Battle of Kursk 1

Battle of Kursk

The eastern front at the time of Operation Citadel. Orange areas show thedestruction of an earlier Soviet breakthrough that ended with the Kharkov

offensive operation. Green areas show German advances on Kursk.

The Battle of Kursk took place whenGerman and Soviet forces confronted eachother on the Eastern Front during WorldWar II in the vicinity of the city of Kursk,(450 kilometres / 280 miles south ofMoscow) in the Soviet Union in July andAugust 1943. It remains both the largestseries of armored clashes, including theBattle of Prokhorovka, and the costliestsingle day of aerial warfare in history. It wasthe final strategic offensive the Germanswere able to mount in the east. The resultingdecisive Soviet victory gave the Red Armythe strategic initiative for the rest of the war.

The Germans hoped to shorten their lines byeliminating the Kursk salient (also known asthe Kursk bulge), created in the aftermath oftheir defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad. Theyenvisioned pincers breaking through its northern and southern flanks to achieve a great encirclement of Red Armyforces. The Soviets, however, had intelligence of the German Army's intentions. This and German delays to wait fornew weapons, mainly Tiger and Panther tanks,[1] [2] gave the Red Army time to construct a series of defense linesand gather large reserve forces for a strategic counterattack.[3]

Advised months in advance that the attack would fall on the neck of the Kursk salient, the Soviets designed a plan toslow, redirect, exhaust, and progressively wear down the powerful German panzer spearheads by forcing them toattack through a vast interconnected web of minefields, pre-sighted artillery fire zones, and concealed anti-tankstrong points comprising eight progressively spaced defense lines 250 km deep—more than 10 times as deep as theMaginot Line—and featuring a greater than 1:1 ratio of anti-tank guns to attacking vehicles. By far the mostextensive defensive works ever constructed, it proved to be more than three times the depth necessary to contain thefurthest extent of the German attack.[4]

When the German forces had exhausted themselves against the defences, the Soviets responded withcounter-offensives, which allowed the Red Army to retake Orel and Belgorod on 5 August and Kharkov on23 August, and push the Germans back across a broad front.Although the Red Army had had success in winter, this was the first successful strategic Soviet summer offensive ofthe war. The model strategic operation earned a place in war college curricula.[5] [6] The Battle of Kursk was the firstbattle in which a Blitzkrieg offensive had been defeated before it could break through enemy defenses and into itsstrategic depths.[7]

Battle of Kursk 2

BackgroundIn the winter of 1942–43 the Red Army conclusively won the Battle of Stalingrad. About 800,000 German and otherAxis troops were lost, including the entire German Sixth Army, seriously depleting Axis strength in the east.During the months of November, 1942 to February, 1943, the German position in southern Russia became critical.With the encirclement of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad, a huge hole opened up in their lines. Follow-up Sovietforces pushed west, threatening to isolate Army Group A in the Caucasus as well.German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was reduced to desperate measures. Divisions were scraped up bythinning nonthreatened sectors. Noncombat personnel were pressed into service, along with tanks in rear areaworkshops. Ad hoc units were formed which blunted the Soviet advance spearheads.In due course, the SS Panzer Corps arrived from France, fresh and up to strength. Other mechanized units such as the11th Panzer Division arrived from Army Group A, along with the 6th and 17th Panzer Divisions. By February 19,enough German armor was concentrated to launch a pincer-style counteroffensive against the overextended Russianforces, notably Armored Group Popov.The ensuing attack left the front line running roughly from Leningrad in the north to Rostov in the south. In themiddle lay a large 200 km (120 mi) wide and 150 km (90 mi) deep Soviet-held salient, or bulge centered round thetown of Kursk between German forward positions near Orel in the north, and Kharkov in the south.The spring thaw now turned the countryside into a muddy quagmire and both sides settled down to plan their nextmove.General Manstein initially believed that the German Army should go on the strategic defensive and deliver strongcounterblows with their mobile reserves. He was convinced that the Red Army would deliver its main effort againstArmy Group South. He proposed to keep the left strong while retreating on the right to the Dnieper River, followedby a massive counterblow to the flank of the Red Army advance. This idea was rejected by Hitler, as he did not eventemporarily want to give up so much terrain.[8]

At the top of the German High Command (OKH), Colonel General Kurt Zeitzler and others did not approve ofManstein's defensive strategy and instead turned their attention to the obvious bulge at Kursk. Two Red ArmyFronts, the Voronezh and Central Fronts, occupied the ground in and around the salient and pinching it off wouldtrap almost a fifth of the Red Army's manpower. It would also result in a much straighter and shorter line andrecapture the strategically useful railway city of Kursk, located on the main north-south railway line from Rostov toMoscow.In March, the plans crystallized. Walter Model's 9th Army would attack southwards from Orel while HermannHoth's 4th Panzer Army and Army Group Kempf under the overall command of Manstein would attack northwardsfrom Belgorod. They planned to meet at Kursk, but if the offensive went well, they would have permission tocontinue forward on their own initiative, with a general plan to re-establish a new line at the Don River, severalweeks' march to the east.The German commanders favoring the attack were confident and guided by the facts that the distance to Kursk wasshort, the attacking forces strong, and the Wehrmacht's history was one of always shattering Soviet front lines whereit chose to.Contrary to his recent behavior, Hitler gave the OKH considerable control over the planning of the operation. Overthe next few weeks, they continued to increase the scope of the forces attached to the front, stripping other areas ofthe German line of anything useful for deployment in the operation. They first set the attack for 4 May, but delayedin order to allow more time for new weapons to arrive from Germany. Hitler postponed the offensive several moretimes. On 5 May, the launch date became 12 June. Due to the potential threat of an Allied landing in Italy and delaysin armor deliveries, Hitler set the launch date to 20 June. On 17 June, he further postponed it until 3 July, and thenlater to 5 July.[9] [10] [11]

Battle of Kursk 3

The concept behind the German offensive was the traditional (and for the Germans usually successful)double-envelopment, or Kesselschlacht (cauldron battle). The German Army had long favored such a Cannae-stylemethod and the tools of Blitzkrieg made these types of tactics even more effective. Blitzkrieg depends upon a mass ofarmor concentrated at some weak point, followed by rapid breakthroughs where columns of tanks and mechanizedinfantry penetrate forward and then curve inward toward each other, trapping the enemy forces in between. Essentialto such operations is control of the air space so that one's tanks are not subject to aerial bombardment, but those ofthe enemy are. Upon encirclement of a portion of the opposing force, defeat follows through disruption of commandand supply rather than continuation of a pitched battle.Such breakthroughs were easier to achieve by attacking in unexpected locations, as the Germans had done in theArdennes in 1940, Kiev in 1941, and towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus in the summer of 1942.The OKH plan for the attack on the Kursk salient, "Operation Citadel", violated one crucial principle of war: theelement of surprise. As the Germans moved in more men and equipment, it became increasingly obvious what washappening.A number of German commanders questioned the idea, notably Guderian, who asked Hitler:

"Was it really necessary to attack Kursk, and indeed in the east that year at all? Do you think anyone evenknows where Kursk is? The entire world doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not. What is the reason that isforcing us to attack this year on Kursk, or even more, on the Eastern Front?"Perhaps more surprisingly, Hitler replied:"I know. The thought of it turns my stomach."[12] [13]

The German force numbered fifty divisions, including 17 Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions. Among them werethe elite Wehrmacht Großdeutschland Division as well as three battle-hardened Waffen-SS divisions; the 1st SSPanzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich and the 3rd SSPanzergrenadier Division Totenkopf, which were all grouped into the II SS Panzer Corps.

Soviet plans

To the West! calls this Soviet poster,while a Soviet soldier destroys the

German To the East! sign

The Red Army had also begun planning their summer offensives and had settledon a plan that mirrored that of the Germans. Attacks in front of Orel and Kharkovwould flatten the line and potentially lead to a breakout near the Pripyat Marshes.

However, these ideas were abandoned as Moscow received warning of theGerman build-up through the Lucy spy ring in Switzerland. Additionalinformation came from John Cairncross in the UK who forwarded decodedLorenz cipher data from Bletchley Park.[14] [15] Marshal Georgiy Zhukov hadalready predicted the site of the German attack as early as 8 April,recommending to Stavka (the Red Army General Staff) a defensive strategy.Anastas Mikoyan wrote in his memoirs that he was notified about the attack ingeneral details by Stalin on 27 March.[16]

The pattern of the war up until this point had been one of German offensivesuccess in spring and summer. Blitzkrieg had worked against all opponents,including the Red Army. On the other hand, Soviet forces had attacked withsuccess only during the winter. Although Joseph Stalin and some Stavka officerswere eager to strike first, the majority along with Zhukov advised a morecautious approach. In a letter to Stalin on April 8, 1943 he wrote:

I consider it inadvisable for our forces to go over to the offensive in the very first days of the campaign in order to forestall the enemy. It would be better to make the enemy exhaust himself against our defences, and knock out his tanks and then, bringing up fresh reserves, to go over to the general offensive which would

Battle of Kursk 4

finally finish off his main force.[9]

Hitler delayed the launching of his offensive which gave the Red Army two months in which to turn the salient intoone of the most heavily defended areas in history. They evacuated most of their troops from the outer bulge leaving acrust of defending infantry there. But at the base of the bulge on both sides, two fronts, the Central on the north faceand Voronezh in the south manned the lines, with Steppe Front in nearby reserve.To meet the German attack, the Central and Voronezh fronts created several main lines of defense in their sectors.Protecting the infantry in each line were enormous mine belts and anti-tank ditches in front.The preparation of the battlefield by Red Army military engineers was thorough. Reports indicate 503,993 anti-tankmines and 439,348 anti-personnel mines were laid. On average, 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines werelaid per kilometre of front. In the sectors eventually attacked, densities were never lower than 1,400 per kilometreand sometimes reached as high as 2,000 per kilometre.Further supporting the Soviet infantry were 6,000 76.2mm anti-tank guns which were skillfully camouflaged.Gunners were instructed to concentrate their fire on the more vulnerable Panzer IV tanks which formed a majority ofthe Panzer division strength. The Russian howitzers, mortars and machinegun posts had as their mission to eliminateGerman infantry attempting to close in on the anti-tank guns. The density of artillery in the salient was unusual.There were more artillery regiments than infantry regiments. The Red Army was determined to grind down theadvancing Panzer formations with artillery and anti-tank obstacles in order to slow, stop, and counterattack them.Further buttressing the Russian infantry were independent armored brigades. Some of these tanks were dug intohull-down positions and used in a static role.Waiting in reserve for the Germans if they should breach the Soviet lines was the Steppe Front consisting of 4th and5th Guards, 27th, 53rd and 57th Armies, and the 5th Guards Tank Army.The Russians massed some 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, and 2,792 aircraft. This amounted to26% of the total manpower of the Red Army, 26% of its mortars and artillery, 35% of its aircraft, and 46% of itstanks.[9] The Germans received reports of powerful Soviet concentrations in the Kursk area and delayed theoffensive to allow for more Panther tanks to reach the front line.[17]

Many of the Soviet forces assigned to the defense of the salient were recent veterans of the Battle of Stalingrad. Butthe Red Army also added over one million new men in the first half of 1943. Hence the Red Army wascomparatively stronger in 1943, while the German army was smaller.

Red Army machine gun crew in action

Like the Germans, the Soviets employed numerous deceptions.Dummy positions were constructed. Mock aircraft were placed on falseairfields and misleading radio traffic sent to confuse Germanintelligence. Camouflage for battlefield positions was excellent.Generally, the first warning German units received of the presence ofSoviet guns was their own vehicles exploding.

State of the Red Air Force

In the early stages of the war, the Red Air Force, while numericallysuperior, suffered from an abundance of obsolete designs and insufficient training. Many Soviet pilots learned to flyas civilian members of air clubs set up by the Osoaviakhim.By 1943, more formal training was introduced and modern aircraft such as the Yakovlev Yak-9 fighter, PetlyakovPe-2 light bomber and Ilyushin Il-2 ground attack aircraft were available in large numbers.Consequently, the Red Air Force had greatly improved by the Battle of Kursk, to the point where neither side gainedascendancy in the air. Both German and Russian armored columns suffered from bombing attacks.

Battle of Kursk 5

Opposing forces

Wehrmacht

Order of battle: Army Group Center (Field Marshal Günther von Kluge)

Army Commander Note Corps Commander Divisions

9th Army Walter Model XX ArmyCorps

R. von Roman 45th, 72nd, 137th, & 251st InfantryDivision

XLVI ArmyCorps

H. Zorn 7th, 31st, 102nd,& 258th Infantry Division

XLI ArmyCorps

J. Harpe 18th Panzer Division & 86th, &292nd Infantry Division

XLVII PanzerCorps

J. Lemelsen 2nd, 9th & 20th Panzer Division & 6thInfantry Division

XXIII ArmyCorps

J. Frießner 216th, & 383rd Infantry Division & 78thSturmdivision

ArmyReserve

4 & 12th Panzer Division & 10th PanzerGrenadier Division

2nd PanzerArmy

Erich-HeinrichClößner

XXXV ArmyCorps

L. Rendulic 34th 56th 262nd & 299th Infantry Division

LIII ArmyCorps

F. Gollwitzer 208th, 211th & 293rd Infantry Division &25th Panzer Grenadier Division

LV ArmyCorps

E. Jaschke 110th, 134th 296th & 339th InfantryDivision

Army reserve 112th Infantry Division

Army GroupReserve

5th & 8th Panzer Division

Order of battle: Army Group South (Field Marshal Erich von Manstein)

Army Commander Note Corps Commander Divisions

4th Panzer Army HermannHoth

LII ArmyCorps

E. Ott 57th, 255th & 332nd Infantry Division

XLVIIIPanzer Corps

Otto vonKnobelsdorff

3rd & 11th Panzer Division & 167th Infantry Division undPanzer-Grenadier-Division Großdeutschland

II SS PanzerCorps

P. Hausser 1st, 2nd & 3rd SS-Panzer Grenadier Division

Army DetachmentKempf

WernerKempf

III PanzerCorps

H. Breith 6th, 7th, & 19th Panzer Division & 168th Infantry Division

Korps Raus E. Raus 106th & 320th Infantry Division

XLII ArmyCorps

F. Mattenklot 39th, 161st & 282nd Infantry Division

Army GroupReserve

XXIV. Tankcorps

5th SS Panzergrenadier Division & 17th Panzer Division

Battle of Kursk 6

Red Army

Order of battle: Central Front (Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky)

Army Commander Note Corps Division

13th Army N. Puchow 17th Guards Rifle Corps 6th, 70th & 75th Guards Rifle Division

18th Guards Rifle Corps 2nd, 3rd & 4th Airborne Guards Rifle Division

15th Rifle Corps 8. 74 & 148. Rifle Division

29th Rifle Corps 15th, 81st & 307th Rifle Division

48th Army P. Romanenko 42nd Rifle Corps 6th, 70th & 75th Guards Rifle Division

73rd Rifle Corps 2nd, 3rd & 4th Airborne Guards Rifle Division

60th Army I. Tschernjachowski 24th Rifle Corps 42nd, & 112th. Rifle Division

30. Rifle Corps 121st, 141st & 322nd Rifle Division

Independent 55th Rifle Division

65th Army I. Tschernjachowski 18th Rifle Corps 69th, 149th & 246th Rifle Division

27th Rifle Corps 60th & 193rd Rifle Division

Independent 37th Garde Rifle Division & 181st, 194th & 354th Rifle Division

70th Army I. Galanin 28th Rifle Corps 132nd, 211th & 280th Rifle Division

Independent 102nd, 106th, 140th & 162nd Rifle Division

2nd Tank Army A. Rodin 3rd Tank Corps

16th Tank Corps

Front Assets 9th Tank Corps

19th Tank Corps

Order of battle: Voronezh Front (Army General Nikolai Vatutin)

Army Commander Note Corps Divisions

6th Guards Army i. Tschistjakow 22nd Guards Rifle Corps 61st, 71st & 90th Guards Rifle Division

23rd Guards Rifle Corps 51st & 52nd Guards Rifle Division & 375th Rifle Division

Independent 89th Guards Rifle Division

7th Guards Army M. Schumilow 24th Guards Rifle Corps 15th, 36th & 72nd Guards Rifle Division

25th Guards Rifle Corps 73rd, 78th & 81st Guards Rifle Division

Independent 213th Rifle Division

40th Army K. Moskalenko 47th Rifle Corps 161st, 206th & 237th Rifle Division

52nd Rifle Corps 100th, 219th & 309th Rifle Division

69th Army W. Krutschenkin 48th Rifle Corps 107th, 183rd & 307th Rifle Division

49th Rifle Corps 111th & 270th Rifle Division

1st Guards Tank Army M. Katukov 6th Tank Corps

31st Tank Corps

3rd Mechanized Corps

Front Assets 35th Guards Rifle Corps 92nd,93rd & 94th Guards Rifle Division

Independent 2nd & 3rd Guards Tank Corps

Battle of Kursk 7

Order of battle: Steppe Front (Ivan Konev)

Army Commander Note Corps Divisions

5th Guards Army A. Zhadov 32nd Guards RifleCorps

13th % 66th Guards Rifle Division 6th Airborne Guards Rifle Division

33rd Guards Rifle Corps 95th & 97nd Guards Rifle Division & 9th Airborne Guards RifleDivision

Independent 42nd Guards Rifle Division & 10th Tank Corps

5th Guards TankArmy

P.Rotmistrov 5th Guards Rifle Corps

29th Tank Corps

Strengths, as tallied by David M. Glantz and Karl-Heinz Frieser

Germanoffensive phase

(Zitadelle)

Men Tanks Guns

Soviet Ratio German Soviet Ratio German Soviet Ratio German

Frieser[18] 1,426,352 2.8:1 518,271 4,938[19] 2:1 2.465 31,415 4:1 7,417

Glantz[20] 1,910,361 2.5:1 780,900 5,128 1.7:1 2,928

For their attack, the Wehrmacht used three armies and a large proportion of their tanks on the eastern front. The 9thArmy in the north had 335,000 men (223,000 combat troops), the 4th Panzer Army had 223,907 men (149,271) andArmy detachment Kempf had 100,000 men (66,000) for a grand total of 778,907 men (518,271).The Red Army used two Fronts (Army groups) for the defence and one Front as a reserve. The Central and VoronezhFronts fielded 12 armies. Central Front had 711,575 men (510,983 combat troops), Voronezh Front had 625,591 men(446,236) and Steppe Front had 573,195 men (449,133) for a grand total of 1,910,361 (1,426,352).

Strengths, as tallied by David M. Glantz and Karl-Heinz Frieser

Soviet offensive phase Men Tanks Guns

Soviet Ratio German Soviet Ratio German Soviet Ratio German

Frieser[1] 1,987,463 3.2:1 625,271 8,200 3:1 2,699[2] 47,416 5:1 9,467

Glantz[3] 2,500,000 2.7:1 940,900 7,360[4] 2.3:1 3,253

When the Red Army launched their counteroffensive in the north, the German 2nd Panzer Army was attacked by twoSoviet Fronts: Brijansk and West. The 107,000 men of the 2nd Panzer Army and some reinforcements in the southbrought the Wehrmacht troops to approximately to 950,000 men (approximately 650,000 combat troops). The twoSoviet Fronts brought the Red Army to 2,629,458 men (1,987,463 combat troops).

Battle of Kursk 8

Sub-operations and nomenclature

Battle of Kursk

For Wehrmacht's OKH, the Battle of Kursk was a part of the strategic OperationCitadel Offensive (German: Unternehmen Zitadelle).

For Soviet historians the series of operations conducted as part of theSummer–Autumn Campaign of 1943 (1 July – 31 December) include:[1]

• Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation (5–23 July 1943)Orel-Kursk Defensive Operation (5–11 July)Belgorod-Kursk Defensive Operation (5–23 July)Denial air operations over the Kursk Bulge (5–23 July)Air superiority operations in Operation Kutuzov

• Orel Strategic Counter-Offensive Operation (codenamed Operation Kutuzov)(12 July – 18 August 1943)

Volkhov-Orel Offensive Operation (12 July – 18 August)Kromy-Orel Offensive Operation (15 July – 18 August)

Air superiority operations in Operation Rumyantsev• Belgorod–Kharkov Counter-Offensive Offensive Operation (codenamed Operation Rumyantsev) (3–23 August

1943)Belgorod–Bogodukhov Offensive Operation (3–23 August)Belgorod–Khar'kov Offensive Operation (3–23 August)

Battle of Prokhorovka (12 July 1943)Zmiyev Offensive Operation (12–23 August)

The exact definition of the operations varies. The Germans saw it only as the Operation Citadel offensive, while theSoviet and Russian historians continue today to combine Citadel and the subsequent Soviet counter-offensives,Operation Kutuzov and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev, as a single strategic event.

Preliminaries

Ground

Waffen-SS soldiers assemble in preparation forthe attack

It took four months before Hitler allowed Manstein to attack, by whichtime the Germans had added 90 Elefant Panzerjägers (the total numberproduced as such), all 79 flyable Henschel Hs 129 ground attackaircraft,[2] as well as 270 Tigers, late model Panzer Mark-IVs and evena number of captured T-34s.[3] In total, they assembled some 3,000tanks and assault guns, 2,110 aircraft[4] [5] and 435,000 men. It formedone of the greatest concentrations of German fighting power ever puttogether. Even so, Hitler expressed doubts about its adequacy.

By this time, Allied action in Western Europe was beginning to have asignificant impact on German military strength. Although actions inNorth Africa hardly constituted the Red Army's longed-for second front, the operation there did begin to tell on theGermans, and in the last quarter of 1942 and the first half of 1943, 40% of Luftwaffe losses occurred in the battles

over Malta and Tunisia. German air superiority was no longer guaranteed. The Soviet Air Force outnumbered the Luftwaffe and was gaining in technological quality as well. Both air forces possessed very effective ground-attack

Battle of Kursk 9

aircraft types capable of destroying armor: the Soviet Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik and the German Junkers Ju 87G Stuka(Initially Ju 87D-3/5 with a pair of added Bordkanone 37 mm gunpods).[6] [7]

The start date for the offensive had been moved repeatedly as delays in preparation had forced the Germans topostpone the attack. Finally, on 1 July, the orders were issued to attack on 5 July. The following day, MarshalAleksandr Vasilevsky warned the Front commanders (N. F. Vatutin, Konstantin Rokossovsky and I. S. Konev) thatthe long-awaited German offensive would begin sometime between 3 and 6 July. For months, the Soviets had beenreceiving detailed information on the planning of the offensive from the Red Orchestra spy ring (German: RoteKapelle), and the "Lucy Group" espionage organization, whose sources allegedly included officers in HermannGöring's aviation ministry and other parts of the Nazi administration.[8]

Two Tiger tanks and a StuG with infantry

Preliminary fighting started on 4 July 1943 in the south, as 4th PanzerArmy elected to try to take Soviet outposts prior to the main assault on5 July, sacrificing tactical surprise. Nikolai Fyodorovich Vatutin,having received reports that the German offensive was imminent,ordered Voronezh Front to bombard German positions on the night of4 July.[9]

In the afternoon Stuka dive bombers attacked the Soviet front lines onthe north, and then returned to their airfields while the German artilleryopened up to continue the pounding. Kempf's armored spearhead, theIII Panzer Corps, then advanced on the Soviet positions around Zavidovka. At the same time, the GroßdeutschlandDivision attacked Butovo in torrential rain and the 11th Panzer Division took the high ground around Butovo. To thewest of Butovo the going proved tougher for Großdeutschland and the 3rd Panzer Division; they met stiff Sovietresistance and did not secure their objectives until midnight. The II SS Panzer Corps launched preliminary attacks tosecure observation posts and again met with strong resistance, until assault troops equipped with flamethrowerscleared the bunkers and outposts.

At 02:30, the Red Army hit back with an artillery bombardment in the north and south. This barrage by over3,000 guns and mortars expended about half of the artillery ammunition for the entire operation. The goal was todelay and disorganize the German attack. In the northern face, the Central Front artillery fired mostly againstGerman artillery positions and managed to suppress 50 of the 100 German batteries they attacked, resulting in muchweaker German artillery fire on the opening day of the attack. This bombardment disrupted German units and causedthem to attack at different times on 5 July. In the south, the Red Army chose to fire largely against the Germaninfantry and tanks in their assembly areas. This was partially successful in delaying the German attack but causedfew casualties.

Main operations — the northern face

German onslaught

Battle of Kursk 10

Tiger I tanks spearhead the assault in the northernsector

The 9th Army's attack in the north fell far short of its objectives on5 July. The attack sector had been correctly anticipated by the RedArmy Central Front. Attacking on a 45 kilometre wide front, theGermans found themselves trapped in the huge defensive minefieldsand needed engineering units to come up and clear them under artilleryfire. Although a few Goliath and Borgward remote-controlledengineering vehicles were available to clear lanes in the minefields,they were not generally successful. Even when the vehicles clearedmines, they had no on-board marking system to show following tankswhere the cleared lanes were. Red Army units covered the minefieldswith small arms and artillery fire, delaying German engineers clearingmanually; German losses were high.

For example, the German 653rd Heavy Panzerjäger Battalion began the attack with 49 "Ferdinand" (known in theWest as "Elefant") heavy tank destroyers; 37 of them were lost in the minefields before 17:00 on 5 July. Althoughmost of the lost vehicles were mobility kills rather than permanent losses, they were out of action until they could berepaired. They were also easier for Red Army artillery to knock out permanently. However, since the Germans wereadvancing, any repairable vehicles could be recovered, repaired, and put back into action. After the first day ofattack, the German units penetrated 8 km deep into the Russian lines for the loss of 1,287 killed and missing and5,921 wounded.[10]

The Germans noted a fundamental flaw in their armored vehicles, particularly the Elefant. Although excellentagainst any Soviet tank at long to medium range, they lacked secondary armament and were vulnerable to attacksfrom Soviet slit trenches, once they were separated from the heavy machine gun protection of the lighter tanks,vehicles and infantry. Guderian noted in his diary:

Once they had broken through into the enemy's infantry zone they literally had to go quail-shooting withcannons. They did not manage to neutralise, let alone destroy, the enemy's rifle and machine guns, so that ourown infantry was unable to follow up behind them. By the time they reached the Soviet artillery they were ontheir own.[11]

On the second day, the Central Front under Rokossovsky started a counter-attack against the German 9th Army,particularly the XLVI Tank Corps. The Red Army attacked with the 2nd Tank Army and the XIX Tank Corps, butthis operational counter-attack was launched too early.[10] Soviet tanks sustained heavy losses in their first combatwith Tiger tanks of 505th Heavy Tank Battalion. The 107th and 164th Tank Brigade lost 69 tanks and the Sovietattack was stopped.[12] After the encounter with German Tigers, Rokossovsky decided to dig in most of his tanks anduse them as static anti-tank guns.[13]

The next two days of the attack saw heavy fighting around the strong point of Ponyri (on the Orel–Kursk railway),which was one of the most fortified positions in the northern sector. Both sides saw this area as a vital point; a veryintense battle took place. The German tanks were awaited by 70 antitank guns per km.[14] On 7 July the 86th and292nd German Infantry Divisions attacked Ponyri and captured the town after intense house to house fighting. TheSoviets counter-attacked and forced the German troops to withdraw temporarily; many counter-attacks by both sidesfollowed and the town changed hands many times. Not before the evening of 8 July did the German units capturemost of the town. The heavy Ferdinands were called into action to take Hill 253.5 and succeeded on 9 July. Itdeveloped into a battle of attrition with heavy casualties for both sides; Keegan called Ponyri "the newDouaumont".[15] German units were exhausted, while Russian reserves were committed.Model decided to pause to rearrange his units.[16] On 10 July, he renewed his attack with additional air support, buthis gains were minor. Fresh Soviet formations repelled German attacks and only limited penetrations were achieved;the diary of the 9th Army describes the heavy fighting as a "new type of mobile attrition battle".[17] Model canceledthe new attack.

Battle of Kursk 11

The cancellation of the attack changed German plans; Model accepted that his forces did not have enough power toadvance directly through the Soviet strongpoints. He decided to bypass the heights of Ol'chovatka and shift theschwerpunkt to XLVI Panzer Corps. He also decided to use the uncommitted 12th Panzer Division. For the first timein the northern sector, a heavy concentration of tanks was planned. Model's hesitation to use the concept ofconcentration, which is described as the decisive element of an armored attack,[18] led to a slow advance of the9th Army. Because of the limited action of the tank units, only 63 tanks and assault guns were written off by12 July.[19]

Soviet formations, including the 3rd Tank Army and the 11th Guards Army, attacked the German 2nd Panzer Army,positioned in the rear of 9th Army. The outnumbered 2nd Panzer Army had trouble with the Soviet attack. Sovietformations made a deep penetration and threatened German supply routes. With their advance on Orel theencirclement of the 9th Army was possible.[19] [20]

The end of Zitadelle in the northThe 9th Army had to withdraw and used an opportunity created for them by the Luftwaffe. Their part in theoffensive was over. Because the German armor was not concentrated and used with the same intensity as in thesouth, the German armor losses were comparatively light — 143 vehicles were total losses between 5 and14 July.[21] Central Front losses were 526 tanks.[22] This failed to keep up with the steady influx of new soldiers andmatériel arriving for the Red Army. Few Red Army guns were captured and those Red Army units that retreated didso on orders. The German attack failed to break through the main Soviet defence zones, and stalled. The Sovietcounter-offensive compelled Model to withdraw or risk the destruction of both German Armies.[23]

Northern analysis

A number of factors explain the 9th Army's lack of progress, mainly the combination of Soviet defensive planningand German lack of concentration of force. German armor was committed piecemeal rather than in strength andoften without sufficient infantry support.[24] Soviet defensive preparation was also a major factor. The Central Frontunder Marshal Rokossovsky had correctly anticipated the likely areas of German attack and had fortified those areasvery heavily, holding other areas more thinly. The 13th Army, which bore the brunt of the German attack, was farstronger in men and anti-tank guns than the other Central Front units and held the strongest defensive positions in thesalient.Model's army had fewer tanks than Manstein had in the south and the German 9th Army committed major unitspiecemeal because Model was afraid of the Bryansk Front, which stood ready for counterattack to the north of hisarmy. Model decided to place his most powerful corps, Gruppe Esebeck (2 Pz. Div and 10 Pz. Gren. Div), far behindthe frontline to use it as "fire brigade" against a possible onslaught by the Bryansk Front. Model's decision not to usehis Panzer divisions as a concentrated force can be seen as the most significant reason for the poor penetration of thenorthern pincer.[25] Finally, the 9th Army led with reinforced infantry divisions that were already in the line facingthe Red Army, rather than attacking with uncommitted units.Review of attack frontages and depth of German penetration clearly shows the success of the Red Army defensivetactics. While it began with a 45 km wide attack front on 5 July, the next day the German 9th Army's front wasreduced to 40 km. This dropped to 15 km wide by 7 July and to only 2 km on 8–9 July. Each day, the depth of theGerman advance slowed: 5 km on the first day, 4 on the second, never more than 2 km each succeeding day. By10 July the 9th Army had been stopped.[26]

Much of the Soviet defensive success is attributable to its method of fire control, known to the Germans as Pakfront.This relied upon a group of 10 or more anti-tank guns under a commander, which would fire at one target at a time.These positions were protected with heavy concentrations of mortar and machine gun nests, which were ordered tofire on German infantry only.[27]

Battle of Kursk 12

Main operations — the southern face

German attack

A Waffen-SS Tiger I engages enemy armor. TheTiger's advanced optics and accurate main gun

allowed it to hit targets at long range.

Von Manstein's troops in the south were better equipped than Model'sin the north. The 4th Panzer Army and Army Group Kempf had1,377 tanks and assault guns while the 9th Army possessed 988 tanksand assault guns.[28] The 1,377 tanks included 102 Tiger I tanks and200 Panthers.

The 4th Panzer Army (Hoth) attacked in two directions with the 48thPanzer Corps and the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. The flanks of thespearheads were protected by the 52nd Corps on the left and by ArmyGroup Kempf on the right. The XLVIII Tank Corps was to be the leadspearhead so they were reinforced with 200 Panthers. Their opponentwas the Voronezh Front.

At 04:00 the attack began; nearly all units advanced with good speed despite encountering well prepared defensivepositions and minefields. Manstein's tanks were much more successful than their northern counterparts. The mainreason for this was his better use of tanks in concentrated spearheads.[28] In the south the Red Army had not beenable to pinpoint the German attack sectors; this forced them to spread out their defenses evenly. Three of the fourarmies of the Voronezh Front had about 10 antitank guns per kilometre of front, whereas in the Central Front, gunswere distributed twice as heavily in the active sectors. The Voronezh Front made the decision to hold the tacticalzone thinly, leaving a higher proportion of units in deeper positions than in the Central Front. The Voronezh Frontwas weaker than the Central Front, and it faced much stronger German forces.

The crew of a PzKpfw III tank assigned to the2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich, resting after

heavy fighting in the southern sector.

The new Panther tanks proved unreliable and failed to perform toexpectations. When they moved to their assembly areas, 45 out of 200new tanks experienced mechanical problems requiring repair.[29] Whenthe remaining Panthers launched their attack, they immediately ran intoa minefield and many were immobilised.

In the first two days the 2nd SS Panzer Corps penetrated 25 km intothe Russian lines and took Jakovlevo. The 200 Panthers of the 48thTank Corps to their left spent more time in the workshops than fightingthe enemy. Army Group Kempf, which was to assist the 2nd SS PanzerCorps, was outnumbered and had problems crossing the Donets River.The steady progress of the German units forced the Russian leaders to

commit some of their strategic reserves, as nearly all operational reserves were in action. The Steppe Front had beenformed in the months leading up to the operation as a central reserve. As early as 6 July, Stavka decided to send the2nd and 10th Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army to the southern sector; a day later, other formations gottheir marching orders. Vatutin planned an operational counterstrike against the German units but decided to cancel itafter the failure of the northern counter-attack. Instead of seeking open battle against the German tanks, Vatutin lethis tanks dig in, as Rokossovsky did in the north.[30] Zhukov protested against this use of the tanks but Vatutin'sdecision stood.

German officers reported that they were slowed down by the "silent tanks" (Schweigepanzer), because it cost muchtime to overcome these camouflaged "bases".[31] Despite the order to dig in many of their tanks, the Soviet units stillhad enough tanks to launch some counterattacks. On 7 July a German Tiger I commanded by SS UnterscharführerFranz Staudegger met a group of about 50 T-34s. In the ensuing battle, Staudegger knocked out 22 T-34s; he was thefirst Tiger commander to be awarded the first Knight's Cross.[32]

Battle of Kursk 13

The Germans' advance was slowed. On the 9 July the first German units reached the Psel River. The next day thefirst infantry units crossed the Psel. By 10 July German units in the south had lost 166 tanks. Despite the deepdefensive system and minefields, German tank losses were remarkably low.[33] The 11th of July was a successfulday for German units; Army Group Kempf achieved a breakthrough and its 3rd Panzer Corps (6th, 7th and 19thPanzer Divisions) penetrated deep into Russian lines. The next night the 6th Panzer Division took a bridge over theDonets with a swift surprise attack.[34] The 3rd Panzer Corps then advanced to Prokhorovka from the south and the2nd SS Panzer Corps from the west, almost trapping the Russian 69th Army. At this moment Manstein thought thefinal breakthrough was achieved and now free of the minefields, could operate freely and destroy the Russianarmored reserves in the open.[35] The Russians, indeed, began moving their tank reserves toward the spearheads ofArmy Group South.

Prokhorovka

Accounts of this battle are controversial. The original Soviet account of a brave but reckless, although ultimatelysuccessful, massive Red Army assault on heavy German armor is now generally discounted; the most recentrevisionist accounts suggest a Soviet debacle, with the Soviet charge on German armor being disrupted not byGerman tanks but because many T-34s fell into a Soviet anti-tank ditch.[36]

What is generally not disputed is that the Red Army did enough, at great cost, to stop a German breakthrough. In thatsense Prokhorovka remains a crucial turning point of the battle and indeed of the Great Patriotic War: here theGerman army was stopped.

Memorial on Prokhorovka Field

On the morning of 12 July, Hoth, determined to push for a breakthrough,collected reserves of the 4th Panzer Army and advanced on Prokhorovka. At thesame time the 5th Guards Tank Army launched a series of attacks as part ofmulti-front counteroffensive in an attempt to catch the Germans off balance. TheSS and Guards units collided west of Prokhorovka in country punctuated byfarms, rolling hills and gullies.

In stifling heat, an eight-hour battle began. The German units had 494 tanks andself-propelled artillery pieces in the attack, 90% of them operational.[37] TheGerman force found itself heavily outnumbered by the 5th Guards Tank Army,who, moving mainly at night, had brought 593 tanks and 37 self-propelledartillery pieces into position at Stary Oskol.[38] They had not yet been committedto battle, so they were fresh.

The Soviet 31st Guards Tank Corps and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps fought the3rd SS Totenkopf to a standstill by getting in close to the German armor and attacking the vulnerable sides of theTigers. The 2nd SS was soon forced onto the defensive. Although the German formation held, it lost half its armor ina prolonged engagement. By the night of 11–12 July, the only success the Germans had to show for their losses wasa captured bridgehead over the Donets river at Rzavets. The 1st SS Division Leibstandarte had been stopped by theSoviet 18th Tank Corps, while the 3rd Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Division were checked by the 2nd GuardsTank Corps and two other Soviet reserve corps.[39]

The air battle was also intense. Von Manstein had intended it to be the decisive blow against the Red Army forces toprevent a breakthrough to Oboyan and Kursk. Sturmoviks from 291 ShAD attacked the 2nd SS Panzer Divisionthroughout the day, causing significant damage to German armored formations. Simultaneously, waves of Hs 129sand Ju 87s inflicted losses on the 69th Army and 5th Guards Army. Although Soviet tank losses are unknown, areport from the 29th Tank Corps reported "heavy losses in tanks through enemy aircraft and artillery". Losses wereso heavy that the advance had to be halted and a switch to the defensive ordered.[40]

The Luftwaffe had complete air superiority over Prokhorovka, due to the VVS being concentrated over the flanks ofthe 4th Panzer Army.

Battle of Kursk 14

The battle can best be described as a costly tactical loss but an operational draw for the Red Army. Neither the 5thGuards Tank Army nor the 2nd SS Panzer Corps accomplished their missions that day. After the battle was over, theSoviets held the area and were able to recover their disabled tanks and wounded crews.[41] [42]

Tank losses in the battle have been a contentious subject. Red Army losses have been given from 200 to 822 tanks,but the records show about 300 complete losses and as many damaged. German losses have been reported to be aslow as 80 and as high as several hundred. The Soviets claim the Germans lost 400 tanks in this battle and 3,500soldiers killed,[43] but newer research suggest only about 500 lost men and much lower tank losses, with only a fewtanks completely destroyed and about 40-80 damaged.[44] [45] [46] [47] In any event, the losses of both the 2nd SSPanzer Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army in what has been called the greatest tank battle of all time were not ofthe epic proportions sometimes attributed to the Prokorovka engagement.

The end of Zitadelle in the southWhile the German offensive had been stopped in the north by 10 July, in the south the overall situation still hung inthe balance, even after 12 July. German forces on the southern wing, exhausted and heavily depleted, had breachedthe first two defensive belts and believed that they were about to break through the last belt. In fact at least five moredefensive zones awaited them, although they were not as strong as the initial belts, and some of them did not havetroops deployed. Red Army defenders had been weakened, and major parts of their reserve forces had beencommitted. Still, the available uncommitted Red Army reserves were far larger than the few available Germanreserves.On 16 July, German forces withdrew to their start line. Severely depleted, the Germans then had to face OperationPolkovodets Rumyantsev, an offensive launched to smash the German forces in the Belgorod–Kharkov area on3 August. Belgorod fell on 5 August, and on 23 August, Kharkov fell, despite fierce resistance from German forces.With the capture of Kharkov, the Soviets considered the Battle of Kursk over.[48]

Southern analysis

The German forces made steady progress, but, as in the north, attack frontage width and penetration depth tended todrop as the attack proceeded. The trend was not as marked as in the north, however. A 30 km wide attack frontage on5 July became 20 km wide by 7 July and 15 km by 9 July. Likewise, the depth of penetration dropped from 9 km on5 July to 5 km on 8 July and 2–3 km each day thereafter until the attack was cancelled.Red Army minefields and artillery were successful in delaying the German attack and inflicting losses. The ability ofdug-in Red Army units to delay the Germans allowed their own reserves to be brought up into threatened sectors.Over 90,000 additional mines were laid during the operations by small mobile groups of engineers, generallyworking at night immediately in front of the expected German attack areas. There were no large-scale captures ofprisoners nor any great loss of artillery, indicating that Soviet units were giving ground in good order.German losses can be seen in the example of the Großdeutschland Division, which began the operation with118 tanks. On 10 July, after five days of fighting, the division reported it had 3 Tigers, 6 Panthers, and 11 Pzkw-IIIand Pzkw-IV tanks operational. XLVIII Panzer Corps reported, overall, 38 Panthers operational with 131 awaitingrepair, out of the 200 it started with on 5 July.

Hitler cancels the operationOn the night of 9–10 July, the Western Allies mounted an amphibious invasion of Sicily. Three days later, Hitler summoned Günther von Kluge and Erich von Manstein to his Wolfsschanze headquarters in East Prussia and declared his intention to "temporarily" call off Operation Zitadelle. Von Manstein attempted to dissuade him, arguing that Zitadelle was on the brink of victory: "on no account should we let go of the enemy until the mobile reserves which he had committed were decisively beaten". In an unusual reversal of their roles, Hitler gave von Manstein a few more days to continue the offensive, but on 17 July, he ordered a withdrawal and canceled the

Battle of Kursk 15

operation. He then ordered the entire SS Panzer Corps to be transferred to Italy.[49]

Hitler's decision to call off the operation at the height of the tactical battle has since been strongly criticized byGerman generals in their memoirs,[50] and by some historians.[51] For example, it has been pointed out that theSS Panzer Corps would have taken three months to be transferred to Sicily, and thus could not possibly have affectedthe outcome there, while its contribution to the Kursk operation was vital.[52]

Only one German division, the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, departed for Italy, without theirequipment. The remainder stayed to face the Red Army counteroffensive launched in the wake of the failed Germanoffensive.

Reasons for the failure of Zitadelle

Historian Karl-Heinz Frieser points out these reasons for the failure of Operation Zitadelle:• The Soviets had numerical superiority. Frieser points out that the biggest problem of the OKW was the shortage

of infantry. The OKH had no operational reserve while the Red Army could field an entire front (Steppe Front) asreserve. That the Red Army had more tanks than the Wehrmacht had less influence on the outcome according toFrieser.[53] [54] [55]

• Repeated delays by Hitler gave the Red Army enough time to fortify the bulge around Kursk to an enormousfortress. High officers like Manstein and Zeitzler pushed for a fast attack to catch the Red Army unprepared andlow on morale after the third battle of Kharkov. The overlap with the Allied invasion of Sicily made Hitler's datefor the attack the "most adverse possible".[56]

Military historian and Soviet military expert David Glantz draws these conclusions:• The German defeat at Kursk did not come about by the "often-exaggerated numerical superiority" of the Soviet

armed forces. The principal factor at Kursk was the revolution in Soviet command, staff, operational and tacticaltechniques. The General Staff had learned lessons from previous battles and disseminated "war experience" basedon "exhaustive" analysis of battles, operations and campaigns. These lessons were added to Soviet doctrine(Soviet deep battle), producing new procedures.[57] Glantz and House have asserted the tank strength was even,between 1:1 and 1.5:1 in the Soviets' favour.[58]

• The Soviets introduced new operational and tactical techniques, and had solved many of the problems ofintegrating arms and services into "a true combined arms operation". He emphasises "sophisticated understandingof intelligence, deception, and anti-tank defence". Similar improvements were made in the combined use ofartillery, tanks, engineers, and infantry to break German defences on a narrow front. At Prokhorovka and in theKutuzov operations, the Red Army gained experience with mobile armored formations and mechanized corps thatbecame the hallmark of Soviet deep operations. These formations demonstrated their ability to match the bestefforts of the German Panzer force. Operations still needed to be perfected to reduce huge casualties.Nevertheless, the German command recognised that at Kursk they faced an entirely new and more competent RedArmy.[57] [59]

• Defensive tactics had improved. Skillful use of anti-tank artillery in strong points and the use of separate tankbrigades, tank regiments and self-propelled gun units to support them offered mobile defence support. These unitsparticipated in wearing down tactical attacks against enemy spearheads. The transitional year of 1943 wasdecisive for the Soviet war effort. Operational and tactical techniques tested and smoothed out in 1943 would berefined further and perfected in 1944 and 1945. "The elementary education the Red Army received in 1941–42gave way to the secondary education of 1943. In 1944 and 1945 the Soviets would accomplish university-leveland graduate study in the conduct of war".[60]

Military expert Steven Zaloga offers these insights about the Red Army at Kursk:• The popular perception of Soviet victory "by numbers" was a myth created by German generals in their memoirs

written in the 1950s. He rejects the caricature of the Red Army relying on mass rather than tactical skill, but

Battle of Kursk 16

accepts that at the tactical end (the platoon and company level), the Red Army was not particularly impressiveand received significantly poorer training.[61] Zaloga points out that there were still many tactical lessons to belearned; however by 1943 the gap between Soviet and German tanker training had "narrowed greatly", and theSoviets were soon at a comparable level with the Germans.[62]

• The Soviets, in terms of operational art, were adept at using mobile tank formations.[62] Zaloga asserts that Sovietoperational methods were superior, allowing Soviet field commanders to bluff, baffle and overwhelm theiropponents.[63]

Historian Richard Overy makes the following interpretations:• The quality of the two air forces were even. The Soviets had introduced air-to-ground communications, radar, a

proper maintenance system, and depots for forward fuel reserves. This allowed aircraft to fly twenty missions inthe heat of the battle (while the Luftwaffe suffered shortages).[64] [65]

• The Soviet tanks were not inferior in quality. Although the T-34 model (with its 76 mm main gun) was out-rangedby German Tiger I and Panther tanks, it was faster and more manoeuvrable than the Tiger and the latter had toomany mechanical difficulties[66] at the Battle of Prokhorovka. To counter the Tiger tank, the Soviets used theirtanks in a "hand-to-hand" combat role. Crews were ordered to close the range so that it would not become anissue.[67] According to Glantz and House the Soviet tanks pressed home their initial attacks despite significantGerman advantages: the range of the German tanks' 88mm gun, German air superiority, and attacking a welldug-in enemy while covering flat rolling terrain. Even so, the loss ratio was less than 2:1, 320 German and 400Soviet AFVs.[7]

Sir Harry Hinsley, a WWII historian who worked at Bletchley Park during the war, has said:• Information decrypted by Ultra was given to the Russians, which helped them prepare for the offensive. The

Russians had a spy at Bletchley Park, who was giving them decrypts of German Military communications.Hinsley said that some speculate that without Ultra, Germany would have won at Kursk, and "Hitler could havecarved up Russia". Ultra decrypts were also given to the Russians concerning German plans for Stalingrad.[68]

Soviet counterattacks

In the north: Operation KutuzovOperation Kutuzov was launched on 12 July against the southern wing of Army Group Centre. The counterattackwas launched before the Germans had stopped their attack, so Operation Kutuzov had a bigger effect on the outcomeof Zitadelle when compared to the southern counterattack, which was launched after the cancellation of Zitadelle.The Bryansk Front (commanded by Markian Popov) and parts of the Western Front (commanded by VasilySokolovsky) attacked the largely undefended German north flank of the 2nd Panzer Army on 12 July. The2nd Panzer Army was diminished as many tanks were transferred to other armies before Zitadelle. On 12 July theattacking forces numbered 487,111 combat troops supported by 1,401 tanks and 15,109 guns.[69] Three days later thesecond phase of Operation Kutuzov started with the attack of the German 9th Army by several Russian armies. Thecombined troops deployed for Kutuzov now numbered 1,286,049 men supported by 2,409 tanks and 26,379 guns.[70]

The operations of the Bryansk Front marked the beginning of the Russian summer offensive. The artillery barragewas heavy and the first German lines were overrun. German defensive lines were deeper than expected and manyRussian spearheads were slowed and sustained heavy casualties,[71] but in some areas the Russian units achieveddeep penetrations.[72] The Germans lacked reserves to block these penetrations, so the situation became verydangerous for the 2nd Panzer Army.[72] On 13 July Army Group Centre gave command of the 2nd Panzer Army toModel, who already commanded the German 9th Army. Model now was in control of all German units in the Orelarea.

Battle of Kursk 17

The situation for the Germans worsened as Russian breakthroughs threatened the entire 9th Army. Model sent nearlyall of his Panzer units to aid the 2nd Panzer Army whose northern front was about to collapse, while the 4th Army inthe north sent the 253rd Infantry Division. German units achieved a temporary stabilization of the front butmeanwhile the 9th Army started to withdraw from the captured ground. Initially, the Russian Central Front followedhesitantly, but then started attacking in earnest with heavy air support.[72] On 18 July the 9th Army was at the sameposition as on 5 July, before the start of Zitadelle.Russian tank formations failed to achieve an operational breakthrough despite their numerical superiority.[73] RedArmy tank armies repeated their attacks against the same positions with the same methods and suffered heavycasualties in men and tanks. For example, the 4th Tank Army lost 84% of their T-34s and 46% of their light tankswithin a few days.[74] After two weeks of fighting the 3rd Guards Tank Army had lost half of their 800 tanks.[74] TheGerman armies conducted a fighting withdrawal to Hagen-Stellung.[75]

Organized by the Red Army, approximately 100,000 partisans supported the Russian operations.[76] Germanmovements were hampered by partisans disrupting German supply routes, especially railway lines. On 3 Augustpartisans launched a large operation against the German rear, the so called "Railway-war".By shortening their line the Wehrmacht freed 19 divisions, which could be used elsewhere or held as reserves.[75]

Nevertheless, the Soviets achieved a complete breakthrough. The Soviets massed a concentration of artillery andtanks on small narrow fronts and used sophisticated artillery techniques to defeat German fortified positions despitetenacious German defences. Operation Kutuzov "was a perfect example of the newly sophisticated Soviet way ofwar".[77] On 5 August the 3rd Guards Tank Army entered Orel and by 18 August, the Bryansk Front had reached thecity Bryansk, "completely eliminating the German salient in the region".[77]

The battle was the bloodiest of the three major operations during the Battle of Kursk. The German overall losseswere 86,064 men;[75] the Red Army lost 112,529 men and 317,361 were wounded.[78] The losses for the Red Armywere particularly high for tanks and assault guns: 2,586 of them were written off during Kutuzov.[79] German tanklosses are not available for this battle, but Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Center) lost 343 during both Zitadelleand Kutuzov.[75]

Some of the Soviet commanders were displeased, complaining that an even greater victory might have been won.Marshal Rokossovsky said, "Instead of encircling the enemy, we only pushed them out of the bulge... The operationwould have been different if we had used our force for two heavy punches which met at Bryansk". Zhukov held asimilar opinion.[80] Stalin instead thought encirclement tactics could wait: "It is our task to push them from ourterritory. We can trap them when they are weaker".[80]

In the south: Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev

Southern sector of the Battle of Kursk.

To the south the Red Army needed time to regroup after the lossessustained in July, and could not launch another offensive until3 August, when Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev commenced.Stavka planned Operation Rumyantsev as the major thrust of theirsummer offensive. The aim was to destroy Manstein's 4th Panzer Armyand Army Group Kempf and later the southern wing of HeeresgruppeSüd (Army Group South). The German 1st Tank Army and newlyformed 6th Army were to be trapped by an advance to the BlackSea.[81] The Russian Southern Front and the Southwestern Frontattacked as early as 17 July.

The Voronezh Front and the Steppe Front deployed about 1,144,000 men[82] supported by 2,418 tanks[83] and 13,633 guns and rocket launchers[83] for the attack. At the start of "Rumyantsev" the Germans fielded only 237 tanks and assault guns. Manstein believed that the Soviets were incapable of launching an offensive in the southern sector,

Battle of Kursk 18

and dispatched his reserves (II SS Panzer Corps, XXIV Corps and XXXXVIII Panzer Corps) southward to deal withSoviet offensives aimed at the Dnieper and Mius Rivers. The Soviet operations in those regions were actuallycarefully planned diversion operations. The Soviet plan worked; German reserves were removed from the criticalKharkov axis (conforming to Maskirovka: military deception).[77] The tactical operations across the Mius wereunsuccessful, but achieved their primary aim of diverting German forces further away from Kharkov, although bySoviet accounts, the Stavka had wished for more.[84]

For the Kharkov offensive the Red Army focused enormous firepower on a 30 km front. The 5th and 6th GuardsArmies, two elements that had borne the brunt of the German offensive, and the Soviet 53rd Army took part. Theartillery concentration was necessary to puncture the first five German defence lines between Kursk and Kharkov.The 1st Tank Army and 5th Guards Army, supported by two additional mobile corps, would act as a mobileoperational unit to encircle Kharkov from the north and west. To the west, four separate tank corps would supportthe 27th and 40th Armies would make supporting attacks. To the east and south-east, the 69th and 7th GuardsArmies, followed by the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front, would also support the attack.[85]

On 3 August the initial attack demonstrated the growing sophistication of Soviet tactical art. Heavy and long-rangeartillery bombarded German positions, supported by anti-tank shock groups, ready to repel counter attacks. TheGerman defence was tenacious, and two tank armies had to enter the battle to secure a penetration. By 5 August theSoviets had broken deep into the German rear and captured Belgorod, advancing some 60 km into German lines.Each combined-arms army pressed the German defences from the north and east.[86]

German reserves were rushed from the Orel sector and north from the Donbas regions (where Soviet maskirovkaoperations had diverted them) and tried to break up Soviet attacks. The only success was achieved by theGrossdeutschland Panzergrenadier Division, which succeeded in delaying the 40th Army from 6–7 August. Fourinfantry divisions and seven Panzer and motorised divisions were assembled under the III Panzer Corps. Mansteintried to repeat the success of the Third Battle of Kharkov, where the Soviets had been over-extended and defeated.This time the Soviets were alert to the danger, and it was the German forces that were worn down.[87] On 12 August,units of the newly arrived 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich and 3rd SS Panzergrenadier DivisionTotenkopf started a counterattack against two Soviet Armies near Bogodukhov, 30 km northwest of Kharkov. TheWaffen-SS units trapped and annihilated many Soviet units during the following maneuver battles. To assist the6th Guards Army and the 1st Tank Army, the 5th Guards Tank Army joined the battles. All three Soviet armiessuffered heavily and the tank armies lost more than 800 of their initial 1,112 tanks.[88] [89] After the counterattack ofthe two German divisions, the Soviet tank armies were no longer capable of offensive actions.[89] The Sovietadvance around Bogodukhov was stopped so the German units now tried to close the gap between Achtryrka andKrasnokutsk. The counterattack started on 18 August and on 20 August Totenkopf and Großdeutschland met behindthe Soviet units.[88] Parts of two Soviet armies and two tank corps were trapped, but the trapped units heavilyoutnumbered the German units. Many Soviet units were able to break out while suffering heavy casualties.[88] [90]

After this setback the Soviet troops focused on Kharkov and captured it after heavy fighting on 23 August. The battleis usually referred to as the Fourth Battle of Kharkov by the Germans and the Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operationby the Soviets.[91]

Soviet casualties in the Belgorod–Kharkov sector during this operation were 71,611 killed and 183,955 wounded;1,864 tanks and 423 artillery guns were lost.[78]

German losses were 10,000 killed and 20,000 wounded. German tank losses are estimated at least 8 times lower thanSoviet tank losses of 1,864.[92]

Battle of Kursk 19

Results

The battlefield grave of Heinz Kühl,a German soldier. The Third Reich

did not recover from the lossessustained at Kursk and found itself ina strategic retreat for the remainder

of the campaign in the east.

The campaign was a decisive Soviet success. For the first time, a major Germanoffensive had been stopped before achieving a breakthrough. The Germans,despite using more technologically advanced armor than in previous years, wereunable to break through the in-depth defenses of the Red Army, and weresurprised by the significant operational reserves of the Red Army. This was anoutcome that few had predicted, and it changed the pattern of operations on theEastern Front. The victory had not been cheap; the Red Army, althoughpreventing the Germans from achieving their goals, lost considerably more menand matériel than the Wehrmacht.

With the failure of Zitadelle we have suffered a decisive defeat. Thearmoured formations, reformed and re-equipped with so much effort, hadlost heavily in both men and equipment and would now be unemployablefor a long time to come. It was problematical whether they could berehabilitated in time to defend the Eastern Front... Needless to say theRussians exploited their victory to the full. There were to be no moreperiods of quiet on the Eastern Front. From now on, the enemy was inundisputed possession of the initiative.[93] — Heinz Guderian

Prokhorovka Cathedral on the formerbattlefield commemorates the Red

Army losses and victory.

From this point on, a new pattern emerged. The initiative had firmly passed tothe Red Army, while the Germans spent the rest of the war reacting rather thanattacking. A new front had opened in Italy, diverting some of Germany'sresources and attention.[48] Both sides had their losses, but only the Soviets hadthe manpower and the industrial production to recover fully. The Germans neverregained the initiative after Kursk and never again launched a major offensive inthe East.

The loss convinced Hitler of the incompetence of his General Staff. Hisinterference in military matters progressively increased, so that by the end of thewar he was involved in tactical decisions. The German Army went from loss toloss as Hitler attempted personally to micromanage the day-to-day operations ofwhat soon became a three-front war. The opposite was true for Stalin. Afterseeing Stavka's planning justified on the battlefield, he trusted his advisors more,and stepped back from operational planning, only rarely overruling militarydecisions. The Red Army gained more freedom and became more and more fluidas the war continued.

Battle of Kursk 20

Casualties

German

According to German historian Karl-Heinz Frieser, who interpreted German archives, the Wehrmacht suffered54,182 casualties in total during Operation Citadel (4–16 July). Of these 9,036 personnel were killed in action,another 1,960 were reported missing in action, and 43,159 wounded in action. The German 9th Army (under thecommand of Army Group Centre) suffered 23,345 casualties while Army Group South suffered 30,837 casualties.[94]

For Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev Frieser states between 1–20 August, the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS unitssuffered 25,068 casualties, including 8,933 killed and missing. For Rumyantzev he estimated ~30,000 men lost with10,000 killed and missing. For Operation Kutuzov Frieser gives 86,064 casualties with 14,215 killed, 11,300 missingand 60,549 wounded.[95] Total casualties for the Battle of Kursk were ~170,000 men.According to Frieser, the Wehrmacht lost 252 tanks and assault guns during Operation Zitadelle (until 20 July).Army Group South admitted losses of 161 tanks and 14 assault guns by 16 July. The German Ninth Army reportedthe loss of 41 tanks and 17 assault guns up to and including the 14 July. Among these were ten Tiger tanks, 42Panther and 19 "Ferdinand" or "Elefant" heavy tank destroyers. Other losses included 109 Panzer IVs, 38 PanzerIIIs, 3 flame tanks and 31 assault guns.[96]

The number of lost tanks for Zitadelle and the Soviet counter offensives is hard to establish. Frieser gives the numberof 1,331 tanks destroyed for the entire Eastern Front for July and August. Frieser estimates the number of tanksdestroyed during the Battle of Kursk as 760. Frieser explains that many of these tanks were beyond repair andabandoned.[95]

David Glantz gives a total of 49,822 casualties.[97] Glantz asserts German losses during the Soviet counter offensivesare unavailable.[98]

Glantz estimates that 1,612 tanks and assault guns were knocked out and/or damaged, of which 323 weredestroyed.[99] Tank losses from counterattacks are uncertain according to Glantz.Aircraft losses, according to Frieser, totaled 524. For Zitadelle (5–20 July) 159 were lost, while 218 were destroyedduring the Soviet Operation Kutuzov and a further 147 during Polkovodets Rumyantsev.[100]

According to Christer Bergström, the Generalquartiermeister der Luftwaffe reported 97 aircraft lost between5–8 July (Fliegerkorps VIII 58 and Luftflotte 6 39). For the period 5–31 July, Generalquartiermeister der Luftwaffegives figures of 681 lost from the two air fleets (335 for Fliegerkorps VIII and 346 for Luftflotte 6). Of this total 420were written off; 192 from Fliegerkorps VIII and 229 from Luftflotte 6.[101]

According to Soviets claims the Red Army smashed thirty German divisions, inflicting the following casualtiesbetween 5 July and 23 August 1943: 500,000 dead, wounded, and captured soldiers; 1,500 tanks and 3,700 planesdestroyed.[102] [103]

Soviet

David Glantz quotes Grigoriy Krivosheyev as the most reliable source. According to Glantz' interpretation ofKrivosheev's work, which interpreted Soviet archives, Soviet losses at Kursk during Citadel (known to the Soviets asthe Kursk strategic defensive operation, 5–20 July) amounted to 177,874 casualties.[104] The Central Front suffered15,336 killed and 18,561 sick or wounded for a total of 33,897 casualties. The Voronezh Front suffered 27,542 killedand 46,350 sick or wounded for a total of 73,892 casualties. The Steppe Front suffered 27,452 killed with 42,606sick or wounded for a total of 70,085 casualties.[105]

Glantz estimates Soviet losses during Operation Kutuzov at 112,529 killed and 317,361 wounded for a total of429,890 casualties;[99] the Western Front as losing 25,585 killed and 76,856 wounded and sick; the Bryansk Frontsuffered 39,173 killed and 123,234 wounded and sick. The Central Front lost 47,771 killed and 117,271 woundedand sick.[99] Total casualties for the "Battle of Kursk" were 863,303 men.

Battle of Kursk 21

The Soviet losses during Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev (3–23 August), according to Glantz and official Sovietsources, were 255,566 casualties, including 71,611 killed and 183,955 wounded. The Voronezh Front lost 48,339killed and 108,954 wounded for a total of 157,293 casualties. The Steppe Front lost 23,272 killed and 75,001wounded for a total of 98,273 casualties.[99] Soviet material losses for Citadel (5–20 July) amounted to 2,586 tanksand Self-propelled artillery out of 3,925 committed to combat (well over 50 percent). Roughly, this was seven timesthe number of German losses. The number of losses in the Polkovodets Rumyantsev operation were also heavy.Glantz quotes Krivosheyev's numbers of 1,864 tanks and self-propelled artillery guns out of 2,439 engaged, wellover 50 percent. The loss ratio was roughly 5:1 in favor of the Germans.[106]

Frieser also supports Krivosheyev's casualty figures for men and armor.[107]

According to Christer Bergström, Red Air Force losses amounted to 677 on the northern flank and 439 on thesouthern flank of the bulge during Citadel. In the north, 5–11 July, Soviet losses amounted to 430 destroyed aircraft.The 2nd Air Army suffered 433 casualties in total in the north during July 1943. Total losses for the 17th Air Armywere 244 during the same period. Other unit casualties are uncertain. Bergström's research indicates total Soviet airlosses were 1,104 between 12 July and 18 August, covering Operations Citadel and Kutuzov.[108]

Notes[1] Glantz (1990), pp. 82–113[2] Bergström 2007, pp. 124–125.[3] Töppel 2002, p. 33–34.[4] Bergström 2007, pp. 123–125.[5] figures from German archives. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Freiburg; Luftfahrtmuseum, Hannover-Laatzen; WASt Deutsche Dienststelle,

Berlin.[6] Bergström 2007, pp. 79–81; 102; 106; 114; 118.[7] The air operation is misunderstood in most accounts. The German Freya radar stations established in Belgorod and Kharkov in 1943 had only

picked up Soviet formations approaching from Belgorod and were not responsible for the failure of the strike.Bergström 2007, pp. 26–27.[8] Mulligan 1987, pp. 236, 254.[9] Clark 1966, p. 329.[10] Frieser 2007, p. 108.[11] Clark 1966, p. 333.[12] Glantz p. 93.[13] Rokossovsky p. 266.[14] Piekalkiewice, Unternehmen Zitadelle, p. 154.[15] Keegan 2006, p. 72.[16] Frieser 2007, p. 110.[17] KTB AOK9 9 July ( Daily war diary of the 9th Army)Frieser 2007, p. 110.[18] Guderian, Achtung-Panzer![19] Frieser 2007, p. 111.[20] Overy 1995, p. 205.[21] Restayn & Moller 2002, pp. 333–336.[22] 651 knocked out tanks, 526 write offs, primary source: CAMO (Ministry of Defence of Russia)Frieser 2007, p. 111.[23] Overy 1995, pp. 204–205.[24] Restayn & Moller 2002, p. 333.[25] Frieser 2007, p. 107.[26] Overy 1995, p. 204.[27] Clark 1966, pp. 331–332.[28] Frieser 2007, p. 112.[29] Frieser 2007, p. 113.[30] Glantz & House, p. 102.[31] Frieser 2007, p. 116.[32] Wendt p.18[33] Geheime Kommandosache[34] Frieser 2007, p. 118.[35] Manstein p. 500[36] Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich at War, London, Allen Lane, 2008, p. 488.

Battle of Kursk 22

[37] Frankson, p. 30.[38] Bergström 2007, p. 77.[39] Healy 1992, pp. 84–87.[40] Bergström 2007, pp. 79–80.[41] Clark 1966, p. 337.[42] Healy 1992, pp. 76–77.[43] "чпеообс мйфетбфхтб -[ чПЕООБС ЙУФПТЙС ]- уБНУПОПЧ б.н. лТБИ ЖБЫЙУФУЛПК БЗТЕУУЙЙ 1939–1945" (http:/ / militera.

lib. ru/ h/ samsonov2/ 11. html). Militera.lib.ru. . Retrieved 2010-08-06.[44] Bergström 2007, p. 81.[45] Dieter Brand Generalmajor a.D : "Vor 60 Jahren: Prochorowka (Teil II)" (http:/ / www. bmlv. gv. at/ omz/ ausgaben/ artikel. php?id=158)[46] Frieser pp. 130, 132.[47] Glantz 1999, p. 275.[48] Taylor & Kulish 1974, p. 171.[49] Clark 1966, pp. 337–38.[50] Manstein, Verlorene Siege p. 504.[51] Engelmann, Zitadelle p. 5.[52] Carell & Osers 1966–1971.[53] Frieser 2007, p. 149.[54] Krivosheev, p. 188–190.[55] Zetterling/Frankson p. 116, 117.[56] Magenheimer, die Militärstrategie Deutschlands 1940–1945 p.244[57] Glantz & House 1995, p. 176.[58] Glantz & House 1995, pp. 149–150.[59] Glantz 1991, pp. 132–133.[60] Glantz 1991, pp. 136–137.[61] Zagola 1989, p. 6.[62] Zagola 1989, p. 18.[63] Zagola 1989, p. 7.[64] Bergström 2007, pp. 48–49.[65] Overy 1995, p. 192.[66] Overy 1995, p. 207.[67] Overy 1995, pp. 207–209.[68] Hinley, Sir Harry (1998 [last update]). "The Influence of ULTRA in the Second World War" (http:/ / www. cl. cam. ac. uk/ research/

security/ Historical/ hinsley. html). cl.cam.ac.uk. . Retrieved 17 November 2011.[69] Koltunov, p. 80.[70] Koltunov, p. 82.[71] Rendulic, Die Schlacht von Orel, p. 134.[72] Frieser 2007, p. 185.[73] Rotmistrov, The Role of Armoured Forces p. 173.[74] Sutov/Ramanicev, p. 277.[75] Frieser 2007, p. 188.[76] Frieser 2007, p. 187, according to Soviet numbers.[77] Glantz & House 1995, p. 168.[78] Glantz & House 1995, p. 297.[79] Krivosheev, p. 278.[80] Zhukov p. 188.[81] Glantz & House p. 241.[82] Krivosheev. p. 190.[83] Koltunov p. 81.[84] Glantz & House 1995, p. 352.[85] Glantz & House 1995, pp. 168–169.[86] Glantz & House 1995, p. 169.[87] Glantz & House 1995, pp. 169–170.[88] Frieser 2007, p. 196.[89] Glantz & House 2004, p. 249.[90] Glantz & House 2004, p. 251.[91] Glantz & House 1995, p. 70.[92] Frieser 2007, p. 199.[93] Bergström 2007, p. 121.

Battle of Kursk 23

[94] Frieser 2007, p. 154.[95] Frieser 2007, p. 202.[96] Frieser 2007, p. 151.[97] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 338.[98] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 345.[99] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 276.[100] Frieser 2007, p. 204.[101] Bergström 2008, p. 120.[102] "Основные операции Советских Вооруженных Сил в ВОВ, начавшиеся в 1943 году" (http:/ / militarymaps. narod. ru/ oper_1943.

html#14). MilitaryMaps.narod.ru. . Retrieved 2010-08-06.[103] Пигарев Ростислав Владимирович. "Курская Битва" (http:/ / www. biograph-soldat. ru/ OPER/ ARTICLES/ 021-kursk. htm).

Biograph-soldat.ru. . Retrieved 2010-08-06.[104] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 274.[105] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 275.[106] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, pp. 276–277.[107] Frieser 2007, pp. 150, 200 onward.[108] Bergström 2008, p. 121.

Citations

References• Bergström, Christer (2007). Kursk — The Air Battle: July 1943. Hersham: Chervron/Ian Allen.

ISBN 978-1-903223-88-8.• Bergström, Christer (2008). Bagration to Berlin — The Final Air Battle in the East: 1941–1945. Burgess Hill:

Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN 978-1-903223-91-8.• Carell, Paul; Osers, Ewald (1966–1971). Hitler's War on Russia: V1: Hitler Moves East, V2: Scorched Earth.

Translated from the German Unternehmen Barbarossa. London: Corgi. ISBN 9780552086387.• Clark, Alan (1966). Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict 1941–1945. New York: William Morrow.

ISBN 0688042686. OCLC 40117106.• Dunn, Walter (1997). Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press.

ISBN 978-0-275957-33-9.• Frieser, Karl-Heinz; Klaus Schmider, Klaus Schönherr, Gerhard Schreiber, Kristián Ungváry, Bernd Wegner

(2007) (in German). Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg – Vol. 8: Die Ostfront 1943/44 – Der Kriegim Osten und an den Nebenfronten. München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt München. ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2.

• Glantz, David M. & House, Jonathon (1995). When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler.Lawrence, Kan: University of Kansas Press. ISBN 9780700608997.

• Glantz, David M. & Orenstein, Harold S. (1999). The Battle for Kursk 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study.London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass. ISBN 0714649333.

• Glantz, David M. & House, Jonathan M. (2004). The Battle of Kursk. Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas.ISBN 0700613358.

• Glantz, David M. (1990). The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II. Novato, CA:Presidio Press. ISBN 0891413804.

• Glantz, David M. (1989). Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. London: Routledge.ISBN 9780714633473.

• Glantz, David M. (September 1986). "Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943" (http:/ / www. cgsc. edu/carl/ download/ csipubs/ glantz2. pdf). U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (Ft. Belvoir) Soviet ArmyStudies Office Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute (CSI Report No. 11). OCLC 320412485.

• Healy, Mark (1992). Kursk 1943: Tide Turns in the East. London: Osprey Publishers. ISBN 978-1-855322-11-0.• Kasdorf, Colonel Bruno (PDF). The Battle of Kursk – An Analysis of Strategic and Operational Principles (http:/

/ www. theblackvault. com/ documents/ ADA377406. pdf). U.S. Army War College.

Battle of Kursk 24

• Keegan, John, ed (2006). Atlas of World War II. London: Collins. ISBN 0-00-721465-0.• Krivosheev, Grigoriy (1997). Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century. London: Greenhill

Books. ISBN 1853672807.• Krivosheev, Grigoriy. "Россия и СССР в войнах XX века: Потери вооруженных сил: Статистическое

исследование [Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: Loss of Armed Forces: Statistical Study]"(http:/ / www. soldat. ru/ doc/ casualties/ book/ ) (in Russian). Olma Press. ISBN 9785224015153. Googletranslation (http:/ / translate. google. com/ translate?js=y& prev=_t& hl=en& ie=UTF-8& layout=1& eotf=1&u=http:/ / www. soldat. ru/ doc/ casualties/ book/ & sl=auto& tl=en)

• Manstein, Erich von (1983) [1955] (in German). Verlorene Siege [Lost Victories]. München: Monch.ISBN 9783763750511.

• Manstein, Erich von (2000) [1955] (in German). Verlorene Siege [Lost Victories]. München: Monch.ISBN 3763752536.

• Mawdsley, Evan (2007). Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War, 1941–1945. London: Hodder Arnold.ISBN 0340613920.

• Mulligan, Timothy P. (1987). "Spies, Ciphers and 'Zitadelle': Intelligence and the Battle of Kursk, 1943" (http:/ /jch. sagepub. com/ cgi/ content/ citation/ 22/ 2/ 235) (PDF). Journal of Contemporary History 22 (2): 235–260.doi:10.1177/002200948702200203.

• Newton, Stephen H. (2003). Kursk: The German View. Cambridge, Mass: Westview Press. ISBN 0306811502.• Nipe, George (1996). Decision In the Ukraine, Summer 1943, II. SS and III. Panzerkorps. Winnipeg: J.J.

Fedorowicz. ISBN 0921991355.• Overy, Richard (1995). Why the Allies Won. New York City: Norton Press. ISBN 9780393039252.• Restayn, Jean & Moller, N. (2002). Operation "Citadel", A Text and Photo Album, Volume 1: The South. Altona,

Man: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing. ISBN 0921991703.• Restayn, Jean & Moller, N. (2006). Operation "Citadel", A Text and Photo Album, Volume 2: The North. Altona,

Man: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing. ISBN 092199172X.• Robbins, David L. (2004). Last Citadel. London: Orion. ISBN 0752859250.• Taylor, A.J.P & Kulish, V.M (1974). A History Of World War Two. London: Octopus Books.

ISBN 0-70640-399-1.• Töppel, Roman (2001) (MA Thesis). Die Offensive gegen Kursk 1943 – Legenden, Mythen, Propaganda.

Dresden: Technical University.• Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders (2000). Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis. Cass Series on the Soviet

(Russian) Study of War. London: Routledge. ISBN 0714650528.

Further reading• Healy, Mark. Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4–17 July 1943. Stroud: The History

Press. ISBN 9780752457161.• irbergui (YouTube id), German newsreels showing the Battle of Kursk (http:/ / www. youtube. com/

view_play_list?p=03DC0345FAB5EC2B), YouTube, Retrieved 2008-09-19• Licari, Michael J. The Battle of Kursk: Myths and Reality (http:/ / www. uni. edu/ ~licari/ citadel. htm), Mike

Licari's Home Page (http:/ / www. uni. edu/ ~licari/ ), Retrieved 2008-09-19• Licari, Michael J. A Review Essay: Books on the Battle of Kursk (http:/ / www. uni. edu/ ~licari/ review15. html),

Mike Licari's Home Page (http:/ / www. uni. edu/ ~licari/ ), Retrieved 2008-09-19• Staff. Sixth Scale Battle (http:/ / www. sixthscalebattle. com/ )• Vázquez, Rodolfo Torres, rtvmodeler.com (http:/ / rtvmodeler. com/ portalrtv1. htm), Retrieved 2008-09-19• Wilson, Alan Kursk – Raw Data to Download (http:/ / www. vy75. dial. pipex. com/ data. htm), 6 February 1999.

—Information from the US Army KOSAVE II study on the southern face battle

Battle of Kursk 25

• Wilson, Alan The Kursk Region, 5 July 1943 (http:/ / dialspace. dial. pipex. com/ town/ avenue/ vy75/ kskmap01.htm) (map), 27 October 1999

Article Sources and Contributors 26

Article Sources and ContributorsBattle of Kursk  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=464499429  Contributors: 1297, 1942 Porsche, 3Jane, AbeTheFro, Adam Carr, Adam Keller, Adnan Rahman, AdultSwim,Afernand74, Ahpook, Ajaxkroon, Albrecht, Aleenf1, Alex Bakharev, Alfio, Alphasinus, Altenmann, Andreas1968, Andrei nacu, AndrewHowse, Andries, Andrwsc, Angrymutant, Anotherclown,Ansbachdragoner, Anubis-SG, Armourhistorian, Ash sul, AshLin, AtTheAbyss, Auntof6, Avial334, Avoidupper, Avriette, B1atv, Bad Night, Barbatus, Basalisk, Beanbatch, BearAllen, BerndvdB, Bignra, Blablaaa, Blckmgc, Bob O'Bob, Bobblewik, Bobby D. 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Image Sources, Licenses and ContributorsFile:Eastern Front 1943-02 to 1943-08.png  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Eastern_Front_1943-02_to_1943-08.png  License: GNU Free Documentation License Contributors: Original uploader was Gdr at en.wikipedia Later version(s) were uploaded by Zocky, Eliashc at en.wikipedia.File:Na zapad.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Na_zapad.jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: Constanz, MonkeybaitFile:Kursk Soviet machineguns.JPG  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Kursk_Soviet_machineguns.JPG  License: Public Domain  Contributors: Avron, Kam Solusar,Martin H., Pelex, Revizionist, Shtanga, 2 anonymous editsFile:Battle of Kursk (map).jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Battle_of_Kursk_(map).jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: Fastboy, Mogelzahn, Noclador, TCY,TFCforever, W.wolnyFile:Bundesarchiv Bild 101III-Cantzler-077-39, Russland, Angehörige der Waffen-SS in einer Stellung.jpg  Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101III-Cantzler-077-39,_Russland,_Angehörige_der_Waffen-SS_in_einer_Stellung.jpg  License: Creative CommonsAttribution-Share Alike 3.0 Germany  Contributors: CantzlerFile:Bundesarchiv Bild 101III-Cantzler-077-24, Russland, Vormarsch deutscher Panzer.jpg  Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101III-Cantzler-077-24,_Russland,_Vormarsch_deutscher_Panzer.jpg  License: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0Germany  Contributors: CantzlerFile:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-J14813, Bei Orel, Panzer VI (Tiger I).jpg  Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-J14813,_Bei_Orel,_Panzer_VI_(Tiger_I).jpg  License: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Germany Contributors: HenischFile:Bundesarchiv Bild 101III-Groenert-019-23A, Schlacht um Kursk, Panzer VI (Tiger I).jpg  Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101III-Groenert-019-23A,_Schlacht_um_Kursk,_Panzer_VI_(Tiger_I).jpg  License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Germany  Contributors: GrönertFile:Bundesarchiv Bild 101III-Zschaeckel-208-25, Schlacht um Kursk, Panzer III.jpg  Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101III-Zschaeckel-208-25,_Schlacht_um_Kursk,_Panzer_III.jpg  License: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0Germany  Contributors: Zschäckel, FriedrichFile:ProkhorovkaMonument.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:ProkhorovkaMonument.jpg  License: GNU Free Documentation License  Contributors:ru:User:GrebenkovFile:Battle of Kursk, southern sectorV2.png  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Battle_of_Kursk,_southern_sectorV2.png  License: Public Domain  Contributors: BlablaaaFile:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-022-2948-19, Russland, Unternehmen "Zitadelle". Soldatengrab.jpg  Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-022-2948-19,_Russland,_Unternehmen_"Zitadelle"._Soldatengrab.jpg  License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Germany  Contributors: Wolff, Paul Dr.File:Prokhorovka Cathedral.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Prokhorovka_Cathedral.jpg  License: GNU Free Documentation License  Contributors: A.Savin, AlexBakharev, Citypeek, Demidow, NVO, PMG

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