The Air Superiority Battle i n the Middle East, 1967-1973

Clarence E. Olschner, 111, MAJ, W A F U.S. Army Command and General STaff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

Final report 9 June 1978

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

A Master of Military A r t and Science thesis presented t o the faculty of the U.S. Army Couunand and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

MASTER OF MILITAQY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

N a m e o f candidate a Title of thesis The Air Superiority Battle in the Middle East, 1967-1973

, Research Advisor , M e m b e r , Graduate Faculty Member, Consulting Faculty

11978 by , Dir ctor, Master of Military A r t and Science.

Thc opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the v i e w s of either the U . S . Army Command and G e n e r a l Staff College o r any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoinq statement.)

ii

ABSTRACT

THE AIR SUPERIORITY BATTLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1967-1973 by M a j o r Clarence E. Olschner, 111, WAF', 103 pages

This paper is an historical study of the strategy,

tactics, and weapons employed by Israel, Egypt, and Syria in

the battle for air superiority from 1967 through 1973. The

study is developed chronologically beginning with the 1967 W a r ,

through the W a r of Attrition, and ending with the cease-fire

in the 1973 War. It has been compiled f r o m an extensive re-

view of unclassified, primarily secondary, unofficial sources.

The paper concludes that, in a mid-intensity war with

modern air forces and air defense forces:

1. The achievement of strategic, tactical, and/or

technological surprise can significantly influence the battle

for air superiority.

2, Missiles have demonstrated the capability t o

significantly influence the air superiority battle in surface-

to-air, air-to-air, and air-to-ground operations.

3 . Air superiority can be achieved over the modern

battlefield only by defeating both surface-to-air and air-

t o - a i r capabilities of the enemy.

4, The achievement of air superiority over the battle

area requires the combined efforts of air and land forces of

which long range artillery may be the most effective weapon

for the suppression of surface-based air defenses.

iii

ASKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to say thank you to those who gave

generously of their time and talent to make this thesis

possible. Dr. Kenneth Werrell provided excellent guidance

and assistance throughout the y e a r . COL T o N. Dupuy (USA,

Ret.) kindly answered numerous questions and made available

several unpublished resources. LTC Roger K. Taylor (USAF)

offered insight on the employment of airpower which was

most helpful. Mrs. Marilyn Slack has provided expert typing

assistance. Finally, I thank my loving w i f e , Donna, without

whose prayers and support this paper could not have been

writ ten.

iv

TAEILE O F CONTENTS

Page

A P P R O V A L P A G E . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ii

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i v

LIST O F TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v i i i

INTRODUCTION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ix

I. T H E 1 9 6 7 W A R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0THE ISflA?3LI WAR PLAN 1

4SURPRISE ACHIEVED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

6

THE IAF' VERSUS JORDA.. AVD SYRIA . . . . . . 10

TOTAL LOSSES ON 5 JUNE 1967 . . . . . . . . 11

A I R ACTIVITY ON 6 JUNE 1967 . . . . . . . . 11

TOTAL LOSSES, 5-6 JUNE 1967 . . . . . . . . 12

AIR ACTIVITY 7-10 JUNE 1967 . . . . . . . . 12

OBSERVATIONS ON THE 1967 WAR . . . . . . . 14

E.NDN0TES 160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

THE IAF ATTACK ON EGYPT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

II. BETWEEN TWO WARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

THE BEGINNING O F THE WAR O F ATTRITION . . . 20

AIR POWm I N THE WAR O F ATTRITION . . . . . 21

0 0 0THE CONSTRUCTION O F THE SAM UMBRELLA 24

IsRmLr VIEW OF THE UMBRELLA . . . . . . . 25

DEVELOPMENT O F THE EGYPTIAN AIR DEFENSE

FORCE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

V

Page

PREPARATION OF THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE . . . . 31

REBUILDING THE smrm AIR FORCE . . . . . . . 33

SUMMARY O F THE INTER-WAR PERIOD 0 0 0 0 0 33

ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

111. THE 1973 BATTLE FOR AIR SUPERIORITY . . . . . . 39

THE ISRAELI CONCEPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

THE I S R A E L I DECISION TO NOT PRE-EMPT . . . . 41

THE ARAB STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

THE COORDINATED ATTACK . . . . . . . . . . . 45

OVER THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. 6 OCTOBER 1973 . . . 46

TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISE 0 0 0 a a a 0 0 48

0 .IAF TACTICS AND LOSSES. 6 OCTOBER 1973 . 49

MOUNT HERMON.. ANOTHER SURPRISE . . . . . . . 50

GOLAN SUMMARY. 6 OCTOBER 1973 . . . . . . . . 50

OVER THE SINAI. 6 OCTOBER 1973 . . . . . . . 50

SUMMARY OF THE AIR BATTLE. 6 OCTOBER 1973 . . 54

rm PRIORITIES ON 7 OCTOBER 1973 . . . . . . 54

COUNTERAIR STRIKES .AGAINST AIRFIELDS

BEGINNING 7 OCTOBER . . . . . . . . . . . 56

IAF ATTACKS ON EGYPTIAN BRIDGES . . . . . . . 58

I A F DIRECTLY CONFRONTED SAMS. BEGINNING

8OCTOBER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

WEAPONS AND TACTICS USED AGAINST SAM SITES . 59

COUNTERMEASURES .AGAINST SAMS . . . . . . . . 62

STRATEGIC BOMBING I N SYRIA BEGINNING

9 OCTOBER 2973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

THE EGYPTIAN OFFENSIVE. 14 OCTOBER . . . . . 63

Vi

Page

COUNTERING EGYPT'S SAM UMBRELLA, 16-24

65OCTOBER 1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

E.AF RESPONSE TO THE ISFIAELI CROSSING . . . . 65

SUMMARY OF' THE 1973 AIR SUPERIORITY BATTLE . 66

E N D N O T E S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 72

I V . OBSERVATIONS .AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . 79

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0SURPRISE. . 79

80CONCLUSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

80MISSILES. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

81CONCLUSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

81SURFACE-BASED AIR DEFENSES 0 0 0 0

82

COMBINED ARMS FOR A I R SUPERIORITY . . . . . 83

CONCLUSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CONCLUSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 83

BIBLIOGRlLDXY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 85

vii

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1 0. Air O r d e r of Battle. 5 June 1967 0 . 3

2. I A F Losses Against Egypt on 5 June 1967 ... 9

3 . Aircraft Lost 5-6 June 1967 . . . . . . . . . 12

40 Air Order of Battle. 6 October 1973 . . . . . 34

5 . 1973 Aircraft Losses by Type . . . . . . . . . 68

60 1973 Aircraft Losses by Cause . . . . . . . . 68

7. 1973 Aircraft Losses by Time Period . . . . . 69

80 1973 Combat Sorties and Loss Rates . . . . . . 69

1973 I A F Air-to-Air Kills by Weapon . . . . . 69

viii

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Air superiority in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War is of

particular interest to the military tactician today because

this battle f o r the air was intensely fought with some of

the most modern weapons and tactics in the world. The

intensity, complexity and duration of this battle contrasted

sharply with the relatively simple and quick manner in which

the Israeli A i r Force (IAF) gained air superiority in the

1967 War. To understand the conduct of the 1973 War it is

essential to examine the development of the air battle in

the 1967 War and the War of Attrition.

This paper is an historical study of the strategy,

tactics, and weapons employed by Israel, E g y p t , and Syria

in the battle f o r air superiority f r o m 1967 through 1973.

The study is developed chronologically beginning with the

1967 War, through the War of Attrition, and ending with the

cease-fire in the 1973 War. It is appropriate here to say

a few words about data.

This study has been prepared from unclassified,

primarily unofficial, secondary sources. Because of the

limited information available on Syrian participation in the

w a r , greater emphasis has been given to examining the battle

on tho Egyptian front.

ix

The study of an air superiority battle revolves around

the destruction of aircraft and how they were destroyed.

While different sources seldom agree on the air order of

h t t t t l c at t h c start of a war, t.here is greater difficulty in

(3etcrmining how many aircraft were lost during a war and,

further, how they were lost. Few, if any, participants in

a war can afford to accurately reveal their own losses, but

each side makes claims about the opponent's losses. Some

claims are conservative, some are optimistic, and some are

exaggerated for reasons which are easy to understand.

Since the Arab-Israeli dispute is far from settled,

it is not surprising that none of the participants has

opened its records for examination.

A number of books and articles have been written by

Israeli and, m o r e recently, by E g y p t i a n political and

military leaders. These provide good information on the

course of the war, but they generally omit details on their

own losses. Most of the data on Israeli losses must come

from the m a n y military analysts who have contacted unofficial

sources in Israel. Unfortunately, very few western writers

have had access to unofficial sources in the Arab countries,

and their reports usually cover Israeli rather than Arab

losses.

This author has attempted to select the data on

Israeli losses which is most consistent with the course of

the war; the data on Arab losses, as explained, has been

limited primarily to that reported by Israel.

X

With the passage of time and hopefully the resolution

of this conflict, one can hope that all participants will

reveal more of the information which will enable a true

picture of the war to emerge.

Xi

CHAPTER r

On 5 June 1967 Israel launched a combined air and

land attack against three of her neighbors: Egypt, Jordan,

and Syria. Israel initiated the fighting after consider-

able preparations for war by both sides. On 7 April 1967

there was a serious clash between Syrian and Israeli fighters

in which six Syrian MIGs were shot down.' Between 14 and

16 May, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan mobilized their armed

forces, and the Egyptian Army began a buildup in the Sinai.

On 28 May the Israel Defense Forces ( I D F ) also began to

mobilize. The next day Egyptian President Nasser requested

that the U.N. observers withdraw f r o m the Sinai, and he 2ordered the G u l f of Aqaba be closed to Israeli shipping.

On 23 May Israeli Premier Eshkol termed the blockade m a n

act of aggression against Israel"; a week later he appointed

Moshe Dayan as defense minister. The threats, maneuvering,

and buildup of forces continued through Sunday, 4 June, when

Iraq joined the defense alliance recently formed by Egypt,

Syria, and Jordan. On the same day, the Israeli cabinet con-

cluded that Israel could best survive a w a r against this 3Arab alliance by striking the first blow.

THE IsRm.m WAR PLAN

Seizing the initiative and taking the battle into

L

2

enemy territory at the earliest opportunity had become

o f f i c i a l Israeli doctrine under the direction of Israel's

first defense minister, David Ben-Gurion. Churchill wrote,

"Because of the small size of Israel and the concentration of

her population, the Israelis know that they can never afford

to let their own country be the battlefield . . ..11 4 The main objective of the Israeli plan was to reopen

the Straits of Tiran, and it assumed that Israel would have

only 48 hours before the U.N. and the great powers imposed a

cease-fire, To accomplish the objective, the Israelis

planned to quickly destroy the Egyptian Air Force and to

thrust the Israeli Army into the Sinai supported by the IAF'

as soon as it was available,5

The Egyptian Air Force (Em) (Tabla X ) posed the

greatest threat to the IN; it therefore had to be the first

targe t o

Surprise was critical to the I A F plan; they had to

catch the EAF on the ground before they could launch against

IsraeL. F r o m their bases in the Sinai, the EAF could be

over Israel's cities and airfields in less than ten minutes,

a n d their TU-26 "Badgerff bombers could reach Israel f r o m the

fartherest corner of Egypt.

Ex-IAF Commander, Ezer Weizman, stated that the IAF'

developed the plan and the capability f o r a pre-emptive

strike over a period of ten yearsO7 Another source reported:

--

-- --

--

3

6TABLE 1

AIR ORDER OF B.ATTLE, 5 JUNE 1967

JORDAN ISRAEL

Fighter-

Bombers :

su-7 Mirage 92 MIG-21 Super Mystere 24 MIG-19 Mys tere 82 MIG-15/17 0-uragan 55 Hunter -

T o t a l 358 253

Bombers :

Tu-3.6 30 Vauto u r 24 1~-28 43 -0

Total 73 24

SAMS : 160 0-- 50 950 143 550

NOTES: All the SAYS possessed by Egypt at this time were S A - ~ S , Israel also had 60 Magister trainers which had a light ground attack capability,

4

The whole of the IAFfs operational training syllabus over the past f ive years or more had been based on the assumption that a large-scale pre-emptive strike might one day have to be made on airfields in Egypt and the other Arab countries. Five bombing ranges in the Negev had be n specially designed to simulate enemy targets !3 0 0 0 .

In 1.965the IAF began a routine of launching large

flights of fighters early each morning and sending them

west into the Mediterranean. The E D responded with a

sizeable "dawn patrol'f of MIG fighters, but after several

months these flights became a standard practice rather than

a response to IAF activity. The presence of large flights

of IAJ? aircraft north of Egypt had become routine and were

no longer a cause for alarm in Egypt. The Egyptian dawn

patrol would land about 0830 hours; the pilots then had

breakfast and prepared f o r the d a y b training,9

The IAF, therefore, selected 0845 hours as the

optimum time to attack. At this time, there were a minimum

of EAF aircraft on alert; the morning fog over the four

bases along the canal had usually lifted; and m a n y of the

EAF commanders would be caught enroute to their offices

(because the normal workday began at 0900). This time also

anticipated the great physical strain the IAF'pilots would

experience in the first two days of the war, By attacking 10at 0845 the Israeli pilots could sleep until 0400.

As the first wave of I A F fighters departed Israeli

airspace at 0825 hours on 5 June 1967, there were two

5

factors which nearly preve.nted the IAF from achieving the

all-important element of su.rprise.

The first was the flight of a twin-engine IL-14

flying command post of the Egyptian A i r Force, which was

carrying Egyptian Air Force Commander, General Sidki,

Egyptian Chief of Staff General Alner, and a Soviet A i r Force

brigadier general, the advisor to the E.AF. The IL-14 took

o f f at 0805 so that Generals Sidki and h e r could personally

a s s e s s the Sinai situation. When the Ilyushin reached the

eastern Sinai and turned south, the Israeli generals watching

it on radar breathed a sigh of relief. Had the plane turned

north toward Gaza, the occupants would probably have seen

the first wave of IAF' fighters enroute to their targets. 11

The second f a c t o r was t he Jordanian radar station at

A j l u n which saw the Israeli fighters and at 0838 hours sent

a warning message to Egypt. A recent directive by the

Egyptian War Minister, Shams-al-Din Badran, however, required

such messages be routed through his office enroute to the

A i r Forcc. This delay prevented the message from reaching 12 the EAF before the Israelis did .

f With these t w o favorable breaks, the IAF did the rest.

They maintained absolute radio silence and penetrated beneath

the Egyptian radars by flying over the water and land at

30 to 50 feet. Good fortune, extensive planning, preparation

and training, ,.and disciplined execution resulted in the

achievemsnt of complete surprise. I 3 4

6

THE I A F ATTACK ON EGYPT

A t 0845 hours Cairo time (0745 in Tel Aviv) on

Monday, 5 June 1967, the first wave of Israeli fighters

simultaneously struck nine of Egypt's nineteen airfields.

Minutes later, the morning fog lifted over Fayid airfield

on the canal, and it was immediately struck. The first wave

consisted of one or two flights of four for each of the ten

bases. These aircraft had a maximum of ten minutes over

their targets before the arrival of the next wave. The

second and third waves struck at 0855 and 0905 hours and

expanded the attack to include the remaining six bases in

northern Egypt . Then there was a thirty minute respite

before the first wave returned. In this manner, nine waves

in three hours destroyed the greater part of the EM'. That

afternoon the three bases in Southern Egypt (Hurghada, Luxor, 14

a n t i ! RasBanas) were hit by the "Vautour" light bombers.

The IAF capitalized on the element of surprise by

first attacking the runways, thereby trapping most of the

Egyptian aircraft on the ground. The majority of the

attackers hit the runways with 500 or 1,000-pound bombs while

about 40 percent employed the French-designed "concrete

dibber.ff This bomb had retrorockets which slowed it

immediately after release and pointed it straight down; then

another rocket drove it into the concrete where a timer

exploded it moments, minutes, o r hours later. It produced

a hole one t o two meters deep, and the delay fuse produced a

7

difficult problem f o r runway repair c r e w s , This bomb also

allowed the attackers to remain at low altitude instead of

"popping uptr several thousand feet f o r a conventional dive

bomb attack. 15

The initial bombing pass by the Israelis was made at

about 500 knots. Subsequent passes, f o r firing cannon and

rockets, were flown at minimurn effective speed. Although

this slow speed increased I@ losses to A4 guns, it also

increased Israeli accuracy, target identification and damage 16assessment.

The EAJ? had no hardened shelters for their aircraft,

but some were parked in revetments. Nonetheless, the

accurate strafing of the IAF enabled them to fire inside

these revetments. In this manner, a l l 30 of the T U - ~ ~ S ,

the IAFb highest priority target, were destroyed at Cairo

West airfield by the first and second waves. Accurate

strafing also accounted f o r most of the second-priority

M I G - 2 1 s . These proved to be particularly susceptible to

f l r o ; they burst into flame after relatively few hits by

1730-mm cannons.

To insure the success of the attack upon Egypt the

IA??had confidently concentrated almost all of the fighters

in its offensive, holding back only 22 interceptors for air

defense. On this day, the IAF a l so did not fly any escort

missions, and mrther ordered the pilots not to engage in

air-to-air combat unless they were intercepted during their

ground attack. 18

8

Egypt had interceptors on alert at the end of a number

o f .ruriwayy:;, but tkic attack came so swiftly that only t w o

fli.[;htr; of four MIG-22s each got airborne. These aircraft

shot down t w o IAF' aircraft engaged in ground attack before

all eight of them were shot down. Twelve MIG-21 and eight

MIG-19 interceptors also got airborne froa the southern base

of Hurghada. They flew over 200 miles north and engaged 16

Mirages in a dogfight over Abu Sueir. Four of the MIGs were

shot down, others were destroyed while landing on torn-up

runways, and a few got down safely, The only other aircraft

reported to have been airborne during the attack were four

unarmed Egyptian trainers and the flying co.mand post. 19

Lieutenant General Mohamrllad Fahmy later related the

inadequacy of Egyptian air defense to stop this attack:

Enemy aircraft approached at low altitudes, making use of the gaps in our radar field, which was still being established. In addition to the limited number of our available antiaircraft missile units, they were not de- signed f o r engagement of low altitude targets, at which height all enemy air raids were carried out. Thus the enemy air force was confronted only by the limited, old- fashioned anti-aircraft artillery which dated back to World War 11. It was not capable of dealing efficiently with modern aircraft which had speed and maneuverability. Nevertheless, AA units did shoot down a number of enemy aircsBf t . But this had no effect on the results of the war.

Table I1 shows the losses by cause, f o r the IAF' in

490 sorties against Egypt on the first day. The l o s s of

19 aircraft amounts to 3.9 aircraft l o s t per 100 sorties, or

an attrition rate of approximately 4 percent.

Of the l.3 Israeli aircraft shot down by AAA three were

hit on their initial bombing pass; the other ten were knocked

9

TABLE rI2l

IAF LOSSE3 .ArAINST EGYPT ON 5 JUNE 1967

Air-to-air.

13 AAA 0 SAM

2 Flew into the ground.

2 O w n ordnance o r targetexplosion.

I UnknownI

down while making their second, third, or fourth pass. 22 r t

should also be noted that the IAF did :not lose any aircraft

to the Egyptian S.A-2 SAMs. The S A - 2 was ineffective below

3,000 feet; and, when fired at aircraft above that altitude,

it was defeated by a hard descending turn into the missile.

The SAMs w e r e not considered important enough to even be

atkackcd. on the first day.23

Dur ing the afternoon of 5 June the IAF attacked radar

sites in Egypt and claimed the destruction of 23 including

all 16 of the radars in the Sinai. 24 Before sundown the IAF

returned to most of the airfields in northern Egypt and hit

the runways with delay-fuse bombs to deter repairs during

the night. 25 With the 493 sorties flown against Egypt on

the first day the I A F claimed the destruction of 254 of the

10

E A P s 358 combat aircraft, most of them on the ground. 26 On

this day the IAF also dealt crushing blows against Jordan

aric I S y r i a,

THE IAF VERSUS JORDAN AND SYRIA

Late on the morning of 5 June, the Syrian A i r Force

damaged the oil refinery in Haifa Bay and some dummy air-

craft on the airfield of Meguiddo. Of the three Syrian

M I G s which attacked Meguiddo, two were shot down and the

other crashed, Shortly after noon, three Jordanian Hunters

produced some injuries and damage in the city of Natanya

bcfo rc being intercepted and driven off. 27 The I A F response

was quick.

Monday afternoon the IAF' directed the majority of their

aircraft against the airfields of Jordan and Syria. In a

brief series of raids on Aman and Mafraq airfields, the I A F

clcstroyed all of Jordan's corn twenty-one Hawker .c

I l u n t c r s . (Jordan quickly borrowed three more from Iraq.)

Simultaneous at tacks on five Syrian airfields destroyed 60

of Syria's 127 combat aircraft. At this point, Syria with-

d r e w the remainder from the battle area and relinquished air

superiority over the Golan Heights. 28

The 1A.F claimed the total destruction of the Jordanian

A i r Force with no Israeli losses. The attack on Syria was

also impressive but not without a price. Robert Jackson has

recorded the air battle in Syria:

Anti-aircraft; firc was heavy and several Israeli

a . i rcrafl, wor'(s sho I; down including t w o Mystcrcs, destroyedov(;.r ~ ~ a r r i x ; c u ~ ~ , f l i g h tAnol-hcr MysL-crc was jumpcd by a of MIG-XYs, which shot it; down as it was attacking targets on the ground; the M I G s were hemselves shot down byMirages a few minutes later, 25

The only other important counterair action on 5 June

w a s the destruction o f the powerf'ul Jordanian radar at Ajlun.

This was accomplished at noon by a flight of four Super Mys teres. 30

TOTAL LOSSES ON 5 JUNE 1967

The f i n a l score f o r 5 June was approximately 388 Arab

aircraf t destroyed versus about 23 IAF' aircraft lost for a

ratio of 27 to 1,

AIR ACTIVITY ON 6 JUNE 1967

Except f o r some Magister trainers ancc a few Tautours ,

there was little IAF support f o r the Israeli Army on 5 June.

On 6 June, however, the priority was reversed, and the

I : : rao l%{;round forces received heavy support in the Sinai

and on thc wcst bank of the Jordan, On Tuesday, the IAF

also flew some missions against airfields in Egypt and

Iraq.33-

A lone Iraqi TU-16 bombed the city of Natanya on

Tuesday morning; as the TU-16 exited the target area it was

knocked down by accurate AA fire. The IAF' retaliated by

attacking the Iraqi airfields of Habbaniya and Hotel Three.

Enroute to one target, eight Mirages were jumped by eight

12

I raq i H u n t e r s ; this resulted in the l o s s of three Mirages

TOY o n l y o m Tluntcr. On t hc p o u n d , howt7vm7, tlic IAF dcs-

k o y c d n i n e MIG-22s, four H u n t e r s , and t w o IL-14 transports.32

Table III shows the aircraft lost by t y p e after two

d a y s of conflict. About 23 of the Arab aircraft were lost in

thdz air; ths rest w e r e destroyed on the ground.

TABLZ 11133

LOST 5-6 JUNE 1967

Egypt Jordan Syria

Iraq

Arab Total:

Israel 26-n

Includes 7 Magister trainers used f o r ground attack.

AIR A C T I V I T Y 7-10 JUNE 1967

After the airstrikes on the Iraqi a i r f i e l d s on

6 June, the I A F enjoyed almost unchallenged air superiority

f o r the remaining four days of the war. Diring this time

the I A F was able to devote most of its sorties to ground

support . As a result, approximately two-thirds of the total

IAF sorties flown during the war were in support of the

ground forces . On the 7th and 8th the IAF' used the recently

captured airfield of El Arish to f l y nuxerous missions

attacking Egyptian armor in the Mitla Pass and on the road

from B i r G i f g a f a to Ismailiya. On the 8th the I@ attacked

a well defended column of Egyptian tanks near Kantara; here

the deadliest AA fire of the war downed five Israeli air-

craft in a couple hours. 34

Tns air battle against Egypt had been won on Monday,

but it continued through Wednesday. In a last desperate

attempt to assist the hard-pressed Egyptian A r m y , the EAF

f l e w their remaining MIGs (and a few borrowed f r o m Algeria)

in close air support. Most of them were engaged by the I A F

which claimed 14 k i l l e d 2n air-to-air combat and no Israeli

losses.35

On the 9th and 10th the IAF strongly supported the

Israeli A r m y assault on the Golan Heights. In this campaign

thc IN;' silenced a number of AA guns by exploding proximity-

fuscci bombs directly over the sites. Thereafter, the IAF

was heavily committed to the task of destroying the concrete

bunkers and fortifications on the Golan. In spite of con-

centrated bombing, most of these positions were overcome

only when the Israeli infantry assaulted them.

When the cease-fire went into effect Saturday, 10 June,

the I A F had made a significant and critical contribution to

the Israeli victory. 36

0%

OBSERVATIONS CIN Ti33 1967 WAR

In six days of warfare the Israelis claimed the

destruction of 452 A r a b aircraft . Of these, 32 were downed

in some 50 dogfights. The IAF admitted losing 26 aircraft

in the first two days, but have not released a figure f o r

the entire w a r . Jackson indicated the IAF lost 40 aircraft

and had another 10 so badly damaged that they could be used

only for parts. In a more recent book Zeev Schiff stated 37the I A F lost 45 aircraft in this war.

The I A F dsny losing any aircraft in air-to-air combat,

but their use of the term ffair-to-airfl must be clarified.

Their use of this term does not include I A F aircraft which

were ffjumpedtfin the process of an air-to-ground mission.

Tne I A F acknowledged two such losses over Egypt , another is

reported over Syria, and three more w e r e l o s t when the Iraqi

Hunters jumped an IAF s t r i k e flight on the second d a y . 33

For the most part, this was a missileless war. The

IAF pilots credited the Egyp t i an S.A-2 missiles with only one

ffpossibleff The 2%kill. .-...1 1

tive. envelo2e or,,.out-maneuvered, 5 ,, itL after it GW*was&=d. Theser 4 ... < 3 ,, . 1 - . - . . A I .

results compare favorably with the U.S. experience over North

Vietnam. During 1967, 59 S.A-2 missiles were fired for each

U. S. aircraft downed. 39 The IAF did n o t employ missiles in either a.-f-to-al_tr

s < %A&.L.QlL?,

were w- n. Cannon was also the most effective weapon

h l S W -.n.v.--*.

because of these factors (not in order of precedence):

1, IAF' achieved comglete surprise.

2. IAF' concentrated its forces on the primary

objective.

IAF prepared f o r years f o r that explicit mission.

Egyptian aircraft were not sheltered,

5. Egyptian airfields were not well defended.

60 The S.A-2 missiles were ineffective below 3000 feet,

Unlike the Egyptians, the air forces of Jordan, Syr ia ,

and Iraq w e r e not surprised, but they were no match for the

IAF', They w e r e to3 small and their airfields w e r e also

unprotected and p o o r l y defended.

Thc parformmce of the IAI? in t he 1967 Mar has been

I;(>r~nc;d a classic employment of airpower. The developacnt

and training of t h i s force for a specific mission, the long

range efforts to achieve surprise, and the advantages of

striking the first blow are but a few o f the lessons to be

drawn f r o m this war. Many nations have studied this war,

but no one studied it harder than the Arab participants,

especially the Egyptians. They learned the lessons well,

and they began to prepare f o r the next war,

END.NOTES

'Military Balance 1967-1968 (London: The Inter- national Institute f o r Strategic Studies, 1967), pp. 51-52,

2Randolph Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, The Six D a y War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 76-77; Ezer W~izman, On Eagles' Wings (New York: MacMilIan Publish-ing Coo, Inc., p. 210.

3Roderick MacLeish, The S u n Stood Still (New Y o r k : Atheneum, 1967) , p. 83.

4Walter Laqueur, Confrontation: The Middle East and World Politics (New Y o r k : Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Coo, 19741, p. 9 2 ; Quote is f r o m Churchill, p. 62.

'Claude Witze, "Kiss in the Desert" Air Force Magazine, J u l y 1967, p. 8 ; Wsizman, pp. 215-216,

%ohn Andrews, COL. (USAF, Ret. ), Historical Evalua-tion and Research Organization, Interviewed on 3 and 4 May 1978.

'William Stevenson, Zanekl A Chronicle of the Israeli A i r Force (New York: .The Viking Press, 19711, p. 331.

8Hobert Jackson, The Israeli A i r Force Story (London: Northumberland Press Ltd., 19701, p. 176.

'T. N o Dupuy, COL. (USA, Ret.), Elusive Victory (To be published in the near future), p. 243.

"Navad Safran, From W a r to War (New Y o r k : Pegasus, 19691, p. 321; Churchill, pp. 78-79.

"Jackson, pp. 185-186.

12MG Do KO Palid (India), Return to Sinai (New Delhi : Palit & Palit Publishers, 1 9 7 4 ) , p. 230

16

14Robert R. R o d w e l l , "Three Hours - And Six Days," Air Force Magazine, October, 1967, p2a 57-63; Jackson, pp. 177-178.

I6D,a J, F, Reagan, fUir Power O v e r Sinai," Ordnance November-December, 1967, pp. 258-259 a

"Peter B o r g a r t , "The Vulnerability of the Manned Airborn3 Weapon System, If (Part 2), International Defense R e v i e w , October 2977, pa 863; Jackson, p. 187.

18Warren C . Wstrnore, ffIsraelis* A i r Punch Major Factor in Aviation_ W&k & Space Technolom, July 3 , 1967, p. 18; Churchill, p. 82; Safran, p . 324.

*'Yohammad Ali Fabmy, LTG, &History Air Defense -___.- future.Forcem(T0 be published in the near

21Avihu Ben-Nun, LTC, (IAF), "Three Hours in June, If A video-tape available a t UaSa Amy Comxand and G m s r a l Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

2 5 . ~ o ~ w e ~ l ,60.p.

18

2YJackson, pp. 193-1953 Safran, p , 328.

29Jackson, p. 195.

30Jackson, p. 295 .

31Jackson, pp. 200-202.

32Wetrnore, p. 18; Safran, 329.

33Jackson, pp. 204-205; Churchill, p. 86. Churchill

differs slightly indicating Egypt l o s t 264 combat aircraft and that the total Arab losses were 416.

36Wetrnore, pp. 18-27; Jackson, pp. 212-215; Rodwell,

P. 62,

37Jackson, p. 263; Zeev Schiff, October Earthquake, Yom Kippur 1973 (Louis Williams, trans.), (Tel Aviv: Univer-s i t y Publishing Projects, Ltd., 19741, p, 263.

38Ben-Nun film; Jackson, p, 195.

One of the primary lessons Egypt and Syria drew from

the 1967 W a r was that they must develop the capability to

deny Israeli air superiority over their countries and protect

their air forces and armies f r o m its crippling blows.' With

Soviet assistance they soon began major programs to achieve

. this end.

Jordan was least capable of defending itself against

the I A F , but King Hussein prepared to remain vulnerable

rather than ally his nation with the Soviet Union. Jordan's

rebuilding would again produce a small a i r force, not expec-

ted to seriously challenge Israeli air superiority.2

The Israeli leaders recognized the decisive advantage

which air superiority had given them in the 1967 War and

continued to base their wartime strategy upon its achievement

and o~ploitation.~ One of their first concerns was to

replace the 45 aircraft lost in the W a r with modern aircraft

which would insure their continued dominance of the air.

The Israelis were counting on the receipt of 50 Mirage V

fighters which had been ordered from France in December 1966.

France, however, placed an arms embargo on "frontline

participants" in the Mideast War and remsed to deliver the

Mirages. In early 1968 Israel turned to the United States

20

with a request f o r 50 F-4 Phantoms. The United States was

already providing I s rae l w i t h 48 A - 4 Slcyliawlcs on an agreement

reached just before the 1967 War. In December 1968 the

United States agreed to the sale of the F-4s with delivery

to begin i n September 1969. 4

THE BEGINNING OF TH.E W A R OF ATTRITION

On 8 September 1968 Egypt significantly increased the

price Israel would have to pay to continue to occupy the

Sinai. On this day 150 E g y p t i a n artillery batteries fired

over 20,000 shells against Israeli positions across the Suez

Canal. Israel retaliated by shelling the Suez oil refineries

and the cities of Ismailia and Suez. The Israeli bombing of

these civilian targets prompted the Egyptians "to evacuate

some 400,000people from the Canal Zone area. It was evident

that E g y p t was wiZling to pay a substantial price in order

to continue artillery harassment of the Israeli-held east

bankoff In October 1968 the IDF responded to another Egyptian

shelling with commando raids deep into Egypt . From November

1968 to March 1969 light artillery exchanges w e r e fired as

occasional harassment. 5

On 8 March 1969 the Egyptians fired a massive artillery

bombardment on the recently-constructed Bar Lev Line, and

President Nasser announced the beginning of a "Period of

Attrition.f1 Heavy artillery exchanges continued through

April and May 1969 accompanied by commando raids by both

sides.6

21

The a r t i l Z e . r y botnbardrnents and raids hit Israel's

w c a k spo b- - rnanpower . At this time I s rae l had approximately

half a million men o f military age while Egypt had some

five million, For each casualty the Israelis sus ta ined , they

felt they had -to produce ten casualties or they were losing

this "War of

The Egyptians, however, had considerably m o r e

artillery on the Suez f ront than did the Israelis. From

their 1967 experience the Israelis believed the I A F could

always concentrate firepower more rapidly than artillery and

at a lower cost in manpower. They, therefore, purchased

planes in lieu of howitzers and considered the aircraft

t t f ly ing artilleryoff As the Israeli casualties approached a

peak of 30 killed and 76 wounded in J u l y 1969, the Israeli

governme,nt decided to use the I A F in retaliation.7

AIR P01dT3H IN THE WAR OF A'ATRITIOTJ

On 20 J u l y 1969 the IAF began a ten-day campaign of

i.nf;eii,si.vc airstrikes on artillery and SAN sites on the west

Tho quick response of the EAF to the I A F strike on

20 J u l y was described by Edgar OfBallance:

Just before dusk on that day the E g y p t i a n Air Force flew out to challenge the Israeli A i r Force seriously f o r the first t i m e since the June War, ASout 40 aircraft (ten MIS-21s and 30 SU-~S)penetrated over 60 miles into the Sinai. Israeli aircraft were scrambled and a number of dogfights took place. Mien it was over the Egyptians claimed to have shot down 19 Israeli planes, but admitted the loss of two of their own, while the Israelis also admitted Losing two planes but cZairned to have brought down f ive Egyptian ones. . . . The startling fact was that the Egyptian A i r Force hag penetrated in such strength so far into Israeli air space.

22

O - J C ~t h e n(?.xI: t cn days there were three more majQ3-L-,

a i r brxtl;lcs in wliich the I A F proved that it was still

super ior . Air activity continued, but at a much slower pace,

through August and the first week of September. On 9 September

1969 the I A F changed its priority from artillery to SAJI sites

on the west bank. The EAJ? responded on 23 September with a

202-plane raid into central Sinai where numerous dogfights

developed. Afterwards the IAF claimed 11 kills (eight air-

t o - a i r , two by Hawk missiles, and one by A.4 fire) and ad-

mitted losing one Israeli fighter, The EAF claimed four

(three by combat and one by A4 fire) w h i l e admitting the loss

o f two Egyptian aircraft. lo The I A F continued to attack

missile sites throughout September and i n October expanded

the attacks to SAWS and radars w e s t aLong the mediterranean

coast as far as Alexandria, By the end o f 1.969 the I A F

claimed the destruction of 24 SAI4 sites and 61 Egyptian air-

c ra f t since the 1-96? War; in this time the IAF l o s t 15 air-2 1c r a f t 0.n all f r o n t s .

By January 19'70 the 1 A . F had achieved air superiority

over Egyp t , prevented the Egyptians f r o m developing an air

defense over the Canal, and greatly reduced Israeli casual-

t i e s , but there was no end in sight. The Egyptians continued

to repair and replace the missiles and were gaining con-

siderable combat experience. To further pressure Egypt to

end the War, on 7 January 1970 the 1A.F began to hit targets 12of military significance near Egypt's population centers.

23

T h f s s tya teg ic bombing o f mi l i t a ry and i n d u s t r i a l

f,c . i r*/ , ; t ; I,;.: i r i ! : ? I . ( : hcarL (if Egypt put pressu:ir,t?upon Presichxi t

N a s s e r , not to yie ld to the I s r a e l i s , but t o r e t a l i a t e . In

l a t e January 1970 President; Nasser made a secre t t r i p t o

Moscow i n search of lloffensive weapons.lf Instead he received

from the Soviets a pledge t o assist Egypt i n the development

o f a modern and e f f ec t ive a i r defense, l3 I t w a s , therefore ,

the s t r a t e g i c bombing i n Egypt which, more than the 1967 W a r ,

p.rompted the Soviets t o give Egypt the massive ass i s tance

requi red to develop the s t rong a i r defense which faced t h e

T A P i n 1973.

I n March and e a r l y Apr i l 1970 Soviet M I G - 2 1 squadrons

and S.4-3 (SAI4) ba t t a l ions a r r ived i n Egypt, By mid-April

t h e y assumed r e spons ib i l i t y f o r the a i r defense o f the Nile

Valley m d -theDelta , l4 The IAF had s t ruck a t w i l l through-

out Egypt for a l i t t l e over three months; but, when on

27 A p r i l 3.970 they rea l ized the Soviets were f ly ing a i r

defense for Egypt, they abrupt ly ended deep s t r i k e s i n t o

FQ;ypL-. T.hc.reaf.ter, the IAF confined i t s e l f to s t r i k i n g SAM

::ii;os and a r t i l l e r y within a 25-mile wide s t r i p on the west 15bank o f the C a n a l .

The Russians seemed to accept t h i s arrangement by

normally keeping t h e i r a i r c r a f t 25 miles from the C a n a l . O n

30 J m e 1970, however, the inevi tab le confrontat ion o c c u i ~ e d .

Reports o f the incident vary, but here are the e s s e n t i a l

d e t a i l s . The IAi?' employed a favor i te Ifanbush t a c t i c f t o f

behind the A - 4 s and at l o w a l t i t u d e (below radar coverage) w e r e

f0u.r o r eight Israeli f igh te r s . Wien -the A - 4 s were i n t e r -

ccpted by a f l i g h t o f Soviet p i lo t ed MIG-2ls, the I s r a e l i

f i g h t e r s shot down four MIG-2lsY killing three o f the p i l o t s .

Neither I s r a e l nor %he Soviet Union publ ic ized the inc ident , 16but some months l a t e r Mrs. Meir confirmed i t had occurred.

TIIF, COIJSTRUCTIOF? 0 LLA 0

%tween A p r i l and June 1970 the I s r a e l i government

had made several public statements that i t did no t want t o

injure any Russ-ians i n Egyp t , but t ha t I s r a e l could not allow

the e rec t ion o f a r n i s s i l e umbrella over the C a n a l . Such an

u i n b r e l l a could pro tec t an Egyptian crossing o f the C a n a l and,

therefore , threatened the secu r i ty o f I s r a e l ' s recent ly

es tab l i shed border. Israel made i t c l e a r tha t the 1A.F' would

bomb any SA-3 s i t e es tab l i shed within 25 miles o f the C a n a l

regardless o f whose so ld i e r s manned them, The Soviets

apparent ly accepted this risk as they a s s i s t ed the Egyptians

i n the prepara t ion o f numerous SA-3 s i t e s i n the C a n a l Zone

17during May and June o f 1970.

On the night of 29 June 1970 SA-3 miss i les were

brought f o r w a r d -to the C a n a l s i t e s and on 30 June a SAM

umbrella came i n t o being over the Canal, I t may have besn

t h i s f a i t accornpli which prompted the Soviet M I G s that day 18to make t h e i r i l l - f a t e d in te rcept o f the IAF Skyhawks.

25 The more significant event of the day in the long run

was the establishment of the SAY umbrella, The SA-3 was

much m o r e capable than the SA-2 at low altitude and was not

affected by the ECM pods which the United States had recently

made available to Israel.

During the moiith of July the IA?heavily attacked the

SAM sites in the Canal zone with partial success but at a

substantial price. The IAi? lost 6 aircraft to SAYS between 1 J u l y and 7 August 1970. 19

ISlXAELI VIEW OF THE: UMBRELLA

The political situation was moving toward a cease-

f i r e on tho Suez, and the U.S. Department of Defense advised

Israel that a cease-fire would provide the time required to

develop countermeasures for the SA-3 , 011 the evening of

7 A u g u s t 1970 the cease-fire went into effect. 20

The cease-fire was a welcome relief f o r most Israelis,

but some w e r e concerned with the situation which prompted it,

In the opinion of one Israeli military writer:

The War of Attrition ended when the clash between aircraft and Eg,y-ptianand Russian operated missile batteries resulted in stalemate, While the I A F only had to fight SA--2s o2erated by Egyptians, the planes still enjoyed supremacy, Russian crews, with SA-3 missiles, modern radar equipment and S U z f 3 radar-guided guns, changed the balance of power,

After the cease-fire the United States and Israel

worked together to improve -the Shrike anti-radiation missile

SO it c o u l d d e s t r o y the SA--3 tracking and guidance radar,

26

Ily ~ a . r b Z y197.1 thc I A F was co.nfident that with these Shrikes

The growing inventory of F - ~ s , A - 4 s , ECM pods,

Shrikes, and other armaments between 1971 and 1973 kept war-

time expectations of the IAF at a high level.

Since 1967, it was assumed that the A i r Force could, in the event of war, achieve aerial supremacy quickly, serve as the IDF's strategic arm and supply full support to ground forces. Defense plans were based on the Air Force as the major factor. So great was their self- confidence that no other possibility was conceivable. Their success in the War of Attrition, in which the Israel Air Force was the major offensive factor, only served to strengthen the feeling. The missile problem at the end of the War of Attrition was considered a mere episode.23

Not everyone was convinced this was SO. Ex-IAF com-

mander Ezer Weizman was quite concerned about the SAM

umbrella. This is his post rnortem on the War of Attrition:

The Egyptian surface-to-air missile system . . . could have been eliminated in 1970. It would have required scndin in infantry and armor, in addition to the air force.54

In another passage he said:

Throughout the War of Attrition, there were apprehen- sions about the Russians, which was why the ground forces w e r e not used f o r any decisive purpose, and also why the air force attacked here and there, causing the Egyptians-and itself-casualties and damage, but without employing its full strength.

As the war dragged on, without our Army finding a way

to put a stop to it, I,unlike others, became gradually

convinced that this was the first time we were not winning.

I said so countless times: we failed in this war. We

did not conprehend it correctly. When the Egyptians agreed

to a cease-fire, in A-;zgust1970, we interpreted it as an

admission on their part that they couldn't stand our

27

hoinbin;r a n y tnore. Without detracting f r o m the great suffer- i ng inflicted on them by o u r air force, I don't have the shadow of a doubt that the Egyptians wanted a cease-fire in o r d e r to move their missile system forward to the Canal, so that it could neutralize o u r air force when their u n i t s crossed the waterway. All this backs up both of my contentions. First, the War of Attrition, in which o u r best s o l d i e r s shed t h e i r blood, resulted in the Egyptians gaining a free hand, over a period of three years, to prepare f o r the great war of October 1973 ; if so, it is no more than foolishness to claim that we won the War of Attrition, On the contrary, f o r all their casualties, it was the Egyptians who got the best of it, Sacond, by our e r r o r s between March 1969 and August 1970, and, subsequently, by our tragic acquiescence when the Egyptians violated t he cease-fire and moved their missiles ahead, we, with our25 own hands, smoothed Egypt's path to the Yom Kippur War.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE EGYPTIAN A I R DEFENSE FOZCE

The erection of the SAY umbrella was the most threaten-

ing, b u t not the only important development in Egypt's air

defense capability. On 23 June 1969 the Egyptian A i r Defense

F o r c e (EADF) became a separate service, co-equal to the

Egyptian Army, Navy, and A i r Force, The EADF commanded the

territorial air defense units and the air defense w i t s which

accompanied the ground forces, It also had operational con-

trol of Air Force fighters on air defense missions as w e l l as

those on air defense alert. 26 The EADF gained considerable

operational experience during the War of Attrition and

meticulously noted every Israeli tactic. The EADF was

organized, trained and equipped f o r only one purpose, to

maintain air superiority over Egyptian territory and forces

in the expected war, The E.ADF knew that Egyptian fighters

did not have the range to knock out the airfields inside

28

27

Israel; therefore, they expected that they would have to

withstand the full force of an I A F assault in the next war.

By 1973 the NADF included 280 radar sites, 400 radars,

50 control centers and some 200,000 well trained officers and

men,28 The chain of command ran from E.ADF headquarters to

division, brigade, battalion (equal to a U . S , battery) then

launcher. In operation, the EADF was controlled by a number

of joint command posts at brigade level. The air defense

brigade commander was joined by an air force colonel in a

command post buried deep under reinforced concrete and sand,

A brigade normally controlled eight missile battalions and

110 t o 60 interceptors. Providing radar coverage f o r the

brigade were multiple Russian-made P-35 Barlock radars with 29a range of approximately 200 nautical miles.

The primary duties of the brigade control center were

to detect enemy aircraft and identify them by type, number,

and ECM being employed and to control friendly interceptors,

The brigade commander then directed one or more missile

battalions to engage each enemy flight depending upon its

type and strength. Missile battalion commanders were

additionally authorized to engage any target within their

coverage identified as hostile.30

The S.A-2 battery normally consisted of six single

missile launchers clustered about a control radar, The SA-2

Guideline was propelled by a first stage solid booster and

a second stage liquid sustainer giving it a slant range o f

25-30 miles (40-50 k m , ) , It was designed to attack targets

29

up to 80,000 feet. Reported modifications by Egyp.tian

engineers improved the S.A-2fs low altitude capability f rom

a minimum of approximately 3,000 feet down to about 1,500

feet and gave it an optical tracking capability, The missile

carried a 286 pound warhead which could be detonated by

contact, proximity or command.31 The relatively large size

of the missile (overall length of 35 feet) produced some l o w

altitude limitations; if the command guidance quickly

reversed f r o m a turn in one direction to a turn in the

opposite direction, the missile of t en w e n t out o f control

or even broke in half . This was due to overcontrol by the

large control surfaces which were designed to operate in

the much thinner air at high altitude. In spite of its

size, Egyptian missile crews demonstrated the capability

of taking an S.A-2 f r o m its truck transporter and placing

i t on its launcher in less than a minute.32

The SA-3 Goa was a smaller missile (22 f e e t ) with a

better l o w altitude capability than the SA-2. Powered by

a t w o stage, solid fuel motor, it could cover a range of

15-18 m i l e s (25-30 k m . ) and altitudes up to 40,000 feet.

Guidance was reported to be automatic radio command w i t h

semi-active radar homing in the terminal stage.33

Tne SA-6 Gainf'ul was a more modern and sophisticated

l o w altitude weapon than the S A - 3 . Mhile the ground radar

units of the S.A-2 and S.A-3 transmitted on fixed frequency

bands, the supporting radar of the SA-6 switched rapidly

3 0

L~cro; ;ss c v o r a l radar bands (betwecn C - b a n d and X-band). The

SA-6 was cornnand guided initially but switched to active

radar terminal homing once these systems acquired the target,

AQ S . A ~battery normally consisted o f f o u r highly mobile,

armored vehicle launchers with three missiles on each

vehicle plus a separate radar and control vehicle. 34

Complementing the S A - 2 , 3 and 6 missiles were two

t y p z s o f AA guns, the s-60 and the ZSU-23-4, and the shou lde r

f i r e d SA-7, The s-60 was a 57 mrn. single-barrel anti-air-

c r a f t gun capable of firing 105 to 120 rounds per minute.

It could engage targets visually o u t to 4 km. or out to 6 km.

when coupled with offcarriage radar.

The ZSLJ-23-4 w a s a four-barrel, 23 mm anti-aircraft

gun system mounted on an armored vehicle. It could engage

targets optically o r w i t h its integral radar o u t to 3 k m .

a n d could fire up to 4,000 rounds per minute. 35

The S A - 7 Grail (Saviet name-Strela) was a shoulder

launched, heat seeking air defense missile, similar to the

U . S , ficcieye missile. I t s m a x i m u m effective range was about

3.5 km. The relatively small size of this missile (4 feet,

6 inches long) severely limited the size of its warhead and

reduced its effectiveness. The SA-7 w a s employed primarily

by the Army to provide organic air defense at battalion and

company level. 36

Each Egyptian Army combat battalion normally had a

Strela platoon, which consisted of six firing teams; a team

was two men with one S.A-7. Because central command and con-

trol of these teams w a s not feasible, Strela teams in combat

were directed to fire at any aircraft they visually identified

as hostile. The danger that friendly aircraft could be

mistaken for hostile was a risk the Egyptians were willing

to accept.

Two additional measures taken by the EADF to prepare

f o r an Israeli attack were: first, they had complete air

defense units positioned in reserve near the expected c r i t i c a l

arcas; second, they trained combat repair teams to quickly

repa i r or replace damaged radar and supporting electronic

equipment. These preparations provided Egypt with recovery

capabilities it did not have in 1967 or during the War of

Attrition. 37

PR.EPARATION OF THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE

The preparation of the Egyptian Air Force ( E M ) for

t h e 1973 War was comparable to that of the E.ADF. The

rebuilding of the E.AF' after i t s destruction in a967 required

an increase in the number of pilots, planes, and airfields.

Soon after the 1967 War a large nurnber of student pilots

began training at airfields well removed f rom the Saez front

and in the Soviet Union. The Soviets quickly replaced the

aircraft lost in 1967, but: the pilot shortage took years

to overcome. The shortage was in experience as well as

in the number of pilots. Many of Egypt's most experienced

pilots had been killed trying to g e t their MIG-21s airborne

32

in t h o f i r s t hour of the 1967 War. (Shortage and inexperience

wcrc - two reasons f o r coinmitting the EA-??only on high priority

missions in the War of Attrition.) 38

From 1968 until October 1973 every combat pilot flew

20 hours per month; heavy emphasis was placed on countering

Israeli tactics observed in 1967 and during the War of

Attrition. In 1970 the Libyans converted Whellus Air Base,

which the US.AF had recently vacated, to a training center

for Arab pilots. Here Egyptian, Libyan and Russian aviators

trained in air-to-ground and air-to-air operations with the

trainer version of the MIG-21, the Nongol, and the Mirages

which Libya had purchased f r o m France.39

Two problems which the EAF w z s determined to overcome

were the lack of airfields and aircraft protection. In 1967

the EAF lost five airfields in the Sinai, and fou r more on

the west bank of the canal were unusable because they were

w i t h i n Israeli artillery range, The E.m, tne re fo re , construc-

t e d twenty new airfields, with at least t w o runways each.

At some bases sections of the nearby highway were reinforced

t o provide emergency landing st r ips , Dispersed about these

fields they constructed hangarettes of reinforced concrete

covered with sand and protected t h e entrance and exit with

massive d o o r s . These shelters were also w e l l vented to

minimize blast effects, In additioii, the EAF' trained and

equipped explosive ordnance teams and r u n w a y repair crews at 40each airfield.

33

REBUILDING THE SYRICNJ. AIR FORCE

/ / I ( t ( L ) ~ i il f l i t r i ; or thv SM wL1:: : ; i r r i i l L ~ ~ ~ 01..Lo t i i a t tlie

EAJ but; on a smallor1 scale and at a s l o w e r pace. The

Syrians also constructed concrete hangarcttes, multiple

runways, and emergency landing strips; but from 1967 to 1970

t hey concentrated on airfields w e l l removed from the Israeli

border . I C 2 The pace of development increased after A i r Force

General Hafez Assad seized control of the Syrian government

on 18 October 1970. In January 1971 Assad visited Moscow in

scarch of additional weapons; S y r i a soon received substantial

numbers of MIG-~ZS,S U - ~ S , S A M s , and o t h e r equipment.42 It

was not until May 1973, however, -ci-,atthe Soviets made the

commitment to provide the S A F with an air defense system

which could negate Israeli a i r superiority in w a r . The

addition of the SA-6 to the S y r i a n umbrella was completed

in August and September of 1973.43

Egypt, too, received the SA-6 late in the summer of

1973. W i t h these weapons, the air defenses and air forces

of Egypt and Syria were prepared Lo take on t he IAF in the

air superiority battle. The a i r o r d e r of battle as of

6 October 1973 is shown in Table IT/.

SUMMARY OF THE .INTEH--dAR PERIOD

Egypt began the W a r o f Attrition t o extract a high

price f r o m Israel f o r continued occupation of the Sinai.

When the Israelis, ic turn, escalated the war to bombing

--- ---

34

TABLE IV

44

.AIR ORDER OF BATTLE, 6 OCTOBER 1973

-_.----I_-_-----___-----

- EGYPT

Fighter-bombers: IiI

su-7 ~ 1 ~ 4 7

130 200

45 120

1 A-4i F-4 MIG-19 60 -- i 1 Super Mystere MIG-21 160

550 -

J

Bombers : 4

TU-16 18 -- Ii Vautour 1 ~ ~ 2 8 4822

Helicopters:

12M I - 6 MI-8 7 0-

82

SAM Launchers:

SA-2/3 800 80SA-6

SA-7 920 1,800

AA funs:

k50ZTJ-23 ZSU-23-4 300

s-60,57 mm 550 1,300

-ISRAEL

150

140

12

50

352

8

8

12

30

50

75

770 212

35

ta.rl;c?Ls o u t s i d e Cairo, the Soviet Union was prompted to

j)rnciv i ( I ( : w h a l , 1 3 ~ y j ) / ,laclccd in 2.967-CL m i s s i i l c ! urnbrella stronc

c,nouf:h to challenge Israeli air superiority. By October

1373 the S o v i e t s had provided Syria with a similar, but

smaller, umbrella. These umbreIZas, reinforced aircraft

shelters and strong air base defenses convinced Egypt and

Syria that they were prepared to again meet Israel in the

battle f o r air superiority.

CHAPTER I1

ENDNOTES

LTG Mohammad Ali Fahmy (Egypt), A Yistory of the Egyptian Air Defense Force (Unpublished manuscript).

2Analysis of Military Balance (1967 through 1973), [London: The International Institute f o r Strategic Studies).

3Zeev Szhiff, October Earthquake, Yom Kippur 1973 (Louis Williams trans.) (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects Ltd., 19741, pp. 258-2590

4 ~ o b e r tJackson, The Israeli Air Force Story (London: Northumberland Press Ltd., 19701, pp. 221-226.

N o Dupuy (USA, Ret.), Elusive Victory (To be published in the near future), pp. 357-358.

William Stevenson, ZanekI A Chronicle of the Israel i A i r Force [New York: The Viking Press, 19711, p. 71; Edgar OBallance, The Electronic War in the Middle East: 1968-70 (Hamden: Archon Books, 19741, pp. 67-69;MG Chaim Herzog, The W a r of Atonement (Boston: Little, Brown and Coo, 1975), PP. 252-253.

8fiPuY, P. 363.

90tBallance, p. 69.

0 t Ballance, pp. 83-85.

OtBaZlance, p. 86;Dupuy, p. 365.

Strategic Survey 1.973 (London: The International Institute f o r Strategic Studies, 19741, p. 13; OtBallance,

37

13MG D o KO Palit (India), Return t o Sinai (New Delhi: Palit & Palit Publishers, 1974), pp. 25-26; OrBallance, p . 106,

16Charles Wakebridge, flElectrons Over Suez, Ordnance, May-June 1972, p. 475; Martin Miller, "The Israeli Air Force," Ordnance, September-October 1972, p. 128; OfBaZlance, p. 122.

z7Stevenson, p. 158; OrBallance, pp. 1l7-1l8.

18Fahmy manuscript; O'Ballance, p. 124.

l g ~ f ~ a ~ ~ a n c e ,pp. 126-127.

"Wakebridge, p. 475; OfBallance, p. 126.

21Schiff, p. 259.

"Schiff, p . 260.

23Schiff, pp. 258-259.

24Ezer Weizman, O n Eagles' Wings (New York: MacMillan Publishing Coo, Inc., 19771, p. 281.

25Weizrnan, pp. 274-275.

2 6 ~ a ~ y manuscript.

27LTG Mohammad Fahmy (E.ADF) in International Symposium on the 1973 October War (Cairo: Egyptian J nistry of War, 1976), p. 87.

28MG 3enjamin Peled (IAF) in Military Aspects of the Israeli A r a b Conflict (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1975), p. 242.

--- - -

38

2gRobert Hotz ( e d . ) , Both Sides of the Suez--Airpower in Mideast, Aviation Week and Space Technology (McGraw H i l l Publications, 19751, p. 20.

3~ota, 21.

"Ronald Pretty (ed.), Jane's Pocket Book of Missiles

(New York: Collier Books, 19761, p. 79.

32~otz, 21.

"pretty, p. 74.

341nsight Team of the London Sunday Times, The Yom Kippur W a r (New Y o r k : Doubleday and Company, 2 9 7 k m 8 6 ; Pretty, p. 680

35R. Do M. Furlong, ffEvolution in Air Defense Require- ments, International Defense Review, June 1974, p. 313.

36~retty,p. 76.

37~~t,,p. 25.

38Wakebridge, p. 473; Miller, P. 128.

39Stevenson, p. 140.

"Herbert J. Coleman, ffIsraeli Air Force Decisive in W a r , " Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 3 , 1973, p. 21; LTG Mahmond Moneim (E.AF) in International Symposium on the 1973 October W a r , (Cairo: Egyptian Ministry of War, 1976), P o 1320

42mPuY, P. 372.

43David Nicolle, "The Holy Day Air War,f1A i r Enthusiast International, May 1974, p. 241; Louis Williams (trans), Kippur (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1973), p. 124.

44C0L John Andrews (USAF', Ret. ), Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Interviewed on 3 and 4 May.

CHAPTER 111

THE 1973 BATTLE FOR AIR SUPERIORITY

The IAF gained air superiority in 1967 by an

offensive counterair campaign which destroyed most of the

Arab aircraft on the ground. A i r superiority became a

factor i n the War o f Attrition when Israel decided t o employ

the IAF to match the f i r e p o w e r o f large numbers of Egyptian

artillery. As the 1973 War began, the majority o f Egyptian

and Syrian firepower still resided in their artillery while

more of Israel's firepower was concentrated in its aircraft,

which were considered "flying artillery. rrl Thus, the 1973

battle f o r air superiority was centered upon Israel's efforts

to effectively deliver this firepower, and the k a b actions

to deny the 1A.F this freedom of operation. In the words of

Professor Handel :

I n 1973 the Israelis projected their preoccupation with air superiority onto the Egyptians and the Syrians, and were astonished to discover that the Arabs were content merely to negate Israel's control of t e skies, rather 9than to dominate the skies themselves.

A s we shall see, the battle ranged across the full

spectrum of counter air operations, but the crucial battle

was between Israeli fighter-bombers and Arab surface-to-air

defenses. As it turned out, a critical resource used by

39

the IDF against the SAM in 1973 was the ground weapon which

Israeli aircraft had, to a significant degree, replaced--

long range artillery. 3

THE .rsR.mLICONCEPT

Prior to the October War the IAF' did not appreciate

what a difficult, combined arms effort would be required

to suppress the Arab air defenses. As early as 1971 an IAF'

spokesman stated:

We are convinced we have the full answer to missiles. In July 1970, we didn't have it. Now there will be no serious problems. There will be losses, but smaller than those we sustained on the eve of cease-fire [in 19701. This should be proven within the first two or three hours of war. We will overcome the whole system within two or three days.4

Since the 1A.F considered the missiles vulnerable to

a concerted effort, they felt that air superiority would

thereafter be won primarily in air-to-air combat, at which

t h e I A F was clearly superior. In 1973 Israeli Intelligence

estimated that the EAF could not possibly challenge the I A F

in the air for several years. Without a.n effective counter

air capability in the EAF, the IAF believed the Egyptian Army

would be badly defeated if they tried to attack across the

S - ~ e z . This overconfidence and preoccupation with a i r

superiority caused the Israelis to misinterpret the signals

of impending war in early October 1973. 5

On 5 October 1973 there were reports of Syr ian fighter-

bombers moving to bases closer to the Golan Heights. In

spite of these and other reports on large scale Syrian and

.Egyptian f'maneuvors, If the Chief of Israeli Intelligence

br ie fcd the Cabinet on the 5th that the probability of war 6was f'Zow,'' As a result of this estimate Defense Minister

Dayan and Prime Minister Meir rejected a proposed mobiliza-

tion of Israel's reserve forces; nonetheless, they accepted

Chief of Staff Elazarfsrequest to place the IAF' on a C Alert, its highest state of readiness.7

The intelligence failure and the decision not to

mobilize were to have a significant impact upon employment

of t h e IAF in the first three days of the war, The mobiliza-

tion process was expected to expand the I D F within 72 hours

from 30,000 to 300,000mene8 A late decision to mobilize

r e q u i r e d the I A F to allocate a larger percentage of its

sorties to ground support until the reserve armor and

artillery units arrived at the front.9

THE ISRAELI D E C I S I O N TO NOT PRE-EMPT

At O k O O on 6 October Prime Minister Meir and Defense

Minister Dayan learned that there w e r e definite indications

that Egypt and Syria would attack at 1800 hours that day,

When the War Cabinet assembled at 0700 hours, General Elazar

advised that the A i r Force w a s ready to make a pre-emptive

strike and suggested 1300 hours, Mrs, Meir, supported by

Dayan, vetoed this suggestion, There appears to have been

at least two considerations against a pre-emptfve strike,

42

The first was strictly political. Mrs. Meir agreed with

Dayan that Israel would receive no support from the world

community, not even from the United States, if it appeared

Israel had started another war. lo A second consideration

was their belief that Israel would not be seriously hurt by

allowing the Arabs to strike first. General Elazar later

elaborated on this point. In 1967 he was one of several

leaders who advised Premier Eshkol that Israel could be

defeated if they allowed the Arabs to strike first in a

combined attack. However, on 6 October 1973, he advised

M r s . Meir that " 8 pre-emptive strike is very important from

the military point of view . . but, even if we do not

strike first we shall not lose the war."11

Overconfidence prompted the Israelis to reject the

strategy which had contributed so much to the achievement

of air superiority in 1967. In the words of Eeer Weiarnan:

"In 1967 we launched the first attack because we felt too

weak to withstand an Egyptian first strike; in 1973 we didn't land the first blow, because we felt strong, 4 2

Wnat the targets and effects of a pre-ernptive strike

would have been we can only speculate, but Zeev Schiff, a

prominent military writer in Israel, provided this opinion:

The strike would certainly have caused heavy Arab losses, but would not have prevented their offensive. Since the General Staff were watching the north, the preventive air attack would certainly have been against Syria. The A i r Force would probably have lashed out at missile batteries, headquarters and communications centers. This might have shortened the first stage of the war, but would not have prevented it. The Air Force would probably not

43

have sent its planes against Egypt at the same time. So, the canal crossing would have been carried out according to plan. 1 3

General Peled has revealed that after the decision

was made to not pre-empt, the IAF planned to launch a

counterair campaign on the morning o f the 7th. Approaching t

darkness at the expected start time of the war, 1800 hours,

14would preclude effective counterair strikes on the 6th.

When this is considered in conjunction with Mr. Schiffb

statement, the principal elements of IAF' strategy on the eve

of the war appear to have been:

1. Maintain Israelb air sovereignty to protect the

population and the mobilization of the reserve forces.

2. As in 1967, begin the counterair campaign against

Egyptian airfields, but attack the Egyptian SAM umbrella as

well.

3. Sappress the Syrian SAY umbrella to the extent

necessary to a l l o w close air support for the Israeli ground

forces.

Following the War Cabinet meeting, a partial mobiliza-

tion began about 1000 hours on the 6th, and the IAF remained

on alert awaiting the enemy attack. 12;

THE ARAB STRATEGY

The strategy o f Egypt and Syria was strongly influenced

by their respect f o r the capabilities of the I A F . First,

the coordinated attack was designed to force the Israelis to

44

divide their air and land forces between two fronts. Sacond,

both Egypt and Syria attacked across the r U l l length of t h e i r

bo rde r s to fbrther disperse Israelrs firepower over "broad

fronts. l6 Third, to prevent the I A F from disrupting the

crossing o f the Canal, the Egyptian plan required this

operation be conducted primarily under the cover of darkness.17

Finally, both Egypt a n d Syria planned to protect their armies

from the I A F by keeping them under the cover of their SAY

umbrellas.z8 For the Syrians, whose SAM umbrella included

numerous highly-mobile SA=6s, their objective was the re-

capture of the Golan Heights. With a lower percentage of

S.A-6s in its umbrella and the Canal to cross, the Egyptian

military objective was limited to a bridgehead of 15-20

kilometers.19

Egypt% ultimate goal was to recover the entire Sinai.

President Sadat recognized the superiority of the I A F outside

Egyptrs S.AM umbrella and knew that the entire Sinai might be

regained only by political, not military, means. 20

Egypt sought to fo rce Israel to negotiate by employing

the same strategy as in the War of Attrition-produce maximum

Israeli casualties. The Egyptian Army would seize a bridge-

head, dig in, and attrit the I D F in the expected counter-

attacks. The EADF would maintain air superiority over the

Egyptian Army and attrit as many Israeli aircraft as possible.

The EAF was to assist the EADF in the counterair r o l e and,

on selected missions, provide close a i r support for the

Egyptian Army. The EAF' was to be used somewhat sparingly

45

until the I A F was weakened by the constant hammering of the 21 a i r de f ense umbrella.

Tne S.AF was to be used more aggressively both in air-

to-air and air-to-ground operations. While the EAF normally

provided the second echelon defense behind the SAM umbrella,

the SAF was employed in the midst of their missile screen and

seldom left its protection. They also provided their A r m y 22with close air support on a modest but continuing basis.

THE COORDINATED ATTACK

The Egyptian and Syrian air forces were both heavily

committed to the initial attack on 6 October 1973. The IAI?

received tactical warning of the initial attack when the

radar on top of Mount H e r m o n detected approximately 100 Syrian

aircraft heading southwest f r o m airfields in the vicinity of

Damascus. Some 250 miles southwest of the Golan Heights,

over 200 Egyptian fighter-bombers were flying eastward at

such low altitudes that they were not seen until they crossed

the Canal. 23

24At 1405 hours on Saturday, 6.0ctober 1973, these

Syr i an and Egyptian aircraft began a coordinated attack upon

Israeli positions onthe Golan Heights and in the Sinai desert.

At the same time, those Israeli aircraft which had scrambled

at the first warning were turning toward the borders to meet

the attackers.

46

OVgR 'THE' GOLAV HEIGHTS, 6 OCTOBZR 1973

With MIG-21 interceptors flying top cover, the Syrian

SU-7 and MIG-17 fighter-bombers attacked Israeli armor,

infantry, command posts, and communication facilities through-

out the Golan Heights. A number of these attacks were

reportedly quite effective. Same Syr ian aircraft tried to

penetrate beyond the Golan Heights (which took them beyond

t h e i r SAV umbrella) to bomb targets in the Huleh Valley.

The Israelis state that these were shot down or driven off

arid that no bombs fell on Israel proper, over which the IAF

maintained air superiority.25 Somewhat surprisingly, the

IAF claimed only five Syrian aircraft were downed on the 26first day-all in air-to-air combat.

The Syrian S.AV umbrella was quite active against the

IAF on the first day, as will be discussed later, and the

MIG-21 top cover operated in the same area as the SAMs. Tne

Syr ians relied upon the identification-friend-or-foe (IFF)

system to differentiate between Syrian and IAF aircraft.

Although they did shoot down some friendly aircraft later in

27the war, this system apparently worked well the first day.

From the I A F point of view, the SAYS picked out the Israeli

planes devastatingly well.

Following a massive artillery barrage by 1500 guns at

1405 hours, three reinforced Syrian divisions with over 900

tanks attacked Israeli positions on the Golan Heights held

by 1000 infantrymen and less than 200 tanks.28 At this

point the IAF paid the price f o r Israel's late decision t o

mobilize, The I A F tried to provide the firepower needed by

t b c badly outnumbered ground forces without first suppressing

t h e SAM umbrella, An excellent description of the extreme

difficulty faced by the IAF on 6 October is provided by the

Insight Team of the London Sunday Times:

The A-4 Skyhawks played the heaviest ground-at tack r o l e , with Phantoms and Mirages giving air cover, The Israelis' targeting was so precise that tank commanders could call down air strikes, only a f e w yards from their positions. But losses were heavy f o r among the defense screen that the Syrians had moved up to their Golan lines was the latest Soviet mobile anti-aircraft missile, the SAM-6, And Israel had no counter to this: It had never been seen in combat anywhere in the world before, ln the first afternoon, Israel lost thirty Skyhawks and about t en Phantoms over Golan. All to S A M - ~ Sor the devastating flak of the mobile ZSU-23 antiaircraft batteries (also Soviet) which chewed up the Skyhawks if t h e i r pilots dropped to deck level in an effort to beat the S A M s , There w e r e rarely any parachutes . . .. The scale of losses was so clearly insupportable that in mid-afternoon, Chief o f Staff Elaear actually abandoned air strikes over Golan . . ., B u t without air strikes, there was no hope of salvaging the olan front: After a coupleof hours they had to resume. 2s

On their initial response to the Arab attack the IAE'

f'%f;hter-bornbers came in at medium altitudes, confident that

t h c i r JCCM pods (supplemented by more p o w e r f b l ECM on nearby

helicopters), chaff, and flares would suppress the Arab air

defenses.30 But, the Soviet designers of this S&V/AAA U M -

brella were one step ahead of these Israeli countermeasures.

As a result of technological surprise the IAF' was unable to

achieve air superiority over the Golan Heights.

48 TECHNOLOGICAL S"i3RPRISE

On 6 October 1973, the S.A-6 was being employed f o r

the first time anywhere in the world, and it was not affected

by the ECM, chaff, o r flares then employed by the IAF', 31 The

Israeli ECM equipment was designed f o r the S.A-2 and S.A-3 and

not f o r the wider frequency band over which the SA-6 m d a r

operated,32 Even if the ECM were effective, the SA-6 could

.have been launched under optical control. 33 Chaff, which

the I A F used extensively, also had to be fftunedff to the proper

frequencies, L e o , cut t o the proper lengths.34 The Israeli

f l a r e s were intended to divert the SA-7; they could not

affect the ffcommand plus semi-active radar homing guidance!'

35of the S A - 6 .

When compared with earlier SAM'S, the SA-6 was faster,

more maneuverable, had a better lowcaltitude capability, and

w a s more difficult to spot, Because the second-stage ramjet

engine burns inside the first stage rocket chamber, the S A - 6

d i d not have the telltale fire plume of the SA-2 and S.A-3. 36

The SA-6 scored a number of kills on I s r ae l i aircraft;

but its greatest contribution to the Arab effort was %end-

ing the Israeli attack planes into their standard high-G

split-S evasive dive to the deck where the ZSLJ-23s chewed

them up. ff37 The ZSU-23-4 radar, like that of the SA-6,

operated over a wide frequency band which was not affected by

Israeli ECM at the start of the war.

The S.A-7 was not of itself a surprise because it

had been used in Vietnam; however, its appearance in the 1973

49 War included two new capabilities: filters were added to

counter flare decoys, and it was launched in salvos of four

or eight frommulti-barreled racks on top of armored

carriers. The only weakness of the SA-7 was its small war-

head which damaged without knocking down many aircraft. 38

I A F TACTICS AND LOSSES, 6 OCTOBER 1973

Because of heavy initial losses, the I A F stood down

for about two hours and reviewed t h e i r tactics in an attempt

to find a means of working around the enemy capabilities.

In the last light of the afternoon the IAF resumed close

support over the Golan with minimum altitude tactics. They

approached the Golan at tree-top height in a sweeping hook

over Jo rdan ian territory to attack the Syrian columns in the

flank, then continued in a left turn and egressed to the

southwest. The use of napalm and cluster bomb units (CBU)

minimized the requirement to rrpop-upftfor ordnance delivery.

Minimum altitude, high speed, and a single pass reduced air-

craft vulnerability but increased the difficulties of target

acquisition and accurate weapons delivery. These tactics,

therefore, did not provide as effective close support, but

they reduced the attrition rate and so had to be used until

the a i r defenses could be suppressed.39

In an estimated 281 ground support sorties over the

Golan on 6 October, the I A F lost 30 to 40 aircraft f o r a l o s s

rate of 10-14percent. O The loss rate was highest in the

first hour and a half and decreased with the revised tactics.

An estimate of the l o s s rate with modified tactics was

"about one Skyhawk down in twelve sorties" or about 8 per-

41cent,

MOUNT HERMON--ANOTHEX SURPRISE

The Syrians achieved more than technological surprise,

They also took by surprise the important Israeli observation

post on Mount Hermon. Syrian commandos in four MI-8 heli-

copters assaulted the mountain top and overran the 55-man

carrison in a little over two hours on the first afternoon

o:r tho war. In this action the Israelis lost the radar which

looked northeast into Syria and the vantage point from which

air and artillery strikes could have been directed across 42much of the Golan H e i g h t s .

GOLAN S'UMMARY, 6 OCTOBER 2973

To summarize the first day on the northern front, the

S.AF, primarily with surface-to-air weapons, concentrated their

forces and initially achieved air superiority over the

critical area o f the land battle, With revised tactics the

IAF reduced their ?ass rate to a level which was acceptable

only because of the desperate situation on the ground,

OVER THE SINAI, 6 OCTOBER 1973

When compared to the G o l m j there were some distinct

differences in the air battle on 6 October over the Suez;

but the end result was quite similar, The Egyptian aircraft

5s

initially penetrated beyond their air defense umbrella to

strike military targets throughout the occupied Sinai but

suffered moderate losses in doing SO. The IAF'maintained air

superiority over the occupied Sinai, but w a s unable to

achieve it within Egypt's air defense umbrella.

Over 200 EAF' aircraft crossed the Canal at 1405 hours

and proceeded at minimum altitude to targets in the Sinai.

These strikes had been well rehearsed against representative

targets erected in the Libyan desert. (This was quite

similar to IAF training f o r the 1967 War.) Priority targets

were the larger airfields in the Sinai (El Meliez, El Arish,

R a s Nasrani, Bir Tamada, Ophira, and Akaba), air defense

batteries, radars, command posts, tank depots, lines of

communication, and artillery. (FROG missiles were fired at

Bir Gifgafa and Tasa bases.) Following the Israeli example

of 1967, the Egyptian A i r Force employed a rocket-propelled 43bomb to crater the runways.

Those Israeli aircraft which did not launch at the

first warning were apparently well protected in hardened

bunkers, but reports on the results of the EAF attack are

limited.

The EAF commander, Lieutenant General Moneirn, later

claimed Egypt had lost only five aircraft while damaging

targets which included six runways, twelve Hawk missile

positions, and two radar stations. 44 Israeli and other

sources claim the EM' lost 16 fighters and 20 helicopters

on the first day. 45 For the fighters this was a l o s s rate

52 46of 5-7 percent, While this loss rate was not prohibitive,

: i t was hrifyh considcring tho dement of surprise the E.AF

enjoyed in striking the first blow, It also reflected con-

tinued Israeli air superiority east of the Egyptian SAY

umbrella.

The initial EAF attack disrupted somewhat the IAF*s

support of the ground forces on the Canal, 47 One of the

m c t i o n s of the Bar-Lav Line was to act as a trip-wire to

provide an eight-minute response time for fighters to hit

targets which attempted to c r o s s the Suez C a n a l , but the

first I A F airstrike on the canal occurred 26 minutes after 48tho w a r began.

There was no shortage of targets f o r the IAF.

Eight thousand Egyptian soldiers had crossed the C a n a l in

rubber dinghies, and 20 bridges were being constructed (10

f o r infantry and 10 for vehicles). The first IAI? targets

w e r e the bridges, and second were t