the dynamics of conflict resolution in...

Chapter-VI

The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution in Orissa

Chapter-VI

The Dyna~ics of Conflict Resolution in Orissa

Indian Society follows a policy of transition to modern society based on modified

version of capitalist mode of production. Mode of Production is modified by

welferist concerns of the deprived sections. The penetration of capitalism with

justice means break up of pre-capitalist production relations, feudal and

subsistence economy. This affects the poor and weaker sections. So, for them

development schemes are framed. These are rural development, banking,

employment, anti-poverty and resettlement schemes. There is no doubt that there

is much to be desired in implementation of the schemes. Secondly, a new class of

middlemen emerged and that also steals the show. These may be contractors,

merchants and other middlemen. So a large section of the poor get to face the new

mode of production and feel cheated by faulty bureaucratic implementation and

cheating by middlemen. The lat~r may also voice political demands for their own

narrow interests in the wake of struggle for poor in a democracy with periodic

elections and party system marked by coalitions and factional fights and

organizational splits. In context of good governance at formal level has to be seen.

The situation gets complicated by the existence of local leadership with its own

mindsets. The federal polity makes agriculture and law and order a state subject.

So most of the agrarian and tribal revolts are caused and handled by the local

leadership - both in and out of rower. As the Home Minister of India, Shiv Raj

Patil, observes "The widespread socio-economic, political and regional inequities

prevalent in the country, coupled with poverty, unemployment and lack of proper

infrastructure remain the basic causes for continuance and spatial expansion of

naxalism. Recognizing this and for tacking naxalism from the developmental

The Dynamics of Conflict...

perspective, the central Government has asked the states to accord high priority in

the annual plans to ensure faster integrated development of naxalite-affected

districts." 1 Having said this Shri. Patil was also critical about the fact that in the

wake of Naxalism the development aid has not been properly spent by the state

governments.

In this context of law and order provision and the tendency of political

parties to Naxalism do split we notice the relevance adopting the Organizational

conflict model. We deal with the way the Government of Orissa has treated

Naxalism as a law and order problem and how it has led to its growth. During the

NDA period in Andhra a hurt Chandra Babu Naidu managed to escape the Naxal

ambush.

Even though the problem ofNaxalism was treated as a problem of law and

.. order; it was largely left to the police at the local level to deal with the situation

with no clear direction from the upper level. This confusion also had a very bad

impact over the morale of the Police force. The decades ofNaxal history in Orissa

also pitiably highlights that, through out all these years Orissa could not give a

constructive anti-Naxalism policy. Following is a brief review of certain policies

of the Government of Orissa which are largely seen as of some relevance to the

growing problem ofNaxalism in the state.

1 Union Home Minister Shiv Raj Patil in his address at the Annual Conference of DGPs/IGPs on November3,2004, at New Delhi

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1. The Experience of Shanti Sena (Peace Force):

While the contemporary research on Naxalism is widely polarized over the issue

of Salva Judum2, long back in Orissa such an experiment was going on in the

name of Shanti Shena. As early as in 1998 under the patronage of the Gajapati

district police the first Shanti Shena came in to existence in the name of the Adaba

Shanti Committee. "It was the "desire of the police to organize the local tribals

against the Naxals, who by then were tiered of violent and exploitive Naxal modus

operandi. However the state government had no role in this programme, it was ·.

purely a police initiative and in the absence of any support from the state

government the programme was lost midway."3 On the other hand the Naxals

allege that it was a well thought out strategy of the state government to spoil the

revolutionary movement. "As a part of its ugly design, the Orissa Police through

the Adaba Shanti Committee, tried to crack the unity among the Adivasis and

Panas (S.Cs). On 51h November 1998, the Adaba Shanti Committee convened one

anti-adivasi meet at Kenduguda village in Rayagada. However the Chashi Mulia

Samiti was able to prevent the ugly game plan of the government."4

Unable to learn anything from this episode another government sponsored

Shanti Shena came in to existence during 200 I. This time one Panchayat Samiti

member Tangadi Dibaka took the leadership in the Chandrapur block of Rayagada

district. The district police managed to rope in a few former Naxal leaders like

2 'Salva Judum', which means "Peace Campaign" in Halbi and "Collective Hunting" in the

Santhali language is a civil society based anti Naxal campaign going on in Chhatisgarh. The Raman Singh government claims it to be a peace movement to save tribals from the evils of naxalism. However, the Naxals ridicule it as the group hunting of innocent tribals supporting the people's movement.

3 Statement of a senior IPS officer from Orissa who himself was involved in the formulation and

execution of this programme .. However the said officer does not want to be named here. 4

Daman, an undated Naxal literature (Oriya) published by the Chashi Mulia Samiti, RayagadaGajapati Divisional Committee.

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The Dynamics of Conflict. ..

Abraham Gomang, Ananta Mandai, Bhal Chandra Sarangi and Budha Gomang.5

They organized some anti Naxal meetings in several villages; however the

initiative proved to be·.a failure in the absence of any clear cut stand at the

government level.

Yet another Shanti Shena came in to existence in 2003 and this time Daku

Padagandaka an erstwhile Naxal leader and the then Chairman of the Chandrapur

block with active backing from the police took charge of the committee. This time

the initiative was relatively large scale and soon it spread to different pockets of

Rayagada and Gajapati. Daku· managed to mobilize a large number of tribals

against the Naxals. However, "day by day Daku's demand from the police was

increasing. He was asking for government bodyguards, which was not possible

and in those circumstances we decided gradually to withdraw our support." 6

Since the government did not know what to do with the Shanti Shena, the

experiment was short-lived, and Daku Padagandaka was finally eliminated by the

Sabyasachi group on April 24, 2004 during the General Elections.

This shows that at least at the Police level there were some efforts to

instigate organizational conflict among the Naxal cadres in order to weaken the

movement. As these efforts were never taken to their logical conclusion, it worked

adversely and resulted i~ strengthening the organizational capability of the Naxals

in Orissa.

5 Ibid. 6

Statement of a senior IPS officer from Orissa who himself was involved in the formulation and execution of this programme. However the said officer does not want to be named here.

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2. Confused State, Unclear Policies

The problem with successive governments in Orissa with regard to Naxalism lies

with fact that they always viewed Naxalism an issue of electoral politics. Today's

alarming situation is mostly designed by the 'no Naxal policy' in the state. It is

absolutely a case of failure of governance in Orissa as none of the successive

governments have been able to come out with a policy to win over its own people

from the Naxals nor did they effectively used force to suppress the rebels.

Recognizing Naxalism as a problem is something else and coming up with

solutions is something else. It was late Biju Pattnaik, Former Chief Minister of

Orissa, who once declared in the .state Assembly that his name be put first in the

list of Naxalites and such political gimmick cannot be a solution to the serious

problem of Left Wing Extremism. It was in the mid nineties that the Naxals made

their presence felt in se'<eral pockets of the state. The next incumbent government

of Sri J.B. Pattnaik in the state preferred to ignore the Naxal Movement and that

apathy soon became a blessing for the Naxals as it gave them a free hand to reach

into every nook and corner of the state.

The present government of Naveen Pattnaik also could not get away with

the prevailing confusions on policy formulations on Naxalism. It allowed the

Naxals to hold a rally on the capital in September 2004 and even had a dialogue

with the front organizations of the PWG. However, soon after the rally it arrested

some of the people who were returning from the rally. Such contradictory signs

only proved to be worsening the already chaotic atmosphere in the state. Such

illusions (self proclaimed) are best explained by one of the leading security

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experts of India and it certainly suits the prevailing atmosphere of Orissa. "There

is a pattern here. Each new in~umbent, be it in North Block or in the State

Governments, sets about reinventing the wheel with little concern for what history

points out. The cycle is almost invariable: 'peaceful' and political resolutions

passionately advocated in the early days of incumbency, yield gradually to an

eventual return to the use of 'force' as Naxalite depredations mount.. ... The

interregnums of 'sympathy and understanding' have, however, been the periods of

the most rapid consolidation for the Naxalites."7

Recently, during a meeting of the 'Coordination Committee' of the Naxal

affected states in April 2006, the Union Government conveyed its anguish over

the 'no Naxal' policy in the state. "The Centre has asked Orissa government to pull

up its socks and work out a strategy to deal effectively with Naxalites as otherwise

there could be more Naxal violence in the state than neighbouring Chattisgarh.

Orissa Chief Secretary Subas Pani along with the Additional Director General of

state Intelligence faced a tough time during the recent coordination committee

meeting where central security agencies pointed to several weaknesses in the

state's policy in dealing with Naxalism, official sources said. Orissa could not give

a constructive anti-naxalism policy and continued to harp on that no Naxal

violence was witnessed in the state during the last year. However, the officials

were told that no incident was witnessed only because it was giving a free run to

extremists."8

In a significant decision on June 9, 2006, the Government of Orissa imposed a

ban on the Communist Party of India (Maoist) and seven of its front organizations

7 Ajay Sahni, "Bad Medicine For the Red Epidemic", South Asia Intelligence Review,

(www.satp.org), Vol.3, No.4, October 4, 2004. 8 As reported by Press Trust of India (PTI) on 2"d April 2006.

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under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908. The front organizations declared

unlawful are: Daman Pratirodh Manch, Revolutionary Democratic Front, Chasi

Mulia Samiti, Kui Labanga Sangh, Jana Natya Mandali, Krantikari Kisan Samiti ' '

9 and Bal Sangam.

The ban order was accompanied by a comprehensive surrender and '

rehabilitation packa~e for the Naxals. Following are the main features of the said "'--

package;

• Payment of up to Rs. 10,000 on acceptance of surrender.

• Up to Rs. 20,000 on surrender of arms and ammunition. Rs. 15.000/ for

Rocket Launcher, Light Machine Gun (LMG), and other heavy arms. Rs.

I 0,000/ for AK 47, and INSAS Rifles. Rs. 5000/ for Rifle, Revolver, Pistol

and Wireless set. Rs ... 3000/ for Remote Controlled Devices and

Improvised Explosive Device (lED).

• Allotment of land and house building grants up toRs. 25,000.

• Rs. 15,000 assistance for marriage.

• Up to the High school level the government would bear the education

related expanses of the children of surrendered Naxalites.

• It includes bank loans up to Rs. 2 lakh; subsidy up to Rs. 50,000 after

' repayment of 75 per cent of the loan; payment of interest after two years

from the date a loan is availed of.

• Free medical treatment irr government hospitals.

• Those surrendering will also get the reward money on their head.

9 Sambad (Oriya Daily), 101h June 2006.'

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• The state govern!pent has also announced that all minor cases against

those who surrender will be withdrawn. 10

Announcing the ban, the state Home Secretary Santosh Kumar said that a

District Level Screening Committee with the Collector, the Superintendent of

Police and an officer from the Intelligence Department as its members would

recommend the package' for the surrendered Naxalites.

For quite some time the Orissa Government was under tremendous pressure to

take a tough stand on the growing problem of naxalism in the state. Whatever the

reason, a major policy shift has undoubtedly occurred, which will have far

reaching implications for the complex problem ofNaxalism in the state. Although

it is too early to predict anything, there are reasons to believe that the CPI

(Maoists) will not keep quiet. W~th a newly formed Peoples Liberation Guerrilla

Army (PLGA) and a State Committee, both headed by the undisputed guerilla

' leader Sabyasachi Panda, the Naxalites will definitely' challenge the state

government. Barring the Daman Pratirodh Manch, all other banned outfits were

operating underground; hence this ban will not affect their functioning. On the

other hand, the stakes are high for the state government.

Nevertheless, the ban would boost the morale of the Police force, which was

waging a lonely battle against the red terror in Orissa. The next logical step for the

government is to embark on police modernization. In recent years, the Naxal

attacks have proved that they have become masters of guerrilla warfare. To tackle

them the government needs a modern police force. As per the statement of the

Chief Minister an amount of Rs. 216.22 crores has been spent from 2000-01 tO

10 Ibid. Opp. Cit.

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2006-06 (up to 15/1/2006) to enhance the ability of the state police to deal with

the growing problem of Naxalism in the state. Following are the details as

furnished by the Chief Minister.

Table No. 6.1: Details of Expenditure incurred for Police Modernization

Arms & Ammunitions Rs. 31.00 Crore.

Equipment For Police Rs. 5.72 Crore.

Mobility Rs. 45.19 Crore

Communications Rs. 5.11 Crore

Training Equipments Rs.0.20 Crores

Traffic Control Equipments Rs. 0.26 Crores

C.I.D Equipments Rs.0.45 Crores

Security and Intelligence Equipments Rs. 5.08 Crores

F.S.L Equipments Rs. 1.33 Crore

Finger Print Bureau Equipments Rs. 0.03 Crore

Photo Bureau Equipments Rs. 0.50 Crore

POL NET Rs. 1.87 Crore

Non-Residential Buildirlgs Rs. 71.64 Crores.

Residential Buildings Rs. 4 7.84 Crore

Total Rs. 216.22 Crore.

Source: Statement of Sri Naveen Pattnaik, Chief Minister of Orissa, in the State Legislative Assembly on Dt. 6/02/2006.

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Continuing with the statement the Chief Minister informed that, "the shares of the

State and the Union Government in the expenditure, respectively are Rs. 97.03

Crore and Rs.l19.19 Crore. The Central Assistance of Rs. 150.51 Crore has been

received during the said'period."11

However, Police modernization does not mean procurement of arms; it is

linked to crucial elements of recruitment, training, counseling, and intelligence.

The Government's decision to ban the Naxal Movement will yield results only

when an effective police force implements the ban. The state government should

come out with a package for its Police Force who are working in the naxal hit

areas; the neighboring state of Andhra Pradesh has declared several such

incentives for its police personnel.

The most important part of the government announcement is the policy on

surrender and rehabilitation. If properly executed this would provide the

government with an opportunity to crack the Naxal network, while revealing the

human face of the government in its war against the red terror. The growth of

Naxal violence in Orissa necessitated a tough stand by the government. Now, after

imposing the ban the government has made it clear that violence cannot be

allowed to impede development. The success of this ban impact depends on the

government's ability to integrate its military and developmental approaches into its

counter Naxal programmes and policies.

11 Statement of Sri Naveen Pattnaik, Chief Minister of Orissa, in the State Legislative Assembly on

Dt. 6/02/2006 in response to *S.A.Q. No. 9.

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3. Land Regulating Acts

Although land continues to be one important factor in the Naxal Movement,

Orissa has a dismal record of land reforms. No government in the state has ever

been able to formulate and implement a meaningful land reforms programme.

Orissa Estate Abolition Act, 1952

It aimed at abolition of intermediaries and vesting of all land rights in the state

while allowing agrarian land of less than 33 acres to remain with intermediaries

for personal cultivation.

Orissa Land Reform Act, 1960

This act was further amended in 1965, 1970, 1973, 1974, 1976, 1990, 1991 and

1992. The main provisions covered under this act is granting permanent, heritable

and transferable rights in land for tillers; ban on leasing land except under special

conditions; title to land in continuous cultivation for 12 years or more by a person

other than the owner to pass on to the cultivator; rent not to exceed one fourth of

grass produce; ceiling on individual holding reduced to 20 acres in 1965 and I 0

acres in 1972.

Orissa Consolidation of Holding and Prevention of Fragmentation of

Land Act, 1972

The objective of this Act is to prevent the fragmentation of land and exchange of

equitable land for bigger farming.

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Orissa Prevention of Lard Encroachment Act, 1972

The act was amended in Amended in 1982. The main purpose as underlined by

this act is to prohibit unauthorized encroachment of government land and

settlement of 2 acres of unobjectionable land (government wasteland) with

eligible (landless) beneficiaries.

Prevention of Tribals' Land Alienation

The Constitution of India empowers state government to make regulations for

checking alienation of land owned by Scheduled Tribes in Scheduled Areas '

(under the 5th Schedule). In Orissa, Regulation 2 of 1956 provides that land held

by a person belonging to ST cannot, without permission from the appropriate

authority, be transferred to a person not belonging to ST. This law also allows for

a suo moto action by the collector for restitution of alienated tribal lands. Section

22/23 of the Orissa Land Reform Act forbids land alienation by tribals in non-

scheduled areas. Again in early 2003 the Orissa Government amended relevant

rules to make the law more stringent in protecting the lands of tribals and ensuring

that these could not be transferred to non-tribals in the Scheduled areas of the

state. Under the new rules, no tribal can transfer his land to a non-tribal or even to

another tribal if he possesses less than two acres of irrigated land or less than five

acres ofun-irrigated land. Violations ofthe rules entail severe penal consequences

including extended jail terms.

The provisions in the above-mentioned legal framework have however

remained paper tigers. All these legal provisions have some how proved to be

insufficient which have given the Naxals a ready-made platform to put the state on

the defensive. 'Manipulation of lapd records' is the single largest problem, which '

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has contributed a lot for the growth of land alienation among the tribal rural poor.

The unsatisfactory state of land records contributed a lot to the problem of land

alienation. The tribals were never legally recognized as owners of the lands, which

they cultivated. The second important factor resulting in the problem of land '

alienation is 'benami transfer', because of which the original owners of the land

are reduced to the level of sharecroppers though the land remains to be in their

names. The third most important problem is the 'encroachment' which is divesting

the tribals of their lands. This is common in all the Naxal infested districts Orissa

where by bribing the local Patwari a systematic manipulation is being done with

the date of settlement of land disp_utes, ante-dating etc., to claim the tribal lands.

"The sagginess in the implementation of the available preventive provisions

encourages the non-tribals to occupy the tribal lands. Though the problem lies

elsewhere, it is being unfortunately always interpreted as the handiwork of certain

individuals like the moneylender, traders, land lords, etc, without understanding

the class connection ofthese individuals. The unsystematic land record ofthe pre-

colonial and colonial periods is followed by the present State and is the prime

cause of land alienation in Orissa. " 12

3. The Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy

As stated earlier the Naxal Movement in Orissa is concentrated in the mines and

mineral rich areas of the state. It is because of this factor several industrial, mining

as well as irrigation projects have come up in those areas resulting in large scale

displacement which was ineptly handled by the administration and which gave a

powerful weapon in the hands of the Naxals to manipulate the situation in their

12 As mentioned by one senior Orissa Administrative Service Officer who is currently posted in

Naxal infested district of Koraput recorded during our fieldwork; however he does not want to be named here.

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favor. Till recently the policy of Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R) has been

more than half blind to the plight of the poor and marginalized tribals who have

been the worst victim of such developmental activities. However during 2006 the

Government of Orissa constituted a group of Ministers to finalize a

comprehensive R&R Policy for the state; following are its high points.

(A) Definition:

"Family" has been expanded for the purpose of rehabilitation assistance and now

includes:

• A major son irrespective of his marital status.

• Unmarried daughter or sister more than 30 years of age.

• Physically and mentally cballenged person irrespective of age and sex;

(duly certified by the authorized Medical board). For this purpose, the

blind, the deaf, the orthopaedically handicapped/ mentally challenged

person suffering from more than 40% permanent disability will only be

considered as separate family.

• Minor orphan who has lost both his /her parents.

• A widow or a woman divorcee.

"Cut off date" which was vague earlier is now specified as the date of

notification under LA Act. 1894.

• Verification 1st January every year.

• There has no clear definition of 'periphery' in the earlier draft policy

and now district bounqary has been identified as periphery.

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The Dynamics ofContlict...

(B) Comprehensive Survey and Baseline Development

In addition to the prevailing practice of socioeconomic survey in earlier policies,

the new policy proposes a comprehensive socio-cultural resource mapping and in

(restructural survey and those shall be conducted by an independent agency to be

identified by the Government to ensure proper benchmarking.

Assessment of Land Requirement: A realistic assessment of the land by the

project will be made by a committee headed by ROC. This is a new feature of this

policy that will prevent land arbitrage.

Several new features added in this policy are as follows:

• Comprehensive communication plan for awareness creation.

• Consultation with gram sabha I panchayat for planning.

• Normal development plans implemented by different agencies should be

dovetailed with resettlement and rehabilitation package in resettlement

habitats and made available to the displaced community on a priority basis.

(c) Land Acquisition

Options for direct negotiations for purchase and consent award before acquisition

under provisions of the relevant Act. A comprehensive action plan before

acquisition specified as below:

• Site for the resettlement habitat shall be selected by the RPDAC in

consultation with the displAced families.

• No physical displacement shall be made before the completion of

resettlement work as approved by RPDAC.

• Gram sabha I Panchayat shall be consulted.

• Where there is multiple displacement additional compensation amounting

to 50% ofthe normal compensation payable, in form 1 of ex-gratia.

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(. . .. ·

• Provisions relating to rehabilitation will be given effect from the date of

actual vacation of the land.

• Project Authority shall abide by the provisions laid down in this policy and

the decisions taken by RPDAC.

• District administration and Project Authorities shall be jointly responsible

for ensuring that the benefits of R&R reach the target beneficiaries in a

time bound manner.

• Record of Rights of the land and houses allotted to the displaced persons

should be handed over to them by the District Administration while

resettling Steps will be taken by the Project Authorities for acclimatization

of the resettled people in new habitat including development of cordial

social relationship between the host and resettle communities.

(D) Project Types

• Industrial Projects ;

• Mining Projects; (separated from Industrial Projects)

• Irrigation Projects, National Parks and Sanctuaries; Urban Projects and

Linear Projects like roads and railways,

• Power lines; (newly added) and any other projects that can be notified to

make it comprehensive.

(E) Rehabilitation Assistance

Industrial Project

• Employment to one member of the original displaced family. (OF)

• Skill Upgradation of the old Displaced Family.

• House Building Assistanc~ of Rs. 150, 000/ (Three fold).

• At least 50% of cash assistance as share convertible share.

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• One time cash assistance increased toRs. 5 Lakh, Rs. 3 Lakh, and Rs. 2

Lakh and Rs. 1 Lakh to category 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively.

• Shops and service units added to restore livelihood ofDF.

Mining Project

• Same as above but the employment applicable to the expanded family.

Irrigation, Park etc.

• Homestead land of 0.10 acre or cash Rs. 50,000/ . '

• Agricultural Land for SC & ST 2.5 acres irrigated, and 5 acres un-

irrigated. For others it is 2 acres irrigated and 4 acres un-irrigated.

• In case land is not available than cash compensation of Rs. 1 Lakh per acre

for irrigated land and Rs. 50, 000/ per acre for un-irrigated land.

Urban and Linear

• Homestead of Ill Oth acre (rural) or l/251h of an acre (urban) or cash

equivalent ofRs. 50,000/. Land near growth centre for DF.

• House building assistance Rs.l50, 000/.

• Rs.2000/ per month, common assistance to all entire category for a year.

• Maintenance Allowance ofRs.lO, 000/.

• Temporary shed /Transportation allowance ofRs. 2000/

(F) Institutional Arrangement

• Compensation Advisory Committee (CAC) at Project level. (Headed hy

Collector; if more then one district than RDC)

• A state level Committee by Member, Board of Revenue for Dispute

Resolution.

\

• Rehabilitation and Periphery Development Advisory Committee at the

District level headed by the Collector.

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The Dynamics ofConllict...

• State level Resettlement and Rehabilitation Council (SLRRC) headed by

the Chief Minister.

• State level Unified Directorate ofR&R .

(F) Special Provisions Introduced in this Policy

• While developing the resettlement plans, the socio-cultural norms of

indigenous and primitive tribal groups will be respected.

• Each displaced family of indigenous category shall be given preferential.

• As far as practicable, indigenous communities should be resettled in a

compact area close to their natural habitat.

• Indigenous displaced families resettled outside the district shall be given

25 Indexation of benefits to compensate for the escalations in replacement

cost against the prevailing concept of depreciated value.

• Comprehensive survey, master planning and investment in common

infrastructure development.

(G) Flexibility

• For budget provisioning.

• Amendment when needed.

• Grievance redressal.13

Scholars prefer to make a cautious opinion about the new development, as

writes Manipadma Jena, "Though Orissa's draft resettlement and rehabilitation

policy is an improvement on the national policy; it does not go far enough in

ensuring adequate representation of affected women in rehabilitation and other

13http://orissagov.nic.in/revenue/R&RPOLICIES/Relief1'/o20and%20Rehabilitation/key%20feature

s/key%20features.html

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representative committees. The draft, while it has created separate categories for

the displaced, with commensurate compensation, still does not specify norms

stringent enough to assess land claims put forward by investing companies. 14 On

the other hand observes Mr. L.N. Gupta, lAS, Commissioner cum Secretary, Steel

and Mines department, 'Government of Orissa that "the new policy reflects the

democratic response of the government in policy formulation. It comes as

recognition of the voices and choices of the affected families and vulnerable

groups, indigenous communities, women and physically challenged."15 Of course

the new R&R policy as mentioned in the above table seems to be quite

comprehensive it's too early to predict its fall out but undoubtedly a well thought

out strategy by the Naveen Pattnaik government.

The Naxal growth in Orissa is all about the organizational consolidation by

rival Naxal groups on the one hand and successive state governments falling prey

in to the Naxal game plan on the other. With state governments at best being

apathetic about the Naxal problem, the Naxal Movement in the state touched

several points of inter and intra organizational conflict, which all contributed to its

growth. As per the available statistics a huge fund is already being made available

to the state government to strengthen the capabilities of the state police, however,

the security forces are yet to pose a major challenge to the Naxal growth in the

state. "Police Force is neither technically nor morally strong enough to take on the

Maoists. We are not empowered to open fire on the Naxals on our own; we can

only open fire on the grounds of private defense. Police Intelligence is a total

14 Manipadma Jena, Orissa: Draft Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy, 2006, Economic and

Political Weekly, February 4, 2006.

15 A presentation by L.N. Gupta, lAS, Commissioner cum Secretary, Steel and Mines department,

Government of Orissa, www.assocham.org/events/recent/event_72/0rissa _ R _ n _ R _ ASSOCHAM _ L _ N _ Gupta.ppt -

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failure. Therefore most of the arrests made by the Police are false and fabricated.

Police force goes for a combing operation just for the namesake. It is just a farce

because unless and until they (Naxals) open fire at us we (Police) can't fire. No

one understands. They are armed with automatic weapons and if we wait till they

fire on us then they can shoot 30 people at one go. This is the reason whenever

there is a combing operation; we just go, move around and come back. How many

Naxalites have so far been killed in a combing operation? Negligible." 16

The above statement of one senior on the ground Police officer gives us

the real but dismal picture of the police front in Orissa. It is a reality that

Policemen consider stints in Naxalite-affected areas as "punishment postings".

Orissa does not have a rule where every IPS and state cadre officer has to be

posted in Naxal-affected districts and this drawback has led to corrupt practices

and this is a serious cause of demotivation among the security personnel who are

posted in the guerrilla zone.

Undoubtedly forces belonging to the Central Police Organization are better

equipped in comparison to the state Police force. As per the government statistics,

presently "three CRPF Battalions have been deployed in the bordering districts-

two in South Orissa and one in North Orissa. The state government's request on

three more companies of CRPF in Orissa is still pending with the Union

government." 17 But the past experience shows that rushing Central battalions

doesn't give favourable results all the time. Naxals operate in small groups over

16 Statement of Mr. Patnaik, one Assisstant Commandant of Orissa Special Armed Police. We met

him on 20th May 2005 on a train in the Naxal infested district of Samba! pur when he was returning from a combing operation. However, as desired by him, we cannot disclose his full name and designation. 17

*S.A.Q. No. 1, statement ofShri Naveen Pattnaik on 'Maoist Movement in the Border Districts' in the State Assembly on 6th February 2006. '

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usually difficult terrain. A paramilitary battalion, rushed into an area they don't

know, unable to gathe~ local intelligence, can't track down and fight Naxals.

Moreover, when the Centre says it is sending a battalion, what it means that it is

sending, on an average, only around 400 fighting men. The rest of the battalion

are support staff.

Given the unusual conflict dynamics of the Naxal Movement, what would

put the Naxals on the defensive is not the large- scale deployment of para military

forces but an extensive network of police stations. Capable officers should head

the police stations in the Naxal infested areas and they should be allowed to

develop local intelligence. They must be given considerable operational latitude

and they must have complete political backing.

A strategic structure, in terms of resolving the crisis of Naxalism in the

state, now seems to be emerging in Orissa. It appears that the government has

started to take certain bold decisions and there are signs that the government is

following a two-prong strategy to deal with the problem. In an attempt to win over

the tribals, "the Government of Orissa has decided not to press charges against

over 156 suspected rebels in 34 cases and to drop 1,513 minor cases against over

2000 tribals. The Chief Minister also decided to drop 1,513 minor cases against

villagers of the tribal dominated and to review cases relating to extremist

activities."18

In addition to this, by clamping a ban on Naxal organizat.ions the

government has made it clear that there is no place of violence in a democratic set

up of governance. A ban is no solution; the government will have to effectively

coordinate its military offensives with socio-economic overtures to make the ban

18 Dr. Nihar Nayak, Maoists in Orissa: Growing Tentacles and a Dormant State, Faultlines,

Vol.l7, 2006.

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effective. Nevertheless, the solution of the ongoing problem lies with a formula

of social development along with immediate replacement of the prevailing

atmosphere of violence, terror and suspicion. Its time for the Government to

correct past wrongdoings, at the same time it must not allow the rebels to create an

atmosphere of fear and terror.

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the dynamics of conflict resolution in...

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