EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-59234. September 30, 1982.]

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION, respondents.

Mariano P. Brion, Jr. for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioners who are taxicab operators assail the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 issued by the Board of Transportation (BOT) providing for the phasing out and replacement of old and dilapidated taxicabs; as well as Implementing Circular No. 52 issued pursuant thereto by the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) instructing personnel of the BLT within the National Capital Region to implement the said BOT Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. Petitioners allege that the questioned Circulars did not afford them procedural and substantive due process, equal protection of the law, and protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard. Among others, they question the issuance of the Circulars without first calling them to a conference or requiring them to submit position papers or other documents enforceability thereof only in Metro Manila; and their being applicable only to taxicabs and not to other transportation services.

The Supreme Court held that there was no denial of due process since calling the taxicab operators or persons who may be affected by the questioned Circulars to a conference or requiring them to submit position papers or other documents is only one of the options open to the BOT which is given wide discretionary authority under P.D. No. 101; and fixing a six- year ceiling for a car to be operated as taxicab is a reasonable standard adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The Court also ruled that neither has the equal protection clause been violated by initially enforcing the Circulars only in Metro Manila since it is of common knowledge that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, thus making for a substantial distinction; nor by non-application of the Circulars to other transportation services because the said Circulars satisfy the criteria required under the equal protection clause, which is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS; MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR PROVIDING FOR PHASING-OUT AND REPLACEMENT OF OLD AND DILAPIDATED TAXICABS; ISSUANCE NOT VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS; CALLING TAXICAB OPERATORS TO CONFERENCE OR REQUIRING SUBMISSION OF POSITION PAPERS OR DOCUMENTS, ONLY ONE OF OPTIONS GIVEN TO BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION IN

FORMULATING POLICIES. — It is clear from the provision of Section 2 of P.D. 101 aforequoted, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. Operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC HEARING, NOT A DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT. — Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307(1972); "Previous notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitations or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, generally dependent upon a past act or even which has to be established or ascertained. It is nor essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise.''

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SIX-YEAR CEILING FOR CARS TO OPERATE AS TAXICAB, MEETS DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT FOR SUPPLYING REASONABLE STANDARD. — Petitioners farther take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because of roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of registration. As public respondents contend, however, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and evens graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly , and justly, The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ISSUANCE NOT VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; ENFORCING CIRCULAR INITIALLY IN METRO MANILA ONLY. — At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exist so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. — As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general

welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 48 [1970]. It may also regulate property rights. (Samson vs. Mayor of Bacolod City, 60 SCRA 267 [1974]. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". (The Constitution of the Philippines, Second Edition, p. 548.)

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NONE APPLICATION TO OTHER TRANSPORTATION SERVICES. — In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56; People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12; Central Bank vs. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307 [1972]; Anucension vs. National Labor Union, 80 SCRA 350 [1977] citing Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1974] & Basa vs. Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas, 61 SCRA 93 [1974]). What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. (Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.

7. ID., ID., DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY REQUIRES CLEAR AND CATEGORICAL INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHT. — Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable.

D E C I S I O N

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:

This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" filed by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation, seeks to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10, 1977, of the Board of Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated August 16, 1980, of the Bureau of Land Transportation.

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience.

On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:

SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of

Old and Dilapidated Taxis

"WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances;

WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and again, complained against, and condemned, the continued operation of old and dilapidated taxis;

WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety, a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis should be adopted;

WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation, the latter believes that in six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only covered the cost of his taxis, but has made reasonable profit for his investments;

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares that no car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi, and in implementation of the same hereby promulgates the following rules and regulations:

1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cards for 1978, only taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation;

2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cars for 1979, only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation; and every year thereafter, there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit:

1980 — Model 1974

1981 — Model 1975, etc.

All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered withdrawn from public service as of the last day of registration of each particular year and their respective plates shall be surrendered directly to the Board of Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land Transportation Commission.

For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall immediately be effective in Metro-Manila. Its implementation outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board." 1

Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular,

and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. To quote said Circular:

"Pursuant to BOT Memo Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year models over six (6) years old are now banned from operating as public utilities in Metro Manila. As such the units involved should be considered as automatically dropped as public utilities and, therefore, do not require any further dropping order from the BOT.

"Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old shall be refused registration. The following schedule of phase-out is herewith prescribed for the guidance of all concerned:

"Year Model Automatic Phase-Out Year

1980

1974 1981

1975 1982

1976 1983

1977

etc. etc.

Strict compliance here is desired." 2

In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981.

On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.

On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on February 20, 1981. Petitioners presented testimonial and documentary evidence, offered the same, and manifested that they would submit additional documentary proofs. Said proofs were submitted on March 27, 1981 attached to petitioners' pleading entitled, "Manifestation, Presentation of Additional Evidence and Submission of the Case for Resolution." 3

On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than December 10, 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on January 1, 1982.

Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located.

On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the following queries were posed for consideration by this Court:

"A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?

B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to.

(1) Equal protection of the law;

(2) Substantive due process; and

(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?

On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:

Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power

"4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles."

Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers:

"Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. — In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding section, the Board shall proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.

Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, or any other government office or agency that may be able to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the implementation of this Decree.

The Board may also call conferences, require the submission of position papers or other documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry. "

In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process, petitioners contend that they were not called upon to submit their position papers, nor were they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the issuance of the questioned BOT Circular.

It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars Operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT.

Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972):

"Previous notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise." (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because the road-worthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of registration. As public respondents contend, however, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met.

On Equal Protection of the Law:

Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the pertinent portion:

"For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall immediately be effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board." 4

In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars in Cebu City is already being effected, with the BOT in the process of conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities.

The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. Thus is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.

As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. 5 It may also regulate property rights. 6 In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". 7

In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. 8 What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. 9 The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.

Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable. 10

WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Teehankee and Aquino, JJ., in the result.

Footnotes

1. Annex "A", pp. 26-27, Rollo.

2. Annex "B", p. 28, ibid.

3. Annex "D", pp. 38-53, ibid.

4. p. 19, ibid.

5. Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1970).

6. Samson vs. Mayor of Bacolod City. 60 SCRA 267 (1974).

7. The Constitution of the Philippines, Second Edition, p. 548.

8. People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56; People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12; Central Bank vs. Cloribel 44 SCRA 307 (1972); Anucension vs. National Labor Union, 80 SCRA 350 (1977) citing Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974) & Basa vs. Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas. 61 SCRA 93 (1974).

9. Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971).

10. Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1868).

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005.]

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC., respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO-MORALES, J p:

Respondent, JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to and from Lucena City, assailed, via a petition for prohibition and injunction 1 against the City of Lucena, its Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. The salient provisions of the ordinances are:

Ordinance No. 1631 2

AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENA ATcaID

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 1. There is hereby granted to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., its successors or assigns, hereinafter referred to as the "grantee", a franchise to construct, finance, establish, operate, and maintain a common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena.

SECTION 2. This franchise shall continue for a period of twenty-five years, counted from the approval of this Ordinance, and renewable at the option of the grantee for another period of twenty-five (25) years upon such expiration.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 4. Responsibilities and Obligations of the City Government of Lucena. — During the existence of the franchise, the City Government of Lucena shall have the following responsibilities and obligations:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) It shall not grant any third party any privilege and/or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus and/or jeepney terminal.

xxx xxx xxx

Ordinance No. 1778 3

AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES, MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 1420, SERIES OF 1993, AND ORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF 1995 HEASaC

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 1. The entrance to the City of Lucena of all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys is hereby regulated as follows:

(a) All buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers.

(b) All temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 3. a) Section 1 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses from other municipalities and/or local government units going to Lucena City are directed to proceed to the Common Terminal located at Diversion Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, to unload and load passengers.

xxx xxx xxx

c) Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local government units shall utilize the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal at Diversion Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, this City, and no other terminals shall be situated inside or within the City of Lucena; cECTaD

d) Section 4 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local government units shall avail of the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal which is hereby designated as the officially sanctioned common terminal for the City of Lucena;

e) Section 5 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:

The Lucena Grand Central Terminal is the permanent common terminal as this is the entity which was given the exclusive franchise by the Sangguniang Panglungsod under Ordinance No. 1631; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

These ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty five years, renewable for another twenty five years, to one entity for the construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney

terminal facility in Lucena City, to be located outside the city proper, were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city, as the "Explanatory Note" — Whereas Clause adopting Ordinance No. 1778 states:

WHEREAS, in line with the worsening traffic condition of the City of Lucena, and with the purpose of easing and regulating the flow of the same, it is imperative that the Buses, Mini-Buses and out-of-town jeepneys be prohibited from maintaining terminals within the City, but instead directing to proceed to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal for purposes of picking-up and/or dropping off their passengers; 4

Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, was one of those affected by the ordinances. aSTAcH

Petitioner, Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., claiming legal interest as the grantee of the exclusive franchise for the operation of the common terminal, 5 was allowed to intervene in the petition before the trial court. jur2005cd

In the hearing conducted on November 25, 1998, all the parties agreed to dispense with the presentation of evidence and to submit the case for resolution solely on the basis of the pleadings filed. 6

By Order of March 31, 1999, 7 Branch 54 of the Lucena RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

1. Declaring City Ordinance No. 1631 as valid, having been issued in the exercise of the police power of the City Government of Lucena insofar as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., to construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena;

2. But however, declaring the provision of Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631 to the effect that the City Government shall not grant any third party any privilege and/or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus and/or jeepney terminal, as illegal and ultra vires because it contravenes the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as "The Local Government Code";

3. Declaring City Ordinance No. 1778 as null and void, the same being also an ultra vires act of the City Government of Lucena arising from an invalid, oppressive and unreasonable exercise of the police power, more specifically, declaring illegal [sections 1(b), 3(c) and 3(e)]; ACIESH

4. Ordering the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition and/or Injunction directing the respondents public officials, the City Mayor and the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Lucena, to cease and desist from implementing Ordinance No. 1778 insofar as said ordinance prohibits or curtails petitioner from maintaining and operating its own bus terminal subject to the conditions provided for in Ordinance No. 1557, Sec. 3, which authorizes the construction of terminal outside the poblacion of Lucena City; and

likewise, insofar as said ordinance directs and compels the petitioner to use the Lucena Grand Central Terminal Inc., and furthermore, insofar as it declares that no other terminals shall be situated, constructed, maintained or established inside or within the City of Lucena; and furthermore,

5. The Motion to Dismiss filed by the Intervenor, Lucena Grand Central Terminal Inc., dated October 19, 1998, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) 8

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 9 of the trial court's order having been denied by Order of August 6, 1999, 10 it elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45 before this Court. 11 This Court, by Resolution of November 24, 1999, 12 referred the petition to the Court of Appeals with which it has concurrent jurisdiction, no special and important reason having been cited for it to take cognizance thereof in the first instance.

By Decision of December 15, 2000, 13 the appellate court dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged orders of the trial court. Its motion for reconsideration 14 having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution dated June 5, 2001, 15 petitioner once again comes to this Court via petition for review, 16 this time assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. cAaDHT

Decision on the petition hinges on two issues, to wit: (1) whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the case, it not having furnished the Office of the Solicitor General copy of the orders it issued therein, and (2) whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted the subject ordinances.

Petitioner argues that since the trial court failed to serve a copy of its assailed orders upon the Office of the Solicitor General, it never acquired jurisdiction over the case, it citing Section 22, Rule 3 of the Rules which provides:

SEC. 22.Notice to the Solicitor General. — In any action involving the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, executive order, presidential decree, rules or regulations, the court in its discretion, may require the appearance of the Solicitor General who may be heard in person or through representative duly designated by him. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Furthermore, petitioner invokes Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 63 which respectively provide:

SEC. 3. Notice on Solicitor General. — In any action which involves the validity of a statute, executive order or regulation, or any other governmental regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party assailing the same and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question. aSADIC

SEC. 4. Local government ordinances. — In any action involving the validity of a local government ordinance, the corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local government unit involved shall be similarly notified and entitled to be heard. If such ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Solicitor General shall also be notified and entitled to be heard. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Nowhere, however, is it stated in the above-quoted rules that failure to notify the Solicitor General about the action is a jurisdictional defect.

In fact, Rule 3, Section 22 gives the courts in any action involving the "validity" of any ordinance, inter alia, "discretion" to notify the Solicitor General.

Section 4 of Rule 63, which more specifically deals with cases assailing the constitutionality, not just the validity, of a local government ordinance, directs that the Solicitor General "shall also be notified and entitled to be heard." Who will notify him, Sec. 3 of the same rule provides — it is the party which is assailing the local government's ordinance.

More importantly, however, this Court finds that no procedural defect, fatal or otherwise, attended the disposition of the case. For respondent actually served a copy of its petition upon the Office of the Solicitor General on October 1, 1998, two days after it was filed. The Solicitor General has issued a Certification to that effect. 17 There was thus compliance with above-quoted rules. DAEcIS

Respecting the issue of whether police power was properly exercised when the subject ordinances were enacted: As with the State, the local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method. 18

That traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern, cannot be gainsaid. In Calalang v. Williams 19 which involved a statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads, this Court held:

In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. 20 (Emphasis supplied)

The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present. DAaIEc

Respondent's suggestion to have this Court look behind the explicit objective of the ordinances which, to it, was actually to benefit the private interest of petitioner by coercing all bus operators to patronize its terminal does not lie. 21 Lim v. Pacquing 22 instructs:

. . . [T]his Court cannot look into allegations that PD No. 771 was enacted to benefit a select group which was later given authority to operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810. The examination of legislative motivation is generally prohibited. (Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438 [1971] per Black,

J.) There is, in the first place, absolute lack of evidence to support ADC's allegation of improper motivation in the issuance of PD No. 771. In the second place, as already averred, this Court cannot go behind the expressed and proclaimed purposes of PD No. 771, which are reasonable and even laudable. (Underscoring supplied) 23

This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, 24 the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to petitioner. The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of petitioner. EAaHTI

In De la Cruz v. Paras, 25 this Court declared unconstitutional an ordinance characterized by overbreadth. In that case, the Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan prohibited the operation of all night clubs, cabarets and dance halls within its jurisdiction for the protection of public morals. Held the Court:

It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The admonition in Salaveria should be heeded: "The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation." It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed. (Underscoring supplied) 26

In Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 27 this Court, in declaring unconstitutional the resolution subject thereof, advanced a similar consideration. That case involved a resolution issued by the Professional Regulation Commission which prohibited examinees from attending review classes and receiving handout materials, tips, and the like three days before the date of examination in order to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations in accountancy. Besides being unreasonable on its face and violative of academic freedom, the measure was found to be more sweeping than what was necessary, viz:

Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself — would be like uprooting the

tree to get rid of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) 28

As in De la Cruz 29 and Lupangco, 30 the ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. 31 What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there. aCTHEA

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. (Underscoring supplied) 32

A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.

From the memorandum 33 filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets.

Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.

In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. DTESIA

Petitioner argues, however, that other solutions for the traffic problem have already been tried but proven ineffective. But the grant of an exclusive franchise to petitioner has not been shown to be the only solution to the problem.

While the Sangguniang Panlungsod, via Ordinance No. 1557, 34 previously directed bus owners and operators to put up their terminals "outside the poblacion of Lucena City," petitioner informs that said ordinance only resulted in the relocation of terminals to other well-populated barangays, thereby giving rise to traffic congestion in those areas. 35 Assuming that information to be true, the Sangguniang

Panlungsod was not without remedy. It could have defined, among other considerations, in a more precise manner, the area of relocation to avoid such consequences.

As for petitioner's argument that the challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to "[r]egulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public places". 36 Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are encroaching upon public roads, they are not obstacles. The buses which indiscriminately load and unload passengers on the city streets are. The power then of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments and obstacles does not extend to terminals.

Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. For their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort of the community.

But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to their alleged indirect effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they are nuisance per accidens, not per se. STcDIE

Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings, as was done in the case at bar.

In Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 37 this Court held:

Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. (Underscoring supplied) 38

In Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac 39 where the appellant-municipality similarly argued that the terminal involved therein is a nuisance that may be abated by the Municipal Council via an ordinance, this Court held: "Suffice it to say that in the abatement of nuisances the provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 694-707) must be observed and followed. This appellant failed to do."

As for petitioner's claim that the challenged ordinances have actually been proven effective in easing traffic congestion: Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different from whether it is reasonably necessary. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be effective. AHcaDC

The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City supporting the establishment of a common terminal, and similar expressions of support from the private sector, copies

of which were submitted to this Court by petitioner. The weight of popular opinion, however, must be balanced with that of an individual's rights.

There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right. 40

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. aHCSTD

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Records at 1-10.

2. Rollo at 118-120.

3. Id. at 226-229.

4. Id. at 227.

5. Records at 55-59.

6. Id. at 339.

7. Id. at 328-360.

8. Id. at 358-360.

9. Id. at 384-399.

10. Id. at 467-470.

11. CA Rollo at 18-59.

12. Id. at 327.

13. Id. at 548-557.

14. Id. at 560-572.

15. Id. at 622-623.

16. Rollo at 9-407 inclusive of Annexes "A"-"Y".

17. CA Rollo at 498.

18. DECS v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533, 537 (1989).

19. 70 Phil. 726 (1940).

20. Id. at 733.

21. Rollo at 539.

22. 240 SCRA 649 (1995).

23. Id. at 677-678.

24. Rollo at 505.

25. 123 SCRA 569 (1983).

26. Id. at 578.

27. 160 SCRA 848 (1988).

28. Id. at 860.

29. Supra.

30. Supra.

31. Rollo at 59.

32. CRUZ, I., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1995).

33. Rollo at 496, 509-510.

34. Id. at 109.

35. Memorandum of Petitioner, id. at 510.

36. Section 458(5)(vi), LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE of 1991.

37. 199 SCRA 595 (1991).

38. Id. at 601.

39. 3 SCRA 816 (1961).

40. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376. (1989).

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 0 5 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.