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Santos v. Maranang, 27 Phil 209

(1914) NAMLA

State of Non-Claims, Rule 86, secs.

2,5; Rule 87, sec.1

Doctrine: 1.EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; ALLOWANCE AND PAYMENT OF CLAIMS; TIME FOR

PRESENTATION.—If the property of the estate has been properly inventoried, the committee on claims

regularly appointed, the publication of the notice required by law duly made, and there has been no

fraud in the proceedings, claims or debts which the law requires shall be presented to the committee onclaims must be presented to it within the limitation of time provided in section 689 (Code Civ. Proc.) or

they will be barred.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTRARY PROVISIONS IN THE WILL.—Directions in the testator's will that such claims

and debts, or any of them, shall be settled in some other manner are void as opposed to public policy, at

least where there are heirs by force of law.

3.ID.; ID.; ACTION AGAINST ADMINISTRATOR.—No action can be instituted directly against the

administrator of the estate for the collection of claims and debts which the committee on claims is

directed to pass upon.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; DIRECTION IN WILL TO PAY DEBTS.—An itemized list of debts in the will of the testator

which he directs shall be paid does not obviate the necessity of presenting them to the committee for

allowance. Nor do such directions in a will indicate that it was the testator's desire to have them paid

without being probated in accordance with the probate procedure provided in Act No. 190.

5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MISTAKE OF LAW.—If, because of such provisions in the will, a creditor fails to present

such claims to the committee in the belief that it is unnecessary, he is laboring under a mistake of law

for which no relief can be afforded by the courts. [Santos vs. Manarang., 27 Phil. 209(1914)

Who died: Don Lucas de Ocampo (November 18, 1906)

Facts: Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of certain real and personalproperty which, by his last will and testament, he left to his three children. The fourth clause of this will

reads as follows:

I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that they may be

religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time agreed upon with my creditors.

Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos; one

due on April 14, 1907, for P5,000, and various other described as falling due at different dates (the dates

are not given) amounting to the sum of P2,454. The will was duly probated and a committee was

regularly appointed to hear and determine such claims against the estate

as might be presented. This committee submitted its report to the court on June 27, 1908. On July 14,

1908, the plaintiff, Isidro Santos, presented a petition to the court asking that the committee be

required to reconvene and pass upon his claims against the estate which were recognized in the will of

testator. This petition was denied by the court, and on November 21, 1910, the plaintiff instituted the

present proceedings against the administratrix of the estate to recover the sums mentioned in the will

as due him. Relief was denied in the court below, and now appeals to this court.

Issue:

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Whether or not petitioner’s claim is within the purview of the committee’s jurisdiction.

Ruling: YES

The petition of the plaintiff filed on November 21, 1910, wherein he asks that the administratrix be

compelled to pay over to him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him appears to be nothing

more nor less than a complaint instituting an action against the administratrix for the recovery of the

sum of money. Obviously, the plaintiff is not seeking possession of or title to real property or specific

articles of personal property. When a committee is appointed as herein provided, no action or suit shall

be commenced or prosecute against the executor or administrator upon a claim against the estate to

recover a debt due from the state; but actions to recover the seizing and possession of real estate and

personal chattels claimed by the estate may be commenced against him. (Sec. 699, Code Civ. Proc.)

It is evident from the brief outline of the sections referred to above that the Code of Civil Procedure has

established a system for the allowance of claims against the estates of decedents. Those are at least two

restrictions imposed by law upon the power of the testator to dispose of his property, and which pro

tanto restrict the maxim that "the will of the testator law: (1) His estate is liable for all legal obligationsincurred by him; and (2) he can not dispose of or encumber the legal portion due his heirs by force of

law. The former take precedence over the latter. (Sec. 640, Code Civ, Proc.) In case his estate is sufficient

they must be paid. (Sec, 734, id.) In case the estate is insolvent they must be paid in the order named in

section 735. It is hardly necessary to say that a provision in an insolvent's will that a certain debt be paid

would not entitle it to preference over other debts. But, if the express mention of a debt in the will

requires the administrator to pay it without reference to the committee, what assurance is there, in the

case of an insolvent estate, that it will not take precedence over preferred debts?

If it is unnecessary to present such claim to the committee, the source of nonclaims is not applicable. It

is not barred until from four to ten years, according to its classification in chapter 3 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, establishing questions upon actions. Under such circumstances, when then the legal portionis determined? If, in the meantime the estate has been

distributed, what security have the differences against the interruption of their possession? Is the

administrator required to pay the amount stipulated in the will regardless of its correctness? And, if not,

what authority has he to vise the claim? Section 706 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an

executor may, with the approval of the court, compound with a debtor of deceased for a debt due the

estate, But he is nowhere permitted or directed to deal with a creditor of the estate. On the contrary, he

is the advocate of the estate before an impartial committee with quasi-judicial power to determine the

amount of the claims against the estate, and, in certain cases, to equitably adjust the amounts due. The

administrator, representing the debtor estate, and the creditor appear before this body as parties

litigant and, if either is dissatisfied with its decision, an appeal to the court is their remedy. To allow the

administrator to examine and approve a claim against the estate would put him in the dual role of a

claimant and a judge. The law in this jurisdiction has been so framed that this may not occur. The most

important restriction, in this jurisdiction, on the disposition of property by will are those provisions of

the Civil Code providing for the preservation of the legal portions due to heirs by force of law, and

expressly recognized and continued in force by sections 614, 684, and 753 of the Code of Civil

Procedure. But if a debt is expressly recognized in the will must be paid without its being verified, there

is nothing to prevent a partial or total alienation of the legal portion by means of a bequest under a

guise of a debt, since all of the latter must be paid before the amount of the legal portion can be

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determined.

Plaintiff's argument at this point becomes obviously inconsistent. Under his first assignment of error he

alleges that the committee on claims should have been reconvened to pass upon his claim against the

estate. It is clear that this committee has nothing to do with legacies. It is true that a debt may be left as

a legacy, either to the debtor (in which case it virtually amounts to a release), or to a third person. But

this case can only arise when the debt is anasset of the estate. It would be absurd to speak of a

testator's leaving a bare legacy of his own debt. (Arts. 866, 878, Civil Code.) The creation of a legacy

depends upon the will of the testator, is an act of pure beneficence, has no binding force until his death,

and may be avoided in whole or in part by the mere with whim of the testator, prior to that time. A debt

arises from an obligation recognized by law (art. 1089, Civil Code) and once established, can only be

extinguished in a lawful manner. (Art. 1156, id.) Debts are demandable and must be paid in legal tender.

Legacies may, and often do, consist of specific articles of personal property and must be satisfied

accordingly. In order to collect as legacy the sum mentioned in the will as due him, the plaintiff must

show that it is in fact a legacy and not a debt. As he has already attempted to show that this sum

represents a debt, it is an anomaly to urge now it is a legacy.

But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered as partaking of the nature of a legacy anddisposed of accordingly. If this be perfect then the plaintiff would receive nothing until after all debts

had been paid and the heirs by force of law had received their shares. From any point of view the

inevitable result is that there must be a hearing sometime before some tribunal to

determine the correctness of the debts recognized in the wills of deceased persons. This hearing, in the

first instance, can not be had before the court because the law does not authorize it. Such debtors must

present their claims to the committee, otherwise their claims will be forever barred.

For the foregoing reasons the orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Bank of the P.I. v. Hijos, Inc. 53 Phil

806 (1928) RAMOS

State of Non-Claims, Rule 86, secs.

2,5; Rule 87, sec.1

Tan Sen Guan v. Go Siu San, 47 Phil89 (1924) VARGAS

State of Non-Claims, Rule 86, secs.2,5; Rule 87, sec.1

FACTS:

Plaintiff is the administrator of the intestate estate of Tan Peng Sue, defendant is the administrator in

the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Antonio Tampoco. As per books kept by

the defendant, Antonio Tampoco owed Tan Peng Sue for P25,802.60 with the interest stipulated at the

rate of 9 6/10 per cent per year, amounted to P30,272.89 at the end of the year 1922. Upon the death

of Antonio Tampoco, proceeding was instituted in the CFI Manila for the settlement of his estate.

Commissioners were appointed, and rendered their final report. After the approval by the court of the

report, the plaintiff moved the court that the committee on claims be again authorized, or a newcommittee appointed, to hear and decide a claim that he had and which he was to present against the

estate, alleging that the administrator Go Sui San had been assuring the heirs of Tan Peng Sue that they

would not lose their credit, were in no need of presenting their claim, and would be paid by the heirs of

Antonio Tampoco, and that in the meantime the credit might continue in the business of the deceased

Antonio Tampoco and thus earn interest.CFI appointed new commissioners, holding that the committee

on claims did not comply with sections 687 and 693 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the motion

of the plaintiff was in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 190. The new commissioners admitted

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the claim of the plaintiff, recommending its payment by the defendant administrator. Judge Diaz

reversed, holding that the commissioners had no authority to hear and decide said claim due to lack of

court jurisdiction since more than fourteen months have elapsed from the final report by the former

committee. Plaintiff moved for new trial and Harvey set aside the decision, and ordered the

administrator of the estate of Antonio Tampoco to pay the administrator of the estate of Tan Peng Sue

P28,802.60, with interest. Hence this appeal. Defendant contends that the action has prescribed.

ISSUE:

W/N the action has prescribed.

Ruling:

NO. Plaintiff alleges that his failure to present the claim to the committee appointed by the court was

due to the machinations and fraudulent and false representations of the defendant. However,

prescription cannot be avoided on the ground of fraud or undue influence. The failure of Tan Chu Lay,

heir of Tan Peng Sue, to present his claim was an omission committed by an heir who had knowledge of

the existence of the credit of his deceased father. Also, the law does not make any reservation or

exception whatever. Plaintiff also alleges that the notice to the creditors was not published in the

manner prescribed by section 687 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 693 requires the committee tostate in their report among other things, "the manner in which notice was given to the claimants." The

report was not written exactly in accordance with the technicality of the law; however, attached is the

affidavit of the editor of the newspaper La Nacion, the committee on claims had published for three

consecutive weeks a notice to claimants. The committee complied with the requirements of the law as

to publication of notice. There are also attached the appointment. The Court opines that the documents

attached to the report of said committee, the stipulation of facts and the approval of said report by the

trial court constitute a conclusive proof that the commissioners have complied with the publication of

the notice to the creditors.

Quinno v. Grospe, 169 SCRA 702(1989) BERMAS


Calma v. Tanedo, 66 Phil 594(1938)CABARON


FACTS:

Eulalio Calma was married to Fausta Macasaquit. They were indebted to Esperanza Tanedo which was

chargeable to their conjugal property. Later Fausta died. In her will, she appointed her daughter Maria

as administratrix and upon probate, was appointed judicial adminstratrix (JA).

While the probate proceedings were pending, Tanedo filed a complaint against Eulalio for the recovery

of the aforementioned debt. The CFI ruled for payment of the sum and the aforesaid conjugal property

of Eulalio and Fausta was levied on execution and sold in auction despite opposition of the JA.

The JA brought action to annul the auction sale conducted and to declare that the estate of Fausta owns

solely and absolutely the properties.CASES now existing:

Probate (1x)

Collection of sum of money (1x)

Note that the probate proceedings were instituted in accordance with Act No. 3176 Section 685.

When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be

inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or

intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, xxxx unless xxx extrajudicial partition and liquidation of

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said property.

ISSUE:

W/N the sale of the community property to satisfy the judgment in the collection case is valid.

W/N Tanedo can properly run after Eulalio for satisfaction of the debt.

DECISION:

The sale is void. Said property should be deemed subject to the testamentary proceedings of the

deceased Fausta Macasaquit for all the purposes of that case. Testamentary proceedings and ordinary

action for partition and liquidation of property is alternative; the institution of one precludes the other

to avoid confusion i.e. testamentary proceedings should be given due course. Being an indebtedness

chargeable against conjugal property, no complaint for its payment can be brought against Eulalio

Calma, who had already ceased as administrator of the conjugal property; the claim for this amount had

to be filed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit. It should be filed before the

committee on claims in said testamentary proceedings and, at all events, thereafter, by appeal to the

corresponding Court of First Instance, in an ordinary action against the judicial administratrix. Eulalio

Calma having ceased as legal administrator of the conjugal property had with his wife Fausta

Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against him for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeableagainst said conjugal property, and that the action should be instituted in the testamentary proceedings

of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the manner provided by law.

Paredes v. Moya, 61 SCRA 527 (1974)

CABATO

Claims that Survive, Rule 87, sec. 1,

second clause; Rule 3, secs. 16, 17,20; Rule 86, sec. 5

Facts:

Petitioner Severino Parades commenced a suit for the collection of separation and overtime pays

against his employer, August Kuntze. Decision was rendered against the defendant Kuntze, from which

judgment, he appealed to the CA. While the case was pending, Kuntze died on June 19, 1972.

Accordingly, Parades was duly notified. Thereafter, Carmencita Kuntze, administratrix of the estate of

the deceased, was substituted in his place as party in the appealed case. CA dismissed the appeal forappellant's failure to file the printed record on appeal, so the case was ordered remanded to respondent

court.

A motion for execution was filed by Parades. Sheriff levied on the properties of defendant, consisting of

two lots. In the auction sale, Paredes, being the highest bidder, acquired one of said lots.

However, in spite of a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution filed by respondent (Administratrix) and

still pending resolution, Parades sold the property he acquired in favor of his co-petitioner, Victorio

Ignacio.

Notwithstanding the opposition to the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution, respondent Court, issuedan order setting aside the Writ of Execution, and the Sheriff's Sale and Public Auction of the property,

without prejudice to the filing of the judgment as a claim in the proceedings for settlement of the estate

of the deceased.

Issue:

WON the action for money claims survive even after the death of the defendant?

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Held:

YES. In case of a money claim, where the defendant dies during the pendency of his appeal from the

judgment rendered against him, the appeal should not be dismissed; it should continue. Deceased

defendant should be substituted by his legal representative, namely, the executor or administrator of

the estate. If the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, the plaintiff must afterwards go to the probate

court for an order directing the executor or administrator to satisfy the judgment. The Court that

originally rendered the judgment has no power to order its execution and a levy on the properties of the

deceased because the same are already in custodialegis in the probate court where administration

proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased defendant are already pending.

Consequently, contrary to respondents' claim, the judgment against the deceased Kuntze became final

and executory; it was not arrested by his death.But it was error on the part of Paredes, to have the

money judgment in his favor executed against the properties of the deceased Kuntze. Paredes should

have filed his claim in the administration proceedings of the estate of the deceased where private

respondent is the administratrix.

Judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed at the time limited in the notice (to creditors)

before the court where the administration proceeding involving the estate of the deceased Kuntze arepending. Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides:

All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same

be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the

decedent and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed (before the probate court) within

the time limited in the notice (to the creditors); otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may

be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the

claimants. (1st sentence, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court) (Emphasis ours)

Consequently, the respondent court, correctly nullified its order of execution pursuant to the judgment

which became final and executory and the corresponding levy on execution and the public auction.

No writ of execution should issue against the properties of the deceased. The claim for satisfaction of

the money judgment should be presented in the probate court for payment by the administrator. In the

testate or intestate proceedings to settle the estate of a deceased person, the properties belonging to

the estate are under the jurisdiction of the court and such jurisdiction continues until said properties

have been distributed among the heirs entitled thereto. During the pendency of the proceedings all the

estate is in custodialegis and the proper procedure is not to allow the sheriff, in the case of court

judgment, to seize the properties but to ask the court for an order to require the administrator to pay

the amount due from the estate and required to be paid."

Our decision in this case against the petitioner Paredes binds his co-petitioner Victorio G. Ignacio not

only because the order of execution and the public auction sale in question are null and void, but also

because petitioner Ignacio cannot be considered as a purchaser in good faith, for Ignacio purchased the

"Right of Execution Sale" of Paredes over the property in question when, at that time, the respondent

administratrix of the estate of Kuntze had already filed a motion to quash the Writ of Execution and

auction sale; as a matter of fact the validity of said writ of execution was still up for respondent court's

resolution after the parties shall have submitted memoranda on the question raised in the aforesaid

motion as required by the respondent court.

Spouses Manalansan v. Castañeda, Claims that Survive, Rule 87, sec. 1,

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Jr., 83 SCRA 777 (1978) CARDENAS second clause; Rule 3, secs. 16, 17,

20; Rule 86, sec. 5

Malolos v. Asia Pacific Finance Corp.,

147 SCRA 61 (1987) DEGUSMAN

Claims that Survive, Rule 87, sec. 1,

second clause; Rule 3, secs. 16, 17,

20; Rule 86, sec. 5 DOCTRINE:

The reason for the dismissal of the case is that upon the death of the defendant a testate or intestate

proceeding shall be instituted in the proper court wherein all his creditors must appear and file their

claims which shall be paid proportionately out of the property left by the deceased

FACTS:

Asia Pacific Finance Corporation purchased E. Francisco Liners Company, Inc. (herein referred to as

Francisco Liner) a postdated Far East Bank and Trust Company check numbered 214070 in the amount

of P105,000.00 issued in the latter's favor by herein petitioner, Josephine Cruz Malolos. When deposited

on its maturity date, the aforesaid check was dishonored for the reason that petitioner's bank account

had already been closed. Thereupon, APCOR demanded from Francisco Liners and also from petitioner,

in her capacity as drawer of the check, the payment of said check, but the obligation remained unpaid.

As a result, on August 15, 1979, APCOR filed a complaint for sum of money with preliminary attachment

docketed as Civil Case No. 125887 in the then CFI of Manila (now RTC) against E. Francisco Liners, Co.,

Inc., Elias A. Francisco (as president of Francisco Liners), and herein petitioner (in her capacity as drawer

of said check). An Order for Attachment was issued on grounds that the defendants were allegedly guilty

of fraud. Josephine Cruz Malolos died on April 27, 1980, and her counsel, on July 10, 1980, filed a

Motion to Dismiss the complaint as against her pursuant to Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Private

respondent opposed the aforementioned motion and the late argued that while it is admitted that the

action again Josephine Cruz Malolos is one for recovery of money and being such it does not survive, the

circumstances obtaining in the case place the same among the exceptions to Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules

of Court. The Court ordered the denial of the Motion to Dismiss. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an attachment levied on some properties of the defendant constitutes an exception tothe general rule of non-survival of the money claim as provided for in Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of

Court.

RULING:

No, it is not an exception. There is no question that the action in the court below is for collection or

recovery of money. It is already a settled rule that an action for recovery of money or for collection of a

debt is one that does not survive and upon the death of the defendant the case should be dismissed to

be presented in the manner especially provided in the Rules of Court. "The language of Section 21 of

Rule 3 is too clear in this respect as to require any interpretation or construction. It very explicitly says

that "when the action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before

final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner

specially provided by the rules," meaning, Section 5 of Rule 86 and its related provisions." In the presentcase, the money claim arose out of a pure and simple debt, which as aforementioned, under the

provision of Rule 3, Sec. 21 of the Rules of Court shall be dismissed and must be brought before the

probate court (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 215-216). In the light of the

foregoing considerations, the conclusion is inevitable that the trial court deviated from the procedure

laid down by the above-mentioned provisions of the Rules.

Luzon Surety Co., v. IAC, 151 SCRA652 (1987) GARCIA

Claims that Survive, Rule 87, sec. 1,second clause; Rule 3, secs. 16, 17,

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20; Rule 86, sec. 5

Facts:

In Civil Case No. 59506 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Luzon Surety Co., Inc., v.

Material Distributors (Phil.), Inc., et al.," judgment was rendered against the defendants, including Gil

Puyat, for the principal sum of P20,000.00 with interest at the rate of 12% computed and compounded

quarterly from June 25, 1958, and the further sum of P3,608.00 representing premiums and stamps. The judgment became final on April 13, 1967, but was not enforced. Within the prescribed period, Civil Case

No. 93268 was instituted to revive the judgment in Civil Case No. 59506. On May 24, 1974, judgment

was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. On March 28, 1981 Gil Puyat died. On September 1, 1982, a claim

against the estate of Gil Puyat was filed. The Administrators oppose the claim for the reason that it is

unenforceable and barred by laches for no steps were taken by the claimant to secure a writ of

execution against defendant Gil Puyat during his lifetime to enforce the judgment in Civil Case No.

59506 or Case No. 93268. On November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the case, the IAC

affirmed stating that the judgment-creditor is only entitled to revive the judgment only once. After the

expiration of five years from the date a judgment has become final the judgment is reduced to a mere

right of action in favor of the prevailing party. The period of ten years should be computed not from the

finality of the judgment in Civil Case 93268 but rather of Civil Case 59506 which became final on April

13, 1967. This judgment would have prescribed on April 30, 1977. However, this judgment was revivedby the decision of the Court of First Instance in Civil Case 93268.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner may still file an action against the defendant’s estate.

Held:

The decision in Civil Case No. 59506 became final and executory on April 13, 1967. The judgment was

not enforced. The petitioner instituted Civil Case No. 93268 within the prescriptive period to revive the

judgment in Civil Case No. 59506. The revived judgment was rendered on May 24, 1974. This judgment

became final and executory sometime in 1974. Again, this was not enforced. On September 1, 1982, the

petitioner filed a claim in Special Proceedings No. Q-32291 before the then Court of First Instance ofRizal. What is sought is a second revival of the judgment that had become final in 1967. This can no

longer be done due to the lapse of the allowable period. The Court finds that the right of the petitioner

to enforce the judgment against Gil Puyat, an accommodation party and a defendant in Civil Case Nos.

59506 and 93268, filed on September 1, 1982 had already prescribed considering that more than ten

(10) years had already elapsed from the finality of the original judgment on April 13, 1967. The failure of

the private respondents to raise prescription in their "Comment to Claim" does not imply the waiver of

such defense. In the instant rase, there is no new issue of fact that arises in connection with the

question of prescription. All the pertinent dates showing that the petitioner's enforcement of the

judgment under Civil Case No. 93268 has already prescribed can be found in the petitioner's allegations

in the "claim" as well as its evidence filed. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The

questioned decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals, is AFFIRMED

Marini-Gonzales v. Lood, 148 SCRA457 (1987) GENERAL

Claims that Survive, Rule 87, sec. 1,second clause; Rule 3, secs. 16, 17,

20; Rule 86, sec. 5

Albano v. Agtarap, 22 Phil 345 (1912)

LAJARATO

Claims that Survive, Rule 87, sec. 1,second clause; Rule 3, secs. 16, 17,20; Rule 86, sec. 5

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FACTS:

Lucio Agtarap owned several parcels of agricultural land in Laoag, Ilocos Norte. He died leaving 4 sons

Cornelio, Nicolas, Silverio and grandson Melencio Agtarap. Later on Silverio also died intestate and his

wife Juana Domingo filed a petition for the settlement of his estate as well as for the appointment of an

administrator. The trial court appointed Rodrigo Albano as administrator of the estate of Silverio.

Rodrigo Albano instituted a civil action improperly entitled in the matter of the claim for the widow’s

legal portion against the other three heirs of Lucio Agtarap namely Cornelio, Nicolas and a grandson

named Melecio Agtarap. Improperly so entitled, because in the present civil action the matter involved

is a claim in favor of the intestate estate of Silverio to certain property belonging to the decedent Lucio,

against the three heirs who have taken to themselves all the estate left by the latter, including the

fourth part which belongs to Silverio Agtarap.. Therefore the subject matter of this action can only be

this co-ownership, if it exists, in which the hereditary estate was left, and, if it does so exist, the partition

of the property among the four lawful co-owners, the heirs of Lucio Agtarap, and withdrawal of

Silverio’s portion in order to transfer it to his intestate estate. The trial court ruled that one -fourth part

of the property of their father Lucio be delivered to the administrator of the intestate estate of the late

Silverio Agtarap, as his legacy, so that, after proper proceedings, their respective portions may be

adjudicated to the widow and other heirs of the said Silverio. The court considered the action to be one

of partition. Defendants argued that the administrator has no power to compel the partition of theestate on the ground that being an administrator, he has no title or interest in said estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an administrator may bring an action or claim to compel the partition of the estate.

HELD:

Yes.The claim or action made by the administrator Albano for recognition of the right the decedent

Silverio has to a portion of the property, held by persons who are heirs with him, should be enforced by

an action for partition, and the trial in such case should terminate with the judgment fixing the portion

that belongs to the said decedent. The necessary procedure will be the special proceedings in the

intestate estate of Silverio Agtarap, in which may properly be presented the claim of the administrator

of the said intestate estate on behalf of Juana Domingo for her legal portion as widow. In the trial held

for such purpose it will be determined who are the heirs of the intestate estate of Silverio Agtarap.Dissenting opinion of Justice Moreland:

By common law executors and administrators acquired a qualified title to the personal property of the

decedent, and, when his interest therein was that of a co-tenant, he is authorized to compel partition.

As to real property, neither at common law nor under any statute does an executor or administrator

take any title. Neither can he compel partition, in the absence of a statute authorizing it.So far as I can

ascertain, nowhere in the law of these Islands is an administrator given power to bring an action for the

partition of real estate.

Heirs of Gregoire v. Baker, 51 Phil 75(1927) NAMLA


Doctrine: 1.EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS) INSOLVENT ESTATE; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE BYDECEDENT; REMEDY OF CREDITOR.—Where an 68tate in administration appears to be insolvent, any

creditor who believes that a conveyance of property executed in life by the decedent was made in fraud

of creditors may, by leave of the court, and upon giving bond to indemnify the executor or administrator

against costs, commence an action in the name of the executor or administrator, and recover the

property thus fraudulently conveyed away. The personal representative of a decedent is not under the

peremptory duty of starting such action himself.

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2.JUDGMENT; APPEAL; INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.—Orders made by a' court with reference to the

inclusion of items of property in the inventory or the exclusion of items therefrom are manifestly of a

purely discretionary, provisional, and interlocutory nature and are subject to modification or change at

any time during the course of the administration proceedings Such orders are not conclusive of the

rights of any one, and the order in question not final in the sense necessary to make it appealable.

Who died: J.H. Ankrom (September 18, 1922, Davao)

Petitioner/Appointed Administrator: A.L. Baker

Facts: It appears that J. H. Ankrom and on September 25, thereafter, the appellee, A. L. Baker, qualified

as his administrator. On December 13 of the same year, the administrator filed his inventory of the

assets pertaining to the estate of his decedent, in which inventory was included a tract of land covered

by Torrens certificate of title and containing an area of more than 930 hectares. In this inventory, said

tract of land, with the improvements thereon, was estimated at nearly P60,000. On September 24, 1924,

the heirs of Rafael Gregoire, appellants herein, filed a claim against the estate of Ankrom for the P70,

877.56, based upon a judgment rendered in the Supreme Court of the Republic of Panama.

This claim was allowed by the commissioners in the estate of Ankrom, and no appeal was at any time

taken against the order so allowing it. It appears that the total recognized claims against the estate

amounted originally to P76,645.13.

As the affairs of the estate stood upon the original inventory, there appeared to be sufficient assets to

pay all claimants; but while these intestate proceedings were being conducted the administrator

discovered that on April 22, 1920, or about a year and a half before his death, Ankrom had executed a

mortgage on the property here in question in favor of the Philippine Trust Company to secure that

company from liability on a note in the amount of P20,000.00, of the same date, upon which it had

made itself contigently liable. Two days after this mortgage had been executed Ankrom appears to have

made an assignment of all his interest in the mortgaged property to one J. G. Jung Ohio, for a purportedconsideration of the sum of P1 and other good and valuable considerations.

Admin upon this knowledge omitted the said property but the court, however, having its attention

called to the fact that the omission of this property from the inventory would leave the estate insolvent,

made an order on October 7, 1925, directing the administrator to restore said item to his inventory.

Upon petition by admin, court made a new order, dated march 5, 1926, approving of the omission by

the administrator of said property from the inventory; and its is from this order that the present appeal

is here being prosecuted.

Issue: Would an appeal be proper?

Held: No. The remedy of the appellants is, therefore, to indemnify the administrator against costs and,

by leave of court, to institute an action in the name of the administrator to set aside the assignment or

other conveyance believed to have been made in fraud of creditors.

When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or administrator to pay debts and

expenses, and when the deceased person made in his life-time such fraudulent conveyance of such real

or personal estate or of a right or interest therein, as is stated in the preceding section, any creditor of

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the estate may, by license of the court, if the executor or administrator has not commenced such action,

commence and prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the executor or administrator, an action for

the recovery of the same and may recover for the benefit of the creditors, such real or personal estate,

or interest therein so conveyed. But such action shall not be commenced until the creditor files in court

a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge, conditioned to indemnify the executor or

administrator against the costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon the judgment by him

so recovered for the costs incurred and such other expenses as the court deems equitable.

For the appellants it is contended that, inasmuch as no appeal was taken from the order of October 7,

1925, directing the administrator to include the land in question in the inventory, said order became

final, with the result that the appealed order of March 5, 1926, authorizing the exclusion of said

property from the inventory, should be considered beyond the competence of the court. This

contention is untenable. Orders made by a court with reference to the inclusion of items of property in

the inventory or the exclusion of items therefrom are manifestly of a purely discretionary, provisional,

and interlocutory nature and are subject to modification or change at any time during the course of the

administration proceedings. Such order in question not final in the sense necessary to make it

appealable. In fact we note that the appealed order was expressly made without prejudice to the rights

of the creditors to proceed in the manner indicated in the provision above quoted from the Code of CivilProcedure.

The order appealed from not being of an appealable nature, it results that this appeal must be

dismissed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellants.

Aguas v. Llemos, 5 SCRA 959 (1962)

RAMOS


Facts:

Francisco Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas filed to recover damages from

Hermogenes Llemos, alleging that the Llemos had served them by registered mail with a copy of a

petition for a writ of possession with notice that the same would be filed in the CFI of Samar. Aguasproceeded to the court, traveling from Manila to Samar together with their lawyers and discovered that

no such petition had been filed, and that defendant maliciously failed to appear in court. Before he

could answer the complaint, the defendant died Plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the heirs.

The heirs filed a motion to dismiss, which the court approved, on the ground that the legal

representative, and not the heirs, should have been made the party defendant; and testate or intestate

proceedings should be initiated and the petitioner’s claim filed therein.

Issue:

Whether or not the claim survives the death of the decedent.

Ruling:Yes, pursuant to Rule 87 Sec. 1 (sa full text nakalagay Rule 88 Sec. 1, nagkamali sila nyahahaha) the

following claims may be filed against the executor of the estate of the decedent, to wit:

“xxx recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien

thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be

commenced against him.”

The present suit is one for damages under the last class, it having been held that "injury to property" is

not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is

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injured or diminished. To maliciously cause a party to incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this

case, is certainly injurious to that party's property.

Aguas v. Llenos, supra VARGAS Claims that Do Not Survive, Rule 87,

sec. 1, first clause; Rule 3, secs. 16-17

Facts:

Francisco Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas filed an action in CFI Catbalogan torecover damages from Hermogenes Llemos, alleging that the latter had served them by registered mail

with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession; that plaintiffs proceeded to the court and discovered

that no such petition had been filed; and that defendant maliciously failed to appear in court. Before he

could answer the complaint, the defendant died Plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the heirs.

The heirs filed a motion to dismiss, which the court approved, on the ground that the legal

representative, and not the heirs, should have been made the party defendant; and testate or intestate

proceedings should be initiated and the claim filed therein. MR was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the claim survives the death of defendant and passes to the heirs.

Ruling:

YES. Under Rule 87, section 5, the actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses

and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money

against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied". None of these includes that of the

plaintiffs-appellants Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors

or administrators: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to

enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. The

present suit is one for damages under the last class. However, the parties have arrived at an amicable

settlement, and agreed to dismiss the appeal. The settlement has been approved. (MOOT AND

ACADEMIC)

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