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187THE CULTURAL DIMENSION OF NEGOTIATIONGroup Decision and Negotiation 8: 187–215, 1999

© 1999 K luwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands

The Cultural Dimension of Negotiation: The ChineseCase

GUY OLIVIER FAURE

Sorbonne

Racot et Eggimann

Abstract

Culture is one of the major components of negotiation and plays an especially crucial role in international

relations. The current state of research is presented and discussed. The type of influence of culture is specified

and compared with other categories such as strategic behavior and structural determination.

Then, referring to the China case, the way culture impacts on the key elements of negotiation such as actors,

structures, strategies, process, and outcome is described and analyzed. Lastly, culture’s consequences on the

negotiator’s cognition, beliefs, behaviors and identity are investigated.

Key words: negotiation, culture, international relations, China, cognition, behavior, identity

Introduction

Our age is definitely one of negotiation as already pointed out by Zartman (1976).Opportunities for that type of encounter, have considerably increased over a few decades

throughout the whole world. Economic development, multiplication of exchanges,

integration of third world countries in this global trend have led men to meet more and

more around the negotiation table. Technological changes in communications has also

brought people closer to each other, reduced distances and provided convenient support

for joint discussions. Dominant values have also changed and more and more conflicts

are settled through negotiation instead of being played until the destruction or capitulation

of the adversary.

On the business side, new activities have recently taken a large place among more

usual transactions. Joint ventures set up and technology transfers are among their most

prominent manifestations. If one considers a country like China, within 15 years over

300,000 joint venture agreements have been signed.Consequences such as scarcity of some resources (water, wild life) and pollution of

others also call for negotiation. Decision-making in international organization such as

the European Union or the World Trade Organization is carried out through negotiation at

such a point that it has become the main activity of their members.

The interdependence between nations, markets, enterprises and people has strongly

emphasized the visibility of national cultures. This is typically when people are confronted

with people from other cultures that they realize that culture exists. It is a similar situation

to the fish that ignores it lives in the water until it is taken out.



188 FAURE

For human beings, culture provides meaning, goals, justifications, norms of conduct.

This perfectly applies to negotiators and the task of those who like to understand a

negotiation process is to grasp the sense that actors attach to their moves.

Considering culture does not imply that it is necessarily the explanatory variable for

any negotiation. Structural influences and strategic choices play their part and can also be

major variables. But culture with its ambiguities and complexity may have on occasions

an essential influence on some aspects of a negotiation. A negotiation while operating

produces a chemistry among actors. An international negotiation develops a kind of

combination among the various interacting cultures. The real intellectual challenge is to

grasp the elusive and ubiquitous concept of culture and to analyze in a next stage under

which circumstances this combination becomes a key variable. The investigation reported

here addresses the following questions: how is it done? Which levels of the negotiationare concerned? And what are the consequences?

In addition, understanding the role of culture and its various consequences can do

more than increase knowledge. Its predictive dimension may help anticipation and thus,

contribute to prescriptive tools to support negotiator’s behavior while working for a better

outcome.

Based on the case of Chinese-Foreign negotiations conducted in China, the work that

follows, aims to show how culture impacts the key elements of a negotiation. These

elements are the actors, the structure of the “game”, the strategies developed by the parties,

the negotiation process, and the final outcome. The consequences of these influences on

the negotiator are then studied according to the various levels on which they impact:

negotiator’s cognition, beliefs, behaviors, and identity.

This research is of an empirical nature and is introduced by a review of the mainconcepts used in negotiation analysis and the way they interrelate in a negotiation system.

A state of the art on current research concerning the cultural aspects of negotiation is

also provided, bringing to light four main approaches.

Culture: scope and definition

Most of the problems that face human groups are universal but the solutions are specific.

Social interactions among members, relationship between the group and its environment,

the way people consider nature, space, time or major events of one’s life lead to elaborate

beliefs and assumptions widely shared by members of the group. If we take into account

works from social anthropologists, these answers to living conditions strongly vary from

one group to another.

Culture has been defined by Herriot, a French writer and politician, as what remains

when one has forgotten everything. This apparently paradoxical statement grasps one of

the most salient property of culture because it is not so much a matter of substance but a

way of thinking and acting. Faure and Rubin explicit culture as a “set of shared and enduring

meanings, values and beliefs that characterize national, ethnic, or other groups and orient

their behavior” (1993). Herskovits (1995) considers it as the “human-made part of the

environment”, where man left its print on nature. Triandis (1994) distinguishes between



189THE CULTURAL DIMENSION OF NEGOTIATION

“subjective culture” made of categories, norms, roles and values and “objective culture”,

regrouping human products such as tools, chairs, jet planes.

Culture is transmitted through socialization and education from one generation to the

next. In the short-term perspective, culture can be conceived as a structural component

of any society that conditions human thinking and behavior, operating in a deterministic

way. In the long term perspective, it is a dynamic social dimension that induces changes

over time through modification of values scale.

Culture should not be viewed as a sector of human activity but as a part of each sector

of human activity. Religious, political, economic, social aspects of societies are imbued

with a cultural component, influenced by it. In the same way, religious, political, economic

and social developments produce culture and grant it a role in the future (Demorgon

1996).

Extracting and capturing culture

A professor in a European business school had submitted the same problem to three

different groups of students (French, German, and English). It was about a conflict between

two departments of the same company and the question was on how to solve this conflict.

The French brought the decision at the higher hierarchical level; the German suggested

establishing written rules defining precisely scope and prerogatives of each one of the

departments; the English offered to improve communication between the heads of the

two departments (Hofstede 1987). Cultural differences are clearly the explanatory factor.

Each one of the three cultures involved has its own way to see the problem, to identify thecause of the dysfunctioning and to suggest a solution. Referential models such as the

organizational pyramid, the perfected machinery, the information exchange place implicitly

operate but in none of the cases negotiation is put forth as a possible or wishable solution.

In China, on a hot afternoon, “Two Englishmen sweat and puffed while playing tennis.

When they finished, a sympathetic Chinese friend asked: Could you not get two servants

to do this for you?” (Triandis 1994, p. 181). Here again culture manifests itself through

the way each observer interpret a social situation. It is not even necessary to introduce an

exotic dimension to come across that type of interpretation lag, necessarily culturalized,

that can be done. One just needs asking the French about American baseball. Not only its

rationale seems incomprehensible but even the very point of the game remains impossible

to grasp.

The way the Japanese draft a business contract also demonstrate that their conception

of contract including relationship is far from the Western one as shown by the following

excerpt (Graham and Sano 1989, p. 105). “Article 1. This agreement is made ... to maintain

mutual prosperity and coexistence and lasting amicable relations.” Again it is the culture

to whom each of the parties belong which will condition ways to look at the contract, its

meaning and assigned function.

An analytical approach of culture has been suggested by Hofstede (1980) based on

four dimensions that are used to compare national cultures in classifying people’s attitude

on each of them. One dimension concerns “power distance” and corresponds to authority



190 FAURE

ranking. Another measures “uncertainty avoidance” and reflects the tendency to avoid

situations when the outcome is uncertain or with no clear norms or elicits stress. A third

dimension “individualism” deals with the relationship between the subject and the

collectivity. The last dimension, “masculinity” relates to the tendency to adopt values

more commonly shared by men such as ambition, defined as the desire to achieve

something or to earn more.

Each national sample is located on those four scales, thus characterizing its culture.

For instance, Chinese from Hong Kong and Taiwan have far more respect for authority

than Americans (with scores of 6.8 and 5.8 to 4.0 for Americans), are much more collective

minded than Americans (2.5 and 1.7 against 9.1 on the individualism index). Concerning

uncertainty control, Taiwan ranks higher than the U.S. that itself ranks higher than Hong

Kong (respectively 69 for 46 and 29). The three cultures rather emphasize masculine values,the USA ranking first on this scale (62 against 57 for Hong Kong and 45 for Taiwan).

Language is typically a cultural product and as such may help to show how culture

structures thinking. Language influences people’s experience of the world because it

provides categories to capture what is observed, to turn it into thinking and conditions

behaviors, as underlined in the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Any particular language has its

own set of categories to describe reality. For instance, the Eskimo have more than twenty

words to differentiate among various types of snow, while Aztecs use a unique word for

snow, ice and frost. Arabs have 6,000 words connected with camels and 50 of them deal

only with pregnancy stages (Klineberg 1954).

The culture of a society is not a coherent and stable set of values but should rather be

viewed as a “bundle of cultural norms” that are subject to “dialectic tension” (Janosik

1977). Thus, changes can be explained as the varying outcome of the management of these tensions. Blaker (1977) distinguishes between two highly contrasting domestic

ideals of conflict revolution within the Japanese culture, the “harmonious cooperation”

and the “warrior ethic”. Both indeed, are incompatible but at the same time embedded in

the Japanese tradition. According to circumstances one or the other becomes legitimate.

Similarly, French culture has been always defined and expressed by conflicting values

such as liberty and equality. According to the period of history, one or the other would

dominate. Those tensions among priorities provide internal dynamics for change and show

that culture is not a static and conservative component opposing evolution.

Perception, interpretation, problem framing are essential aspects of cultural influences

in social life and in international negotiation. It is extremely interesting to reverse the

usual process of interpreting non western behaviors with Western cultural lenses and see

what non-Western people decode when observing what Western do. Miner (1958, quoted

by Triandis 1994, p. 13) suggests the following: “the ritual consists of inserting a small

bundle of hog hairs into the mouth, along with certain magical powders, and then moving

the bundle in a highly formalized series of gestures”. In fact, it is simply toothbrushing

seen from another cultural perspective.

Differences across cultures are quite complex. Comparative studies by themselves do

not enable to predict the behavior of the other party. As underlined by Graham (1996),

the best they can do is to help the practitioner to become aware of cultural differences in

communication and negotiating style to avoid misunderstandings and misinterpretations.




For instance, in a laboratory simulation including business people from 18 cultures, Graham

found that Chinese ask 3 times more questions than Germans do. Knowing the fact does

not enable a negotiator to build up a strategy but at least helps him to understand that such

a behavior is not part of a deliberated strategy devised by the other side, Chinese or

German.

A number of problematiques can be raised over culture, its status in social sciences,

its definition and its instrumentality. The Anglo-Saxon definition of culture is rather social-

anthropological, whereas the French understanding leans towards cultivation as a

refinement of knowledge. The German concept of “Kultur” is closer to civilization. Already

and without going into non Western definitions, the very definition of culture is highly

culturalized.

Another interesting question concerns the very nature of culture. Should it be seen asa process or as a product? It is a process in the sense that culture elicits actions and

orients them. It triggers specific actions in a particular type of situation and, thus, could

be understood as a substitute for instinct (Faure and Rubin 1993, p. 4). At the same time,

it is a product, an outcome of this process that is expressed in visible, tangible ways.

Culture like social structure for instance cannot be seen but can be inferred from its

manifestations.

When culture is assured to be the dominant variable in a social process such as a

negotiation, does it suppose a kind of behavioral determinism of the actors and as a

consequence should we look at negotiation analysis as a deterministic theory? In fact, it

should not be so, because culture is seldom an exclusive explanatory factor. In addition,

culture is made of values “in tension” or simply conflicting, that provide room for choices.

Furthermore, the cultural dimension is composite as it integrates in a complexcombination several components such as the national, local, family, professional,

organizational and religious culture. Last, what is basic in the rationale of the negotiation

system even reduced to its cultural dimension is the intercultural aspect which is the

encounter between several sub-systems with all the entailed uncertainties.

Research on cultural aspects of negotiation

Research on international negotiation is widely influenced by the cultural conditions

within which it is caused out. Ways to view objects and ideas are culturalized, framed by

given concepts and current local problematiques that pertain to the culture when research

is elaborated. Are we able, with the Western analytical tools we have built up, to properly

understand a negotiation happening in Timbuktu or in New Guinea as well as another

one going on in Manhattan? Research on cultural issues in negotiation is strongly

anchored in North America and shows very little interest for non-American publications

(Dupont 1994). Although as underlined by Weiss (1995), bodies of work on negotiation

have developed outside the U.S. as, for instance, in France. Non U.S. research on

negotiation has even been carried out in rather unexpected places such as China (Faure

1995c). Culture intervenes as an influential variable on researchers on negotiation as

well as on negotiators.



192 FAURE

If now we consider research on international negotiation focusing on cultural aspects,

four main streams can be distinguished: the structural-processual approach, the behavioral

approach, the cognitive-strategic approach, the stages approach. Each of those categories

will be presented with some research references.

The structural-processual approach draws heavily on Sawyer and Guetzkow social-

psychological model (1965) that defined five groups of variables intervening in a

negotiation. The resulting analytical framework combines a set of factors playing an

essential role that are contextual or situational, processual or behavioral, strategic or

related to the outcome. Culture is either integrated among contextual factors

(Fayerweather and Kapoor 1976; Tung 1988), or assumed as operating directly within

each of the analytical categories (Faure and Rubin 1993; Weiss 1993).

A second type of approach focuses on the negotiator’s behavior as the fundamentalcomponent in producing negotiation dynamics. According to the analytical tools and

methodology used, two different traditions have been established. The first one aims at

testing the impact of cultural elements on a number of behavioral variables in order to

assess the reality of their influence (Carnevale 1995; Graham 1983, 1984, 1994;

Kirkbridge, Tang and Westwood 1991). The second tradition is based on surveys and aims

at describing the impact of culture on negotiators behaviors and subsequently at analyzing

its consequences (Campbell 1988; De Paw 1981; Frankenstein 1986; Kimura 1980). Most

of the collected data comes from international negotiators bringing their personal experience

through, for instance, a questionnaire.

The cognitive-strategic approach aims at capturing the main elements of negotiator’s

action and at linking them to the actor’s cognition in order to explain the logics implemented

during the negotiation. In comparing national cultural profiles of negotiators, Casse (1982),Weiss and Stripp (1985) describe negotiation conception, cultural dispositions and typical

ways of acting for each negotiator. Bringing the focus on a single profile of actor, the Chinese

negotiator, Faure (1998a), basing his work on interviews of actors and field observations,

presents the major elements of the cognitive map of the Chinese negotiator and establishes

a relation with the most typical strategic actions undertaken by this negotiator in terms of

cultural causation. Thus, negotiation dynamics are captured, made explicit and explained.

The fourth mode for grasping cultural effects in international negotiation is the stages

approach. Borrowing from Zartman and Berman (1984), Salacuse (1991) divides the

negotiation process in three phases having each of them a particular objective and a specific

rationale. Satisfying the requirements of each stage allows an effective adjustment of the

different sequences and the reaching of the agreement.

Concerning the global trends of current research, what can be observed is the care to

grasp the amorphous concept of culture through methods borrowing from systematic

approaches such as those used in social sciences. An emphasis is also put on epistemic

issues by moving from the mere description of cultures as a social component in a

negotiation. Furthermore, it is at the level of query framing, a shift from a comparative

stance expressed in cross-cultural studies to an intercultural concept that takes into account

the encounter between cultures itself.

The cross-cultural approach provides data by ways of comparison and, thus, enables to

anticipate on the behavior of the other, assuming that no other culture influences him or




her. By doing so, such an approach remains static, segments reality and brings situations

to a standstill. The intercultural approach, although highly difficult to implement, has a

specific property, that of incorporating the very dynamics of the negotiation. It deals with

the mutual osmosis between two cultures, the homeostasis of the cultural system that has

been thus created with its relations, harmonies, paradoxes, contradictions and antagonisms.

In short, it takes into account complexity.

Critical views

One of the most critical streams on the importance of culture is represented by Zartman

(1993) who formulates four basic observations: “Culture is cited primarily for its negativeeffects. Yet even the best understanding of any such effect is tautological, its measure

vague, and its role in the process basically epiphenomenal.” The first argument opposes

culturalists who claim that ignoring culture is a major cause of failure in negotiations.

For Zartman, culturalists do not seriously substantiate their assertions and in no case, set

out a culturally distinct process that could shed light on the matter. In addition, they are

no more able to prove the reverse, that the successful end of a negotiation is due to the

influence of the cultural aspects. Such a comment does make sense but far from rendering

the hypothesis void, calls for more work in this area. Rubin and Brown (1975) already

underlined the relative scarcity of scholar works, assuming that the cause could be the

methodological problems inherent to such studies. For instance, laboratory experiments

concerning culture tend to have one negotiator for each side and one variable to test. In a

real world negotiation between a Western company and its Chinese counterpart to set upa joint venture, two to five Westerners face fifteen to thirty Chinese and discuss during

several years over more than a hundred issues, putting on the stage dozens of variables. It

is quite objectable to transfer findings extracted from the former situation to the latter.

Resorting to a different approach, several researchers have recently carried out some

fieldworks and analysis to provide more insights on this topic, showing how shared norms,

specific cultural combinations may facilitate negotiation or how the creation of a

professional negotiator’s culture may strengthen the dynamics of the process (Elgström

1990; Dupont, Lang and Kremenyuk 1993).

Culture tends to be defined tautologically. When culture is related to independent

variables, these variables end up being cultural too. If, for instance, social structure is

claimed to determine culture, at the same time, it is a cultural product. In fact, as shown

by Faure and Rubin (1993), culture relates to problems of different kinds: communication,

perception, identity, that enable the researcher to formulate hypothesis on its relative

importance as compared to other types of causation. What is at stake is not really how

weak can culture be as an influencing factor but rather to shed light on the complexity of

the interaction process and its consequences.

As a variable, how much independent is culture is a chicken and egg type of question.

It is, at the same time, a social product and bears an autonomy of its own. Culture changes

but not because of an external decision as it has been observed in studies concerning

corporate cultures.



194 FAURE

Culture is a vague concept and if it is viewed as the sum of the behavioral traits of a

collectivity, the significance of the “cultural basket” is never clearly defined. This is

certainly true but does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the influence of culture

should be smaller than formerly hypothesized. The essential lesson to draw from this

criticism is that research should be more narrowly focused on specific and well defined

objects in order to avoid this problem in the future. Works such as those of Hofstede

(1980, 1991), distinguishing several dimensions of culture or those of Carnevale and

Radhakrishnan (1994), using attitude scales to characterize a cultural trait demonstrate

concern and clear will to investigate more on this aspect.

Zartman’s last critique is that culture is epiphenomenal and, as a consequence, does

not substantially help in understanding the negotiation process itself. The epiphenomenal

character assigned to culture is a judgment which is not backed by a demonstration. It bears the same weakness that was underlined in the first criticism stating that culturalists

have never been able to prove what they assume. In addition, cultural minorities are certainly

more sensitive to cultural issues. This is probably why most of the critics taking that type

of position belong to the same nowadays overwhelming culture.

In fact, as underlined by Elgström (1994) while raising the issue of the “internal

validity” of culture as the relevant determinant, it is extremely difficult to precisely assess

the relative influence of each major variable operating in the negotiation process.

Outcomes can also be determined by other variables such as structural or process variables

and it would not make sense to turn culture into the unique explanatory variable of a

whole and often complex process. As shown by Druckman et al. (1976) in a study of

bargaining behavior of Indians, Argentineans and Americans, culture does matter in

determining behavior but other factors such as age, gender, environment also play animportant role, paving the way to multicausal models. In addition, what is often observed

is that culture’s effect on negotiation is subtle and this subtlety, however, does not reduce

the importance of culture but only makes it less visible. Again, it only calls for more

attention, more research.

Another strong objection to the importance of culture in negotiation is raised by a

number of psychologists who tend to consider that individual variables are by far the

most important, and that personality is the leading force in the interaction process. The

answers to this can only be found in real cases studies and might even provide a different

answer each time. In addition, and this restriction cannot be easily lifted, it is sometimes

very difficult to draw a line between cultural variables and personality variables. If we

consider, for instance, risk-taking behavior, it may belong to both sets and only a specific

investigation within a case study, will enable the researcher to draw an accurate conclusion.

An interesting remark that should trigger more research on culture and negotiation

addresses the degree to which a culture affects behavior varies from one culture to another.

Another highly relevant observation comes from the fact that as a negotiator belongs at

the same time to several cultures such as national, local, religious, professional,

organizational, family, gender, which one is the driving force? What happens when some

of these cultures put on the stage conflicting values?

Other suggestions consist in “unpackaging” the cultural category, put some of its content

in other categories such as the sociological one, the strategic one or the psychological




one. Then, it would be interesting to see what is left when attitudes, norms, roles,

motivations, perceptions, personality factors have been taken away. What would be its

explanatory value?

Another question often raised concerns how to distinguish between culture and its

manifestation, how to separate what is acted from what is acted upon. Otherwise, it would

be most challenging to apply any classical scientific method to deal with the explanatory

value of culture.

The weak points in classical approaches concerning the cultural dimension

Two main shortcomings related to cultural aspects can be underlined in classicalapproaches. One consists in simply ignoring the cultural dimension, the other does not

differentiate among cultures. Research in social sciences, when not differentiating among

cultures, leads to establish the culture of the researcher as the norm from which social

facts belonging to other cultures will be analyzed and possibly measured. One may rightfully

speak of a “scientific ethnocentrism”. If considering, for instance, the concept of

intelligence, its definition may strongly vary from one culture to another. Then, the same

scale measures something which is different and this makes the comparative approach

fallacious.

So is it if one considers the semantics of the negotiation concept. The Chinese concept

does not strictly coincide with the Anglo-Saxon concept (Faure 1995a). To capture it one

must distinguish it from the idea of discussion which only represents the cooperative

side. To negotiate (tanpan) combines two actions: “talking” and “making judgment”. Inthis case, harmony, a central value in the Chinese culture, is disrupted. The general

orientation is basically conflictual, while to discuss (taolun) links two ideas: “searching”

and “exposing” towards a cooperative outcome, assuming that harmony is still maintained.

“Emic” aspects of culture are what makes a culture unique as opposed to “etic” aspects,

being what provides ground for comparisons. Emics are especially of interest to the social

anthropologist and etics to the cross-cultural psychologist. Research tends to resort to

etic measurements of emic constructs, for instance social distance in various societies.

However the basis of social distance is often an emic attribute such as tribe, religion,

social group, nationality. Then what is used as an indicator in one culture to measure

social distance may not make sense in another culture. For instance, to ask an American

if “he would mind having a Turk touch his earthenware”, which is a question that does only

make sense in India (Triandis 1994, p. 72). In fact, research should go in an opposite way

and use emic measurements of etic constructs by building, for instance, parallel scales

separately by members of each culture and only afterward try to compare and standardize

them.

The cultural component of a negotiation situation enters in a game of mutual influences

with other components such as the structural and the strategic dimensions. The reality of

a situation is never made of totally distinct, autonomous categories and its ultimate

rationale borrows from the various interactions happening between these three

dimensions.



196 FAURE

Structural aspects are, for instance, widely conditioned by the social culture. Thus,

legal frameworks and administrative ways of intervention are influenced by values and

mores related to the culture in which they are embedded. Similarly, strategic behaviors

are part of a range of choices narrowed by the possibilities offered by the law of the

country and by the social norms to which actors abide to. Thus, not any kind of move is

allowed in a negotiation, and a number of rules of the game should be followed, reducing

accordingly the margin of manoeuvre of the negotiators.

In the same way, all what is culturally conceivable is not strategically feasible because

the nature of the interaction, common project or division of a resource, and the goals that

are targeted reduce the field of possible. Last, from another angle, the strategic component

when often repeated or under way of institutionalization, generates culture through the

new norms that are set up.Besides the fact of being Westerners or applying Western methods and tools, a huge

majority of the research population is made of males and raise choice of problems and

issues connected with their gender. This androcentric bias has put one-gender culture as

the standard from which research, supposedly universal, has developed and half of mankind

has been put aside.

Another weak point for current methodologies is that they assume that intercultural

negotiation processes apply in intercultural contexts. As long as there will not be theoretical

models specifically designed for intercultural contexts, the problem will remain.

Further question in line with the above remarks addresses computer assisted

negotiations. Do ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution) professionals at the electronic

bargaining table integrate cultural issues in their expert systems? The power to

communicate over great distances, the ability to store an enormous amount of data, theincredible speed with which it can be processed, should provide incentives to deal more

closely with cultural aspects. For instance, should a program operating as a mediator that

helps to reframe bargaining issues and options only work on quantitative grounds by

introducing new issues in order to enlarge the pie and create joint gains? What about

more qualitative approach of reframing such as changing of basic metaphor to structure

the problem? This would lead to introduce culture in a highly constructive way.

Expert systems, when providing one-sided or two-sided advice have to assess the

reservation price(s). Again, culture leaves its print in what should be a reservation price

or, even more complex, a security point.

Economic approaches are based on the assumption of an interactive concession-

convergence model usually described as a “negotiation dance”. Again, the idea of

incremental concessions is certainly culturally biased, for it is a process that is far from

being observed in many different types of societies (Faure 1998b).

What to do while using a negotiation support system if a negotiator misrepresents

his preferences? In the Orient, there is no transparency of goals. Again, people not

disclose what they want because of cultural reasons such as face-maintenance and indirect

action.

What about the concept of stable/unstable outcome? The Chinese way to secure a

stable outcome is not by a written contract including penalties for no respect of

obligations and international arbitration in case of disagreement on the term of




implementation of the contract. It is rather by establishing a strong and friendly

relationship that conflicts will be prevented or solved.

How to integrate these factors, highly qualitative and cultural in an expert system?

Finally, it has been demonstrated that it is possible to include social-emotional aspects in

problem representations of a negotiation (Faure, Lê Dong and Shakun 1990). This should

also be done with cultural aspects resorting to the various ways culture impacts on the

negotiation process. As long as this world will be made of many cultures interacting with

each other, dispute resolution in cyberspace should integrate this basic component of

human societies.

How culture impacts on negotiation: The Chinese case

Culture exerts a subtle influence that often cannot be directly seen. One has to deduce it

from attitudes and behaviors, the visible aspects of human activity. Negotiation can be

broken down into five key components: actors, structure, strategies, process and outcome.

It is particularly instrumental to confront theory with facts by shedding light on the

influence of culture over each of the key variables in a negotiation. The collected data

comes from a fieldwork that has been carried out in China. Two different types of sources

have been used. On one hand, direct observations made during negotiations concerning

buying, selling, renting, equipment supplying, sub-contracting, technology transferring,

setting up joint ventures. Thus, thirty negotiations have been investigated between Chinese

and Westerners. On the other hand, fifty interviews have been made with Western and

Chinese negotiators involved in business negotiations. Each interview lasted betweenone and a half and six hours. The fieldwork has taken place from 1990 to 1996, and has

mainly concerned two areas: Beijing and Shanghai.

Actors

Individuals, groups, organizations can be involved in the negotiation process. In all cases,

they are men and women and as such, they bring culture into the interaction. For actors,

culture conditions how negotiations will be perceived. Under what kind of metaphorical

representation of negotiation will they operate? Will it be viewed and played as a power

confrontation, a cooperative exercise, a debate, a ritual, a human venture?

For Americans negotiation is rather a give and take exercise, but for the Chinese it is

far more of a confrontation (Faure 1997; Pye 1982; Weiss and Stripp 1985). The way

actors perceive other actors, including stereotypes, their intentions and the values that

guide their conduct. How issues themselves are understood, will a set of issues be viewed

as a list of items to be discussed sequentially as Americans do, or will it be seen as a

system of interconnected elements to be approached in a holistic way as Chinese would

do (Needham 1956).

Issues may also carry a symbolic value that take them away from simple, clearly

delineated understanding and adds a third level of reality and beliefs. Underlying symbolic



198 FAURE

meanings, memories from past experiences, occasionally historical memory may

strongly influence behaviors and become true explanatory variables. In a tough

negotiation, a Chinese may not mind reminding his Western counterpart, what he would

see as a moral debt to China in order to weaken his position. He would refer to events

from the last century such as the sack of the Summer Palace by English and French

troops, the “unequal treaties” of Nanjing and Tianjin compelling China to open its ports

to international trade.

The negotiators themselves bring ethics into the interaction. The cultural line drawn

between what should be and what should not be done, or tolerated, varied from one culture

to another. In some cultures, people easily resort to means of action such as lies, deception

or bribes that are considered as absolutely unacceptable by other cultures.

Considering the counterpart as an enemy may legitimate use of tactics that would not be conceivable with people seen as partners. A threat in China usually generates a “casus

belli”.

In addition to this national culture, actors also bring other types of cultures such as the

organizational culture (Hofstede 1991), the professional culture (Lang and Sjöstedt,

forthcoming), the local culture. Addressing China, Graham (1996) distinguishes between

Northern and Southern culture. The Northern Chinese culture is defined as cooperative

and equity oriented, whereas the Southern culture is more competitive and does not mind

about unbalanced outcomes provided that they are beneficial. With the same concern,

Faure and Chen (1997) isolate three Chinese main subcultures, Northern, South-Coastal,

South-West and relate them to very specific negotiation behaviors. They take into account

criteria such as the way to frame negotiation, flexibility, role of status, emotions, trust,

risk-taking propensity, time management, complexity handling and decision-making. Theyalso distinguish professional profiles of Chinese negotiators such as chief executives,

salesmen, technicians and present the prominent attributes of their negotiating styles.

Last, among the current Chinese counterparts a foreign negotiator may come across in

China, they consider generations and again study their negotiation behavior, be they old

conservatives, mid-age pragmatists, or young materialists.

Structure

External constraints, such as the national and local legal framework, the organizational

setting of a negotiation, are social products and, as such, are not culture free. Other typical

structural factors include the number of parties involved, the number of issues at stake,

the distribution of power between the parties and the degree of transparency of the process

for external observers such as the media.

Again, culture may influence some of the structural aspects. For instance, the number

of negotiators representing one party in the negotiation is largely related to cultural habits.

A couple of foreign negotiators currently have to deal with fifteen to thirty Chinese

counterparts, sitting on the other side of the table. In business negotiations in China, a

foreign team does not only negotiate with its Chinese counterpart but indirectly with

other parties such as the local authorities and government.




On the Chinese side, usually the real decision-maker does not directly participate to

the negotiation. Such an attitude perfectly illustrates Chinese traditions. It follows the

way it was done by Empress Ci Xi who, sitting behind a white curtain, would listen to what

was said during the hearing from her son, dictate him the answers he should give without

being ever seen. To remain behind the scene is for decision-makers a way to protect

themselves, to avoid exposing themselves to the turbulence of the negotiation, to prevent

any possible risk of loss of face during the highly conflicting episodes. In addition, in

China, negotiation is rather conceived as an “art d’exécution” (applied art) than as an

activity done by a high level executive. This displays how Chinese culture and society

in-print on the negotiation structure.

Culture tends to give pre-eminence to some types of situational power and to disavow

others. In China, it is quite legitimate for the strongest to impose his own views. In former USSR, the Party could not be wrong. In traditional African villages, in a discussion, the

eldest always has the final word. Such a priori judgments will influence the whole process

by weighting on negotiators’ behaviors.

In China, a business negotiation is always conceived as an unbalanced situation. It is

not the foreigner who sells to a Chinese counterpart, but China that buys from a foreigner.

In addition, according to Chinese views, the buyer has a stronger position than the seller,

even if the international dimension is not present. The consequences are quite foreseeable.

If the foreigner treats the Chinese negotiator as an equal, he will be perceived as incredibly

arrogant.

In the case of a negotiation in China, decisions are made according to a double rationale

abiding by the formal Chinese organizational structure but also by following the “guanxi”

system. The formal authority gives its approval according to rules whether public or keptsecret. The “guanxi” is the parallel network of acquaintances within which each of the

members is caught in a logic of mutual obligations in terms of support (Chen and Faure

1995). Thus, this informal network, requested by one of the negotiators makes use of its

influence to try modifying authorities’ attitude on a particular issue in the negotiation.

The relation to law and written rules is also highly culturalized and strongly contrasts

with that adopted in cultures based on written law. For instance, a number of laws and

regulations provide the legal framework because in China fairness is always superior to

law. This is a legacy from Confucian tradition for which governing according to morals

was the major value. From such a position, Confucius opposed the Legists and won over

them. Today Westerners could be viewed as the spiritual successors of those Legists with

their insistence to have a legal framework built up. This is the reason why in China there

is a number of joint ventures that do not have any legal base for existing but nevertheless

have been operating for years without major problems.

Harmony is another Confucian principle that has, at the present time, kept its

importance in the current Chinese culture and its central aspect in the structural

organization of the negotiation. Such a principle applies to civilized people, which means

to Chinese or assimilated people involved in a relationship of a friendly nature. It aims to

maintain non-conflictual social relations. Such a value prevails in the structuring of the

game between the Chinese and the Foreigners who got over the threshold of sinization

that enables them not to be any longer categorized as devils or ghosts.



200 FAURE

Strategy

Negotiating is a global action and the overall orientation given by an actor to achieve his

goal is a strategy. Strategic choices are led by values which, in turn, relate to culture.

Goal setting is also, to some extent, influenced by culture. Maximizing one’s own gains,

creating joint gains, building up a reputation, establishing a friendly relationship, teaching

a lesson to the other side are as many intentions that have to be implemented by adequate

strategies. In some cultures action will be direct, conflict widely accepted and problems

met head on; in others, action will be indirect, conflict not openly acknowledged and

problems only dealt with through allusions. Russians, for instance, tend to negotiate from

a position of strength and do not mind resorting to aggressive tactics such as threats,

whereas the Japanese are highly reluctant about direct confrontation (Kimura 1980).Westerners are strongly driven by the idea of fairness and respect to basic principles,

and rules. The Chinese are much more concerned by preserving at least the appearance of

a peaceful relation among the participants of a negotiation or by maintaining face than by

abiding by rules and abstract principles, and may even sometimes act at the expenses of

these rules. Thus, on many occasions, social values can be dominating over economic

interests.

Culture may also influence the way negotiators proceed to reach an agreement. Some

cultures, such as the French or the German, favor a deductive approach, looking first for

acceptable principles, then applying them to concrete issues. Other cultures, such as the

American, would rather adopt an inductive approach, dealing pragmatically with specifics

and underlying principles will only become discernible in the end (Salacuse, in this issue).

The Chinese global approach of negotiation combines two very different types of exercises inherited from the tradition (Faure 1998a). The first one, the “ mobile warfare”

operates on a basically highly conflictual repertoire. The foreign counterpart is defined

as an adversary, a barbarian, and this enables the Chinese negotiator to use a lot of tricks

and tough tactics to meet their goals. For instance, to cut the other off his base, to take

advantage of the isolation of the foreigner in China. This is expressed in a classical saying

“to lure the tiger down from the mountain”. Compared to a tiger, the foreigner is integrated

in a quite meaningful metaphor, that of a powerful and merciless prowler on the Chinese

land.

Impressing the counterpart, showing determination, frightening him is another type of

tactics used. It is “killing the chicken to warn the monkey”. The false concession is also

a way to gain a lot over the other. This is done by offering something of a low cost for

oneself, trading upon foreigner’s ignorance of its real value. it is “giving away a brick to

earn a piece of jade”.

Dividing the opposite side by playing on possible disagreements among its various

members is another tactic commonly used. The purpose is to sow dissension by discussing

separately with each foreign negotiator and thus “take advantage of a fire to commit a

robbery”, here to get an otherwise unexpected benefit.

To raise a guilt feeling in the foreigner by making him responsible for some wrong

doing, misbehavior or so-called offenses that his company has supposedly formerly done,

is another way to get a positional advantage. To plan on the assumption that he will feel




indebted to his Chinese counterpart is “to borrow a corpse for the return of the soul”, to

recall a past event to serve a present purpose.

The "mobile warfare” is also based on tactics of harassment, destabilization, exhaustion

and squashing. All of them having some similarities with the teachings from traditional

war books such as “The three Kingdoms” “Outlaws of the Marsh” or Sun Zi works (a war

adviser in ancient China). Harassment consists in submerging the other under a host of

questions so that he loses his references. Destabilizing the other is achieved by brutally

changing the style of the negotiation, from a smooth mode to a tough stance, then back to

the smooth mode with no apparent cause. The exhaustion tactics are designed to reach a

certain level of physical and psychological weariness of the opponent so that to surrender

on some important issue. This is done, for instance, by fighting with the last energy over

the smallest detail, coming back endlessly to the same questions, taking turns if necessary.Squashing tactics are meant to crush the claims and expectations of the other party by

making offers at a very low level. The foreigner can be made desperate if, in addition, the

Chinese side insists on the fact that it does not really need to quickly reach an agreement,

that it can do without, that it has an alternative option.

Usually the final purpose of the Chinese is not like in the classical chess game, to

destroy pieces from the other side until he collapses and thus get a total victory. It is

more inspired by the game of Go whose point is to secure an advantage on the other, to

score more points. Maneuvers to reach this goal consist in holding encircling rings,

organizing chains, creating areas of influence, controlling territories.

The second type of traditional way to conceive a negotiation applies to an encounter

between “civilized people”. A barbarian has been sinizied if he is considered to understand

some of the particulars of Chinese culture and possibly has adopted some of them likeeating dog meat and drinking mao tai. Then, he gets access to the category of the “civilized

people” and the Chinese negotiation strategy he has to face is entirely different from the

former one. It is a kind of “ joint quest ” whose point is to rather negotiate the construction

of the problem than to just agree on a solution. It is first of all an orientation for action

and a state of mind. One might see the influence of Taoism because it strives at establishing

a balance among various elements of the game, at building a stabilizing harmony within

this uncertain encounter that is negotiation. The conciliatory spirit that prevails over such

a relation promotes a very specific principle of fairness, that of a symmetry modified

according to the inequality of the needs that should be met.

The major means used for this joint quest is a highly ritually controlled activity, with

well defined formal limits, where the subtle tools of perception and decoding do at their

highest, like while making a medical diagnosis in ancient China. The pulse was the only

indicator and the doctor was able to differentiate among nine distinct pulses in order to

deduce anything wrong with the patient’s health.

In such a negotiation situation, the point is no more to optimize one’s gains on a laid

out itinerary but to build the road itself. The rules of the game are the shared values

necessary to cant out the task paying respect to the Confucian precept according to which

“without common principles, it is useless to discuss” (Confucius XL, p. 40).

The joint quest is a long and exacting work of exploration which gives rise to a lot of

impatience with the Western negotiators. Its cognitive nature disconcert the Foreigner



202 FAURE

who rather expects getting into a give and take process. The application of the Confucian

principle of harmony requires the reaching of a balanced state through successive

adjustments excluding any disclosure of conflicting interests. Negotiator’s positions

cannot be made explicit without infringing those basic rules. Joint research is done through

implicit communications and allusive discourses to avoid exposing the other’s face. In

addition, elementary rules of politeness imply that one should not openly show any

impatience because it would be understood as a loss of control on oneself, meaning a

loss of face. This process is a highly time consuming and painstaking exercise.

In traditional China, only devils move on a straight line. Effectiveness requires

“Slipping into the on-going, oscillating, and flowing course of events. It implies a

proper judgment of the auspicious moment for a passive use of their process” (Jullien

1992). The major point of the joint quest is not to strike a deal on the substance of thenegotiation but to conceive a puzzle, an unknown figure, with some of the pieces given

and others to be created. What will be built is a metaphoric game for whom both parties

have to establish rules of functioning.

The Chinese concept of negotiation combines these two approaches, the one that elicits

clearly observable effects and the one that never reveals itself as such. If the foreigner is

not able to establish this distinction while negotiating, he or she runs the risk to operate

on the wrong repertoire and face considerable difficulties if not total failure.

Process

The core of the negotiation is the interaction between the actors. Process is made of moves or tactics of all kinds designed to divide a resource, to exchange information and

concessions or to create new options. Process is normally the variable that produces and

explains the outcome. It noticeably varies from one culture to another.

Usually, the process is divided into several stages, each of them related to the

implementation of a distinctive rationale such as consensus-seeking and concession-

making, integrative and distributive bargaining (Walton and McKersie 1965), value creating

and value claiming (Lax and Sebenius 1986), formula and details approach (Zartman 1978;

Zartman and Berman 1982). For negotiations in China, the process can be subdivided into

four phases: opening moves, assessment, end-game, and implementation phase

(Frankenstein 1986). The first phase exploratory and focused on relationship building, is

for many foreigners at the same time something very specific of China and a major

difficulty. It is a long lasting and apparently unproductive stage, because it does not enable

the parties to move ahead on any substantive issue. No doubt, if someone comes to China

to get a quick solution and ends up with a protracted game of relationship building, a lot

of frustration will appear on his side. In fact, in China, one has to know his counterpart

before developing any significant business with him. In the Chinese tradition, managing

relationships is an art, a sign of civilization. Any attempt to bypass this stage can only

lead to mutual misunderstanding, personal offense and the paralysis of the whole process.

Rituals plays also an essential part in negotiations. A ritual can be defined as any formal

action that carries a symbolic quality. Ritual action is imbued with shared social meanings




and is performed through a kind of ceremonial. Viewed as often senseless by many

Westerners, rituals are in China the warrant of the quality of the relationship, for in the

People’s Republic as well as in the Middle Kingdom, it is the ability to perform rituals

that distinguishes a civilized person. Ritualized behaviors in a negotiation are many :

exchange of business cards held with the two hands as an offering, welcome gifts, banquets

in formal dress following a specific etiquette including speeches and toasts, rules of

precedence during meetings, ways to address someone, handling of symbols and numbers

(often meaningful too), the agreement signature ceremony. The Chinese negotiator will

assess their counterparts according to their ability to perform rituals in a satisfactory

way and will make his opinion on the possibilities of developing with him a fruitful relation.

Thus, rituals from an empty shell becomes a structuring element that functionally

contributes to the negotiation dynamics.Concession making is one of the basis sub-processes in negotiation. If a concession is

an objective fact, it is interpreted as a somehow cultural origin. In a “mobile warfare”

setting, a Chinese would surely take it as a sign of weakness, a proof that being tough,

insistent, clever pays. Then, he would go ahead with the same tactic and seek another

concession. In a “joint-quest” concessions are mainly gestures, moves to meet the

concerns of the other party. In that case, that would be reciprocated.

The negotiator’s behaviors are value related and what can be seen as legitimate in one

culture can be totally rejected in another culture. For instance, not sticking to one’s word

or deceiving the other party about a deadline can be viewed from very different angles,

for being polite is in some cultures more important than telling the truth.

Adler (1986), drawing upon Fisher and Ury (1981) provides a list of 15 tactics

considered as “dirty tricks” in the North American culture. Some of them would never beunderstood as “dirty tricks” in the Chinese culture but rather as common practice. For

instance, “too little eye contact” does not mean in China the launching of a psychological

warfare but simply a polite and modest attitude which is the sign of a good education. No

private place to talk does not either mean that the Chinese negotiator is trying to put his

foreign counterpart in a stressful situation. In the Chinese culture, there is very little

privacy and a negotiation is a rather public discussion as much of the life of people in

professional settings. Even a hotel room is rather viewed as a public place.

Another example is “extreme demands”. In fact, what is highly exaggerated in one

culture, can be seen as reasonable in another one, especially if the foreign seller is viewed

as rich. In addition, such a stance allows room for concessions and provides opportunities

to contribute to equalize both parties’ condition, thus meeting an essential value in China.

“Reopening old demands” is something very common in China. It does not mean that

the Chinese negotiator is trying to play some trick but it rather means that he has another

understanding of negotiation and that he has a strong concern for the issue on which he

goes back.

“Take it or leave it” often comes in the end of the negotiation. It is in China, as in many

other places, a way to indicate that one has gone as far as he could with concession-making.

In any case, it is definitely not seen as a dirty trick but as a very normal and decent, even

if a little tough, behavior in the Chinese culture. Conversely, some actions and moves

considered as quite common in the West would be viewed as unscrupulous or abnormal



204 FAURE

practices by Chinese negotiators. Among them, emotional outbursts, face and reputation

challenges, embarrassment of the other side, escalating demands, direct threats are part

of the panoply of non-acceptable behaviors.

The way behaviors are perceived and understood is also highly cultural. A significant

example is given in the letter sent, at the beginning of the century, by a Chinese traveling

in the West to one of his friends. “I have seen two white men meeting on the deck of a

ship. Each one offers his right hand and holds the other’s. I thought they were trying to

throw each other into the water, for I believed they were engaging themselves in a fight. In

fact, it was their way to greet each other: they were friends” (Chih 1962, p. 203). Thus, in

those times, it was just inconceivable for a Chinese to see shaking hands as an expression

of politeness or friendship. It is culture which provides the meaning of the gestures.

Communication is another major component of the negotiation process. Itseffectiveness may be considerably affected by cross-cultural dissimilarities. When

communication is indirect, content ambiguous, feedback scarce, negotiation has to become

mainly a decoding exercise in which culture and context provide the two main keys to an

accurate perception of signals sent by the other party. Differences do not only lie in what

is said but in how it is said and also in the social context of the discussions.

The meaning of the Chinese smile is an interesting case with which to illustrate the

complexity of the task, and at the same time its necessity because from an objective fact

one can derive opposite conclusions. A Chinese smile can be perceived as a mask of

politeness, an opaque wall behind which one observes the other. It can express cooperation

or denial, joy or anger, certainty or total ignorance, trust or distrust, pleasure or

embarrassment. Only some knowledge of the Chinese culture and the reference to the

current context of the smile may enable to get access to its real meaning. It is a necessaryinformation in a negotiation where signals are often scarce.

The discourse itself follows a different logic according to cultures. Kaplan (1966),

analyzing the Anglo-Saxon way of reasoning, deduces that it develops linearly, following

an inductive process from fact to conclusion or a deductive approach starting from a

general principle that will be applied to particular cases. By contrast, the Oriental argument

development has a “beating around the bush” structure, including a lot of digressions and

moves slowly by concentric circles to the real core of the subject.

Cross cultural differences in the use of time may also affect the negotiation process.

In the West, time is conceived as a commodity that has a cost and should be used with

parsimony. In contrast, in the Orient, tinie is rather viewed as an unlimited resource like

the air. As a consequence, time pressure will have very little effect on Oriental negotiation

behavior. As it has been said by a Chinese negotiator to his Western counterpart who was

pressing him to quickly come to an agreement: “Your technology, China has been able to

do without for 5,000 years. We can wait for a few more years”.

Humor may be used as a facilitator but what is funny in a culture may be merely viewed

as nonsense or as a quite unpleasant remark in another culture. Differences existing

between, “Voltairian irony” and the critical distantiation conventionally called “English

humor”, are more than a matter of shade, but reveal intellectual constructs of a very

distinct nature. For instance, self criticism is simply a polite way to give face to the

counterpart, not a purposive way to entertain him.




Outcome

The outcome is a function of. the other key elements of negotiation and, as a consequence,

the influence of culture on these elements will indirectly bear upon it. A choice is made

among the various types of possible agreements, through the values that culture

emphasizes. Fairness is one of the values which operates as a driving force in this selection.

According to the principle of fairness that is applied, the zone of potential agreements

may be modified and the global value of the game changed.

There are also more direct linkages between cultures and outcome. For instance,

Western negotiators prefer an agreement in which each word has been carefully assessed

and where all possible eventualities have been anticipated. Chinese may do with more

loosely formulated agreements, simply stating general principles. Thus, a joint venturecontract in China conceived by the Western side can be several hundred pages long,

whereas the Chinese would easily do with a ten-page length. What is included in the

outcome, is far from always being put in a written form and varies according to cultures.

Besides the usual provisions, numbers and figures that are mentioned in a business contract,

Westerners consider that the time spent (or saved), reaching the agreement is part of the

outcome. Chinese systematically put trust and quality of the relationship as major

components of the outcome.

Fundamentally, to the Chinese the idea of a written contract is a tangible proof of a

lack of trust and demonstrates that the conditions for cooperation are not fully fulfilled.

The very essence of the transaction is legal instead of being relational.

Culture may also influence how the parties interpret the outcome that has been attained.

In Western societies, an agreement is a final decision carved on stone that has to bestrictly implemented. In the Chinese society, an agreement is a written paper that was

valid the day it was signed but which may be modified if the external conditions prevailing

at the time of the signature have changed. Signing a contract is definitely not closing a

deal but substantiating a relationship. It is just one episode in an ongoing relationship

(Pye 1992, p. 49) and the negotiation may start again the next day.

To be concluded, as previously mentioned, agreements normally have to meet some

norm of fairness. Perceived fairness can be narrowly linked with cultural differences

(Roth et al. 1991). Behind such a concept one can find different, sometimes conflicting

principles of justice narrowly connected with social values. Some cultures resort to

precedent, other favor equality of concessions or gains as a basic norm of fairness; others

prefer imbalance gains distributed according to the specific needs of each party, as the

Chinese do. Both sides may not agree on which principle should be applied. Typically,

principles in a negotiation work either as a strong cement that get people together or as a

major obstacle to any agreement.

Once an agreement has been reached, the point becomes to make sure both parties will

respect its provisions. In the Western mind, this is done through institutional mechanisms

such as courts, international arbitration. In the Chinese culture this attitude is simply

viewed as a sign of distrust and would rather resort to additional negotiation or mediation

in case of litigation. The legal system does not guarantee the enforcement of written

contracts but the quality of the relation does. As underlined by Adler (1986 p. 516),



206 FAURE

people honor contracts if they like and respect the people with whom they are doing

business.

Rather than abiding by principles, the Chinese would pay more attention to the

consequences of not respecting what has been decided and consider the related cost as

the first criteria in making a decision. If he is himself victim of someone who does not

implement all the terms of the contract, he would first assess the losses and if these are

relatively small, he would not protest in order not to look mean and expose himself to

losing face.

Rather than looking for an arbitration as it is done in the West, Chinese tradition favors

mediation, for its takes much more care of social-cultural constraints. Nowadays, as it

used to be in ancient time, as shown by Wall and Blum (1991), mediation practice still

operate on a rich and broad range of actions.If the matter is not a business negotiation but a peace settlement between countries

for instance, again a cultural disjunction takes place. In Western cultures, peace is

conceived as a state of absence of conflict. In Chinese culture, a peaceful situation needs

to be characterized by additional features such as the prominence of a principle of harmony

and the establishment of a balanced relational system. Thus, where a Westerner would

perceive a successful restoration of peace, a Chinese might only see a situation of non-open

aggression. If both sides were at war, unexpected initiative may happen after some time.

Levels of cultural effects of negotiation

Culture impacts on negotiation in a number of ways eliciting various types of consequencesat four different levels: cognition, beliefs, behaviors, identity. As underlined by Rubin

and Sander (1991), some of the most important effects of culture are felt even before the

negotiation starts. This is typically the case with these four levels where, silently and

unconsciously for the actors, culture leaves its invisible trail.

Cognition relates to ways of perceiving, understanding what is at stake in a negotiation:

goods, money, power, technology, status, face concerns. Cognition also relates to how

the negotiation is perceived in itself, the nature of the game that the actors are playing:

for instance a strength test, a relationship, a search for justice, a palabra, a game of

seduction, a construction exercise. Cognition also concerns what one party knows about

the other party. What are the driving perceptions operating: stereotypes, historical memory,

past personal experiences. Stereotyping by bringing together various traits reduces

cognitive complexity to simple terms, easier to handle during the preparation of the action.

Cognitive aspects play a central part in problem framing and subsequently when making

choices in terms of strategy and behaviors. When Magellan, in the year 1521, accomplished

the first circumnavigation around the world, reaching an island in the Pacific ocean, he

met the king and offered him presents. He wanted to establish relationships on an equal

basis and explained that he wanted to treat him as a brother, but the king sharply objected

the idea and told he could only be considered as a father. In this early cultural encounter,

what was at stake, was precisely the framing of the relationship to be subsequently

developed. Concerning a more actual type of encounter such as those elicited in doing




business in China, what is viewed as a conflictual negotiation by Chinese may not be seen

as such by Americans. Similarly, what is often seen by American negotiators as a delaying

device can simply be for a Chinese the time needed to know better the other party.

The general approach to the negotiation is typically conditioned by actors’ culture. To

the cartesian-analytical approach implemented in the West can be opposed the holistic

approach of the Chinese. The first approach aims to segmenting the problem and solving

the difficulties as and when required ; the second tends to assess the entire situation and

to learn how to accommodate the relative influence of the many forces involved (Redding

1990). These conflicting approaches produce highly negative effects because the point is

not to meet way in the course of negotiation, but already to put the process on its tracks.

In that case, each party moves on a different track.

“When you will have understood the whole, then you will understand the parts” asChinese wisdom says. Originally, the holistic approach finds its origin in the Chinese

writing itself in its initial form, that of a pictogram. To capture the meaning of a character

requires the complete representation of the object. Thus, the Chinese develops a global

perception of reality, a sense of the whole including, in the case of a negotiation, situational

aspects far from the negotiation table. A Chinese meal perfectly illustrates the holistic

approach. Dishes do not come one after the other but are all displayed at the same time

on the table, and starting from the perception of the whole meal, the participants make

their choices and organize their own sequencing.

Thinking is often built up from metaphors that are concrete expressions that capture

reality with its ambiguities and contradictions. Metaphors are culturally bound and should

be understood in terms of what culturally shapes them, in the culture of the actor. One

way to capture the cultural dimension is to take an example that expresses the Chineseapproach to negotiation with the help of a metaphor directly drawn from a real context

such as the bicycle circulation in Beijing. This metaphor, while showing the tacit

coordination and non verbal exchanges that occur among the thousands of Chinese cycling

around the city, reveals a number of essential features of the Chinese way of negotiating

(Faure 1995b).

Language, a typical cultural product, is a major instrument in cognitive activities.

Problems are necessarily defined within existing categories. As commonly stated, if your

only tool is a hammer, then every problem is a nail. Labeling is, thus, a major cultural

activity which conditions and, to some extent, structures social action.

Hidden values may be found behind words givin them very different connotations. For

instance, the term “compromise” has a positive acceptation in English. In others cultures,

it carries a strong negative judgment such as giving up all morals.

Attributions also play an important role because perceptions are narrowly linked to

behaviors explanations. Cultures strongly differ in the focus of the attributions they make

(Miller 1984). Individualistic cultures such as the American tend to make attributions an

internal disposition (for instance, moral qualities or weaknesses), whereas collectivist

cultures such as the Chinese tend to make more use of contextual judgments (for instance,

external circumstances).

The second level, that of beliefs, puts forth a set of values rooted in the cultural

background of the negotiator. These values, expressing what is desirable and what is not,



208 FAURE

operate as instrumental goals and directly orient the behavior of the actors. If only national

cultures were at play, as a set of shared values, culture would generate a rather predictable

pattern of negotiating behavior. With other cultures such as the corporate culture and the

professional culture, the assumption of homogeneity looses its relevance and common

values become more difficult to discern. Paradoxes and inconsistencies may start taking

a large place. Combined with personality variables within strategic behaviors, the final

attitude of the negotiator would become much less predictable, if ever.

When both parties stick to conflicting beliefs, unless these are never disclosed as it

can be done through indirect games, the whole negotiation process may be strongly

affected as there is no way to divide values and no reason to give up one’s own beliefs.

Both negotiation teams operate along highly contrasted rationales. For instance,

Chinese culture, is based on an “associating logic” that does not systematically opposevalues one another to show what is desirable but lays down complementary relationships

between those values. Like the “yin” and the “yang” in the Taoist philosophy, black and

white are not opposed; no more than socialism and market economy in today’s China.

Beliefs also refer to ethical issues and here again considerable gaps take place between

Chinese and Westerners in terms of values. In the Chinese tradition, ruse is a form of

wisdom, the pre-eminence of smartness, cleverness over strength and power. Fundamental

books displaying Chinese values such as the “Three Kingdoms” lengthily illustrate this

idea and are still used as educational tools. This is why now Chinese keep copying

shamelessly Western products and through this type of conduct, not only enjoy economic

benefits but gain merits for having so well served their fatherland. Technology follows

often a similar fate when transfers to joint ventures because, far from being protected as

stipulated in the contract, it can be widely disseminated to competing Chinese enterprises.If cognition refers to the type of game to be played and beliefs deal with the goals and

the rules of the game, behaviors concern the way to play. The negotiator chooses within

a range of acceptable behaviors and defensible arguments what he thinks appropriate to

his task. Tactics such as “imposing a deadline” or issuing direct threats are rather part of

the American culture. The Chinese culture would better be illustrated by the use, for

instance, of the “salami tactic” (nibbling) or just keeping silent and not answering. Each

culture has some sense of what level of risk should be taken and this level can be extremely

diverse (Faure 1995b). For instance, the uncertainty avoidance scale, on which Hofstede

(1980) ranks 53 cultures, goes from 8 to 112. Cultural learning is an ongoing process

throughout the interaction and the experience gained in the course of the negotiation may

influence back cognition.

Under the heading of “negotiating styles”, a number of publications address the

behavioral aspects of negotiation in putting the emphasis on cultural differences. They

describe typical ways in which negotiators behave when they are, for instance, Japanese

(Van Zandt 1970; Blaker 1977), Chinese (Pye 1982), Arabs (Alghanim 1976). Conclusions

were sometimes drawn in terms of advice to the practitioner such as “do not call your

Chinese counterpart by his first name”, “while sitting in a tent do not show the sole of

your shoes to your Arab counterpart”, “do not give a slap on the shoulder of a Japanese to

show him sympathy”, “when you meet a Latin-American negotiator, do not suggest getting

down to the work before getting well acquainted”. The attention of the reader is drawn on




misperception, miscommunication and cross-cultural misunderstanding that often occur

in international encounters.

These often anecdotal observations may sometimes be useful to the practitioner but

bear limitations as they do not very much help to understand the culture of the negotiator

across the table and, in any case, do not tell much about what happens on the intercultural

side of the relationship. The major obstacle to a productive negotiation at this level is the

behavioral disadjustment produced by the influence of the two other levels, the cognitive

one and that of beliefs. For instance, the highly normative thinking generated by the Chinese

culture (Granet 1950) leads to make judgments concerning the foreign counterpart’s

behavior and personality. The classical way to handle difficult situations, here those

disadjustments, not to face the risk of a destruction of the relation, is to use indirect

proceedings, to resort to allusive talks, to make an abundant use of understatements,metaphors, meaningful silences.

Identity is the last level of intervention, the deepest and most difficult to deal with.

The consciousness that a negotiator develops of his own culture contributes to build an

inner sense of identity. If a behavior is put into question or criticized, it can be perceived

as an attack against one’s own culture, subsequently eliciting a feeling of a threat to one’s

identity which may entail defensive reactions. Such a defensive attitude often permeates

the whole negotiation, inducing a paralyzing effect.

Such a process can be highly critical in some negotiations even when they apparently

involve only business issues. When identity is not built by differentiation but mainly

through opposition to the other party, any change likely to reduce the antagonistic

relationship and to improve the conditions for a settlement may appear as a betrayal.

Modifying the elements that form one’s identity is a denial of oneself and can be viewed,at the symbolic level, as a destructive attempt.

The role of culture is narrowly associated with the intensity of conflict. If conflict

increases, so does the role of culture (Faure and Rubin 1995, p. 216). When the conflict

deepens and reaches the identity issue, it turns to cultural stakes, and negotiation becomes

a game in which culture is used as a sword and a shield.

In a business negotiation with foreigners, the Chinese do not tend to see their

counterpart as representatives of a company, coming to serve its interests. They view

them first as nationals representing their own country and accountable for it. Such a

perception drastically modifies the fundamentals of the negotiation, for it introduces

new issues. This is why, for instance, a Chinese negotiator in the course of the discussion

may refer to a historical litigation more than a century old.

Chinese negotiators nowadays like in old times demonstrate what Kissinger (1979)

calls the “middle Kingdom Syndrome”. Foreigners are no more than Barbarians coming

to pay tribute to the center of the world and of civilization. They have to be received and

treated accordingly. If they do not behave as expected, it is seen as a disruptive attempt of

the basic relationship as framework and a challenge in role assignments and identities. A

suggestion supported by an argument such as this is the way it is done in America runs the

risk of not only being counterproductive but of being felt as a blow the Chinese identity.

An aggravating factor comes often on top of this, the Sino-centrism which, combined

with the extreme Chinese sensitiveness, makes all issues cropping up during the negotiation



210 FAURE

reframed in comparative terms. Then, any critical attitude from the foreign side may be

easily interpreted as a denial of identity. This observation applies to a number of negotiated

issues such as the salary of the Chinese deputy general manager, equal access to foreign

schools, technology protection, force majeure in case of nationalization of private

assets.

The importance given to face-saving in the Chinese culture entails a multiplying effect

to identity stakes. “Face-maintenance” can be defined as the “desire to project an image

of capability and strength or conversely to avoid projecting an image of incapability,

weakness, or foolishness” (Brown 1977). The concept of face-maintenance applies when

the negotiator is exposed to the other party, but also to an audience, to a third party or to

his constituents. Open proceedings increase the likelihood of having to resort to

face-maintenance devices (Dupont and Faure 1991).Opportunities to be concerned by face-maintenance, face-saving or face-restoration

are many because in a relationship of a competitive nature, sometimes even highly

antagonistic, negotiators must constantly not only avoid objective losses but also protect

themselves against any risk of being humiliated. Face-maintenance may incur a high

economic cost. For instance, a protracted deadlock leading both parties to waste market

opportunities can find its origin in the Chinese concern not to lose face in mentioning

the difficulties the Chinese side has met and cannot overcome, or in submitting itself to

the requirements of the foreign side (Faure et al. 1998). Difficult to grasp, highly complex

to manipulate, identity aspects remain the untouchable core of culture.

Conclusion

Three categories of factors directly influence the negotiation process: the structural-

organizational factors, the strategic factors, the cultural factors. None of these categories

is totally absent in an international negotiation. If the strategic dimension is by definition

of a universal importance, in China the two other dimensions take a considerable acuteness

(Faure, forthcoming). Structural-organizational factors such as the legal framework, the

role of public administration, the political guardianship, the information and decision-

making systems are not without any relation to the social culture that has either produced

them or accepted them. The cultural factors play a determinant role at several levels of

the negotiation process and, for a practitioner, to ignore such a reality is to run the risk of

conducting all his approach to failure.

Any cross-cultural exploration begins with the experience of being lost, as emphasized

by Hall. However most often, it is only a temporary stage. Predictors of success have

been put forward for people working abroad in another culture (Martin 1989). Among

them, the following apply to negotiators: the ability to develop social relations; the

willingness to communicate; skills in conflict resolution; patience as the ability to suspend

judgment; intercultural sensitivity. These predictors are certainly quite valid in China but

if one wants to get more specific about Chinese culture and negotiator’s behavior, several

aspects should be emphasized: awareness and understanding, empathy, anticipation,

uncertainty management and creativity.



212 FAURE

culture. However, again, it can be highly problematic to implement such a dimension for

the above mentioned reasons.

The challenges a foreign negotiator in China is confronted with, are not so rnuch of a

cross-cultural nature but actually intercultural. If it is already difficult to foresee the

other’s behavior, it is even harder to imagine what will come out of this uncertain encounter

between two cultures and what will be the dominating rationale of this cultural

combination.

Considering Chinese culture, the foreign negotiators often waver between fascination

and stubborn resistance. Fascination leads them to implement an immersion rationale

aiming to absorb a number of Chinese cultural traits. Resistance is the expression of the

development with foreigners of a siege mentality that incites them to shelter in a cultural

ghetto, the protective cluster made with their own nationals, within the turbulent and hardChinese environment.

The foreign negotiator comes up against an additional difficulty because China has

produced a “fortress culture”, at the example of the Great Wall protecting the country

from external influences. By contrast, Hongkong has, for instance, worked out a “bridge

culture” that lives on traffic, interactions and information flows.

Another challenge for the foreign negotiator at the stage of preparing for action is to

make an accurate distinction between what belongs, in the behavior of the Chinese

counterpart, to the cultural register and what refers to the strategic dimension. This should

be viewed as a high stake, especially in case of deadlock when it becomes necessary to

make a diagnosis. According to the nature of the deadlock, a specific treatment will be

devised and implemented, for the means to overcome a cultural stalemate have nothing to

do with those required to effectively deal with a strategic deadlock.The persistent lack of feedback from the Chinese side added to the indirect way to

play the game, makes such a diagnosis difficult to carry out and the final outcome rather

uncertain. A clever Chinese negotiator may thus make his foreign counterpart believe

that he is acting according to social habits and traditions, when in fact he is playing with

these strategically. Again, the foreign negotiator has to carefully assess which one is the

driving force behind the Chinese behavior and to this purpose find significant indicators.

Among the major necessary skills for a negotiator entering the Chinese market are

observing and decoding. In a research, it provides data for the first stage, the description:

When, where, how? What are the relevant elements of the situation? A cultural training

also enables the researcher and the practitioner to reach the second stage, the explanation.

Taking into account the cultural, organizational context and considering the actor’s

strategies, what is the reason behind such an event, why such an outcome has been achieved,

or why such a goal has not been attained?

To predict what should happen is a far more difficult exercise. Negotiation does not

belong to deterministic approaches and what makes it always exciting to follow makes

extremely difficult any forecast on a possible result. Finally, to prescribe a strategy or a

move in a negotiation raises the same obstacles and risks. Furthermore, this last level of

intervention requires that each side knows precisely what he wants, which is far from

being always the case in China. It also requires that the Chinese side accepts to let its real

goals known, which seldom happens.




Here lies the vital stakes to be met for a productive development of the negotiation.

For it is by providing relevant answers to the various issues just stated that the degree

of effectiveness of the negotiation system can be raised by discovering com-

plementarities and by transforming this cultural encounter into a synergistic and creative

interaction.

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