyandcontemplation.Thisgenerallygoesbythenameofthestrictintellectualistview.Strictintellectualism holds that the activity of theoria114 is the humangood,either(a)totheexclusionofethicallifealtogetheror(b)withtheunderstandingthattheethicalvirtuesderiveanyvaluetheymay110J.L.Ackrill,“AristotleonEudaimonia,”17.111LawrenceNannery,“TheProblemoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics,”278.112ThethreevariantsarebasedfromL.Nannery’sclassificationsofexclusivist

interpretations.113Inthispaper,theresearcherprimarilyconsiderstheexclusivistordominantac-

countofeudaimoniatothisvariantinordertominimizeambiguityonthestudy.114InAristotle’smostspecializeduse,theōria oritscognatetheōreinreferstothe

contemplativestudythatheidentifieswiththewholeoranimportantpartofhappiness.ThisisstudyinthesenseinwhichIstudyafaceorascenethatIalreadyhaveinfullview;thatiswhythevisualassociationsoftheōrienareappropriate.Itistheactivityofthecapac-ityofknowledge.InBookX,7Aristotleexplainswhyhethinksstudyistheactivitythatcomesclosesttomeetingtheconditionsforcompletehappiness.Forfurtherdefinitionon theōria,seeT.Irwin,trans.NE,Glossary,427.

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havefromaninstrumentalrelationshiptotheoreticalvirtue.115IthasitsbasicfoundationfromBookX,Chapters7-8oftheNicomachean Ethics,whereAristotleexplicitlytellsusthatforahumanbeingthelifeaccordingtointellectisthebestandpleasantest,sinceintellectmorethananythingelseisman.Thislifethereforeisalsotheprimehappiness.Thelifeexpressingtheotherkindofvirtueishappyinasecondarydegree.116

(b) Civic-intellectualism

A second possible exclusivist view would haveAristotleidentify eudaimoniawith the active life of the court or the civiclife.117This is anunusual interpretation indeedand the researchershalllimittoonlyafewcommentsonit.

This variant of the exclusivist interpretations bases thepositiononarereadingof thenotionof techne,usually translatedas “craft.”Techneor craft is a rational discipline concernedwithproduction.Hence,Aristotlesometimesassociatescraftwithscience,thoughitdoesnotmeetthestrictestconditionforascience.118Craftinvolves inquiry and deliberation and soAristotle often uses itsmethodstoillustratetheprocedureofvirtueandintelligence.Theadherents of this variant purport that the polis is awork of truthwhichtellsuswhatmanisandmakesparticipationincivicaffairsman’s highest good. They claim that Aristotle’s position is thathumannatureandhumanreasonfindtheircompleteandsufficientexpression in the “work” of the polis and the “work” that is thepolis.119Inotherwords,thisvariantclaimsthatthehighestactivityexpressing virtue, the activity of the intellect, finds its completeexpressioninthepoliticalcommunityorpolis.

115LawrenceNannery,“TheProblemoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics,”278.116NE,X,7-8,1178a5-1178b6.117 Nannery based this distinction from Joachim Ritter’s essay. See Lawrence

Nannery,“TheProblemoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics,”279-280.118Forfurtherdiscussiononthemeaningoftechne,seeT.Irwin,trans.NE,Glos-

sary,392.119LawrenceNannery,“TheProblemoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics,”280.

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(c) Developmental View120

The third variant of the dominant account takes thedevelopmental view, e. g., Jaeger’s, claims that Aristotle wasevolving from the view that the life of study and contemplationby itself constituted eudaimonia to the view that eudaimonia isconstitutedsolelybytheethicalvirtues.121Onthisview,Aristotle,in the Eudemian Ethics, is still expressing the direct relevanceof the knowledgeofGod tomoral action as he haddone earlier,bymeans of the Platonic conception of the absolute norm in theProtrepticus.122“InthelaterEthics,thisrecedesverymuchintothebackground;fortheinstinctiverightnessofmorallyeducatedperson,which isa law to itself, isnotanaimthatcanbe focusedclearlyat a single point, unlike the highestGood by reference towhichtheEudemianEthicsdirectsus to live.”123Against suchanethicsofpuredevotion toGod, thefamouspictureof thecontemplativelifeinBookXoftheNicomachean Ethicsfades,andbecomeslittlemorethananobjectiveofanidealizeddescriptionofthelifeofthescholardevotingtoresearch.124AccordingtoJaeger,althoughtheNicomacheanEthics triedtoaccomplishthemovement, it fails toreconcile the irreconcilable and was composed short of the finaldevelopment;themovement,however,iscompletedbythewriteroftheMagna Moralia.125

The Function Argument

According to the Intellectualist account, both the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics exhibit indecision between two accounts of

120ThisviewisbasicallybasedfromWernerJaeger’sassumptionthatbymeansofthefragmentsoftheProtrepticus,itispossibletomakeapictureofthedevelopmentofAr-istotle’sethicsinthreeclearlyseparatedstages:thelatePlatonicperiodoftheProtrepticus,thereformedPlatonismoftheEudemian,andthelateAristotelianismoftheNicomachean,seeWernerJaeger,Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development,ChapterIX,229-258.

121LawrenceNannery,“TheProblemoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics,”280.122W.Jaeger,Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development,241.123Ibid.124Ibid.,243.125SeeW.Jaeger,Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development,Ap-

pendixII,“OntheOriginandCycleofthePhilosophicIdealofLife,”440-450.

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eudaimonia, although it is less elaborately expressed in the EudemianEthics.126TheNicomachean Ethicsseeshappinessasconstitutedessentiallybythecontemplativeactivityoftheintellect;thisistheonlyhappinessreallyworthyofthenameandthelifeofpracticalwisdomandthemoralvirtuesisasecond-ratekindofhappiness.IntheEudemian Ethicsontheotherhand,happiness consists in the ideal functioningof everypart of the soul; theactivityofcontemplationisonlyone,admittedlythehighestone,amongafamilyofactivitieswhichconstitutethehappylife.MostoftheEudemianEthicsexpoundsacomprehensiveaccount,buttheclosingpassageappearsotherwise:

What choice, then, or possession of the natural goods –whether bodily goods, wealth, friends, or other things –willmostproducethecontemplationofgod,thatchoiceorpossessionisbest;thisisthenobleststandard.127

Since the philosophic issue between these two positions arisesin virtue of the ambivalence, to explore the intellectualist account ofeudaimoniaistoenterintoadiscussionofman’sergon128–theergonofathingisafunctionthatisspecifictothatthingalone.Ifathingdoes,indeed,haveanergonoraspecialpurpose,thenitsspecificgoodmustbeafunctionofthatergon;thus,tounderstandtheultimategoodofmanwemustcometoaconclusionofwhathisergonis.Accordingly,“Theproperergonofman,bywhichhumanexcellenceismeasured,isthatwhichmakeshimamanratherthananythingelse.”129

Themaindifferencebetweenahumanbeingandananimalisthatmanhasreasonandthathisentirecomplexoforganicfunctionssupportsrationalaswellasirrationalactivity.Althoughreasonhelpsmantogetenoughtoeatandmovearound,itisnotsubservienttothoselowerfunctions.Onone

126T.Nagel,“AristotleonEudaimonia,”7.127EE,VII,15,1249b17ff.128Thebestsingletranslationofergon wouldbe“work.”Itisalsousedtomean

“function,”“characteristictask,”“activity,”and“end.”Thisistheusethatconnectssome-thing’sergonwithitsessenceanditsvirtue;inanimatebeingstheergondefinesthetypeof soul.For a furtherdistinctionon thedifferentusesof ergon, seeT. Iwin, trans.NE,Glossary,404.Foradiscussionontherelationofergonwitheudaimonia,seeT.Nagel,“AristotleonEudaimonia,”7-13;seealsoStephenR.L.Clark,Aristotle’s Man,15-27.

129T.Nagel,“AristotleonEudaimonia,”8.

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plausibleview,reason,despiteitscontinualservicetothelowerfunctions,iswhat human life is all about.The lower functions serve it, provide itwithasettingandare tosomeextentunder itscontrol,but thedominantcharacterization of a human beingmust refer to his reason.This iswhyAristotle is usually considered tobeproposing an intellectualist positionandwhyacomprehensiveposition,whichletsvariousotheraspectsoflifeinto themeasureof good, is less plausible. “The supremegood formanmustbemeasuredintermsofthataroundwhichallotherhumanfunctionsareorganized.”130

Furthermore,humanpossibilitiesrevealthatreasonhasausebeyondtheorderingofpracticallife.Thecircleofmutualsupportbetweenreason,activity,andnutritionisnotcompletelyclosed.Infactallofit, includingthe practical employment of reason, serves to support the individual foran activity that completely transcends theseworldly concerns. “Aristotlebelieves, in short, that human life is not important enough for humansto spend their lives on.A person should seek to transcend not only hisindividual practical concerns but also those of society or humanity as awhole.”131Neverthelessthisdivineelement,whichgivesusthecapacitytothinkaboutthingshigherthanourselves,isthehighestaspectofoursouls,andwearenotjustifiedinforgoingitsactivitiestoconcentrateonlowliermatters,unlessthedemandsinthelatterareathreatentomakecontemplationimpossible.

Objections against the Intellectualist Account132

ThoughtheexclusivistinterpretationsmaybethoughttohavestrongtextsintheirfavorfromBookX,Chapters7-8oftheNicomachean Ethics,“strangetosaythatisall theymighthave.”133TheydonotclaimtohavemorethanthetextsfromChapters7and8.Theirclaimhowever,Nanneryconcludes,iscompletelyun-Aristotelianandisnotsupportedbythetextsinquestion.CertainlyitisanomalousthatAristotleshouldfindhappinessto

130Ibid.,11.131Ibid.,12.132Thispaperwillpresentonlytheobjectionsraisedagainststrictintellectualism

forbrevitysake.Foracompletediscussionontheobjectionsofthethreevariants,seeLaw-renceNannery,“TheProblemoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics,”278-280.

133LNannery,“TheProblemoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics,”278.

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beakindoflifewhichisoutsidetherangeofthebookinwhichhappinessisdiscussed.ItshouldalsobefeltasananomalythatAristotleshouldfindthe human good to be simply identical with something super-human.134Moreover,Chapter9ofBookXoftheNicomachean Ethicsassertsthattheendoftheinquiryisnotjusttoknowabouthappinessbuttobecomehappyandgood.135

Though Chapters 7-8 of NE Book X are certainly incompatiblewithan inclusivist interpretation, thesechapterscannotbe read inawayconsistentwithstrictintellectualismeither.Aristotleneversaysthatthelifeofstudyandcontemplationistheonlylifethatiseudaimon.Infacthestatesthat thelifeofthemanofaffairsiseudaimon,althoughnotaseudaimonasalifegivenovertocontemplation.136If,asAristotleexpresslysays,thelifeofactioniseudaimoninasecondaryway,thensurelyitiseudaimon.Inaddition,thereisanamplenumberoftextsinwhichAristotleillustrateseudaimonia by examples taken from “the active life.”137 Emphatically, amajorbulkoftheEthicsdiscussesthiskindoflife,assertingthathappinessissomethingcompleteandinclusive.

Ifthestrictintellectualistfallsbacktothepositionofinstrumentalism,admitting that the ethical virtues are necessary by virtue of their use inpromoting contemplation, the same two criticisms apply: on the onehand, it is completelyun-Aristotelian;on theother, therearemany textsthatcontradict it.138Asimplepresentationof thepictureof theidealmanaccordingtothisviewisenoughtorefuteit.

Thismanwouldneverwritebooks,havefriends,orindeeddomostanythingunlessitcontributedtotheoria.Hewouldnotobeythesummonsofthekingtocomeandadvisethesovereign,unlesstheoriarequiredsuchactivity…Hewouldhavenodeep-seatedloyaltytoanyethicalstandards,butwould obey any given norm or rule insofar as, and only insofar as,theywereinstrumentaltotheoria.Thus,hemightwellmakeithisgeneralpracticetostealbooksifhecalculatedthattheywouldfurthertheactivity

134Ibid.135NE,X,9,1179b1-4.136SeeNE,X,8,1178a9.137SeeNE,1097b11;1099a33-1099b2;1099b25-32;1102a5-15.138LNannery,“TheProblemoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics,”279.

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of theoria. The retiring life of the scholar offers few occasions for thecommissionofgreatcrimes,butifitwereclearthatitwouldopenupmoreleisureandtherebyallowformoretheoria,oursagewouldbeobligedtotrytocheatonhisincometax.139

Thismightbeanexaggeratedexampleoftheintellectualistposition;nevertheless,itmightsuggestsometruthwithit.Onecanseeimmediatelyhowfar this“ideal life” is removedfromthegenerousandwell-roundedpresentationofthegoodthingstobefoundinhumanlifethatweassociatewiththenameofAristotle.“Topostulatethattheoriaitselfconfersagraceupon its practitioner that would preclude such repulsive character traitsis simply gratuitous, both with respect toAristotle’s text and to life ingeneral.”140 Inaddition, agreatnumberof textscanbecitedagainst thisview.EverytimeAristotlecallsethicalactivitiesnoble,thereisanimplieddenialthattheygettheirvaluefromanyrelation,instrumentalorotherwise,toanythingelsebecauseforAristotletheethicalvirtueisanendinitself.141

The Inclusive Account of Eudaimonia

The Definition: Organization of Life

One can take theview thatAristotle’s ideal is inclusivist; that is,thatitincludesinsomemannerboththetheoreticalandpracticallives.“Byan‘inclusiveend’mightbemeantanyendcombiningorincludingtwoormorevaluesoractivitiesorgoods;ortheremightbemeantanendinwhichdifferent components have roughly equal value (or at least are such thatno one component is incommensurablymore valuable than another).”142This account of eudaimonia is also called a “comprehensive”143 view ofAristotle’shappiness.Accordingtothecomprehensiveaccount,eudaimoniaessentiallyinvolvesnotjusttheactivityofthetheoreticalintellectbutthefullrangeofhumanlifeandaction,inaccordancewiththebroaderexcellenceof moral virtue and practical wisdom. This view connects eudaimonia

139TheexampleisborrowedfromLNannery,“TheProblemoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics,”279.

140Ibid.,279.141 See, for instance,NE, 1099b15-1100a5,1100b10;MM, 1184b22-1185a1; EE,

1219a28-39;1220a1ff.142J.L.Ackrill,“AristotleonEudaimonia,”17.143SeeT.Nagel,“AristotleonEudaimonia,”7.

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with the conception of human nature as composite, that is, as involvingtheinteractionofreason,emotion,perceptionandactioninan“ensouled”body.144

This account of happiness suggests that, in theEudemian Ethics,Aristotlepurports that it isasignof“great folly”not to“haveone’s lifeorganizedinviewofsomeend.”145Perhapsitwouldbebettertosaythatitisimpossiblenottoliveaccordingtosomeplan,anditisfollynottotrytomaketheplanagoodone.Theinevitabilityofaplanarisesfromthefactthatamanbothhas,andknowsthathehas,anumberofdesiresandinterestswhichcanbeadoptedasmotiveseithercasuallyorindiscriminatelyorinaccordancewithprioritiesdeterminedbytheaimoflivingthekindoflifewhichhethinksproperforamanlikehimself.TothissideofAristotle’sdoctrine isapplied the terminclusiveend,“inclusivebecause there isnodesire or interestwhich should not be regarded as a candidate, howeverunpromising,foraplaceinthepatternoflife.”146

The Three Logical Possibilities

InclaimingthatAristotleexpoundsinBook1oftheNicomachean Ethicsan“inclusive”andnotamonolithicdoctrineofeudaimonia,onecouldbereferringbothtohisaccountoftheconceptitself,thatis,whatonemightcallinabroadsensethemeaningoftheword;andtohisviewaboutthelifethatsatisfiestheconceptanddeservesthename.Hence,therearedifferentlogical possibilities that the termmight suggest. These possibilities willspelloutthemainvariantsofthecomprehensiveaccountofeudaimonia.147

The Trade-Off View

This variant of the inclusivist account of eudaimonia maintainsthatamaximizationofbothpracticalandtheoreticvirtuousactionscanbe

144T.Nagel,“AristotleonEudaimonia,”7.145EE,I,2,1214b10.146SeeW.F.R.Hardie,“TheFinalGoodinAristotle’sEthics,”317.147Theterminologyanddivision,theresearcherwillemploy,isborrowedfrom

LawrenceNannery,“TheProblemoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics,”280-281.Nan-nerybasedthissimilardivisionfromDavidKeyt,“IntellectualisminAristotle,”Paideia(Summer,1979),139-156.Inthispaper,theresearcherwillusethesethreemainvariantsinterchangeablytomeanthesamebroadcomprehensiveaccountofhumanhappiness.

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calculated,witheachtypehavinganequalor,atleast,aconvertiblevalue.148This type of inclusion suggests that both the life of practical virtue andthelifeofcontemplationandstudycanbetradedofforinterchangedastothekindoflifeonemightchoosetolive.Noonekindoflifeissaidtobesecondary indegreeorextremely superiorwith regard to its relationshipwitheudaimonia.Thevirtuesofcharacterandtheactionsexpressingthem,deservetobechosenfortheirownsakesascomponentsofhappiness.Inlikemanner, the life of study canbe chosen for its own sake because itpromoteseudaimonia.Hence,onecanliveanexcellentpracticallifewhilebeingascholar,oramanofstudywhilebeingamanofvirtue.

The Absolute Priority View

This type of comprehensive view maintains that one can nevertradeoff theoretical forpracticalvirtues.The twospheresofactivityarerelativelyself-containedandAristotle’sidealrequiresthemaximizationofthetheoreticvirtuesbeforethepracticalvirtuesaretobeattended.Althoughthissoundssimilartothedominantaccount,thisisnotthesameasthestrictintellectualist view. In absolute priority view the practical activities areunderstoodtohavetheirownindependentandnotmerelyaninstrumental,value.149Theinclusionofthepracticallifebeginswhenonehasrealizedthetruthsthroughcontemplation.Thiscanbeusuallypicturedasanenlightenedperson,who after contemplation under a tree realizes that the importantcomponentofhappinessistolivealifeinexcellenceandvirtuebasedfromthetruthsherealized.Nowthetheoreticvirtueswillserveasaguideorarulewithregardtohisactions;nevertheless,hisactionstogetherwiththeother aspects of his life are still seen as oneof themain components ofhappinesstogetherwiththetheoreticvirtuesherealized.

The Superstructure View

According to the superstructure view, the moral life sets certainminimum requirements thatmust be satisfiedbefore one is to engage intheoreticalactivity.Insofarasheisahumanbeingandlivestogetherwithanumberofotherhumanbeings,hechoosestodotheactionsexpressing

148LawrenceNannery,“TheProblemoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics,”280-281.

149Ibid.,281.

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virtue.Hencehewillneedthesortsofexternalgoodsthatareneededforthe virtues, for living a human life.This view suggests thatman shouldworkfirstandbevirtuousinhisactionsbeforehegainsthedispositionforstudyandcontemplation.Indeedhowonecancontemplateifhisstomachistremblingoraneighborisyellingathim.He,thus,needsfirsttolookafterhis duty virtuously and settle down the primary requirements necessaryfor him to pursue theoretical activity.However, this variant of inclusiveaccount “does not demand that one should never shirk a duty, however,trivial, for anopportunity to contemplate.”Where the line is drawnwillpresumably be determined by themoral intuition of the practicallywiseman(hophronimos).150Inthevirtuousperson,thevirtuesofcharacterandtheactionsexpressingthemwillregulateone’schoiceofothergoods,andsotheyalsowillregulateone’schoicesaboutcontemplation.

The Constitutive Activity Argument151

This argument claims that inBook I and generally untilBookXoftheNicomachean Ethics,Aristotleisexpoundinganinclusivedoctrineof eudaimonia and that there is noneed to suppose that hewas led intoconfusiononthismatterbysomeinadequacyinhisunderstandingofmeansandends.Furthermore,theotheraccountsofAristotleoneudaimoniafoundintheEudemian Ethics,theMagna Moralia,thePoliticsandtheRhetoric support the comprehensive account.152 Thus, in the Rhetoric Aristotlespeaksof eudaimonia and its parts and in theMagna Moralia as sayingthateudaimoniaiscomposedofmanygoods.Butapartfromthesespecificassertionsofthecomplexityofeudaimonia,onemightwellthinkitstrangethatsucha largeproportionof thediscussion in theNicomachean Ethics shouldbedevotedtothepracticalvirtuesiftheyplayedno,oronlyaminor,roleinthegoodlife.153

150Ibid.151TheresearcherisusingthistermreferringtoJ.L.Ackrill’sinclusiveargument.

Foracompletediscussionofhisarguments,seeJ.L.Ackrill,“AristotleonEudaimonia,”15-33.

152 See for instance, EE, 1220a1ff;MM, 1184a19ff;Rhetoric, 1360b9;Politics,1323a1ff.

153 J.O.Urmson,Aristotle’s Ethics (Oxford:BlackwellPublishersLtd., 1988),118.

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ItarguesthatattheverystartoftheNicomachean Ethics,wefindAristotleexpoundingandusingthenotionofanendandconnectingitwithtermslike“good”and“forthesakeof.”Hedistinguishesbetweenactivitiesthathaveendsapart fromthemselvesandothers thatare theirownends.Hethenmakesastatementthatisoftenneglectedandnevergivenitsfullweight:“itmakesnodifferencewhether theactivities themselvesare theendsoftheactionsorsomethingelseapartfromthese,asinthecaseofthesciencesjustmentioned.”154

Itwouldthenbenaturaltoexpectthatcorrespondingtotheinitialdistinctionbetweentheactivitiestherewouldbeafundamentaldistinctionbetween theways inwhichactivitiesof the twodifferent typescouldbesubordinated to another activity. If the idea of use or exploitation of aproductoroutcomebecomes inappropriatewhen thesubordinateactivityisnotdirectedtoaproductoroutcome,whatimmediatelysuggestsitselfinsteadisarelationlikethatofparttowhole,therelationanactivityorendmayhavetoanactivityorendthatincludesorembracesit.Toseekagoodexampletothiscase,onemaythinkoftherelationofputtingtoplayinggolfortherelationofthestepsinadancetothewholedanceitself.155Onedoesnotputtinordertoplaygolfasonebuysaclubinordertoplaygolfsinceputtingisplayinggolf(thoughnotallthatplayinggolfis).Inlikemanner,thestepsofthedancearenotmeanstoperformadancebutitisdancinginitself.

NowtheideathatsomethingsaredonefortheirownsakeandmayyetbedoneforthesakeofsomethingelseispreciselytheideaAristotlewillneedanduseintalkingofgoodactionsandeudaimonia.Foreudaimoniais not the result or outcomeof a lifetime’s effort; it is not something tolookforwardto;itisalife,enjoyableandworthwhileallthrough.“Thattheprimary ingredients of eudaimonia are for the sakeof eudaimonia isnot incompatiblewith their being ends in themselves; for eudaimonia isconstitutedbyactivitiesthatareendsinthemselves.”156ItisnotnecessarytoclaimthatAristotlehasmadequiteclearhowtheremaybe“components”inthebestlifeorhowtheymaybeinterrelated.ItisenoughtoclaimthatAristotle understands the concept of eudaimonia in such away that the

154NE,I,1,1094a16-18.155TheseexpositionisbasedfromJ.L.Ackrill,“AristotleonEudaimonia,”19.156J.L.Ackrill,“AristotleonEudaimonia,”19.

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eudaimonlifenecessarilyincludesallactivitiesthatarevaluable.Comfortsand prosperitymay be goals to be secured by action, but eudaimonia ispreciselynotsuchagoal.Itisdoingwell,nottheresultofdoingwell;alife,nottherewardoflife.157

Objections against the Inclusive Account

The inclusive account of eudaimonia is more in the spirit ofAristotle’sdiscussionthantheexclusivistviews;nonetheless,allinclusivistviewsareopentothesamecriticisms.158

The primary contention among critics is Aristotle’s inexplicitstatementconcerningthematter.IfAristotle’sidealisacompositeone,whydoesn’theexplicitlysayso?Nothingpreventshimfromdoingthis.Istherenotapatentanomalyinsayingthat,inBook1oftheNicomachean Ethics,Aristotlegivesthreechoices(thethreelives),eliminatesoneofthem,andrefuses to decide between the other two? Now, when he returns to thequestionagaininthemiddleofthelastBookhetellsus,inabriefspace,thatbothlivesareeudaimon,butthatthelifeofcontemplationandstudyisthe“mosteudaimon”–andbyallthiswhatheactuallymeanstoconveyisthatalifewhichissomecombinationofbothofthelivesiswhatreallytheideal?Certainly,ifthiswasAristotle’sintention,hedidnotsucceedinconveyingthismeaning.159

Second,theseinclusivistviewsaresubjecttothecriticismthattheyallmustmaintain thatAristotle uses theword “life” to denote two verydifferentthings,andthatheconsciouslyswitchesfromonetotheotherinthecourseofasingleargumentwithoutwarningthereader.Thustheword“life”isunderstoodtomeansomethingcloseto“aroadoncetaken”intheNicomachean Ethics,BooksI-IX,buttheninBookX,7-8itisallowedtoalsohavethemeaningofacombinationoftwoofthelivesthathavebeencontendingforthehonorofbeingidentifiedwitheudaimonia.

157Ibid.,24.158SeeL.Nannery,“TheProblemoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics,”281.

ThefollowingobjectionsareborrowedfromL.Nannery,“TheProbeoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics,”281-282.

159L.Nannery,“TheProblemoftheTwoLivesinAristotle’sEthics,”281

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Third,allinclusivistviewsmustmakethepursuitoftheoriahostageto a prudential decision.Determinations concerningwhether to actualizehere and now theoria (contemplation) or praxis (action) require the useof a faculty nowherementioned inAristotle. If the intellectual virtue orphronesisguidesethicalandpoliticalactionandthethreevirtuesofnous(understanding),episteme(science)andsophia(wisdom)constitutethelifeof theory,what faculty is there leftover to telluswhichof the facultiesoughttobeexercised?Onemustpostulateakindofsuper-phronesiswhichhasthefunctionofchoosingtheright“mix”forthe“mixedideal.”160

Lastly,theinclusivistviewsfailtofullyexplicatehowthevariousgoodsoflifearetobecombinedinthebestpossiblehumanlife.Theymisstoillustrateclearlywhatcriterionoverseestheorganizationofthewhole,orwhatrelationthereisbetweenthepursuitofcontemplationandtheexerciseoftheothervirtues.

For these reasons the inclusivist views are all improbable andunpersuasive.ThoughtheyexpresssomeofthespiritofAristotle,theydonotaccountfortheletterofthetext.

WewillpursuethematterinthesucceedingissueNo.133ofthisjournal.

160Ibid.

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THE EUDAIMONIA PROBLEMATIC

EUDAIMONIA(HumanFulfillment)

Interpretations

ARISTOTLE

“Activityofthesoulinaccordancewithvirtueandinacompletelife”

Inclusive/ComprehensiveAccount

Activityinaccordancewiththebestandmostperfectvirtue

Activityinaccordancewithcom-pletevirtueandcompletelife

Dominant/IntellectualistAccount

Identifieshappinesswiththeoria/contemplationAgoodcompoundedbyallgoods

ObjectionsObjections

• althoughitismoreinthespiritofAristotle’sdiscussion,itisnotcon-veyeddirectlybythePhilosopher

• thedifficultyoftheterm“life”orβιος

• thediffultyontheorderoffacul-ties

• failstoexplicatethecriterionthatoverseesthecomponentsandtheirrelation

• althoughithasastrongsupportinBookXofNE,itisoutsidetherangeofthewholeAristotelianethicaltreatises

• itisun-Aristoteliantoidentifyeudaimonia with something super-human

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the eudaimoinia problematic

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