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Draft Unclassified

Proposed Work Plan for the Counterterrorism Policy Team

Alexis AlbionScott Allan

Warren BassDaniel BymanBonnie Jenkins

Charles Hill

Draft: April 25,2003

Draft Unclassified


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Draft - Unclassified

Contents

Project Overview

Key Questions

Proposed Division of Labor

Initial Document Review List

Appendix One: Summary of Joint Inquiry Staff Work on Policy

Appendix Two: Suggested Readings

Appendix Three: Notional Interview List

Appendix Four: Proposed Briefings for the Commissioners

Draft Unclassified


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Project Overview: Counterterrorism Policy

The policy team seeks to understand and assess the development of U.S. counterterrorismpolicy before the September 11 attacks, the changes in the immediate aftermath, and thenature of the policy today. These tasks will require reviewing overall priorities,identifying and evaluating the different instruments used to fight terrorism (prosecutions,military strikes, extraditions/renditions, and so on), and determining how well seniorpolicy makers understood the threat from al-Qa'ida. Another integral part of the policyteam's effort is examining U.S. relationships with key foreign partners and adversarieswith regard to counterterrorism. When appropriate, the team will distinguish betweenU.S. counterterrorism policy in general and U.S. efforts to fight al-Qa'ida in particular.

The nature of terrorism during the Cold War shaped U.S. counterterrorism policy whenal-Qa'ida began to emerge. These earlier terrorists, in the words of RAND's BrianJenkins, wanted "a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot ofpeople dead." Their goals were usually tied to Marxist or ethno-nationalist agendas. Themost lethal terrorists during this era were those backed by states, not those operatingindependently. In general, terrorism during this period was viewed as an important butnot overriding policy concern.

As al-Qa'ida and affiliated Islamist groups emerged and grew in the 1990s, the focusslowly shifted. The 1993 attack on the World Trade Center marked a turning point. Forthe first time, Islamist radicals sought mass casualties on U.S. soil. In contrast to theterrorists of the 1970s and 1980s, who had balked at destroying entire buildings, the newradicals wanted a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead.

Several government counterterrorism officials recognized the danger al-Qa'ida posed, butU.S. policy changed unevenly at best. The 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies inKenya and Tanzania elevated the importance of terrorism in general and al-Qa'ida inparticular,but policy still lagged behind the immensity of the threat. It took theSeptember 11 attacks to dramatically change U.S. counterterrorism policy. Even today,counterterrorism policy is evolving, with important policy decisions being made almostdaily.

The policy team expects to follow a normal investigative regimen of document requestsand review, briefings by key individuals both inside and outside government, andextensive interviews with those in a position to discuss the formulation andimplementation of U.S. government policy in the counterterrorism arena. In addition, theteam will draw on the work of the Congressional September 11 Joint Inquiry asappropriate.


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Key Questions

At the Commission hearings held on March 31 in New York, witnesses described theirviews of the September 11 attackers, the intelligence capabilities of the government, andthe quality of the USG's counterterrorism policy before September 11. They alsosuggested improvements in these areas in order to prevent another tragedy. Based upontheir statements and our research so far, we have compiled a list of key questions andissues that we think need to be addressed by the Commission.

The list is divided into three parts, corresponding to the overall statutory structure of theCommission's inquiry. Most of the questions focus on Part I (the pre-September 11 era),as this is essential for understanding Parts n and ffl, which cover the period after theattacks.

Part One: Counterterrorism Policy before September 11,2001

Background

1. What shaped counterterrorism policy before the 1993 World Trade Center attack? What was the "old paradigm" regarding the threat posed by terrorist groups? What instruments (law enforcement, diplomacy, military strikes, financial

controls, and so on) were used for lighting terrorism? How important was terrorism considered, in general?

Strategy and Priorities DV*Al< ^ Secretary of Defense WilliamCohen Former Office of Managementand Budge t Director Jacob("Jack") Lew Office of Managementand Budget Director Mitch D aniels Former FBI Director Louis Freeh Directorof Central Intelligence George Tenet Former Directorof Central Intelligence John D eutch Any other participantsin the "Small Group" Deputiesof various departmentsas appropriate

Counterterrorism Specialists

Richard Clarke Participantsin the Ambassador Michael Sheehan(former S/CT at State)

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Sheehan's predecessors at S/CT General (ret.) Wayne D owning,former Coordinatorfor Counterterrorism

General/Gordon,Coordinator for Counterterrorism Asst. Secretary, SOLIC,OSD, the Clinton Administration

SOLIC and CENTCOM officials with CT responsibilities Other NSC staff working w ith Clarke (Roger Cressey,Dan Benjamin,

Steve Simon, and so on) NSC staff working on intelligence>x^ Cofer Black, both in his CTC and in his S/CT responsibilities %^

Those with related respon sibilities

Ambassador KarlInderfurth (form er Asst. Secretary, South Asia) Am bassador MarkParris (former Asst. Secretary, Near East) Am bassador W illiam B urns (Asst. Secretary, Near East) Am bassador Martin Indyk Bruce Reidel, form er SeniorNSC Director for the M iddle East Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Germany, Britain, Israel, Qatar,

Egypt, and Jordan before September1 1

Foreign government officials

HRH Prince B andarbin Sultan Jean-PaulBrugiere, investigating magistrate, France

Outside experts

Bruce Hoffman, the RAN D Corporation Brian Jenkins,the RAN D Corporation M artha Crenshaw, W esleyan University Jessica Stem, Harvard University Juliette Kayyem , Harvard University Richard Betts, C olum bia University

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Initial Work Plan of the Coun terterrorism Policy Team

Introduction

The following investigative plan being presented by the9-11 Commission Team

lookingat USG Counterterrorism Po licy should be viewed very much as a work inprogress. It certainly is not intended to be rigid. As the investigation proceeds the teamexpects that the work plan w ill change andmove in different directions as information isdeveloped and investigative leads are follo w ed. The refore w e view this plan as a startingpoint,but only that at this junctu re.Also, a cautionary note. This is an unclassified wo rkplan. As the team m oves forward and begins delving into classified documents,briefings,interviews, and other information it is more likely that the plan could change.

The Coun terterrorism polic y of the United States has evo lvedover t ime and morethen one administration. It can be a broad subject w ith man y facets. Given the time thisinquiryhas to complete its work the team in its internal discussions and discussion withstaff manag ement has decided to break the Coun terterrorism policy subject into twophases inorder to facilitate a timely and thorough investigation.

Research do ne thus far seems to show a change, albeit not drastic thus far, in thegovernment's approachto Coun terterrorism policy befo rean d after the East Africanembassy bom bings in 1998. The team plan is to initially approach its investigation intw o parts - CT policy pre-1998and CT policy post 1998. Thereare some indicationsthat policy began to be reevaluatedafter the 1993 Wo rld Trade Center bombin g and thatwill clearly play arole in our deliberations and could change o ur premise depending onwhat we find. What seems to be clear thus far is a change in the volume and stridency ofUSG pronouncements on CT policyafter the embassy bombings We will pay particularattention to USG po licy as it related to co untries such as Pakistan,Afghanistan,and SaudiArabia w ith an emphasis on policy towards sanctuaries. As the investigation becomesmore specific the document research and cast of people to interview w ill no doubt changefrom that listed below. The same will hold true as we begin to mo ve deeper intoclassified information.

The team ex pects tofollow a normal investigative regimen of documen t requestsan d review, briefing s by key individuals both inside and outside government, andextensive interviews w ith those in a position to discuss the form ulation and promulg ationof USG policy in the Counterterrorism arena. In addition the team w ill draw o n the workof the Congressional9-11 Joint Inquiry in as much detail as ongoing commissionnego tiations for access to Inquiry records and reports permit. One area of particularinterest w ill be the do cuments collected or requested by the Joint Inquiry and the policylevel individuals interviewed. Tw o members of the team come to the Comm issionStafffrom the Joint Inquiry. One of them has provided a summ ary of Joint Inquiry activity asit touched on theCounterterrorismpolicy question.


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Summary of Congressional Joint Inquiry Activity in the Policy Area

The Inquiry did some w ork on policy issues, but m ost of itfocused on the intelligence-

policy nexus rather than on the soundness of the overall policy. We d iscussedintelligencepriorities, the disseminationof information,and the quality of analysis withpolicy makers insome depth, but w e did not try to go farbeyond this. Thefocus of ourwork was on the late Clinton-early Bush ad ministration, having more success learningabout the Clinton period.

Policies towardforeign partners received at best incomplete attention. For example, theInquiry looked at how the policy m akers' desire for a strong bilateral relationship withCountry X affected intelligence gathering on Country X or on neighb oring countries.Howe ver, this was only done with a few countries, and even there it was not donesystematically. Moreover, the Inquiry deliberately did not try to jud ge wh ether otherequities in the bilateral relationship were more or less important thancounterterrorism.

The Inquiry did more extensive work on the use of militaryforce and on covert action.On the former, howeve r, it was ham pered by a lack of interviews and access to many keyindividualsand docum ents outside the strict purview of intelligence.

The Inquiry did not try to jud ge overall counterterrorism policy in any compreh ensiveway. Parts of the Inq uiry's w ork looked at issues such as warning the public, workingwith state and local officials, and emphasizinglaw enforcement over disruption. Manyofthese issues, howe ver, involvedthe work of non-Intelligence Community agencies (e.g.the Dep artment of Justice, the INS), which received less attention than they deserved. Inaddition,the Inquiry did not do basic policy analysis such as trying to evaluate theavailableinstruments, the lim its on those instruments, and political support in Congress.

Key Q uestions

At the Commission hearings held March31 in New York witnesses described, inboth verbal and written stateme nts, their views of the9-11 attackers, the intelligencecapability and the USG's counter-terrorism polic ybefore 9-11, and suggestedimprovementsin these areas in order to prevent another tragedy. A ddition ally theyrecomm ended, either explicitly or imp licitly by way of suggested improvem ents, areasthat the Commission shouldfocus its analysis on. Based upon their statements and ourresearch so far , we have compiled a list of key questions/issues we think need to beanswered by the Commission inquiry:

1. Did the USG possess a compreh ensive counter-terrorism policy bothbeforeand after the embassy bombings and particularly prior to 9-11 or did policy vary betweenagencies?

Was the strategy employingall instrumentsof U.S. national power?


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4What were th e gaps in the strategy? Were they obviousat the time?W as everyone "on board" with this strategy? If not, why not?Did the President exercise direction?W as there an overall lackof leadershipand coordinationin connection

;ith/p9unter-terrorimpolicy?

i counterterrorismon the overall priority list?

W hat wereth r nthrrprinrit ion0 ~ ~ ~ ~ Tx Did mone\rfoliow the priority list? If not, why not? Was there a system for managing priorities?

3. Did USGpolicy on counterterrorism allowfor sufficient resourcesan dattention to combatthe threats?

Was enough priority givento fighting terrorism or was it eclipsed by theUSG's attention towards China, peacekeeping in the Balkans, etc.?

What percentageof the intelligence community's budgetwas directedtowards counter-terrorism and was this amountsufficient?

4. Did the USG have asufficient understanding of the treat posed byinternationalterrorism toformulate a com prehensive policy prior to1998?

Was there an overall lackof leadership and coordinationin connectionwith counter-terrorism policy?

5. Did the USGsufficiently understand Al-Qaeda,at least post 1998, to formulatea comprehensive policy?

W hat werethe USG's efforts to understandand eliminatethe "rootcauses" of the Al-Qaeda movement?

W hat agencies w ere responsiblefor understandingAl-Qaeda'saims,philosophy, targeting selection and recruitment method s?

Did the USG study the prior Al-Qaeda attacks closely enough?Did the USGfail to learn lessons from the prior attacks?

)id w /& conswdt with other nations thathad experience with Al-Qaeda?

6. Did the USGfail to confront terrorist sanctuariesin the SudanandAfghanistan?

W hat agencies were responsiblefor monitoring the Al-Qaeda relatedactions in those countries?

W hat actions were taken ag ainst those countriesand were theyeffective incombating terrorism or removing terrorists from such regions?


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7. W as there an integration of domestic policy andforeign policy oncounterterrorism?

Did budgets and other manifestationsof policy reflect this integration?

Did the USG focus its intelligence efforts too heavily on Al-Qaeda'sforeign activities as opposed to m onitoringAl-Qaeda's domesticoperations?

If so, were there policy im plications?

8. What were limitson various instrumentsof national power?

Was law enforcementeffective? How well did renditions and intelligence cooperation w ork? Why was military power used sparingly?

9. Did the USG approach terrorism as a criminal problem (i.e. employing FBIinvestigations, arrests and trials) as opposed to a m ilitary one that required the use offorce?

10. Why was preemption not amajor focus in the USG's pre 9-11 counter-terrorism policy?

11. Did USG policy on counterterrorism allow for sufficient resources andattention to combat the threats?

Was enough priority givento fighting terrorism or was it eclipsed by the

USG's attention towards China, peacekeepingin the Balkans, etc.? What percentageof the intelligence comm unity's budgetwas directed

towards counter-terrorismand was this amount sufficient?

12 . In formulating counterterrorism policydid the USG focus sufficient attentionon the FBI's organizational ability to coun ter domestic terrorism?

Did the FBI's role as a domestic law enforcement agency, which preparesevidence fo r criminal cases, restrictit from sharing informationwith otheragencies?

Was there any intelligence gatheringby local law enforcement groupsand

how was it shared w ith federal agencies suchas the FBI?

13. hi formulating counterterrorism policy wassufficient attention given to theorganization of the intelligenc e comm unity andi fsabi l i ty to combat terrorism.

Before 9-11, how was information shared between agencies? Was the intelligence communitytoo "reactive" in connection with

counter-terrorism?


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Did it "fail to keep up" with the fluid structure of Al-Qaeda? How did the intelligence community changeit operations after they

learned that Al-Qaedahad "declared war" on the United States and vowedto attack it?

Were too many agencies taking "paralleltracts" in monitoring Al-Qaeda

while failing to acknowledge gapsin intelligence coverage? To what extent did the culture of secrecy in the intelligence com mu nityrestrict it from sharing inform ation?

Before 9-11, how was threat information shared withinthe agencies of theintelligence commu nity and between the intelligence com mu nity as awhole and the FB I and local law enforcement?

14. Did the United States properly emphasizecounterterrorism in its foreignrelations? What werethe tradeoffs required to do so?

15. Has the United States madethe appropriate changessince September 11?

Suggested Readings

Readings onU.S. Policy

1. Jonathan Fredman, "Covert Action, Loss ofLife, and the Prohibition onAssassination," Studies in Intelligence (1997), pp. 15-25.

2. Adam Roberts, "Counter-terrorism, Armed Force,and the Laws of War," Survival,Vol. 44, no. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 7-32.

3. Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Po licy (Brookings, 2001),pp. 73-129.

4. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House,2002), pp. 219-392.

General Readings on Terrorism

1. Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic ofTerrorism," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, edsRussell D. How ard and Reid L. Sawyer (McGraw Hill, 2002), pp. 55-66.

2. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 1998),pp . 13-44.

Readings onal-Qa'ida and Jihadist Groups

1. Anonymous,Through Our Enemies' Eyes, entire.

2. Bruce Hoffman, "Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since9/11," Studies inConflict an d Terrorism,no. 25 (2002), pp. 303-316.


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~ " 7 3. Steven Emerson,American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Am ongUs (Free Press,' 2002), pp. 27-42.

--i 4. Daniel Pipes, "God and Mam mon: Does Poverty Cause MilitaryIslam?" The National Interest (Winter 2001/02), pp. 14-21.

Proposed Briefings for the Commission

Richard Clarke - Former NSC Director for CounterterrorismAmbassador Michael Sheehan- Former Assistant Secretaryfor CounterterrorismBruce Hoffman - For background on terrorism and 9-11 contextDaniel Byman- Present consultantto Team 3 and former Joint Inquiry Staff

Mr C larke, Ambassador Sheehan, and Mr. Byman wou ld probably prefer to briefin a classified or, at least, private venuein order to provide the maximum detail. Mr.Hoffman could brief in public.

A First Cut at People to Interview

As a first cut the team would divide people to be interviewed intothreecategories: those wi th responsibilities for U.S.foreign policy who can placeCounterterrorism in context; those with Counterterrorism responsib ilities;and those withpotential competing responsibilities (e.g. nuclear proliferation).The first list in particularincludes the most prominent names inU.S. government. That may seem like a stretch,but priorities and focus do begin at the top and often end there. Once you go one ortwo levels down the food chain, the individuals have"accounts" and thus do not have asense of where their responsib ilities fit into the overall pic ture. So if we are to becomprehensive, we need to talk tothese people. In a fewcases (e.g. at OM B), it may bemore appropriate to talk to a deputy or someone whofocused more on Counterterrorism.

People Responsible for O verall Policy -

President George W. Bush

President W illiamJ. Clinton

Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor

Samuel Berger, former National Security Advisor

Colin Powell, Secretaryof State

Madeline A lbright, former Secretaryof State

Anthony Lake, former National Security Advisor


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Attorney General John Ashcroft

Former Attorney G eneral Janet Reno

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld

Secretaryof Defense W illiam C ohen

Former Office of Managementand Budget Director Jacob("Jack") Lew

Office of Managementand Budget Director Mitch Daniels

Former FBI Director Lo uis Freeh. tXLl ^

Counterterrorism Specialists -

Richard Clarke

Ambassador Michael Sheehan(former S/CT)

Sheehan'spredecessor at S/CT

General (ret.) Wayne Downing,former Coordinator for Counterterrorism

General Gordon, Coordinatorfor Counterterrorism

Asst. Secretary,SOLIC,OSD, the Clinton Administration

SOLIC and GENICOM officials with CT responsibilities

OtherNSC staff work ing with Clarke (Roger Cressey,Dan Benjamin,Steve Simon, and so on)

NSC staff working on intelligence.

Intelligence Com munityofficials (Tenet, Deutch,and CTC leaders)whocan explain their understandingof priorities

UjLhose with com peting respon sibilities - Ambassador KarlInderfurth (former Asst. Secretary, South Asia)

Ambassador MarkParris (former Asst. Secretary, Near East)

Ambassador William Burns (Asst. Secretary, Near East)


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Bruce Reidel, former Senior NSC Director for the M iddle East

Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Germany, Britain, Israel, Qatar,Egypt, and Jordan before September11

Generalized D ocument Review List

It is a little difficult to accurately predict what documentsthe team will wanttoreview, although there are some obvious ones. Much, if not all, of what we w ill beasking for will be classified. Since we w ill be requesting p olicy docum ents thefocus willbe the Executive/NSC/OM B and probably State. There could be som e requests o f theJustice Department as well. This list will grow and becom e m ore specific as theinvestigation proceeds.

The docum ents we will be requesting include;

Presidential Decision Directives relatedto counterterrorism policy

NSC Mem oranda related to counterterrorism policy

Records of discussion of counterterrorism policy

Deliberative informationand factors consideredbefore issuing policy

Tasking directed to the Intelligence Com m unity relatedto

counterterrorism

Tasking directed to the m ilitary related to counterterrorism

Budget do cum ents reflecting resources appliedto counterterrorism

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