the co-producing citizen: a case study on the motives...
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GHENT UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
ACADEMIC YEAR 2013 – 2014
THE CO-PRODUCING CITIZEN:
A case study on the motives affecting citizen participation in community
development
Master Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Public Administration and Public Management
Daphne Vanleene
under the guidance of
Professor Bram Verschuere
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PERMISSION
Ondergetekende verklaart dat de inhoud van deze masterproef mag geraadpleegd en/of
gereproduceerd worden, mits bronvermelding.
Daphne Vanleene
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Acknowledgements
My thanks are due to many people without whose help and support this thesis would have
remained a dream.
First and foremost, I sincerely want to thank Professor Verschuere, my promoter, for his faith
in my capabilities and his guidance. Without those it would have been all but impossible to
complete this work. He was the one who introduced me to the social profit sector, and
specifically to co-production. He showed an infectious enthusiasm on the subject that
undoubtedly rubbed off on me. This enthusiasm remained throughout the many meetings this
year.
Secondly I owe thanks to all the employees of “de Torekes” project and “De Site”, without
whose help I would not have been able to research this wonderful local project. I am
especially grateful to Wouter Van Thillo who helped set up the first interviews and introduced
me to the different initiatives and to Gülcan Sari who not only welcomed me with open arms
and facilitated the recruitment of participants for my research but who also helped me reach
the Turkish residents. Without her this thesis would’ve been unreliable and poorly
researched.
I wish to thank both my parents for their support, advice and help throughout, for being my
chauffeur on numerous drives to and from ‘t Rabot, for proofreading and advising, and for
being the sympathetic ear when it became all just a little too much.
Lastly, I owe my deepest gratitude to Jens, my boyfriend, not only for his comforting words
and soothing presence when I most needed it, but also for his willingness to sit by me and
discuss (or explain) difficult phases of thesis-writing and research. He sacrificed weekends
and evenings and encouraged me to accomplish my goal and aim for success.
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Abstract This thesis engages with the concept of co-production, a mix of activities where professionals
work with citizens to enhance the quality and the quantity of the public services . It focuses
on one specific subcategory within co-production, that is community development, and it
aims to answer the central research question “What are the motivations behind citizen
co-production within community development?”.
The goal of the research was to distinguish the different motives in co-producers. A group of
ten motives, currently described in literature, have been compiled. There were the extrinsic
motives encompassing material and non-material rewards and material and immaterial
sanctions, the intrinsic motives consisting of the solidary motive, the expressive motive, the
normative motive and effectiveness and the circumstantial motives, ease of involvement and
salience.
To answer our research question these motives were then tested in a case study, the
community development project ‘De Torekes’. Through the use of a Likert-scale survey
opinions of the co-producers were measured. The data from this survey was reduced so as
to be measurable and its reliability was tested. From a Paired Samples T-test the levels
between the different hypotheses have been assessed. This hierarchical ranking led to the
conclusion, confirmed in previous research, that extrinsic motives are the least influential of
incentives. Thus people are not conditioned by the "carrot and stick" approach and will not
co-produce solely because of the potential reward or sanction. In this case study, the
expressive motivation was the highest scoring motive, which led to the remarkable
conclusion that these co-producers are most influenced by their altruistic spirit.
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Samenvatting
Deze thesis bespreekt het concept van coproductie, een mix van activiteiten waar
professionals samenwerken met burgers om de kwaliteit/kwantiteit van de openbare diensten
die ze gebruiken te verbeteren. Wij hebben ons vooral richten op een specifieke
subcategorie binnen coproductie: samenlevingsopbouw. Centraal in ons onderzoek stond de
volgende onderzoeksvraag : "Wat zijn de motivaties voor burgers om te coproduceren
in samenlevingsopbouw?”
Het doel van het onderzoek was om de aanwezigheid van verschillende prikkels in co -
producenten te ontdekken . Op basis van de secundaire literatuur werd een groep van tien
motieven op gelijst . Deze lijst bestond uit de extrinsieke motieven waarin de materiële en
niet-materiële beloningen en materiële en immateriële sancties, de intrinsieke motieven
bestaande uit de solidaire motieven, de expressieve motieven, de normatieve motieven en
de effectiviteit en als laatste de omgevingsmotieven, het gemak van deelname en het
persoonlijk belang.
Om onze onderzoeksvraag te kunnen beantwoorden werden de motieven vervolgens getest
in een casestudy, het samenlevingsopbouw project 'De Torekes'. Door het gebruik van een
Likert - schaal onderzoek werden de adviezen van de coproducenten gemeten. De gegevens
uit dit onderzoek werden gereduceerd om meetbaar zijn en de betrouwbaarheid hiervan
werd getest. Door gebruik van een Paired Samples T-test werden de niveaus tussen de
verschillende hypotheses beoordeeld. Via deze hiërarchische rangorde werd ontdekt dat, net
als in het vorige onderzoek, extrinsieke motieven de minst invloedrijke zijn van alle prikkels.
Dus mensen worden niet beïnvloed door de "wortel en stok"-aanpak en zullen dus niet
coproduceren uitsluitend vanwege de potentiele beloning of sanctie. In deze casestudy was
het expressieve motief het hoogst scoorde motief. Daaruit volgend kan men concluderen dat
de coproducenten in deze casestudy het meest worden beïnvloed door hun altruïstische
geest .
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Table of Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................................ I
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................ III
SAMENVATTING .................................................................................................................................... V
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 1
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK .............................................................................................................. 3
2.1. THE ORIGINS OF CO-PRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 3
2.2. A DESCRIPTION OF CO-PRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 4
2.2.1. Definition ................................................................................................................................ 4
2.2.2. Intent and focus ..................................................................................................................... 5
2.2.3. Categories of Co-production.................................................................................................. 6
2.2.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 7
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .............................................................................................................. 9
3.1. CATEGORIES OF MOTIVATION ........................................................................................................... 9
3.2. PERSONAL MOTIVES ...................................................................................................................... 11
3.2.1. Hypothesis 1: Extrinsic motivations boost citizen’s co-production. ..................................... 11
3.2.2. Hypothesis 2: Citizens co-produce because of intrinsic influences..................................... 12
3.3. CIRCUMSTANTIAL MOTIVES ............................................................................................................ 15
3.3.1. Hypothesis 3: Citizens will co-produce (more) when they perceive it easy to get involved. 15
3.3.2. Hypothesis 4: Citizens will co-produce (more) when they perceive the co-production project
to be of enduring importance (salience) to them. .......................................................................... 16
3.3. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 17
CASE STUDY & METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................................... 19
4.1. CASE STUDY ................................................................................................................................. 19
A. Community development project ‘De Torekes’ ......................................................................... 19
B. Co-production characteristics ................................................................................................... 20
4.2. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................................. 22
4.3. SURVEY ........................................................................................................................................ 23
DATA ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................................. 25
5.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE ................................................................................................ 25
5.2. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS ........................................................................................................... 25
A. Data reduction ....................................................................................................................... 25
B. Paired Samples T-test ........................................................................................................... 27
C. Intermediate Findings ............................................................................................................ 31
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D. Analysis of variance ............................................................................................................... 32
E. Intermediate Findings ............................................................................................................ 32
CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................................... 33
6.1. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 33
A. The Citizens’ Motivation ............................................................................................................ 33
B. Co-producer’s profile ................................................................................................................. 35
C. Recommendations .................................................................................................................... 35
6.2. LIMITATIONS ................................................................................................................................. 36
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................... 37
DATA ..................................................................................................................................................... 41
APPENDIX 1. ORIGINAL SURVEYLIST ..................................................................................................... 41
APPENDIX 2. DUTCH SURVEY ............................................................................................................... 43
APPENDIX 3. TURKISH SURVEY ............................................................................................................. 45
APPENDIX 4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS. ................................................................................................ 47
APPENDIX 5. RELIABILITY TESTS .......................................................................................................... 49
APPENDIX 6. PAIRED SAMPLES T-TEST .................................................................................................. 58
APPENDIX 7: ONE WAY ANOVA ............................................................................................................. 85
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List of Tables and Figures Figure A: Theoretical map ....................................................................................................10
Table 3.1: Extrinsic motives ..................................................................................................12
Table 3.2: Intrinsic motives ...................................................................................................15
Table 3.3.Extrinsic motivations boost citizen’s co-production................................................17
Table 3.4. Citizens co-produce because of intrinsic influences. ............................................17
Table 3.5. Citizens co-produce because of ease of involvement. .........................................17
Table 3.6. Citizens co-produce because of salience. ............................................................17
Table 5.1: Reliability test ......................................................................................................26
Table 5.2: Interpretation of paired samples test(A) ...............................................................28
Table 5.3: Interpretation of paired samples test (C) ..............................................................28
Table 5.4: Interpretation of paired samples test (D) ..............................................................28
Table 5.5: Interpretation of paired samples test (E) ..............................................................29
Table 5.6: Interpretation of paired samples test (F) ..............................................................29
Table 5.7: Interpretation of paired samples test (G) ..............................................................29
Table 5.8: Interpretation of paired samples test (H) ..............................................................30
Table 5.9: Interpretation of paired samples test (I) ................................................................30
Table 5.10: Interpretation of paired samples test (J) .............................................................30
Figure B. hierarchical ranking of motives ..............................................................................31
Table 5.11: one way ANOVA tests .......................................................................................32
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Introduction
Co-production is a term that grew more and more common these past decades. As
researchers and governments discovered the importance and usefulness of co-production it
steadily found its place in our public services. This rising interest and the ascertainment that
many government services are unable to function without co-production this subject into a
worthwhile study. (Kiser 1984, Parks et al 1981 as referred to by Alford 2002) Apart from
that there is the fact But that is not the sole reason that public management has adjusted or
shows a growing interest in co-production. Sundeen (1988) claims the most obvious reason
behind this is the possibility of budgetary reductions, particularly at municipal government
level. After all, co-production has often been considered a source of improved service quality
and production efficiency. In theory this means that through the interaction of public
employees and citizen, quality and efficiency may improve (Ostrom, 1996). Indeed, a number
of studies support this claim.(Jakobsen, 2013) Moreover, co-production has also been linked
to improved citizenship as well as social capital (Jakobsen, 2013). These benefits are
reasons for the government to support co-production initiatives and to prompt citizen
participation in the hope of improving the trust and appeasement of their citizens but also to
sustain the social cohesion of their communities.
However in order to link the correct incentives to co-production projects, governments need
to know their citizens’ motivations. And in this paper I will try to answer that question. I will try
to find out what the motivations are for citizens to get involved in co-production.
I begin with a conceptual and theoretical framework that explains both co-production as well
as the research that has been done hitherto. This theoretical framework will present an
overview of the possible motives of co-producers. From this I will extract a list of potential
motives and create a series of hypotheses based on these motives which I can then
operationalize for our case study. This case study, located within community development, is
an internationally known project with great prospects called ‘De Torekes’.
Then I will research the best way to contact the target audience and gather reliable data.
Finally through SPSS, the statistical computer program, I pinpoint the variables that influence
those motivations and establish which motivations influence citizen co-production.
Lastly I discuss theoretical and practical implications and consider future research
possibilities.
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Conceptual
Framework Before I begin this exposé I delve into the past, discovering both the origins and background
of co-production as well as the diverse definitions of the concept and decide on and the
definition that will be most helpful to my research.
2.1. THE ORIGINS OF CO-PRODUCTION
In the late 70s and early 80s the concept of “co-production” was developed within a public
administration context. This happened largely because of the rising antipathy towards
traditional and big government. Policy making was no longer seen as a purely top-down
process but rather as a negotiation that even held possibilities for competition (Alford 1998,
2002; Bovaird 2007; Bovaird & Loeffler 2012) .
There ensued a search for alternative solutions. Firstly, there were the New Public
Management approaches. Through either a focus on the potential larger role of customer
service, including user research, quality assurance and choice among providers or by giving
attention to competition among providers for the contracts commissioned by public agencies.
However both approaches are limited as neither really considers the potential of users and
their roles in service provision (Bovaird, 2007).
This led to the discovery of co-production and its potential. Here the third sector, citizens’
participation and input in the provision of public services is essential to maintain the growing
demand (Alford 1998, 2002; Bovaird 2007; Bovaird & Loeffler 2012; Jakobsen 2013) .
Interest in this concept, and the subsequent growing participatory role of citizens has, not
surprisingly, been revived in recent years. Both the New Public Governance paradigm as the
current economic crisis enhance the interest in co-production further.
The New Public Governance paradigm (Osborne, 2010) assumes that policy and the
provision of public services are mainly achieved through a variety of networks of multiple
interdependent actors. It is easy to connect co-production and citizen participation to this
paradigm, for through this public services and goods are no longer solely delivered by
professional public agencies but also by the users and their communities. (Verschuere,
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Brandsen & Pestoff, 2012) Meanwhile the economic crisis leads government, public agents
and academics to search for alternative solutions to public service provision.
The work of Parks et al. (1981) originating from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy
Analysis at Indiana University, is one of the most important pieces of literature when
discussing co-production. This sparked the further investigations and research into co-
production.(Jakobsen, 2013)
That there’s a definite significance to the subject, and its revival in recent years, is proven by
awarding the late Elinor Ostrom with the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics, for her work on
analysis of common goods and the role of the users and their associations in the provision of
these goods (Ostrom, 2009 as mentioned by Verschuere et al. 2012)
2.2. A DESCRIPTION OF CO-PRODUCTION
2.2.1. DEFINITION
Because of this rising interest in the subject there is a diverse number of definitions
concerning co-production. Each of these brings different nuances, broader interpretations or
differences to the term. (Jakobsen, 2013) Ostrom’s definitions, both broad and narrow, are
those most-often mentioned and used. In her 1996 study she defines co-production of public
services as “the process through which inputs used to provide a good or service are
contributed by individuals who are not in the same organization” (Bovaird, 2007; Jakobsen,
2013).
In a later work Ostrom expands her definition (1999): “the mix of activities that both public
service agents and citizens contribute to provision of public services. The former are involved
as professionals, or ‘regular producers’, while ‘citizen production’ is based on voluntary
efforts by individuals and groups to enhance the quality and/or quantity of the services they
use.” (Parks, Baker, Kiser, Oakerson, Ostrom, Percy, Vandivort, Whitaker, & Wilson, 1981)
Joshi and Moore have created an even tighter definition for the concept they call
‘institutionalized co-production’: “provision of public services (broadly defined, to include
regulation) through regular, long term relationships between state agencies and organised
groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions.” (Bovaird, 2007)
Another attempt is the one by Nesta who defines co-production as follows: “co-production
means delivering public services in an equal and reciprocal relationship between
professionals, people using services, their families and their neighbours. Where activities are
co-produced in this way, both services and neighbourhoods become far more effective
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agents of change.” This definition focuses on the genuinely joint activity between
professionals and the public and insists on an ‘equal and reciprocal relationship’. But as
Bovaird and Loeffler clarify this is rare to find within public services (Bovaird & Loeffler,
2012).
That is why I return to the first two definitions by Ostrom. In my research I will consider co-
production along the lines of the second and widely-accepted definition of Ostrom (1999),
defining co-production as:
“the mix of activities that both public service agents and citizens contribute to provision
of public services. The former are involved as professionals, or ‘regular producers’, while
‘citizen production’ is based on voluntary efforts by individuals and groups to enhance the
quality and/or quantity of the services they use.”
Ostrom’s definition focuses on the collaboration between the citizens and public service
agents. She also offers terms to distinguish the two. The definition explains the applicability
of co-production and gives us an idea of how broad a concept it can really be, and how far
this concept can reach (in public services). I apply this definition throughout the paper
because it is befitting for the case study I will research, both consisting of public service
agents and citizens working side-by-side.
2.2.2. INTENT AND FOCUS
As Verschuere et al. (2012) explain, co-production is applicable to several academic
disciplines and therefore it raises a flurry of interest in these different sectors. By applying
Ostrom’s definition they find that co-production, through its ‘voluntary efforts’, and the
‘provision of public services’ create the perfect link between the voluntary sector research
and public management research.
While sociologists will mainly be interested in the voluntary aspect, administration scholars
try to understand and derive the process and motives behind co-production. This diverse
academic playing field is one of the explanations why co-production has such a high
conceptual heterogeneity.
However the ‘voluntary efforts’ mentioned in the definition are not to be confused with the
concept of ‘volunteering’. Since co-production also implies the consummation of the service,
wherein for volunteering is purely altruistic, the act of providing the service or good is the sole
goal. Another important attribute of co-production is the long-term durability of the services
provided and consumed. Therefore the main intent of the collaboration is the creation of a
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long-term relationship between citizen and professional, with both investing time and
resources in the maintenance of the project (Verschuere et al 2012).
2.2.3. CATEGORIES OF CO-PRODUCTION
As stated above co-production differs from ‘ volunteering’ because the provider is also a
consumer of the service. It also differs from other developing concepts of ‘active citizenship’.
In that last-mentioned case citizens act without government whilst co-production is a
collaboration of the two, citizen and government (van Eijk & Steen, 2014).
However, within the concept of ‘co-production’ there’s a varying degree of depth and
definition. As I have seen already different authors delimit co-production differently to fit their
research.
To begin with, by considering co-production as the bridge that fills the gap between the
different disciplines, as mentioned above, there are noticeable levels within the concept.
Pestoff and Brandsen create a theoretical division of three: macro, meso and micro, which
split the different methods of collaboration between citizen and government (Pestoff and
Brandsen, 2006).
Macro-level considers the input of the policy process, whether citizens and/or other actors
are (in)directly involved with policy making and policy decisions. Examples of these are the
direct and indirect participation mechanisms such as referenda (direct) or through civil
society (indirect). Because of this, these co-production processes often carry different names
such as ‘co-construction’, ‘co-planning policy’ or ‘co-prioritization’. Collectively Pestoff and
Brandsen (2006) brand them as ‘co-governance’ again referring to the involvement of
citizens in the initial stages of the policy process (Verschuere et al., 2012).
For the meso-level the term ‘co-management’ is used. It is defined as the provision of public
services through cooperative private and non-profit actors. (Pestoff & Brandsen, 2006) These
actors are involved in the development of the public service(s) and in turn are required to
invest time and other resources (Verschuere et al., 2012).
Lastly there is the micro level, the most limiting of the three. In contrast to the meso-level (or
co-management), the micro level comprises of a direct involvement of the individual,
meaning citizens are (to some extent) considered to be directly or indirectly responsible for
the provision of their specific public service. (Evers and Adalbert, 2006) This can be
connected back to the definition of Ostrom (2006), making the micro level the most closely
related to my concept of co-production.
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It is important to realise that these concepts are neither exhaustive or exclusive. As a result
the three levels are often divided into two dimensions.
The first dimension depends on participants, e.g. citizens (individuals) or organizations
(profit, non-profit). While co-management mainly focuses on the collaboration between
organization co-production emphases on the voluntary efforts of the citizen.
On the other hand there’s the dimension that depends on the different stages within the
policy cycle itself. As stated before, co-governance endorses the earlier stage of the policy
process contrary to co-management and co-production that are situated at the policy
implementation stage (Pestoff & Brandsen, 2006; Pestoff, 2012).
2.2.4. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, co-production is a rising phenomenon in our current society. Now that
we have a tangible idea of what co-production entails and where it comes from I can present
my research results. Through the works of Sundeen (1988) and Jakobsen (2013) I already
found several reasons for government to co-produce and encourage co-production. However
that’s only one side of the collaboration. For co-production to work efficiently there is a heavy
reliance on the citizens.
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Theoretical
Framework In order to form decent hypotheses for my study and to get a general idea of what has
already been discovered, I need to delve into the current research and the categories
describing citizen profile, motivations, influences and expectations. In short, I need to find the
answers to my research question: ‘What are the characteristics, motivations, expectations
and appreciations for citizens to get involved in co-production?
To aid my research, I review previous and recent works attempting to divide the different
categories and types of motivation.
3.1. CATEGORIES OF MOTIVATION
Let us begin by presenting a precise idea of what I will discuss in the following chapter.
Current research results taught us that there are two sets of dominant motives: personal and
circumstantial motives. (1) Motivations that are based on the citizen’s personal criteria and
character and (2) external motivations which are the factors through which the government
can stimulate or discourage co-production. Both of these sets of motives can be refined into
several other motivations. The extrinsic motives, or the tangible benefits (Alford, 2002) and
the intrinsic motives.
For the first, the personal motives, we shall discuss the two most distant motives and the
groups within. From those I shall then extract basic hypotheses and sub hypotheses to test in
my subsequent research.
Next to these personal motivations Pestoff (2012) points to other important influences such
as the ease of becoming involved and the salience of the services delivered. When citizens’
attention, or their individual motivations, are drawn to a specific problem, this can prompt
them to become active. As Steen & van Eijck (2014) explain, this has to do with salience.
When a topic is important enough, citizens will find the willingness to consider involvement
and weigh up their investment of effort. However, this salience isn’t the only factor that
influences their decision-making. Besides that, citizens will have to consider whether they
feel competent enough to engage, called efficacy (Steen & van Eijck, 2014). Circumstantial
3.
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influences such as these are often dependent on the government’s input as they can hinder
or facilitate co-production. These factors pose answers to the citizens’ questions on why they
would participate and how easy it really is to get involved (Verschuere et al., 2012). However
bear in mind that these are often considered necessary conditions. After all, without the
possibility of finding and participating in co-production the citizen will not think of the option of
participating (Steen & van Eijck, 2014).
Below an outline:
Figure A: Theoretical map
Personal
motivation
Circumstantial
motivation
Salience
Ease of
involvement
Intrinsically
motivated
Extrinsically
motivated
Hypothesis J
Hypothesis I
Hypothesis H: effectiveness
Hypothesis G: expressive motives
Hypothesis F: normative motives
Hypothesis E: solidary motives
Hypothesis D: immaterial sanctions
Hypothesis C: immaterial rewards
Hypothesis B: material sanctions
Hypothesis A: material rewards
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3.2. PERSONAL MOTIVES
Personal motivates are, as the name implies, based on the citizen’s personal criteria and
character. They are easily divided into two separate incentives: the extrinsic and the intrinsic
motivations.
3.2.1. HYPOTHESIS 1: EXTRINSIC MOTIVATIONS BOOST CITIZEN’S CO-PRODUCTION.
An accessible typology to consider to be the baseline from which to start, is the one designed
by Sharp (1987 as referred to in Alford, 2002) who created a three-part-typology on the
factors that induce citizen co-production. To understand extrinsic motivations I have to begin
with Sharp’s extrinsic incentives, the most classical of Sharp’s (1987) three-part-typology.
These incentives are considered to be the tangible benefits such as money, goods or
services and have been rigorously discussed in literature on co-production. In theory this
means the co-producer expects to be rewarded through material means for their input
(Alford, 2002). As Verschuere et al. (2012) explain this incentive can be both monetary (e.g.
a voucher or free goods) or non-monetary (e.g. safety, non-exclusion). It assumes people as
being benefit maximizers who only co-produce if it is in their own interest (the benefits
outweigh the costs). This viewpoint is largely inspired by the public choice theory and so this
incentive is considered, especially by economists, to be the main reason people co-produce
(Verschuere et al., 2012).
Apart from this rewards-incentive given by Sharp, Alford (2002) finds a second extrinsic
incentive: the avoidance of sanctions (Asquer, 2013). Alford’s (2002) research confirms that
both incentives are used when dealing with co-production. Sanctions can be sectioned into
two, the first where citizens are penalized by a reduction or suspension of benefits when they
do not meet their obligations(Alford, 2011). The second, the nonmaterial motivation for
compliance, such as fear of social condemnation and moral values.(Alford, 2002)
However, Alford (2002) also points out that neither incentives are very effective. The
sanctions are at best ineffective, at worst even counterproductive. After all, citizens do not
experience co-production positively when threatened. As he explains in a later work (Alford,
2011), sanctions are bad generators of these complex positive actions, which are essential to
co-production. Acting co-productively, contrary to refraining from something prohibited, is
similar to moving from a lethargic to an active state, which calls for what Alford (2011)
defines as consummate co-operation. In simpler words, judgment, forethought and discretion
are required to perform. Thus the citizens will want to recall an information input, to gain new
skills or attributes and to utilize an organizational output. Sanctions do not connect with these
impulses and will mostly demotivate citizens from contributing (Alford, 2011).
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For the material incentives Alford found a similar constraint. People aren’t conditioned as the
dog in the famous Pavlovian experiment, and therefore won’t solely co-produce because of a
material reward. On the contrary he discovered that although the motives behind co-
production can very well develop from self-interest, these benefits are often to be found far
more complex than solely monetary (Alford, 2002).
When Asquer (2013) describes the different incentives for citizens to co-produce he quickly
establishes, as Alford (2002) did, that both extrinsic rewards are generally understood to be
non- or minimally influential when discussing the motivation to co-produce. There is one
exception to the rule, in circumstances of, what Verschuere et al. (2012) call, mundane tasks.
This applies when citizens are asked to perform relatively simple, frequent and short tasks,
without costing them too much time or effort. Here the extrinsic incentive will motivate as
there’s no direct benefit linked to the co-production (Asquer, 2013).
However, authors who have previously written about this subject, agree that this self-interest
incentive has some severe limitations in explaining why people still co-produce. Even
economists from public choice schools accept that other values, besides the monetary
incentive, can influence a person’s actions (Verschuere et al., 2012). I can therefore
conclude this overview with several sub hypotheses connected to the number of extrinsic
motives. The four sub hypotheses, in matrix below, will be further operationalised during the
research for my paper.
Table 3.1: Extrinsic motives
Material Nonmaterial
Rewards Citizens will co-produce when offered
material rewards in return.
Citizens will co-produce when offered
immaterial rewards in return.
Sanctions The presence of material sanctions
improves citizen’s co-production;
The presence of immaterial sanctions
improves citizen’s co-production.
3.2.2. HYPOTHESIS 2: CITIZENS CO-PRODUCE BECAUSE OF INTRINSIC INFLUENCES.
The intrinsic or non-material motivations have a wide array of different motives. Intrinsic
mostly means that the motivation exists within an individual. So, rather than relying on
rewards or sanctions one is motivated by an interest or the enjoyment of performing the task.
Alford (2002) divides intrinsic motivations into four namely intrinsic, solidary, expressive and
normative influences. He defines intrinsic motivation as “the clients’ sense of self-
determination and competence.” (Alford 2002) In other words, by co-producing the citizens’
self-esteem can enhance and their sense of hope and purpose restored. Steen and van Eijck
13
(2014) agree with this definition, claiming intrinsic rewards assisted in enhancing one’ sense
of competence and self-efficacy.
But within the definition of intrinsic motivation there are three more types. The first, the
solidary incentives, also from Sharp’s account (1987 as referred to in Alford, 2002) are
defined as the rewards and enjoyment that come of associating with others. Alford (2002)
refers to this as sociality. The citizens’ willingness to participate is directly connected to their
desire to belong, to socialize, to be a member of a group and have a sense of identification
and being well-regarded but also the simple fun and pleasantness of working together.
Verschuere et al. (2012) define social incentives as the enjoyment one would associate with
interacting with other people as well as the aim to gain their approval or avoid their
disapproval.
Pestoff (2012) gives us an umbrella term, the cooperative gambit, which is closely related to
the solidary incentives. He defines the term as “is the willingness of individuals to sacrifice
their short-term personal interest for the sake of the long-term individual and group benefits
stemming from collective action.” The idea behind the gambit is to create a trust that will help
surmount the short term self-interest-thinking of group members. Moreover the cooperative
gambit offers its members the opportunity to reap benefits they could never achieve as
individuals (Pestoff , 2012).
It has to be mentioned though that there are still factors such as the costs of the collective
action and problems of “free riding” that cause a probability of failure of large groups when
forming voluntary organizations in pursuit of the public interests. In smaller organizations
individual members have the chance to exercise social control over the efforts and
contribution of others hereby lessening or avoiding these problems.(Pestoff, 2012)
Another intrinsic incentive mentioned by multiple authors is the normative purpose. This
incentive coaxes citizens to co-produce simply because it is ‘the norm’, because their belief
systems claim it to be right or logical. As Verschuere et al. (2012) define it, here citizens are
guided by their base values such as their belief in democracy.
A term, closely connected to these normative motives, is the study of Public Service
Motivation (from hereon PSM). PSM is originally used to explain public sector employees’
engagement not only in their daily tasks but also in civic action on their own time. (Perry and
Hondeghem 2008 as referred to by Steen & van Eijck, 2014) PSM explains a socially-
oriented motivation that prompts public servants to contribute to the public interest because
of their democratic values. The phenomenon could also contribute to explain citizen’s
motivations, offering insight into a more community-centred motivation. I follow Steen & van
14
Eijck (2014) in this line of thought. They were not the first to link the motivation of public
servants with studies of motivation of citizens. Perry and Wise defined PSM as “an
individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public
institutions and organizations” (Perry & Wise in Steen & Van Eijck, 2014). Several other
authors build upon this definition. Authors such as Brewer (2003), Pandey, Wright &
Moynihan (2008) and Steen & van Eijck (2014) argue that PSM is not just a theory of public
employee motivation but has the capacity of representing one’s predisposition to act altruistic
or hold pro-social behaviour regardless of them being at home or at work. Consequently a
public employee with a high level of PSM, or concerned with the public interest, is more
probable of becoming active in his community. This level of PSM could increase the
likelihood that a citizen wants to take up his/her responsibilities and engage as a co-producer
(Steen & van Eijck, 2014).
Finally as the last intrinsic incentive there is Sharp’s (1978) third motivation type, the
expressive incentive. These are the intangible rewards that create the sense of satisfaction
of having contributed to attaining a worthwhile cause (Wilson 1973 as mentioned in Alford,
2002). It isn’t hard to link these incentives to the concept volunteering. Alford (2002)
expanded his research to investigate the concept alongside co-production. He describes the
6 motivations of Clary, Snyder, Ridge, Copeland, Stukas & Haugen (1998). Yet because it
isn’t applicable in my research I will not further investigate the volunteering viewpoint.
Another term connected to volunteering which is used for co-production is altruism, more
specifically the concept of ‘impure’ altruism. As Steen (2006) explains altruism and egoism
can often be combined in one motivation as citizens could be motivated through some
private or selfish reason beside the ‘pure’ altruistic motive. (Govekar & Govekar, 2002 as
referred to by Steen 2006) This generates the term ‘impure’ altruism. Through her research
Steen (2006) confirmed the possibility of rational thinking, explaining that an altruistic person
can consider the benefits to others and him/herself when participating and thus creating
‘impure’ altruism. This concept also has the potential of being accepted by rational
economists and in the rational choice theory which is, as discussed above, often present
within public administration studies (Steen, 2006).
After all these considerations and the citizen participation following, Steen & van Eijck (2012)
point out there will be an assessment of the effectiveness of their input and actions. The
citizens will consider whether or not their goals have been reached and if the outcome is
preferable. However, the actual outcome does not have to be the expected one, as during
the participation new insights can develop and the resulting outcome will thus be judged in a
positive way even if they are not the preferred one. More importantly, the process of the
15
engagement itself will be evaluated and thus the effectiveness of participating. (Steen & van
Eijck, 2014)
The intrinsic motivation is a complex reasoning that happens mostly inside someone.
Whether it is as a group or alone, people behave co-productively because they believe it, the
task itself, the gratification, the solidarity or the consequences, is a valuable experience. I
assume thus that citizens can co-produce because of several, different, intrinsic influences.
Table 3.2: Intrinsic motives
Sub-hypotheses
Solidary Citizens’ willingness to participate is directly connected to their desire to belong &
socialize.
Normative Citizens co-produce because their belief systems claim it to be right or logical.
Expressive Citizen co-production is influenced by intangible rewards that create the sense of
satisfaction of having contributed to a worthwhile cause.
Effectiveness Citizens keep co-producing when their goals have been reached and if the outcome
is preferable.
3.3. CIRCUMSTANTIAL MOTIVES
Beside the citizens’ personal motivations, there are circumstances that can influence the
extent of citizen co-production. The two most important aspects here are the ease of
involvement and the importance of the task.
3.3.1. HYPOTHESIS 3: CITIZENS WILL CO-PRODUCE (MORE) WHEN THEY PERCEIVE IT EASY TO
GET INVOLVED.
One often mentioned and important influence is the question as to how easy it is for citizens
to get involved. As Verschuere et al. (2012) explain ease of citizen involvement can be
dependent on several factors, such as the distance to a service provider, whether or not
information is easily available about this service and its provision etc. This circumstance is
directly related to the time and effort citizens are required to put in. Pestoff (2012) defines
these as transaction costs. The lower these costs are, the easier it is for citizens to
participate. However this can also be reversed, the greater the effort required, the less likely
they will get involved. (Pestoff, 2012)
Another aspect of this ease is the efficacy, or whether or not the citizens feel competent
enough to engage in co-production. Here I look into Steen and van Eijck’s (2014) answer as
they discuss a concept from political science, internal efficacy. They use the term within the
concept of co-production and thus define internal efficacy as “the feeling of personal
16
competence to understand and affect the delivery of the service at hand and to participate in
the mechanism of co-production.” (Steen & van Eijck, 2014)
From previous research and current literature I thus assume that citizens will co-produce
more when it is easier to get involved. As argued above, this ease relies mostly on the efforts
of the government to provide information, aid both the participating citizens as well as those
that are interested, by being present for them both physically and mentally. This can be done
by providing close public presence via a post in the community or civil servants who walk
around the neighbourhood and are easy to approach. Providing an information database
through folders, websites, social media and briefings is another important means to facilitate
involvement. These are only a handful of the many tools available for governments to interact
with their citizens and encourage and ease their involvement.
3.3.2. HYPOTHESIS 4: CITIZENS WILL CO-PRODUCE (MORE) WHEN THEY PERCEIVE THE CO-PRODUCTION PROJECT TO BE OF ENDURING IMPORTANCE (SALIENCE) TO THEM.
Their involvement will also depend on the salience of the service. This deals with the
question whether or not the service is truly of importance for the citizen or their loved ones
and if the service affects them, their life and life chances directly or indirectly. When these
questions are answered positively, and a citizen feels that the service is important, is vital to
their life chances or that of their loved ones, they will be more likely to get involved and be
motivated in the co-production of social services. (Pestoff, 2012)
The salience of a service is indirectly connected to the durability of that service. Pestoff
(2012) here stresses the necessary distinction between enduring and non-enduring tasks.
After all, many social services provided belong to the first category and have therefore an
immediate and important impact on the life of the people receiving them. The salience of
these services guarantees a high involvement and interest of their clients in the further
development of the services. Typical examples of these enduring social services are
preschool services, education, elderly care, handicap care, as well as preventive and long-
term health care, etc. The ability of users to leave these services is slim, as they are locked
in for a long time. Therefore they have to use their involvement and voice as a way to
influence or better the services. (Pestoff, 2012)
Thus I can hypothesize that citizens will co-produce (more) when the co-production project is
of enduring importance (salience) to them.
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3.3. CONCLUSION
In conclusion I can say that there are a number of motivations and influences that can
prompt a citizen to co-produce. But these motivations are never stand-alone when
influencing a citizen to co-produce. The authors who discovered the motivations above have
found and described several distinctions between and nuances on these specific motivational
factors (Steen & van Eijck, 2014). From the literature reviewed I derived two main influences,
personal and circumstantial. Both are significant when it comes to answering why citizens co-
produce. And neither is considered autonomous (Pestoff, 2012).
First I discussed the motivations that are based on the citizens’ internal criteria and
character. Within personal motivations I discovered another great division between extrinsic
and intrinsic motivations. It is generally agreed on that the first, containing self-interest
motivations and sanctions, is severely limited and cannot perform correctly without added
influences. On this I build my first hypotheses:
Table 3.3.Extrinsic motivations boost citizen’s co-production.
A. Citizens will co-produce when offered material rewards in return.
B. The presence of material sanctions improves citizen’s co-production.
C. Citizens will co-produce when offered immaterial rewards in return.
D. The presence of immaterial sanctions improves citizen’s co-production.
On the contrary, the intrinsic motives are recognized by most authors as important motives in
co-production. Our second hypothesis was derived from this assumption:
Table 3.4. Citizens co-produce because of intrinsic influences.
E. Citizens’ willingness to participate is directly connected to their desire to belong & socialize.
F. Citizens co-produce because their belief systems claim it to be right or logical.
G. Citizen co-production is influenced by intangible rewards that create the sense of satisfaction of
having contributed to a worthwhile cause.
H. Citizens keep co-producing when their goals have been reached and if the outcome is preferable.
The external motivations or the factors through which the government can aid or discourage
co-production, the circumstantial motivations, weren’t so complicatedly divided. I found that
an easy access to get involved is considered a fairly important factor to boost successful co-
production as well as whether the citizens consider themselves able to co-produce.
Table 3.5. Citizens co-produce because of ease of involvement.
I. Citizens will co-produce (more) when they perceive it easy to get involved.
Secondly, and the final motivation, was the salience of the resulting service for the citizens.
Table 3.6. Citizens co-produce because of salience.
J. Citizens will co-produce (more) when they perceive the co-production project to be of enduring
importance (salience) to them.
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19
Case study &
Methodology This chapter will discuss the case study and the different projects and fields in which I will
question participants. I will then also explain my choice of surveys as the methodology for
data gathering and following chapter’s data analysis.
4.1. CASE STUDY
A. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT ‘DE TOREKES’
To discover citizen motivations I investigated a community development project situated in
the Rabot neighbourhood in Ghent, Belgium. There the city together with a community
development team, ‘Samenlevingsopbouw Gent’ has erected several co-production projects.
These ecological projects are means to an end, to have citizens participate voluntarily but
also to influence governments in their future policy decisions. (Debruyn & De Bisschop,
2013)
‘De Torekes’ together with ‘De Site’ are the main sources of influence in the neighbourhood.
Initially the ‘Torekes’ project was scheduled to run for a year, beginning in 2011, the goal was
to discover whether or not complementary currencies strengthened environmental and
neighbourhood care as well as local and sustainable consumption. Through the
complementary currency those who took the initiative wanted to show governments that this
was a policy instrument they had not considered yet: a way to enhance local or sustainable
consumption and to mobilize unused capabilities. (Torekes, n.d.)
As the year passed, the ‘Torekes’s’ success was evident and it remained and pressed on till
this day, gaining recognition all over Europe for its innovative tactics to tackle the
community’s problems. In 2013 the project won a provincial award in Social Cultural Adult
work. However the Torekes are only a part of the larger development initiative.
‘De Site’ another temporary project (at first), was linked to the complementary currency and
is one of the largest projects there to date. Thus it became the main platform to find voluntary
co-producers.
4.
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‘De Site’ is located on an old industry floor, soon to be developed into a new urban
development project. Because of its fame and success ‘De Site’ will remain within the
redevelopment project, scrapping several hundreds of houses (Debruyn & De Bisschop,
2013). The cement surface holds a city field, a football square, a community oven, several
coops of chickens, a playground and 200 small gardens.
The choice for city farming is a logical one, it answers most to the needs of the inhabitants,
both socially (they can meet others, converse, engage and work) as well as physically
(there’s healthy produce, a healthy environment and plenty of activities) (Debruyn & De
Bisschop, 2013).
The rent to acquire one of the 200 plots is paid with ‘Torekes’ currency, encouraging the
citizens to participate in local initiatives to earn the complementary coin. Thus, every
Wednesday ‘De Site’ bursts with people as community-work-day is in full swing. On that day
citizens can earn up to 25 Torekes by working on the city field, in neighborhood parks like
‘het Witte Kaproenplein’, or in a clean-up-action on the streets.
The produce from ‘De Site’ are sold and used in the Social Grocer and the Social
Restaurant. Again, here too citizens can volunteer their time to work in the kitchens or behind
the till.
The Social Grocer is a shop where people can go for a basic supply of products. The shop is
intended for people who have financial difficulties and not enough have money to buy
supplies, maintenance or care. Social Grocers Gent works in cooperation with the previously
mentioned projects. Their volunteers are paid through Torekes, customers can pay with
Torekes and some of the produce (e.g. the eggs) come from De Site. People can shop when
it suits them best, and they pay 30% less than the normal retail price.
B. CO-PRODUCTION CHARACTERISTICS
In the first chapter I discussed the different characteristics of co-production. Now that I have
information on our case study I can apply these characteristics and see whether ‘De Torekes’
really is a co-production project.
As the definition states co-production is the mix of activities that both public service agents
and citizens contribute to provision of public services. The former are involved as
professionals, or ‘regular producers’, while ‘citizen production’ is based on voluntary efforts
by individuals and groups to enhance the quality and/or quantity of the services they use.
Ostrom (1999)
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Within the case study ‘De Torekes’ there is a clear cooperation between the municipality of
Ghent and private and non-profit actors (De Torekes, n.d.).
When I try to refine this by using Pestoff and Brandsen’s theoretical division of macro, meso
and micro, which split the different methods of collaboration between citizen and
government,(Pestoff and Brandsen, 2006) it is less obvious where I can place my research. I
can only establish that there are both elements of micro and meso level within the case
study.
When looking at the division in dimensions, the case study is clearly situated within the first
dimension, with both citizens and organisations as participants. After all, this case study
relies largely on its participants (Pestoff & Brandsen, 2006; Pestoff, 2012).
Secondly, concerning the motivations of co-producers a number of first impressions can be
derived. ‘De Torekes’ project is built upon a system of material rewards, specifically the
complementary currency with which participants are paid. However, there are no material
sanctions decreed for non-participants. As Debruyn & De Bisschop (2013) say, there is a
social component to it as well, I can expect to find at least one intrinsic motive.
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4.2. METHODOLOGY
This research will primarily have a deductive character (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2008).
Deductive because the first part of the study draws on scientific articles and theories about
the motivations of co-producing citizens. This information is then applied to a case study with
co-producers in order to find their motives and confirm some of the hypotheses.
The survey strategy is usually associated with the deductive approach (Saunders et al,
2008), which is why I chose the method for this study. I thus follow the lead of previous
authors who worked on co-production and used a similar method. (E.g. Jakobsen, 2013)
Benefits of this method are:
- It is cheaper than traditional research ( sample size has limited impact on the overall
research costs ): there are no additional postage or interview costs
- There is less time required: there is the possibility of quick response and good follow
–up.
- It is fairly easy to use.
- There is no interview bias.
- Risk of non-response decreases (by previous benefits ).
Of course there are disadvantages as well:
- "No time " as a non-response increase
- Anonymity is guaranteed but can be misinterpreted.
Liker scales are often used as the method of data gathering for surveys. The scales, used to
measure attitudes, requires respondents to choose from a scale (one to five or one to seven)
how much they agree or disagree with the statement (Saunders et al. 2008). Each number is
assigned a weight or statement (agree, disagree…) to it, this way I can later apply statistical
analysis on the response sheets. Saunders et al. (2008) state the survey should be
organised in such a way that similar questions or statements are placed within the same
category in order to make it easier for the respondents to follow.
The target group of the research were the co-producing citizens active in ‘het Torekes
project’. To find these participants and the projects they participated in I relied on the help of
development worker Wouter Van Thillo who is responsible for Torekes within the different
initiatives. Through him I came into contact with co-producing citizens as well as other
development workers in closer contact with the participants.
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4.3. SURVEY
The majority of the statements in my survey (see Appendix 1.) is taken from previous
research (Verhaeghe & De Vos, 2013) and was then supplemented by some additional
variables that were derived from literature mentioned above. This is more efficient than
creating a new questionnaire by myself and thus increases reliability.
As the main speaking language in Ghent is Dutch, I translated the survey into Dutch (see
Appendix 2.) Because of the large concentration of Turkish speakers in Rabot, one of the
development workers, Gülcan Sari, translated the survey to Turkish. (See Appendix 3.) She
has a background in social work so had little problem understanding the intention of the
survey and is fluently bilingual, which makes her translation reliable.
For each hypothesis I used three statements that supported the motive. Only the extrinsic
hypothesis B, on material sanctions, was inapplicable for this case as there are no material
sanctions for non-participants. It is important to note that several of the statements are
applicable to more than one hypothesis, dependent on how you interpret both the statement
and the hypothesis. I follow the list in Appendix 1 as my guide for interpretation.
As longer surveys tend to increase non-response (Saunders et al, 2008) I tried to limit the
statements solely to relevant details that may impact on motivation. Hence the importance of
good literature, so I only focus on potentially interesting motives. All statements were
answered on a seven-point Likert scale. These are often used to collect information on
opinion (Saunders et al, 2008). The only danger here is the central tendency error, when the
respondents tend to score the middle, considering it the most normal or desirable.
The development workers of ‘De Site’ were the ones who helped us achieve the number of
respondents by inviting us to the volunteering event days on Wednesdays. On those
‘community-work’ days there were an average number of 40 to 50 co-producers in rotation.
There I was advised by the employees who would be interested in participating as well as
aided in explaining the purpose behind the research. During three of these activity days a
total of 37 surveys were completed.
24
25
5.
Data Analysis
5.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE
For the tables from SPSS on which I base myself in these descriptive statistics, I refer to
Appendix 4.
The survey was completed by 37 respondents, of those 11 were men and 26 were women.
The majority (54%) of the respondents were of Belgian nationality (however their origins
were not taken into account in this survey).
The average age is 42, with the 24% of the participants within the category 35-44. Almost
half (48%) is unemployed. The average participant has been working for Torekes for 14
months.
5.2. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
The goal of this research is to answer the research question:
“What are the motivations behind citizen co-production within community
development?”
To analyse the survey, I relied mainly on the statistical program SPSS. I researched the
acquired data in three steps. First, in order to measure the target data, the nine hypotheses
incorporated in the survey, a data reduction is needed. Secondly, by using a Paired Samples
T-test the nine motives can be compared to discover whether or not these motives are
related to one another. Lastly I wish to see if there’s a profile of the co-producer to be derived
from our results, I do this by using an analysis of variance.
A. DATA REDUCTION
As discussed in 4.2. Methodology each hypothesis has been theoretically linked to three
statements. These statements are used to probe at the underlying motives that we’re trying
to measure. To confirm or deny the target hypotheses the data first needs to be diminished
into more measurable variables. This is done by computing the summated scales in SPSS to
acquire the remaining nine hypotheses (as previously mentioned Hypothesis B is excluded
as there are no material sanctions implemented in the case study).
26
The development of these scales is a means to gather variables to use in the objective
models below. However, before I can perform these models I must answer the question of
reliability.
To check the reliability of this data reduction I use Cronbach’s alpha. Cronbach's alpha is the
most common measure of internal consistency ("reliability"). In order to be reliable the
Cronbach’s alpha needs to be greater than .70. I implemented Cronbach’s alpha on all 9
clustered statements and achieved following results. (See Appendix 5 for statistical data)
Table 5.1: Reliability test
Hypothesis Groups Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items
A S1, S2, S3 ,787 Reliable
C S4, S5, S6 ,725 Reliable
D S7, S8, S9 ,624 Less internally consistent
E S10, S11, S12 ,554 Less internally consistent
F S13, S14, S15 ,689 Reliable
G S16, S17,S 18 ,715 Reliable
H S19, S20, S21 ,668 Reliable
I S22, S23, S24 ,777 Reliable
J S25, S26, S27 ,434 Less internally consistent
As you can see from Table 5.1. the majority of the groups are internally consistent and thus
reliable. Only hypothesis D, E and J have less internal consistency. Cronbach’s alpha allows
us to see if items can be removed from the sum. According to the statistical data this would
only be possible with question 7 in Hypothesis D. However as Hair et al (2009) explain there
is need for a minimum of three items per factor in order to provide minimum coverage of the
hypotheses’ theoretical domain, but also to provide adequate identification of these
hypotheses. I will keep the hypotheses as is, but keep these internally less consistent in mind
when discussing our end-results.
27
B. PAIRED SAMPLES T-TEST
Secondly I attempt to confirm the hypotheses. Using an alpha level of .05, a dependent-
samples t-test was conducted to evaluate whether statistically differences between the
different hypotheses can be found and create a hierarchy ranging from highest motive to
lowest.
A Paired Samples T-test (PASW) is used to compare two related means. The test is useful in
two cases. Either you have two interval/ratio variables from the same people in a sample that
are measured exactly the same way; here you can use PASW to compare the scores on the
variables. Or you have two variables with the same units of measure from the same subjects
from the same time and you want to see if the subjects score differently on one test
compared to the other. The second option makes the PASW applicable to different
hypotheses.
The PASW tests the null hypothesis (the difference between the two related means is 0). For
example, when comparing hypothesis A and E, our null-hypothesis would be: “There is no
statistical difference between A and E.” while the alternative hypothesis would then be “There
is a (positive/negative) statistical difference between A and E.”
In the SPSS data I find the statistically significant difference between the two by comparing
sig. (probability) value to .05. So, if p < .05 then I reject the null hypothesis of no difference
but if p > 0.05 I retain the null hypothesis of no difference.
In the example of A and E, p =.014 which is < .05 indicating that I should reject the null
hypothesis of no difference and conclude that the average score of A (material rewards) is
significantly higher than the average score on E (solidary motives). However, if the Paired
Mean Differences and the Obtained Test Statistic (t) are negative, as is the case for this
example, it has to be interpreted that the second value is higher than the first value. Thus the
average score of A (material rewards) is significantly less than the average score on E
(solidary motives).
From these T-tests I acquired following results (See appendix 6 for the statistical data). In the
following tables I only provide a framework of what was deduced from the output of SPSS.
The hierarchy following from of these results will be discussed in subsequent title C.
28
Table 5.2: Interpretation of paired samples test(A)
A = C There is no statistically significant difference between A & C (p=.421)
A > D Citizens will co-produce statistically more material rewards for in comparison to immaterial sanctions (p=.028)
A < E Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards in comparison to solidary motives (p=.014)
A < F Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than for normative motives (p=.008):
A < G Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than for expressive motives (p=.000)
A < H Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than for effectiveness (p=.002)
A < I Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than because it’s easy to get involved (p=.001)
A < J Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than for salience (p=.020)
Table 5.3: Interpretation of paired samples test (C)
C = A There is no statistically significant difference between C & A (p=.421)
C > D Citizens will co-produce statistically more for immaterial rewards than for immaterial sanctions (p=.010)
C < E Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial rewards than for solidary motives (p=.017)
C < F Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial rewards than for normative motives (p=.024):
C < G Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial rewards than for expressive motives (p=.000)
C < H Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial rewards than for effectiveness (p=.017)
C < I Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial rewards than because it’s easy to get involved (p=.002)
C < J Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial rewards than for salience (p=.036)
Table 5.4: Interpretation of paired samples test (D)
D < A Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions in comparison to material motives (p=.028)
D < C Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for immaterial rewards (p=.010)
D < E Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for solidary motives (p=.000)
D < F Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for normative motives (p=.000)
D < G Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for expressive motives (p=.000)
D < H Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for effectiveness (p=.000)
D < I Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than because it’s easy to get involved (p=.000)
D < J Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for salience (p=000)
29
Table 5.5: Interpretation of paired samples test (E)
E > A Citizens will co-produce statistically more for solidary motives than for material rewards
(p=.014)
E > C Citizens will co-produce statistically more for solidary motives than for immaterial rewards.
(p=.017)
E > D Citizens will co-produce statistically more for solidary motives than for immaterial sanctions
(p=.000)
E = F There is no statistically significant difference between E & F (p=.745)
E < G Citizens will co-produce statistically less for solidary motives than for expressive motives (p=.006)
E = H There is no statistically significant difference between E & H (p=.618)
E < I Citizens will co-produce statistically less for solidary motives than because it’s easy to get involved (p=.036)
E = J There is no statistically significant difference between E & J (p=.697),
Table 5.6: Interpretation of paired samples test (F)
F > A Citizens will co-produce statistically more for normative motives than for material rewards. (p=.008):
F > C Citizens will co-produce statistically more for normative motives than for immaterial rewards (p=.024):
F > D Citizens will co-produce statistically more for normative motives than for immaterial sanctions .(p=.000)
F = E There is no statistically significant difference between F & E (p=.745)
F < G Citizens will co-produce statistically less for normative motives than for expressive motives
(p=.009)
F =H There is no statistically significant difference between F & H (p=.727),
F = I There is no statistically significant difference between F & I (p=.248),
F = J There is no statistically significant difference between F & J(p=.971)
Table 5.7: Interpretation of paired samples test (G)
G > A Citizens will co-produce statistically more for expressive motives than for material rewards (p=.000)
G > C Citizens will co-produce statistically more for expressive motives than for immaterial rewards (p=.000)
G > D Citizens will co-produce statistically more for expressive motives than for immaterial sanctions (p=.000)
G > E Citizens will co-produce statistically more for expressive motives than for the solidary motive (p=.006)
G > F Citizens will co-produce statistically more for expressive motives than for normative motives
(p=.009)
G > H Citizens will co-produce statistically more for expressive motives than for effectiveness.
(p=.054)
G = I There is no statistically significant difference between G & I (p=.454)
G > J Citizens will co-produce statistically more for expressive motives than for salience. (p=.016)
30
Table 5.8: Interpretation of paired samples test (H)
H > A Citizens will co-produce statistically more for effectiveness than for material rewards (p=.002)
H > C Citizens will co-produce statistically more for effectiveness than for immaterial rewards (p=.017)
H > D Citizens will co-produce statistically more for effectiveness for immaterial sanctions (p=.000) than
H = E There is no statistically significant difference between H & E (p=.618)
H = F There is no statistically significant difference between H & F (p=.727)
H < G Citizens will co-produce statistically less for effectiveness than for expressive motives.
(p=.054)
H = I There is no statistically significant difference between H & I (p=.337)
H = J There is no statistically significant difference between H & J (p=.627)
Table 5.9: Interpretation of paired samples test (I)
I > A Citizens will co-produce statistically because it’s easy to get involved than for material rewards (p=.001)
I > C Citizens will co-produce statistically more because it’s easy to get involved than for immaterial rewards (p=.002)
I > D Citizens will co-produce statistically more because it’s easy to get involved than for immaterial sanctions(p=.000)
I > E Citizens will co-produce statistically more because it’s easy to get involved than for solidary motives (p=.036)
I = F There is no statistically significant difference between I & F (p=.248)
I = G There is no statistically significant difference between I & G (p=.454),
I = H There is no statistically significant difference between I & H (p=.337)
I > J Citizens will coproduce statistically more because it’s easy to get involved than for salience.
(p=.057)
Table 5.10: Interpretation of paired samples test (J)
J > A Citizens will co-produce statistically more for salience than for material rewards (p=.020)
J > C Citizens will co-produce statistically more for salience than for immaterial rewards (p=.036
J > D Citizens will co-produce statistically more for salience than for immaterial sanctions (p=000)
J = E There is no statistically significant difference between J & E (p=.697)
J = F There is no statistically significant difference between J & F (p=.971)
J < G Citizens will co-produce statistically less for salience than for expressive motives. (p=.016)
J = H There is no statistically significant difference between J & H (p=.627)
J < I Citizens will coproduce statistically less for salience than because it’s easy to get involved.
(p=.057)
31
C. INTERMEDIATE FINDINGS
When scouring through the tables above an unclear image appears. It is quickly obvious that
Hypotheses D, A and C are low-level influencers, but is there a ranking and what of the other
hypotheses? To compare the different findings of these hypotheses and provide a
hierarchical ranking I created a figure that places each motive on a level (figure B).
In figure B it is immediately clear that immaterial sanctions are the least motivating, all arrows
point towards the hypothesis, indicating it is less influential than the other eight hypotheses.
Material and immaterial rewards are second to this, with not statistical difference between
them, a lower influence compared to six of the nine hypotheses, only higher than hypothesis
D. On the third level the normative motivation as well as effectiveness, solidary and salience
are placed. There was no statistical difference between these four but they are all four less
incentive than hypothesis G, and more incentive than A, C and D. The difficult one in the
groupings is hypothesis I, ease of involvement, which has no statistical difference with the
level three hypotheses, except for the solidary motivation which is less motivating, and no
differences with level four, the expressive motivation.
Hypothesis G is placed on top of this imaginary pyramid or ladder. The expressive motivation
is more influential than all other hypotheses except for ease of involvement; it thus scores
highest out of all the motives when considering the importance of the motive.
Figure B. hierarchical ranking of motives
G: Expressive
motivation
F: Normative
motivation H: Effectiveness J: Salience
I: Ease of
involvement
A: Material
rewards
C: Immaterial
rewards
D: Immaterial
sanctions
Mo
re c
o-p
rod
uc
tive
E: Solidary
motivation
32
D. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
As last step in the analysis of the sample data I want to refine the results even further. This is
done by researching differences in the groups of the independent variables in hopes to find
predictors in these different groups of gender, age, nationality, employment or language. By
collecting these predictors a possible co-producer profile could be presented.
Because of the possibility of more than two groups in some of the variables I analyse them
all with the one-way ANOVA test and acquired following results (See appendix 7 for the
statistical data). Only within nationality, employment, language and age categories were the
differences significant. In table 5.11 the statistical results are explained, I discuss the findings
in title E.
Table 5.11: one way ANOVA tests
Nationality
Turkish(=1) citizens score higher on immaterial sanctions than Belgians(=0) would.
Employment
Unemployed score higher than those in category ‘other’ on solidary motives. (p=.039)
Retired score higher than those in category ‘other’ in solidary motives. (p= .055)
The other differences are not significant.
Language
Turkish speakers score higher on motivation through material rewards compared to Dutch speakers.
Turkish speakers score higher on motivation through immaterial sanctions compared to Dutch
speakers.
Turkish speakers score higher on expressive motivation than Dutch speakers.
Age
In this case the post-hoc could not reveal with sufficient confidence which pairs of means differ. This
could be because I need a larger data pool for clear significant differences.
E. INTERMEDIATE FINDINGS
From Table 5.11 I can conclude that Turkish citizens are more influenced by immaterial
sanctions when co-producing, while the significant difference between Turkish speakers and
Dutch speakers is even more obvious. Turkish speakers co-produce more when there are
material rewards, as well as when there are immaterial sanctions present. But Turkish
speakers are also more expressively motivated compared to their Dutch speaking peers.
Secondly, concerning employment, respondents who signed ‘other’ are less solidary
motivated than unemployed respondents and retired respondents.
Lastly when considering age categories there is a significant difference within ease of
involvement, however which groups differ cannot be found with sufficient confidence.
33
Conclusion
6.1. CONCLUSION
A. THE CITIZENS’ MOTIVATION
I began/have begun this research by listing possible answers to the research question, what
are the motivations behind citizen co-production within community development? I
acquired these answers after a documents analysis and translated them into ten hypotheses.
These different hypotheses can now be confirmed through the case study. In this case study
all the hypotheses were researched except for hypothesis B which pertained to the use of
material sanctions. As previously said, ‘De Torekes’ project does not sanction its citizens and
so this hypothesis was quickly dropped.
By questioning the remaining nine hypotheses, I tried to confirm or refute more hypotheses,
refine their importance as incentives and see if the results revealed a profile of the co-
producing citizen in the ‘Torekes’ project.
Firstly from the survey I managed to develop a hierarchical ranking of the hypotheses that
represent the different motives that influence co-production. I can conclude that co-producing
citizens are influenced by all hypotheses mentioned; however some have more influence and
some significantly less so.
To begin with the lowest rank on our pyramid, the evidence from our case study indicates
that immaterial sanctions are the most problematic motivators of co-production. This is also
the case for material and immaterial rewards. So, even though this co-production project is
largely based on material rewards through the use of a complementary currency, the
difference with the other incentives is significant. Citizens are least influenced by the extrinsic
motivations. When looking back at the document analysis, this conclusion was to be
expected. Asquer (2013) as well as Alford (2002) and Verschuere et al. (2012) all mentioned
the non- or minimal influence of extrinsic motivations to co-produce. Alford (2002) explains
the logic behind this: citizens do not experience co-production positively when threatened.
These extrinsic motivations are bad generators for the complex positive actions that
essentially constitute co-production. (Alford, 2011)
6.
34
Like researchers before me, I too believe it safe to say that co-producing citizens are not
necessarily the simple selfish benefit-maximizers they are often assumed to be.
Secondly, we find some of our intrinsic motives on the same level of influence. As Steen and
van Eijck (2014) explained intrinsic motives assist in enhancing a person’s sense of
competence and self-efficacy. These motives that are present in our case, such as the
normative motives, where citizens are guided by their base values and the solidarity motives,
directly connected to citizens’ desire to socialize, are considered almost equal in importance.
They share their rung with another intrinsic motivation: effectiveness, wherein citizens
evaluate the process of the engagement itself. Lastly, equal to these three intrinsic
motivations in importance is the circumstantial motivation, salience, i.e. whether or not the
service is truly of importance for the citizen or their loved ones and if the service affects
them.
The other circumstantial motive we researched was ease of involvement, this ease relies
mostly on the efforts of the government to provide information but also the individual’s
internal efficacy is important. In this case the incentive was the second most influential, equal
to the normative motive, effectiveness and salience but also to our highest level, the
expressive motive.
I can conclude with this last intrinsic motivation, the expressive motive that is the most
important influencer for citizens’ co-production in the case study. The expressive motive
offers the citizen a sense of satisfaction of having contributed to attaining a worthwhile
cause.
This altruistic motive is in the case study the main incentive for co-production. However as
seen in the literary study this altruism can often be combined with egoism (Steen, 2006).
Citizens could be motivated through some private or selfish reason beside the ‘purely’
altruistic motive. I presume that in this case study where citizens participated based on a
number of incentives I can use the term ‘impure’ altruism. After all, as Steen (2006)
explained, an altruistic person can consider the benefits to others and him/herself when
participating.
I conclude with this phrase from Alford (2002)
“If they are willing to contribute time and effort to organizational purposes, they do so for their
own good reasons, which are much more complex than money or the avoidance of
punishment.”
35
B. CO-PRODUCER’S PROFILE
Secondly I refined the test to check for personal characteristics within the subject pool and
discovered a few significant differences between the participating citizens.
First of all, there were significant differences between the answers of the Turkish and the
Belgian citizens as well as differences between the answers to the Dutch versus the Turkish
surveys. The Turkish citizens are more influenced by immaterial sanctions than Belgian
citizens are. And this is also a significant difference when comparing the Dutch response with
the Turkish response. Apart from that there are still further differences: Turkish-speaking
respondents co-produce more when there are material rewards but are also more
expressively motivated compared to their Dutch-speaking peers. When considering the
employment of our respondents, the group ‘other’ is least solidary motivated compared to the
‘unemployed’ group as well as the ‘retired’ group. Concerning age categories there was
significant difference within ease of involvement; however which groups differ cannot be
found with sufficient confidence.
I can conclude here that no clear profile emerges from the sample that could be taken into
account in future research even though there were differences concerning language and
nationality.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations to be made from this research are twofold.
First, concerning governments, this study is a reminder that citizens are not just benefit
maximizers and those who co-produce have far more complex reasons to participate. This
must be kept in mind for even when the co-production project is based on a rewards-system,
as is the case in the ‘Torekes’ project, the government should attempt to encourage the
other, intrinsic, motives as well, perhaps even more so. ‘De Site’ is an experiment that
demonstrates how these intrinsic motives can be stimulated.
Secondly, with an eye to future research, this study has some limitations that should be
taken into consideration. The results of the study could further improve by the use of a larger
sample pool as well as a more suitable questionnaire and a larger time frame.
36
6.2. LIMITATIONS
This research was not conducted without any limitations. To begin, at the start of the data
gathering phase, I had intended to contact several different activities and events within the
‘Torekes’ initiative. However, soon it became evident that the voluntary nature of co-
producing hindered the contact pool. Citizens were free to participate and a number of ways
were available to them, making it less evident for us to contact interested volunteers.
Secondly, several of the co-producers who were major players in the Torekes project, were
unwilling to participate in the research. This was either out of fear for repercussions or
because they were radically against anything to do with bureaucracy. Some mentioned they
had seen enough questionnaires and simply were tired of answering them.
In the field it was remarked that the survey was too difficult for several of the co-producers.
Not only did potential participants find the method of scoring (7 Likert scale) complex, some
were illiterate and needed a read-through of the survey. With the help of some of ‘De Site’
employees I led several participants through the 27 statements, turning this into a guided
survey.
When performing the reliability test I noticed that three of the hypotheses groupings
displayed some internal inconsistency (being slightly less than .700). This needs to be taken
into account when considering the hierarchical ranking.
Secondly, the sample counts only 37 respondents, and all were co-producers. In order to
achieve more significant results in future research attempts should be made to question non-
co-producers and their motives as well. Besides that, a larger timeframe would probably
achieve a greater number of respondents.
37
7.
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(eds.), Public value: theory and practice, Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Asquer, A., (2013), Co-investment of public services: are clients willing to do it?
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services, Public management review 8 (4): 493-501
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Ostrom, E. (2009). Nobel Prize lecture. <www.nobelprize.org.>
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Whitaker, and R. Wilson. (1981). Consumers as co-producers of public services: Some
economic and institutional considerations. Policy Studies Journal 9 (7): 1001–1011.
Pestoff, V. (2009). Towards a paradigm of democratic participation: Citizen participation and
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Economics, 80(2), 197-224.
Pestoff, Brandsen, Verschuere, V., T., B., (2012), New public governance, the third sector
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motivations to participate in co-production of public services by bringing in the concept of
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van Eijk, C. & Steen, T. (2014) Why people co-produce: analyzing citizens’ perceptions on
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40
41
Data
APPENDIX 1. ORIGINAL SURVEYLIST
1. Extrinsic A I participate to earn ‘Torekes’.
2. Extrinsic A ‘Torekes’ are a main source of income for me.
3. Extrinsic A I participate for another type of reward (if so, which?)
4. Extrinsic C I participate because it helps my family
5. Extrinsic C My relationships with friends and family betters because of my involvement in this project.
6. Extrinsic C Through co-production I’m learning a lot.
7. Extrinsic D I participate because I don’t want to be excluded from my community.
8. Extrinsic D If I don’t participate my friends would look down on me.
9. Extrinsic D I would feel guilty if I didn’t participate.
10. Intrinsic E I find it important to belong to a community.
11. Intrinsic E A lot of people in my neighbourhood already co-produce, so I started to as well.
12. Intrinsic E I feel happier when I can do something for my neighbourhood.
13. Intrinsic F Co-producing is actually a habit, I don’t think about it that much.
14. Intrinsic F I believe everyone should participate in their neighbourhood.
15. Intrinsic F It’s my responsibility as well to work for my neighbourhood.
16. Intrinsic G I’m very interested in these kinds of community development projects.
17. Intrinsic G I think it can be very satisfying for people when they can do something for their neighbours.
18. Intrinsic G Participating gives meaning to my life.
19. Intrinsic H I’ve noticed a change in our neighbourhood thanks to the ‘Torekes’.
20. Intrinsic H I know that my efforts will contribute to a better community.
8.
42
21. Intrinsic H Because I participate, others will too.
22. Ease of involvement
There’s enough shops in my neighbourhood that provide information and aid about the ‘Torekes’.
23. Ease of involvement
There’s a lot of information(folders, social media, website) about the Torekes, and I can easily find it.
24. Ease of involvement
The professionals who work for the project are kind and easily accessible.
25. Salience The project is important for me personally.
26. Salience The project is important for my friends and family.
27. Salience I believe if something’s important to you, you should spend time working for it.
43
APPENDIX 2. DUTCH SURVEY
○ man ○ vrouw Geboortejaar: . . . .
Nationaliteit::…………………………………. Opleiding:…………………………………….
Ik ben momenteel ○ student (middelbaar / universiteit / hogeschool /
volwassenenonderwijs)
○ werkende (arbeider / bediende / zelfstandige / ambtenaar)
○ werkloos
○ met pensioen (arbeider / bediende / zelfstandige / ambtenaar)
○ andere: …………
Ik word al ….. maanden betaald in Torekes.
Scoor van 1 tot 7 hoe toepasselijk de volgende stellingen voor jou zijn.
(1= helemaal mee oneens, 2= mee oneens, 3= een beetje mee oneens, 4= niet mee
oneens/niet mee eens, 5= een beetje mee eens 6= mee eens 7= helemaal mee eens)
1. Ik werk in de Site om Torekes te verdienen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Torekes zijn een belangrijke inkomstbron voor mij. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Ik doe het voor een ander soort beloning.(bv. gratis eten,
producten, tuintjes…)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Ik werk in de Site opdat het mijn familie helpt. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Mijn relatie met vrienden en familie verbetert door mijn werk
bij de Site
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Via de Site leer ik enorm veel bij. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Ik doe mee omdat ik niet wil uitgesloten worden in de
gemeenschap.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. Als ik niet meedoe dan zullen mijn buren/vrienden me
minder appreciëren.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. Ik zou me schuldig voelen als ik niet meedeed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. Ik vind het belangrijk om tot een gemeenschap te behoren. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. Veel mensen in mijn buurt werken al op de Site, dus ik ben
ook begonnen.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. Ik voel me gelukkiger wanneer ik iets kan doen voor mijn
gemeenschap.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. Meewerken in mijn gemeenschap is eigenlijk een gewoonte,
ik denk er niet zo veel over na.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
44
14. Ik vind dat iedereen zou moeten meewerken in zijn buurt. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. Het is ook mijn verantwoordelijkheid om aan mijn buurt te
werken.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16. Ik heb interesse in projecten zoals deze. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17. Ik denk dat mensen veel voldoening halen uit wat ze kunnen
betekenen voor hun naaste.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18. Werken op de Site geeft mijn leven zin. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. Ik merk veranderingen in de buurt sinds het Torekes-project
begon.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20. Ik weet dat mijn inspanningen helpen aan een betere
gemeenschap.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21. Omdat ik meedoe zullen anderen ook vlugger participeren. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22. Er zijn genoeg loketten en winkels in mijn buurt die
informatie en hulp voorzien over ‘Torekes’.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
23. Er wordt veel informatie (folders, sociale media, website)
over het Torekes project gegeven en ik kan het makkelijk
vinden.
Wie/wat heeft jou geïnformeerd?..........................................
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
24. De professionelen die voor het Torekes project werken
(en/of in de Site) zijn makkelijk aanspreekbaar.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25. Mijn werk op de Site is belangrijk voor mij persoonlijk. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26. Mijn werk op de Site is belangrijk voor mijn familie en/of
vrienden.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
27. Ik geloof dat als iets belangrijk is voor jou, dat je er tijd en
werk in zou moeten steken.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
45
APPENDIX 3. TURKISH SURVEY
○ erkek ○ kadin Dogum tarihi: . . . .
Hangi irk:…………………………………. Tahsil
durumu:…………………………………….
Suan ben ○ ogrenciyim (orta okul/universite / yüksek okul / acik ogretim)
○ calisiyor (isci/ memur / kendi isyeri)/ devlet memuru)
○ issiz
○ emekli (isci / memur / kendi isyeri / devlet memurur
○ diger: …………
Bana .... aydir Torekes ödemesi yapiliyor
Assagidaki rakamlardan size uygun olani seciniz
(1=kesinlikle katilmiyorum, 2= katilmiyorum, 3= biraz katilmiyorum, 4= katilmiyorumt ,
5=biraz katiliyorum 6= katiliyorum 7= kesinlikle katiliyorum)
1. Ben De Sitede Torekes kazanmak icin calisiyorum. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Torekes benim icin önemli bir gelir kaynagidir. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Ben baska türlü kazanc sagliyorum.(ôrnek bedava yemek,
ürünler, bahceler, ...)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Ben sitede aileme yardimci olmak icin calisiyorum. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Site calistigim zaman , ailemle ve arkadaslarimla olan
iliskilerim daha iyiyye gidiyor.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Sitede bir cok sey ögreniyorum. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Toplumdan dislanmamak icin sitede calisiyorum. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. Sitede calismiyorsam komsularim veya arkadaslarim bunu
takdir etmeyecekdir.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. Eger birseyler yapmiyorsam kendimi borclu hissederim. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. Topluma ait bir parca olmak benim icin onemlidir.. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. Bir cok kisi sitede calisiyor ve buyuzden bende basladim. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. Ne zaman cevrem icin birseyler yapsam kendimi mutlu
hissediyorum.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. Aslinda kendi toplulum icin calismak bir aliskanlikdir ve
bunun uzerinde fazla dusunmem.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. Herkes kendi mahallesi veya semti icin calismak zorundadir. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. Kendi semtim icin calismak benim icin bir sorumluluktur. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
46
16. Bu tur projelere karsi ilgiliyim. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17. Insanlar kendi komsulari icin birsey yaptiginda memmuniyet
duyuyorlar.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18. Sitede calismak hayatima anlam katiyor. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. Torekes projesi basladigindan beri semtimizde bir cok
degisiklik goruyorum.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20. Biliyorumki benim cabalarim toplumun daha iyi gelismesine
yardimci olucak.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21. Ben katildigim icin digerleride daha cabuk katilicakdir. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22. Er zijn genoeg loketten en winkels in mijn buurt die
informatie en hulp voorzien over ‘Torekes’.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
23. Torekes projesinle ilgili yeterince bilgilendiriliyorum (ornek:
brosür, sosyal medya, website) ve bunlari kolaylikla
bulabilirim.
Kim size ve ne igilendirdi?......................................................
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
24. Torekes projesine veya De Site calisanlari rahatlikla
konusubilirsiniz aanspreekbaar.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25. Kendi kisiligim icin De Sitedeki isim benim icin cok önemli. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26. Sitede iqim ailem icin veya arkadaslarim icin önemli 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
27. Inaniyorum ki birseye inaniyorsaniz, buna yeterince is ve
zaman koymaniz gerek.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
47
APPENDIX 4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS.
Gender
Frequenc
y
Percent Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid
male 11 29,7 29,7 29,7
female 26 70,3 70,3 100,0
Total 37 100,0 100,0
Nationality
Frequency Percent Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid
Missing
Belgian 20 54,1 54,1 54,1
Turkish 15 40,5 40,5 94,6
99 2 5,4 5,4 100,0
Total 37 100,0 100,0
Employment
Frequenc
y
Perce
nt
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Val
id
unemployed 18 48,6 48,6 48,6
student 1 2,7 2,7 51,4
employed 7 18,9 18,9 70,3
retired 6 16,2 16,2 86,5
other 5 13,5 13,5 100,0
Total 37 100,0 100,0
48
Age categories
Frequency Percent Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid
18-24 6 16,2 16,2 16,2
25-34 8 21,6 21,6 37,8
35-44 9 24,3 24,3 62,2
45-54 3 8,1 8,1 70,3
55-64 8 21,6 21,6 91,9
65-95 3 8,1 8,1 100,0
Total 37 100,0 100,0
Statistics
Age
N Valid 37
Missing 0
Mean 42,62
Median 42,00
Mode 31
Std. Deviation 15,410
Range 49
Minimum 19
Maximum 68
Statistics
Months paid in Torekes
N Valid 27
Missing 10
Mean 13,37
Median 12,00
Mode 0
Std. Deviation 14,388
Range 48
Minimum 0
Maximum 48
Statistics
ExtrinsicA ExtrinsicC ExtrinsicD IntrinsicE IntrinsicF IntrinsicG IntrinsicH Ease Salience
N Valid 36 37 34 36 35 36 34 32 36
Missing 1 0 3 1 2 1 3 5 1
Mean 4,1296 4,3514 3,3627 4,9074 4,9619 5,5741 5,1471 5,4063 5,0093
Median 3,8333 4,3333 3,3333 5,1667 5,3333 6,0000 5,3333 5,8333 5,0000
Mode 3,00 6,00a 1,00
a 6,00 6,00 7,00 5,00
a 7,00 6,00
Std.
Deviation 1,96037 1,86578 1,61301 1,44664 1,50548 1,35602 1,45225 1,47557 1,35573
Range 6,00 5,67 5,00 6,00 4,67 5,33 6,00 6,00 5,33
Minimum 1,00 1,33 1,00 1,00 2,33 1,67 1,00 1,00 1,67
Maximum 7,00 7,00 6,00 7,00 7,00 7,00 7,00 7,00 7,00
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown
49
APPENDIX 5. RELIABILITY TESTS
1,2,3 = A
Case Processing Summary
N %
Cases
Valid 36 97,3
Excludeda 1 2,7
Total 37 100,0
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the
procedure.
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based on
Standardized
Items
N of Items
,785 ,787 3
Item Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation N
1 4,61 2,233 36
2 3,97 2,490 36
3 3,81 2,303 36
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
1 2 3
1 1,000 ,430 ,629
2 ,430 1,000 ,597
3 ,629 ,597 1,000
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale Variance
if Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
1 7,78 18,349 ,588 ,401 ,746
2 8,42 16,764 ,570 ,361 ,772
3 8,58 15,964 ,724 ,527 ,599
Scale Statistics
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items
12,39 34,587 5,881 3
50
4,5,6 =C
Case Processing Summary
N %
Cases
Valid 37 100,0
Excludeda 0 ,0
Total 37 100,0
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the
procedure.
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based on
Standardized
Items
N of Items
,724 ,725 3
Item Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation N
4 3,49 2,399 37
5 4,59 2,477 37
6 4,97 2,075 37
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
4 5 6
4 1,000 ,529 ,410
5 ,529 1,000 ,463
6 ,410 ,463 1,000
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale Variance
if Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
4 9,57 15,197 ,555 ,315 ,626
5 8,46 14,144 ,593 ,353 ,577
6 8,08 18,188 ,499 ,252 ,692
Scale Statistics
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items
13,05 31,330 5,597 3
51
7,8,9 =D
Case Processing Summary
N %
Cases
Valid 34 91,9
Excludeda 3 8,1
Total 37 100,0
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the
procedure.
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based on
Standardized
Items
N of Items
,629 ,624 3
Item Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation N
7 3,74 2,050 34
8 2,47 1,911 34
9 3,88 2,397 34
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
7 8 9
7 1,000 ,149 ,370
8 ,149 1,000 ,549
9 ,370 ,549 1,000
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale Variance
if Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
7 6,35 14,417 ,308 ,141 ,697
8 7,62 13,577 ,440 ,304 ,535
9 6,21 9,017 ,601 ,386 ,259
Scale Statistics
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items
10,09 23,416 4,839 3
52
10,11,12 = E
Case Processing Summary
N %
Cases
Valid 36 97,3
Excludeda 1 2,7
Total 37 100,0
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the
procedure.
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based on
Standardized
Items
N of Items
,540 ,554 3
Item Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation N
10 5,00 1,971 36
11 4,28 2,212 36
12 5,44 1,812 36
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
10 11 12
10 1,000 ,138 ,424
11 ,138 1,000 ,318
12 ,424 ,318 1,000
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale Variance
if Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
10 9,72 10,721 ,328 ,180 ,475
11 10,44 10,197 ,265 ,101 ,594
12 9,28 9,978 ,487 ,248 ,241
Scale Statistics
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items
14,72 18,835 4,340 3
53
13,14,15 = F
Case Processing Summary
N %
Cases
Valid 35 94,6
Excludeda 2 5,4
Total 37 100,0
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the
procedure.
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based on
Standardized
Items
N of Items
,692 ,689 3
Item Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation N
13 4,91 1,869 35
14 5,03 2,093 35
15 4,94 1,765 35
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
13 14 15
13 1,000 ,384 ,221
14 ,384 1,000 ,669
15 ,221 ,669 1,000
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale Variance
if Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
13 9,97 12,440 ,339 ,150 ,795
14 9,86 8,067 ,669 ,506 ,362
15 9,94 10,879 ,550 ,449 ,552
Scale Statistics
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items
14,89 20,398 4,516 3
54
16,17,18 = G
Case Processing Summary
N %
Cases
Valid 36 97,3
Excludeda 1 2,7
Total 37 100,0
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the
procedure.
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based on
Standardized
Items
N of Items
,705 ,715 3
Item Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation N
16 5,89 1,635 36
17 5,75 1,538 36
18 5,08 1,933 36
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
16 17 18
16 1,000 ,568 ,446
17 ,568 1,000 ,353
18 ,446 ,353 1,000
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale Variance
if Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
16 10,83 8,200 ,606 ,392 ,512
17 10,97 9,228 ,531 ,335 ,611
18 11,64 7,894 ,453 ,214 ,724
Scale Statistics
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items
16,72 16,549 4,068 3
55
19,20,21 = H
Case Processing Summary
N %
Cases
Valid 34 91,9
Excludeda 3 8,1
Total 37 100,0
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the
procedure.
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based on
Standardized
Items
N of Items
,653 ,668 3
Item Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation N
19 5,09 2,165 34
20 5,68 1,571 34
21 4,68 1,886 34
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
19 20 21
19 1,000 ,383 ,356
20 ,383 1,000 ,465
21 ,356 ,465 1,000
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale Variance
if Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
19 10,35 8,781 ,429 ,187 ,627
20 9,76 11,155 ,511 ,270 ,521
21 10,76 9,761 ,480 ,253 ,534
Scale Statistics
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items
15,44 18,981 4,357 3
56
22,23,24= I
Case Processing Summary
N %
Cases
Valid 32 86,5
Excludeda 5 13,5
Total 37 100,0
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the
procedure.
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based on
Standardized
Items
N of Items
,777 ,777 3
Item Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation N
22 5,38 1,862 32
23 5,06 1,795 32
24 5,78 1,660 32
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
22 23 24
22 1,000 ,639 ,393
23 ,639 1,000 ,578
24 ,393 ,578 1,000
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale Variance
if Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
22 10,84 9,426 ,586 ,410 ,731
23 11,16 8,652 ,731 ,536 ,561
24 10,44 10,964 ,534 ,335 ,780
Scale Statistics
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items
16,22 19,596 4,427 3
57
25,26,27 = J
Case Processing Summary
N %
Cases
Valid 36 97,3
Excludeda 1 2,7
Total 37 100,0
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the
procedure.
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's
Alpha Based on
Standardized
Items
N of Items
,448 ,434 3
Item Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation N
25 5,14 1,869 36
26 4,47 2,210 36
27 5,42 1,795 36
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
25 26 27
25 1,000 ,385 ,025
26 ,385 1,000 ,201
27 ,025 ,201 1,000
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Scale Variance
if Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
25 9,89 9,702 ,287 ,151 ,329
26 10,56 6,883 ,412 ,185 ,048
27 9,61 11,559 ,144 ,044 ,550
Scale Statistics
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items
15,03 16,542 4,067 3
58
APPENDIX 6. PAIRED SAMPLES T-TEST
Note: The difference in means compared to the descriptive table, results from how cases
with missing data are handled. The descriptives used every valid case to calculate the
statistics for each variable. All 37 cases with valid data were used to calculate the mean.
The Paired-Samples T Test procedure, however, only uses those cases that have valid
values on both of the variables being compared. Dropping the cases with valid data on one
of the two variables accounts for the shift in means.
T-Test Hypothesis A compared to the others
Paired Samples Statistics
Mean N Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
Pair
1
ExtrinsicA 4,13 36 1,960 ,327
ExtrinsicC 4,40 36 1,870 ,312
Pair
2
ExtrinsicA 4,08 33 1,926 ,335
ExtrinsicD 3,35 33 1,637 ,285
Pair
3
ExtrinsicA 4,16 35 1,979 ,335
IntrinsicE 4,95 35 1,442 ,244
Pair
4
ExtrinsicA 4,05 34 1,954 ,335
IntrinsicF 4,93 34 1,517 ,260
Pair
5
ExtrinsicA 4,13 35 1,989 ,336
IntrinsicG 5,59 35 1,372 ,232
Pair
6
ExtrinsicA 4,12 33 2,022 ,352
IntrinsicH 5,19 33 1,451 ,253
Pair
7
ExtrinsicA 4,13 31 1,999 ,359
Ease 5,43 31 1,494 ,268
Pair
8
ExtrinsicA 4,13 35 1,989 ,336
Salience 5,01 35 1,376 ,233
Paired Samples Correlations
N Correlation Sig.
Pair
1
ExtrinsicA &
ExtrinsicC 36 ,466 ,004
Pair
2
ExtrinsicA &
ExtrinsicD 33 ,491 ,004
Pair
3
ExtrinsicA &
IntrinsicE 35 ,483 ,003
Pair
4
ExtrinsicA &
IntrinsicF 34 ,465 ,006
Pair
5
ExtrinsicA &
IntrinsicG 35 ,440 ,008
Pair
6
ExtrinsicA &
IntrinsicH 33 ,509 ,002
Pair
7 ExtrinsicA & Ease 31 ,440 ,013
Pair
8
ExtrinsicA &
Salience 35 ,250 ,147
59
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences
Mean Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower
Pair 1 ExtrinsicA - ExtrinsicC -,269 1,981 ,330 -,939
Pair 2 ExtrinsicA - ExtrinsicD ,727 1,815 ,316 ,084
Pair 3 ExtrinsicA - IntrinsicE -,790 1,801 ,304 -1,409
Pair 4 ExtrinsicA - IntrinsicF -,882 1,835 ,315 -1,523
Pair 5 ExtrinsicA - IntrinsicG -1,457 1,854 ,313 -2,094
Pair 6 ExtrinsicA - IntrinsicH -1,071 1,791 ,312 -1,706
Pair 7 ExtrinsicA - Ease -1,301 1,898 ,341 -1,997
Pair 8 ExtrinsicA - Salience -,876 2,116 ,358 -1,603
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed)
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Upper
Pair 1 ExtrinsicA - ExtrinsicC ,402 -,813 35 ,421
Pair 2 ExtrinsicA - ExtrinsicD 1,371 2,302 32 ,028
Pair 3 ExtrinsicA - IntrinsicE -,172 -2,597 34 ,014
Pair 4 ExtrinsicA - IntrinsicF -,242 -2,804 33 ,008
Pair 5 ExtrinsicA - IntrinsicG -,820 -4,649 34 ,000
60
Pair 6 ExtrinsicA - IntrinsicH -,436 -3,435 32 ,002
Pair 7 ExtrinsicA - Ease -,605 -3,817 30 ,001
Pair 8 ExtrinsicA - Salience -,149 -2,450 34 ,020
A & D: Citizens will co-produce statistically more for material rewards than for immaterial
sanctions (p=.028)
A & E: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than for solidary
motives (p=.014)
A & F: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than for normative
motives (p=.008):
A & G: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than for expressive
motives (p=.000)
A & H: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than for motives
concerning effectiveness (p=.002)
A & I: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than because it’s easy to
get involved (p=.001)
A & J: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than for salience
(p=.020)
There is no statistically significant difference between A & C (p=.421)
61
T-Test Hypothesis C compared to the others
Paired Samples Statistics
Mean N Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
Pair
1
ExtrinsicC 4,38 34 1,837 ,315
ExtrinsicD 3,36 34 1,613 ,277
Pair
2
ExtrinsicC 4,31 36 1,871 ,312
IntrinsicE 4,91 36 1,447 ,241
Pair
3
ExtrinsicC 4,37 35 1,832 ,310
IntrinsicF 4,96 35 1,505 ,254
Pair
4
ExtrinsicC 4,43 36 1,835 ,306
IntrinsicG 5,57 36 1,356 ,226
Pair
5
ExtrinsicC 4,42 34 1,890 ,324
IntrinsicH 5,15 34 1,452 ,249
Pair
6
ExtrinsicC 4,43 32 1,852 ,327
Ease 5,41 32 1,476 ,261
Pair
7
ExtrinsicC 4,43 36 1,835 ,306
Salience 5,01 36 1,356 ,226
Pair
8
ExtrinsicC 4,40 36 1,870 ,312
ExtrinsicA 4,13 36 1,960 ,327
paired Samples Correlations
N Correlation Sig.
Pair
1
ExtrinsicC &
ExtrinsicD 34 ,217 ,219
Pair
2
ExtrinsicC &
IntrinsicE 36 ,649 ,000
Pair
3
ExtrinsicC &
IntrinsicF 35 ,624 ,000
Pair
4
ExtrinsicC &
IntrinsicG 36 ,560 ,000
Pair
5
ExtrinsicC &
IntrinsicH 34 ,517 ,002
Pair
6 ExtrinsicC & Ease 32 ,520 ,002
Pair
7
ExtrinsicC &
Salience 36 ,527 ,001
Pair
8
ExtrinsicC &
ExtrinsicA 36 ,466 ,004
62
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences
Mean Std.
Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
95% Confidence Interval of
the Difference
Lower
Pair 1 ExtrinsicC - ExtrinsicD 1,020 2,166 ,372 ,264
Pair 2 ExtrinsicC - IntrinsicE -,602 1,443 ,240 -1,090
Pair 3 ExtrinsicC - IntrinsicF -,590 1,478 ,250 -1,098
Pair 4 ExtrinsicC - IntrinsicG -1,148 1,556 ,259 -1,675
Pair 5 ExtrinsicC - IntrinsicH -,725 1,687 ,289 -1,314
Pair 6 ExtrinsicC - Ease -,979 1,663 ,294 -1,579
Pair 7 ExtrinsicC - Salience -,583 1,608 ,268 -1,127
Pair 8 ExtrinsicC - ExtrinsicA ,269 1,981 ,330 -,402
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-
tailed)
95% Confidence Interval of the
Difference
Upper
Pair 1 ExtrinsicC - ExtrinsicD 1,775 2,744 33 ,010
Pair 2 ExtrinsicC - IntrinsicE -,114 -2,503 35 ,017
Pair 3 ExtrinsicC - IntrinsicF -,083 -2,364 34 ,024
Pair 4 ExtrinsicC - IntrinsicG -,622 -4,427 35 ,000
Pair 5 ExtrinsicC - IntrinsicH -,137 -2,508 33 ,017
Pair 6 ExtrinsicC - Ease -,379 -3,330 31 ,002
Pair 7 ExtrinsicC - Salience -,039 -2,176 35 ,036
Pair 8 ExtrinsicC - ExtrinsicA ,939 ,813 35 ,421
C & D: Citizens will co-produce statistically more for immaterial rewards than for immaterial
sanctions (p=.010)
C & E: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial rewards than for solidary
motives (p=.017)
63
C & F: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial rewards than for normative
motives (p=.024):
C & G: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than for expressive
motives (p=.000)
C & H: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than for motives
concerning effectiveness (p=.017)
C & I: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than because it’s easy to
get involved (p=.002)
C & J: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than for salience
(p=.036)
There is no statistically significant difference between C & A (p=.421)
64
T-Test Hypothesis D compared to the others
Paired Samples Statistics
Mean N Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
Pair
1
ExtrinsicD 3,34 33 1,634 ,284
IntrinsicE 5,02 33 1,392 ,242
Pair
2
ExtrinsicD 3,40 32 1,614 ,285
IntrinsicF 4,97 32 1,518 ,268
Pair
3
ExtrinsicD 3,42 33 1,597 ,278
IntrinsicG 5,55 33 1,384 ,241
Pair
4
ExtrinsicD 3,51 31 1,601 ,287
IntrinsicH 5,04 31 1,470 ,264
Pair
5
ExtrinsicD 3,32 30 1,608 ,294
Ease 5,34 30 1,502 ,274
Pair
6
ExtrinsicD 3,42 33 1,597 ,278
Salience 4,96 33 1,381 ,240
Pair
7
ExtrinsicD 3,35 33 1,637 ,285
ExtrinsicA 4,08 33 1,926 ,335
Pair
8
ExtrinsicD 3,36 34 1,613 ,277
ExtrinsicC 4,38 34 1,837 ,315
Paired Samples Correlations
N Correlation Sig.
Pair
1
ExtrinsicD &
IntrinsicE 33 ,359 ,040
Pair
2
ExtrinsicD &
IntrinsicF 32 ,242 ,182
Pair
3
ExtrinsicD &
IntrinsicG 33 ,057 ,753
Pair
4
ExtrinsicD &
IntrinsicH 31 ,319 ,080
Pair
5 ExtrinsicD & Ease 30 ,214 ,256
Pair
6
ExtrinsicD &
Salience 33 ,266 ,134
Pair
7
ExtrinsicD &
ExtrinsicA 33 ,491 ,004
Pair
8
ExtrinsicD &
ExtrinsicC 34 ,217 ,219
Paired Samples Test
65
Paired Differences
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower
Pair 1 ExtrinsicD - IntrinsicE -1,677 1,725 ,300 -2,288
Pair 2 ExtrinsicD - IntrinsicF -1,573 1,929 ,341 -2,268
Pair 3 ExtrinsicD - IntrinsicG -2,121 2,053 ,357 -2,849
Pair 4 ExtrinsicD - IntrinsicH -1,538 1,794 ,322 -2,196
Pair 5 ExtrinsicD - Ease -2,022 1,951 ,356 -2,751
Pair 6 ExtrinsicD - Salience -1,535 1,812 ,315 -2,178
Pair 7 ExtrinsicD - ExtrinsicA -,727 1,815 ,316 -1,371
Pair 8 ExtrinsicD - ExtrinsicC -1,020 2,166 ,372 -1,775
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed)
95% Confidence Interval of
the Difference
Upper
Pair 1 ExtrinsicD - IntrinsicE -1,065 -5,584 32 ,000
Pair 2 ExtrinsicD - IntrinsicF -,877 -4,612 31 ,000
Pair 3 ExtrinsicD - IntrinsicG -1,393 -5,936 32 ,000
Pair 4 ExtrinsicD - IntrinsicH -,879 -4,771 30 ,000
Pair 5 ExtrinsicD - Ease -1,294 -5,676 29 ,000
Pair 6 ExtrinsicD - Salience -,893 -4,867 32 ,000
Pair 7 ExtrinsicD - ExtrinsicA -,084 -2,302 32 ,028
Pair 8 ExtrinsicD - ExtrinsicC -,264 -2,744 33 ,010
D & A: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for material
rewards (p=.028)
66
D & C: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for immaterial
rewards (p=.010)
D & E: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for solidary
motives (p=.000)
D & F: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for normative
motives (p=.000)
D & G: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for expressive
motives (p=.000)
D & H: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for motives
concerning effectiveness (p=.000)
D & I: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than because it’s
easy to get involved (p=.000)
D & J: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for salience
(p=000)
67
T-Test Hypothesis E compared to the others
Paired Samples Statistics
Mean N Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
Pair
1
IntrinsicE 4,87 34 1,468 ,252
IntrinsicF 4,94 34 1,523 ,261
Pair
2
IntrinsicE 4,91 35 1,467 ,248
IntrinsicG 5,56 35 1,374 ,232
Pair
3
IntrinsicE 5,00 33 1,328 ,231
IntrinsicH 5,12 33 1,467 ,255
Pair
4
IntrinsicE 4,88 31 1,529 ,275
Ease 5,43 31 1,494 ,268
Pair
5
IntrinsicE 4,91 35 1,467 ,248
Salience 5,02 35 1,374 ,232
Pair
6
IntrinsicE 4,95 35 1,442 ,244
ExtrinsicA 4,16 35 1,979 ,335
Pair
7
IntrinsicE 4,91 36 1,447 ,241
ExtrinsicC 4,31 36 1,871 ,312
Pair
8
IntrinsicE 5,02 33 1,392 ,242
ExtrinsicD 3,34 33 1,634 ,284
Paired Samples Correlations
N Correlation Sig.
Pair
1
IntrinsicE &
IntrinsicF 34 ,668 ,000
Pair
2
IntrinsicE &
IntrinsicG 35 ,584 ,000
Pair
3
IntrinsicE &
IntrinsicH 33 ,513 ,002
Pair
4 IntrinsicE & Ease 31 ,576 ,001
Pair
5
IntrinsicE &
Salience 35 ,383 ,023
Pair
6
IntrinsicE &
ExtrinsicA 35 ,483 ,003
Pair
7
IntrinsicE &
ExtrinsicC 36 ,649 ,000
Pair
8
IntrinsicE &
ExtrinsicD 33 ,359 ,040
Paired Samples Test
68
Paired Differences
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower
Pair 1 IntrinsicE - IntrinsicF -,069 1,219 ,209 -,494
Pair 2 IntrinsicE - IntrinsicG -,648 1,298 ,219 -1,094
Pair 3 IntrinsicE - IntrinsicH -,121 1,384 ,241 -,612
Pair 4 IntrinsicE - Ease -,548 1,392 ,250 -1,059
Pair 5 IntrinsicE - Salience -,105 1,580 ,267 -,647
Pair 6 IntrinsicE - ExtrinsicA ,790 1,801 ,304 ,172
Pair 7 IntrinsicE - ExtrinsicC ,602 1,443 ,240 ,114
Pair 8 IntrinsicE - ExtrinsicD 1,677 1,725 ,300 1,065
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed)
95% Confidence Interval of the
Difference
Upper
Pair 1 IntrinsicE - IntrinsicF ,357 -,328 33 ,745
Pair 2 IntrinsicE - IntrinsicG -,202 -2,951 34 ,006
Pair 3 IntrinsicE - IntrinsicH ,370 -,503 32 ,618
Pair 4 IntrinsicE - Ease -,038 -2,194 30 ,036
Pair 5 IntrinsicE - Salience ,438 -,392 34 ,697
Pair 6 IntrinsicE - ExtrinsicA 1,409 2,597 34 ,014
Pair 7 IntrinsicE - ExtrinsicC 1,090 2,503 35 ,017
Pair 8 IntrinsicE - ExtrinsicD 2,288 5,584 32 ,000
69
E & A: Citizens will co-produce statistically more for the solidary motive than for material
rewards (p=.014)
E & C: Citizens will co-produce statistically more for the solidary motive than for immaterial
rewards (p=.017)
E & D: Citizens will co-produce statistically more for the solidary motive than for immaterial
sanctions (p=.000)
E & G: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for the solidary motive than for expressive
motives (p=.006)
E & I: Citizens will co-produce statistically less for the solidary motive than because it’s easy
to get involved (p=.036)
There is no statistically significant difference between E & F (p=.745), E & J (p=.697), E & H
(p=.618)
70
T-Test Hypothesis F compared to the others
Paired Samples Statistics
Mean N Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
Pair
1
IntrinsicF 4,96 35 1,505 ,254
IntrinsicG 5,53 35 1,353 ,229
Pair
2
IntrinsicF 5,03 33 1,478 ,257
IntrinsicH 5,12 33 1,467 ,255
Pair
3
IntrinsicF 5,02 31 1,532 ,275
Ease 5,35 31 1,471 ,264
Pair
4
IntrinsicF 4,96 35 1,505 ,254
Salience 4,95 35 1,331 ,225
Pair
5
IntrinsicF 4,93 34 1,517 ,260
ExtrinsicA 4,05 34 1,954 ,335
Pair
6
IntrinsicF 4,96 35 1,505 ,254
ExtrinsicC 4,37 35 1,832 ,310
Pair
7
IntrinsicF 4,97 32 1,518 ,268
ExtrinsicD 3,40 32 1,614 ,285
Pair
8
IntrinsicF 4,94 34 1,523 ,261
IntrinsicE 4,87 34 1,468 ,252
Paired Samples Correlations
N Correlation Sig.
Pair
1
IntrinsicF &
IntrinsicG 35 ,637 ,000
Pair
2
IntrinsicF &
IntrinsicH 33 ,492 ,004
Pair
3 IntrinsicF & Ease 31 ,450 ,011
Pair
4
IntrinsicF &
Salience 35 ,415 ,013
Pair
5
IntrinsicF &
ExtrinsicA 34 ,465 ,006
Pair
6
IntrinsicF &
ExtrinsicC 35 ,624 ,000
Pair
7
IntrinsicF &
ExtrinsicD 32 ,242 ,182
Pair
8
IntrinsicF &
IntrinsicE 34 ,668 ,000
71
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Lower
Pair 1 IntrinsicF - IntrinsicG -,571 1,225 ,207 -,992
Pair 2 IntrinsicF - IntrinsicH -,091 1,484 ,258 -,617
Pair 3 IntrinsicF - Ease -,333 1,575 ,283 -,911
Pair 4 IntrinsicF - Salience ,010 1,541 ,261 -,520
Pair 5 IntrinsicF - ExtrinsicA ,882 1,835 ,315 ,242
Pair 6 IntrinsicF - ExtrinsicC ,590 1,478 ,250 ,083
Pair 7 IntrinsicF - ExtrinsicD 1,573 1,929 ,341 ,877
Pair 8 IntrinsicF - IntrinsicE ,069 1,219 ,209 -,357
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed)
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Upper
Pair 1 IntrinsicF - IntrinsicG -,151 -2,760 34 ,009
Pair 2 IntrinsicF - IntrinsicH ,435 -,352 32 ,727
Pair 3 IntrinsicF - Ease ,244 -1,178 30 ,248
Pair 4 IntrinsicF - Salience ,539 ,037 34 ,971
Pair 5 IntrinsicF - ExtrinsicA 1,523 2,804 33 ,008
Pair 6 IntrinsicF - ExtrinsicC 1,098 2,364 34 ,024
Pair 7 IntrinsicF - ExtrinsicD 2,268 4,612 31 ,000
Pair 8 IntrinsicF - IntrinsicE ,494 ,328 33 ,745
72
F & A: Citizens will co-produce statistically more for normative motives than for material
rewards (p=.008)
F & C: Citizens will co-produce statistically more for normative motives than for immaterial
rewards (p=.024)
F & D: Citizens will co-produce statistically more for normative motives than for immaterial
sanctions (p=.000)
F & G: Citizens will co-produce statistically less normative motives than for expressive
motives (p=.009)
There is no statistically significant difference between F & E (p=.745),F & H (p=.727), F & I
(p=.248), F & J(p=.971)
73
T-Test Hypothesis G compared to the others
Paired Samples Statistics
Mean N Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
Pair
1
IntrinsicG 5,63 34 1,338 ,229
IntrinsicH 5,15 34 1,452 ,249
Pair
2
IntrinsicG 5,57 32 1,427 ,252
Ease 5,41 32 1,476 ,261
Pair
3
IntrinsicG 5,57 36 1,356 ,226
Salience 5,01 36 1,356 ,226
Pair
4
IntrinsicG 5,59 35 1,372 ,232
ExtrinsicA 4,13 35 1,989 ,336
Pair
5
IntrinsicG 5,57 36 1,356 ,226
ExtrinsicC 4,43 36 1,835 ,306
Pair
6
IntrinsicG 5,55 33 1,384 ,241
ExtrinsicD 3,42 33 1,597 ,278
Pair
7
IntrinsicG 5,56 35 1,374 ,232
IntrinsicE 4,91 35 1,467 ,248
Pair
8
IntrinsicG 5,53 35 1,353 ,229
IntrinsicF 4,96 35 1,505 ,254
Paired Samples Correlations
N Correlation Sig.
Pair
1
IntrinsicG &
IntrinsicH 34 ,499 ,003
Pair
2 IntrinsicG & Ease 32 ,633 ,000
Pair
3
IntrinsicG &
Salience 36 ,512 ,001
Pair
4
IntrinsicG &
ExtrinsicA 35 ,440 ,008
Pair
5
IntrinsicG &
ExtrinsicC 36 ,560 ,000
Pair
6
IntrinsicG &
ExtrinsicD 33 ,057 ,753
Pair
7
IntrinsicG &
IntrinsicE 35 ,584 ,000
Pair
8
IntrinsicG &
IntrinsicF 35 ,637 ,000
74
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower
Pair 1 IntrinsicG - IntrinsicH ,480 1,400 ,240 -,008
Pair 2 IntrinsicG - Ease ,167 1,244 ,220 -,282
Pair 3 IntrinsicG - Salience ,565 1,340 ,223 ,111
Pair 4 IntrinsicG - ExtrinsicA 1,457 1,854 ,313 ,820
Pair 5 IntrinsicG - ExtrinsicC 1,148 1,556 ,259 ,622
Pair 6 IntrinsicG - ExtrinsicD 2,121 2,053 ,357 1,393
Pair 7 IntrinsicG - IntrinsicE ,648 1,298 ,219 ,202
Pair 8 IntrinsicG - IntrinsicF ,571 1,225 ,207 ,151
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed)
95% Confidence Interval of the
Difference
Upper
Pair 1 IntrinsicG - IntrinsicH ,969 2,000 33 ,054
Pair 2 IntrinsicG - Ease ,615 ,758 31 ,454
Pair 3 IntrinsicG - Salience 1,018 2,529 35 ,016
Pair 4 IntrinsicG - ExtrinsicA 2,094 4,649 34 ,000
Pair 5 IntrinsicG - ExtrinsicC 1,675 4,427 35 ,000
Pair 6 IntrinsicG - ExtrinsicD 2,849 5,936 32 ,000
Pair 7 IntrinsicG - IntrinsicE 1,094 2,951 34 ,006
Pair 8 IntrinsicG - IntrinsicF ,992 2,760 34 ,009
75
G & A: Citizens will co-produce statistically more for expressive motives than for material
rewards (p=.000)
G & C: Citizens will co-produce statistically more for expressive motives than for immaterial
rewards (p=.000)
G & D: Citizens will co-produce statistically more for expressive motives than for immaterial
sanctions (p=.000)
G & E: Citizens will co-produce statistically more for expressive motives than for solidary
motives.(p=.006)
G & H: Citizens will co-produce statistically more for expressive motives than for motives
concerning effectiveness. (p=.054)
G & J: Citizens will co-produce statistically more for expressive motives than for salience.
(p=.016)
There is no statistically significant difference between G & I (p=.454)
76
T-Test Hypothesis H compared to the others
Paired Samples Statistics
Mean N Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
Pair
1
IntrinsicH 5,19 31 1,483 ,266
Ease 5,47 31 1,450 ,260
Pair
2
IntrinsicH 5,15 34 1,452 ,249
Salience 5,02 34 1,395 ,239
Pair
3
IntrinsicH 5,19 33 1,451 ,253
ExtrinsicA 4,12 33 2,022 ,352
Pair
4
IntrinsicH 5,15 34 1,452 ,249
ExtrinsicC 4,42 34 1,890 ,324
Pair
5
IntrinsicH 5,04 31 1,470 ,264
ExtrinsicD 3,51 31 1,601 ,287
Pair
6
IntrinsicH 5,12 33 1,467 ,255
IntrinsicE 5,00 33 1,328 ,231
Pair
7
IntrinsicH 5,12 33 1,467 ,255
IntrinsicF 5,03 33 1,478 ,257
Pair
8
IntrinsicH 5,15 34 1,452 ,249
IntrinsicG 5,63 34 1,338 ,229
Paired Samples Correlations
N Correlation Sig.
Pair
1 IntrinsicH & Ease 31 ,409 ,022
Pair
2
IntrinsicH &
Salience 34 ,434 ,010
Pair
3
IntrinsicH &
ExtrinsicA 33 ,509 ,002
Pair
4
IntrinsicH &
ExtrinsicC 34 ,517 ,002
Pair
5
IntrinsicH &
ExtrinsicD 31 ,319 ,080
Pair
6
IntrinsicH &
IntrinsicE 33 ,513 ,002
Pair
7
IntrinsicH &
IntrinsicF 33 ,492 ,004
Pair
8
IntrinsicH &
IntrinsicG 34 ,499 ,003
Paired Samples Test
77
Paired Differences
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower
Pair 1 IntrinsicH - Ease -,280 1,594 ,286 -,864
Pair 2 IntrinsicH - Salience ,127 1,515 ,260 -,401
Pair 3 IntrinsicH - ExtrinsicA 1,071 1,791 ,312 ,436
Pair 4 IntrinsicH - ExtrinsicC ,725 1,687 ,289 ,137
Pair 5 IntrinsicH - ExtrinsicD 1,538 1,794 ,322 ,879
Pair 6 IntrinsicH - IntrinsicE ,121 1,384 ,241 -,370
Pair 7 IntrinsicH - IntrinsicF ,091 1,484 ,258 -,435
Pair 8 IntrinsicH - IntrinsicG -,480 1,400 ,240 -,969
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed)
95% Confidence Interval of the
Difference
Upper
Pair 1 IntrinsicH - Ease ,305 -,976 30 ,337
Pair 2 IntrinsicH - Salience ,656 ,490 33 ,627
Pair 3 IntrinsicH - ExtrinsicA 1,706 3,435 32 ,002
Pair 4 IntrinsicH - ExtrinsicC 1,314 2,508 33 ,017
Pair 5 IntrinsicH - ExtrinsicD 2,196 4,771 30 ,000
Pair 6 IntrinsicH - IntrinsicE ,612 ,503 32 ,618
Pair 7 IntrinsicH - IntrinsicF ,617 ,352 32 ,727
Pair 8 IntrinsicH - IntrinsicG ,008 -2,000 33 ,054
78
H & A: Citizens will co-produce statistically more for motives concerning effectiveness than
for material rewards (p=.002)
H & C: Citizens will co-produce statistically more motives concerning effectiveness than for
immaterial rewards (p=.017)
H & D: Citizens will co-produce statistically more motives concerning effectiveness than for
immaterial sanctions (p=.000)
H & G: Citizens will co-produce statistically more motives concerning effectiveness than for
expressive motives. (p=.054)
There is no statistically significant difference between H & I (p=.337), H & J (p=.627), H & E
(p=.618), H & F (p=.727)
79
T-Test Hypothesis I compared to the others
Paired Samples Statistics
Mean N Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
Pair
1
Ease 5,41 32 1,476 ,261
Salience 4,95 32 1,407 ,249
Pair
2
Ease 5,43 31 1,494 ,268
ExtrinsicA 4,13 31 1,999 ,359
Pair
3
Ease 5,41 32 1,476 ,261
ExtrinsicC 4,43 32 1,852 ,327
Pair
4
Ease 5,34 30 1,502 ,274
ExtrinsicD 3,32 30 1,608 ,294
Pair
5
Ease 5,43 31 1,494 ,268
IntrinsicE 4,88 31 1,529 ,275
Pair
6
Ease 5,35 31 1,471 ,264
IntrinsicF 5,02 31 1,532 ,275
Pair
7
Ease 5,41 32 1,476 ,261
IntrinsicG 5,57 32 1,427 ,252
Pair
8
Ease 5,47 31 1,450 ,260
IntrinsicH 5,19 31 1,483 ,266
Paired Samples Correlations
N Correlation Sig.
Pair 1 Ease & Salience 32 ,587 ,000
Pair 2 Ease & ExtrinsicA 31 ,440 ,013
Pair 3 Ease & ExtrinsicC 32 ,520 ,002
Pair 4 Ease & ExtrinsicD 30 ,214 ,256
Pair 5 Ease & IntrinsicE 31 ,576 ,001
Pair 6 Ease & IntrinsicF 31 ,450 ,011
Pair 7 Ease & IntrinsicG 32 ,633 ,000
Pair 8 Ease & IntrinsicH 31 ,409 ,022
Paired Samples Test
80
Paired Differences
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 95% Confidence Interval of
the Difference
Lower
Pair 1 Ease - Salience ,458 1,311 ,232 -,014
Pair 2 Ease - ExtrinsicA 1,301 1,898 ,341 ,605
Pair 3 Ease - ExtrinsicC ,979 1,663 ,294 ,379
Pair 4 Ease - ExtrinsicD 2,022 1,951 ,356 1,294
Pair 5 Ease - IntrinsicE ,548 1,392 ,250 ,038
Pair 6 Ease - IntrinsicF ,333 1,575 ,283 -,244
Pair 7 Ease - IntrinsicG -,167 1,244 ,220 -,615
Pair 8 Ease - IntrinsicH ,280 1,594 ,286 -,305
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed)
95% Confidence Interval of
the Difference
Upper
Pair 1 Ease - Salience ,931 1,978 31 ,057
Pair 2 Ease - ExtrinsicA 1,997 3,817 30 ,001
Pair 3 Ease - ExtrinsicC 1,579 3,330 31 ,002
Pair 4 Ease - ExtrinsicD 2,751 5,676 29 ,000
Pair 5 Ease - IntrinsicE 1,059 2,194 30 ,036
Pair 6 Ease - IntrinsicF ,911 1,178 30 ,248
Pair 7 Ease - IntrinsicG ,282 -,758 31 ,454
Pair 8 Ease - IntrinsicH ,864 ,976 30 ,337
81
I & A: Citizens will co-produce statistically more for when it’s easy to get involved than for
material rewards (p=.001)
I & C: Citizens will co-produce statistically more when it’s easy to get involved than for
immaterial rewards (p=.002)
I & D: Citizens will co-produce statistically more when it’s easy to get involved than for
immaterial sanctions (p=.000)
I & E: Citizens will co-produce statistically more when it’s easy to get involved than for
solidary motives.(p=.036)
I & J: Citizens will co-produce statistically more when it’s easy to get involved than for
salience. (p=.057)
There is no statistically significant difference between I & F (p=.248), I & G (p=.454), I & H
(p=.337)
82
T-Test Hypothesis J compared to the others
Paired Samples Statistics
Mean N Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
Pair
1
Salience 5,01 35 1,376 ,233
ExtrinsicA 4,13 35 1,989 ,336
Pair
2
Salience 5,01 36 1,356 ,226
ExtrinsicC 4,43 36 1,835 ,306
Pair
3
Salience 4,96 33 1,381 ,240
ExtrinsicD 3,42 33 1,597 ,278
Pair
4
Salience 5,02 35 1,374 ,232
IntrinsicE 4,91 35 1,467 ,248
Pair
5
Salience 4,95 35 1,331 ,225
IntrinsicF 4,96 35 1,505 ,254
Pair
6
Salience 5,01 36 1,356 ,226
IntrinsicG 5,57 36 1,356 ,226
Pair
7
Salience 5,02 34 1,395 ,239
IntrinsicH 5,15 34 1,452 ,249
Pair
8
Salience 4,95 32 1,407 ,249
Ease 5,41 32 1,476 ,261
Paired Samples Correlations
N Correlation Sig.
Pair
1
Salience &
ExtrinsicA 35 ,250 ,147
Pair
2
Salience &
ExtrinsicC 36 ,527 ,001
Pair
3
Salience &
ExtrinsicD 33 ,266 ,134
Pair
4
Salience &
IntrinsicE 35 ,383 ,023
Pair
5
Salience &
IntrinsicF 35 ,415 ,013
Pair
6
Salience &
IntrinsicG 36 ,512 ,001
Pair
7
Salience &
IntrinsicH 34 ,434 ,010
Pair
8 Salience & Ease 32 ,587 ,000
83
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower
Pair 1 Salience - ExtrinsicA ,876 2,116 ,358 ,149
Pair 2 Salience - ExtrinsicC ,583 1,608 ,268 ,039
Pair 3 Salience - ExtrinsicD 1,535 1,812 ,315 ,893
Pair 4 Salience - IntrinsicE ,105 1,580 ,267 -,438
Pair 5 Salience - IntrinsicF -,010 1,541 ,261 -,539
Pair 6 Salience - IntrinsicG -,565 1,340 ,223 -1,018
Pair 7 Salience - IntrinsicH -,127 1,515 ,260 -,656
Pair 8 Salience - Ease -,458 1,311 ,232 -,931
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed)
95% Confidence Interval of
the Difference
Upper
Pair 1 Salience - ExtrinsicA 1,603 2,450 34 ,020
Pair 2 Salience - ExtrinsicC 1,127 2,176 35 ,036
Pair 3 Salience - ExtrinsicD 2,178 4,867 32 ,000
Pair 4 Salience - IntrinsicE ,647 ,392 34 ,697
Pair 5 Salience - IntrinsicF ,520 -,037 34 ,971
Pair 6 Salience - IntrinsicG -,111 -2,529 35 ,016
Pair 7 Salience - IntrinsicH ,401 -,490 33 ,627
Pair 8 Salience - Ease ,014 -1,978 31 ,057
84
J & A: Citizens will co-produce statistically more for when it’s of salience to them than for
material rewards (p=.020)
J & C: Citizens will co-produce statistically more when it’s of salience to them than for
immaterial rewards (p=.036)
J & D: Citizens will co-produce statistically more when it’s of salience to them than for
immaterial sanctions (p=.000)
J & G: Citizens will co-produce statistically less when it’s of salience to them than for
expressive motives.(p=.016)
J & I: Citizens will co-produce statistically less when it’s of salience to them than for ease of
involvement. (p=.057)
There is no statistically significant difference between J & E (p=.697), J & F (p=.971), J & H
(p=.627)
85
APPENDIX 7: ONE WAY ANOVA
Oneway Anova on Gender
ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ExtrinsicA
Between Groups 2,645 1 2,645 ,682 ,415
Within Groups 131,862 34 3,878
Total 134,506 35
ExtrinsicC
Between Groups 2,657 1 2,657 ,758 ,390
Within Groups 122,665 35 3,505
Total 125,321 36
ExtrinsicD
Between Groups 2,161 1 2,161 ,826 ,370
Within Groups 83,699 32 2,616
Total 85,859 33
IntrinsicE
Between Groups ,724 1 ,724 ,339 ,564
Within Groups 72,523 34 2,133
Total 73,247 35
IntrinsicF
Between Groups 1,300 1 1,300 ,566 ,457
Within Groups 75,760 33 2,296
Total 77,060 34
IntrinsicG
Between Groups 1,778 1 1,778 ,966 ,333
Within Groups 62,580 34 1,841
Total 64,358 35
IntrinsicH Between Groups ,647 1 ,647 ,300 ,587
86
Within Groups 68,951 32 2,155
Total 69,598 33
Ease
Between Groups 2,401 1 2,401 1,106 ,301
Within Groups 65,096 30 2,170
Total 67,497 31
Salience
Between Groups 1,260 1 1,260 ,679 ,416
Within Groups 63,071 34 1,855
Total 64,330 35
There’s no significant difference in gender.
87
Oneway Anova on Nationality
ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ExtrinsicA
Between Groups 12,624 1 12,624 3,357 ,076
Within Groups 120,317 32 3,760
Total 132,941 33
ExtrinsicC
Between Groups 1,334 1 1,334 ,392 ,536
Within Groups 112,298 33 3,403
Total 113,632 34
ExtrinsicD
Between Groups 15,170 1 15,170 7,193 ,012
Within Groups 63,274 30 2,109
Total 78,444 31
IntrinsicE
Between Groups ,650 1 ,650 ,311 ,581
Within Groups 66,935 32 2,092
Total 67,585 33
IntrinsicF
Between Groups 2,200 1 2,200 ,989 ,328
Within Groups 68,938 31 2,224
Total 71,138 32
IntrinsicG
Between Groups 2,936 1 2,936 1,817 ,187
Within Groups 51,718 32 1,616
Total 54,654 33
IntrinsicH
Between Groups 7,627 1 7,627 3,822 ,060
Within Groups 59,873 30 1,996
88
Total 67,500 31
Ease
Between Groups ,233 1 ,233 ,114 ,738
Within Groups 57,263 28 2,045
Total 57,496 29
Salience
Between Groups 1,429 1 1,429 ,892 ,352
Within Groups 51,280 32 1,603
Total 52,709 33
Significant positive difference between nationalities concerning hypothesis D (p=.012)
Thus to conclude, Turkish(=1) citizens score higher on immaterial sanctions than
Belgians(=0).
89
Oneway Anova on Employment
ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ExtrinsicA
Between Groups 24,062 3 8,021 2,324 ,094
Within Groups 110,445 32 3,451
Total 134,506 35
ExtrinsicC
Between Groups 15,417 3 5,139 1,543 ,222
Within Groups 109,904 33 3,330
Total 125,321 36
ExtrinsicD
Between Groups 6,397 3 2,132 ,805 ,501
Within Groups 79,463 30 2,649
Total 85,859 33
IntrinsicE
Between Groups 17,572 3 5,857 3,367 ,031
Within Groups 55,675 32 1,740
Total 73,247 35
IntrinsicF
Between Groups 5,117 3 1,706 ,735 ,539
Within Groups 71,943 31 2,321
Total 77,060 34
IntrinsicG
Between Groups 7,572 3 2,524 1,422 ,254
Within Groups 56,786 32 1,775
Total 64,358 35
IntrinsicH
Between Groups 7,881 3 2,627 1,277 ,300
Within Groups 61,717 30 2,057
90
Total 69,598 33
Salience
Between Groups 8,218 3 2,739 1,562 ,218
Within Groups 56,113 32 1,754
Total 64,330 35
Ease
Between Groups 6,661 3 2,220 1,022 ,398
Within Groups 60,836 28 2,173
Total 67,497 31
Significant difference between employment-levels concerning hypothesis E (p=.047)
Post hoc:
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: IntrinsicE
Bonferroni
(I) Employment (J) Employment Mean Difference
(I-J)
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
unemployed
employed ,263 ,592 1,000 -1,40 1,93
retired -,284 ,626 1,000 -2,05 1,48
other 1,827* ,626 ,039 ,07 3,59
employed
unemployed -,263 ,592 1,000 -1,93 1,40
retired -,548 ,734 1,000 -2,61 1,52
other 1,563 ,734 ,245 -,50 3,63
retired
unemployed ,284 ,626 1,000 -1,48 2,05
employed ,548 ,734 1,000 -1,52 2,61
other 2,111 ,762 ,055 -,03 4,25
91
other
unemployed -1,827* ,626 ,039 -3,59 -,07
employed -1,563 ,734 ,245 -3,63 ,50
retired -2,111 ,762 ,055 -4,25 ,03
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
Unemployed > other(p=.039)
The other differences are not significant
92
Oneway Anova on Language
ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ExtrinsicA
Between Groups 23,519 1 23,519 7,205 ,011
Within Groups 110,987 34 3,264
Total 134,506 35
ExtrinsicC
Between Groups 3,265 1 3,265 ,936 ,340
Within Groups 122,056 35 3,487
Total 125,321 36
ExtrinsicD
Between Groups 13,700 1 13,700 6,075 ,019
Within Groups 72,160 32 2,255
Total 85,859 33
IntrinsicE
Between Groups ,017 1 ,017 ,008 ,929
Within Groups 73,230 34 2,154
Total 73,247 35
IntrinsicF
Between Groups 3,621 1 3,621 1,627 ,211
Within Groups 73,439 33 2,225
Total 77,060 34
IntrinsicG
Between Groups ,593 1 ,593 ,316 ,578
Within Groups 63,765 34 1,875
Total 64,358 35
IntrinsicH
Between Groups 8,997 1 8,997 4,751 ,037
Within Groups 60,601 32 1,894
93
Total 69,598 33
Ease
Between Groups 2,885 1 2,885 1,339 ,256
Within Groups 64,612 30 2,154
Total 67,497 31
Salience
Between Groups 6,476 1 6,476 3,806 ,059
Within Groups 57,854 34 1,702
Total 64,330 35
Significant positive difference between languages concerning hypothesis A (p=.011)and
hypothesis D (p=.019)and G (p=.037)
A: Turkish speakers will score higher on motivation through material rewards compared to
Dutch speakers.
D: Turkish speakers will score higher on motivation through immaterial sanctions compared
to Dutch speakers
G: Turkish speakers will score higher on expressive motivation than Dutch speakers.
Oneway Anova on Age
ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ExtrinsicA
Between Groups 32,710 5 6,542 1,928 ,119
Within Groups 101,796 30 3,393
Total 134,506 35
ExtrinsicC
Between Groups 15,111 5 3,022 ,850 ,525
Within Groups 110,210 31 3,555
Total 125,321 36
ExtrinsicD Between Groups 15,735 5 3,147 1,257 ,310
94
Within Groups 70,124 28 2,504
Total 85,859 33
IntrinsicE
Between Groups 15,006 5 3,001 1,546 ,206
Within Groups 58,241 30 1,941
Total 73,247 35
IntrinsicF
Between Groups 8,780 5 1,756 ,746 ,596
Within Groups 68,281 29 2,355
Total 77,060 34
IntrinsicG
Between Groups 7,353 5 1,471 ,774 ,576
Within Groups 57,005 30 1,900
Total 64,358 35
IntrinsicH
Between Groups 6,883 5 1,377 ,615 ,690
Within Groups 62,715 28 2,240
Total 69,598 33
Ease
Between Groups 22,915 5 4,583 2,673 ,044
Within Groups 44,582 26 1,715
Total 67,497 31
Salience
Between Groups 4,327 5 ,865 ,433 ,822
Within Groups 60,003 30 2,000
Total 64,330 35
Significant difference between age categories concerning Ease (p=.044)
Post hoc:
95
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: Ease
Bonferroni
(I) Age categories (J) Age categories Mean Difference
(I-J)
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
18-24
25-34 -,321 ,821 1,000 -2,97 2,33
35-44 ,509 ,787 1,000 -2,03 3,05
45-54 -1,417 1,000 1,000 -4,65 1,82
55-64 -1,361 ,845 1,000 -4,09 1,37
65-95 -1,861 1,000 1,000 -5,09 1,37
25-34
18-24 ,321 ,821 1,000 -2,33 2,97
35-44 ,831 ,660 1,000 -1,30 2,96
45-54 -1,095 ,904 1,000 -4,02 1,82
55-64 -1,040 ,729 1,000 -3,39 1,31
65-95 -1,540 ,904 1,000 -4,46 1,38
35-44
18-24 -,509 ,787 1,000 -3,05 2,03
25-34 -,831 ,660 1,000 -2,96 1,30
45-54 -1,926 ,873 ,546 -4,75 ,89
55-64 -1,870 ,690 ,176 -4,10 ,36
65-95 -2,370 ,873 ,174 -5,19 ,45
45-54
18-24 1,417 1,000 1,000 -1,82 4,65
25-34 1,095 ,904 1,000 -1,82 4,02
35-44 1,926 ,873 ,546 -,89 4,75
55-64 ,056 ,926 1,000 -2,94 3,05
65-95 -,444 1,069 1,000 -3,90 3,01
55-64 18-24 1,361 ,845 1,000 -1,37 4,09
96
25-34 1,040 ,729 1,000 -1,31 3,39
35-44 1,870 ,690 ,176 -,36 4,10
45-54 -,056 ,926 1,000 -3,05 2,94
65-95 -,500 ,926 1,000 -3,49 2,49
65-95
18-24 1,861 1,000 1,000 -1,37 5,09
25-34 1,540 ,904 1,000 -1,38 4,46
35-44 2,370 ,873 ,174 -,45 5,19
45-54 ,444 1,069 1,000 -3,01 3,90
55-64 ,500 ,926 1,000 -2,49 3,49
In this case the post-hoc cannot reveal with sufficient confidence which pairs of means differ.
This could be because I need a larger data pool.
97
Oneway Anova on Length of time co-producing
ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ExtrinsicA
Between Groups 24,062 3 8,021 2,324 ,094
Within Groups 110,445 32 3,451
Total 134,506 35
ExtrinsicC
Between Groups 15,417 3 5,139 1,543 ,222
Within Groups 109,904 33 3,330
Total 125,321 36
ExtrinsicD
Between Groups 6,397 3 2,132 ,805 ,501
Within Groups 79,463 30 2,649
Total 85,859 33
IntrinsicE
Between Groups 17,572 3 5,857 3,367 ,031
Within Groups 55,675 32 1,740
Total 73,247 35
IntrinsicF
Between Groups 5,117 3 1,706 ,735 ,539
Within Groups 71,943 31 2,321
Total 77,060 34
IntrinsicG
Between Groups 7,572 3 2,524 1,422 ,254
Within Groups 56,786 32 1,775
Total 64,358 35
IntrinsicH
Between Groups 7,881 3 2,627 1,277 ,300
Within Groups 61,717 30 2,057
98
Total 69,598 33
Salience
Between Groups 8,218 3 2,739 1,562 ,218
Within Groups 56,113 32 1,754
Total 64,330 35
Ease
Between Groups 6,661 3 2,220 1,022 ,398
Within Groups 60,836 28 2,173
Total 67,497 31
There’s no significant difference in length of time.