t8 b19 neads trip 1 of 3 fdr- interview guide- neads rome ny 225

8/14/2019 T8 B19 NEADS Trip 1 of 3 Fdr- Interview Guide- NEADS Rome NY 225

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Interview GuideNortheast Air Defense SectorRome, New York

D ates: TBD

Note: With possible exception of the Commanding Officer and the Operations Officer allinterviewees will first be asked to, in narrative form without interruption, provide theirrecollection of events as they unfolded on 9/11. The detailed interview guide can then beused to make sure all relevant points are covered.

Commission Sensitive


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Commanding OfficerPersonal DataName: Rank:

Years in Position on 9/11:Current Position: Phone :E-mail:

Start with short career history with emph asis on air defense experience.

Morning of 9/111. Where w ere you on the morning of 9/11 and how did you become awareof the developing situation?2. What were your immediate orders and actions when you became aware?3. What comm unication means were imm ediately available to you and towhom?4. Explain how you deconflicted the on-going exercise and how youorganized your forces to meet the challenge?5. What processes and procedures were in place for you to gain situationalawareness and how quickly were you able to do so?6. W hat initial guidance did you receive from CONR, if any. At what pointdid you receive guidance and what was it?7. Did you personally have any contact with FAA at any level or withNORAD at any level? How about the NMCC or other Washington areaentity?8. Did you pe rsonally have any contact with the W ings at Otis and Langley?If so what w ere the de tails of that contact?



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9. How did you manage events of the morning what was your relationshipwith the Mission Control Commander and the Director of Operations?10. What input did you have to the decisions to scramblefrom Otis? FromLangley?11 . What input did you have to the decisions to continue routine scheduledtraining at Otis? Elsewhere? W as that training exercise-related?12 . In the hunt for American Air 11 what do you recall about the effort toestablish its altitude? W hat capa bility does the Sector have to do so?M anning the Watch13. What standards did you establish for your SAOC to identify specialtracks or other unknown tracks of interest?14 . How did you decide when an officer is sufficiently trained an d capableto perform duty as a Mission Control Commander?15 . W here did Major Nasypany rank am ong the Mission ControlCommanders and alternates who performed that duty?16 . How often and in what m anner did you test or exercise your watchteams to deal w ith unknown targets?17. How often and whe n did you conduct such tests or exercises to dealwith a hijacking?The Scram bles, Interception and Shootdown Authority18. W hat orders did you understand the scramb led pilots to have as they gotin the air that morning? W hat were they supposed to do? What were theirorders concerning expenditure of ordnance?19. At wh at tim e did you becom e aware of guidance to take positive actionagainst hijacked commercial airliners and how and from whom did youreceive that guidance?



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20. At what time and how did you become aware that Andrew s fighters hadbeen alerted and then scrambled?21. At one time CONR cautioned NEAD S that it did not have control ofAndrews and Atlantic City fighters. How was that caution communicated toyou and what steps did you take to gain control?22. W hat conversations did you have with senior officers of the DCANGconcerning the Andrews fighters?The Tough Questions23. The families and the American public do not understand why scrambledfighters did not simp ly kick in the afterb urner and head straight for eitherNew York City in the case of Otis or W ashington DC in the case of Langley.How wou ld you have us answer that concern?24. The families and the Am erican public are also confused as to the timethat NEAD S was notified by the FAA. How did the 0840 time become theagreed upon time betw een NORA D and the FAA and what input did youhave to that agreement?25. W hat did you docum ent here at NE AD S as the time of the notification?26. How did the NOR AD Pu blic Affairs Office acqu ire the no tion thatnotification came either as early as 0835 or shortly after 0830?Lessons Learned27. Shifting gears now, in the aftermath of 9/11 what immediate changesdid you make in the way you did business, apart from the 24-hr CAPrequirement?

28. How m uch of that changed su rvived and becam e institutionalized?29. W hat are the two o r three dom estic air defe nse lessons learned fromevents of 9/11?



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30. Could, today, your SAOC pick up and identify an unknown or specialtrack such as AA11? How about AA77 where height-finding was notavailable?Conclusion31. What have w e not asked you that we should have asked?32. What did you come prepared to talk about or inform us that we have notasked you?33. Who, particularly at CON R, NO RA D, the W ings and FAA must weinterview in order to understand events of 9/11 and their impact today?34. What after action review, "hot wash", or other critique did you conduct?If done, where wou ld we find a copy of the results?

Z-O.A V/gg



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Operations OfficerDOC (or SAOC supervisor)Battle Commander

Note : This guide applies to all three potential interviewees

Personal DataName:Position on 9/1 1 : PO )Current Position:_ 0_J _ Phone:E-mail:

Start with career history, with em phasis on air defense trainingMorning of 9/111. Where were you on the morning of 9/11 and how did you become aware

\ of thedeveloping situation?\ 2. What were you r imm ediate orders and actions when you became aware?

3. What com mun ication means were im mediately available to you and towhom?4. Explain how you deconflicted the on-going exercise and how youorganized your forces to meet the challenge?5. W hat processes and procedures were in place for you to gain situationalawareness and ho w qu ickly were you able to do so?6. W hat initial guidance did you receive from CONR, if any. At what pointdid you receive guidance and what was it?



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7. Did you personally have any contact with FAA at any level or withNORA D at any level? How about the N MC C or other Washington areaentity?8. Did you personally have any contact with the Wings at Otis an d Langley?If so what were the details of that contact?9. How did you manage events of the morningw hat was your relationshipwith the M ission C ontrol Comm ander and the Exercise Commander?10. What input did you have to the decisions to scramblefrom Otis? FromLangley?11. W hat input did you have to the dec isions to continue routine scheduledtraining at Otis? Elsew here? W as that training exercise-related?12. In the hunt for Am erican Air 11 wha t do you recall about the effort toestablish its altitude? W hat capability does the Sector have to do so?Running th e Watch13. W hat standards did you establish for your SAOC to identify specialtracks or other unknown tracks of interest?14 . How did you decide when an officer is sufficiently trained an d capableto perform duty as a Mission Control Commander?15. Where did M ajor Nasypany rank among the Mission ControlCom manders and alternates who perform ed that duty?16. How often and in what manner did you test or exercise your watchteams to deal with unknown targets?

17. How often and when did you conduct such tests or exercises to dealwith a hijacking?18. W alk us through the standards that existed at the tim e, time-wise, fromfirst notification or awareness of a special situation to fighters in the sky.How m uch time does the ID Tech have, the Weapons Section, MCC, theW ing, Other? Any changes to those standards.



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The Scram bles, Interception and Shootdown Authority19. W hat orders did you understand the scrambled pilots to have as they gotin the air that m orning? W hat were they supposed to do? What were theirorders concerning expenditure of ordnance?20. At what time did you become aware of guidance to take positive actionagainst hijacked com mercial airliners and how and from w hom did youreceive that g uidance?21. At what tim e and how did you become aw are that Andrew s fighters hadbeen alerted and then scrambled?22. At one t ime CONR cautioned NEA DS that it did not have control ofAndrews and Atlantic City fighters. How was that caution communicated toyou and what steps did you take to gain control?23. W hat conversations did you have with senior officers of the DCANGconcerning the A ndrews fighters?The Tough Questions24. The families and the Am erican public do not understand why scrambledfighters did not simply kick in the afterburner and head straight fo r eitherNew York City in the case of Otis or Washington DC in the case of Langley.How w ould you have us answer that concern?25. The families and the Am erican pu blic are also confused as to the timethat NEADS was notified by the FAA. How did the 0840 time become theagreed upon time between NORAD and the FAA and what input did youhave to that agreement?26. What did you docum ent here at NEADS as the t ime of the notification?27. How did the NO RA D Public Affairs Office acquire the notion thatnotification came either as early as 0835 or shortly after 0830?

Commiss ion Sensitive


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Lessons Learned28. Shifting gears now, in the aftermath of 9/11 what immediate changesdid you m ake in the way yo u did business, apart from the 24-hr CAPrequirement?29. How much of that changed survived an d became institutionalized?30. W hat are the two o r three dom estic air defense lessons learned fromevents of 9/11?31. Could, today, your SAOC pick up and identify an unknown or specialtrack such as AA11? How about AA 77 where height-finding was notavailable?Conclusion32. Wh at have we not asked you that we should have asked?33. Wh at did you com e prepared to talk about or inform us that we have notasked you?34. W ho, particularly at CON R, NORAD, the Wing s and FAA m ust weinterview in order to un derstand events of 9/11 and their im pact today?Added for the Battle Comm ander1. What was the array of communications in the Battle Cab, to whom was itconnected and how effective was the arrangement?2. What was the relationship between th e Mission Control Commander an dthe Battle Cab? Wh at could the MC C do on his own and what did he haveto check with th e Battle Cab?3. W ho actually issued the scram ble orders, MCC or Battle Cab?Added for the Operations Officer(s)1. At one time the position of MCC did not exist and the senior watchofficer was the S D (Senior Director). W hy was the role of the SD retained



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in addition to that of the MCC? Didn' t that add a level of managementperhaps no t needed? Tell us about the m aturation o f this new role for the SDan d how that role in conjunction with the role of the M CC and the W eaponsOfficer played out on 9/11.



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Mission Control CommanderPersonal DataName: Rank:

Position on 9/11:Current Position: Phone:E-mail:

Preliminary1. Tell us about your backgroun d. W hat training did you receive to becomea Mission Control Commander, what qualifications did you have to meet,and when did you first perform this duty on your own?2. How well prepared were you for events as they unfolded on 9/11? Howmuch did your training help, or hinder, and what did you have to make up onyour own?3. How often and to what extent did you train or exercise for a hijackingscenario?4. Were you ever made aware that commercial airplanes might be used asweapons?5. How integral was the crew you had on duty on 9/11 usual crew whohabitually worked together o r did you have substitutes as part of your teamthat day?6. How was the relationship established between your operation and theongoing exercise? How were the two separated? Were they on the SAOCfloor with you?7. What "pre-game" discussion did you and Major Deskins hold on shiftchange th e morning of 9/11? Did you talk about th e habitual tendency ofexercise events to bleed into real world events or vice versa, and what to doabout that?



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8. How often and to what extent were you briefed on the threat youconfronted each time you assumed duty? Did those briefings ever speak to adome stic air defense threat of an y nature, but spe cifically a hijacking, orworse, a suicide hijacking ?M orning of 9/119. Okay, now take us to the morn ing of 9/11 and walk us through whathappened, in order, as best you can recall .[Note: Following points must be addressed either during his narrative orafterwards}

Which notification came f irstBoston or Otis? How were the two deconflicted? How did Major Deskins get in the act as an What prompted the ID Tech to began work so quickly? What was the separate role of the Surveillance Tech? Were you aware that N Truro radar was down for PMI? Did it make a difference? Can the ARS R-4 radar primary return feed be used by NEADS toestablish altitude? If so, how and by whom is that done? What is a special trackr^ What is a Z point and who establishes it Once established, then what happens?^ What situational awaren ess did you have about AA11? Were you aware that FAA managers at Boston and Herndon hadobserved that AA11 was descending and slowing? How hard is it to work up a track on an unknown over land asopposed to over water? Shouldn' t it be easierless clutter? W as the AA11 track as a transponding aircraft on your scope or any

Sector scope? If not, the reason for that is? When you gave orders affecting Otis or Langley who carried themout? Explain the different roles of the M CC/T, SD, and Weapons Officeras you organized for battle on 9/11.



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W hat situational awareness did you have at the mo men t the first planeimpacted the North tower. About AA11, about what hit the tower,about UA 175.Transcipts show that at about the moment of impact an ID techexclaimed "there it is right where she said it was." Exp lain that as itwas relayed to you.Did the ID Tech have the capability at that point to determinealtitude?If not, isn't that a capability of the ARSR-4 radar that NEADS uses?Once Otis was airborne w hat happenedwhy the path they took?Who determines the mach after launch, you or the wing?How were you r instructions relayed to the pilots?From yo ur position who could you talk to? Pilots? Wing? Otis? B attleCab? CONR? NORAD? NMCC/Washington DC?W hat was the thou ght process that led to the early battle stations forLangley?W hy the delay, then, in scrambling Langley?What other USA F fighter assets, if any, could you draw upon?What was the thought process that led to a Langley scramble first Eastand then to the North?At what point did you gain situational awareness, if at all, that AA11had impacted the first tower? UA175 the second?How did Delta89 become a possible hijack?W as that the third B oston-departure plane that was at issue?At what p oint, if at all, did you gain awareness that AA7 7 was ahijack?That AA77, not AA11 was the fast mover approaching the DC areafrom the west?Tell us about the Andrews scramblewere you aware they had beenalerted and then scramb led outside of your p urview?The first Andrews fighter up did one circle and landed immediatelywhat w as that all about?At one point CONR cautioned NEADS to get control of fighters fromAndrew s and Atlantic City. How d id you accom plish that?When did you become aw are that fighters could engage commercialairliners? Who informed you and in what m anner?



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The Transcript and the Scrambles11. Over and above the previous discussion, walk through his transcript withthe MC C to clarify any remaining po ints to:- Understand who was talking, when

- Determine w ho w as relaying his orders to the pilots- Establish what his thought processes were that led to the scrambledecisions- Learn what information caused him to "fight" the Otis and Langleyfighters the way he did- Determine how much he was guided or informed by the Battle Cab,CONR, and NORAD- Establish his situational awareness of each of the four hijackedaircraft as the mo rning proceededConclusion11. W hat have we not asked you that we should have?12 . W hat did you com e prepared to talk about that we have not asked you?13. W ho, at any level, in either NORA D or FAA, or elsewhere must w e talkto in order to understand and be informed about events as they u nfolde d onthe morning of 9/11.



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Lieutenant Colonel DeskinsPersonal Data ~ -Name: d^CMuxg-, &fwy Rank: CT

Position on 9/1 1 : -A^-VJO _Current Po sition: rQ)_ Phone:E-mail :

Preliminary1 . Tell us about your backgro und. W hat training did you receive to becoh^ea M ission Co ntrol Com mander, what qualifications did you have to m eet,and when did you first perform this duty on your own?2. How w ell prepared w ere you for events as they unfolded on 9/1 1? Howmu ch did your training help, o r hinder, and what did you have to m ake up onyour own?3. How often and to what extent did you train or exercise for a hiscenario?4. W ere you ever made aware that comm ercial airplanes might bweapons?5. W hy did you happen to be present on the SAOC floor that day? Were^you the exercise MC C an d is that why you w ere called to the phone to takethe call from Joe Cooper?6. How was the relationship established between your exercise and nomialoperations? How were the two separated? W ere your exercise staff on theSAOC floor with you? How robust was that staff compared to the watch \staff?6a. Was the watch staff performing both exercise and real world dutysimultaneously? If so, why?7. What "pre-game" discussion did you and Major Nasypany hold on shiftchange the m orning of 9/1 1? Did you talk about the habitual tendency of



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exercise events to bleed into real world events or vice versa, and what toabout that?8. How often and to what extent were you briefed on the threat facing theSector? Did those briefings ever speak to a domestic air defense threat^fany nature, but specifically a hijacking, or worse, a suicide hijacking?Morning of 9/119. Okay, now take us to the morning of 9/11 and walk us throughhappene d, in order, as best you can recall.[Note: Following points must be addressed either during her narrative orafterwards}

\ W h y w a s s h e called to the phone and not M ajor

Was their some uncertainty, despite Sgt Pow ell's early awareness thatthe call might be f or the exerciser^ Once Major Nasypany s team went to work in earnest what did shedo, where did shego \ Given that she is a pub lic persona, how did that come aboutinformation did she actually im part and what time of notification did\she provide?

Conclusion10. What have we not asked you that we should have?1 1 . What did you come prepared to talk about that we have not asked you?12. Who, at any level, in either NORAD or FAA, or elsewhere m ust we talkto in order to understand and be informed about events as they unf olded onthe morning of 9/1 1 .

J^YV_.



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MCC/TPersonal DataName: Rank:

Position on 9/11:Current Position: Phone:E-mail:

Background1. Tell us about your backgrou nd. W hat training did you receive to becomea M CC/T, w hat qua lifications did you have to meet, and when did you firstperform this duty on your own?2. How well prepared were you for events as they unfolded on 9/11? Howmuch did your training help, or hinder, and what did you have to make up onyour own?3. How often and to what extent did you train or exercise for a hijackingscenario?4. Were you ever made aware that commercial airplanes might be used asweapons?5. How integral was the crew you had on duty on 9/11usual crew whohabitually worked together or did you hav e substitutes as part of your teamthat day?6. How was the relationship established between your operation and theongoing exercise? How were the two separated? W ere they on the SAOCfloor with you?7. What "pre-game" discussion did you and the exercise senior NCO holdon shift change the morning of 9/11? Did you talk about the habitual



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tendency of exercise events to bleed into real world events or vice versa, andwhat to do about that?8. How often and to what extent were you briefed on the threat youconfronted each time you assumed duty? Did those briefings ever speak to adomestic air defense threat of any nature, but specifically a hijacking, orworse, a suicide hijacking?Morning of 9/119. Okay, now take us to the morning of 9/11 and walk us through whathappened, in order, as best you can recall.[Note: Following points mu st be addressed either during his narrative orafterwards}

Which notification came firstBoston or Otis? What was your specific role in sorting out the first few chaoticmoments? Did you, if fact, run the floor for the MCC? W as the division of labor among th e watch sectionsID,Surveillance, Weaponsclearly understood and followed that day? Did you have to order exercise participants out of the road or did youintegrate them in some manner? Did you have the "A" team on duty or were there substitutes on watchfor what ever the reason? Who does th e MC C/T talk toBattle Cab, outside agencies, CON Rwhat is the division of labor between you an d the M CC incommunicating information to others? What was your person al situational aw areness in the hunt for AA11?

Conclusion10. What have we not asked you that we should have?11. What did you come p repared to talk about that we have not asked y ou?



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12. W ho, at any level, in either NO RA D or FAA , or elsewhere m ust we talkto in order to understand and be inform ed about events as they unfolded onthe morning of 9/11.



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W eapons, Surveillance and Ide ntification SectionsNote: This format will be used, w ith slight variation, for the supervisors of the threesections, and the four or 5 watch standersSenior Director, Weapons Officer, WeaponsNCO, Surveillance Tech, ID Tech.The ID Tech w ill be asked about the hunt for AA1 1, the S D and W eapons folks aboutthe scrambles and the Surveillance Tech about situational awareness.The three supervisors w ill be asked about trainin g, threat awareness, standa rds, andqualifications to stand watch. They will be asked to rate the persons on duty that day andhow substitutes are integrated into the m ix. They will be asked how new individuals areintegrated into the watch. They will be asked fo r check lists as they existed that day andfor a summ ary of changes ma de since 9/11 based on the experience of that d ay.

Personal DataName: Rank:Position on 9/11:Current P osition: Phone:E-mail :

Background1. Tell us about your background. What training did you receive to becomea , what qualifications did you have to meet, and when did youfirst perform this duty on your own?2. How w ell prepared were you for events as they unf olded on 9/11? Howmuch did your training help, or hinder, and what d id you have to make up onyour own?3. How often and to what extent did you train or exercise for a hijackingscenario?4. Were you ever made aware that commercial airplanes might be used asweapons?



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5. How was the relationship established between your desk and the ongoingexercise counterpart desk? How were the two separated? Were they on theSAOC floor with you? Did you perform both real world and exercise roles?7. What "pre-game" discussion did you and you r exercise counterpart holdon shift change the morning of 9/11? Did you talk about the habitualtendency of exercise events to bleed into real world events or vice versa, andwhat to do about that?8. How often and to what extent were you briefed on the threat youconfronted each time you assumed duty? Did those briefings ever speak to adom estic air defense threat of any nature, but specif ically a hijacking , orworse, a suicide hijackin g?Morning of 9/119. Okay, now take us to the m orning of 9/11 and walk us through whathappened, in order, as best you can recall.Am ong points we want clarified are:

W hat is the scope display at each desk and how is inform ation sharedamong desks? W ho had FAA com m unication responsibility? W ho did they talk to,how did they effect im m ediate contact, and how often did theyactivate/exercise the communications link? Who establishes Z points? Special tracks? Unknow n tracks ofinterest? How were dom estic com m ercial airliners treated? For example, didany one even know that AA11 took off and then lost comm unicationsand then its transponder? W hat is the altitude determ ination capab ility on the floor? Whichdesk does that and what is the standard that applies?

Who talks to the wing? To the pilots? Who gives the pilots their missioncourse, altitude, speed? Need to know second by second the hunt for AA11probably the IDTech, but others m ay have assisted. Who was watching CNN, if anyone? An yone have thatresponsibility?



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D id J O S 3 down fo r maintenance have any practical impact? Evennoticeable?Lessons learnedshort term and for the long haul


t8 b19 neads trip 1 of 3 fdr- interview guide- neads rome ny 225

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