Democratic Forum

The 1996 Institutional Crisis in Paraguay

September 1996 Washington, D.C.

Secretary General César Gaviria

Assistant Secretary General

Christopher R. Thomas Executive Coordinator, Unit for the Promotion of Democracy

Elizabeth M. Spehar

This publication is part of a series of publications of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States (OAS). Opinions and statements expressed are not necessarily those of the OAS or its member states, and are entirely the responsibility of the parties expressing them.

Democratic Forum

The institutional crisis of April 22 to 24, 1996, in Paraguay, from the perspective of the Government,

civil society, and the international community

Unit for the Promotion of Democracy

This report is an edited version of the original transcripts, produced under the technical

supervision of Mr. Diego Paz, Senior Specialist of the UPD, and Coordinator of this Forum. Professor Riordan Roett contributed with the summary and comments included in this issue.

Design and composition of this publication was done by the Information and Dialogue Section headed by Mr. John Murray of the UPD. Mrs. Betty Robinson and Mrs. Judith Horvath-Rouco helped with the final editing of this report, and JNA Design was responsible for the graphic design.

Copyright @ 1997. All rights reserved. Reproduction of this material is authorized; please credit it as Aa publication of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States@. Table of contents

Preface........................................................................................................................................... vii Opening remarks..............................................................................................................................1 Presentations of the panelists ...........................................................................................................5 Question-and-answer period ..........................................................................................................23 Summary and comments................................................................................................................31 Closing remarks .............................................................................................................................33 Appendix........................................................................................................................................35

Preface

The Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) was established in 1991 to support the democratization efforts in the Hemisphere, in compliance with Resolution AG/RES.1063/90 of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS), and Executive Orders Nos. 90-3 and 90-3 rev.1 of the Secretary General of the Organization. The Unit=s mandate is to provide technical assistance and advisory services to the member states of the OAS, at the request of those states, for the strengthening of their political institutions and democratic procedures.

One of the principal tasks of the Unit is to stimulate and support the exchange of knowledge and experience on democratic development among countries of the Hemisphere. An important mechanism for this exchange is the Democratic Forum. Organized in the form of seminars, round tables, conferences or lectures, the Democratic Forum brings together the diplomatic community, multilateral and non-governmental organizations, academic institutions, media representatives and others, to share ideas and experiences and to debate key issues of democracy and the development of democratic governance. It thus reaches out to various sectors of opinion and provides an important space for intellectual discourse. Democratic fora brings together representatives of a broad cross section of the community in the Washington, D.C. area, but they may also be convened elsewhere in the Hemisphere with the collaboration of local counterpart organizations and in response to the interests of member states.

The agenda for this session of the Democratic Forum on the topic AThe Institutional Crisis in Paraguay - April 1996", was a review of the events that gave rise to the crisis and its resolution from the perspectives of the government and civil society in Paraguay and the international community. Opening remarks were delivered by Ambassador Carlos Víctor Montanaro, Permanent Representative of Paraguay to the OAS and Chairman of the Permanent Council of the Organization. The subsequent proceedings were chaired by Elizabeth Spehar, Executive Coordinator of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy.

The other principal participants at this session of the Democratic Forum were Senator Carlos Podestá of the Colorado Party and the Representative of the Government of Paraguay; Domingo Laíno, President of the Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA); Ambassador Lawrence Chewning Fábrega, Permanent Representative of Panama to the OAS and Chairman of the Permanent Council of the Organization at the time of the crisis in Paraguay; Ambassador Antonio Mercader, Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the OAS; Professor Riordan Roett, Director of the Latin American Studies Program, School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University; and César Gaviria, Secretary General of the OAS. Ambassador Christopher R. Thomas, Assistant Secretary General of the OAS, also attended. (Brief biographies of the speakers are in the appendix hereto). vi

2 Opening remarks Opening remarks Ambassador Carlos Víctor Montanaro Permanent Representative of Paraguay to the OAS and Chairman of the Permanent Council at the time of the Democratic Forum

We are very grateful for your presence and your interest in Paraguay, especially with respect to the events of last April, which were of great importance to the Hemisphere as well as to Paraguay. You are proof that our hemisphere's governments and democratic institutions are gaining in strength and vigor and can survive challenges that until recently would have overwhelmed them.

On February 3, 1989, there began in Paraguay a process of development toward democracy without precedent in our history. It is in fact regarded as our country's second national independence. We shook off long years of authoritarian rule and entered a new era of government based on respect for human rights, a representative government.

Seven years after that historic date, it is dawning on us that this process of transition, which began almost unexpectedly, has not given us a chance to sit back and analyze everything that has happened. It is as if there had been no time for that. The changes we are undergoing are so swift and constant that it is sometimes difficult to keep up with all of them. That is why the Government of the Republic of Paraguay attributes the utmost importance to this meeting of the Democratic Forum, organized by the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy of the OAS. It is useful for us to be able to share our experience of democratization with the other countries of the Hemisphere. We realize that Paraguay's growth toward democracy requires, now more than ever, painstaking and exhaustive analysis.

One of the most important tests of the fledgling democracy will be analyzed today from the standpoint of the principal actors. Who is more qualified to tell us about the events of last April 22 than those invited to this forum?

Although several aspects of our democracy fall short of perfection, we take pride in the progress made over this short period of time. Today we can point to a new, redesigned, reliable system for ensuring fair elections; a democratically elected congress; total freedom of expression; and a will and a commitment on the part of the national government to press on with the strengthening of democracy.

It is supremely appropriate to be discussing this subject, which concerns not only Paraguay but all the countries of the Hemisphere, here at the headquarters of the Organization of American States. We are fully cognizant of the significant response of the inter-American system, as a whole, to the events of April 22 and 23. Our Secretary General, Mr. César Gaviria, will speak to us about this matter in greater detail, along with Ambassador Lawrence Chewning Fábrega of Panama, who was Chairman the Permanent Council at that time.

Opening remarks 3

We also have Ambassador Antonio Mercader of Uruguay, who will talk about the role of the MERCOSUR countries on that occasion. This Forum will enable us to reflect on and analyze the events of last April 22 and 23, and I believe we shall inevitably arrive at the conclusion that Paraguayan democracy has come into its own, thanks to the maturity of its institutions and of Paraguayan society itself.

I particularly want to thank the distinguished members of this panel: Secretary General Gaviria; Ambassador Chewning Fábrega; Ambassador Mercader; Carlos Podestá, a Senator of the governing party and former Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Paraguay; Domingo Laíno, Chairman of the Authentic Radical Liberal Party, the main opposition party of Paraguay, and a recognized statesman and politician in the Hemisphere; and Professor Riordan Roett, Director of the Latin American Studies Program of the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University.

It is a real honor for the Paraguayan Mission to have such distinguished speakers. Again, thank you all for being here.

We also owe a special word of thanks to Ambassador Christopher Thomas, Assistant Secretary General of the OAS, who is sitting on the panel with us, and to Elizabeth Spehar, Executive Coordinator of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, who organized this Forum. Elizabeth Spehar Executive Coordinator Unit for the Promotion of Democracy

On behalf of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, I welcome you to the Democratic Forum on the institutional crisis of April 22 to 24, 1996, in Paraguay, from the perspective of the government, civil society, and the international community.

The Unit for the Promotion of Democracy sponsors these fora, which are designed to further public dialogue aimed at elucidating facts and circumstances pertaining to democratic development in the Hemisphere. To that end, the UPD, at the request of a member state or on its own initiative and in consultation with the governments through their Permanent Missions to the OAS, has organized lectures, seminars, and round tables, with the participation of academics, politicians, diplomats, and other specialists.

The purposes of the Democratic Forum that brings us together today are to examine the role assumed by the government, civil society, and the international community in defense of democratic institutions in Paraguay, as a result of the political crisis of April 22 to 24, 1996; to comment on the response of the Organization of American States to the institutional crisis of a member state; and to prepare a publication containing the papers read.

4 Opening remarks

Today's program consists of a single session in which the speakers will have a maximum of ten minutes to make their presentations. Because of the stature of this group of panelists in the academic, political, and diplomatic fields, it is a privilege for us to be able to hear the topic discussed from the various perspectives they bring to it.

6 Presentations of the panelists Presentations of the panelists Topic: The institutional crisis of April 22 to 24, 1996, from the perspective of the Government of President Juan Carlos Wasmosy Senator Carlos Podestá, Colorado Party Representative of the Government of Paraguay

The unwillingness of the army commander, Major General Lino César Oviedo, to step down as ordered by his commander in chief, President Juan Carlos Wasmosy, touched off a constitutional crisis from April 22 to 24, 1996, that raised profound concern throughout the country and in the international community. General Oviedo had a distinguished military career, often serving as assistant commander of the military units in which he served. As a staff colonel, he was commanding officer of the Third Cavalry Regiment. At the time of the coup of February 3, 1989, which overthrew General Alfredo Stroessner, he took command of the armored group that neutralized the presidential guard regiment. This action led to the unconditional surrender of the troops loyal to Stroessner and the latter's arrest and removal to the Cavalry Division headquarters, where the old dictator signed his resignation.

This record, together with his swagger, boldness, and quick wit, made him a favorite with the public. However, Oviedo soon showed signs of intense political ambition, his repeated involvement in party and national affairs at first raising eyebrows and then causing indignation in many quarters.

In view of his valuable service,--so I understand--during the planning and execution of the 1989 coup and the prestige he earned among his fellow military officers, President Wasmosy excused a number of conflicts caused by Oviedo's interference in political affairs, though at a high cost to his own public credibility.

Most democratic sectors, both in the Government and in as the opposition and the press, insistently pressed the President to separate Oviedo from active duty. The pressure mounted by Oviedo to prevent internal elections in the National Republican Association (Colorado Party), his opposition to plans for governmental reform, and his constant meddling in government affairs outside his purview eventually became too much for the President to tolerate.

Finally, President Wasmosy summoned him and informed him of his decision to retire him, in the presence of the commander of the armed forces, General Silvio Rafael Noguera. From that moment on, General Oviedo resisted compliance with the order by various means.

Presentations of the panelists 7

The forces loyal to the constitutional President of the Republic had developed some time earlier a defensive strategy to put down a possible uprising by Oviedo. Perceiving that the army units under his command would not follow him in an adventure against the Constitution, Oviedo sought to persuade the President, first through intimidation and then through negotiation, and was relatively successful, winning a promise to be named Minister of Defense in exchange for his retirement, as ordered, from active service and from his post as army commander.

At that point, large segments of public opinion--all the political parties, led by the governing National Republican Association (Colorado Party), and most strongly students and the press--demonstrated their opposition to the compromise engineered to placate the ambitious General. President Wasmosy responded by withdrawing his promise and publicly announced to the youthful protesters gathered in the gardens of the Government Palace that he no longer had any intention of bringing Oviedo into his cabinet as Minister of Defense.

The tangible presence of the Organization of American States, through its Secretary General, César Gaviria, the statements of the Government of the United States of America, and the support of the MERCOSUR countries and the entire international community for the constitutional order and democratic institutions of the Republic of Paraguay overcame the resistance of the General, who had to abandon his efforts and bow to legitimate authority.

At present, General Oviedo faces a trial in a civilian court on his conduct during the events of April 1996. The defendant is enjoying all the guarantees of due process. The court of first instance hearing his case ordered him held in preventive detention in the military prison; this measure was vacated by a criminal appeals court, but the proceeding is continuing and testimony is awaited from members of the armed forces involved in the case.

Meanwhile, General Oviedo, now in retired status, is conducting a vigorous political campaign for nomination as the Colorado Party's presidential candidate during the 1998-2003 term.

Paraguay has had a turbulent political history. To give you an idea, this century alone saw 26 governments between 1904 and 1994, and there have been periods of extreme political violence. In 1954, longing for stability, the people found someone who came and didn't want to leave, and wouldn't leave until a gun was put to his head.

As a cultural product of not exactly democratic sources--the Spanish crown and the aboriginal chieftains--and as young nations, we have yet to produce spectacular democratic results. But I would also like to stress today that we Paraguayans have long yearned to live in civilized fashion under a democratic system.

Present here is my compatriot Domingo Laíno, my friendly adversary. I must tell you that when the armed forces troops went into the streets to establish freedom, Dr. Laíno, who with his comrades was persecuted and attacked by the police, went out into the street with a red rose in his hand and gave it, in public, to a member of Stroessner's repressive police. Examples of this kind have had much more significant sequels, such as the fact that my party lost 43 municipalities in

8 Presentations of the panelists democratic elections and relinquished them without any shenanigans aimed at putting our opponents' victory in doubt.

The development we are seeing in our intense political life, in Parliament, in the streets, in the university, suggests that Paraguayans truly desire democracy.

I think there are two things I should mention before my time runs out. President Wasmosy wanted to avoid bloodshed at all costs, even though those costs might include his personal sacrifice as President of the Republic. Naturally, we knew that bloodshed was inevitable even if the President wished not to resist Oviedo, because there had to be a response to Oviedo commensurate with his breach of discipline.

In addition, I want to make clear the fundamental, very honorable role of my country's armed forces. The fact that they harbored a deluded senior officer who went beyond his authority should not be construed to mean that the armed forces as a whole shared his attitude. The facts show that most, if not all, members of my country's splendid armed forces have respected the constitution and therefore deserve the respect of my country's political class and citizenry. Topic: Behavior of the opposition political parties and the reaction of civil society to the institutional crisis of April 22 to 24 in Paraguay Domingo Laíno Chairman of the Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA)

We have perceived and interpreted the military developments of April in Paraguay as part of the transition to democracy. Paraguay has been in transition to democracy since February 1989. We understand that this transition must be peaceful, and that is why it is imperative to follow the principle of gradualism.

We cannot go from the pinnacle of dictatorship to the valley of democracy in a single leap. It would be fatal to try. We must make the move gradually, feeling our way around the mountain till we get there.

Accordingly, we faced the crisis open to dialogue, keeping in mind two central requirements: first, to uphold the constitutional order at all costs, and second, to avoid bloodshed and violence, also at all costs. For that reason the Chairman of the Authentic Radical Liberal Party did not take to the streets, wasting electoral capital, for we realized that this was not an election campaign. We used whatever personal and national influence we had in service to the Constitution and to peace, through dialogue.

Furthermore, I want to start by pointing to something very important in the military developments of April in Paraguay. Something novel, really new. The insurgents did not go for a traditional coup, that is, an undisguised overthrow of established authority in defiance of the Constitution. That was the traditional way. The insurgents of April in Paraguay tried to inaugurate a new style, which I call "coup under the table." That is to say, a show of respect for existing laws

Presentations of the panelists 9 and the Constitution while applying pressure or threats to remove the constitutional government through resignation. The leader of the insurgency did not aspire to the presidency, he only wanted it to go the speaker of the Congress--the third in the constitutional order of succession. Thus, to all appearances, the Constitution and the rule of law were respected. The leader of the insurgency may have been seeking in this way to run the government from under the table.

I recall that the previous time, in 1989, which was the last military coup, when the dictator Stroessner was overthrown, the leader of the insurrection was General Andrés Rodríguez; he took power as the nation's provisional president. An important difference.

As this development is so novel in my country, it needs a close look. Why did it happen? And here we find two factors, one endogenous, the other exogenous. I am not going to say anything about exogenous factors, because I am in Washington in the presence of Mr. Gaviria, and both the United States Department of State and the distinguished Secretary General of the OAS have spoken and acted in very felicitous and timely fashion regarding the progress of democracy in Paraguay.

I want to recall here an experience I had in exile, while living in Buenos Aires, when, from the Plaza de Mayo, the "painted faces" also attempted a coup against the constitutional government of Alfonsín. Alfonsín called the people to the Plaza de Mayo (as an exile I also participated; it was an intervention in the internal affairs of another state, but in short I had to break that rule), dug in and overcame the crisis, and then came the messages in support of democracy and constitutional government. That was after the crisis had been brought under control.

In Paraguay, however, no such thing happened. In Paraguay, when the crisis may be said to have been at its peak, I would say on the 23rd, Mr. Gaviria showed up in my country and had lunch with us, together with members of the executive branch. I think Dr. Carlos Podestá was there too. The crisis was in progress at the time, it was at its height. In other words, during the military events of April in Paraguay there appeared for the first time an international network of democratic solidarity. And this is very important: not only the economy is globalizing, but so is democracy. And this is very good for democrats.

My topic, of course, has to do with the so-called endogenous factors: "Behavior of the opposition political parties and the reaction of civil society to the institutional crisis of April 22 to 24 in Paraguay."

I should point out that ordinary Paraguayans, especially young people, reacted appropriately, swiftly, and enthusiastically to the institutional crisis. With respect to the opposition political parties, I must note that, in the face of the indifference of the official party, except for democrats like Carlos Podestá and others, the official party as an institution did not make its presence felt. In contrast to that indifference, however, the National Encounter Party, the February Revolution Party, and the Christian Democratic Party, all to the same extent and on various fronts, were acting in defense of the rule of law and constitutionality.

The Authentic Radical Liberal Party took important initiatives. Let me mention two. The first was to mediate between the administration and Oviedo. That was the reason, in fact, for my

10 Presentations of the panelists being called by the judge assigned to this proceeding against General Oviedo, as correctly noted by Carlos Podestá. I was the first to testify to that court, and I want to read out part of my testimony.

I told the court the Authentic Radical Liberal Party was the first organization to issue a public statement on the grave crisis threatening the transition process. Issued on the afternoon of April 22, it was worded as follows:

"The Authentic Radical Liberal Party, in view of the reports of alleged insubordination by the army chief of staff concerning an order to accept retirement," which had not yet been officially confirmed at that time, "believes it to be its duty to declare the following: First, it states its irrevocable determination to support the process of transition to democracy, to which it aspires together with the entire Paraguayan people. Second, it accepts the decisions taken institutionally by the president of the republic as commander in chief of the nation's armed forces, in keeping with the powers vested in him by the Constitution and laws of Paraguay."

I also made the following statement to Judge Alcides Corbeta, who is hearing this case: "The party whose chairman I am was also the first political institution to expressly firmly its disagreement with the decision to name the general in question as minister of defense."

On the afternoon of April 23, the Political Committee unanimously agreed to make public the following communiqué:

"With respect to the present situation in the country, the Authentic Radical Liberal Party declares that: (1) It disagrees with the decision of the President of the Republic to appoint Major General Lino Oviedo as Minister of Defense, and makes it clear that it has not in any way participated, directly or indirectly, in the questionable transaction that gave rise thereto. (2) This presidential transaction endangers the institutional stability of the republic by placing in that ministry an insubordinate military officer who openly challenged the constitutional order and will continue to do so from that post, thus posing a constant danger to our country's transition to democracy. (3) It is important to underscore the unanimously expressed support of the national and international communities for the process of democratization of Paraguay and the legality and full validity of the national constitution. (4) The appointment as minister of an officer in a state of open insubordination, whatever the reason for it, not only set an abominable institutional precedent, but is ethically and politically unacceptable and harmful to Paraguay's image in the concert of nations."

That is what I said to the judge and also in reply to a disingenuous question from the prosecutor who was with the judge when I testified. Because acting as mediator at the President's request, I went to the First Army Corps and undertook certain initiatives, the prosecutor asked me, "If the parliamentary committee set up by you, upon bringing General Oviedo's message, and which in order to surmount the then ongoing crisis and that the transaction would be based on the president and the office of the vice president, what were going to be the committee's terms or suggestions in the event of finding the president in Mburubisha Roga, the presidential palace."

I replied that I did not think any member of the delegation entertained the idea of brokering or negotiating, let alone striking a deal. The essential points for all the members of the delegation

Presentations of the panelists 11 were to keep the country's constitutional framework intact, to maintain absolute respect for the nation's laws, and, especially, to accept the official decisions taken by the President as commander in chief, in accordance with the powers conferred upon him by the Constitution.

At that juncture, with only partial information, it was our intention to prevent violence from breaking out that night, the eve of April 23; to avert bloodshed. The idea was to hold out till later morning, when foreign offices around the world would be open and the international democratic safety net could enable Paraguay to proceed with the transition to democracy, its Constitution inviolate. The second important initiative of the Authentic Radical Liberal Party was to have its chairman urge the Congress to try to prevent the "coup under the table" through a public statement pointing out that a forced resignation is not a resignation. The public statement was made. And in this connection I would like to read out what the Ambassador of the Federative Republic of Brazil, with whom I was in contact, told me; obviously he had information that I also needed to deal with my party and with the opposition.

The Brazilian Ambassador said the chairman of the PLRA had acted discreetly and objectively. He noted, "the mission of the opposition was to try to gain time in order to permit mobilization of democratic citizen forces and broaden support from countries friendly to Paraguay." The Brazilian Ambassador further observed that "the PLRA chairman showed concern over the course of events" and that "on the morning of April 23, at about 6:30, he tried to find out how matters stood." He went on, "when he learned of the intended white coup"--this was the Ambassador's term for what I call coup under the table"--[and] the resignation of President Wasmosy [and] Vice President Seifart, he took the initiative of proposing to the Congress that it approve an official document stating that it would not consider any request for resignation at that time, since it would obviously be forced."

We obtained that resolution. We spoke with the Speaker of the Congress and at noon, or a little later, when Secretary General Gaviria was already in Asunción, we delivered it to Mburubisha Roga. This was a very important document, because obviously the idea that "a forced resignation is not resignation" was fundamental. Because, as I said, they were attempting a "coup under the table."

Marcio Oliveira Dias, Ambassador of Brazil, whose actions in the April crisis were very important, ended, according to the interview, with a tribute to "the efforts of the political class, the loyal members of the military who did their duty, the country's youth, and the determination shown by all citizens to defend democracy in Paraguay." I agree with Dr. Carlos Podestá: there are many good members of the military, loyal to our institutions, and there may be many of them present among us. Topic: The OAS response to the institutional crisis of April 22 to 24, 1996, in Paraguay César Gaviria Secretary General of the Organization of American States

12 Presentations of the panelists

After those very authoritative and useful accounts of what happened in Paraguay, I would like to make a few specific comments. The first is how wise and useful for the community of American nations resolution AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-O/91), adopted at Santiago in 1991, has turned t\out to be in very diverse situations and circumstances, which have not necessarily meant everywhere the downfall of a civil government or its replacement by a military regime, in various countries of the Americas.

Take Peru, Guatemala, Haiti, and now Paraguay. In all these cases, the resolution has been broad enough to enable the nations of our Organization to examine the crisis and adopt a solution appropriate to the circumstances and the context of the situation. I think it is important to make that clear, one reason being that there have not been many disagreements. And in the case of Paraguay there were no disagreements on the desirability of using resolution 1080. Every single nation represented in the Organization agreed that the conditions were right for invoking resolution 1080 and taking the action started by the Permanent Council of our Organization.

The second lesson I think we must draw from the situation in Paraguay is the need to act promptly. I believe the best indication of the speed with which our Organization acted is the fact that we were present in Paraguay almost as soon as the crisis got under way and could make a contribution to a favorable outcome.

In the academic world there is much discussion of "early warning"--trying to anticipate crises. This is difficult in any crisis. It is generally very hard to get in ahead of the powers that take the initiative to generate this kind of situation. What is possible is to react promptly. The OAS reacted promptly, MERCOSUR reacted extraordinarily prompt and the [United States] Department of State reacted very promptly. And this concurrence of swift reactions made it possible to contribute significantly to a solution in Paraguay.

And I say "contribution" because, of course, it must be clearly understood by all that the solution was up to the Paraguayan Government and people, not the international community. What the international community did was contribute to a favorable outcome.

Another point I want to make relates to the military, i.e., that the military in our countries must learn, first of all, not to involve themselves in party politics. That has only negative consequences. General Oviedo had been involved in party activities for a long time, and the consequences were harmful. In the second place, is becoming more and more evident that the military should not be involved in activities outside their military function. Their involvement in other areas, other activities, leads to undesirable results. Third, the military should not take sides. Not only should they stay out of party activities, they should not take sides on national issues. Taking sides in public matters that can involve them in party activities may lead to trouble.

Now, I also think we should see from the crisis we were faced with in Paraguay that it is possible in America to find a peaceful solution to a potentially major crisis. And I think we must commend the Government and the President, the country's political forces, and the Paraguayan people. It is almost unimaginable that a crisis of this magnitude should have been resolved without the loss of a single life, in a totally peaceful manner.

Presentations of the panelists 13

We have seen in the recent past in Eastern Europe some of the political crises that arose when the Berlin Wall came down and all those countries faced new situations, which gave them democracy and different values and respect for human rights, but in the Americas we had never gone through quite such upheavals.

I think the credit for the way the crisis was handled should definitely go to the Paraguayan people, their government, and their political establishment. And I am looking at the result, not the particular course of events: others will judge the episodes and the proposed solutions, and people's reactions to those solutions, as in the naming of the General as Minister of Defense. But it was the action of all, at the same time, that produced the favorable outcome.

Let me emphasize another aspect that struck me as particularly important. It was not only promptness. All the member countries of MERCOSUR, with their presidents at the helm, with their foreign ministers and some of their military--for I don't know about all of them--played a critical role during those hours. I think that is something which has to be made crystal-clear. MERCOSUR and the swift action of its presidents, foreign ministers, and some of their military played a key deterrent role in this crisis. For me that role is easy to assess, since I was there; it may not be so easy for others. It was absolutely critical to the peaceful conclusion and to General Oviedo's finally relinquishing command of his troops and requesting his retirement from active duty.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that from the moment this crisis began I was in touch all night with the Chairman of our Permanent Council and coordinated all our actions with him. He called a meeting of the Council on the morning of that same day. It may be the first time in the history of this Organization that within hours of an assault on a country's constitutional system the Council was already adopting resolutions on the preservation of democracy in Paraguay, and this had become a cause of the 34 nations that belong to our Organization.

These were the points I wanted to make clear this morning. And I want to rejoice as an American, and in particular as a Latin American, that we have learned so much from past bad experiences. I am more and more convinced that assaults on constitutional systems may not even be attempted in the future, because it proved possible, with everyone doing his bit, to save the constitutional system of Paraguay, a country with a relatively weak and new, young democracy.

I made it clear to the President of Paraguay, especially during the first hours, that his resignation would solve nothing, that defending democracy in Paraguay entailed defending the full exercise of the constitutional functions that the people had elected him to carry out, and that the Organization of American States would with absolute certainty adopt this position: that the defense of democracy in Paraguay hinged on whether the democratically elected president could fulfill his constitutional functions. Topic: Legal and political instruments considered by the Permanent Council of the OAS for the resolution of the institutional crisis of April 22 to 24, 1996, in Paraguay

Ambassador Lawrence Chewning Fábrega

14 Presentations of the panelists Permanent Representative of Panama to the OAS and Chairman of the Permanent Council during the events of April 1996 in Paraguay

We can say without any doubt that the OAS emerged strengthened from the Paraguayan crisis of April 22 to 24, 1996. Our Organization sent a clear and convincing message that we are a club of democratic countries where there is no place for regimes or governments in power by force. This is because, fortunately, since 1991 we have had a legal instrument that instructs the Secretary General of the Organization to convene the Permanent Council as soon as anything happens to interrupt the democratic institutional political process or the legitimate exercise of power by a democratically elected government abruptly or irregularly in any of the member states of the Organization.

In the new framework of the Charter, the Council is convened to examine the situation, reach a decision, and call an ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or a special session of the General Assembly, all within ten days, this is provided for in resolution AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-O/91), "Representative Democracy," adopted by the twenty-first regular session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, held at Santiago, Chile, in June 1991.

Yet another legal instrument of the OAS empowers the Organization to suspend a member state if its democratically constituted government is overthrown by force. This suspension affects the right to take part in sessions of the General Assembly and Specialized Conferences and to sit on committees, working groups, and other bodies. I am referring to the Washington Protocol.

I wanted to start this brief presentation by giving you a general idea of these two instruments, which now enable the OAS to come to the aid of a member state when its institutional order has been violated. I am doing this so that you can better visualize the role played by the highest regional organization in a crisis such as the one in Paraguay.

It is also worth mentioning what the OAS was before 1991, before these two political instruments existed. In spite of being the main political organ of the Hemisphere, the OAS was powerless to take any decision whenever the institutional order was breached in a member state. All it could do was call a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to consider the situation. And once this had been done, with much discussion and speeches, a declaration was issued or a resolution passed, to little effect because it was a weak document and did not provide for any punishment by the Organization or by the member states individually.

It was, so to speak, an inert OAS. It was a different OAS, which at that time was made up of representatives of democratic governments and de facto governments ruling by force. It was the time when both kinds sat around the same table, elbow to elbow. Ambassadors from democratic governments and ambassadors from dictatorial regimes. I witnessed, during the Panamanian crisis in 1988 and 1989, the way our Organization was totally ineffective in dealing with the agony the Panamanian people were suffering under the regime of then General Manuel Antonio Noriega. Many meetings were held and many resolutions passed, and I can tell you here that there was not one condemnation of General Noriega, whose name was never mentioned in any of those resolutions.

Presentations of the panelists 15

Let me tell you an anecdote: In 1988, when General Noriega overthrew President Erick Arturo del Valle, the latter, from is refuge in the U.S. Embassy, named me Ambassador to the Organization of American States. At the time, ironically, the Chairman of the Permanent Council was the Ambassador of Paraguay, representing the government of President Stroessner. It was up to the Permanent Council to decide whether it would accept me as representative of a government that had been deposed by the military in Panama, or the Ambassador named by a new puppet administration set up by General Noriega. As it turned out, the Permanent Council decided in favor of General Noriega's representative, and the decision was given directly by the Council to the Chairman of the Permanent Council, who was the Ambassador of Paraguay. It was a nice twist of fate, then, that this year it was my job, as Chair of the Permanent Council, to defend democracy in Paraguay.

As you can see, times have changed. In the case of Paraguay, the OAS sent a message to the coup leaders while events in that country were unfolding. The Permanent Council acted swiftly and decisively. And I can tell you, with great satisfaction, that its decision was wise and just.

I can report to you that on the night of April 22, when I learned what was happening in Paraguay, I got in touch, in my capacity as Chairman of the Permanent Council, with Ambassador Carlos Victor Montanaro, Permanent Representative of Paraguay to the OAS, and told him of my intention to convene a special session of the Permanent Council the next day, urgently. Immediately afterwards I spoke with several ambassadors, among whom I recall those of Colombia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, who at once gave me their full support. At about two in the morning I received a call from César Gaviria, Secretary General of the OAS, who was in Bolivia. He asked me to convene the Permanent Council and informed me of his plans to go to Asunción, with a view to serving as mediator in the crisis.

The next day I gave instructions to convene the Permanent Council. It was a timely and necessary decision. Not only would democracy in Paraguay be defended, but the effectiveness of the OAS and its legal and political instruments would be put to the test by invoking resolution 1080.

I think it should be mentioned that, before the Permanent Council meeting I met in the Council Chairman's office with several ambassadors and Strobe Talbott, Under Secretary of State of the United States of America, in order to harmonize our views. I wanted a unanimous decision on the part of each and every council member. I wanted to satisfy the desires of the Paraguayan people and the constitutional government of President Wasmosy as transmitted to me by Ambassador Montanaro himself.

It should further be noted that I also held an informal meeting in the Columbus Room at OAS headquarters, attended by all the ambassadors and representatives of the Organization's member countries. There we analyzed the events that had taken place in Paraguay and agreed to apply resolution 1080, for in Paraguay the rule of law and the institutional system had been compromised since President Wasmosy, though in touch with his entire cabinet, was not fully in control of civil authority.

16 Presentations of the panelists

You already know the rest. The special session of the Permanent Council was held in full agreement and the representatives backed President Wasmosy's administration with one voice by adopting resolution CP/RES. 681, "Support for the Democratic Government of Paraguay." In the operative part of this resolution the Permanent Council expressed its support for the legitimate representative of the Paraguayan people; condemned the events that had taken place in Paraguay; paid tribute to the action of César Gaviria, Secretary General of the OAS, in going to Asunción in order to help strengthen the process of consolidating democracy in Paraguay; convoked a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs pursuant to resolution 1080 of 1991; and instructed the Chairman of the Permanent Council to set a date and place for that meeting in accordance with the course of events.

Fortunately, the Meeting of Consultation did not take place because democracy was restored immediately in Paraguay, thanks to the efforts of the international community and, above all, to the will of the Paraguayan people, their government, and their political leadership, which were prepared to defend their democratic institutions. Topic: The reaction of MERCOSUR to the institutional crisis of April 22 to 24 , 1996, in Paraguay Ambassador Antonio Mercader Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the OAS

I wish to congratulate and thank the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy for giving us this opportunity to address the Paraguayan case today. It strikes us as important, indeed emblematic: a case that cannot be ignored and from which we must draw certain lessons.

I want to start with this observation: the Paraguayan crisis of April 1996 was thwarted by the commitment to democracy of the Paraguayan people and their constitutionally elected government. The international community also influenced the outcome, in particular some countries that felt they had something at stake in the institutional stability of Paraguay. The OAS also played a part, through its organs, the Permanent Council and the Secretary General, whose personal action during those days was crucial to the outcome of the crisis.

MERCOSUR's participation in the reaction of the international community to the institutional crisis in Paraguay took several forms, one of which was the presence in Asunción of the foreign ministers of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.

In various ways, Paraguay's trading partners warned those who were encouraging the coup that, if they were to succeed in their design, Paraguay would suffer sanctions that might entail its exclusion from MERCOSUR's basic agreements. Although it would be premature to estimate the influence this warning may have had on the crisis, it is obvious that it had a powerful impact on all the actors and on public opinion in Paraguay, a country that channels a third of its foreign trade through MERCOSUR.

In an episode without precedent in the history of Latin America, a regional economic and trade group has come onto the domestic political stage of one of the member countries to ensure the continuity of the democratic system. It is a new situation, too significant and having too many

Presentations of the panelists 17 implications to go unnoticed. The most important of these is the revival of the old quarrel between the now-irresistible democratic principles and the classic principle of nonintervention.

I shall try to explore a few lines of thought, bearing in mind that they do not exhaust the subject but serve rather as notes of possible use to future students who can approach this event from a larger historical perspective and with better information.

The first line relates to the formal aspects. Legally speaking, the threat to expel an anti-democratic member from MERCOSUR was questionable at that time because the bloc lacked the so-called "democratic clause" at the time the April crisis arose.

There were declarations by the four presidents that sought to couple the integration process to democracy. The first of these declarations was drawn up at Las Leñas, Argentina, in June 1992, and stated, "Democratic institutions in full effect are an indispensable assumption for the existence and operation of MERCOSUR."

Subsequently, in January 1994, at Colonia del Sacramento, Uruguay, the presidents reiterated their "conviction that integration, insofar as it makes a notable contribution to economic development and social justice, strengthens and consolidates the democratic processes of the four countries."

In August 1994, at Buenos Aires, the heads of government once more "reiterated their conviction that integration contributes to development and social justice and to overcoming economic backwardness, thus consolidating the democratic processes of the four nations."

Another important bit of background was the agreement signed in Madrid in December 1995 between MERCOSUR and the European Union, in which the members of both organizations declared in Article 1, concerning the basis for cooperation, that respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights, as enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, inspires the domestic and international policies of the parties and forms an essential element of the agreement. Both this agreement and the declarations cited above indicated a definite desire to honor the principle of democracy, but their legal value as a basis for sanctions in the Paraguayan case could prove more than questionable. Furthermore, though important, none of these statements had the force of a democratic clause like the one formally embodied by the European Union in 1990 in its Charter of Paris.

If the institutional system had crumbled, an interruption of the trade agreements with Paraguay by the other three members of MERCOSUR would have been legally open to challenge. Fortunately, that extreme measure was not necessary, and it is clear that the presidential declarations of Las Leñas, Colonia, and Buenos Aires were effective.

Consequently, two months after the Paraguayan crisis the four presidents, meeting in San Luis, Argentina, signed the "democratic commitment" in MERCOSUR which states that "the full effectiveness of democratic institutions is an essential condition for cooperation," and that "any disturbance of the democratic order constitutes an unacceptable obstacle to the continuity of the

18 Presentations of the panelists integration process." The sanctions provided for can include the suspension of agreements signed in the MERCOSUR framework.

At San Luis the presidents of Bolivia and Chile, countries interested in joining MERCOSUR, also acceded to this commitment. It is interesting to note that the protocol of accession signed by Bolivia and Chile covers not only agreements within MERCOSUR but also the bilateral relations of both countries with its four founders, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

The significance of this process can be measured by noting that other countries, such as some of the members of the Andean Group, have expressed an interest in joining this market. An expanded MERCOSUR will then mean a gradual extension of the democratic pact in Latin America.

This process would thus seem to be a remarkable example, characteristic of the new international law in the Americas, of the dynamic among events, values, and norms that is currently taking shape with novel approaches and the reordering of principles which used to seem changeless. To be sure, juridical doubts are being heard more frequently, and new formal entities will have to be set up to improve upon what has been done.

The pro-democratic and peacemaking intervention of a regional economic bloc in the internal affairs of one of its members may occur again in the future and create a certain amount of confusion, especially regarding the limits, forms, and requirements of such intervention.

The collision between the democratic principle and that of nonintervention raises serious doubts and questions. This is a central aspect of the issue whose detailed study falls outside the scope of this forum but which ought to receive the closest possible attention in the future.

The Paraguayan case is one more example of the current status of democracy as an uncontested political system and as the cardinal principle informing relations between states. It escapes no one that the traditional neutrality of the law of nations with respect to countries' internal affairs is giving way to what might be described as a social contract among states for the defense of democracy.

In this way, democratic ideology becomes a factor of international cohesion and an essential link to the world. And this is so because a universal conviction exists, as Popper has said, that, its problems and limits notwithstanding, our free world is by far the best social model devised in the course of history.1

This conviction, added to the other great process of our time, the inexorable advance of regionalism, has created the context in which MERCOSUR's forceful reaction to the Paraguayan crisis should be understood.

1 Popper, Karl Raimund "The History of Our Times: An Optimist's View," World Affairs, Winter 1986-87, Vol. 149, pp.111-119.

Presentations of the panelists 19

A second line of thought concerns MERCOSUR itself. It has been said that all integration processes always end by having political consequences. In the case of MERCOSUR, not only did intrazonal trade quadruple in less than five years but its impact has been felt in the areas of social policy, education, public health, and judicial cooperation. The last step, as we have seen, is linked to the political realm. What is amazing is how fast MERCOSUR has traveled the course. It has adopted the democratic principle in five years instead of the decades needed by the European Union.

Analyzing the Paraguayan crisis, Richard Feinberg, former director of inter-American affairs of the National Security Council of the United States, said MERCOSUR was more than a trade agreement: it was a strategic alliance between countries. We added that a coup against democracy cannot be accepted behind a common external tariff, and that no country may act as if it were an island. That is true.2

It is obvious that political considerations entered into the integration process, particularly in connection with the parliamentary ratifications of the Treaty of Asunción, which created MERCOSUR. This is so for four countries, but most particularly for Paraguay, where economic integration with other democracies was regarded as "a sort of reinsurance of democracy."

2 Richard Feinberg, "The Coup That Wasn=t," The Washington Post, April 30, 1996.

20 Presentations of the panelists

Indeed, as Achard, Flores, and González note in a study on the political variable in MERCOSUR, Paraguayan public opinion views the progress of integration primarily in the context of political transition to democracy. These authors cite numerous accounts and opinion polls showing that integration is considered more a political than an economic gain.3

Clearly, Paraguayan public opinion was not mistaken and MERCOSUR carried out its function as democratic reinsurance when the time came.

A final line of thought deals with at another aspect of the matter, which could be called democratic consistency and deserves to be treated in greater depth in the future. In an ill-favored era that many of us were familiar with, an unabashedly authoritarian regime could be set up in this hemisphere at any time as long as it was anti-communist and had free markets. There were brilliant theoreticians who explained to us that one could simultaneously be liberal in the economic field and authoritarian on the political side. Worse yet, there were those who sought to convince us that in our countries the most efficient economic liberalism could only work with the iron backing of an authoritarian regime.

Fortunately, the situation in the Americas is more coherent today: the international community sets democracy, respect for human rights, and the freedom to exercise all the freedoms as conditions before even considering the economic system. Thus the trends towards a free market, open economies, regionalization, and commercial integration are no longer disconnected from political systems. They have in fact been turned into allies of democracy, as is proved by the reaction of MERCOSUR to the Paraguayan crisis of April 1996. Topic: Democratic consolidation process Professor Riordan Roett Director, Latin American Studies Program Johns Hopkins University - School of Advanced International Studies

Let me combine my synthesis and my own comments on four lessons I think we should learn from the case of Paraguay in 1996.

First, Latin America continues its transition to democracy. We should never assume that democracy has been consolidated in Latin America. The transition is precisely the most difficult part of any process. Beginnings are difficult and uncertain and the ultimate objective is clear. It is precisely in the movement through the early stages of attempting to build institutions to relate

3 Diego Achard, Manuel Flores Silva, and Luis Eduardo González, Estudio de la variable política en el proceso de integración regional de los países pequeños del MERCOSUR y análisis de las opiniones de sus élites sobre dicho acuerdo, Buenos Aires, BID/INTAL, l993.

Presentations of the panelists 21 individuals to processes, and to identify common goals, that the kinds of intervention that General Oviedo represented become possible.

Second, the case raises of course the broader question, not only in Paraguay but elsewhere, of the appropriate role of the armed forces in Latin America as we move to the twenty-first century. In Mexico the Army has grown, its budget has increased, and it now increasingly carries out police functions. The precarious part of the Guatemalan peace ending the civil war will be the downsizing and the reinterpretation of the role of the armed forces in Guatemala after decades of bloody conflict. Conflict between Peru and Ecuador clearly indicates that the armies of Latin America have not lost their vocation for conflict and their desire to protect what they define as their national interests. In the case of Paraguay, Oviedo clearly overstepped, but more importantly, as Senator Podestá pointed out, the armed forces of Paraguay reacted negatively. General Oviedo was left standing alone.

I think it is important to emphasize again, as part of the process of transition, that there is still a role to be found for the armed forces in the twenty-first century. Given the absence of most national-security conflicts, the absence of military regimes, the absence of significant outside threats to the Hemisphere, we need to think seriously about the role of the armed forces in society, the relationship between civil society and the military, the appropriateness of military budgets, and the authentic requirements of national defense in the twenty-first century.

Third, as Ambassador Mercader has just pointed out, perhaps the most far-reaching significance of the case of Paraguay is the testing, once again, of the new inter-American architecture of diplomacy, negotiation, and persuasion; that is, the emergence of a dynamic and committed Organization of American States, MERCOSUR, and the other institutional factors that came into play, which would have been impossible 15, perhaps even 10, years ago in the Americas.

It is interesting that in official Washington there was a tendency to underrate the role of the Organization of American States and MERCOSUR in the resolution of the conflict in Paraguay. In part, this is because official Washington is still recovering from the fact that it doesn't run everything in the world, particularly in the Americas, where counterbalances are now beginning to emerge. But I think that in the twenty-first century it will be very significant.

The old code of nonintervention for which this Organization stood firmly for decadesC whether it was covert intervention, military intervention, CIA interventions, or intervention in elections that was in questionChas now yielded to a new code of selectivity for the promotion and defense of democracy. And that is a very appropriate transition in the Americas: to selective democratic interventions in the best sense.

You will remember that the European Union took a very different approach to integration from other processes of integration in the world, providing carrots and some sticks to Greece, Spain, and Portugal, which were non-democratic before they were allowed to join the European Community or the European Union. I will not necessarily argue for carrots and sticks in the AmericasCthat's up to the leaders of the American states. But ultimately, that process is probably why successful democracy was restored in Europe. Those countries have entered the European Union, they have remained democratic, and now they make a very important contribution to that

22 Presentations of the panelists entity. It may well be that beginning with the clear dramatic intervention in Paraguay, the new regional architecture of MERCOSUR, and a revitalized Organization of American States, after the 1991 resolution in Santiago, will become more and more dynamic elements tipping the balance permanently in favor of the maintenance of democratic processes and institutions helping to redefine the role of the armed forces in Latin America and provide public and political support for the process of transition.

My fourth point, which Dr. Laíno addressed in the context of Paraguay but which is very important in the context of Latin America in general, is that as part of the transition to democracy, civil society must always receive the highest priority. Economic growth is very important: there is no question about that. Broader foreign policy goals and objectives are of great significance, but most of those things really will not have a great deal of meaning in the twenty-first century if we don't have modern, competitive political parties; if we don't have a strong nongovernmental organization structure; if we don't have a transparent judiciary; and if we don't have the capacity of the average citizen to participate openly, to disagree democratically, and indeed to understand the importance of losing elections as well as of winning them.

There are indications both ways in the Americas. I returned Sunday night from Mexico, where I was an observer of the national convention of the Institutional Revolutionary Party. If I were an American statesmanCwhich I am notCI would be concerned about the decisions of the convention in this matter of transitions in the consolidation of democracy. The rank and file basically took back the party from the Government, inserting a requirement that all future presidents, governors, and other officials of Mexico have political experience. They don't want any more technocrats and economists. The rank and file also turned down a decision by the leadership of the country to pursue corrupt officials.

Civil society is not benefiting from these kinds of decisions, but those are Mexican decisions and Mexico will have to live with them. I merely use that example to point out that the process, the transition is a very complicated and difficult one. It is obviously affected by economic issues, and it quite clearly has a social content, so that the very important work of the OAS and the very important work of civil society is to explain to the individual citizen why democracy, with all its imperfections is the only system that ultimately should prevail in the Americas. The Paraguayan example is extremely significant because it brought together in the context of a difficult transition to democracy questions about the armed forces, it brought into play the new regional architecture, and it quite clearly demonstrated the growing importance of civil society in Paraguay, which needs to be reconfirmed publicly and continuously by the institutions and, of course, the people of the Americas.

Finally, just as MERCOSUR is becoming an increasingly vibrant and important institution, we also have, as Ambassador Mercader pointed out, the framework agreement with the European Union and the recent meeting. As you know, this received no coverage in Washington of the Rio Group in Cochabamba, BoliviaC there was no mention whatsoever in the American press that I could find. But this was an extremely important meeting that produced an extremely important document supporting democracy, the new regional architecture, and civil society in the much broader context of economic growth and development in the Americas. It is precisely statements

Presentations of the panelists 23 like to one by the presidents in the Rio Group, supported by the new institutional arrangements, that I think give a great deal of hope for the future of the democratic process in the Americas.

24 Question-and-answer period Question-and-answer period Antonio Segovia Representative of the Center of Paraguayan Studies, College Park, Maryland

The question is addressed to Carlos Podestá. I have a question and an invitation for him, based on his statements in favor of democracy, which I was very happy to hear.

A consensus obviously exists that politics and the armed forces should be kept separate. I understand that the Paraguayan Colorado Party still maintains an affiliation with the military. Even if they are not militarily active at the moment, they continue to accumulate seniority in the party. Would Dr. Podestá be prepared to take on a fight to have his party finally withdraw its affiliation with the Paraguayan military? Senator Carlos Podestá Representative of the Government of Paraguay

My position on this issue is a matter of public record. I agree with you, but I would like to quote to you a remark once made by President Sanguinetti of Uruguay: "You can govern with the armed forces or without the armed forces, but never against the armed forces." Dr. Laíno was very clear in explaining that we are in a democratic process, and that we must measure our dosage in order to free the citizenry from any kind of pressure that might pervert their will. I think, sir, that aim will be achieved within a few years. Christina Cerna Representative of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

My question is also directed to Senator Podestá and concerns the situation of former General Oviedo. I was surprised that after five months he still hasn't been tried and convicted for these actions and even more surprised that he is a candidate for the presidency. In Guatemala there is a constitutional amendment that prohibits any participant in a coup d'état from ever running for the highest office in the land. I am wondering if the Congress of Paraguay is considering adopting a similar provision and if not, why not. Senator Carlos Podestá

As a matter of fact, the Constitution of Paraguay contains precisely the provision you mention. However, it becomes operative only when the person has been convicted.

Question-and-answer period 25

I share your surprise. But just imagine: last week, in a poll taken in the center of the city, where thousands and thousands of young people were gathered shouting against Oviedo, Oviedo came out in first place.

Unfortunately, madam, ideologies do not solve the problem of hunger, but hunger generates ideologies. And we must remember that as long as we are unable to meet the social needs of our multitudes of destitute citizens, the people are likely to believe anything, even from troublemakers. Teófilo Acosta First Vice President, Desfile de las Américas

I have two questions for Senator Podestá: What are the politicians doing, if they can't control the military? Why don't they have a plan to work with the military? That is to say, they are creating military men and can't take action against them if they don't do the right thing.

The other question is: If General Oviedo feels he would make such a good president and he hasn't been convicted, as you say, why can't we bring him here and listen to his side? Senator Carlos Podestá

I am happy to say that your question suggests its own answer. The truth is, my friend, that we must not confuse the armed forces with General Oviedo. This crisis made it plain that the ways of General Oviedo's providentialism is not common in the armed forces generally. I think the armed forces from now on are going to respect the country's Constitution to the letter and obey the constitutional authorities put there by the sovereign will of the people.

In any case, in the barracks, in the military training institutes, in all military units, the word and the practice today are respect for the Constitution. So I discount the possibility that we will shortly have to face another situation like the one last April. And as for anyone listening to General Oviedo, I think he is free to speak and those who want to can listen to him. Oscar Ayala Paraguayan citizen

Many of us find it hard to understand talk about efforts to improve the social situation in Paraguay when the real effort seems to be going into earmarking more funds out of a tiny budget to raise military salaries again, while our doctors, teachers, and social workers are worse off all the time.

I wonder, do we really need to give the military all those benefits? We give them their pay, vehicles, orderlies to do the housework--and more than the housework--and we also give them food. And what do we give our educators, our doctors, our social workers, etc.? It makes me wonder, what actually is the Government's priority? It has such a tiny budget, 95 or 98 percent of which is used for running expenses and yet there it goes, trying to give even more to the military.

26 Question-and-answer period

I ask this question of all the panelists with all due respect. Because the military deserve the same treatment as everyone else, but there is a big difference in how they are treated. Senator Carlos Podestá

I shall be brief, for I think Dr. Laíno has something to say on this point. I want to tell you that our doctors and teachers received pay increases of 1,800 percent from 1989 to 1993. That means they were earning too little, because they are still poorly paid. But at least we are making an effort to distribute the budget better.

As to the armed forces and the national police, their pay scales were streamlined to reduce the number of grades from 45, which they had until last year, to 27, so that they can get higher pay without a significant increase in the budget. Comparatively speaking, our armed forces are still very poorly compensated. But we are perfectly well aware that we can't distribute what we don't have. Those are the facts in reply to the question from my compatriot Mr. Ayala. Thank you. Rubén Teisidó Physician residing in the United States

Being a doctor, I'm going to issue a prescription for all of us. I am in complete agreement with Dr. Laíno's comments and draw great hope from them. Democracy isn't something you put on like a poncho or a hat. Gradualism is the only way we are going to get a democratic society in Paraguay. And I hope and pray we may all understand this process and hold on to the small gains we have made these last few years. I think Paraguay's best years lie ahead of us. Domingo Laíno Chairman, Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA)

An optimistic message, doctor. Many thanks. My comment would be that the military hardliners lost ground in the April crisis. The victory of the rule of law can be viewed as the start of a permanent return of the military to the barracks. I think we have made progress.

I think the political class has also understood that it mustn't miss this opportunity to move forward to a situation in which the armed forces have stopped arrogating to themselves the right to manage the democracy and referee its development.

The April victory also means a severe blow for the coup-oriented mentality that still exists in Latin America's military institutions. The diehards have suffered a big setback, in Paraguay and in the region. And as someone said: The substantive principle of democracy triumphed in Paraguay last April; ballots decide and boots obey.

I want to stress that the issue of the military is a very difficult aspect of the transition process. Nevertheless, we have made strides. It was in 1989--seven years ago--that we launched the process of transition to democracy, and as a responsible political opposition we announced as our goals democratic stability and governability. We also introduced a new style in politics, which at first

Question-and-answer period 27 startled those interested in politics and was also not understood by the people at large. This was because we were weighed down with almost half a century of dictatorship, intolerance, savage warfare between parties, constant confrontation, injustices; and obviously that was useful when what we had to do was confront. With the dictator you couldn't discuss matters or have a dialogue, so you fought. But now we have destroyed and overthrown the dictatorship.

In February a new period began, a new political scenario. Dialogue was established as a mechanism for seeking agreement and coordination between the official political actors, the executive branch and the opposition. At first, of course, this wasn't understood, because of our tradition of tough, savage--one might say confrontational and primitive--politics. But little by little we gained ground. I would say that where the armed forces are concerned, although we still haven't arrived at a military institution that can be described as professional and so on, we have managed to pass some laws penalizing members of the military who engage in party politics while on active duty.

Of course, our judicial branch is also in transition. The aim is to punish those who violate that law.

We have achieved a lot. I even believe there are very strong currents favoring institutional government within the armed forces. I'm talking about the air force, navy, and army. A new consciousness exists. The cadets of the Military College no longer have to join the Colorado Party. Young people can enter without showing their party cards.

We have not yet reached the degree of perfection we strive for. But we're getting there. In political terms, the electoral system has been radically changed. Through dialogue and cooperation we have succeeded, first of all, in setting up a Superior Tribunal of Electoral Justice. Its composition is balanced: one Liberal, one Colorado, one independent. It is administering the entire electoral process with great care and fairness.

Through dialogue and cooperation we have also, for example, succeeded in getting rid of the old electoral roll. This roll listed not only living voters but the dead as well. It had to go. We had our work cut out for us, because diehards in high places didn't want to see the roll go; they just wanted to audit it and settle the affair. But we stuck to our guns and dialogued.

Now, you have to know how to be patient. Yes, indeed. The gains I am talking about took hours, days, weeks, months, even years of dialogue. But we made them.

I spoke with Violeta de Chamorro, President of Nicaragua, and she told me that in her country they prepared a national roll based on fixed registration places and fixed registration days. And voters vote where they are registered.

We lobbied for that system. We are using it in Paraguay and now have more than 1,800,000 registered voters. This was done in a fixed place of registration on a fixed day of registration, in the presence of all the opposition representatives. So now we have the cleanest registration system Paraguay has ever had throughout its political history.

28 Question-and-answer period

We succeeded in setting up the Conciliation Council. It wasn't easy. Eight members. The government wanted 7 - 1, or 6 - 2. We told them, no: 4 - 4. We argued day and night until we got what we wanted. There are four Colorados, three Liberals, and one independent member of the opposition.

All in all, I think we are moving forward. But, of course, I know what Dr. Ayala means. We have a problem: the nation's general budget. I think 99 percent is salaries; there is no investment. And money is still being spent on nonessentials.

More attention has to be paid to education and health, and to investment in infrastructure. But we are going in the right direction. All is not darkness. I see the outlook here is a bit pessimistic. But believe me: we are doing everything we can. In November we are going to hold municipal elections in 220 Paraguayan municipalities. The electoral system that is being created has never been created before. We will have a new Superior Tribunal of Electoral Justice, as I said; we have a new electoral code, and we have a new electoral roll. As a result, I believe, the system will become more transparent and provide less and less opportunity for fraud and cheating. For according to some we had cheating until 1993. Timothy Towell Former Ambassador of the United States in Paraguay

I have a short commentary rather than a question, if I may. I think this has been an absolutely superb meeting. I didn't think I could learn anything about Paraguay that I didn't know, but I have learned a lot. It seems to me there are two heroes I have heard of today in this review of the events of April 23. The first hero is the people: the people of Paraguay and the people of the Hemisphere, reflected in their elected representatives, both legislative and in the executive branch. The other hero, as you all stressed, is the newly invigorated institutions of the Hemisphere. There was talk of official Washington with its cynicismCI am not an official WashingtonianCabout the energy and role of hemispheric institutions. It is the people in both senses that are the real heroes of this historic event, which is important for the whole Hemisphere.

As Foreign Minister Melgarejo said yesterday in his UN speech, the generation of the next centuryCI hope I'll be around for thatCis a different generation and this world is evolving. I had a couple of telephone calls in the middle of the night on April 22 and 23 from people down in Paraguay reacting to old-fashioned threats in an old-fashioned way. They wanted the bomberos to come in. They wanted to know what the Pentagon was going to do, what SOUTHCOM was going to do, where the helicopters were, and why, with our new cooperation on drugs, didn't a little SWAT team come down and do things the old-fashioned Cold War way. Mission impossible. Save democracy, Yankee Cold War style.

What I have learned today, and what all the people of the Hemisphere have learned, is that all that has gone out, just as did my friend General Oviedo's part in history; it's over with, and the new generation of the next century, as Melgarejo said at the UN, the people of Paraguay, the people of the Hemisphere, their elected representatives and their institutions, have the vigor and the dynamism to make this kind of thing work both in the Hemisphere and in my favorite country in South America.

Question-and-answer period 29 Darío Elías Representative of Diario ABC

My appraisal is also optimistic, in the sense that politically Paraguay has come a long way lately. I want to direct the following question to Dr. Laíno.

In spite of all the optimism expressed this morning, you mentioned something I find worrisome: that in April, at the critical moment, when the test came, the Colorado Party remained silent, with a few exceptions you mentioned. It must be borne in mind that the Colorado Party is the party in power, and it kept silent. Perhaps it was a new circumstance or a crisis situation or something: My question is about the future. Starting with the next elections, the municipal elections you mentioned, and of course the next general elections, what plans has the opposition, which sees more democracy in its sector than in the Colorado silence, with respect to the next step in that advance to democracy? I would also like to hear what Dr. Podestá has to say about that silence, and whether it means anything given the large number of people who support the Colorado Party. Domingo Laíno

I thank Darío Elías for his question, because it will let me make another point I had forgotten about.

The Colorado Party officially did not take sides or get involved. It kept silent with, of course, some exceptions. People like Carlos Podestá and others, other voices in the Colorado Party, did speak out and, of course, support the constitutional system, and were always concerned and active in the defense of democracy. Some Colorado groups--youth--even demonstrated in the streets. But officially the party said nothing; it remained aloof.

The reason I offer Darío Elías is that the Colorado Party is also in transition. I expect this transition to take a while yet, because the party stood behind harsh, dictatorial regimes: for instance, it was the political arm of Stroessner, who lasted more than 30 years. And obviously this led to strong notions of verticalism, of authoritarianism.

Transition is not only a matter of correcting the Constitution and issuing new decrees and laws; transition is above all a matter of exchanging authoritarian values for democratic ones. And that takes time. This means the Colorado Party will have to undergo a somewhat longer transition; it will be hard work. At present, a very small part of the party is in the hands of the new Stroessnerites, people who defend Stroessner directly or indirectly. In other words, with education and re-education, these authoritarian values will give way little by little to democratic values.

And this, Darío Elías, brings me to the point I wish to make. I think that the transition to democracy in Paraguay will end, and we will have firmly rooted democracy, only when power alternates. With the Colorado Party in the government, that will be hard to bring about. And (Carlos Podestá will forgive me) I don't believe the Colorado Party will change. Mark my words. I believe

30 Question-and-answer period we must introduce a new style of governance in Paraguay, governance based on national integration. This is very important. The Colorado Party is a party of gymnasts in government, gymnasts in diplomacy, people who have even been trained abroad. Many of its members meet high ethical and intellectual standards. We need them for a future government, but the party as such cannot lead us into the future. That would make for a longer, more painful transition.

However, with parties taking turns in power, and all sectors represented in them, I think then we'll be able to say the transition is complete and democracy in Paraguay can really begin. So I thank Mr. Elías for his question. Senator Carlos Podestá

My compatriot Elías, though far away, is always very close to us through his work here and the reports he receives from over there. I must explain that at the time of the crisis the Colorado Party was immersed in furious internal strife. It was my job to manage popular mobilization from party headquarters. We had to do this in the name of the governing junta, of which I was a member, but we received no backing from a large segment of the party, the one that defeated us in the elections.

Dr. Laíno was quite right in saying that the majority of my party today consists of those to whom General Stroessner is an emblematic symbol. We believe this has to do with a kind of nostalgia for what many Colorados, myself included, felt for a long time; but we realize it cannot continue. When we try to promote compliance with the law and conduct ourselves in accordance with the Constitution and laws of our country, no one likes it very much, but we know this is a question of time.

I also wish to say that I recognize the patriotism of my political adversary, Dr. Laíno, because when I was Minister of the Interior we were able to create an inter-party dialogue. We adopted a democratic governance agreement by Dr. Laíno. Unfortunately, we were unable to form a national government with the full participation of the democratic forces, because it would have been too costly within our party. Nevertheless, I still think, three years later, that we made a mistake. I'm sure that if we, the democratic forces, had put together a national government, the totalitarian, authoritarian, diehard forces in my party would now be in the minority.

Unfortunately, sometimes we can't quite convince the others; sometimes we have to back off, but not all the way.

I am going to conclude these remarks with an observation that will disappoint my friend and compatriot Dr. Laíno. Though we might wish otherwise, the Colorado Party is the majority and will undoubtedly continue to hold power in Paraguay if there are democratic elections. Since we now have a Superior Tribunal of Electoral Justice with an opposition majority, we drew up the roll as it ought to be, and in so doing worked beside Dr. Laíno even as I was being called a traitor to my party. But that doesn't matter. Our country comes first.

Question-and-answer period 31

Therefore, I think alternating party government isn't in the cards just yet, and we will continue in power. But I agree with him that the government should be national, even though that may cost me many votes within my party.

Summary and comments Professor Riordan Roett

With a year=s perspective, it is now possible to evaluate the importance of the institutional crisis of April 1996 in Paraguay. It led directly to the strong statement in June, in Argentina, by the leaders of MERCOSUR that democracy was an integral aspect of membership in the emerging customs union. That established a critical benchmark for the expansion of MERCOSUR as Chile and then Bolivia accepted associate status. It will continue to be a significant part of the customs union as it Abroadens@ to include the members of the Andean Pact, now in negotiations with MERCOSUR.

The crisis also strengthened civil society in Paraguay by demonstrating the efficacy of citizen involvement in crucial turning points of a society=s development. Students, labor unions, and the media are now better able to express their opinions. The political opposition, while not united, has seen its role in civil society strengthened. And the armed forces, such a strong institutional factor throughout Paraguayan history, have begun the slow transition that has taken place throughout the Southern Cone towards subordination to civilian authorities. It should be noted that the 1997 crisis in Ecuador reflected the more cautious approach to impasses in the transition. The military in Quito made it clear that the civilian politicians were responsible for resolving the constitutional issues surrounding the ouster of President Bucaram.

Finally, the institutional crisis of April 1996 demonstrated the growing importance of regional diplomacy. The intervention of the Organization of American States and of the governments of the MERCOSUR countries was important in demonstrating to the contending forces in the Paraguayan crisis that their actions were no longer isolated and were to be seen in a broader, regional context. Paraguay was drawn, inevitably, into a regional framework. To all of the MERCOSUR countries the message was clear: democracy was now a permanent component of future economic and financial cooperation and integration.

The commitment to democracy is an important component of the growing dialogue between MERCOSUR and the European Union. The trade and investment ties between the Southern Cone and Europe are strong and will expand, based on a common history, culture, and languages. But as the European Union has demonstrated in dealing with military regimes in southern Europe some years ago, cooperation with Brussels is predicated on a strong and permanent democratic institutional framework.

34 Closing remarks Closing remarks Ambassador Carlos Víctor Montanaro

You have seen, experienced, and felt Paraguayan democracy: how it works, how it functions, and that it is a reality thanks to all Paraguayans. We cannot leave any part of our nation out or excluded, including the armed forces, who have received due recognition on this occasion for their contribution to democracy. After all, our country's authoritarian regime, its bitter dictatorship, was overthrown thanks to them, and with a few exceptions they have at all times accepted the new role of the armed forces in our country.

No democracy is easy. We have seen it, we have touched it, and we are seeing it not only in Paraguay but in many other lands as well. We must proceed cautiously, making sure that our democracy continues to gain in strength, that it becomes a lasting reality. I think the great majority of Paraguayans are convinced that democracy is the only form of government. It is a process that can't be turned back anymore. And we shall keep on going.

I want to thank the entire staff of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, in particular Dr. Spehar, not only for their efforts in organizing this forum but also for the constant support they are giving to Paraguayan democracy. There has been much talk of the Superior Tribunal of Electoral Justice. Actually, its success has been due to the support it receives from the Organization of American States, through the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy.

Our democracy needs help, from our multilateral institutions as well as from Paraguayans. The Organization of American States has demonstrated that it can act swiftly and effectively. For the first time in its history, the OAS acted through its political organ, the Permanent Council, at the key moment, while the crisis was going on; not one, two, or three months later, as had historically been the case. That proves that all the nations stand shoulder to shoulder, clearly committed to the strengthening of democracy in our hemisphere.

My special thanks to all the participants in this forum. I needn't mention them all by name. Everybody knows very well who they are. We are honored by the presence of all of them. And once again, I want to thank all of you for being here, for your interest in our country. We need friends, and now we know we have many. Elizabeth Spehar

To conclude, I would like to echo Ambassador Montanaro's thanks for the participation of our distinguished panelists and for the presence of all of you. I thank the Ambassadors and the other

representatives of the diplomatic corps. I would also like to thank Diego Paz, Jamel Espinoza, and other officials of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, who have worked long and hard to help make this forum a success, and the General Secretariat that helped us to prepare it.

Finally, I cordially invite you to watch for information from the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy regarding future democratic forums.

Appendix Biographical data on the participants Carlos Podestá has a degree in communication sciences. He was elected national senator in Paraguay for the 1993-1998 constitutional term. From August 15, 1993, to November 10, 1995, he was on leave from the Senate to serve as Minister of the Interior. At present, from his seat in the Senate, he is Chairman of the Senatorial Committee of Petitions, Powers, and Regulations and a member of the Committee on Education and Culture, the Committee on Public Health and Narcotics, and the Bicameral Committee on Budget and Accounts. Domingo Laíno earned a doctorate in economic sciences from the National University of Asunción. He completed postgraduate studies in economics and social sciences in Rome and The Hague. He was a candidate for President of Paraguay in 1989 and 1993. At present he is chairman of the Authentic Radical Liberal Party, to which post he has been elected four times. He is vice president of the Liberal and Progressive International and a member of the Executive Committee of the South American Commission for Peace and the Latin American Association for Human Rights. Lawrence Chewning Fábrega graduated in international relations from the University of Panama, and completed postgraduate studies in Great Britain. He has held diplomatic posts in Great Britain, Belgium, and the United States. In Panama he has been director of Latin America, director of the Department of the United States, and foreign policy director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At present he is Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Panama to the Organization of American States. On September 19, 1996, he received a decoration from the Government of Paraguay, presented by Foreign Minister Rubén Melgarejo, in recognition of his work as Chairman of the Permanent Council during the events of last April in Paraguay. Antonio Mercader is a doctor of law and social sciences from the University of the Republic in Montevideo, Uruguay. He has been a member of the Consultative Council of the Law Faculty and a professor of communication sciences at the Universidad de la República. He has been Minister of Education and Culture, and at present he is Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the Organization of American States. Riordan Roett is a professor of political science and since 1993 has been director of the Latin American Studies Program of the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. He is widely recognized and respected for his work on Paraguay and its political history.

Participants in the forum (left to right): Prof Riordan Roett, Johns Hopkins Uni-versity, School of Ad-vanced International Studies; Senator Car-los Podestá of Para-guay; Ambassador Antonio Mercader, Permanent Repre-sentative of Uruguay to the OAS; Ambassador Carlos Víctor Montanaro, Permanent Representative of Paraguay to the OAS; Dr. César Gaviria, Secretary General of the OAS; Dr. Elizabeth Spehar, Executive Coordinator, Unit for the Promotion of Democracy; Ambassador Lawrence Chewning Fábrega, Permanent Representative of Panama to the OAS; Dr. Domingo Laíno, Chairman of PLRA; and Dr. Christopher Thomas, Assistant Secretary General of the OAS. General view of the audience.