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The energy transition and opportunities for EU industries
European Parliament: Energy Transition Workshop Brussels, 19th February 2019
Andre FaaijDirector of Science ECN part of TNO
Distinguished Professor Energy System Analysis , Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
CCS REQUIRES ADDITIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE (EXAMPLE: NL)
6
National CO2network
Regional CO2 network & dedicated lines
Use existing gas production lines >2020
Trunk line to large UK offshore gas
fields
Trunk line to oil fields + aquifers in offshore UK/Norway region
National CO2network
Regional CO2 network & dedicated lines
Use existing gas production lines >2020
Trunk line to large UK offshore gas
fields
Trunk line to oil fields + aquifers in offshore UK/Norway region
[Damen et al., IJGHGC, 2008]
CIRCULARITY
WHY:In 2015 world plastics production 335 Mta, only 2% of plastics closed loop recycling (Ellen McArthur)EU: in 2025 55% recycling rate set for plastics, 10 Mta plastics recycled to products (Circular Plastics Alliance) - in 2030 all plastics are recyclable and >50% is recycled Worldwide Industry partnership announced 1.5 billion euro initiative plastics recycling January 14, 2019
ELECTRIFICATION:
Key technical & scientific enablers:
Power to chemicals
Electro-organic synthesis CO2 electro-reduction
Electro-reduction
Electro-oxidation
Oxidation of furfura l
Oxidation of hydroxymethyl furan
Oxidation of a lcohols
Reduction of furfura l
Reduction of hydroxymethyl furan
Reductive amination
Reduction of oxygen
INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION -> ZERO CARBON FOOTPRINT; DAUNTING COMPLEXITY.Industry ~50% of primary energy use.Many options:
Energy efficiency improvement existing processesNew (inherently more efficient) processesRenewable feedstock ( biobased industryRenewable energy carriers (green power, green hydrogen)Carbon Capture & Storage (with BECCS negative GHG emissions)Recycling/re-use/circulair value chainsShifts in markets and products.
All combined! Over roughly 3 decades; overall one investment cycle!!Factory level, regional level, structural changes in economy and energy system11
Figure 2 Location and size of the main industrial emission clusters.1) Rotterdam - Moerdijk (16.9 Mt CO2); 2) Noordzeekanaalgebied (12.0 Mt CO2); 3)
Zeeland - W-Brabant (7.9 Mt CO2); 4) Chemelot (4.5 Mt CO2); 5) Eemsdelta (0.7 Mt CO2); 6) Emmen (0.5 Mt CO2).[8,9]
13
Drivers and barriers for PtM
CO2 target (2050)228 Mton/y914 Mton/y
VRE penetration (%)97%0%
450 Mton/year
60%
CO2 storage0 Gton255 Gton
Biomass potential25.5 EJ/y 10 EJ/y 7 EJ/y
PtM Capex250 €/kW 75 €/kW
PtM Efficiency85 % 100%
LMG efficiency in ships
25 gCO2/tnm 12 gCO2/tnm18-20 gCO2/tnm
[Blanco et al., applied Energy 2018]
14
"Optimistic" scenario
*All values in PJ
Other dimensions are:• Costs (prices)• Time slices• Countries
PtG> 75% of gas demand~ 600 GW of capacity
[Blanco et al., applied Energy 2018]
15
"Alternative" scenario
*All values in PJ
PtG0% of gas demand~ 0 GW of capacity
[Blanco et al., applied Energy 2018]
Electricity system simulationsNW Europe 2050 with 60% iRESWeeks with maximum and minimumresidual loads during the year.
System implications!
[Brouwer et al., Applied Energy, 2016]
EEMSDELTA/DELFZIJL
(OR ANY OTHER INDUSTRIAL CLUSTER)
Eemshaven
Delfzijl
Eemsdelta
National CO2network
Regional CO2 network & dedicated lines
Use existing gas production lines >2020
Trunk line to large UK offshore gas
fields
Trunk line to oil fields + aquifers in offshore UK/Norway region
National CO2network
Regional CO2 network & dedicated lines
Use existing gas production lines >2020
Trunk line to large UK offshore gas
fields
Trunk line to oil fields + aquifers in offshore UK/Norway region
KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR INDUSTRIALTRANSFORMATION1. Sufficient potential measures to fully decarbonize industry and even
partly transform to negative emission capacity (BECCS options)2. Several transformation pathways offer more competitive production
(technological learning / innovation = key) and higher resource efficiency.
3. Mixtures of key measures (circularity, new inherently more efficient processes, green energy carriers, green feedstock, CCS) most promising.
4. Optimal solutions sector and location specific over time.5. One investment cycle to go for many players; good planning is key!6. CO2 tax, innovation programs per sector (and EU collaboration),
alignment with energy transition19
THE COSTS OF THE (GLOBAL) ENERGY SYSTEM TRANSITION; IPCC WORDING:• Costs of CO2: estimates for a Below-1.5˚C pathway range from:
• 135–5500 USD2010 tCO2-eq in 2030• 245–13000 USD2010 tCO2-eq in 2050• 420–17500 USD2010 tCO2-eq in 2070• 690–27000 USD2010 tCO2-eq in 2100
• Models that encompass a higher degree of technology granularity and more flexibility in mitigation technology portfolio, often produce relatively lower mitigation costs.
• Ranges explained by: methodologies, projected energy service demands, mitigation targets, fuel pricesand technologyavailability. The characteristics of the technology portfolio, particularly in terms of investment costs and deployment rates play a key role.
24
HOPED ECONOMICS HYDROGEN PRODUCTION (NATURAL GAS BASED PRODUCTION: 2-3 EURO/GJ)
1.4
0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 (0.3)
2.3
0
1
2
3
4
ElectrolysisExemplary cost build-up of hydrogen
(EUR per kg, electricity @ 25 EUR/MWh)
2.2
0.3 0.8
0.1 0.2 0.2(1.7)
2.2
0
1
2
3
4
Biomass gasificationExemplary cost build-up of hydrogen
(EUR per kg, torrefied biomass @ 8.3 EUR/GJ)
Source: Rabobank/NIB H2 roadmap, van Wijk, 2017However, electricity now some 50 Euro/MWh, surpluses of power minimal during short periods, and infrastructure costs not yet included.
NO REGRET OR SCENARIO DEPENDENT OPTION?
29
Option AOption COption GOption B
Goal
For 2020
Abatementoptions
Infrastructure
CO2
Energy modelBiomassElectricity
H2Fossil fuels
NO REGRET OPTIONS / SCENARIO DEPENDENT
30
Option AOption COption GOption B
For 2020
Scenario X
Scenario Y
For 2030
Option A1Option FOption J
Option C2
Option A1Option C2Option ROption F
NO REGRET OPTIONS / SCENARIO DEPENDENT
31
2030Option
A1Option FOption JOption
C1
Option A1
Option C1
Option ROption F
Option AOption COption GOption B
Option A2
Option R1
O ti
Option A2
Option C2
Option R1
Option F1
Option A2
Option J1
Option F1
Option D
2020 2040 2050Option
A3Option J2Option
F2Option
D1Option
A3Option J2Option
D1Option
G1Option
A3Option
C3Option
R2Option
F2
Option A3
Option R2
Option F2
Option HOption
A3Option
R2Option
F2Option
Similar strategy
Different strategy
Climate neutrality, circular economy and energy transition as opportunities for EU basic industries
19 February 2019 | Brussels
EP-ITRE Workshop: Just energy transition, opportunity for EU industries, the role of hydrogen in the future and the example of energy transition in Germany
Stefan Lechtenböhmer, Wuppertal Institut
A non-fossil basic industry is possible
Deep decarbonisation of materials production processes works via
Direct and indirect electrificationCCU/S and BiomassCircularity
This means: Break through
technologies need to be developed and invested under high risks
Infrastructures for huge amounts of renewable energies or CCS and cirular economy need to be in place
Cost structures in processing industries may change significantly (which may lead to material substitution etc.)
Government risk taking and an active industrial policy with a clear focus on the role and function of regions are core needs.
steel25%
cement19%
plastic5%
paper4%
alumi-nium3%
other44%
Industrial carbon
emissions: 10 Gt CO2
5 basic materials are responsible for 20% of global GHG emissions
Three pathways to net zero GHG emissons forEU steel, cement, chemistry production (2050 vs. baseline)
19 February 2019
Circularity and reduced (primary) demand
Break-through and RES electricity
CCS / CCU
19%
48%
44%
64%
5%
26%
Source: Material economics, Wuppertal Institut,IES, 2018
500 Mt CO2
Close to Zero CO2
Stefan Lechtenböhmer - ITRE-hearing 2
Three pathways to net zero GHG emissons forEU steel, cement, chemistry production (2050 vs. baseline)
19 February 2019
Circularity and reduced (primary) demand
Break-through and RES electricity
CCS / CCU
19%
48%
44%
64%
5%
26%
Source: Material economics, Wuppertal Institut,IES, 2018
500 Mt CO2
Close to Zero CO2
Stefan Lechtenböhmer - ITRE-hearing 3
Reframing the industrial innovation system: From technology focus to an integrated value chain focus.
19 February 2019 Stefan Lechtenböhmer - ITRE-hearing 4
Sour
ce: W
esse
ling
et a
l. 20
17
Steel value chain
Steel – from sector to value chain perspective
Hot & cold rolling
(154 Mt)
Manufacturing
Consumption / UseStock
Recycling (51 Mt + 18 Mt
production scrap)
Secondarysteel making
(61 Mt)
Primary steelmaking (101 Mt)
Mining of ore, coal, lime
Steel sector180 Mt CO2
33% Construction25% Metalware/tubes22% Cars/transport20% Machines, other
Scrap trade
30 Mt export40 Mt import
15 Mt CO2
15 Mt net exports in traded goods (cars, machines)
40 Mt CO2
78% Construction12% Machines/
products10% Cars/transport
19 February 2019 Stefan Lechtenböhmer - ITRE-hearing 5
Steel value chain
Steel – Innovation fields along the value chain
Hot & cold rolling
Manufacturing
Consumption / UseStock
Recycling
Secondarysteel making
Primary steelmakingMining of ore,
coal, lime
Steel sector
Break-through
33% Construction25% Metalware/tubes22% Cars/transport20% Machines, other
Closed recycling loops
Material efficiency& design for re-use and recycling
Renewable electricity
Service life extension & product service efficiency
Service demand reduction
Energy efficiency
19 February 2019 Stefan Lechtenböhmer - ITRE-hearing 6
Steel value chain
Steel – Fields for Intervention
Hot & cold rolling
Manufacturing
Consumption / UseStock
Recycling
Secondarysteel making
Primary steelmakingMining of ore,
coal, lime
Steel sector
Break-through
33% Construction25% Metalware/tubes22% Cars/transport20% Machines, other
Closed recycling loops
Material efficiency& design for re-use and recycling
Renewable electricity
Service life extension & product service efficiency
Service demand reduction
Energy efficiency
19 February 2019 Stefan Lechtenböhmer - ITRE-hearing 7
Green energy supply(e.g. Carbon floor price w. BTA, ETS, Investment & planning support for infrastructures (electricity and hydrogen))
Support circularityimprove value chains, support circular technology & business cases
Create demand (e.g. quota or standards for sustainable materials, green public pro-curement, GHG taxation of materials)
R&D & Investment support for break through processes & green energy infrastructures (e.g. Carbon CFDs, Innovation funds...)
Really goes to zero carbonInnovativebut very long term oriented and not the only project in steel industryNeeds public support (R&D, Infrastructure for green electricity and hydrogen)Potentially re-configures the steel value chain (e.g. future exports of green iron instead of ore, challenge for existing primary smelters, possible future for small steel sites)
Hybrit. A project by Swedish SSAB, LKAB and Vattenfall
19 February 2019 Stefan Lechtenböhmer - ITRE-hearing 8
19 February 2019 Stefan Lechtenböhmer - ITRE-hearing 9
Industrial trans-
formation (Co-evolution with energy
system trans-formation)
Climate policyParis agreement
Difficult to decarbonise sectors
EU mid century low emission strategy
NDCs
Energy policyEnergy transition (expansion of renewable electricity generation)Electrification of heat, transport, processesEnergy infrastructures & Winter packages
Industrial policyEU-Re-Industrialisation
policy / Int. trade policy / EC Communication Sept.
2017
Resource policy
EU-Circular Economy package
....
Research&innovation
RDD&D-Policies9th FRP, ETS
Innovation FundsJEDI, Mission
Innovation
Structural policyin heavily industrialised regions: Concepts for regional industrial decarbonisation (innovation,
infrastructure, cluster formation)
An integrated climate and industrial polcy is needed
A new paradigm of industrial policy would best be
Clearly target orientedtowards sustainability and deep decarbonization as core long term targets
Integrating policies for climate, energy, innovation and ressource efficiency with trade, growth and structural policies
And including all steps of the value chain and all societal stakeholders
EU flagship mission oriented R&D programme for low-carbon and circular processes in EEIs and adequate support for market introduction.Strategic alignment of the EU‘s energy and industry transitions (i.e. ample and competitive supply of low-carbon electricity/hydrogen to EEIs) Financing mechanisms for high CAPEX low-carbon investments (possibly including early replacement of existing assets)Strategic industrial low carbon infrastructure planning and development (for regional and transnational industry clusters / projects of common interest)Smart regulation for market creation for low carbon products/materials and integration with material efficiency and circularity (procurement, standards etc.)Continued support for energy intensive basic industries to safeguard competitiveness during the transition
6 recommendations for a comprehensive climate, energy, innovation and industrial policy strategy
Sourec: IT50 consortium, modified
19 February 2019 Stefan Lechtenböhmer - ITRE-hearing 10
Thank youFor your attentionSee our related projects: www.wupperinst.org www.in4climate.nrw www.reinvent.eu http://re-industrialise.climate-kic.org ECF/IT50
1119 February 2019 Stefan Lechtenböhmer - ITRE-hearing
The role of hydrogen in energy flexibility, availability, security,
and decarbonisation
Paul DoddsUniversity College London
Presented at the ITRE Workshop, EU Parliament, Brussels, on 19 February 2019
0
1.000
2.000
3.000
4.000
5.000
6.000
7.000
PJ
Biomass and biofuels Coal Electricity Natural GasHydrogen Oil Products Other Renewables Manufactured fuels
0
200
400
600
800
1.000
1.200
1.400
1.600
Hydr
ogen
cons
umpt
ion
(PJ)
2050
Service
Industry
Transport
Residential
Electricity
Does hydrogen have an important future energy role?
What is the role of hydrogen in a cost-optimal system in 2050 with an 80% GHG target? UK example – 26% of final energy consumption in 2050.
Hydrogen
4
What about across Europe?
JRC-EU-TIMES model, for the “CAP” scenario with an 80% GHG target across the EU. In 2050:
• ~1000 PJ hydrogen in heavy industry.
• ~500 PJ hydrogen in transport (mainly buses; some trucks and cars).
• No other hydrogen consumption for building heat.
• Hydrogen accounts for ~40% of excess electricity through power-to-gas.
5
Fuel cell cars are finally being commercialised
6
• The first models are now available to buy today in Europe.• Large-scale production has started in the last couple of years, which will
greatly reduce costs and spur innovation.
Hyundai ix35: 101 kW Toyota Mirai: 113 kW
Will hydrogen compete with battery vehicles?
• The IEA have historically been pro-electrification.
• Hydrogen advocacy has ramped up, with several McKinsey-backed reports.
• The Hydrogen Council has attracted a wide and enthusiastic membership.
• There is a lack of credible alternative studies of hydrogen potential, particularly globally.
KPMG Automotive Executive Survey 2019
71% in Europe; particularly high at CEO level
8
Hydrogen-powered vehicles
• Cars have a fuel tank, fuel cell and electric motor.• All commercial vehicles are hybrids, with battery
packs of various sizes.• No exhaust emissions.• There are many possible designs, including plug-in
hybrids.
9
Vehicle cost of ownership, excluding taxes
Dodds, P. E. and Ekins, P. (2014) A portfolio of power-trains for the UK: an energy systems analysis. International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 39(26):13941–13953.
It is very difficult to identify the “best” low-carbon powertrain
• Costs of many technologies are uncertain, and hydrogen and fuel cell technologies are close to being least-cost – hydrogen is used in many sectors and the overall cost differences are small.
• Non-cost issues such as vehicle range, refuelling time and loss of space in houses are important and consumers will pay a premium where necessary.
• There is an innovation race between technologies, with an uncertain outcome if we do not choose to pick what we believe will be winners.
Dodds, P. E. and Ekins, P. (2014) A portfolio of power-trains for the UK: an energy systems analysis. International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 39(26):13941–13953.
10
Hydrogen for heating
11
Heating is by far the largest global market for fuel cells at the moment – supplied with natural gas
Is Europe at the forefront of hydrogen and fuel cell innovation? Consider patents.
Global shift from focus on fuel cell design…
…to integration of H2FC into transport and other products
But Japan and the USA, and now Korea, are leaders in patents.
Fuel cells
Application of hydrogen and fuel cells to transport
12
CHP Vehicles RefuellingJapan 181,500 900 cars 78
Germany ~1,000 100 cars, 14 buses 22China n/a 90 cars, 40 buses 4
US 0.7 MW 331 cars, 33 buses 87South Korea 177 MW 71 cars 7
UK ~10 42 cars, 18 buses 14
Is Europe at the forefront of hydrogen and fuel cell innovation? Consider deployment andgovernment support.
Deployment to Sep 2016
CHP Vehicles RefuellingJapan £500–1,400 per unit £107m £45m
Germany € 10,200 / kW €8m for trains €350mChina ? £23–58k per vehicle £500k per station
US up to $3,000 / kW $8k per vehicle$0.50 / gallon H2
$100m in California
South Korea $31m total £20kper vehicle ?
UK n/a £2m for cars£2.8m for buses £5m
Governmentsupport in 2016
13
Hydrogen for heating in the UK
• Business-as-usual option for homeowners with natural gas heating.
• Is it politically feasible to decarbonise heating without decarbonising the gas networks?
• Would we use gas boilers, or fuel cell micro-CHP, or hybrid heat pumps?
• The UK is investing €35m in feasibility studies.
14
Fuel cell micro-CHP reduces peak heat pump load
Energy security implications of hydrogen
• How might hydrogen and fuel cells affect energy security in the UK energy system?
Conclusions:• Using hydrogen would not greatly change
energy security, as measured by various indices.
• Using hydrogen could reduce the impacts of volatile energy import prices – hydrogen is much cheaper to store than electricity.
• Diversity is a much cheaper strategy than energy commodity independence.
• Forward planning would be needed to ensure a diverse hydrogen production portfolio.
15
Hydrogen sustainability
Terminology that is gradually being adopted:• “Green” hydrogen: renewable, low carbon• “Blue” hydrogen: low carbon, non-renewable• “Brown” hydrogen: high carbon, non-renewable
• In Europe, green hydrogen schemes include:– CertifHy – EU certification scheme– TŰV SŰD – German– CEP – German– AFHYPAC – French– DECC – UK (abandoned)
• Electricity has had the same challenge for 20 years, yet some issues have still not been overcome (e.g. different treatment of green and blue?)
16
Thank you for listening
Contact me: [email protected]
Download the four White Papers:http://www.h2fcsupergen.com/our-
work/whitepapers/
Looking at Germany as an example
3
Germany will need significant renewable energy imports
Source: BMWi Energiedaten 30.07.2018 and FEV Europe GmbH
Reduction of primary energy usage below 2000TWh until 2050 not likely
Increase of production of renewable energy above 2000TWh also not likely due to
− Land usage and social acceptance of wind farms
− bioenergy limited if produced sustainable
Germany will need transportable (liquid) renewable energy carriers0
5001.0001.5002.0002.5003.0003.5004.0004.5005.000
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020Prim
ary e
nerg
y co
nsum
ptio
n / T
Wh
Energy situation GermanyPrimärenergieverbrauch AußenhandelssaldoPrimary energy usage Foreign trade balance
Energy scenario for Germany 2050
5
H2
H2
Imported energy must be:
- stored
- distributed
- sold to customers
- used by customersGrid and electricstorage
Imported energy can be:
- Hydrogen
- Methanol
- E-Fuels (Fischer-Tropsch)
- others
~300 TWh
~300 TWh
~1500 TWh
~200 TWh
Source: FEV Europe GmbH: Zero CO2 mobility conference 2018
Challenging assumption: 600TWh renewable electricity in Germany
Electricity & hydrogen are best used from domestic supply
6
PtX is a key element of energy revolution establishing a circular economy for CO2
Storage of domestic excess renewable energy from fluctuation of wind and solar power
Re-electrification in times of calm darkness
Germany will depend completely on renewable energy, though domestic resources will not suffice
Import of chemical carriers of renewable energy
− Low density of H2 and CH4 requires liquefaction or large gas tanks on vessels or pipeline diameters
− PtL requires more energy but drop-in fuels could reduce net CO2 emissions of the entire fleet
PtL enables energy transport over long distances.
Source: https://globalsolaratlas.infom https://globalwindatlas.info/ and FEV Europe GmbH
Where to start? - The Netherlands
10
Existing gas pipeline
Retrofitted compressors
New hydrogen pipeline
Industrial cluster
Hydrogen storage in salt cavern
• Low caloric gas pipelines will become available, because the Groningen gas
field has to reduce production to 0 in 2030
• 1 Transport pipeline capacity about 15 GW
• New hydrogen pipeline connections to offshore wind farms
• Connections to Germany (Ruhr-area, Bremen-Hamburg and Belgium
(Antwerp, Zeebrugge)
• European connections to France, Austria, Italy, etc.
12
Contacts
Hydrogen Europe
Avenue de la Toison d’Or 56-60 E-mail: [email protected]
1060 Brussels Tel.: 0032 2 540 87 75
Belgium www.hydrogeneurope.eu
Phasing out coal from the electricity generation sector in Germany
Brussels,19.02.2019, Rafał Bajczuk
1. Goals of Germany’s energy transition
Energy generation Energy consumption GHGemmissions
Renewables Energy efficiency Climatepolicy
Electricity Final energyconsumption
Primaryenergy
Electricalenergy
2020 35% 18% -20% -10% -40%
2030 50% 30% -55%
2040 65% 45% -70%2050 80% 60% -50% -25% -80-95%
1. Goals of Germanys Energy transition
1. Environmental aspects Creating an energy supply system that is environmentally compatible and protects natural habitat.
2. Nuclear energyphase-out Switching off the last nuclear power plants at the end of 2022.
3. Affordability Competitiveness Maintaining affordability of energy and ensuring Germany's competitiveness.
4. Sector couplingand digitisation Unlocking the potential of efficient sector coupling and digitisation for a successful energy transition
5. Research and Innovation Fostering forward-looking innovations for the restructuring of the energy supply.
6. Investment GrowthJobs Retaining and creating jobs in Germany and laying the foundations for sustainable prosperity and quality of life.
7. Security of supply Efficiently covering Germany’s energy needs at all times.
8. Grid expansion Expanding and modernising grids to meet demand.
Source: Sixth "Energy Transition" Monitoring Report "The Energy of the Future„ 2018
1. How is Germany accomplishing its goals?
6.2
15.2 15.96.3
9.4
17.0
31.5
36.0
11.5
18
30
35
50
40
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2000 2005 2010 2015 Ziel2020
Ziel2025
Ziel2030
Renewable energy share of gross final energy consumption
Renewable energy share of gross electricity consumption
to 45
Source: German Environment Agency - Umweltbundesamt
1. What about the climate policy?
751
563
375
427333 313
284
193 200
164
166 168
132
89 93
79
67 66
1,251
911 907
,0
,200
,400
,600
,800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2017 Ziel2020**
Ziel2030**
Ziel2040**
Ziel2050**
Energy Industry Industry* Transport Households Commercial/Insti tutional Agr icul ture Waste and Waste Water Other Emissions*
substantial greenhouse
gas neutrality
Source: German Environment Agency - Umweltbundesamt
Million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents
1. CO2 emmissions from electricity generation
156,9 150,7
118,5
71,1
0,0
50,0
100,0
150,0
200,0
250,0
300,0
350,0
400,0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Other
Waste
Oil
Natural gas
Hard coal
Lignite
326,8
285,2
Source: Federal Ministry For Economic Affairs And Energy, Energy Data: Complete Edition, August 2018
2. Coal – exit
Source: Federal Ministry For Economic Affairs And Energy, Energy Data: Complete Edition, August 2018
0
5
10
15
20
25
2018 2022 2030 2035/38
LigniteHard Coal
Power plant capacity in GW
3. Impact on the electricity mix
Source: Federal Ministry For Economic Affairs And Energy, Energy Data: Complete Edition, August 2018
Lignite; 24,10%
Hard Coal;
13,90%
Nuclear Power; 13,30%
Natural gas;
8,40%
Wind power; 20,40%
Biomas; 7,40%
PV; 8,40%
Hydro; 3,20%
Other; 0,91%
Electricity mix 2018 Electricity mix 2035
Renewable
energy; 60%
Natural gas; 40%
3. Impact on CO2 emmissions
Source: Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (2016). Climate Action Plan 2050
Area of action
1990(in million tonnes
of CO2-equivalent)
2014(in million tonnes
of CO2-equivalent)
2030(in million tonnes
of CO2-equivalent)
2030(reduction in percent compared to 1990)
Total 1248 902 543 to 562 56 to 55Energy sector 466 358 175 to 183 62 to 61
Buildings 209 119 70 to 72 67 to 66Transport 163 160 95 to 98 42 to 40Industry 283 181 140 to 143 51 to 49Agriculture 88 72 58 to 61 34 to 31Subtotal 1209 890 538 to 557 56 to 54Other 39 12 5 87
3. Impact on power prices
Source: Federal Ministry For Economic Affairs And Energy, Energy Data: Complete Edition, August 2018
Source: Levelized cost of electricity. Renewable Energy Technologies, Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems ISE, 2018
3. Impact on European energy and climate policy
Source: Last Gasp. The coal companies making Europe sick, November 2018
3. Impact on European energy and climate policy
Source: Last Gasp. The coal companies making Europe sick, November 2018
“Energiewende” in Germany- phasing out coal from the electricity generation -
Jürgen-Fr. Hake, JülichBrussels, February 19th, 2019
Transformation – “Energiewende”Top Priorities• Mitigation of GHG
emissions• High share of REN• Highest efficiency in all
sectors.Conversion Sector• Electricity, heat and fuels• 80 % REN in electricity
generation
European Dimension
Braunkohle in DRevier Vorräte Beschäftigte Strom-, FW Brutto-StromRheinland 31,0 Mrd. t 8.961 80,4 Mio. t 74,5 TWh (NRW)Lausitz 3,1 Mrd. t 8.278 58,6 Mio. t 34,6 TWh (BB)Mitteldeutschland 2,0 Mrd. t 2.414 16,4 Mio. t 31,8 TWh (S)Total 36,1 Mrd. t 19.852 156,9 Mio. t 150 TWh
• Brutto-Stromerzeugung in D: 648,4 TWh, davon Braunkohle 22,7 % (150TWh), Steinkohle 16,5 %.
• Kohlequalität variiert.• Ein Ausstieg aus der Braunkohle erscheint kurzfristig problematisch,
perspektivisch aber möglich.
ProblemsGeneration• Reduced technology portfolio• Managing volatility / capacity and …Grid• Delays in grid restructuring• Subsurface cables / costEnd-use• Efficiency• Alternatives for energy intensive industries
Public acceptance still high, but NIMBY effects
“Kohle-Kommission” - Questions• Was bekommen die
Kohleregionen?• Wie wird Strukturwandel
abgesichert?• Neue Arbeitsplätze für
Kohlekumpel?• Wie wird der Ausstieg
organisiert?• Was passiert bis 2030?• Was kosten die
Stilllegungen?• Wann ist endgültig Schluss?/FAZ, 18. Januar 2019, p. 23/
„Kohle-Kommission“ – Results• Schrittweise Reduzierung der Kohleverstromung bis Ende
2038; Monitoring der Umsetzbarkeit• Begrenzung der Strompreise: Zuschuss auf die
Übertragungsnetzentgelte o.ä. sowie zusätzlicheEntlastung energieintensiver Unternehmen
• Gewährleistung der Versorgungssicherheit u.a. durch denAusbau von Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung und neuenGaskraftwerken sowie die Modernisierung der Stromnetzeund die Überarbeitung des Steuersystems
• ‚Proaktive Strukturentwicklung‘ in den Revieren durch dieWeiterentwicklung zu zukunftsfähigen Energieregionen(u.a. neue Wertschöpfungsketten und Infrastrukturen; 40Mrd. Euro vom Bund)
Abschlussbericht (01/2019)
20. Februar 2019 Seite 8
“Kohle-Kommission” – First Reactions
FinancialCompensation
“Länder fordern bis zusechzig Milliarden
Euro, der Bund plantmit viel weniger”
/FAS 18. Nov. 2018
FinancialCompensation
“Länder fordern bis zusechzig Milliarden
Euro, der Bund plantmit viel weniger”
/FAS 18. Nov. 2018
“In der Koalition Ärger über dieErgebnisse der Kohlekommission”
/FAZ 14. Feb. 2019, p. 19/
“In der Koalition Ärger über dieErgebnisse der Kohlekommission”
/FAZ 14. Feb. 2019, p. 19/
In the Nutshell• Stakeholder representation• Parliamentary involvement• Financial commitment• Structural change
In the Nutshell• Stakeholder representation• Parliamentary involvement• Financial commitment• Structural change
Conclusions & OutlookAnalysis• Studies from major stakeholders• “Energiewende” is feasible, but …• Public acceptance matters• European dimension important
New Role for Natural Gas• Increasing market share• Baltic Sea Pipeline II• New LNG terminals
monitoring, checkpoints, learning, … most relevant!
“Europa braucht in Zukunft viel mehr russisches Erdgas, dadie Produktion in den Niederlanden in den nächsten Jahrenstark abnehmen wird und Norwegen […] keine Steigerungzugetraut wird. Darüber hinauswird noch zusätzliches Gas
gebraucht, um Atom- und Kohlestrom zu ersetzen.”/FAZ 16. Feb. 2019, p. 26/
“Europa braucht in Zukunft viel mehr russisches Erdgas, dadie Produktion in den Niederlanden in den nächsten Jahrenstark abnehmen wird und Norwegen […] keine Steigerungzugetraut wird. Darüber hinauswird noch zusätzliches Gas
gebraucht, um Atom- und Kohlestrom zu ersetzen.”/FAZ 16. Feb. 2019, p. 26/
• Climate change• Energy security• Climate change• Energy security