the effect of habit as a behavioural response in risk reduction programmes

Pergamon Safety Science, Vol. 22, No. l-3, pp. 163-175, 1996

Copyright 0 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd

Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0925-7X45/96 $15.00 + 0.00

SO9257535(96)00013-6

THE EFFECT OF HABIT AS A BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSE IN RISK REDUCTION PROGRAMMES

Sharon Clarke

Aston Business School (Psychology Group), Aston University, Birmingham 84 7ET, UK

Abstract-A company’s decision to implement a risk reduction programme must take account

of employees’ behavioural responses to the target risk. Hazard reporting by train drivers is

examined in semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire study. It is suggested that the

behavioural response of drivers, in terms of writing a report, depends on how the hazard is

perceived. The response to “trivial” and “routine” hazards is habitual non-reporting, being

characterized by a lack of risk evaluation. However, hazards that are evaluated as posing a

significant risk are reported. Possible ways of breaking habitual responses to hazards, using

behavioural change programmes, are discussed, and it is argued that management commitment

is essential for their success. Copyright 0 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd

1. Introduction

In order to safeguard the integrity of a socio-technical system, it is essential to understand the associated risks and responses of operators to those risks, on a day-to-day basis. As operators interact with the system over time, they will develop a repertoire of behaviours; these will be shaped by their experience of reality, including the risks associated with system operation. The design of risk reduction programmes must take account of the nature of risky operator behaviours in the face of workplace hazards.

Qualitative and quantitative methods of risk assessment exist to identify the nature, frequency and severity of risks. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) has incorporated the reliability of the human element in socio-technical systems, through the assessment of the likelihood of error (see, for example, Miller and Swain, 1987). Where an unacceptable risk is identified, measures can be taken to eliminate, reduce or control the hazard or mitigate its consequences. Engineered safety devices may be installed, such as interlocks and automatic alarm systems, to protect the system from operator error. However, such devices can be foiled through the risk compensatory behaviour of operators. Safety rules and procedures may be developed to control the behaviour of operators in the face of risk; however, such rules may be violated. This paper examines operators’ responses to hazards and ways in which risk reduction programmes can mitigate risky operator behaviours.

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164 S. Clarke

2. Theories of risk-taking

One of the most prominent theories of behaviour in the face of risk, Risk Homeostasis Theory (RI-IT), suggests that individuals have a target level of risk that they will seek to maintain; they will take action to restore the target level when a discrepancy between perceived risk and target risk is detected (Wilde, 1982). This theory assumes that individuals process environmental information in terms of risk and make a conscious evaluation of the risk in relation to the target level. Although Wilde (1988) has suggested compensatory behaviour can occur at a pre-attentive level, thought processes such as hazard seeking, risk evaluation and cost-benefit analysis will require focused attention. However, Summala (1988) notes that for much of the time, “we do not really worry about.. . risks; in fact, we usually do not even think about them”. (p. 493). Jorgensen (1988) concluded that road users do not perceive their everyday actions in terms of risk. l%Nnen and Summala (1974) have suggested that people tend to operate at the level of zero perceived risk. They adapt to risks and this leads to a distortion of their risk perceptions, resulting in automatic actions without risk considerations. In the work context, this might lead to operators adapting to risks and violating rules designed to limit risk. This suggests that rules should be strictly enforced to prevent operators taking risks.

McKenna (1988) notes that “target level of risk is almost certainly not the sole determining factor directing behaviour” (p. 487); indeed, broader theories of behaviour include measures of an individual’s attitudes, perceptions and beliefs, without necessarily referring to the risk associated with an activity. The theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) proposes that behaviour can be predicted on the basis of behavioural intentions and attitudes towards a specific behaviour. Much research has focused on the importance of attitudes towards safety (Leather, 1987, 1988; Cox and Cox, 1991; Glendon, 1991). Zohar (198Oa) argues that safe behaviour by workers will ensue when they perceive that safety is relevant to their job and that management has a positive attitude towards safety. At an individual level, therefore, specific attitudes towards safety will influence safe behaviour. Group and company values will shape individuals’ safety attitudes. These values will be represented in the organization’s “safety culture” (CBI, 1990; IAEA, 1991; HSC, 1993). The safety culture influences the behaviour of employees by shaping their perceptions of what is expected of them; i.e., it establishes norms amongst employees of what is regarded as “acceptable behaviour”. Important aspects of the safety culture include: perceived commitment of management to safety, visible management actions, and the relation between safety and the individual’s work outcomes, e.g., promotion (Cooper and Phillips, 1994). Therefore, operators’ perceptions of managers’ attitudes and actions will have a significant influence on their safety behaviour.

Empirical research has demonstrated that attitudes and behavioural intentions predict behaviour well for low base-rate behaviours, e.g., blood donation, where conscious processes such as decision-making and risk-taking are involved, but less well for high base-rate behaviours, e.g., use of seatbelts, where the behaviour is routine or habitual. In the latter case, measures of habit or past experience are better predictors than attitudes or intentions (Wittenbraker et al., 1983; Mittal, 1988). It has been observed that many everyday behaviours are routinized and do not involve conscious processes such as decision-making and risk evaluation (Wagenaar, 1992). This may be particularly true in industrial settings, where an operator’s job may have a fairly narrow definition. Analyses of the causes of accidents seem to support this view. Habit has been found to play a significant role in maritime accidents: it

Behavioural response and risk reduction 165

was involved in 46% of all accidents in one study (Wagenaar and Groeneweg, 1987). It was also prominent in accidents affecting an oil company, but played a smaller role in the accidents of the Dutch police force (studies cited by Groeneweg, 1992). Parker et al. (1992) found that perceived behavioural control (which is predicted by past behaviour) accounted for significant additional variance in predictions of drivers’ intentions to commit violations in hypothetical road traffic scenarios. At an individual level, therefore, risky behaviour will depend on a variety of factors, including attitudes, beliefs and past experience, as well as risk perceptions.

The following studies investigate self-reported behavioural responses to hazards, in terms of train drivers’ hazard reporting. Theories of risk-taking behaviour would suggest that drivers will evaluate the risk involved in leaving a hazard unreported and weigh this evaluation in their decision of whether to report. However, empirical studies have shown that high base-rate behaviours are better predicted by habit. Factors other than the level of risk are likely to be involved; drivers’ safety attitudes and past experience of reporting and their perceptions of managers’ safety commitment will significantly influence their behaviour. The following studies examine the association between assumed reasons for not reporting and a variety of hazards.

3. Train driver hazard reporting

The environment of the railway system is intrinsically hazardous. System safety depends on both engineered safety devices, such as a signalling system designed to keep trains a safe distance apart, and procedures designed to ensure safe working practices among staff. The railway depends on procedures, having developed an extensive Rule Book over many years, based largely on lessons learned from previous accidents. Train drivers are required by the Rule Book to report faults, failures and other hazards by writing a report. For example, regarding signalling irregularities, clause 6.8.2 states that “Before leaving duty, the Driver must complete and hand in Form BR 2351 showing the full details of the failure or irregularity”; the same applies to defective AWS (Appendix 8, clause 7); train defects must be entered into the Repair Book (section H.14, clause 14.3.1). More generally, section H 7.1 deals with the reporting of any observed irregularity or obstruction; clause 7.1.4 states that “If he observes something not of immediate danger to trains.. . he must report it at the first suitable opportunity”, and clause 7.1.6 states that “Before leaving duty, the person concerned must make a full written report of the circumstances of any irregularity or exceptional incident”. The following two studies examine the extent to which drivers report a variety of railway hazards.

4. Study One: semi-structured interviews

4. I. Method

4.1 .I. Sample As part of a wider study, 38 train drivers in one large area of British Rail were interviewed.

Respondents were aged between 22 and 63 years (mean = 36.6, S.D. = 14.1) and had been qualified drivers from one to 37 years (mean = 11.9, S.D. = 13.3).

166 S. Clarke

4. I .2. Procedure Interviews took place at each of the three major depots in the area, over the period

December 1991-February 1992. Drivers were recruited from the messroom during periods when they had no scheduled work. They were asked their age, how long they had worked for the railway and how long they had been driving.

A semi-structured interview schedule was piloted with four drivers; minor alterations were then made to the wording of some of the questions. Drivers were asked if they objected to the interview being recorded; in cases where drivers had no objection, interviews were recorded on audio tape (otherwise written notes were taken). Interviews lasted between 30 and 45 minutes. Two of the questions referred specifically to hazard reporting, i.e.:

“What is your attitude towards putting in reports on signal irregularities or any other safety concerns you come

across?”

“Do you think drivers fill in reports as ofren as they should?’ ’

4.2. Results

About half of the drivers expressed a positive attitude towards reporting, saying it was very necessary and something that had to be done. The remainder, however, expressed a more negative attitude towards reporting, saying it was a waste of time and that they did not report as often as they should.

Those who expressed a positive attitude towards reporting said that by reporting they were protecting their own safety and also the safety of others. One driver said that if he didn’t report a signal fault and the next day there was an accident there, it would “play on his mind” that he could have prevented it. Others commented that:

“I always put reports in on signals that go back to danger and things like that, that’s the top part of safety.

Because its not just passengers’ lives, its your own life you’ve got to think of as well. So when something like that

happens then you’ve got to stick one in.”

“You’ve got to, because basically, you’re playing with people’s lives. I mean if there’s a problem with it, tf

there’s a signal showing the wrong aspect or something, and you don’t report it, and something happens, nine

times out of ten, the driver gets hurt or killed. My motto is, if I look ajier myself. everybody else behind me’s OK.”

Drivers who expressed a more negative attitude towards reporting said that they would make some kind of judgement about whether an incident was “worth reporting”, often saying that they would only put in a report if they considered it a “major” incident:

“If it’s a major incident then obviously you put a report in, if you know somebody on the management’s seen it or

if the incident involves another person who will probably want you as a witness, then, yeah, put a report in. But

otherwise, if something minor happens, you think, that shouldn’t have happened that, you square it up with somebody and you don’t bother.”

The actual procedure of putting in a report acted as a deterrent to some drivers; even those who had never had to put in a report expressed a reluctance about doing so, based on the stories they had heard from other drivers. Drivers were unhappy that, as it was often the case that their reports could not be substantiated, they seemed to carry the blame or were doubted. One driver said that sometimes it was as though the driver had “broken the signal himself”. Other comments included:

“It is a bit of a farce sometimes. _ . The forms you’ve got to fill in as soon as you get back, I’ve had one happen just up here, within two minutes I’ve arrived back at my own depot and I’m ready to go home and I’ve gof to ~711

forms in, in my own time. Its not what I feel like doing.”


“They’ve made it that way now, that you just get fed up with reporting because they just keep asking you the same

thing over and over and over again. You’ve got to fill it out, three copies or something like that, and then they

keep maithering you months and months ajier.. . So drivers just get fed up and don’t bother.”

About two-thirds said they thought drivers did not fill in reports or that they only filled them in “when necessary”. Drivers felt that it was common for drivers to avoid putting in a report and that they would either “square it with the signalman”, call a traction inspector and hope that he would sort it out, or not report it at all, particularly if he considered the incident to be minor:

“If rhey can get out of filling in forms they will do, and I’m just the same. If it’s needed, I may be the wrong

person to judge this, but if I think it’s needed, I’llfill the form in, bur up to now I’ve never needed to.”

“No, drivers should make more reporrs out. They see what is going on and say ‘sod it’ and they should report

it.”

“No, because if you did, you’d be filling reports in all the rime. Certain things, like trespassers and rhings like

rhat, you’d be stopping every two minutes to reporr them, so you jusr don’t bother. But such as signal

irregularities, yes I think most of them, well, they should do anyway.”

The most common reasons given for not reporting were the amount of paperwork and getting someone else into trouble.

5. Study two: fault and failure reporting questionnaire

5.1. Method

This study is reported in more detail in Clarke (1993).

5.1 .I. Sample

Respondents were 128 British Rail train drivers, aged between 22 and 64 years (mean = 48.9, S.D. = 12.41, who had been drivers for between four months and 37 years (mean = 15.9, SD. = 11.0). Drivers were based in three different areas of British Rail.

5.1.2. Procedure

Drivers were given a short self-completion questionnaire to fill in and assured that their responses would be treated as strictly confidential. Questionnaires were returned anonymously in addressed envelopes via the internal maii.

Respondents were presented with a list of 12 hazards that a driver might come across in the course of his job (see Table 1) and asked to indicate their likelihood of reporting them (1 = definitely, 2 = possibly, 3 = not worth reporting). From a list of six reasons for not reporting, drivers could tick as many as applied: just part of the day’s work; nothing would get done; managers would take no notice; you would get someone else into trouble; there would be too much unnecessary paperwork; and you would call the signalman or tell an inspector instead. The hazards and reasons for not reporting were derived from drivers’ responses in the interview study. Only 88 cases were entered into the analysis, or 40 cases had missing data - mostly due to drivers’ reluctance to answer the item about reporting a fellow driver for breaking a rule.

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5.2. Results

The means obtained for likelihood of reporting the 12 hazards are given in Table 1. The most likely to be reported are: AWS bell at yellow (caution) and passing a signal at danger. The former is a signalling failure where the warning system registers clear (a bell) when the signal is at yellow (caution); this is a “wrong-side failure”, as the system does not fail safe. The latter results in a train entering a section of track that is occupied by another train. The least likely to be reported is a fellow driver breaking a rule.

In Clarke (19931, two main factors were extracted; however, extracting a third factor improves the “fit” of the data. The third factor gives an extra dimension to the interpretation of the data that is worth reporting, although the three-factor solution is less parsimonious than the two-factor solution (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989). The three factors extracted by principal components analysis were rotated using varimax rotation (the factors were uncorrelated). The three factors accounted for 48.2% of the variance in total.

Five hazards load onto the first factor: riding over a rough section of track (indicating that the track is in a poor state of repair); cracked windscreen (which could shatter at speed); brakes worse than expected (leading to the train having longer braking distances); signal obscured by trees (leading to difficulty/delay in the driver reading the signal); and information not in the Notice (failing to give the driver advance warning of engineering works). All these hazards present a significant danger to the system; however, this danger is not necessarily immediate, and reporting of these hazards is variable. All these hazards were derived from the interview study as incidents that did occur with some degree of regularity (i.e., drivers had experienced these events themselves or knew of others who had); this factor might be dubbed “routine” hazards.

Table 1 Factor analysis showing loadings of 12 hazards (N = 88)

Hazard Likelihood of reporting mean Factor loadings > 0.40

Fl F2 F3

Rough section of track 1.47 77 Cracked windscreen 1.31 74 Brakes worse than expected I .28 67 Signal obscured by trees 1.49 45 Information not in Notice 1.88 41 Trespassers 1.89 72 AWS horn at green signal 1.40 62 P/Way staff not acknowledge 2.02 60 Material left on lineside 2.13 43 54 AWS bell at yellow signal 1.06 74 Unavoidable SPD 1.10 64 Fellow driver breaks rule 2.39 -61

eigenvalue 3.09 1.41 1.28 % variance explained 25.7 11.8 10.7

P/Way = Permanent Way; AWS = Automatic Warning System; SPD = Signal Passed at Danger; loadings IO 2 decimal places; decimal points omitted.


Four hazards load onto the second factor: trespassers on the line (possible vandalism or potential suicide); AWS horn at green signal (right-side failure, where the system fails safe); P/Way staff not acknowledging the driver; and material left on lineside (providing missiles for vandals). The final hazard (material on lineside) cross-loads with the first factor. These hazards do not pose an immediate danger to the driver or his train; also, they are incidents that occur frequently, i.e., an almost daily occurrence (perhaps with the exception of right-side failures, although one interviewee said it was possible to encounter “half a dozen a day”). This factor might represent “trivial” hazards.

Three hazards load onto the final factor: AWS bell at yellow signal (wrong-side failure); unavoidable SPD (signal passed at danger); and fellow driver breaks rule. The latter hazard was the worst reported, and had a negative loading onto this factor. Wrong-side failures and signals passed at danger are considered very serious by British Rail; they are the type of incidents that might happen to a driver once or twice in his career. This factor might represent “unusual” hazards.

Unweighted factor scores were calculated for each of the factors; excluding material on lineside (cross-loading) from factor 2 and fellow driver breaking a rule (negative loading) from factor 3. Factor 2 was worst reported (mean = 1.74, S.D. = O.SO), factor 1 was not well reported either (mean = 1.46, S.D. = 0.40) and factor 3 was very well reported (mean = 1.07, S.D. = 0.27). One-way ANOVA showed that the three means differed significantly [ F(2, 200) = 98.5, p < O.OOl]. Contrasts showed that factor 1 differed significantly from factor 2 (t = 5.51, p < 0.001) and that factors 1 and 2 differed significantly from factor 3 (r= 13.5, p < 0.001).

Standard multiple regression analyses were used to calculate the predictive power of the reasons for not reporting. Frequencies for each reason were divided into dichotomies, using a median split (high and low usage of the reason). These six dichotomous variables were used as predictors in three multiple regressions, with unweighted factor scores for the three factors as dependent variables.

Factor 1 (routine): the regression model for factor 1 accounted for 29.4% of the variance (multiple R = 0.542; adjusted R* = 0.251), which was significant [ F(6, 98) = 6.81, p <

O.OOOl]. Three of the reasons were significant predictors: managers take no notice (Beta = 0.289; t = 2.94, p < 0.005); nothing will get done (Beta = 0.240; t = 2.40, p < 0.05); and part of the day’s work (Beta = 0.218; t = 2.17, p < 0.05).

Facror 2 (trivial): this model accounted for a smaller proportion of the variance than for factor 1 ( R2 = 0.170, adjusted R2 = 0.120), but was significant (multiple R =

0.408; [ F(6, 106) = 3.53, p < 0.0051. Only one reason was a significant predictor: unnecessary paperwork (Beta = 0.211; t = 2.03, p < 0.05).

Factor 3 (unusual): a log transformation was used to improve the normality of factor 3 scores. The regression model accounted for a small amount of the variance (11.1%; 6.4% when adjusted); however, the model was significant [multiple R = 0.333; F(6, 113) = 2.35, p < 0.051. One reason was a significant predictor: managers take no notice (Beta = 0.295; t = 2.77, p < 0.01).

6. Discussion

The results suggest that the hazards might be grouped into three categories: routine (likely to be encountered, less likely to be reported); trivial (very likely to be encountered, very

170 S. Clarke

unlikely to be reported); unusual (very unlikely to be encountered, very likely to be reported). The factors influencing the likelihood of reporting these hazards differ. “Trivial” hazards are poorly reported; as they are encountered so frequently, it is the reporting procedure itself that seems to deter drivers from reporting. As one driver indicated, “you’d be filling reports in all the time. Certain things, like trespassers and things like that, you’d be stopping every two minutes to report them, so you just don’t bother”. “Routine” hazards are not reported, as they are perceived to be “just part of the day’s work” and unlikely to be resolved; one driver noted that “the odd driver will say, I’ll report that, I’ve done it myself and I’ve ignored others. . . . It depends on the gravity of the failure, obviously if it’s a dangerous one, everyone would stop and report it, but certain things become run of the mill”. This suggests that the behavioural response of drivers to routine hazards, which are regarded as the everyday working norm, is habitual. Thus, as drivers encounter incidents frequently and find that no action is taken to remedy them or reports seem to be ignored, then non-reporting is reinforced. Eventually, this will result in routine hazards being habitually non-reported; i.e., reporting the incident is not considered, the decision not to report is automatic. Whether managers will take notice of reports was the principal predictor of non-reporting for both “routine” and “unusual” hazards; this may be indicative of drivers’ lack of confidence in managers and the reporting system in general. This supports the hypothesis that perceptions of managers’ safety commitment would have a significant effect on drivers’ behaviour. This finding has implications for risk reduction programmes: as behaviour is influenced by perceptions of management commitment, unless drivers are convinced that managers are committed to the changes, they will not alter their behaviour. Previous research has found that management commitment to interventions is important for their success (e.g., Smith et al., 1978).

The non-reporting of hazards allows risk to exist in the system, which would have been controlled if safety rules had not been violated. Whilst it would be unusual for some of the serious hazards (such as a wrong-side signalling failure) not to have been reported, hazards that pose a less immediate danger (such as a rough section of track) were habitually not reported. The results suggest that drivers do not willfully neglect the rules that require them to make reports, rather that they perceive the lack of action on the part of management to justify their non-reporting. A similar result was found by a British Rail investigation into the behaviour of track workers (British Rail Research, 1991), where the report concluded that P/Way gangs violated rules, as they “perceive a lack of ability and commitment to place the maintenance of rules and standards above other aims and perceive the organisation’s top priority as getting the job done” (p. 14). Furthermore, drivers will be aware of the pressures that exist to avoid delays, and in certain cases may be deterred from stopping a train to call the signalman for “trivial” incidents, when this would result in a delay. Some trains may be fitted with in-cab radios, which would not require the train to be stopped; however, more frequently, drivers would need to stop the train and call the signalman from a telephone on the lineside. Guest et al. (1994) found that conflicts can and do arise between completing work on time and obeying safety rules; furthermore, some managers were perceived to condone putting task completion before safety rules, with low accident groups associated with managers who were able to avoid such conflicts by forward planning. Thus, when the functional pressure of work and the perceived need to “get the job done” combine with routinized behaviour, the result will be the development of unsafe working practices and also a reduced confidence in management.

Rule violations, which result in operators running risks, may be routinely committed to gain an acceptable level of system functioning; whilst the possibility of a negative outcome is

Behauioural response and risk reduction 171

accepted, operators may assume that system failure will not occur in the short term (Jackson and Carter, 1992). For example, a driver failing to report a signal obscured by overhanging trees may assume that the next driver to pass the signal will not misread the signal due to its obfuscation and drive his train into the rear of the preceding train; i.e., the system will not fail in the short term. An element of unrealistic optimism (Weinstein, 1980) may also be involved, as the driver may assume that even if such an accident were to occur, it would be unlikely to involve him. The driver’s personal experience and his knowledge concerning this type of incident, gained, for example, through discussions with other drivers, may influence the driver’s behaviour, although Weinstein (1989) found that there was no significant relationship between personal experience of an automobile accident (involving self, relatives or friends) and the wearing of seatbelts (self-protective behaviour). Thus, experience of a particular hazard may not necessarily lead to the driver taking action, i.e., making a report. The extent to which such experience will influence behaviour will depend on the degree of individual responsibility and the perceived relation of safety to the driver’s job (Zohar, 198Oa).

6.1. Habitual operator responses and risk reduction

The previous study showed that hazards could be grouped into three categories: routine, trivial and unusual, with the likelihood of reporting routine and trivial hazards significantly lower than for unusual hazards. These results suggest that the unusual hazards (which pose the most obvious danger) are subject to conscious risk evaluation, whereas the more frequent, routine and trivial incidents are habitually non-reported and are not subject to risk considerations. In order to design an effective risk reduction programme, it would be essential to determine whether the normal operator response was to report (e.g., train drivers normally report an AWS bell at a yellow signal) or not to report (e.g., train drivers normally fail to report obscured signals). In the latter case, where the normal response is a rule violation, it must be appreciated that the behaviour may be habit-driven and, therefore, not amenable to alteration through attitude change programmes.

Habit-driven behaviour will be reinforced by repeated experience and triggered by environmental cues rather than through conscious thought processes. Such behaviour, therefore, will be divorced from the influence of attitudes and intentions: Mittal (1988) found no significant correlation (I = - 0.09) between non-use habit and attitudes (towards seatbelt usage) and a small correlation (r = - 0.13, p < 0.05) between non-use habit and intentions (to use a seatbelt). Such evidence would suggest that changes in attitudes will have little effect in altering this type of behaviour. Weinstein (1987) found that perceptions of risk were unrelated to self-protective behaviour where that behaviour was habitual (seatbelt usage). Thus, efforts to change risk perceptions may have little effect on actual behaviour.

In order for attitude change programmes to be successful, attitude change must be translated into behavioural change; but changes in attitudes do not necessarily translate into changes in behaviour. For example, Adler et al. (1992) note that interventions have been successful in changing health beliefs, but that these attitude changes did not result in any change in personal health habits, such as diet and smoking. However, although a change in attitude need not necessarily lead to a change in behaviour, changes in behaviour, due to environmental pressure, can lead to changes in attitudes. Cooper and Phillips (1994) report that a positive shift was found in attitudes following the implementation of a behavioural intervention (goal-setting and feedback). Attitude change may result as a forced change in behaviour leads to a re-evaluation of attitudes held and a change in attitude to justify the

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adoption of a new behaviour; such a change will result in a reduction of the cognitive dissonance created by a conflict between attitude and behaviour (Festinger, 1957).

6.2. Habit-breaking as a behauioural change technique

If the target behaviour is habitual, then attitude change is not likely to be effective. Wagenaar (1992) suggests that “a change of risk-attitudes would only result in behavioural change if the existing routines were broken down and replaced by new routines” (p. 270). This would suggest that risk reduction measures will be unsuccessful, unless they focus on habits that might be considered risky and replace these habits with new, less risky routines. Therefore, behavioural change is the more appropriate strategy if the target behaviour is habitual.

Rule enforcement may not appear credible where “getting the job done” is perceived to be the company’s priority. Rule violations will be resistant to change where their outcomes, in terms of system operability, are rewarded. For example, if all drivers stopped their trains to call the signalman every time they saw trespassers, there wouldn’t be a route in the country that could meet its punctuality performance target. Therefore, system operability is served by drivers ignoring “trivial” hazards. However, there comes a point where system operability, in the long term, is not served by the non-reporting of hazards; the ignoring of “routine” hazards may lead to poorly maintained lines, defective equipment and obscured signals, creating an error-enforcing work environment. The predictive power of drivers’ confidence in the system suggests that behavioural change through rule enforcement alone will not be effective if management is not perceived as committed to the working practices set out in rules. Research into safety culture has emphasized the importance of management commitment to safety (Phillips et al., 1993; Cooper and Phillips, 1994), and top management commitment to safety has been shown to differentiate between low and high accident rates in companies (Smith et al., 1978). If management does not appear to endorse rule enforcement with visible action (as well as words), this will lead to the continued violation of rules. In order for rule enforcement to be successful, workers must believe in management commitment. The current studies have shown that drivers’ confidence in the system needs to be restored before one could expect to see behavioural change.

Behavioural change programmes have been most successful when they are aimed at a specific behaviour, where goals and rewards can be easily and unambiguously defined, such as the use of personal protective equipment (Cohen et al., 1979; Zohar, 1980b; Chhokar and Wallin, 1984). Therefore, the first step in habit-breaking should involve bringing the problem (e.g., non-reporting of a specific hazard) to the attention of operators. This might be achieved through group discussion in briefings or safety meetings, where open discussion of the issue would oblige operators to re-evaluate consciously the risks involved. Whilst this may result in a positive shift in attitudes, it is unlikely to have any bearing on actual behaviour unless the conditions to which the operators are responding are taken into consideration. For example, drivers might be encouraged to report obscured signals; they might be convinced that ignoring this problem presents a threat to safety but continue to ignore obscured signals as long as their beliefs in management’s lack of commitment remain intact.

The second step must be to take visible action. Resources can be concentrated on a particular hazard and feedback to operators channeled through group briefings or meetings. For example, Clarke (1993) recommends that train drivers’ safety briefings could demonstrate how drivers’ reports have resulted in remedial action, giving actual examples of improve-


ments, e.g., tree-lopping campaigns to clear reported signals. Taking visible action is essential to the programme in order that operators believe in management’s commitment to the new safety drive. As Glendon (1994) notes, individual behaviour will be based on actual outcomes rather than official policy: therefore, actions will speak louder than words. Changes to the working routines of employees will not be accepted unless the management is seen to be committed to those changes, in both word and deed. This conclusion is also evident from the organizational change literature, which emphasizes that top management commitment is

essential for workers to accept rather than resist planned change (e.g., Huse and Cummings, 198.5; Pettigrew, 1985). However, it is still important to target actual behaviour, rather than operators’ attitudes towards safety or confidence in management.

The third step should aim to force behavioural change. The habit-breaking technique involves not only breaking down the old habit but also replacing it with a new one. The previous steps may only result in a temporary change of attitudes resulting in some improvement in behaviour. If a change in behaviour can be forced, e.g., through strict rule enforcement, the process of permanent attitude change can begin. For example, train drivers forced to comply with reporting rules will reassess their behaviour in the light of a more effective reporting system, a management perceived as committed to safety, and less hazardous working conditions. Therefore, through changing behaviour, operators will alter their attitudes. However, strict rule enforcement must be coupled with visible top management commitment to change conditions, otherwise attitudes will not change. Strict rule enforcement alone may only result in employee resentment. Positive attitudes will support the development of a new behaviour, which will be integrated, eventually, into the operator’s repertoire of normal behaviours.

Tackling specific safety-related behaviours might give rise to the criticism of “tokenism”. This argument would suggest that targeting “tokens” takes a localized, short-term approach, and that the only long-term solution is the removal of “types” (Wagenaar and Reason, 1990) i.e., the organizational source of the problem. Indeed, the behavioural change programme described outlines a possible mechanism for reducing the prevalence of a specific risky behaviour. However, it involves steps to change attitudes and perceptions, which will facilitate efforts to ameliorate the source of the problem. In the case of non-reporting, improvements might be made to the wider communication system as a final step in the remediation process.

7. Conclusions

This paper discusses the behavioural responses of operators in the face of workplace risk. Whereas hazards that are encountered rarely may be subject to risk evaluation, routine and trivial hazards may prompt habitual responses that do not involve risk considerations. Risk reduction programmes should focus on behavioural change rather than attitude change, where behaviours represent a routinized response to system hazards. However, such remedial measures can only succeed when supported by visible management commitment. It must be appreciated that risky behaviours that occur routinely may be indicative of a system-wide problem; any attempts to suppress or eliminate such behaviours will be unsuccessful, unless their organizational causes are considered.

174 S. Clarke

Acknowledgements

The author’s research described in this paper (Clarke, 1993) was conducted with the support and cooperation of British Rail; the research was funded by the Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC). The author would also like to thank Ian Glendon and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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