t2 b5 other teams workplans fdr- workplan team 3- draft 4-25-03 (interview candidates- not redacted-...

8/14/2019 T2 B5 Other Teams Workplans Fdr- Workplan Team 3- Draft 4-25-03 (Interview Candidates- Not Redacted- No Wit

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Draft ~ Unclassified

Proposed Work Plan for the Counterterrorism Policy Team

Alexis AlbionScott AllanWarren BassDaniel BymanBonnie JenkinsCharles Hill

Draft: April 25, 2003

Draft -- Unclassified


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Draft Unclassified

Contents

Project OverviewK ey QuestionsProposed Division of LaborInitial Document Review ListAppendix One: Summary of Joint Inquiry Staff Work on PolicyAppendix Two: Suggested Readings

Appendix Three: Notional Interview ListAppendix Four: Proposed Briefings for the Commissioners

Draft Unclassified


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Project Overview: Counter-terrorism Policy

The policy team seeks to understand and assess the development of U.S. counterterrorismpolicy before the September 11 attacks, the changes in the immediate a ftermath, and thenature of the policy today. These tasks will require reviewing overall priorities,identifying and evaluating the different instruments used to fight terrorism (prosecutions,military strikes, extraditions/renditions, and so on), and determining how well seniorpolicy makers understood the threat from al-Qa'ida. Anoth er integral part of the policyteam's effort is examining U .S. relationships with key foreign partners and adversarieswith regard to counterterrorism. When appropriate, the team will distinguish betweenU.S. counterterrorism policy in general and U.S. efforts to fight al-Qa'ida in particular.The nature of terrorism during the Cold War shaped U.S. counterterrorism policy whenal-Qa'ida began to emerge. These earlier terrorists, in the words of RAND's BrianJenkins, wanted "a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot ofpeople dead." Their goals were usually tied to Marxist or ethno-nationalist agendas. Themost lethal terrorists during this era were those backed by states, not those operatingindependently. In general, terrorism during this period was viewed as an important butnot overriding policy concern.As al-Qa'ida and affiliated Islamist groups emerged and grew in the 1990s, the focusslowly shifted. The 1993 attack on the W orld Trade Center marked a turning point. Forthe first time, Islamist radicals sought mass casualties on U.S. soil. In contrast to theterrorists of the 1970s and 1980s, who had balked at destroying entire buildings, the newradicals w anted a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead.Several gov ernme nt counterterrorism officials recognized the danger al-Qa'ida posed, butU.S. policy changed une venly at best. The 1998 bombing s of the U.S. Embassies inKenya and Tanzania elevated the importance of terrorism in general and al-Qa'ida inparticular, but policy still lagged behind the immensity of the threat. It took theSeptember 11 attacks to dramatically change U.S. counterterrorism policy. Even today,counterterrorism policy is evolving, with important policy decisions b eing made almostdaily.The policy team expects to follow a normal investigative regimen of do cume nt requestsand review, briefings by key individuals b oth inside and outside government, andextensive interviews with those in a position to discuss the fo rmu lation andimplementation of U.S. government policy in the counterterrorism arena. In addition, theteam will draw on the work of the Congressional September 11 Joint Inquiry asappropriate.


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Key Questions

At the Commission hearings held on March 31 in New York, witnesses described theirviews of the September 11 attackers, the intelligence capabilities of the government, andthe quality of the USG's counterterrorism policy before September 11. They alsosuggested improvements in these areas in order to prevent another tragedy. Based upontheir statements and our research so far, we have compiled a list of key questions andissues that we think need to be addressed by the Commission.The list is divided into three parts, corresponding to the overall statutory structure of theCommission's inquiry. Most of the questions focus on Part I (the pre-September 11 era),as this is essential for understanding Parts n and HI, which cover the period after theattacks.Part One: Counterterrorism Policy before September 11,2001Background1. What shaped counterterrorism policy before the 1993 World Trade Center attack?

What was the "old paradigm" regarding the threat posed by terrorist groups? What instruments (law enforcement, diplomacy, military strikes, financial

controls, and so on) were used for fighting terrorism? How important was terrorism considered, in general?

Strategy and Priorities2. Did the USG possess a unified counterterrorism policy prior to September 11, or didpolicy vary between agencies?

Did our strategy employ all instruments of U.S. national power? What were the gaps in the strategy? Were they obvious at the time? Was there leadership and coordination? Did any political concerns affect counterterrorism policy?

3. Was counterterrorism factored into the design of key foreign policy measures,including policy toward Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the Middle East peace process, Pakistan, andEgypt?4. Where was counterterrorism on the overall USG priority list?

What were the other priorities? Did money follow the priority list? Did high-level time and attention followthe list? If not, why not? Was there a system for managing priorities?


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Was there an integration of domestic policy and foreign policy oncounterterronsm? With the knowledge available at the time, should counterterronsm have been ahigher priority? Was theparticular threat of al-Qa'ida recognized?

5. Were any "balls dropped" during the transition from the Clinton administration to theBush administration? Were transition mechanisms effective?Understanding the Threat6. Did policy makers feel well-informed by the intelligence community on the nature ofthe threat, both at home and abroad? At what stage was al-Qa'ida considered a threat?At what point was al-Qa'ida considered a grave threat?7. Did the White House and Congress exercise effective oversight of the intelligencecommunity and other bureaucracies fighting terrorism?

Was U.S. policy realistic given the limitations of the key agencies? In formulating counterterrorism policy, was sufficient attention given to theorganization of the intelligence community and its ability to combatterrorism? In formulating counterterrorism policy, did the USG focus sufficient attentionon the FBI's organizational ability to counter foreign terrorists in the UnitedStates?

Terrorism and Foreign Relations8. To what extent did the United States emphasize and integrate counterterrorism into itsforeign relations? What were the tradeoffs?9. Did the USG fail to confront terrorist sanctuaries in the Sudan an d Afghanistan?10. Did the United States properly address the issue of state sponsors of terrorism? Wastoo much attention given to state-sponsored terrorist groups?11. How supportive were ke y countries in fighting al-Qa'ida?

How supportive were Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries where popularsupport fo r Islamists was high and where the governments reportedly ha d links toal-Qa'ida? How supportive were key European countries, such as Germany? Who were our vital friends in the effort against al-Qa'ida?

Counterterrorism Instruments12 . What were the primary instruments used in fighting terrorism?

What were their limitations?


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Were these instruments effective? Were they used well?Were certain options off the table? Should they have been?

Part Two: The Immediate Aftermath of September 11 (through September 20)

13. What changes were made in the aftermath of September 11, and why?14. Could these changes have been made before September 11? Why or why not?15. What was the doctrine laid out by the President's September 20 speech and other keypronouncements made during this pivotal period? How did these emerge?

Part Three: Counterterrorism Policy Today16. Could the United States be better positioned to fight al-Qa'ida and other terroriststoday?17. Are the problems that hindered effective efforts against al-Qa'ida and terrorismbefore September 11 fixed?18. What policy steps should be taken today? What bureaucratic and coordinationchanges are necessary?19. Is counterterrorism properly integrated into U.S. foreign policy today? Does ourcurrent handling of such issues as "winning hearts and minds" abroad, using preemptiveor retaliatory force, handling failed states, and formulating Middle East policy makesense from the perspective of the war against al-Qa'ida?


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Proposed Division of Labor (this will change as our team decides who has thebest skills for which issue)

PersonAlexis Albion

Scott Allan

Warren Bass

Daniel BymanBonnie Jenkins

Charles Hill*Dana Leseman or otherperson who could do DOJissuesKevin Scheid or otherperson with budgetexperience

AgencyCIA, DoD

State, DoJ, CIA

White House/NSC, State

White House/NSCDoD, State

StateDOJ

OMB

IssuesBackground (lead),oversight, transition,understanding the threat(lead)Post-9/1 1 changes,counterterrorisminstruments (lead), foreigngovernments andsanctuariesStrategies/priorities (lead),foreign governments,transitions (lead),understanding the threat,post-9/1 1changesForeign governments (lead),strategies/prioritiesPost-9/1 1changes (lead),oversight (lead),counterterrorisminstruments (but not lawenforcement)Background, foreigngovernmentsCounterterrorisminstruments (particularlylaw enforcement)Counterterrorism budgets

* Senior advisor. It may be best to use him to review the research plan and work as itprogresses rather than assign a particular task. Byman may be used in a similarmanner.

All team members will work Part IJJ - or at least we will split it up later.


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Proposed Briefings for the Commission

Webelieve the Commissioners wouldbenefit from briefings about general U.S.counterterrorism policy, U.S. policy toward al-Qa'ida before September 11, and thestatus of U.S. policy today.

Richard Clarke, the former National Coordinatorfor Counterterrorism, would bethe ideal briefer, given his pivotal role in counterterrorismin both administrations.

General John Gordon, who now holds Clarke's oldjob, should brief on thecurrent counterterrorism policy.

Ambassador Michael Sheehan, the former Special Coordinator forCounterterrorism, would also be well-suitedfor helping Commissionersunderstand counterterrorism policy in context before September 11.

Dr. BruceHoffman of the RAND Corporation, perhaps the leading non-government authority on terrorism, could provide an excellent analysis of how thethreat of terrorism has changed over the years.

Dr. Paul Pillar, currently the National Intelligence Office for the Near East andSouth Asia, is perhaps the government's leading analyst of terrorism and couldprovide an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of different counterterrorisminstruments.

If necessary, staff member Daniel Byman could brief on the nature of al-Qa'ida andseveral aspects of the Joint Inquiry investigation (e.g. covert action, foreign liaison, theuse of military force, and the overall counterterrorism strategy as it related tointelligence). However, in his view, these briefers would be preferred given their statureand experience.Mr. Clarke, Ambassador Sheehan, Dr. Pillar, and Dan Byman would probably prefer tobrief in a classifiedor, at least, private venue in order to provide the maximum detail.Dr. Hoffman could brief in public.


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Generalized Document Review List

It will be difficult to accurately predict what documents the team will want to review,although there are some obvious ones. Much, if not all, of the material we will be askingfor will be classified. Since we will be requesting policy documents, the focus will be theExecutive/NSC/OMB and probably the Departments of State and Justice as well. Thislist will grow and become more specific as the investigation proceeds.

The documents we will be requesting include: Presidential Decision Directives related to counterterrorism policy; NSCMemoranda related to counterterrorism policy; State Department records, from both Foggy Bottom and the field, related to

counterterrorism policy; Records of discussion of counterterrorism policy; Deliberative information and factors considered before issuing policy; Tasking directed to the intelligence community related to counterterrorism; Tasking directed to the military related to counterterrorism; and Budget documents reflecting resources applied to counterterrorism.

Many of the most interesting documents for the purposes of our effort will bepredecisional. Such documents will provide insights into which options were chosen,which were rejected, and which were off the table. Because of the sensitivity of thesedocuments, it may prove difficult to acquire them, which may necessitate high-levelinterventions.


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Appendix One: Congressional Joint Inquiry Activity in the Policy Area

The Inquirydid some work on policy issues, but most of that focused on the intelligence-policy nexus rather than on the soundness of the overall policy. The Inquiry discussedintelligence priorities, the dissemination of information, and the quality of analysis withpolicy makers in some depth, but it did not venture far beyond this. The focus of its workwas on the late Clinton-early Bush administrations, with the Inquiry having more successlearning about the Clinton period.Policies toward foreign partners received at best incomplete attention. For example, theInquiry looked at how the policy makers' desire for a strong bilateral relationship withCountry X affected intelligence gathering on Country X or on neighboring countries.However, this was only done with a few countries, and even there it was not donesystematically. Moreover, the Inquiry deliberately did not try to judge whether otherequities in a bilateral relationship were more or less important than counterterrorism.The Inquiry did more extensive work on the use of military force and on covert action.On the former, however, it was hampered by a lack of interviews and access to many keyindividuals and documents outside the strict purview of intelligence.The Inquiry did not try to judge overall counterterrorism policy in any comprehensiveway. Parts of the Inquiry's work looked at issues such as warning the public, workingwith state and local officials, and emphasizing law enforcement over disruption ofterrorist groups. Many of these issues, however, involved the work of non-IntelligenceCommunity agencies (e.g. the Department of Justice, the INS), which received lessattention than they deserved. In addition, the Inquiry did not do basic policy analysissuch as trying to evaluate the available instruments, the limits on those instruments, andpolitical support in Congress.


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Suggested Readings for the Commissioners on Terrorism and U.S. PolicyReadings on U.S. Policy1. Jonathan Fredman, "Covert Action, Loss of Life, and the Prohibition onAssassination," Studies in Intelligence (1997), pp. 15-25.2. Adam Roberts, "Counter-terrorism, Armed Force, and the Laws of War," Survival,Vol. 44, no. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 7-32.3. Paul Pillar, Terrorism an d U.S. Foreign Policy (Brookings, 2001), pp. 73-129.4. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House,

2002), pp. 219-392.General Readings on Terrorism1. Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism,eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (McGraw Hill, 2002), pp. 55-66.2. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 13-44.Readings on al-Oa'ida an d Jihadist Groups1. Anonymous, Through Our Enemies' Eyes (Brassey's, 2002), entire.2. Bruce Hoffman, "Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11," Studies inConflict and Terrorism, no. 25 (2002), pp. 303-316.3. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network o f Terror (Columbia UniversityPress, 2002), pp. 101-114.4. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?"NewRepublic, June 24,2002.5. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House,

2002), pp. 3-37.


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Notional List of People to Interview

As a first cut, the team would divide people to be interviewed into several categories:those with responsibilities for U.S. foreign policy who can place counterterrorism incontext; those with counterterrorism responsibilities; those with valuable relatedresponsibilities; foreign officials; and outside experts. The first list in particular includesthe most prominent names in U.S. government. That may seem ambitious, but prioritiesan d focus do begin at the top an d often en d there. Once you go one or two levels downthe food chain, the individuals have "accounts" and thus do not have a sense of wheretheir responsibilities fit into the overall picture. So if we are to be comprehensive, weneed to talk to these people. In several cases (e.g., at OMB), it may be more appropriateto talk to a deputy or someone who focused more on counterterrorism.Given the prominence of several of the people on this list, we favor interviewing theworking-level individuals, particularly those involved in counterterrorism, and outsideexperts first whenever possible. Only when we know as much of the story as possiblewill we interview the most senior individuals.

People Responsible for Overall Policy President George W. Bush President William J. Clinton Vice President Richard Cheney Vice President Al Gore Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor Samuel Berger, former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor Colin Powell, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State Attorney General John Ashcroft Former Attorney General Janet Reno Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense William Cohen Former Office of Management andBudget Director Jacob Lew Office of Management and Budget Director Mitch Daniels Former FBIDirector Louis Freeh Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet Former Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch Former U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson Any other participants in the "Small Group" Deputies of various departments as appropriate

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