the anglophone crisis and the way forward: the vision for ... · british cameroons into northern...

International Journal of Social, Politics & Humanities ISSN: 2797-3735, Volume 7, Issue 1, page 49 - 70

Zambrut

Zambrut.com. Publication date: April, 2020.

Achu, M. N. 2020. The Anglophone Crisis and the Way – Forward: The Vision for Peace ............ 49

The Anglophone Crisis and the

Way – Forward:

The Vision for Peace

Maxwell N. Achu

MA International Relations

Diplomat, & International Consultant on Peace and Governance

Greater Accra Region, Republic of Ghana

Abstract: With the recent killings of 27 civilians in Ngarbu, in the Donga

Mantung Division there is an urgent need for a political resolution to the crisis

ravaging Cameroon. It is for this purpose that this Vision for Peace was initiated.

The heightened killings, internally displaced persons, and unlawful abductions

and detentions are just a few reasons that justifies the conception of this peace

proposal for a more inclusive dialogue through mediation. It will be efforts in

futility to try to solve an armed conflict without adequate understanding of the

root causes. Whether or not the crisis is legitimate is not dependent on high

levels of propaganda, rather very distinct analysis must be made (SECTION 2).

The result of these analyses in itself does not amount to an effective Cessation of

Hostilities. A ceasefire mechanism should urgently be negotiated in order to stop

the killings and violence. Without any doubt, no ceasefire mechanism can

succeed without adequate and meaningful concessions by both sides. This

concept for peace proposes other concessions to be made by the Government of

Cameroon (henceforth GoC) and the Restoration Forces (SECTION 3). The

Major National Dialogue and its Special Status resolution piloted by the GoC did

not stop the violence; therefore, there is a primordial need to review the

peacebuilding and peace-making tactics used. A peace proposal that advocates

for mediation and an all-inclusive dialogue (nonviolence), like this one, only

seeks to contribute in the entire peace process. This Vision for Peace does not

pretend to have exhausted all peace avenues; however, it sets the pace on which

more contributions could build on.

Keywords: (All meaning of keywords shall be within the context of this Vision for

Peace). Vision, Peace, Ambazonia, Secession, La République du Cameroun,

Anglophone Crisis, Francophones, Southern Cameroons, British Southern

Cameroon, German Kamerun, Ambazonia Restoration Forces, Interim

Government (IG), Peace Agreement (PA), Act of Union, Self-determination,

Ground Zero, Amba boys.

https://zambrut.com/


https://zambrut.com/vision-peace/

































Zambrut



CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. CHAPTER I A: Components of this Vision for Peace

Without having to undermine the intelligent peace ideas and proposals set forth by other well-

meaning Cameroonians, the current crisis in Cameroon dubbed the „Anglophone Crisis‟ seemed

stubbornly intractable. One of the reasons for such under-achievement could be the vast disparity that

exists between the content of the proposals and the realities on the ground. It is within this backdrop

that this Vision for Peace is conceived with intentions to supplement the ideas put forward and re-

stimulate the atmosphere for peace to reign.

Far be it that this Vision for Peace will satisfy either side in their aspirations and give them what

they want, but if given the chance, it could stop the violence, and negotiate with both sides on an exit

strategy through deep dialogue. One element that adds to the complex nature of the Crisis is the fact

that, some radicals use the conflict to destabilize the regions and perturb the smooth functioning of

socio-cultural lives of Cameroonians.

This Vision for Peace vehemently refutes any claim of knowing-it-all but upholds that its

contribution in the mediation process is vital. Even though the quest for peace by several intelligent and

dedicated people has been elusive, and met with increased wave of terror, violence and human right

abuses, this Vision for Peace seeks to set the pace for substantial moves towards restoring peace in this

part of Africa. This Vision for Peace, indeed, has the capacity to bring lasting peace to both parties

concerned.

Goals for this Vision: This Vision for Peace seeks to uproot the culture of incitement prevailing

in Southern Cameroon. It recognizes that Cameroonians and Southern Cameroonians/Restoration-ist all

deserve a better future and this vision can help them all achieve that desire.

This Vision for Peace seeks to restore conditions for investment to start flowing into the regions,

through deep dialogue and other reconciliation arrangements. Therefore, our hope is that this Vision for

Peace will inspire a future in which all peoples in Cameroon will live together in peace and prosperity.

This Vision presents a package of proposed compromises/concessions for both sides to consider, in

order for them to move forward towards peace and prosperity for all. Even as the vision is forward-

looking, adequate and sufficient re-visit of the historicity of the problem is important. History sets the

platform to build the future.

Finally, this Vision for Peace is setting the guidelines for negotiating a roundtable dialogue.

1.2. CHAPTER I B: The Author’s Previous Predictions based on Researched Indices of

Violence Intensification in the Anglophone Regions sadly becomes a Reality

It is work in futility to endeavour to solve a crisis (violent crisis) without having to analyse the

dynamics of elements that surrounds a violent conflict. This is why in the author‟s last concept paper

predicting the intensity of the conflict; he mentioned the range of measures to undertake by the

Government of Cameroon (hereafter GoC) to reduce the impending multiplicity of violence in these

regions (M. Achu 2019). In this article, Achu highlighted determinants used to evaluate the risk of

violence intensity including, speedy increase of access to small arms, light and conventional weapons;

civilian displacement, increase levels of violence containment expenditure, criminal violence as well as

high rates of incarceration1.

From a face value, Cameroon has witnessed an increase of all these determinants enumerated

above, which is illustrative of the records. Unfortunately, the GoC reacts more often to the anglophone

crisis with counterinsurgency measures that only heightens the level of violence and deteriorates peace,

instead.

Following my previous analysis, I proposed emergency peacebuilding interventions, which if

implemented, could mitigate the rising risk of the Anglophone Crisis intensification. As long as the

GoC ignored the author‟s forewarnings of an impending bloodbath for the nation, then, violence indeed

escalated in these regions coupled with a panoply of other related criminal violence.

On the ground, the Anglophone Crisis has become more confrontational despite the peace-

making efforts initiated by the GoC. Whether or not these peace efforts were appropriate could be

determined from the results on the ground. Unfortunately, it has not work. Rather, these peace

initiatives, notwithstanding the sincerity of the organizers, the resolutions from these initiatives were


Zambrut



met with high levels of combative reactions from the Restoration Forces, supported by a vibrant

diaspora.

The upshot of this resistance has been higher death rates, higher incarceration rates, higher

proliferation of small and light weapons, higher levels of civilian displacements and rural exodus in

neighbouring countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, La Cote D‟Ivoire, just to name a few.

Ultimately, nobody should take delight in prophesying calamity towards either a people or a

government. For this reason, this Vision for Peace comes to buttress and outline the way-forward, by

proposing concessions that could possibly bring the violence to a considerable level, if not stop it

entirely, and usher the warring parties to a deep dialogue table.

1.3. CHAPTER I C: The State of Affairs – Economic of Peace

Peace and the economy are two mutually reinforcing concept, wherein the absence of one limits

the presence of the other. Peace is a necessary element for business performance, and without such

peacefulness, businesses suffers. Illustratively, there is very little or no transactional cost imposed on

businesses that operates in a peaceful environment, contrary to heavy transaction cost in violent-prone

scenarios.

Businesses in the Anglophone regions have actually shutdown due to incessant violence between

the Restoration Forces and the military of the GoC. High levels of perceived risk of violent escalation

has reduced drastically the business confidence in Cameroon entirely, and consequently, this stresses

the economy as these regions (Anglophone regions) supply a chunk of the GDP of Cameroon.

Indeed, high levels of business engagements supports peace invariably2. The violence raging

Cameroon has been the preponderant factor of slow economic growth in Cameroon, according to

experts and other international policy think tanks.

Most importantly, the focus of this Vision for Peace is far from rendering too many scholarly

references to support our assertions; rather it is a pragmatic guide, which may contribute to lasting

peace and prosperity for all Cameroonians.

CHAPTER 2: THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 CHAPTER II A: IS THE ANGLOPHONE CRISIS LEGITIMATE?

This section seeks to establish the fight for liberation according to historical facts. Because this

Vision for Peace is more of a pragmatic guide advocating for a deep dialogue, it will be as brief as

possible, without however ignoring core truths and facts.

Historical Realities

Under this section, it will be instructive to recall and trace the genealogy of the Republic of

Cameroon and the British Southern Cameroon for adequate comprehension. This is in line to

understand the latter‟s claim for right(s) to secession, self-determination and sovereignty.

From German Kamerun to British Southern Cameroon

After WWI, Britain and France jointly invaded the German colonies, which included those in

Africa, in 1916, and on March 17 1916 German Kamerun was partitioned between the two invaders

(Elango, L. 1987). One-fifth of the territory that consisted of the disjointed narrow strips stretching

from Lake Chad to the Atlantic Coast along Eastern Nigeria went to Britain and France got four-fifths

of the rest3. Following Article 22 of the League of Nations

4, the territories were administered as

mandated territories.

Pursuant to the British Cameroon Administration Ordinance in 1924, Britain further divided

British Cameroons into Northern and Southern Cameroons (Anyangwe C. 2009), and ruled them

separately but governed them as integral part of Nigeria. This means, Northern Cameroon was merged

into Northern Nigeria, meanwhile Southern Cameroons as eastern region of Nigeria5. They both shared

issues of common interest (Nigeria‟s constitution, budget, administration legal system etc..), and the

Commissioner for Southern Cameroons answered to Lieutenant Governor of the Eastern Region of

Nigeria and ultimately the Governor-General of Nigeria.

This system remained the same until the trusteeship6 era, when in 1954, Southern Cameroons

was accorded autonomy. It became a self-governing territory with a quasi-regional status within the


Zambrut



Nigerian Federation (Chem-Langhee, B 2011). Following the trusteeship Council Resolution, Southern

Cameroons had self-governing institutions including an executive, a judiciary, a bicameral legislature, a

civil service and police force7.

In 1958, the United Nation mission in their report held that Southern Cameroon had evolved and

could achieve independence in 1960. This was in line with the provision set out in the United Nations

(UN) Charter article 76(b)8. Ultimately, by 1959, Southern Cameroon became a self-governing region

within the Nigerian Federation.

Did the Defective Decolonization Process Birth the Anglophone Crisis?

Without any doubt, decolonization was at the centre of United Nations existence following article

76 of the Charter. To this effect, the Trusteeship Council was the secretariat to ensure smooth

decolonization of Trust Territories to independent states9, within a set timeframe pursuant to United

Nation General Assembly - UNGA resolution 1413(XIV)10

. However, such process of transitioning

Trust Territories was not going to alter or amend boundaries, political system/status and identity. They

had to be maintained (UNGA Resolution 649, 1951).

Noteworthy was that, political, social or educational unpreparedness or inadequacy to

transitioning a Trust Territory was immaterial, meaning Southern Cameroon could achieve

independence by 1960 (Cassese. A).

With all these modalities laid out for effective decolonization, let us examine how it went.

The Decolonization Process According to the UN records (UNGA Resolution 1282), Southern Cameroon was expected to gain

independence in 1960. Ultimately, through a Plebiscite held in Mamfe, Southern Cameroonian opted

with a clear majority for self-determination, void of any links with Nigeria nor The Republic of

Cameroon (Anyangwe, C 2008).

Up until this level, things seemed perfect. Not until two ideologies that would change a People‟s fate

for decades emerged; firstly, Britain doubted the preparedness of the Southern Cameroonians to

achieve independence and did not want to burden British Taxpayers (Omoigui 1950-1975). Secondly,

the pan-Africanist Movement piloted by Dr Kwame Nkrumah strongly denounced the emergence of

small states.

Consequently, in March 13, 1959 the UNGA amended initially adopted plans by re-adopting resolution

1350(XIII) recommending a Plebiscite to get the wishes of the People concerning their right to self-

determination. The date for this historic event was slated to hold between September 30 1960 and

March 1961 through resolution 1352(XIV) of October 16 1959.

The Decolonization Error

The Southern Cameroonian counterparts expected the Plebiscite choice between ‗integration with

Nigeria‘ or ‗Secession and independence‘. Rather the UN imposed differently the following questions:

Question 1: Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of

Nigeria? Or

Question 2: Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent The Republic of

Cameroon?11

According to some historians, a third option to „to gain independence by being independent‟ was

missing. See the case of French Togoland, wherein the Trusteeship Council renounced the proposed

plebiscite questions on grounds that the questions did not include a choice for independence12

.

Therefore, the result of the Plebiscite was against the will of the people, who had preferred an

independence (Mazrui & Tidy 1984).

The Inconsistency

The resolution 1608 (UNGA Resolution 1608) outlined the modalities for the Trusteeship

Termination era, and according to paragraph 4, the deadline was scheduled for October 1 1961 (the day

the Southern Cameroon was to join the Republic of Cameroon). Captivating among the modalities is

the request for the Administering Authority (Trusteeship Council), the Government of Southern


Zambrut



Cameroon and the Government of the Republic of Cameroon to initiate roundtable discussions to set

the basis and policies of the union. This discussion was supposed to precede the final termination of the

Trusteeship period, then, after which the final and official joining with the Republic of Cameroon on

October 1 1961.

Unfortunately, the report of the Trusteeship Council of 196213

established the termination period

of the Trusteeship ear, and the eventual unionism of Southern Cameroon to The Republic of Cameroon,

and no tripartite discussions ever held as mentioned in resolution 1608. With this inconsistency

notwithstanding, the Union Jack was lowered down on the Southern Cameroon‟s territory on October

30 1961, thereby officially transferring sovereignty to the Republic of Cameroon. This move was

inconsistent with resolution 1608. However, the event birthed the Federal Republic of Cameroon,

wherein both sides envisaged a liberal federation with a bicultural society, while preserving the

distinctive features of both parties (Omoigui N.).

2.2 CHAPTER II B: The Birth of the Anglophone Problem

In July 1961, the Foumban Constitutional Conference was held to draft the federal constitution

that would be the basis for the union. To some experts this was just another core tragedy that fuelled

secession sentiments (Awasom, F. 1998). The respective parliaments of both parties has to ratify this

draft federal constitution to qualify it as an ‘Act of Union’, as a common parliament was yet to be

created. This „Act of Union‟ would then be registered in the UN Secretariat as consistent with Article

102 of its Charter.

Instead, it is purported that former President Ahmadou Ahidjo imposed a document for the

Southern Cameroon delegation to review within two days (Anyangwe, C. 2009). It is alleged that all

recommendations to serve as the basis for the creation of a federal constitution, including robust states,

a bill of rights, a bicameral legislature and location of federal capital were vehemently rejected by the

Republic of Cameroon (Mbile. N. 2000). All efforts made by the Southern Cameroon delegation was

further rejected (Mbile 2000). Eventually, the Republic of Cameroon-led draft constitution (supposed

federal constitution) was adopted as a law amending the former Constitution existing in the Republic of

Cameroon.

According to Carlson Anyangwe, this adopted constitution was an annexation law, and he

compares it to the German annexation of Austria, and Morocco of Western Sahara (Anyangwe 2010).

The upshot of this supposed annexation law invariably established a centralized federation, as its article

5, 6, 1514

, 4715

and 5916

deprived Southern Cameroon of control over major institutions including

Administration, Defence, Foreign Affairs, Higher Education and Scientific Research – Article 5 and 6

precisely (Nkwi W.). However, the constitution failed to establish the management of Revenue from

the extractive sector, even though Southern Cameroon gave up their resources. (Manasse 2002)

2.3 CHAPTER II C: The Evolution of the Anglophone Problem to an Anglophone Crisis

The Problem

At this point, two federal states existed: Southern Cameroon turned Federal State of West

Cameroon, while The Republic of Cameroon turned Federal State of East Cameroon. Since the

masterminded constitution gave the president overwhelming powers to rule by decrees, the former

President decreed the Federal State of West Cameroon into an Administrative Region, and appointed an

‗Inspecteur Fédéral d‘Adminitsrtaion‘ to head it. To make matters worse, this political appointee

reported directly to the President, undermining the authority of the puppet Prime Minister of the

Federal State of West Cameroon (Ardener 1998).

In 1966, multi-party democracy was replaced with one-party state/rule. The former President

restricted freedom of expression and opinion, information and press, assembly and association, as far as

movements17

.

In March 1972, the former President announced the abolishment of the Federal system

unilaterally (Nkwain 2013), without consulting the federal legislative institutions in placed18

. This was

in outright violation of articles 2(1), (8) and 47(1) (2) (4) of the 1961 constitution (Breton 1979).

Preceding the former President‟s announcement, a flawed referendum was organized in May

(Anyangwe C. 2008). Hence, the United Republic of Cameroon was born, and this only fuelled the pain


Zambrut



that would burst in 2016. The loss of autonomy of Southern Cameroon to be coerced into taking a

subordinate position under the unitary republic, only grew Anglophone resentments.

Under the unitary state, Anglophones decried under-representation and secondary roles in public

affairs, and exploitation of natural resources (Konings & Nyamnjoh). This followed several petitions

from Southern Cameroon representatives accusing French regimes of an attempt of francophonizing

West Cameroon (Muna S. 1984).

In 1984, the name of the nation amongst others including flag, and state symbols were changed

from the United Republic of Cameroon to The Republic of Cameroon, the same name that French

Cameroon adopted prior to independence in 196019

.

This is the background of the problem dubbed the „Anglophone Problem‟; core to it is successive

marginalization of the minority. They are second-class citizens in a Francophone-dominated nation

(Anyefru 2010). Apparently, since 1961 no Anglophone has ever held critical position in institutions

including Ministry of Finance, Territorial Administration20

, Education, Health, SONARA21

, and

SNH22

. This is the ‘ANGLOPHONE PROBLEM’.

The Crisis

Prior to 2016, it is instructive to recall that, Anglophone had had several attempts at self-

determination. With the advent of multi-party politics re-introduced in 1990, Anglophones created

associations/movements to renounce Frenchification through assimilation – French dominance

(Dongmo 2008). Several pro-federalism political and social groups were birth (Konings & Nyamnjoh).

In 1993, the Anglophones organized the All Anglophone Conference (AAC), which advocated for

federalism, whereas the government preferred decentralization23

. Disgruntled Anglophone activist

further created the Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC), whose main objective was outright

separation to pre-1960 era (Konings & Nyamnjoh).

In their quest for a breakaway, the SCNC was assisted by organizations including the Southern

Cameroons People Organization (SCAPO), Free West Cameroon Movement (FWCM), and the recent

Ambazonian Movement (AM). (Konings & Nyamnjoh). Other groups like the Teachers Association of

Cameroon (TAC) and the Confederation of Anglophone Parents-Teachers Association (CAPTAC)

pressed for educational reforms. (Nyamnjoh. F 1996).

On December 30, 1999, the SCNC proclaimed the revival of Southern Cameroon as a separate

and independent state. The SCNC youths wing the Southern Cameroon Youth League (SCYL) and

SCAPO adopted strategies for the restoration of the Anglophone state.

In 2003, SCNC and SCAPO brought an indictment against the Republic of Cameroon before

the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, claiming their right to self-determination. The

SCNC has addressed specific organs of the UN including the Commission on Human Rights accusing

the Republic of Cameroon of illegal annexation and occupation (Fru-Anye 2008).

The Historic October 11, 2016

Fast forward to 2016 when the English lawyers (from the Anglophone regions of South West-

Coastal Forest and North West-Savannah) went on strike (BBC 2107, Aljazeera 2016). They protested

against widespread marginalization of the Anglophone linguistic, cultural, educational and legal

systems and calling for a return to the federal state. The strike further degenerated into armed violence

for which, several people have been killed (Loh 2017). Tensions have escalated severely with massive

violation of Human Rights from both sides (Lunn 2018, Amnesty International 2018).

Protesters and military have been killed, thousands behind bars, and internet lockdown for

several months. The Anglophones responded with civil disobedience, including school boycotts

through „ghost towns‟. Some activist have been charged with anti-terror indictments and have been

tried and sentenced before military courts (Amnesty International).

In 2017, the Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front unilaterally called for

the independence of Southern Cameroons, but this was met with brutal clashes between security forces

and the Ambazonian restoration fighters. As much as 17 people were killed24

. Following the delay in a

consensus, Cameroon has seen the creation of opposition groups like Ambazonia Defence Forces and

the Red Dragons25

, who have gained momentum considerably.


Zambrut



This armed confrontation has resulted with over 40 000 refugees in neighbouring Nigeria (UNHCR)

and one million internally displace (Center for Human Rights…). This is the ‘ANGLOPHONE

CRISIS’.

2.4 CHAPTER II D: Is upholding the Right to Self-Determination, Secession and the

Independence of Ambazonian Statehood the ONLY Way Forward?

Some very intelligent persons have termed the Anglophone problem as an institutional fantasy.

This Vision for Peace wishes to reiterate that, it is indeed an institutional fantasy but a legitimate one.

This Vision for Peace seeks to propose solutions based on effective comprehension of the root causes

of the problem/crisis. This section seeks to determine the legal basis for the Anglophone‟s demand for

their right to self-determination. In addition, if legitimate, could another solution substitute this

legitimate quest?

Determining Southern Cameroon’s Right to Self-determination

The UN Charter proclaimed self-determination as an objective to be achieved within the context

of „friendly relations‟ and „equality of peoples and self-determination‟ (United Nations). Over time, the

definition evolved to include „People‟ having a right to choose their international status pursuant to

article 73(b), and further mandated colonizers to ‗develop self-government, [for the colonial territories

– Southern Cameroon] to take due account of the political aspirations of [Southern Cameroon] and to

assist them [Southern Cameroonians] in the progressive development of their free political

institutions…‘.

The modalities outlined for the effective implementation of this was further buttressed in article

76(b).

However, to achieve this objective, the UNGA adopted two relevant resolutions – 1514 & 1541. The

former proclaimed the right to self-determination; meanwhile the latter outlined the various methods

through which effective and legal decolonization had to be carried out (GA Resolution 1960): seceding

to form a new state, association with an existing one and/or integration into an existing one.

The conventional right to self-determination is valid in the context of Southern Cameroon‟s

decolonization26

, as upheld by the ICJ in the repressive cases of Namibia27

. Indeed, the legal basis for a

people of Southern Cameroon to exercise their right to Self-determination is not a fantasy. It is indeed

grounded, especially for two major reasons. Firstly, Southern Cameroon quest to exercise their right to

self-determination was exclusively within the context of external colonialization. Secondly, they are a

people who happened to have lived within colonial boundaries drawn by colonizers28

, and the very act

of colonialism created new legal status for the colonial entity, and therefore defines the status-quo that

may ensue.

To substantiate, ICJ applied the same for the definition of the People in the Island of Timor case

(ICJ, 1995). Indonesia laid claim to East Timor and advocated for the unification with West Timor, and

eventually with Indonesia itself. Ultimately, East and West Timor were under Portuguese and Dutch

colonial leadership respectively. This entitled them to self-determination, as separate entities.

Indonesia‟s subsequent annexation of the Island was understood as a violation of the right to self-

determination, and the ensued referendum was in favour of independence.

Under the colonial text therefore, the entire territory as defined by the colonizers were intrinsically

entitled to the exercise of the right to self-determination. (ICJ, Case 1986). This principle of ‗uti

possidetis‘ became the landmark of international law as applied in the dissolution of the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union29

.

Determining Southern Cameroon’s Right to Secession

There are several other „people‟s right‟ that could potentially make a case for Southern

Cameroon including, the Right to Indigenous and Minority Protection30

, the Right to Self-

Determination but the most critical of them all is the Right to Secession. The right to secession is as a

result of a broader definition of the right to self-determination.


Zambrut



As the crisis intensify, the Anglophones continue to decry marginalization because of systematic

discrimination by the government. The government did not meet expectations and hence the

Anglophones resorted to their quest for secession.

However tangible their demands may be, worthy of note is the fact that, the right to secession is

usually exceptional rather than the standard. On the other hand, for the GoC on its part to maintain its

national security considerations and sovereignty, the onus of proof relies on her to show that it is

representative of all peoples to its territory without discrimination31

.

If anything, the Anglophones must illustrate in what manner they have been victims of

discrimination and marginalization according to paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration and

Article 5 of the Declarations on the Celebration Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations.

Grounds for Secession:

According to the author‟s research, two main points could give Southern Cameroon right to

Secession: Firstly, pursuant to the facts aforementioned, the Republic of Cameroon usurped legislative

authority to legislate on behalf of the people of Southern Cameroon by amending the 1960 constitution

on September 1 1961 without due participation of the people (representatives) of Southern Cameroon.

This, according to historians led to consistent marginalization and discrimination of anglophones.

Secondly, following the supreme court of Canada, which held that, a people could have a right

to secede if their linguistics rights are violated, and/or they do not have a fair representation in national

legislative, executive and judicial sectors, and/or their culture faces threats of extinction32

.

Nonetheless, for a secession plea to catch international attention, the secessionist must

demonstrate certain intrinsic values of statehood following the Montevideo Convention33

.

2.5 CHAPTER II E: Could a Beneficial and Realistic One-State Solution be a Plan-B?

According to international documents consulted, it could be legally correct to proclaim that

Southern Cameroon has the intrinsic right to self-determination, and the right to protection of the

Minority. However, these rights must not necessarily make expression in the right of secession. Other

states have made mighty strides in development with effective decentralization and/or

federalism/confederation in place.

This Vision for Peace has one core objective – peace through peaceful means and at all cost. It is

my humble opinion that effective and workable decentralization and/or federalism could be worth more

when measured to the untold pains that accompanies the quest and fight for secession. This section of

this Vision for Peace is not denying the legal basis for the quest for secession, however, it proposes an

institutional arrangement that could preserve the linguistic rights, cultural heritage and curb

discrimination/marginalization in Southern Cameroon.

With decentralization comes deconcentrating of executive powers, more rural/community

delegation, and citizens‟ involvement, devolution of state‟s affairs as well as high levels of private

sector involvement through various privatization models. Moreover, whoever talks about effective

decentralization, should be talking about institutions, as successful decentralization depends on them.

This Vision for Peace is not meant to educate on the pros and cons of decentralization, rather it is

meant to highlight other avenues for peace. The type of institutions and structures on which

decentralization will work will be negotiated on the dialogue table. This Vision for Peace is meant to

bring these parties to the table.

One-State Solution under Effective Decentralization

In a post-conflict scenario given the context of Cameroon, implementing an effective

decentralized system, including the disintegration of the centrality of executive power is of utmost

importance. Decentralization would increase accountability because users or even voters within the

context of electoral pluralism could observe the productivity and efforts of Cameroon legislators whom

they could vote in office. In other words, the diffusion of key government functions to the local levels

will promote inclusion, especially as social exclusion/segmentation and/or political marginalization is

at the root cause of the conflict. Without any doubt, decentralization will limit the contest over

centralized power.


Zambrut



Effective decentralization will provide structural arrangements to facilitate the involvement of

Anglophones in policy decisions on their own development. It will serve as a means through which

resource allocation, improved service delivery and better prospects for peace could be realized.

Decentralization will further bring the government of Cameroon closer to Anglophones and

give impetus to increased voice and accountability, as is the case in Morocco. More broadly, Moroccan

civil or public servants of the government services had a stronger voice in expressing their satisfaction

with the quality and equity of provision of these services.

Looking at the deeper meaning of decentralization should tell us some more. It is simply

increasing the number of more autonomous platforms within which previously centralized public

authority is exercised. In other words, anything that was done by the central authority in Yaoundé could

be replicated at the local levels – in Southern Cameroon (Achu, M 2019). If this could be, then,

decentralization will increase the opportunities for policy innovations (Campbell 2003) and emergence

of effective leaders (Tendler 1997).

CHAPTER III: PROCEEDURE FOR A CEASEFIRE, THROUGH MEANINGFUL

CONCESSIONS FROM BOTH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON

AND THE AMBAZONIAN RESTORATION FORCES – AN APPROACH TO DEEP

DIALOGUE

Considering the fact that violence persist in the North and South West regions of Cameroon,

means all attempt at restoring peace ended in a fiasco. This is not an analysis to throw blames but an

opportunity for more suggestions to be made. Not because those attempts failed that, we will stop

trying to move forward. In fact, failure to move forward could have devastating consequences.

This section seeks to suggest those compromises that could engender deep dialogue between the GoC

and the Ambazonian Restoration Forces. However, prior to highlighting these suggestions, it will be

instructive to examine the moves made by the GoC and the results it brought.

3.1 CHAPTER III A: The author’s impartial commentaries on the unilateral concession made by

the Government of the Republic of Cameroon: - ‘Historic National Dialogue’ and its

resolution - ‘Special Status’ Granted to the Regions of Southern Cameroon’

The Major National Dialogue (MND)

The GoC instigated this initiative, as a move towards enhancing peace and stability in the

restive Anglophone regions. This is commendable and appreciated as part of the peace process

organized by the GoC. However, the results on ground proves that the MND did not conform to

international standards of negotiating a violent conflict.

Firstly, the MND that was supposed to be a component of a larger peacebuilding context failed to

provide a comprehensive and integrative approach in the art of conflict transformation. The MND

presented itself as a fixed recipe, or ready-made product to solve such a complex and sophisticated

crisis. The MND was supposed to implore peacebuilding techniques and creativity to match the

complex nature of the crisis. For instance, the GoC could designate a neutral third party engage the

dialogue process with prior discussions between the armed groups, so as to instigate each conflict party

in the process of self-reflection, and the exploration of the unconscious dimensions of the crisis

formation.

Secondly, according to the TRANSCEND perspective of conflict transformation it is to enable

the people (Anglophones in this case) to be self-reliant/self-confident or autonomous in dealing with

the Anglophone crisis using peaceful means. The Ambazonian fighters are cynical about the whole

process and thinks they were excluded in the dialogue process. This spells the reasons for the

backlashes and deadlocks ongoing on Ground-Zero. Moreover, when exclusionary reasons surface on

any dialogue, there is bound to be what is called a Bargaining Failure and violence becomes even

harsher and deadlier. The Ambazonian fighters and their leaders felt excluded and refused to accept

whether or not there was any dialogue.

Thirdly, the MND did not consider a multiple orientation approach based on deep dialogue and

polilogue as a method of delving into the conflict proper. The purpose of this is to prepare the parties

(GoC and Restoration Forces and their Leaders) to be ready to negotiate. Most often, the parties are


Zambrut



worked on separately, including developing their vertical interdependence for creative negotiation and

mediation.

Special Status Firstly, mention should be made that this resolution for a Special Status to the Anglophone

regions is a sign of Government‟s commitment to make concessions geared towards solving the

Anglophone problem. Therefore, any further suggestions are more or less complementaries to

contribute in the quest for a lasting solution to the crisis.

This article is not against Special Status, but against the processes involved. This was supposed

to be born out of deep dialogue and negotiation between the GoC and the Liberation fighters of

Ambazonia and/or their leaders. A unilateral declaration of a Special Status may not work. The

organizers of the MND did not consider the international standard procedures of conflict

transformation, resolution and management, thereby illegitimating the process for a legitimate result.

Look at Ukraine, which in an attempt to quell the separatist war ravaging the country offered a Special

Status to separatist controlled regions in Eastern Ukraine. Nevertheless, this was born out of

negotiations through mediation in Paris between the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany

built on an already existing 2015-peace treaty/agreement.

The anglophone crisis originated from a failed decolonization process, in which the quest for a

solution should not disregard international law, UN resolutions, African Union Charter, and other due

and standard processes of union treaty negotiation, conflict resolution/transformation and management

and territorial administration. Furthermore, some analyst argue that, the GoC has no legal right to place

Anglophones under the Special Status, basing their arguments on the absence of a Union Treaty

between both parties. They assert that, both the Republic of Cameroon and Southern Cameroon were

both Class B Mandate Trust Territory-ies, under French and British rule respectively. Therefore,

Southern Cameroon remains a separate people, and as such have all rights ascribed under international

law of a People. These include the inalienable right to total freedom, the right to self-determination, the

right to secession and the integrity of their national territory (Resolution 1514 –XV of December 14,

1960). In all, Union Treaties are birth ONLY through negotiation, as was required by UN resolution

1608 (XV), operative paragraph 5, of April 21 1961, to be ratified by the Southern Cameroons House

of Assembly and House of Chiefs as it were.

In conclusion, it is a truism that the Special Status has established the Regional Executive Council,

Regional House of Chiefs, Regional House of Representatives and other organs to diffuse the centrality

of decision making. None of these will stand if it is not born through negotiations between the GoC and

the Ambazonian Governing Council acting through the Ambazonian Restoration Collaborative Council

(ARCC).

3.2 CHAPTER III B: This Vision for Peace proposes other concessions for the attention of the

Government of the Republic of Cameroon:

To start, I would say a ceasefire to stop the violence and killings is of utmost importance. The

Special Status should proceed a ceasefire, but the question is this? What would incentivize both the

GoC and the Restoration forces to drop down arms? Special Status resolution unfortunately did not

ensure any form of Cessation of Hostilities.

Without doubt, the GoC has tried in several ways to ensure peace, even though none of them

worked out. For instance between December 2016 to January 2017, the GoC held talks with striking

unions but police crackdown collapsed negotiations34

. Around March of 2017, the GoC made efforts to

meet the demands of the Anglophones by redeploying francophone teachers, recruiting 1000 bilingual

teachers, and creating a commission for bilingualism and multiculturalism35

. Further, the GoC created

the Common Law bench at the Supreme Court and the National School of Administration Magistracy

and the introduction of Common Law departments at Francophone‟s universities36

. According to the

International Crisis Group, these adjustments were too minor to cause any major impacts.

If all of the above could not stop the violence and bring parties to a deep dialogue, then more

concessions could be proposed.


Zambrut



Partial-Freedom to Ambazonian leaders:

Without controversy, the Ambazonia Defence Forces/Fighters take instructions from both their

diasporan and national leaders (especially those behind bars). The diaspora collaboration is of utmost

importance if there must be a ceasefire, and these ones desire to see their collaborators freed from

prison. Releasing these leaders and gaining the confidence of the diaspora are two mutually reinforcing

elements.

But also, the GoC fears a backlash if these leaders are released, as they could stir and/or

heighten the violence once they are freed. The GoC also feels its national integrity is been threatened

and laws have been violated that should be punishable.

Could the GoC partially release these leaders, and perhaps place them under surveillance and

get them to instruct the fighters to drop down arms? Of a certitude, once the Ambazonian diaspora

leaders understands that their fellow comrades had been released on concessionary basis, they would

cooperate to ensure a ceasefire. Some may ask, what about the GoC‟s military presence in the regions?

That will be answered later.

Demilitarization Dynamics and other Security Considerations:

In order not to incite violence and retaliation from the Ambazonian Defence Forces, the GoC

could demilitarize the regions leaving the usual Police officers for legitimate security concerns. The

widespread of small and light weapons have become rampant, as insecurity will definitely be an issue.

The military personnel of the GoC and the Ambazonian leaders should discuss and negotiate these

concerns with signed security-consideration agreements/ceasefire.

Redeployment of trained Military/Police peacebuilders:

To ensure effective civilian collaboration with the military, a training toolkit for military

peacebuilders could be initiated. This is simply to enhance the concept of ‗military camaraderie‘

towards civilians, as was the case of Rwanda.

Actively engage in Broader Peace-making and Peacebuilding Consultations with Experts:

As far as research could bring me, I perceive this crisis as a socio-political and identity-related

(culturization) than a criminal one. Politicians have done well in their various capacities and

endeavours, however, experts in peacebuilding, conflict management and peacekeeping must be

consulted for a comprehensive peace plan and topics for negotiation while preparing for an inclusive

dialogue table. Third party consultations will ease tension and further demonstrate the political will of

government officials in solving this crisis.

Mentioned should be made that, more considerations are permitted, as these do not pretend to

exhaust all avenues for more concessions. However, let these ones serve as a platform for more

suggestions. Otherwise, this crisis could go on for decades upon decades, as was the case of Eritrea that

lasted for 26years. Despite the thousands of soldiers that Ethiopia committed into eliminating the

Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF), it kept on. Guerrilla warfare fighters are never in a haste to

terminate the war, which is why it took South Sudanese People Liberation Movement over 21years in

South Sudan; it took the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) over 20years in

East Timor; the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) 11years in Mozambique; the Zimbabwean

African National Liberation Army 16years in Zimbabwe.

Time is not on our side.

3.3 CHAPTER III C: This Vision for Peace proposes concessions for the attention of the

Ambazonian Restoration Forces and their partially freed Leaders

Stop all forms of arbitrary kidnaps and abduction:

One clear attitude to illustrate goodwill in conflict resolution processes is to cease from

arbitrary kidnaps for ransom. This alone is punishable by both national and international conventions,

including Cameroon. Any form of detention, asportation, seizure or inveiglement is unacceptable at this

time, if not for anything, for the peace process. To show good faith, this Vision for Peace is calling on

the Restoration fighters to STOP all forms of arbitrary kidnappings and unlawful killings.


Zambrut



Stop all forms of political propaganda that enhances the incitement to violence:

One critical impediment to peace processes in this contemporary time characterized by social

media warfare is political propaganda through misinformation for private interest. Worse still, these

information falsehoods most often incite violence in fellow Cameroonians. With such despicable acts

of vandalism and violence, this Vision for Peace may not yield anything. Therefore, all forms of

political propaganda should stop for peace processes to have a chance.

Ensue the effective collaboration of the Southern Cameroon’s diaspora:

The Cameroon diaspora is one of the largest amongst African countries, with other countries

like Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana etc. The massive influence of the diaspora could be both negative and

positive. For the purposes of peace, we are requesting the positive collaboration of the Cameroon

diaspora, as they are an integral part of this peace process.

Note should be taken that, these points are not in themselves topics meant for the dialogue table,

rather they are simply suggestions to halt violence, establish a convivial environment for peace

initiatives to be mediated upon, while bringing the parties to a dialogue table. The team of mediators,

who ultimately will form part of the Ceasefire Committee will shuttle between the parties for lasting

peace solutions.

Seek nonviolence as a means of conflict resolution:

This Vison for Peace seeks peace through peaceful means and advocates for nonviolent means of

conflict management and resolution. Peace through peaceful means targets principles and not persons,

unlike violence that targets persons and not principles. Therefore, this Vison for Peace is calling on all

Cameroonians and sundry, to consolidate this Vision for Peace within the context of nonviolent conflict

resolution mechanisms. This simply means, violence should cease, so that, children could resume

school.

3.4 CHAPTER III D: This Vision for Peace proposes additional concession for the attention of

both the Government of the Republic of Cameroon and the Ambazonian Restoration Forces

STOP all forms of Human Right Abuses:

Without any doubt, both sides have violated Human Rights abuses, per the submission to the

United Kingdom Parliament of October 30, 201937

. It is alleged that, the GoC violated human rights

including widespread destruction of state38

and private property3940

, extrajudicial41

and unlawful

killings42

(Amnesty International 2107 & Peter 2018), arbitrary43

and illegal44

detention45

, torture,

inhumane conditions4647

, arbitrary punishment and humiliation, sexual assault48

and rape4950

, freedom

of expression51

and assembly violations52

, and unlawful arrest of journalist.53

On the side of the

Restoration Forces, violation against human rights were rampant including unlawful killings54

and

violence against civilians55

, arson attacks,5657

rampant and unlawful kidnappings,58

and right to

education and child welfare abuses59

. This is not the platform to analyse the data on Human Right

abuses, as there are organizations apt for that, rather, this Vision for Peace emphatically suggest that,

for peace to reign there is the need to cease from human right violations to enable credible international

organizations to assist in this peace process.

Ceasefire:

The purpose of this sub-section is not to determine the elements of a ceasefire agreement that

serves to facilitate the implementation and sustainability of peace agreements; rather it is an integral

part in the whole peacebuilding component. It is also not a ceasefire modality of a one size-fits-all

basis; however, it should be regarded as a prescriptive suggestive therapy seeking lasting solutions for

the Cameroon crisis, with ceasefire as a component.

First, the Anglophone crisis is not a frozen conflict, meaning an all-inclusive ceasefire could

pave the way for lasting solutions for this intra-state violence. This call for ceasefire will not outline the

modalities that will guide the ceasefire geographical lines (lines of engagements), or lines from which

the forces are required to withdraw nor what zones must be demilitarized, as these will serve the basis

for the Ceasefire Committee or Group. This literature is meant to incentivize armed groups to see the

manifold benefits to cease from offensive gunfire.


Zambrut



What is Anglophone Crisis Ceasefire Agreement (ACCA?)

Ubiquitously, ceasefire can take various forms and have different purposes depending on the

specific context in which a ceasefire is implemented. The use of the terminology covers a panoply of

social and conflict-related phenomenon, ranging from loose, to informal and unilateral arrangements to

more formal, bi- or multilateral agreements to stop violence and negotiate a Peace Agreement (PA). For

the Anglophone Crisis specifically, the ACCA should take the formal or multilateral ceasefire to enable

the contradictory parties give respite to the traumatized population caught between gunshots from the

military and the Ambazonia Restoration Forces.

However, it should and will not be used as a military strategy to trick the Restoration fighters

into surrendering their weapons; otherwise, a bigger war shall ensue. This ceasefire will provide a

„peaceful‟ environment void of gunshots, killings and maiming for political negotiations to go on

aiming at a comprehensive political settlement, as was the case of Columbia60

.

Nonetheless, the ACCA in itself will not have the capacity to address the political, socio-

economic, judicial and cultural contradictions of the conflict, only the Peace Agreement through

negotiations will. However, the ACCA will therefore entail all arrangements between the Restoration

Forces of Ambazonia and the GoC to halt violence for a specific time, as always is the case for

standard and effective ceasefire procedures. Unlike the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) type of ceasefire,

which gears towards the halting of violence exclusively and without provision to monitor compliance,

the Definitive and/or Preliminary Ceasefire(s) provides for violence reduction clauses, compliance

monitoring, as well as provides provisions for disarmament and demobilization of conflict parties.

Therefore, the Disarmament, Demobilizations and Reintegration (DDR) committee created by a

presidential decree was supposed to be an integral part of the entire ceasefire and peace processes.

The role of ACCA The Pre-negotiation phase: The usefulness of ACCA could be determined at various phases of

the peace negotiations. During the preliminary phase for example, it will signal an intent to the

Cessation of Hostilities for political negotiations to commence. It could also set the guidelines for basic

security arrangements once the negotiations starts, on the protection of civilians, demilitarized zones

(commonly referred as no-fly zone) etc. At this point mediators and peace experts in collaboration with

other stakeholders could draft a rudimentary roadmap entailing the broader scope of the peace-making

and peacebuilding processes.

Meanwhile, at the negotiation phase, the ACCA and its secretariat (the Ceasefire Group-CG)

could strategize on delinking the political negotiations from the Ground-Zero battlefield violence.

Otherwise, the violence in Ground-Zero (GZ) could contaminate the negotiations, eventually leading to

the concept of Bargaining Failures or Collapse of Negotiations, which could intensify the violence to

heights unimaginable. Therefore, to stabilize and insulate the political negotiations process to make it

void of any GZ violence interference or political bad faith, the CG (Ceasefire Group) should advocate

for an Anglophone Crisis Preliminary Ceasefire Agreement (ACPCA). The aim of the ACPCA is to

stop the violence, but further put in place compliance mechanisms such as monitoring and verification

provisions that will help improve the robustness and resilience of the ACCA as a whole. The

Anglophone Crisis Preliminary Ceasefires Agreement should include a commitment to a political nego-

tiation process from the GoC, which can be in the form of a framework agreement or negotiation

agenda, to demonstrate a clearer trajectory towards the broader political goals.

Conflict parties collaborate meaningfully at the Preliminary Ceasefire phase because it often

represents a significant form of confidence building that increases not only the chances of successful

implementation, but also the space for the parties to practice future collaboration. This is essentially

important given the lack of political trust that looms. Due to the lack of such trust, Preliminary

Ceasefires always leaves arms in the hands of combatants, just in case bad faith steps in.

More interesting is the role of an ACCA in the implementation of negotiation phase. The

ACCA will enhance the process to the Peace Agreement (PA) and/or Definitive Ceasefire, which will

include provisions for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of the Amba Boys, as well as

changes to the structure of the Cameroon‟s security forces. Amba boys or Restoration Fighters are only

likely to agree to such provisions if they are satisfied that they are going to achieve some of their


Zambrut



political aims. As a result, the negotiation of an Anglophone Crisis Definitive Ceasefire (ACDC) will

take place towards the end of the negotiation process. Once the political solution is established, then,

the ACDC could take steps in transitioning Cameroon from the status of war to peace.

Two broad approaches of ACCA The Ideal Approach: In the ideal approach, the GoC and the Restoration Forces of Ambazonia,

and a third party observer agrees on an Anglophone Crisis Preliminary Ceasefire Agreement (ACPCA)

prior to, and during negotiations. The ACPCA will create the space for negotiating the issues

underlying the crisis. In the Philippines, for example, a preliminary ceasefire was in place for years

while the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) negotiated first a framework

agreement and later a comprehensive peace accord. In the case of the Sudan North-South peace

process, only a geographically limited ceasefire was in place in the Nuba Mountains in the early phases

of the negotiations. As such, the negotiations began in the absence of a preliminary ceasefire. After a

major military battle around and within the city of Torit in southern Sudan seriously undermined the

negotiations, the parties agreed to a preliminary form of a ceasefire with a Verification and Monitoring

Team (VMT) under the responsibility of the Chief Mediator General Lazaro Sumbeiywo. This stayed

in place for the remainder of the negotiations. Therefore, the ACPCA is of utmost importance in the

peace process.

The Parallel Approach: In the parallel approach of implementing the ACCA, the GoC and the

Restoration Forces/leaders could negotiate the issues pertaining to the crisis in the absence of a pre-

liminary ceasefire. This is most common in cases where previous peace efforts have failed like the

Historic Major National Dialogue. With the presence of too many political propaganda, both sides may

decide to talk while fighting. This could prevent both sides from using the ACPCA for private gains but

it is not very advisable as violence in GZ could contaminate negotiations. Even without a Preliminary

Ceasefire, efforts are always made to de-escalate violence. For example, in Colombia, a number of

unilateral ceasefires and scaled Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) were used, which developed in

relation to the situation on the ground and the progress made in the political negotiations.

In both the ideal and parallel approach, both parties need to continuously build trust through a

series of “successful” security arrangements during the negotiation phase to be able to implement the

definitive ceasefire. For example, in the Central African Republic, numerous definitive ceasefire

agreements with clauses for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration have failed. This could be

due to the failure of the political negotiations, but also due to the inability of the parties to agree to CoH

or preliminary ceasefires prior to the definitive ceasefire.

Anglophone Crisis Ceasefire Agreement (ACCA) may fail for ONE reason

The success of ceasefire agreements are mostly dependent on certain key factors. Notably, from

a conflict management perspective, ceasefire reduce violence for the most, rather than suspend it (for

example the Minsk Agreement in Ukraine). If at all, they suspend violence for a time, for example the

Kofi Annan-mediated ceasefire early in the Syrian conflict. The quality of the provisions stipulated in a

Ceasefire Agreement can determine its life span. Nonetheless, this Vision for Peace identifies one main

reason that can lead to ACCA failure.

Political Will: ACCA is primarily a strategic tool to move towards the attainment of a common

political objective, which may or may not include a negotiated peace agreement. The ACCA will only

occur when both parties see some utility in entering into an arrangement. Both the GoC and the

Restoration Forces are then likely to continue to honour the agreement as long as they perceive that this

is the most effective way of moving towards their political goals. If, for example, the political process

fails to make sufficient progress, or the CoH/violence is seen to be favouring one side (politically or

militarily), an actor may abandon the ceasefire and return to the violent pursuit of their goals. Similarly,

if they only entered into an agreement to re-arm, re-group or otherwise gain a military advantage, we

may see a subsequent intensification in the same conflict, which could see the strategic redeployment

of the GoC military.


Zambrut



3.5 CHAPTER III E: Conduct During Negotiations (Deeper Dialogue)

Note should be mentioned that, this Vision for Peace intentionally omits the various political, socio-

economic, cultural and judicial topics for negotiation. This part, including other issues like the

content(s) of the Anglophone Crisis Preliminary and Definitive Ceasefire Agreement(s) and the

patterns of interactions will greatly be dependent on the parties. Nonetheless, the dynamics involved in

ensuring a successful ceasefire is as vital as the benefits of ceasefires themselves. They actually shape

the results of an effective ceasefire:

For the Government of the Republic of Cameroon.

During the negotiations, the GoC is advised to adhere to the following guidelines to ensure a

smooth peace and transition process: Restrain excessive use of hard power; engage in acts that

engenders institutional and political trust; make non-provoking arrangements for security of fellow

citizens; prosecute all forms of hate speech by either imprisonment or fine or both. The GoC shall

engage in acts of reconciliation and forgiveness to ease pain, anger and tension deeply rooted in the

hearts of anglophones.

For the Ambazonian Forces and/or Leaders.

On the other hand, the Ambazonia Restoration Forces and their leaders shall maintain and uphold

the ceasefire rules with a minimum commitment to peace talks. They shall seek the cooperation and

collaboration of the Cameroon diaspora in the peace process, and report any form of violence

incitement as well as stop all forms of violence and political propaganda thereof; they shall seek peace

at all cost; and stop all forms of Human Rights abuses.

3.6 CHAPTER III F: A Letter to the Ambazonian Restoration Forces and the Interim

Government of the Ambazonian Governing Council

Dear Restoration Fighters/Leaders of Ambazonia,

I write this open letter to you all (Leaders and fighters) within the context of the ongoing conflict

ravaging Cameroon. Permit me start by acknowledging all efforts towards the struggle for the search

for peace and justice for the Anglophones, from both leaders and fighters. For the fallen victims, I

extend my condolences from the very depth of my soul.

However, failure to move forward will have devastating consequences for both sides. This letter is

a proposal that seeks to engage your minds in an all-inclusive peace-building and peace-making

options and strategies. Nevertheless, without your adequate cooperation and meaningful concessions,

the struggle may not achieve the political goals envisaged. This letter could incentivize your

cooperation, to make room for inclusive dialogue. Without any doubt, your readiness for dialogue, as

far as I can tell, will be conditioned on the political will of the GoC. However, kindly be open to receive

impartial peace mediators who may approach the leaders/fighters to ignite the negotiation process.

Permit me stress this once more; your bravery for social justice is a demonstration of your undying

zeal and vim in the achievement of justice itself. No one, not even our French brothers and sisters could

undermine your fire for liberation. Indeed, you are all agents of change but let us use the strongest

weapon – nonviolence, to resolve these issues.

I conclude this letter by calling on your civic responsibility of protecting the people. Kindly

retract from arbitrary kidnaps and unlawful detention for ransom purposes. Illegitimate means will not

justify legitimate goals. Every stakeholder, I can assure you based on statements from credible

International Organizations are willing to be part of this second round of inclusive negotiations,

reflecting international standards and procedures. Thank you very much for your kind attention, may

God bless and protect you all.

Maxwell N. Achu

CHAPTER 4: SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK

4.1 CHAPTER IV A: SOCIAL FRAMEWORK

Without a substantial success of the political framework elaborated above, the quest for the

implementation of the social and economic framework(s) will be in futility. They are more of

complementaries and mutually reinforcing than to be viewed separately. These frameworks are


Zambrut



projections of the enormous potentials of these regions (North West and South West) if let to unleash

themselves in a peaceful environment. Socially, a peace deal or agreement could see the following

occurring in these regions:

Education Services:

Following one of the root causes of the 2016 riots that claimed its reason towards the complete

annihilation of English school systems, a peace agreement could restore these systems. This would

allow Anglophones to pursue and achieve their goals through education, reflective of their cultural

heritage and roots. This could proceed to education reforms to enhance access to educational

opportunities to victimized communities and structure a specific context curricular including peace

education to implant a peace culture.

Workforce for Development:

Through international assistance, a peace agreement could see a reduction of rural

unemployment with increase occupational mobility. Without doubt, as was the case of Rwanda,

International Development Assistance programs will support apprenticeships, and job placement

services for war victims. Such programs will help anglophones fully prepare to enter into the job

market and achieve professional goals, especially for the youth and women.

Quality Healthcare for War Victims:

Traumatized victims could see the assistance of a psychological recovery program if a peace

agreement ensues. Refugees could have access to healthcare networks to provide their needed

medication, supplies, vaccines and other medical equipment to provide top-quality healthcare

emergencies. This would greatly reduce infant mortality rate and increase average life expectancy.

Without any doubt, a peace Agreement will see a significant improvement in health outcomes

throughout the war zones.

Improve Quality life for Anglophones:

Without any doubt, a peace agreement could see the rise of programs gearing towards bettering

the lives of anglophones and Cameroonians as a whole. There will be both private and public

investments in new cultural institutions to finance the Anglo-Saxon arts and cultural lifestyle. Such

programs will transcend time, and enable the next generation to explore their creativity and improve

their talents. The Anglophone regions could be turned into a cultural and recreational centre to benefit

all anglophones.

More so, a Peace Agreement would further restore Anglophone‟s cultural heritage, within the context

of the judiciary (Common law), life style, civil society, and cultural identity as opposed to second-

classed citizens‟ sentiments.

Refugee Settlement:

Anglophones have become refugees in very high significant numbers, not to mention the

internally displaced persons. A Peace Agreement however, could witness a re-settlement plan piloted

by the GoC through international assistant groups including the United Nations, Care International, and

a host of other social non-governmental organizations. All of these could be possible, depending on the

state of peace in the country. Other countries with more devastating situations found solace in such

programs that have bounced them back. Cameroon is not any different.

4.2 CHAPTER IV B: ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK

Economic Growth and Business Environment:

A lasting Peace Agreement (PA) will set the stage for New Opportunities with massive

International support by building sure foundations for growth and enhance the Business Environment.

This will witness new foundations for the Cameroon economy, to generate rapid economic growth and

job creation for the anglophones, especially. International investors will observe the business

environment prior to making giant economic investments in this part of the country, without which,

FDIs will remain lowest. A lasting peace agreement will boast investors‟ confidence that their


Zambrut



investments will be secured by improving property rights, the rule of law, fiscal sustainability, capital

markets and anti-corruption strategies.

A lasting peace solution will see Cameroon reinstated into the African Growth and Opportunity

Act (AGOA), the US foreign economic policy for the continent. This will heighten investors‟ trust and

confidence. This will see an increase in exports as a percentage of GDP and increase foreign direct

investments in these zones.

Human Capital:

A Peace Agreement will allow the GoC to prioritize public investments for post-conflict

reconstruction in the war zones and unleash Human Potentials of the regions through Entrepreneurship

and Innovation. Creating a sure foundation for growth in business begins with the anglophones

themselves – increasing and exploring their economic potentials. This Vison for Peace will make that

dream come true, if only a peace agreement ensues. International donor support systems could

prioritize programs that further builds human potentials through investments in technical and

vocational education, technology, science and engineering programs.

Private Sector Growth:

A Peace Agreement will promote Private Sector Growth in the Domains of, Tourism,

Agriculture, Manufacturing, and Service Sector. The former Southern Cameroon is rich in touristic

attractions cutting from the grasslands of the Northwest to the Coastal lands of the Southwest. These

parts of the country is endowed with rich potential tourism opportunities. To unlock these potentials

and unleash its capacity, new visitors could be seen flowing to this part of the country.

Agriculturally, farmers could have access to finance and technology, as agriculture accounts for

approximately 65 percent of Anglophone‟s employment. With increase local banks, capital and other

reform subsidies, farmers could have the opportunity to purchase or have access to new seeds and

fertilizers while developing irrigation systems.

4.3 CHAPTER IV C: GOOD GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK

Good Governance by Transforming the Business Environment:

A peace Agreement will enable the GoC implement governance policies towards achieving

better economic environment, through private property rights, safeguards against corruption, and state

monopoly of violence; spur international confidence, credibility and legitimacy. This is an opportunity

for Cameroon to take giant steps to regain from the economic deficiencies recorded in the past three

years of violence.

Good Governance through the building of decentralization institutions:

A peace agreement will see the building of just institutions created within the principles of rule

of law and with clear separation of powers. This invariably means much emphasis should be on the

judicial independence and the existence of bi-judicial systems, applicable to the various cultural

heritages.

Equitable distribution of political positions should not be undermined, as this is core to the

Anglophone‟s cry of political marginalization in the affairs of the state. A strong judicial system will

wade off potential abuse from government officials in the mistreatment of their subjects. Even more

importantly, transparency, accountability and a vibrant civil society are all too critical in shaping the

governance systems in any country.

5. CONCLUSION

Peace-----Peace-----Peace

6. ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Competing Interest: The author (Maxwell N. Achu) declares not having any competing interest that

exist

Author’s contribution: Maxwell N. Achu is the sole author of this document


Zambrut



Ethical consideration: This research work followed all ethical standards for carrying out research,

including direct interviews from the Ambazonian leaders, Government officials and the Civil Society

Data Availability: Data sharing is not applicable to this document as no new data were created in the

study

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author‟s and do not

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency the author is affiliated

7. REFERENCES

Achu, M. 2019. The Quest for Creative Governance. A shift from Institutional FORMS to

Institutional FUNCTIONS: Lessons to Improve the Quality of Governance around the World.

Accra: Published in George Padmore Research Library on African Affairs, Accra Ghana. ISBN

978-9988-2-9063-4.

Achu, M., "Conclusions of the “Anglophone Crisis” Risk Assessments, and the Predictability of

the Crisis‟ Intensity, the Clock Is Ticking" Published in International Journal of Trend in

Scientific Research and Development (IJTSRD), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-3 | Issue-3, April

2019, pp.1606-1618, URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd23513.pdf

Aljazeera, 2016, Cameroon teachers, lawyers strike in battle for English, viewed 05 December

2016, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/cameroon-teachers-lawyers-strike-

english-161205095929616.html. Cited in Morris-Chapman, D.P., 2019, „An Ambazonian

theology? A theological approach to the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon‟, HTS Teologiese

Studies/Theological Studies 75(4), a5371. https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v75i4.5371

Amnesty International „A turn for the worse: Violence and Human rights abuses in

Cameroon.‟ (2017)

https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR1784812018ENGLISH.PDF (Last

Accessed February 14 2020) p.21-25.

Amnesty International 2018, A Turn for the Worse: Violence and Human Rights Violations in

Anglophone Cameroon,

https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR1784812018ENGLISH.PDF , accessed on

02/02/2020

Amnesty International, Annual Report 2017/2018,

https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/cameroon/report-cameroon/ see also BBC,

Cameroon military court jails Anglophone activists, 26 May 2018

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-44263218 accessed on 02/02/2020

Anyangwe C., Betrayal of Too Trusting a People, The UN, the UK and the Trust Territory of

Southern Cameroons Langaa RPICG, Bamenda, 2009 p.4

Anyangwe, C., Imperialistic Politics in Cameroun: Resistance and the Inception of the

Restoration of Statehood of Southern Cameroons, Langaa Research and Publishing Common

Initiative Group, Bamenda, 2008, p 33

Anyangwe, C., The Secrets of an Aborted Decolonisation: The Declassified British Secret Files

on Southern Cameroons, Langaa Research &Publishing CIG, Bamenda, 2010, p5

Anyefru, E., 2010, „Paradoxes of internationalization of the Anglophone problem in

Cameroon‟, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 28(1), 85–101.

https://doi.org/10.1080/02589000903542624

Ardener, E., The Nature of the Reunification of Cameroon 1960-1966, in Ardener, S., (ed.),

Kingdom on Mount Cameroon- Studies in the History of the Cameroon Coast 1500-1997,

Berghahn Books, 1998, p 276

Awasom., F., Colonial Background to the Development of Autonomist Tendencies in

Anglophone Cameroon,1916-1961, Journal of Third World Studies, vol. xv, No.1,1998

BBC, 2017, „Why has Cameroon blocked the internet‟, viewed 08 February 2017, from

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38895541. Cited in Morris-Chapman, D.P., 2019, „An

Ambazonian theology? A theological approach to the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon‟, HTS

Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 75(4), a5371. https://doi.org/ 10.4102/hts.v75i4.5371.














































Zambrut



Bongmba, E.K., 2016, „Church and State in Cameroon: The political theology of Christian

Cardinal Tumi‟, Journal of Asian African Studies 51(3), 283–304.

https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909615612110

Breton, J., „De la Tutelle à la République Unie : Réflexion sur la Dynamique Unitaire dans

l‘Evolution Institutionnelle du Cameroun Indépendant,‘ Penant, 1979, p209

Campbell, Tim. 2003. ―The Quiet Revolution: Decentralization and the Rise of Political

Participation in Latin American Cities‖. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Cassese, A., Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, CUP. P 73

Center for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa, the plight of + 400.000 IDPS

https://chrda.org/index.php/2018/08/26/the-plight-of-400000-idps/ accessed on 02/02/2020

Chem-Langhee, B., The Anglophone-Francophone Divide and Political Disintegration in

Cameroon: A Psychohistorical Perspective, in Nkwi and Nyamnjoh, Regional Balance and

National Integration in Cameroon: Lessons Learned and the uncertain future, Oxford, African

Books Collective, 2011,

Dongmo, C., 2008, „The building of a dictatorship‟, Cameroon Journal on Democracy and

Human Rights 2(1), 41–50.

Elango, L., The Anglo-French Condominium in Cameroon 1914-1916: A History of

Misunderstanding, Limbe, Navi-Group Publishers, 1987, p. 9;

Fru-Anye, E., Issues of Minority Rights in the Context of Political Liberalization: The Case of

Anglophone Cameroon (PhD Thesis: University of Witwatersrand, 2008, p 187

GA Resolution 1541 (XV), Defining the Three Options for Self-Determination UN GAOR,

15th Sess. Sup. No. 16 at 29, UN Doc A/4651, 1960

ICJ 1986, Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute, Burkina Faso V Republic of Mali, Merits,

1986 ICJ 564, paras 21-25

ICJ 1995, Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia) ICJ Rep 1995, 90

Johns Hopkins University Press.

Konings, P., Nyamnjoh, F., The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon, p.217

Loh, C., 2017, Anglophone crisis: Catholic, PCC, CBC Leaders Summoned to Court, viewed

21 April 2017.https://www.cameroon-tribune.cm/articles/7825/fr/anglophone-crisis-catholic-

pcc-cbc-leaders-summoned-to-court.

Lunn, J., and Brooke-Holland, L., The Anglophone Cameroon Crisis: June 2018 update,

Briefing paper N0 8331, 6 June 2018, House of Commons Library, p 8

Manasse, A., Menaces Sécessionistes sur l‘Etat Camerounais, Le Monde Diplomatique,

December 2002, No.585, p.12.

Mazrui, A., & Tidy, M., Nationalism and New States in Africa, East African Educational

Publishers, Nairobi, 1984, p77

Mbembe, A., 2001, On the postcolony, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.

Mbembe, A., 2017a, Critique of Black reason, transl. L. Dubois, Duke University Press,

Durham, NC.

Mbile. N., Cameroon Political Story-Memories of an Authentic Eye Witness, Presbyterian

Printing Press, Victoria, 2000

Muna, S., Original Version of the Memorandum Addressed to President Biya in January 1984

on “The Anglophone Problem” 1984

Nkwain, A.N., 2013, Cultural diversity and its challenges to evangelization in Cameroon: A

multidisciplinary approach with Pastoral focus of a church in a multicultural African Society,

Peter Lang, Frankfurt. Cited in Morris-Chapman, D.P., 2019, „An Ambazonian theology? A

theological approach to the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon‟, HTS Teologiese

Studies/Theological Studies 75(4), a5371. https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v75i4.5371

Nkwi, W., The Anglophone Problem, in Ngoh ed., Cameroon: From a Federal to a Unitary

State, p197

Nyamndi, G., Whether Loosing Whether Winning: Essays in Political Realism, Buea, p. ix, x

Nyamnjoh, F., (ed.), The Cameroon GCE Crisis: A Test of Anglophone Solidarity, Limbe,

Nooremac Press, 1996

Omoigui, N., The Bakassi Story, 1950-1975, https://dawodu.com/bakassi3.htm
























































Zambrut



Peter Zongo 2018 'This is a genocide': villages burn as war rages in blood-soaked Cameroon.‟

(The Guardian May 30th 2018) https://www.theguardian.com/global-

development/2018/may/30/cameroon-killings-escalate-anglophone-crisis (Last February 14

2020).

Tendler, Judith. 1997. ―Good Government in the Tropics‖. Baltimore:

UNGA resolution 1282 (XIII) of 5 December 1958

UNGA Resolution 1608 (xv) of 21/04/1961

UNGA Resolution 649 (VII) of 20/12/1951 on Administrative Unions Affecting Trust

Territories

UNHCR, Flash update, 9-20 April 2018,

https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/63470120

United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Articles 1(2), 55, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS

XVI

Endnotes

1 International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (IJTSRD): Volume: 3 | Issue: 3 | Mar-Apr 2019

Available Online: www ijtsrd com e-ISSN: 2456 – 6470 2 United Nations Global Compact, „The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact.‟ In United Nations Global Compact,

2018, https://www unglobalcompact orh/what-is-gc/mission/principles [accessed 20 January 2020] 3 Yearbook of the United Nations, 1952, pp.564-565

4 Covenant of the League of Nations 1920, http://treaties fco gov uk/docs/pdf/1924/TS0037.pdf accessed on 02 January

2020 5 Anyangwe C., Betrayal of Too Trusting a People, ibid, P. 5

6 The Trusteeship Council, under the Authority of the UNGA, was assigned to supervise the transition of Trust Territories,

like British Southern Cameroon into self-governing or independent states: Article 85 UN Charter 1945 7 Trusteeship Council Resolution 899 (XIII) of 26 February 1954

8 General Assembly Resolution 1282 (XIII) of 5th December 1958

9 Repertory of Practice of the United Nations Organs, Supplement No.3 (1959-1966) vol.3 International Trusteeship

System, Article 76 p119 10

UNGA Resolution 1413 (XIV) Attainment of self-government or Independence by Trust Territories, of 05/12/1959 11

Omoigui, N. ibid 12

United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Decolonisation, A publication of the United Nations Department of

Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonisation, No. 19, 1983, p 20 13

Report of the Trusteeship Council presented on the 19 December 1961 at the 1158th meeting under item 4, International

Organisation, Volume 16 Issue 01, December 1962, p141 14

This Article gave the President overwhelming constitutional powers including the ability to rule by decrees. 15

Article 47 rejected any proposals for amendment of the constitution that would endanger the unity an integrity of the

federation 16

Unbelievably but true, Article 59 provided for official publication of this constitution in both English and French with the

French version being the authentic version. 17

The 1962 Subversion Ordinance, the 1966 Law on Press Censorship, the 1967 Law on Associations and the Pass Law. 18

Achille Mbembe (2001, 2017a) articulates how a betrayal of the vision of independence (federalism), and the subsequent

economic devastation that follows, has created the kinds of regimes typified in so many postcolonial states (Bongmba

2016:284). 19

Section 1 (1) of Law No. 84-01 on the Constitution of Cameroon promulgated on the 04/02/194 20

The first Anglophone Ministers of Territorial Administration or Secondary Education were appointed in 2017 in the heat

of the ongoing Anglophone crisis 21

Société Nationale de Raffinage 22

Société Nationale des Hydrocarbures 23

All Anglophone Conference (AAC) Buea Declaration, Limbe, Nooremac Press,1993 24

https://www amnesty org/en/latest/news/2017/10/cameroon-inmates-packed-like-sardines-in-overcrowded-prisons-

following-anglophone-protests/ 25

Amnesty International, A Turn for the Worse: Violence and Human Rights Violations in Anglophone Cameroon,

https://www amnesty org/download/Documents/AFR1784812018ENGLISH.PDF , accessed on 02/02/2020 26

International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian

Territory (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Rep 136,2004, para 118. 27

International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia

(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution, Advisory Opinion No. 53, 276 (1970), 21 June 1971 28

Western Sahara, 1975, ICJ 12, 29

Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 3, 31 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1499 (1992).















Zambrut



30

G. Nyamndi asserted that the federal system had offered Southern Cameroon a form of protection and preservation of

their identity within the Francophone-dominated federation. Furthermore, the dissolution of the Federal system in 1972,

Anglophone Cameroonians became insecure, restive and justifiably irritable due to political inconsistency of the French

regime. (Nyamndi. G). 31

Re Secession of Quebec, Canadian Supreme Court, 2 SCR 217,1998, para 136; Accordance with International Law of the

Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010, I.C.J. 618, 622 11-12 (July 22) 32

Re secession of Quebec, ibid 33

Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Uruguay, 26 December 1933 34

International Crisis Group, Cameroon‟s Anglophone Crisis at the Crossroads, Africa Report No 250 1 2 August 2017 35

Presidential Decree 2017/013 to lay down the establishment, organizations and functioning of the National Commission

on the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism, https://www prc

cm/files/b1/00/4d/1f4edab0eb8fab5df54955177eff43d3.pdf 23 January 2018, accessed on 10/02/2020 36

Camernews, Revendications des Avocats anglophones : la réponse du chef de l‘Etat,

https://www camernews com/revendications-des-avocats-anglophones-la-reponse-du-chef-de-letat/, 31 March 2017,

accessed on 11/02/2020 37

A Report on the Anglophone Crisis by

Dr. Roxana Willis, Postdoctoral Fellow of the British Academy and Junior Research Fellow in Law, University of Oxford

Joseph MacAulay, Doctoral Candidate in Criminology, University of Oxford

Ndjodi Ndeunyema, Doctoral Candidate in Law, University of Oxford, and Research Director of the Oxford Human Rights

Hub and

Dr. James Angove, Researcher and Lecturer in Moral and Political Philosophy, University of Oxford 3838

Journal du Cameroun „Rights group says over 100 villages burnt in Cameroon‟s Anglophone regions.‟ (October 22th

2018) https://www journalducameroun com/en/rights-group-says-100-villages-burnt-cameroons-anglophone-regions/

(Accessed February 14 2020). 39

Siobhan O‟Grady „Divided by Language: Cameroon‟s Crackdown on its English-Speaking Minority is fuelling a

secessionist Movement.‟ (The Washing Post, February 5th 2019) https://www washingtonpost

com/graphics/2019/world/cameroon-anglophone-crisis/ (Accessed February 14, 2020). 40

Human Rights Watch „Cameroon: New Attacks on Civilians By Troops, Separatists: At Least 170 Killed; Hundreds of

Homes Burned.‟ (March 28th 2019) https://www hrw org/news/2019/03/28/cameroon-new-attacks-civilians-troops-

separatists (Last Accessed February 14, 2020). 41

Ruth Maclean „Cameroonian soldiers accused of killing baby as family flees: Army denies involvement in death of four-

month old in violence-plagued anglophone region.‟ (The Guardian May 27th 2019). https://www theguardian

com/world/2019/may/27/cameroonian-soldiers-accused-of-killing-baby-as-family-flees (Last Accessed February 14 2020). 42

Human Rights Watch „“These Killings can be stopped” Government and Separatists human rights abuses in Cameroon‟s

Anglophone Regions.‟ (2018). https://www hrw org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/cameroon0718_web2.pdf (Last Accessed

February 14 2020). 43

U.S. Department of State „Cameroon 2018 Human Rights Report.‟ (March 18th 2019). https://www state gov/wp-

content/uploads/2019/03/Cameroon-2018.pdf (Last Accessed February 14 2020). 44

B.B.C. News „Newsday: Cameroon‟s Lawyers on Strike.‟ (September 17th, 2019). https://www bbc co

uk/programmes/p07njmsz (Last Accessed November 16 2019). 45

Human Rights Watch „Cameroon: Opposition Leaders Arrested: Violent Crackdown on Protests.‟ (January 30th 2019)

https://www hrw org/news/2019/01/30/cameroon-opposition-leaders-arrested (Last Accessed February 14 2020). 46

Amnesty International „Cameroon: Inmates „packed like sardines‟ in overcrowded prisons following deadly Anglophone

protests.‟ (October 13th 2017) https://www amnesty org/en/latest/news/2017/10/cameroon-inmates-packed-like-sardines-in-

overcrowded-prisons-following-anglophone-protests/ (Last Accessed November 14 2020) 47

Amnesty International “Amnesty International Report 2017/18: State of the World‟s Human Rights.” (2018). https://www

amnesty org/download/Documents/POL1067002018ENGLISH.PDF (Last Accessed November 16 2019) p.114. 48

Human Rights Watch „Cameroon: Security Forces Kill Civilians, Rape Woman Investigate Crimes, Hold Security Forces

Accountable.‟ (July 22nd 2019) https://www hrw org/news/2019/07/22/cameroon-security-forces-kill-civilians-rape-woman

(Last Accessed January 16 2020). 49

Annette Young „The 51% - Rape as a weapon of War: Sexual Violence on the rise in Cameroon‟s Anglophone Region.‟

(France 24, April 19th 2019) https://www france24 com/en/20190419-51-percent-sexual-violence-cameroon-anglophone-

region-iran-boxer-brexit-women-impact (Last Accessed January 20 2020). 50

Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa „Cameroon‟s Unfolding Catastrophe: Evidence of Human Rights

Violations and Crimes against Humanity.‟ (June 3rd 2019) https://chrda org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Cameroons-

Unfolding-Catastrophe-CHRDA-RWCHR-2019.pdf (Last Accessed December 20 2020) p.33. 51

See for example Freedom House „Freedom of the Press 2017: Cameroon Profile.‟ (2017). https://freedomhouse

org/report/freedom-press/2017/cameroon (Last Accessed February 10 2020). 52

Amnesty International „Cameroon: Peaceful Protesters Targeted in Violent Crackdown must be released.‟ (28th January

2019) https://www amnesty org/en/latest/news/2019/01/cameroon-peaceful-protesters-targeted-in-violent-crackdown-must-

be-released/ (Last Accessed November 16 2019). 53

U.S. Department of State „Cameroon 2018 Human Rights Report.‟ (March 18th 2019). https://www state gov/wp-

content/uploads/2019/03/Cameroon-2018.pdf (Last Accessed November 16 2020). p.17-19.


Zambrut



54

Amnesty International „Cameroon: Horrific Violence escalates further in Anglophone regions.‟ (18th September 2018)

https://www amnesty org/en/latest/news/2018/09/cameroon-horrific-violence-escalates-further-in-anglophone-regions/

(Last Assessed November 16 2019). 55

Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa „Cameroon‟s Unfolding Catastrophe: Evidence of Human Rights

Violations and Crimes against Humanity.‟ (June 3rd 2019) https://chrda org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Cameroons-

Unfolding-Catastrophe-CHRDA-RWCHR-2019.pdf (Last Accessed November 16 2019) p.35-37. 56

Moki Edwin Kindzeka „Cameroon: Separatist Fighters Occupy 50 Schools.‟ (Voice of America, July 22nd 2019)

https://www voanews com/africa/cameroon-separatist-fighters-occupy-50-schools (Last Accessed November 16 2019). 57

Amnesty International „A turn for the worse: Violence and Human rights abuses in Cameroon.‟ (2017) https://www

amnesty org/download/Documents/AFR1784812018ENGLISH.PDF (Last Accessed November 16 2019). 58

Human Rights Watch „Cameroon: New Attacks on Civilians by Troops, Separatists: At Least 170 Killed; Hundreds of

Homes Burned.‟ (March 28th 2019) https://www hrw org/news/2019/03/28/cameroon-new-attacks-civilians-troops-

separatists (Last Accessed November 20 2019). 59

Human Rights Watch “These Killings can be stopped” Government and Separatists human rights abuses in Cameroon‟s

Anglophone Regions.‟ (2018) https://www hrw org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/cameroon0718_web2.pdf

United Nations News „Over 80 per cent of schools in anglophone Cameroon shut down, as conflict worsens.‟ (21st June

2019) https://news un org/en/story/2019/06/1041071

U.S. Department of State „Cameroon 2018 Human Rights Report.‟ (March 18th 2019) https://www state gov/wp-

content/uploads/2019/03/Cameroon-2018.pdf (Last Accessed November 11 2019) 60

In Colombia, a successfully implemented ceasefire agreement led to the laying down of arms of the Fuerzas Armadas

Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) and ending the status of war with the FARC.

Zambrut Journal, Link Access;

https://zambrut.com


© Copyright International Journal of Zambrut | Zambrut, Inc.


