IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE

DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2013

: PRESENT :

THE HON’BLE MR. D.H.WAGHELA, CHIEF JUSTICE

AND

HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE B.V.NAGARATHNA

WRIT PETITION Nos. 16886-87 / 2013 (GM-DRT)

BETWEEN 1. SRI C LAXMAN GOWDA

S/O CHIKKABYRAPPA M.B., AGED BOUT 51 YEARS

2. SRI VASUDEVAGOWDA S/O CHIKKABYRAPPA M.B., AGED BOUT 49 YEARS. BOTH ARE R/AT NO.29, IST MAIN ROAD, S.R.NAGARA, BANGLORE-560 027.

... PETITIONER

( BY SRI S R HEGDE HUDLAMANE, ADVOCATE. ) A N D 1. DEBT RECOVERY APPELLATE TRIBUNAL

4TH FLOOR, BANK CIRCLE OFFICE, NO.55, ETHIRAJ SALAI, CHENNAI-600 008 REP. BY ITS REGISTRAR.

2. DEBT ROCOVERY TRIBUNAL BANGALORE, KIRSHIBHAVANA, HUDSON CIRCLE, BANGALORE-560 001, REP. BY ITS REGISTRAR.

(R-1 & R-2 DELETED VIDE COURT ORDER DATED 21.8.2013)

R

2

3. MANAGER CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA, GANDHINAGARA BRANCH, BANGALORE-560 009.

4. AUTHORIZED OFFICER CENTRAL BANK OF INIDA, BANGALORE REGIONAL OFFICE, NO.20, CRESENT ROAD, BANGALORE-560 001.

5. R S PADMA W/O K.SELVAM, AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS, R/A NO.499, NEAR VENKATESHWARA TEMPLE, KRISHNAPPA LAYOUT, 8TH BLOCK, KORAMANGALA, BANGALORE-560 095.

... RESPONDENTS

( BY SRI T S VENKATESH, ADVOCATE FOR R-3 & R-4. SRI JOSE SABASTIAN, ADVOCATE FOR R-5. )

WRIT PETITIONS FILED PRAYING TO QUASH IMPUGNED

ORDER PASSED BY R-1 DATED 1.4.2013 MADE IN AIR (SA)

NO. 813/2010 PASSED BY R-1 AT ANNEXURE-G, ILLEGALLY

CONFIRMING THE JUDGEMENT AND ORDER PASSED BY R-2

AT ANNEXURE-D MADE IN S.A. 540/2009 DATED 13.5.2010

BY ISSUE OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY ORDER

APPROPRIATE WRIT AND DIRECT R-1 TO ALLOW THE

APPLICATION FILED BY THE PETITIONERS BEFORE R-2

TRIBUNAL.

THESE PETITIONS COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY

HEARING THIS DAY, NAGARATHNA, J, MADE THE

FOLLOWING:

3

O R D E R

The order of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal at

Chennai (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Appellate Tribunal)

dated 1.4.2013 passed on I.A.No. 1400/2010, which is an

application filed for condonation of delay of 65 days in filing

the appeal, is assailed in these Writ Petitions. By the said

order, the Appellate Tribunal has dismissed the application

for condonation of delay on the premise that Section 18 of

the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets

and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI

Act’ for short) does not provide for condonation of delay.

Accordingly, the appeal filed by the petitioners also stands

dismissed.

2. Brief facts of the case are that, the respondent Bank

had issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI

Act against the petitioners. The said action of the Bank

was assailed by the petitioners before the Debts Recovery

Tribunal, Bangalore, in S.A.No. 540/2009. The appeal was

dismissed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal by order dated

13.5.2010. Being aggrieved by the said order, Writ Petition

4

No. 18947/2010 was filed by the petitioners before this

court. That Writ Petition was also dismissed on the ground

that there was an alternative remedy available by way of a

statutory appeal under the SARFAESI Act. Thereafter, the

petitioners filed AIR (SA) No. 813/2010 under Section 18 of

the SARFAESI Act before the Appellate Tribunal at Chennai

along with an application filed under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay in filing

the appeal. The said application has been rejected placing

reliance on a decision of the Madras High Court dated

28.8.2012 in W.P.No. 13456/2012 and connected matters

holding that Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act does not

permit condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Being

aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners have preferred

these Writ Appeals.

3. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners

and the learned counsel for the respondent Bank and

perused the material on record.

5

4. While drawing our attention to the provisions of the

SARFAESI Act, learned counsel for the petitioners placed

reliance on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in

the case of Smt. Sajida Begum Vs. State Bank of India (Writ

Petition No. 22317/2012 disposed of on 4.9.2012) to

contend that, under the SARFAESI Act, if an appeal is filed

belatedly, the same could be condoned under the

provisions of Limitation Act despite there being no express

provision under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act.

5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent Bank

placed reliance on two decisions to counter the arguments

of the petitioners’ counsel to contend that, in the absence of

an express provision under Section 18 of the SARFAESI

Act, the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply

and, therefore, delay in preferring the appeal before the

Appellate Tribunal cannot be condoned. He placed

reliance on the decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High

Court in the case of M/s Seth Banshidhar Kedia Rice Mills

Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State Bank of India, reported in AIR 2011

Madhya Pradesh 205, and a decision of the Madras High

6

Court in the case of Dr.Zubida Begum Vs. Indian Bank in

W.P.No.15386/2012 and connected matters, disposed of on

28.8.2012, which has been relied upon by the Appellate

Tribunal.

6. Faced with the contradictory judgments of different

High Courts, we have considered the controversy in the

light of the aforesaid judgments and also the provisions of

the SARFAESI Act as well as the Recovery of Debts due to

Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter

referred to as ‘the Debts Recovery Act’ for short) and also

the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963.

7. Section 17(1) and Section 17(7) of the SARFAESI Act

read as follows:

“17. Right to appeal.-

(1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved

by any of the measures referred to in sub-

section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured

creditor or his authorised officer under this

Chapter, may make an application along with

such fee, as may be prescribed to the Debts

Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the

7

matter within forty-five days from the date on

which such measure had been taken:

Provided that different fees may be

prescribed for making the application by the

borrower and the person other than the

borrower.

Explanation.- For the removal of doubts,

it is hereby declared that the communication of

the reasons to the borrower by the secured

creditor for not having accepted his

representation or objection or the likely action

of the secured creditor at the stage of

communication of reasons to the borrower shall

not entitle the person (including borrower) to

make an application to the Debts Recovery

Tribunal under sub-section (1) of section 17.

xxx xxx xxx

(7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act,

the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as

may be, dispose of the application in

accordance with the provisions of the Recovery

of Debts Due to Banks and Financial

Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and the

rules made thereunder.”

Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act reads as follows:

8

“18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal.-

(1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made

by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section

17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee,

as may be prescribed to an Appellate Tribunal

within thirty days from the date of receipt of the

order of Debts Recovery Tribunal.

Provided that different fees may be

prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower

or by the person other than the borrower.

Provided further that no appeal shall be

entertained unless the borrower has deposited

with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the

amount of debt due from him, as claimed by

the secured creditors or determined by the

Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less :

Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal

may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing,

reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five

per cent of debt referred to in the second

proviso.

(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act,

the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be,

dispose of the appeal in accordance with the

provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to

9

Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51

of 1993) and rules made thereunder.”

Sections 35, 36 and 37 of the SARFAESI Act read as

follows:

“35. The provisions of this Act to override other

laws.- The provisions of this Act shall have

effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent

therewith contained in any other law for the

time being in force or any instrument having

effect by virtue of any such law.

36. Limitation.- No secured creditor shall be

entitled to take all or any of the measures

under sub-section (4) of section 13, unless his

claim in respect of the financial asset is made

within the period of limitation prescribed under

the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963).

37. Application of other laws not barred.-

The provisions of this Act or the rules made

thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in

derogation of, the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of

1956), the Securities Contracts (Regulation)

Act, 1956 (42 of 1956), the Securities and

Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (15 of

1992), the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and

10

Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) or

any other law for the time being in force.”

8. Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act states that, any

person, including a borrower being aggrieved by any of the

measures taken under Section 13 by the secured creditor,

can prefer an appeal before the Debts Recovery Tribunal

having jurisdiction in the matter, within 45 days from the

date on which such measures had been taken. If a person

is aggrieved by an order passed by the Debts Recovery

Tribunal, an appeal is provided under Section 18 of the

SARFAESI Act before the Appellate Tribunal.

9. Sub-section (1) of Section 18 states that, any person

aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery

Tribunal, under Section 17 may prefer an appeal to an

Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of

receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal. The

proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 18 deals with the

payment of prescribed fee and also with regard to the

deposit to be made at the time of preferring of the appeal.

Sub-section (2) of Section 18 states that, save as otherwise

11

provided in the Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as

may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the

provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and

Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and the rules made

thereunder. On a reading of sub-section (2), what emerges

is, if there is any express provision made under the

SARFAESI Act, the same would be applicable. If there is

no express provision on any aspect of the matter, then, the

Appellate Tribunal could dispose of the appeal having

regard to the provisions of the Debts Recovery Act and the

rules made thereunder. In other words, reliance placed on

the Debts Recovery Act and its rules would be insofar as it

can be applicable to the provisions of the SARFAESI Act

and are not inconsistent with the latter Act. Therefore, on

a reading of sub-section (2) of Section 18, it becomes clear

that, while dealing with an appeal filed under the

SARFAESI Act, the Appellate Tribunal has to keep in mind

the provisions of the Debts Recovery Act and the rules

made thereunder.

12

10. Section 35 states that the provisions of the Act shall

have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent

contained in any other law for the time being in force or

any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.

The said section gives an overriding effect to SARFAESI Act

on account of the non-abstante clause. But, Section 36, in

fact, expressly refers to the provisions of the Limitation Act

as it states that, no secured creditor is entitled to take all

or any of the measures under sub-section (4) of Section 13,

unless his claim in respect of the financial asset is made

within the period of limitation prescribed under the

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 37 states that the provisions

of SARFAESI Act or the Rules made thereunder shall be in

addition to, and not in derogation of the Companies Act,

1956, the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, the

Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, the

Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions

Act, 1993 or any other law for the time being in force.

11. As far as the matter in hand is concerned, it has to be

seen as to whether an appeal could be preferred beyond the

13

prescribed period of limitation, which is 30 days, which is

prescribed in sub-section (1) of Section 18. It is noticed

that there is no express provision under Section 18 to

condone the delay in filing an appeal beyond the prescribed

period of limitation. But, even in the absence of any

express provision for condonation of delay in SARFAESI

Act, we are of the view that the provisions of the Debts

Recovery Act could be made applicable having regard to

sub-section (2) of Section 18 of SARFAESI Act and there

being no express bar for condonation of delay in filing the

appeal before the appellate Tribunal. On the other hand,

there is an express reference to the applicability of

Limitation Act, 1963 in Section 36 of the SARFAESI Act

and also the applicability of other laws, which would

include even the Limitation Act, 1963, in Section 37 of that

Act. In this context, Sections 20 and 24 of Debts Recovery

Act are relevant and they read as follows:

“20. Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.-

(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), any

person aggrieved by an order made, or deemed

14

to have been made, by a Tribunal under this

Act, may prefer an appeal to an Appellate

Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter.

(2) No appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal

from an order made by a Tribunal with the

consent of the parties.

(3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be

filed within a period of forty-five days from the

date on which a copy of the order made, or

deemed to have been made, by the Tribunal is

received by him and it shall be in such form

and be accompanied by such fee as may be

prescribed:

Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may

entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said

period of forty five days if it is satisfied that

there was sufficient cause for not filing it,

within that period.

(4) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section

(1), the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the

parties to the appeal, an opportunity of being

heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit,

confirming, modifying or setting aside the order

appealed against.

15

(5) The Appellate Tribunal shall send a copy of

every order made by it to the parties to the

appeal and to the concerned Tribunal.

(6) The appeal filed before the Appellate

Tribunal under sub-section (1) shall be dealt

with by it as expeditiously as possible and

endeavor shall be made by it to dispose of the

appeal finally within six months from the date

of receipt of the appeal.

21 to 23. xxx xxx xxx

24. Limitation. – The provisions of the

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall, as far

as may be, apply to an application made to the

Tribunal.”

Section 29 of the Limitation Act reads as follows:

“29. Savings. –

(1) Nothing in this Act, shall affect section

25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).

(2) Where any special or local law

prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a

period of limitation different from the period

prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of

section 3 shall apply as if such period were the

period prescribed by the Schedule and for the

16

purpose of determining any period of limitation

prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by

any special or local law, the provisions

contained in section 5 to 24 (inclusive) shall

apply only in so far, as and to the extent to

which, they are not expressly excluded by such

special or local law.

(3) Save as otherwise provided in any law

for the time being in force with respect to

marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall

apply to any suit or other proceeding under any

such law.

(4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition

of "easement" in section 2 shall not apply to

cases arising in the territories to which the

Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may

for the time being extend.”

Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Debts Recovery

Act states that, if a person is aggrieved by an order passed

by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under the provisions of the

Debts Recovery Act, an appeal could be filed before the

Appellate Tribunal within a period of forty five days from

the date on which a copy of the order made, or deemed to

have been made. The proviso to Sub-section (3) states that

17

if an appeal is filed beyond the period of forty five days, it

can be entertained if the Appellate Tribunal is satisfied that

there was sufficient cause for not filing it within the said

period. Therefore, on a conjoint reading of sub-section (2)

of Section 18 of SARFAESI Act and sub-section (3) of

Section 20 of Debts Recovery Act, it becomes clear that, as

far as the prescription of the period of limitation for filing of

the appeal, sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI

Act would have to be read inasmuch as an express period

of limitation is prescribed i.e., thirty days, for preferring an

appeal. But, the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 20 of

the Debts Recovery Act, which provides for condonation of

delay by the Appellate Tribunal on being satisfied that there

is sufficient cause, would have to be read into Section 18 of

the SARFAESI Act having regard to sub-section (2) of

Section 18 of SARFAESI Act.

12. As stated above, the provisions of the Limitation Act

are also applicable to the proceedings before the Appellate

Tribunal in terms of Section 24 of the Debts Recovery Act

which can also be read into SARFAESI Act. Thus, the

18

provisions of the Debts Recovery Act being incorporated

into Section 18 of SARFAESI Act and there being no bar to

condone delay in filing an appeal before the Appellate

Tribunal, the provisions of Limitation Act as are applicable

to an appeal filed before an Appellate Tribunal under Debts

Recovery Act are applicable under SARFAESI Act also. In

Agrawal Trading Corporation Vs. Assistant Collector,

Customs (1972)3 SCC 553, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has

observed that it is a well accepted legislative practice to

incorporate by reference, if the legislature so chooses, the

provisions of some other Act insofar as they are relevant for

the purposes of and in furtherance of the scheme and

objects of that Act. In that view of the matter, we think

that the Appellate Tribunal was not right in dismissing the

application filed by the petitioner seeking condonation of

delay in filing the appeal. The judgment of the Andhra

Pradesh High Court would be squarely applicable, wherein

a similar view has been taken. With respect, we are of the

opinion that the judgments of the Madhya Pradesh High

Court as well as the Madras High Court taking a contrary

19

view would not be applicable particularly having regard to

the analysis of the provisions, which we have made in this

matter.

13. In AIR 2011 MP 205, the Madhya Pradesh High Court

has considered the provisions of SARFAESI Act and the

Debts Recovery Act. While comparing the two provisions,

the court has noticed that sub-section (7) of Section 17 of

SARFAESI Act states that the Tribunal shall, as far as may

be, dispose of the application in accordance with the

provisions of the Debts Recovery Act and the rules made

thereunder. However, it has lost sight of sub-section (2) of

Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, which also states that,

save as otherwise provided in the Act, the Appellate

Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in

accordance with the provisions of the Debts Recovery Act,

1993 and the rules made thereunder. Without noticing

sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, the

court has stated that the Legislature has consciously

intended not to confer power of condonation of delay on the

Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act.

20

We are of the view that, had the court understood the

import of sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI

Act, then, the decision of the court would have been

otherwise.

14. The judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is

adverted to by the Madras High Court in the case of Zubida

Begum Vs. Indian Bank and the Madras High Court is in

agreement with the views expressed by the Division Bench

of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. Further, the Madras

High Court has referred to sub-section (2) of Section 18 and

has opined as follows:

“40. Sub-section (2) of Section 18 is very

specific that it is only for the purpose of disposal

of the appeals under SARFAESI Act, the

provisions of RDDBFI Act are made applicable.

The question of disposal of the appeal would

arise only after entertaining the appeal. We

have not reached that stage now. We are now

considering the question as to whether a belated

appeal could be entertained by the Appellate

Tribunal. In case there is no power to condone

the delay, there is no question of entertaining

21

the appeal. The question of disposal of the

appeal in accordance with the provisions of the

RDDBFI Act would arise only in case the appeal

is entertained. The fact that the Appellate

Tribunal is obliged to decide the appeal in

accordance with the provisions of the RDDBFI

Act, does not go to show that even for

entertaining the appeal the provisions of

RDDBFI Act are made applicable.”

From the above, what emanates is that the Madras High

Court has opined that an appeal is not entertained until

the delay in filing the appeal is condoned. In other words,

only when the delay is condoned, can an appeal be said to

be entertained is the view of the Madras High Court. If an

appeal is entertained, then it would have to be disposed of

in terms of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 18

which also refers to the provisions of the Debts Recovery

Act. With respect, we are not in agreement with the

aforesaid reasoning. In our view, entertaining of an appeal

would commence from the time the appeal is listed before

the Tribunal for its judicial consideration either on a

preliminary issue or on merits. An appeal would be listed

22

before the Tribunal if the conditions for filing an appeal are

complied with. If the Memorandum of Appeal filed by an

aggrieved person is in order, then, the appeal is listed

before the Tribunal for judicial consideration with or

without interlocutory applications. One of the interlocutory

applications that may be filed along with an appeal is an

application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.

Such an application would have to receive a judicial

consideration by the Appellate Tribunal. While considering

such an application, the Appellate Tribunal would, in

substance, be considering as to whether the appeal should

be entertained or not. In other words, if the application for

condonation of delay is dismissed, automatically, the

appeal would also stand dismissed. On the other hand, if

the application for condonation of delay is allowed, the

appeal would then be considered on merits. Therefore,

“entertaining of an appeal” by the Tribunal would mean

when the appeal is listed before the Tribunal along with or

without an interlocutory application such as an application

for condonation of delay i.e., for its judicial consideration.

23

In M/s Lakshminaratan Engineering Works Ltd. Vs.

Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, Kanpur Range, Kanpur

(AIR 1968 SC 488), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has stated

that the word “entertain” means the first occasion at which

the court takes up the matter for consideration. Without

taking note of this aspect, the Madras High Court has held

that sub-section (2) of Section 18 would not be applicable

at the stage of considering an application for condonation

of delay in filing the appeal. The court has thereafter also

held that the Appellate Tribunal is not a court and,

therefore, there cannot be an automatic extension of the

provisions of the Limitation Act to an appeal under Section

18 of the Act, as there is no express provision in the

SARFAESI Act indicating the applicability of the provisions

of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the Madras High Court

has also held that the Appellate Tribunal has no power to

condone the delay in preferring a statutory appeal under

Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. We do not also agree

with the aforesaid reasoning.

24

16. In both the aforesaid judgments, sub-section (2) of

Section 18 has not been considered in its proper

perspective. In fact, in sub-section (7) of Section 17 of the

Act also the provisions of the Debts Recovery Act, 1993 and

the rules made thereunder have been made applicable to a

proceeding under Section 17 of the Act before the Debts

Recovery Tribunal.

16. In the case of Smt. Sajida Begum Vs. State Bank of

India, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court

has held that there is no express exclusion of the

Limitation Act under the SARFAESI Act and, so far as

Debts Recovery Act is concerned, under which the DRT and

DRAT function and entertain original and appellate

proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, clearly exercise

powers of a civil court under CPC and in addition, the

Limitation Act is expressly made applicable under Section

24 of the DRT Act. Therefore, sub-section (2) of Section 29

of the Limitation Act is attracted and thereby, Sections 4 to

24 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the

proceedings under Sections 17 and 18 of the SARFAESI Act

25

before the DRT as well as DRAT. Thus, the Andhra

Pradesh High Court has held that the provisions of the

Limitation Act are applicable under the special law i.e.,

SARFAESI Act. The court has not agreed with the decision

of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The court has also

referred to a decision of the Mumbai High Court in the case

of Uco Bank Vs. M/s Kanji Manji Kothari & Co., Mumbai

[2008(4) MHLJ 424 = Laws (Bom) 2008(2) 173], wherein the

Mumbai High Court has held that Section 5 of the

Limitation Act would be applicable to an appeal or

application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act. To

the same effect is the decision of the Punjab & Haryana

High Court in the case of Surinder Mahajan Vs. Debts

Recovery Appellate Tribunal (C.W.P. No. 22567/2011,

disposed of on 5.4.2013).

17. In the result, the Writ Petitions are allowed and the

impugned order is quashed. The delay in filing the appeal

before the Appellate Tribunal is condoned by consent of the

parties and the appeal is restored on the file of the

26

Appellate Tribunal, to be disposed of in accordance with

law. No costs.

Sd/-

CHIEF JUSTICE

Sd/- JUDGE

ckc/-