t3 b17 jenkins dod briefing 1 of 3 fdr- entire contents- withdrawal notice and attachments to...

8/14/2019 T3 B17 Jenkins DOD Briefing 1 of 3 Fdr- Entire Contents- Withdrawal Notice and Attachments to 3-23-04 Rumsfeld

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICERG: 148 Exposition, Ann iversary, and Memorial CommissionsSERIES: Team 3,9/11 CommissionN D PROJECT NU MB ER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUM BER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/15/2008

BOX: 00006 FOLDER: 0001COPIES: 1 PAGES: 76

TAB: 16 DOC ID: 31209359

RESTRICTEDThe item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Jenkin's DoD Briefing Notes & Materials [ Iof3DOCUMENT DATE: 08/05/2003 DOCUM ENT TYPE: Note/NotesFROM:TO:SUBJECT: Multiple Classified Documents

This document has been withdraw n for the following reason(s):9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE


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ATTACHMENTS TO THE TESTIMONY OFSECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD H. RUMSFELD

TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKSUPON THE UNITED STATES

23 MARCH 2004

1. Media Availability with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld en route toMunich, Germany - February 2,20012. Confirmation Testimony and Pre-Confirmation Statements by Donald Rumsfeldon: 1. Terrorism and Asymmetrical Warfare and 2. Intelligence Failures3. Statement of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to the NATO North AtlanticCouncil (NAC-D), June 7, 2001

4. Memo by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld - Guidelines to be WeighedWhen Considering Committing U.S. Forces ~ March 20015. Memo by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: "Thoughts on Terrorism" -September 19, 20016. U.S. Department of State List of "Selected Terrorist Incidents Involving U.S.Citizens Resulting in Casualties" Since 19687. Remarks of Donald Rumsfeld to the Association of the United States Army,

October 17, 19848. Memo by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on "Major Directional

Decisions" - prepared on or after 9/11/01.9. September 2001 Letter by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to the Senate

Armed Services Committee Regarding Potential Veto Recommendation10. Evolution of Certain W ar Plans, Programs, and Deployments from 1998-200111 . Summary of Department of Defense Accomplishments and Initiatives 1 /01-3/0412. Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States-

Intelligence Side Letter, March 18, 1999,


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United States Department of Defense.NewsTranscriptOn the web: http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bui/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/200l/t02032001 t0202sd.htmlMedia contact: +1 (703) 697-5131Public contact: http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html or +1 (703) 428-0711

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Friday, February 2,2001

Media availability with Secretary Rumsfeld en route to Munich, Germany(Media availability en route to Munich, Germany)Q: Are you going to give the allies you know they are quite concerned about NMD [national missiledefense] we realize, of course, that the defense ministers understand a lot more than the ordinary person.Are you going to give people some assurances that you are not going to move, hastily or precipitously onNMD without close consultation or cooperation from the allies?Rumsfeld: Well, yes indeed. I mean that's been what I've said previously when the subject's come up. It iswhat the president said and it is what Secretary Powell has said. There is no question but that we are interestedin and intend to consult very closely with our allies. That is what allies do.Q: What kind of questions do you anticipate from them? Are you prepared to give them any specifics abouthow you will proceed on the NMD decision-making?Rumsfeld: We are working that through now back home but we are not yet at that stage. I had my firstmeeting earlier this week. It seems it is all a blur. I am trying to think when that was on the subject. Andtheyare working through some things for me now. We are going to be meeting again. We are not in a position totalk specifics.Q: You are going to make a speech, I assume, or talk.Rumsfeld: A little talk -- ten minutes maybe.Q: Do you tend to outline to people what might happen if this is not done, if NMD is not done?Rumsfeld: I amkind of old-fashioned, as everyone has been writing (laughter). I like to talk to peopleindividually about things like this. When you consult and listen to them and hear what they have to say; I don'tplan to make any pronouncements or anything like that Q: You have said pretty clearly that the danger is there and threat is there and isn't going to go away.Rumsfeld: And it does not affect just us; it affects them every bit as much as it does us.Q: Howwill you try to overcome their reservations about this and that seems to be across the board inEuropethat NMD can start another arms race, it could increase tensions with the Russians, and you, yourself, have

the concern that some Europeans are concerned about de-coupling of the United States fromEurope.


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remarkably peaceful close. U.S. and allied military power was the indispensable instrumentthat contained the Soviet Union, confronted Soviet power and its surrogates at thegeographic extremities of its advance, and provided the shield within which democraticorder and economic prosperity could evolve and develop.

When the great struggle that was World War II has passed, this country found itselffacing new challenges with the advent of the Cold War and the development of nuclearweapons. Today, the Cold War era is history and we find ourselves facing a new era, oftencalled the post-Cold War period, orpossibly more properly the era of globalization.

It's an extraordinarily hopeful time, one that's full of promise, but also full of challenges.One of those challenges, one that, if confirmed, I look forward to working with President-elect Bush and this committee and the Congress to meet, is the challenge of bringing theAmerican military successfully into the 21st century, so that it can continue to play its trulyvital role in preserving and extending peace as far into the future as is possible.

As President-elect Bush has said, "After the hard but clear struggle against an evilempire, the challenge that we face today is not as obvious, but just asnoble, to turn theseyears of influence into decades of peace." And the foundation of that peace is a strong,capable, modern military, let there be no doubt.The end of the Cold War did not bring about an end to armed conflict or the end ofchallenges or threats to U.S. interests; we know that. Indeed, the centrifugal forces in worldpolitics have created a more diverse and less predictable set of potential adversaries, whose

aspirations for regional influence and whose willingness to use military force will producechallenges to importantU,S. interests andJo.those of our friends and allies, as ChairmanLevin mentioned.President-elect Bush has outlined fcree overarching goals for bringing U.S. armed forcesinto the 21st century. First, we must sfreng^theij.4ne bond of trust with the Americanmilitary. The brave and dedicated men and women, who serve in our country's uniform,active Guard and Reserve, must get the best support their country can possibly providethem, so that we can continue to call on the best people in the decades to come.

RUMSFELD:Second, we must develop the capabilities to defend against missiles, terrorism, the newerthreats against space assets and information systems, as members of the committee havementioned. The American people, our forces abroad, and our friends and allies must be

protected against the threats which modern technology and its proliferation confront us.And third, we must take advantage of the newpossibilities that the ongoing technological

revolution offers to create the military of the next century. Meeting these challenges willrequire a cooperative effort between Congress and the Executive Branch an d with industryand our allies as well.If confirmed, I look forward to developing a close working relationship with thiscommittee and with the counterpart committees and the House of Representatives to

achieve these goals and to fashion steps to help to transformour defense posture to address


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September 28, 2001

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM : Pre-Confirmation Statements by Mr. Rumsfeld on:1) Terrorism and Asymmetrical Warfare2) Intelligence Failures

1) Terrorism and Asymmetrical WarfareJanuary 11,2001 SASC Testimony"President-elect B ush has ou tlined three over-arching goals for bringing U .S. armedforces into the 21st century. First, we mu st strengthen the bond of trust with theAmerican military. The brave and dedicated men and women who serve in our country'suniform-active, Gu ard andReserve must get the best support their country canpossibly provide them so that we can continue to call on the best people in the decades tocome. Second, we must develop the capabilities to defend against missiles, terrorism,the newer threats, against space assets and information systems, as members of thecommittee have mentioned. The American people, our forces abroad and our friends andallies must beprotected against the threats w hich modem technology and its proliferationconfront us. And third, we must take advantage of the new possibilities that the ongoingtechnological revolution offers to create the military of the next century." (Openingstatement)"I'm committed to strengthening our intelligence, to serve both our short-term and ourlong-term national security needs. I will personally make establishing a strong spirit ofcooperation between the DoD and the rest of the intelligence community, ... one ofmytop priorities. We simply must strengthen our intelligence capabilities and our spacecapabilities, along w ith the ability to protect those assets against various form s ofattack. (Opening statement)"I wou ld rank bioterrorism quite high in terms of threats. I think that it has theadvantage that it does no t take a genius to create agents that are enormously powerful,and they can be done in mo bile facilities, hi small facilities. And I think it is somethingthat merits very serious attention no t just by the Department of Defense, but by thecountry. And I have an interest in it, and certainly would intend to be attentive to it."(exchange with Senator Kennedy)"And what we have to do is better understand what will deter and what w ill defendagainst this new range of threats? And I don't look at them in isolation. I don't think oflong-range ballistic missiles and short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles andterrorism as something that's disconnected. I think of it as a continuum. With the Gulf


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United States Department of DefenseSpeechOn the web: http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint,cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/200 l/s20010607-secdef.htmlMedia contact: +1 (703) 697-5131Public contact: http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html or+1 (703) 428-0711

NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC-D)Prepared Remarks by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Brussels,Belgium, June 7, 2001.

[NATO] Secretary-General Robertson, fellow ministers of defense.It is certainly a surprise to me to be returning to this distinguished Council after a brief absence of a quarter ofa century.My last time at a North Atlantic Council meeting as Secretary of Defense was December 5, 1976.Back then, we were 15 nations, and a topic of discussion was the admission of Spain into the Alliance. Today,we are 19.Then, the principal challenge NATO faced was the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and the WarsawPact. Since then, the Alliance succeeded in its mission of preserving peace and freedom during the Cold War,has welcomed three former members of the Warsaw Pact into the Alliance, and has extended a hand offriendship to 27 other nations through the Partnership for Peace (PFP). These are important accomplishmentsof which we all can be proud - and onwhich wemust build.But, as we gather here for this first meeting of NATO defense ministers in the 21st Century, we must becareful not to rest on the accomplishments of the 20th Century. We must prepare together for the new andquite different challenges we will face in the new century.This is a matter of some urgency. The Cold War threats have receded, thanks, in no small part, to the work ofthis Alliance. The new and different threats of the 21st Century have not yet fully emerged, but they are there.We need to take advantage of this period to ensure that NATO is prepared for the newer security challengeswe will certainly face in the 21st century.What might those new challenges be? We know this much for certain: it is unlikely that any of us here evenknows what is likely. One statesman summed up the prevailing mood at the turn of the last century: "War," hewrote, "is too foolish, too fantastic, to be thought of in the 20th century. Civilization has climbed above suchperils. The interdependence of nations in trade and traffic, the sense of law, the Hague convention, liberalprinciples... high finance... common sense have rendered such nightmares impossible." Then he asked: "Areyo u quite sure? It would be a pity to be wrong."They were wrong -and it was more than a pity. Howoften have we been wrong about the threats andchallenges to our peace and freedom? Consider the track record during my lifetime: I was born in 1932, theGreat Depression was underway, and the defense planning assumption was "No war for ten years."By 1939, World War II had begun, and in 1941 the fleet we constructed to deter war became the first target ofa naval war of aggression in the Pacific. Airplanes did not even exist at the start of the century; by World WarII, bombers, fighters, transports had all became common military instruments that critically affected theoutcome of the war.


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March 2001

Guidelines to Be Weighed When Considering Committing U.S. ForcesIs the proposed action truly necessary? A Good Reason: IfU.S. lives are going to be put at risk,whatever is to be done mustbe

in the U.S. national interest. If people could be killed, the U.S. must have a darn goodreason. Diplomacy: All instruments of national power should be engaged before resorting toforce, and they should stay involved once force is employed. Legal Basis: In fashioning a clear statement of the legal underpinning for the action andthe political basis for the decision, avoid arguments of convenience. They may be usefulat the outset togain support, but they will be deadly later.Is the proposed action achievable? Achievable: When the U.S. commits force, the task should be achievableat acceptablerisk. It mustbe something the U.S. is capable of accomplishing. We need tounderstandour limitations. The record is clear; mere are some things the U.S. simply cannotaccomplish. Clear Goals: To the extent possible, there should be clear, well considered and well

understood goals as to the purpose of the engagement andwhat would constitute success,so we can know when we have achieved our goals and can honestly exit or turn the taskover to others. Command Structure: The command structure should be clear, not complex and one theU.S. can acceptnot a collective command structure where key decisions are made by a

committee. If the U.S. needs orprefers a coalition to achieve its goals, whichit mostoften will, we should have a clear understanding with coalition partners that they will dowhatevermightbeneeded to achieve the agreed goals. Wemust avoid trying sohard topersuade others to join a coalition that we compromise on our goals or jeopardize thecommand structure. The mission should determine the coalition; the coalition should notdetermine the mission.

Is it worth it? LivesatRisk: If an engagement is worth doing, the U.S. and coalition partners should be

willing to put lives at risk. Resources: The military capabilities needed to achieve the agreed goals must beavailable and not committed or subject to call elsewhere halfway through the

engagement The U.S. cannotdo everything everywhereat once.


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September 19,2001 3:13 P

FROM: Donald RumsfeldSUBJECT: Thoughts on Terrorism

0\g

speeches, press briefings andtalking points, internally and externally. It is alwayshelpful if we are all workingoff the same sheet of music.1. Terrorist Attack. The September 11 fc terrorist attack on the U.S.was

carefully planned. Theremaywell be more attack plans in place, and wemust recognize that. It is likely that the terrorists planned not only theSeptember 11* attack and future attacks, but that they planned how theywould hide andwhat evidence they wished to leave behind for us to find toconfuse our search. Therefore, it will take a sustained effort to root themout.

2. Expectations. Theworld needs tohave realistic expectations. Thiscampaign is amarathon, not a sprint. No terrorist or terrorist network, suchas the Al-Qaida network, is going to be conclusively dealt with by cruisemissiles or bombers. Werecognize that it will take time and pressure onthe countries that harbor these people for the foes of terrorism to besuccessful. Therefore, the fact that the first, second, or third wave of ourefforts does not produce specific people should not come as a surprise. Weare patient anddetermined.

3. Worldwide Support. The legitimacy of our actions does not depend onhow many countries supportus. More nearly the opposite is true: thelegitimacy of other countries' opinions should bejudged by their attitudetoward this systematic, uncivilized assault on a free way of life. ":

4. Coalitions. The coalitions that are being fashioned will not be fixed;rather, they will change and evolve. While most countries are concernedabout terrorism, andproperly so, each country has a somewhat different Qperspective and different relationships, views and concerns. It should not be surprising that some countries will be supportive of some activities inwhich the U.S. is engaged, while other countries will not. Which groupany country falls into will depend on the nature and location of the activity.

U1 5 5 9A /O l

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W e recognize that some countries will have to conceal or downplay theircooperation with us . That needs to be understood and accepted.5. Fear. W e understand that people have fearsfear for them selves, th eirfamilies and their governments. Therefore, some will be reluctant to joinan effort aga inst terrorism or at least some aspects of our efforts. Terroriststerrorize people. W e accept t ha t fact. However, w e need people's help andany information they ca n provide tha t will assist us. A number of countriesare helping quietly and we appreciate th at. Indeed, we ask people acrossth e globe to provide us any information they have that ca n help in rootingout terrorists and the ir netw orks.6. Agains t Terrorism.Not the People. We are after terrorists and theregimes tha t support them . Th is is not a war against the people of anycountry. Th e regimes t ha t support terrorism terrorize their ow n people asw ell. W e need to enlist all civilized people to oppose terrorism, and weneed to m ak e it safe for them to do so.7. Not Agains t Islam. This is not a war against Islam or any other religion.

The Al-Qaida terrorists areextremists whose views areantithetical to thoseof most Muslims. Their actions threaten the interests of the world'sMuslims and are aimed in part at preventing Muslim people from engagingth e rest of the world. There aremillions of Muslims around the world whow e expect to become allies in this struggle.

8. Second ary Effects. Finally, there w ill be secondary effects. We recognizethat as we continue to go after terrorism, our activities will ha ve effects in anumber of countries. W e h av e to accept that, given the importance of thecause. As a result, relationships and allia nces w ill likely be rearranged overthe coming years.

DHR:dh091901-13

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iONLYU.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SELECTED TERRORIST INCIDENTS INVOLVINGUSCFTIZENS RESULTINPrincipal Source:Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. DepartmentofSta

Date16-Jan-6828-Aug-6812-Oct-6811-Jan-702l-Feb-702-Apr-70

10-Jun-70

31-Jul-708 May 72

11 May 7224 May 72

' 30 May 72

1 Mar 7321 May 732Jun735Sep7218Oct735Aug7322Nov7317 Dec 7322 Mar 74

IncidentAssassination-Cdr.USMAAG. Guatemala CityAssassination-USAmbassador, GuatemalaAssassination-US Armv officer. SaoPaulo. BrazilAssassination-USArmv solder. Asmara. EthiopiaAircraft bombing-Swissair Flight 330,ZurichKidnapping/Murder-American serviceman,Clark AirForceBaseAssassination-USArmyAssistantAttache1,Amman,JordanKidnapping/Murder-USAID advisor, Montevideo,UruguayHllack aircraft-from Viennato TelAviv.Pipe bomb~V Corps HQ. Frankfurt. GECar Bomb-US Army European Command HQ,Heidelberg.GEMachinegun/Grenadeattack-LedAirport,Led,IsraelKidnap/Execution- US Ambassador andDCM,Khartoum, SudanAssassination-Ford Motor Company executives,Buenos Aires. ArgentinaAssassination-USMilitary Advisor. Tehran. IranKidnapping/Murder-Munich Olympics, MunichKidnao/Murder-Robbervof Bank of America BeirutKidnap/Murder,Athens AirportMurder. GeneralManager of TRANSAX,Cordoba,ArgentinaGrenade Attack-ARAMCO Employees,FumcinoAirport, Rome, ItalyKidnap/Murder. USVice Counsel, Hermosillo, Mexco

Name(Sf

USAmbassador Cleo Noel,DCMGeorge Moore, &Belgian Charge

LTC LewsHawkins

JohnSwnt

John S. Patterson

USDeaths

21

11621111316

211

131141

ForeignDeaths

14

12

1

11

22

TotalDeaths

21

11

2021111328

31111153141

FOR OFFICIALUSE ONLY


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REMARKS OF

DONALD RUMSFELDPRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERG.D. SEARLE & CO.

On the Awarding of

THE GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL MEDAL

Presented By

JOHN W. DIXONCHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF TRUSTEESTHE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

OCTOBER 17, 1984WASHINGTON, D.C.


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*fay-H),2002 11:42 AM

SUBJECT: Major Directional Decisions9/11/01 etseq.1. Despite the September 11th terrorist attacks or attacks that may occur in the future, the U.S. will not pull

back or withdraw - the U.S. will stay engaged in the world.2. When attacked, the U.S. will be "leaning forward, not back." When the U.S. is seen as faint-hearted or

risk-averse, the deterrent is weakened.3. Terrorism: it is not possible to defend against terrorism in every place, at every time, against every

conceivable technique. Self-defense against terrorism requires preemption - taking thebattle to theterrorists wherever they are and to those who harbor terrorists.

4. The war against terrorism will be "broad-based, applying pressure and using all elements ofnationalpowereconomic, diplomatic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement and military, both overt andcovert."

5. The campaign against terrorism will be "long, hard and difficult." Terrorists do not have armies, naviesor air forces to attack, so we must go after them where they are and root them out.

6. The U.S. will not rule out anythingincluding the use of ground forces. This will not be an antiseptic,"cruise missile war." TheU.S. is ready and willing to put boots on the ground when andwhereappropriate.

7. Coalitions: "The mission must determine thecoalition; coalitions must not determine missions";missions must not be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator by coalition pressure.

8. The U.S. wants help from all countries, in every way they consider appropriate;we recognize that toget maximum support, it is best for each country, rather than theU.S., to characterize how and in whatways they are assisting the overall effort.

9. Declaratory policy: the U.S. is against global terrorists and countries that harbor terrorists"you areeither with us or against us."

10. The U.S. recognizes it must be willing to accept risks. There are causes so important that they requireputting lives at risk - fighting terrorism is one.

11. Avoid personalizing the war against terrorism by focusing excessively on UBL or Omar. The task isbigger and broader than any one individual. Wemust root out the terrorist networks.

12 . Because Afghanistan is "anti-foreigner," the U.S. emphasized the truth, that the U.S. is not there tostay; rather, we are there to help fight terrorism, liberate the Afghan people from the Al Qaeda and theTaliban, assure that it does not harbor terrorists in the future, assist with humanitarian assistanceandhelp establish the conditions to ensure the new Afghan government has the opportunity to succeed.

13. The link between global terrorist networks and the nations on the terrorist list that have active WMDcapabilities is real, and poses a serious threat to the world; it points up the urgency of the effort againstterrorism.


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14. September 11th resulted in a major shift in the world, offering opportunities to establish newrelationships and to reorder institutions in ways that will contribute to our goals of peace and stabilityfo r decades to come.

15. Victory on the ground was crucial to the success of the information campaignbecause strength isrespected throughout the world, and particularly in the Arab world, but also because liberation of theAfghan people has been one of the most powerful stories on our side.

16 . The U.S. can be effective when we leverage the capabilities of others.17. Perhaps most important of all, we leveraged the Achilles heel of our opponents, which was the fact that

the Taliban regime and the terrorists were so widely hated by the people they oppressed. Moregenerally, every government that supports terrorism also rules by terror, and the people they terrorizeare our potential allies.

18. Momentum is crucial, and it was important to pursue th e campaign relentlesslyno pauses tonegotiate, no pauses for Ramadan, no pauses outside Kabul.

19. The campaign had to include humanitarian operations (and information operations) from the verybeginning. Moreover, humanitarian operations had to be viewed in a strategic way, focused on helpingthose people who were on our side.

20 . Military force can have political effect only if it is militarily effective or threatens to be militarilyeffective. Merely blowing things up, without affecting events on the ground, becomes a symbol ofimpotence.

21 . Finally, success required recognizing that defeating the Taliban regime had to be a goal, rather thanpreserving it to avoid chaos in Afghanistan or separating "good" Taliban from bad ones. Afghanreconstruction (and rehabilitation of "good" Taliban) could only come after the defeat of the Talibanregime.

22. Unified commanders are expected to develop military options void of preconceived politicalconstraints. First determine what is possible, then let folks in Washington worry about what can beachieved. (CINC can certainly voice his opinion about the advisability of options.)

23. Setting the bar higherwe should list our expectations of countries based on what we want them to dorather than what we think they are willing to do.

24. Special reconnaissance operations (SRO)focus changed to a proactive mode that places value on ouradversaries knowingwe are doing it. Some will remain unseen, others will be coercive.

25. Even though we are engaged in a large conflict, we must continue to transform in order to emerge fromthis current operation with the quality of our force intact and ready to meet the many challenges of the21st century.

Donald Rumsfeld

DHR:dhSD Memos/Current MFRs/Major Decisions.0501


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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE1OOO DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 2O3O1-1OOO

The Honorable John W .Warne r 8E P 6 2001Com mittee on Armed ServicesUnited States SenateRoom SR-228 Russell Senate Office BuildingWashington, D.C. 20510-6050Dear Se nator W arner:

W e have been advised that the Committee on Armed Services is considering language for OsJth e FY02 De fense A uthorization Bill that wou ld seriously constrain th e President's ability to ^ \y out

$8.3 b illion for missile defen se programs by $1.3 billion. In addition, the language proposed toestablish a congressional approval process for certain expenditures related to U.S. ABM Treatyobligations would further complicate th e Administration's ability to work w ith the Russians todevelop a new framew ork that moves beyond the ABM Treaty of 1972.If such language w ere to become law, the U.S. would fall still further behind incountering the threats of long-range missiles. It would extend the time of deployment for amissile defense system even further into the fu ture. In addition, it wo uld send a signal to th eRussians an d other countries that may prefer that the U.S. remain vulnerable to ballistic missilesthat they ca n wait us out, while proliferation an d offensive missile developments continue apace.By encouraging the Russians to believe that w e w ill remain indefinitely constrained by therestrictions of the ABM Treaty, it will make itmore difficult for the President to succeed in hisefforts with the R ussians to find a cooperative way forw ard.

Finally, I want to reiterate w hat D eputy Secretary Wolfowitz and I have said in testimonybefore your Committee; this Administration has no plans to violate the AB M Treaty. W e intendto maintain a research and development program and continue discussions with th e Russians toestablish a framework to move beyond the treaty, because it inhibits th e testing of ballisticmissile defense.If the language the C omm ittee is considering were to be adopted by the Congress an dforwarded to the P resident for his signature, I wo uld have to recommend to the President that h eveto the FY02 National De fense Autho rization Act.

Sincerely, ^ Ov

cc: The Honorable Carl LevinChairman

U 1 4 9 0 4 7 0 1


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UNCLASSIFIED

Evolution of Infinite Resolve PSummary of TLAM Availability (Evolution of the Armed Predato


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The First 3 Years1/01-3/04HDoD A ccomylishments

Global War on Terrorism- Developed global offensive strategy- Removed Taliban andAl Qaeda powerbase- Removed Iraqi regime from powerSaddam Hussein and top Ba'athistleaders in custody- Degrading/damaging worldwideterrorist networks- Innovative approaches to high value,time-sensitive targets; m aritimeinterdiction- Transforming mindsetmore flexibleand agile- Delegated authorities to capture/killhigh value targets- Sense of urgency

Implemented Space CommissionRecommendations

Improved M i- Funding in- Joint comb- Targeted p- Budget supreadiness

Nuclear Postu- New triad- Nuclear we

Developed PrInitiativeRestructured- Withdrawa- Refocused- Aggressive- Began field

3/4/04


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' ) 1 ' j i! ( '

Report of the

TO THE UNITED STATES


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DONALD RUMSFELDS U I T E *oo40 0 NOBTE M I C H I G A N A V E K UEC H I C A G O , L L L I K O I S eoen

T E L E P H O N E sie-646-oectF A C S IM IL E oie-646-oese

18 M arch 1999

SUBJECT: Unclassified Version of Intelligence Side Letter

On behalf of members of the Commission to Assess theBallistic Missile Threat to the United States, I am sendingto you the unclassified version of our Intelligence SideLetter.

The classified version of this Intelligence Side Letterwas developed by the Commissioners in response to requestsfrom the Congressional Leadership. We were asked to provideobservations on the extent to which the IntelligenceCommunity is organized, trained and equipped to monitor andassess the ballistic missile threat to the United Statesinto the 21st Century, gaps that might exist with respect tothose capabilities, and any recommendations theCommissioners might have with respect to those capabilities.

In addition, the Director of Central Intelligence askedus to provide him with our observations.

We chose to provide these observations in a Side Letterto our Final Report, because our charter was explicitlylimited to an assessment of the nature and magnitude of theexisting and emerging ballistic missile threat to the UnitedStates. The classified version of the Side Letter wasdelivered to the Congressional Leadership and to the seniorleadership of the Intelligence Community on 15 October 1998.Prior to its delivery, we discussed its contents at lengthwith the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet.


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The DCI requested that the Commissioners meet with himand the senior leadership of the Intelligence Community todiscuss their observations. This meeting took place on6 January 1999.

At that meeting the Commissioners were briefed on thesteps being contemplated or taken by the DCI and the 1C toaddress the concerns raised in our Side Letter. At thatmeeting the DCI agreed to the Commissioners request toreview the Side Letter so that it might be declassified andreleased to a broader audience. The. Commissioners alsoproposed, and the DCI agreed, to include as part of anunclassified Side Letter the main points raised by the 1C inits 6 January briefing for the Commissioners.In.late 1998, the Congress provided the IntelligenceCommunity with nearly $3 billion in new funding. Thatfunding was meant to address, in part, the issues raised inour classified Side Letter. The Commissioners understandthat the DCI has used portions of that funding to supportthe initiatives he briefed to the Commissioners.I hope this unclassified version of the Side Letterwill help inform future efforts to assure that ourIntelligence Community is properly organized, trained andequipped to monitor and assess the ballistic missile threat

to the United States today and into the 21st Century.Sincerely,

Donald RumsfeldEnclosure