sweeney v. pence, no. 13-1264 (7th cir. sep. 2, 2014)
TRANSCRIPT
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In the
United States Court of AppealsFor the Seventh Circuit____________________
No.131264
JAMESM.SWEENEY,etal.,
PlaintiffAppellants,
v.
MICHAELPENCE,
GovernoroftheStateofIndiana,etal.,
DefendantAppellees.
____________________
AppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtforthe
NorthernDistrictofIndiana,HammondDivision.
No.2:12cv00081PPSPRCPhilipP.Simon,ChiefJudge.
____________________
ARGUEDSEPTEMBER12,2013DECIDEDSEPTEMBER2,2014
____________________
BeforeWOOD,ChiefJudge,andMANIONandTINDER,Cir
cuitJudges.
TINDER,CircuitJudge.PlaintiffAppellants,membersand
officers of the InternationalUnion ofOperatingEngineers,
Local150,AFLCIO(theUnion)appealthedistrictcourts
dismissalof
their
suit,
arguing
that
the
Indiana
Right
to
WorkActviolatestheirrightsundertheUnitedStatesCon
stitution and ispreemptedby federal labor legislation.Be
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2 No.131264
causethelegislationisnotpreemptedbytheschemeoffed
erallabor
law
and
does
not
violate
any
constitutional
rights,
weaffirmthedistrictcourtsdismissalofthesuit.
I
After a rancorous, partisanmonthlong fight during
whichhundredsofunionmemberscrowded,dayafterday,
intotheStatehousehalls,1theIndianalegislaturepassedthe
IndianaRighttoWorkActonFebruary1,2012,andGover
norMitchDanielssignedthelegislationintolaw.Thelaws
relevant
provisions
for
this
litigation
are
the
following.
Section8,whichspellsout theprincipalprohibitionsof
theRighttoWorkAct:
Apersonmaynotrequireanindividualto:
(1)Becomeor remainamemberofa labor
organization;
(2)Pay dues, fees, assessments, or other
chargesofanykindoramounttoalabor
organization;
or
(3)Pay to a charity or third party an
amount that is equivalent to or a pro
rata part of dues, fees, assessments or
otherchargesrequiredofmembersofa
labororganization
1MonicaDavey, IndianaGovernor Signs aLawCreating a Right to
Work State, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2012) at A12, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/us/indianabecomes
right
to
work
state.html(lastaccessedAug.20,2014).
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No.131264 3
asaconditionofemploymentorcontinua
tionof
employment.
IND.CODE22668.
Section 3, which makes clear what substantive provi
sionsoftheRighttoWorkActaretobeconstruedtoapply
tothebuildingandconstructionindustry:
Nothing in thischapter is intended,orshould
beconstrued, tochangeoraffectany lawcon
cerningcollectivebargainingorcollectivebar
gainingagreements
in
the
building
and
con
structionindustryotherthan:
(1)a law that permits agreements that
would requiremembership in laboror
ganization;
(2)a law that permits agreements that
would require the payment of dues,
fees, assessments, or other charges of
anykindofamounttoalabororganiza
tion;or
(3)a law that permits agreements that
wouldrequire thepayment toacharity
or a third party of an amount that is
equivalenttooraproratapartofdues,
fees, assessment, or other charges re
quiredofmembersofa labororganiza
tion;
as
a
condition
of
employment.
IND.CODE22663.
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4 No.131264
AndSection13,whichmakesclear thatSections812of
theAct
apply
prospectively:
Sections8through12ofthischapter:
(1)apply to a written or oral contract or
agreement entered into, modified, re
newed, or extended after March 14,
2012;and
(2)donotapplytoorabrogateawrittenor
oral contract or agreement in effect on
March14,
2012.
IND.CODE226613.
On February 22, 2012, PlaintiffAppellants, officers and
membersoftheInternationalUnionofOperatingEngineers,
Local 150,AFLCIO (theUnion),brought suit in federal
districtcourtagainst theGovernorofIndiana, theAttorney
General of Indiana, and the Commissioner of the Indiana
DepartmentofLabor in theirofficialcapacities,seekingde
claratoryrelief.TheyallegedthattheIndianaRighttoWork
Actviolates
the
United
States
Constitution
and
the
Indiana
Constitution.Theyfurtherarguedthattheschemeoffederal
labor law, specifically the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),29U.S.C.151 et seq.,preempts8(2)(3)and
3(2)(3)ofthenewlegislation.OnJanuary17,2013,thefed
eral district court grantedDefendantAppelleesMotion to
Dismisson thepreemption claim and the federal constitu
tionalclaims.PlaintiffAppellantstimelyappealed.2
2Webrieflynote that there isparallel litigationpending in the Indianastatecourts.Twodecisionshavebeenissuedbystatetrialcourtsinrela
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No.131264 5
II
Onappeal,PlaintiffAppellants raise twovarietiesof is
sues:whetherthelawispreemptedbythefederalschemeof
labor law,andwhether theIndiana lawviolates theUnited
StatesConstitution.Weanswerinthenegativetobothques
tions.
1. FederalPreemption
PlaintiffAppellantsmain argument asserts that the In
dianarighttowork law ispreemptedby federal legislation
onthe
same
topic.
The history of the federal legislation in question is im
portanthere.CongressenactedtheWagnerActin1935and
amendeditthroughtheLaborManagementRelationsActof
1947,betterknownastheTaftHartleyAct.TheTaftHartley
Actincludedseveralprovisions intendedtoameliorateper
ceivedimbalancesintheNLRA.Inparticular,Congresswas
concernedaboutabusesstemmingfromtheclosedshop,a
unionsecurity agreementwhereby an employer agreed to
tiontothestatute:inacase inLakeCountySuperiorCourtbroughtby,
interalia, thePlaintiffAppellants (Order,Sweeneyv.Zoeller,No.45D01
1305PL52(LakeCnty.Super.Ct.Sep.9,2013),DocketNo.23),andina
separatecase inLakeCountyCircuitCourtbroughtbymembersofan
other union (Order, United Steel Paper v. Zoeller, No. 45C011207PL
00071 (LakeCnty.Cir.Ct.Jul.17,2014)).Bothdecisionshavebeenap
pealed to the Indiana Supreme Court. (Docket Records of Zoeller v.
Sweeney,No.45S001309PL00596(accessedAug.20,2014);Docket
RecordsofZoellerv.UnitedSteelPaper,No.45S001407PL00492
(accessedAug. 20, 2014)).The state trial courtsdecisions are far from
final inmost respects,and,moreover,havenopreclusiveeffectonourconsiderationoffederalquestionshere.
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6 No.131264
hire only unionmembers. Section 8(3) of theWagnerAct
wasaccordingly
amended
to
ban
closed
shops.
However,
the amended Section 8(3) shield[ed] from anunfair labor
practicecharge lesssevereformsofunionsecurityarrange
mentsthantheclosedorunionshop.NLRB.v.Gen.Motors
Corp.,373U.S.734,739(1963).Forexample,itpermittedan
arrangement requiringnonunionmembers topay tothe
union$2amonth for thesupportof thebargainingunit.
Id.
AlthoughCongresspermittedlessrestrictive,posthiring
unionsecurity
agreements
under
federal
law,
it
also
left
states free toban them. Section 14(b) of theAct provided
thatSection8(3)didnotprotectaunionsecurityagreement
ifitwasprohibitedbyStateorTerritoriallaw.Bythetime
Section14(b)wasincludedintheNLRA,twelveStateshad
statutesorconstitutionalprovisionsoutlawingorrestricting
the closed shop and related devices, laws about which
Congressseemstohavebeenwellinformedduringthe1947
debates.RetailClerks IntlAssn,Local1625v.Schermer
horn,375
U.S.
86,
100
(1963)
(Retail
Clerks
II).
Inrelevantpart,Section8(a)(3)oftheNLRAnowreads:
It shallbe an unfair labor practice for an
employerbydiscriminationinregardtohire
ortenureoremploymentoranytermorcondi
tionofemploymenttoencourageordiscourage
membershipinanylabororganization.
Provided,Thatnothinginthissubchapter,or
inanyotherstatuteof theUnitedStates,shall
preclude anemployer frommaking an agree
ment with a labor organization (not estab
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No.131264 7
lished,maintained, or assistedby any action
definedin
this
subsection
as
an
unfair
labor
practice) to require as a conditionof employ
mentmembershiptherein.
29U.S.C.158(a)(3).
AndSection14(b)oftheNLRAprovides:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be con
struedasauthorizingtheexecutionorapplica
tionofagreementsrequiringmembership ina
labororganization
as
acondition
of
employ
ment in any State orTerritory inwhich such
executionorapplication isprohibitedbyState
orTerritoriallaw.
29U.S.C.164(b).
The Supreme Court has clarified the relationship be
tweenthesetwoprovisions:14(b)wasintendedtoprevent
othersectionsintheNLRAfromcompletelyextinguishing
statepowerover certainunionsecurity arrangements.Re
tailClerks Intern.Assn,Local1625v.Schermerhorn, 373U.S.
746,751(1963)(RetailClerksI).Specifically,[Section14(b)]
wasdesignedtomakecertainthat8(a)(3)couldnotbesaid
toauthorizearrangementsof thissort inStateswheresuch
arrangementswere contrary to the State policy. Id. (cita
tionsand internalquotationmarksomitted).Thus,weread
Section 14(b) as protecting states authority to enact laws
prohibiting unionsecurity arrangements that are permissi
bleunderSection8(a)(3)andotherprovisionsoftheNLRA.
Thisreading
was
underscored
by
the
Supreme
Courts
deci
sioninRetailClerksII,whichdeclaredthatthelegislativehis
tory ma[de] clear and unambiguous the purpose ofCon
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gressnot topreempt the field.RetailClerks II, 375U.S. at
101.TheCourt
concluded
that
Congress
in
1947
did
not
de
prive theStatesofanyandallpower toenforce their laws
restricting theexecutionandenforcementofunionsecurity
agreementsandthatitisplainthatCongresslefttheStates
freetolegislateinthefieldofunionsecurityagreements.Id.
at102.Thefreedomreservedtothestatesisextensive;even
if [a]unionsecurityarrangementclearsall federalhurdles,
theStatesby reasonof14(b)have the final sayandmay
outlawit.Id.at10203.TheSupremeCourtcouldnothave
beenmore
explicit
regarding
the
broad
authority
of
states
to
prohibitunionsecurityagreements.
It isagainst thisbackdropofstatesextensiveauthority,
reservedtothembythelanguageofthestatuteandtheSu
preme Courts interpretation, that we consider Plaintiff
AppellantsargumentthatprovisionsoftheIndianarightto
work legislationarepreemptedby federal labor legislation.
Theirprimaryargument is thatSection14(b)permitsstates
tobanonlyunionsecurityagreementsrequiringmember
ship,or
else
compelling
workers
to
pay
afull
membership
fee thatservesas the functionalequivalentofmembership.
TheIndianastatutegoesfurtherbyprohibitingunionsfrom
collectinganyfeesandduesfromunwillingemployees.The
PlaintiffAppellantsassert that thisban is toostrictbecause
employeesmaystillbe required topaya feeequal to their
fair share of the collectivebargaining costssomething
less than the full membership feeand not qualify as
membersoftheunionunderSection14(b).Section8(a)(3),
whichpermitssucharrangements,wouldthen,accordingto
thisargument,
apply
in
full
force
and
preempt
any
state
statutebarringtheunionspractice.
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No.131264 9
PlaintiffAppellants furtherargue that sucha reading is
necessarybecause
unions
are
required
to
act
on
behalf
of
all
employees in labor disputes, and may not discriminate
againstnonmembers.Tocompel theunion torepresentall
employees equally using dues contributed only by some
workers, they argue, creates a freerider problem. Indeed,
theSupremeCourthasobservedthatSection(8)(3)wasde
signed to remedy the inequitiesposedby free riderswho
wouldotherwiseunfairlyprofitfrom theTaftHartleyActs
abolition of the closed shop. CommcnsWorkers ofAm. v.
Beck,487
U.S.
735,
75354
(1988).
Wearenotconvinced thatSection8(3)preempts the In
dianastatute,forseveralreasons.
a. InterpretationsoftheTermMembershipinthe
NLRAContext
PlaintiffAppellants and the dissent admit that the Su
premeCourthasconstruedthetermmembershiptohave
thesamemeaninginSections8(a)(3)and14(b).Indeed,there
is
no
reason
to
think
that
the
term
membership
in
Section
14(b)wouldmeansomethingdifferentfromthetermmem
bership in Section 8(a)(3) of the same act. See Sorenson v.
Sec yofTreasuryofU.S.,475U.S.851,860 (1986) (Thenor
mal rule of statutory construction assumes that identical
wordsusedindifferentpartsofthesameactareintendedto
have the same meaning.) (citation and quotation marks
omitted).As a result, the agreements requiring member
shipinalaborunionwhichareexpresslypermittedbythe
proviso are the same membership agreements expressly
placedwithin
the
reach
of
state
law
by
14(b).
RetailClerks
I, 373U.S. at 751. Ifmembership for purposes of Section
8(a)(3)encompassesanarrangementrequiringnonunion
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memberstopaytotheunion$2amonthforthesupportof
thebargaining
unit,
Gen. Motors,
373
U.S.
at
739,
then
membershipunderSection14(b) should likewiseextend to
suchfees.
TheSupremeCourthasdescribedunionmembershipas
synonymouswithpayingtheportionofduesgermanetothe
unions collective bargaining. It has held that the term
membershipinSection8(a)(3)hasbeenwhittleddownto
itsfinancialcore.Gen.Motors,373U.S.at742.AndtheSu
premeCourthasalsomadeclearthatthisfinancialcoreof
unionmembership
extends
to
only
those
fees
and
dues
necessary to performing the duties of an exclusive repre
sentativeoftheemployeesindealingwiththeemployeron
labormanagement issues.3 Beck, 487 U.S. at 763 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 745
(Thestatutoryquestionpresentedinthiscaseiswhether
thisfinancialcoreincludestheobligationtosupportunion
activities beyond those germane to collective bargaining,
contractadministration,andgrievanceadjustment.Wethink
itdoes
not.).
In
other
words,
Representation
Feesthose
3ThedissentstatesthatBeckshouldbereadforthepropositionthatthe
termmembershipdoesnotextendtothosewhopayonlyRepresenta
tion Fees. (WedefineRepresentation Fees tobe those feesgermane to
collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjust
ment.)ThatcontradictsBeckssubstantiveholding.TheCourtheldthat
8(a)(3)authorizes theexactionofonlyRepresentationFees,an inter
pretation thatnecessarily requires that the term membership in that
clausebereadtomeanRepresentationFees.487U.S.at76263.Itistrue
that in its statement of facts, Beck distinguishesbetween duespaying
employeeswho
choose
not
to
be
union
members
and
full
dues
paying
unionmembers.Id.at739.Butthatquirkisnotsubstantive.
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No.131264 11
fees germane to collectivebargaining, contract administra
tion,and
grievance
adjustmentconstitute
the
financial
coreofmembershipforthepurposesofSection8(a)(3)and
for Section 14(b). Therefore, Section 14(b)s express allow
ance of state lawsprohibiting agreements requiringmem
bership in a labor organization as a condition of employ
mentnecessarilypermitsstatelawsprohibitingagreements
thatrequireemployees topayRepresentationFees(empha
sisadded).4
In the alternative,we find compelling the fact that the
positionadvanced
by
the
Union
and
adopted
in
the
dissent
necessarilyentailsreading8(a)(3)asmaking14(b)super
fluous.As noted above, in Beck the SupremeCourt stated
that8(a)(3)authorizes theexactionofonly those fees
andduesnecessarytoperformingthedutiesofanexclusive
representativeoftheemployeesindealingwiththeemploy
eronlabormanagementissues.487U.S.at76263(citation
andinternalquotationmarksomitted);seeMarquezv.Screen
ActorsGuild, Inc.,525U.S.33,38 (1998) (8(a)(3)doesnot
permitunions
to
exact
dues
or
fees
from
employees
for
ac
tivities thatarenotgermane tocollectivebargaining,griev
ance adjustment, or contract administration.). In arguing
thatRepresentationFeesarepermissible inalljurisdictions,
4As this analysismakes clear,our conclusion is compelled inpartby
Becksholding that the term membership extends to thosewhoonly
payRepresentationFees,notsimplyby theRetailClerksdecisions.And
weareboundbythatprecedent,eveniftherulethatthetermmember
shiphasbeenwhittleddowntoitsfinancialcoretoincludethosewho
payonly
Representation
Fees
does
not
fit
with
the
ordinary
meaning
of
thetermmembership,asthedissentstates.
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including states that havepromulgated righttowork laws
inaccordance
with
14(b),
the
Union
is
asserting
that
all
statesmust allowunions to negotiate thebroadest, largest
possible unionsecurity arrangement permitted under
8(a)(3).Thatcantberight.
Bothof thesepointsaremorecompellingthan thealter
native readings of membership presented to us by the
PlaintiffAppellants,whohangtheirinterpretationonsever
alslenderbranches:twocontemporaneousdictionarydefini
tions,andafederalstatutorydefinitionfound inadifferent
statutepassed
twelve
years
after
the
Taft
Hartley
Act.
See
The LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 29 U.S.C. 401 et seq. Not only are both of these
sourcesextraneoustothestatutewearechargedtointerpret
in thiscase,but theyalsocannotalter theSupremeCourts
later construction of the term membership in the Retail
ClerkscasesandBeck.
b. StateStatutorySchemesConcurrentwithTaft
Hartley
Alsocompellingarethestaterighttoworklawsineffect
atthetimeoftheTaftHartleyActspassagein1947.Asthe
SupremeCourt stated inRetailClerks II, twelve states had
righttoworklawsineffectwhenTaftHartleywasenacted:
Arizona,Arkansas,Georgia,Iowa,Nebraska,Nevada,North
Carolina,NorthDakota,SouthDakota,Tennessee,Texasand
Virginia.5These laws fell into twodifferent categories.The
5 State Laws Regulating UnionSecurity Contracts, 21 L.R.R.M. 66
(1948).Ofthesestates,tenstatesretainthesamerighttoworkstatutorylanguagetothepresentday.ThetwoexceptionsareNevadaandTexas.
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No.131264 13
firstbroadlydisallowedcompulsoryunionmembership.The
secondincluded
specific
provisions
outlawing
compulsory
paymentofduesorfeestolabororganizations.Anexample
of a statute from the secondgroup is Iowas righttowork
law,whichwasenactedonApril28,1947, twomonthsbe
forethepassageoftheTaftHartleyAct:
Sec.1.ItisdeclaredtobethepolicyoftheState
of Iowa that no personwithin itsboundaries
shallbe deprived of the right towork at his
chosenoccupationforanyemployerbecauseof
membershipin,
affiliation
with,
withdrawal
or
expulsionfrom,orrefusaltojoin,anylaborun
ion,organization,orassociation,andanycon
tract which contravenes this policy is illegal
andvoid.
[]
Sec.4.Itshallbeunlawfulforanyperson,firm,
association, labororganizationor corporation,
or
political
subdivision,
either
directly
or
indi
rectly,orinanymannerorbymeansasapre
InthecaseofNevada,therewasarighttoworkprovisionineffectfrom
1911to1951intheCrimesandPunishmentActof1911,whichremained
ineffectuntil1951.Afteratwoyearhiatus,aformal,standalonerightto
worklawwasaddedin1953throughinitiativepetition.NevadaLegisla
tive Counsel Bureau Office of Research Background PaperNo. 7508
(1975).InTexas,arighttoworklawwaspassedin1947andstyledTexas
Civ.Code5207a. Itseems tohavebeenupdatedand renumbered to
appearatTexasLab.Code101in1993.The1993amendmentgaverise
toTexass specific language that restrictedcompelledpaymentofduesandfeestounions.
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requisite toorconditionofemployment tore
quireany
person
to
pay
dues,
charges,
fees,
contributions,finesorassessmentstoanylabor
union,laborassociationorlabororganization.
IOWACODE 736A.1, 4 (1947), renumbered as IOWACODE
731.1,4(1977).
All told,of the twelvestate righttoworkstatutes inef
fectin1947,morethanhalfsevenincludedlanguagesimi
lartoIndianasandIowasstatutes.ARK.CODEANN.113
303
(1947);
GA.
CODE
ANN.
34
6
22
(1947);
IOWA
CODE
731.4 (enacted 1947, renumbered 1977); NEB. REV. STAT.
48217 (1947);N.C.GEN.STAT.9582 (1947);TENN.CODE
ANN. 501203 (1947);VA.CODEANN. 40.162 (enacted
1947, renumbered1970).Congresswaswellawareof these
statuteswhenitdraftedSection14(b).SeeH.R.Rep.No.245,
80thCong.,1stSess.34,reprintedinILegislativeHistoryofthe
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 324 (1948) (listing
states with such statutes).As discussed above, the stated
purposeofSection14(b)wastopreservetheefficacyoflaws
likethese
statutes
that
allowed
states
to
place
restrictions
of their choosing on unionsecurity agreements, including
restrictions onwhether employees couldbe compelled to
payduesorfeesofanykindtoaunion.6
6 The legislative history demonstrates that Congress drafted Section
14(b)topreservetherighttoworkstatutesalreadyineffectin1947.See
IntlUnionoftheUnitedAssnofJourneymen&ApprenticesofthePlumbing
&Pipefitting Indus.,LocalUnionsNos.141,229,681,&706v.NLRB,675
F.2d 1257, 1273 (D.C.Cir. 1982) (Mikva,J.,dissenting) (Thebest evi
denceofcongressional intentmaythereforelie inthekindsof compulsoryunionismthatmembersofCongressunderstoodhadbeenbanned
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No.131264 15
Presently, twentyfourstateshavesome formofaright
towork
law.7
The
overwhelming
majority
of
jurisdictions
eighteen,byourcount,includingGuamhaveadoptedlan
guagesubstantiallyidenticaltotheprohibitioninInd.Code
2268(2).SeeALA.CODE25734(1953);ARK.CODEANN.
113303 (1947); GA. CODE ANN. 34622 (1947); IDAHO
CODE ANN. 442003(3) (1985); 22 GUAM CODE ANN.
4103(3) (2000); IOWA CODE 731.4 (transferred 1977); LA.
REV.STAT.ANN.23:983(1976);MICH.COMP.LAWS423.17
(2013);MISS.CONST.art.7,198A(1960);NEB.REV.STAT.
48217
(1947);
N.C.GEN.STAT.
95
82
(1947);
OKLA.CONST.
art.23,1A (2001);S.C.CODEANN.41730(1954);TENN.
CODEANN.501203(1947);TEX.LAB.CODEANN.101.004
(1993);UTAHCODEANN.343410(1955);VA.CODEANN.
40.162 (1947);WYO. STAT.ANN. 277111 (1963); see also
N.D. CENT. CODE 340114.1 (1987), repealed by NLRB v.
NorthDakota,504F.Supp.2d750(D.N.D.2007).Thelongevi
tyofmanyofthesestatutes,coupledwiththelackofdisap
provalexpressedbytheSupremeCourt,suggeststousthat
Indianas righttowork law falls squarelywithin the realm
ofacceptablelaw.
We also findpersuasive adecisionby theD.C.Circuit,
theonlydecisionfromasistercircuittosquarelyaddressthe
by thestaterighttowork laws.).Yet thedissentspositionnecessarily
entailsconcluding thatCongressdidnot intend14(b)sprotections to
extendtothemajorityofrighttoworkstatutesthenineffect.Thatisnot
areasonableinterpretationoflegislativehistory.
7NationalConferenceofStateLegislatures,RighttoWorkResources,
available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/laborandemployment/righttoworklawsandbills.aspx(lastaccessedAug.20,2014).
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16 No.131264
questionbeforeus.8 Facedwith the question ofwhether a
unioncould
assess
non
union
employees
for
Representation
Feesinfourrighttoworkstates,theD.C.Circuitfound,on
thebasis of the legislative history of the TaftHartleyAct,
that theassessmentofsuchfeesconstitutedanunfair labor
practice.Journeymen&Apprentices,675F.2dat126062.The
D.C.Circuitheld thatCongressknewpreciselywhatstate
laws it was validating when it passed 14(b) as [t]he
HouseReportlistedeachstatewhichhadpassedarightto
worklaworconstitutionalprovision.Id.at1260.Specifical
ly,the
D.C.
Circuit
was
persuaded
that
Congress
also
knew
about the free rider problem posedby such lawswhen it
sanctioned such lawsby passing 14(b), as shownby a
commentintheSenateCommitteereportonthebillreflect
8Thedissentcitestwocircuitdecisionsthatstandfortheprinciple that
14(b)doesnotauthorize states toprohibit theuseofexclusivehiring
halls that do not discriminate between union members and non
members.SeeLaborersIntlUnionofN.Am.,LocalNo.107v.Kunco,Inc.,
472 F.2d 456 (8thCir. 1973);NLRB v.HoustonChapter,AssociatedGen.
ContractorsofAm.,Inc.,349
F.2d
449
(5th
Cir.
1965).
Both
decisions
pre
cedeBeckanddidnothave thebenefitof theCourts interpretationof
membership in that case.And theD.C.Circuit, inJourneymen&Ap
prentices, foundboth casesclearlydistinguishable from thematterat
handonthebasisthattheseconcernprehiringpractices,whereas14(b)
applies to posthiring union security arrangements.Journeymen&Ap
prentices,675F.3dat1262,1267(Useofaunionhiringhallprecedeshir
ingandthereforedoesnotconstitutemembershipunder14(b).).We
agreethatthesecasesaredistinguishablebecausehiringhallsdonotre
quireprospectiveemployeestodoanythingmorethantemporarilyvisit
unionfacilitiesduringthehiringprocess.Suchtemporaryaffiliationdoes
notamount
to
membership
as
that
term
has
been
interpreted
by
the
SupremeCourt.
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No.131264 17
ingunions concerns about free riders,9 aswell as Senator
Taftsrebuttal
on
that
point
that
[m]any
states
have
enacted
lawsoradoptedconstitutionalprovisionstomakeallforms
of compulsoryunionism in such states illegal.As stated in
the report accompanying the Senate committeebill, itwas
not the intent to deprive the States of such power. Id. at
126061 (citationomitted).And theD.C.Circuitnoted that
thisproblemwassowellknownthatPresidentTrumancrit
icizeditinhisvetomessage.Id.at1261.
PlaintiffAppellants are right that Congress was con
cernedthat
banning
the
closed
shop
would
create
afree
riderproblem,butonlyinthosestatesthathadnoadditional
restriction on unionsecurity agreements. Id. at 1260
([L]eadersoforganized laborhavestressedthefactthat in
9A controversial issue towhich the committeehasdevoted themost
maturedeliberationhasbeen theproblemposedbycompulsoryunion
membership. [A]buses of compulsorymembershiphavebecome so
numeroustherehasbeengreatpublicfeelingagainstsucharrangements.
This
has
been
reflected
by
the
fact
that
in
12
States
such
agreements
have
beenmade illegaleitherby legislativeactorconstitutionalamendment,
and in14otherStatesproposals forabolishing such contractsarenow
pending.Althoughtheseregulatorymeasureshavenotreceivedauthori
tative interpretationby theSupremeCourt (citationomitted) it isobvi
ous that theypose importantquestionsofaccommodatingFederaland
State legislation touching labor relations in industries affecting com
merce (citationsomitted). In testifyingbefore thiscommittee,however,
leadersoforganized laborhave stressed the fact that in theabsenceof
suchprovisionsmanyemployeessharingthebenefitsofwhatunionsare
abletoaccomplishbycollectivebargainingwillrefusetopaytheirshare
ofthecost.Journeymen&Apprentices,675F.2dat1260(citingReportof
theSenateCommitteeonLaborandPublicWelfarepresentedbySenatorTaft,80thCong.,1stSess.6,April17,1947).
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18 No.131264
the absence of [antiunionsecurity] provisions many em
ployeessharing
the
benefits
of
what
unions
are
able
to
ac
complishby collectivebargainingwill refuse to pay their
shareof thecost.) (quoting theReportof theSenateCom
mittee on Labor and PublicWelfare presentedby Senator
Taft, 80thCong., 1st Sess. 6,April 17, 1947).On the other
hand,Congress explicitly permitted states that did restrict
thoseagreementstofindtheirownsolutiontothefreerider
problem,ifitwasaprobleminthosestates.Indeed,unions
continuetothriveandassertsignificantinfluenceinseveral
rightto
work
states,
including
Iowa,10
where
provisions
equivalenttoIndianashavebeenineffectformorethansix
tyfive years. If the PlaintiffAppellants believe that Indi
anaslawwillcreateaneworunexpectedlyseverefreerider
problem,theymayaddressthoseconcernstoCongress.
In sum, in reviewing this substantialbody of empirical
evidence, we are not persuaded by PlaintiffAppellants
claims that Indianas law is somehow an extraordinary
measuredistinctfromthenumerousstatestatutesthathave
harmoniouslyexisted
under
the
federal
labor
law
frame
work.Nor arewepersuadedby their assertions that Indi
anaslawrepresentsamortalthreattothecontinuingexist
enceofunionsasprovidedunderfederallaw.Section8(2)of
10 See, e.g.,KrisMaher, IowasHouse ofLabor is Split,WALL ST.J.
(Nov.20,2007)atA6 (examining the importanceofbig,politicallyac
tive unions in the Iowa caucus vote); Steven Greenhouse, Secret
Weapon inGoreCamp:Unions in Iowa,N.Y.TIMES (Jan.17,2000)at
A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/17/us/the2000
campaigntheunionssecretweaponingorecampunionsiniowa.html
(calling Iowas 150,000member union force amajor weapon in theIowacaucuses)(lastaccessedAug.20,2014).
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No.131264 19
the Indiana righttowork statute is thusnotpreemptedby
theNLRA.
c. PlaintiffAppellantsMiscellaneousPreemptionAr
guments
PlaintiffAppellants assert two other preemption argu
ments.Bothdeserveonlyquickconsideration.
The first assertion, that federal labor law preempts the
Indiana lawscriminalpenalties,clashessquarelywith lan
guage in Retail Clerks II,where the SupremeCourt stated
that
Inlightofthewordingof14(b)andthislegis
lative history, we conclude that Congress in
1947didnotdeprive theStatesofanyandall
powertoenforcetheirlawsrestrictingtheexe
cution and enforcement of unionsecurity
agreements.Since it isplain thatCongress left
theStatesfreeto legislate in thatfield,wecan
onlyassumethatitintendedtoleaveunaffect
edthe
power
to
enforce
those
laws.
RetailClerksII,375U.S.at102.
TheUnionssecondargumentisthattheNLRApreempts
8(3)of thestatute,whichbarsmandatorypaymentsofan
amountequivalent touniondues toacharity.Theyrelyon
19 of theNLRA,which allows conscientious objectors to
payduestoacharityratherthantoaunion.Buttheapplica
bilityofthatsectionnaturallypresupposestheexistenceofa
unionsecurityagreementthatrequiresthepaymentofdues.
Andas
we
have
demonstrated,
states
are
permitted
to
re
strictorprohibitsuchagreements.Weagreewiththedistrict
courts assessment that [n]othing in the language of 19
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20 No.131264
suggests or supports interpreting it as an exemption to
14(b)
that
would
preempt
any
state
attempt
to
outlaw
the
kindofprovisionthat19permits.Sweeneyv.Daniels,2013
WL209047,*11(N.D.Ind.Jan.17,2013).
2. FederalConstitutionalClaims
Thedissentclaims thatour interpretationof the federal
statutoryschemaworksanunconstitutionaltakingonHoos
ier unions. We consider this argument first. Plaintiff
Appellants also allege violations of theContracts, Ex Post
Facto,and
Equal
Protection
Clauses
of
the
United
States
Constitution.BecauseboththeirContractsandExPostFacto
Clauseargumentshave forceonly if thestatuteappliesret
roactively,weconsiderthemtogether.
a. IndianasLawDoesNotWorkanUnconstitutional
Taking
Thedissentassertsthat,shouldwehold thatthefederal
statutory schemedoesnotpreempt Indianas righttowork
statute,thatholdinglikelyviolatestheTakingsClauseofthe
FifthAmendment,
as
applied
to
the
states
under
the
Four
teenthAmendment.Dissent at 1718.We observe that no
argumentbasedontheTakingsClausewasadvancedbythe
Union,andsoanysuchargumentwasforfeited.SeeJackson
v.Parker,627F.3d634,640(7thCir.2010)(notingthatargu
mentsnotraisedbefore thedistrictcourtareforfeited);Trs.
ofChi.Painters&DecoratorsPension,Health&Welfare,&De
ferredSav.PlanTrustFundsv.Royal IntlDrywall&Decorat
ing,Inc.,493F.3d782,790(7thCir.2007)(noting thatargu
ments not raised in the openingbrief are forfeited). And
there is the problem of whether the Union has sued the
proper defendants for the purposes of advancing a claim
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No.131264 21
under theTakingsClause.TheUnionsallegeddeprivation
isthe
product
of
federal
law
and
the
Indiana
statute
operat
ingintandem.Becauseitisfederallawthatprovidesaduty
of fair representation, Indianas righttowork statute does
nottakepropertyfromtheUnionitmerelyprecludesthe
Unionfromcollectingfeesdesignedtocoverthecostsofper
formingtheduty.EvensupposingtheUnioncouldjustifyits
suitbyinvokingsomethinglikethetortdoctrineofconcur
rentactualcauses,11thedissenthasnotexplainedwhythe
proper remedywouldbe tostrikedown Indianas rightto
workstatute
rather
than
striking
down
or
modifying
the
federallawimposingonallunionsthedutyoffairrepresen
tation, in righttowork states and nonrighttowork states
alike.
Even so,we engagewith thedissentspositionbecause
we believe it overlooks the fundamental fact that distin
guishes the unions duty of representation from the other
hypotheticalsitpresents.Thatistosay:webelievetheunion
isjustlycompensatedbyfederallawsgranttotheUnionthe
rightto
bargain
exclusively
with
the
employer.
The
reason
theUnionmust represent all employees is that theUnion
alone gets a seat at the negotiation table. See IntlAssn of
Machinistsv.Street,367U.S.740,761(1961)(Aunionssta
tusasexclusivebargainingrepresentativecarrieswithitthe
duty fairlyandequitably to representallemployeesof the
11 See Hill v. Edmonds, 26 A.D.2d 554, 55455 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966)
(Whereseparateactsofnegligencecombinetoproducedirectlyasingle
injuryeach
tort
feasor
is
responsible
for
the
entire
result,
even
though
his
actalonemightnothavecausedit.).
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22 No.131264
craft or class,union andnonunion.);HughesToolCo., 104
N.L.R.B.318,
32425
(1943)
([A]
union
could
not
assess
nonmembersforcostsarisingfromcontractnegotiationsfor
thelatteraretheexclusivedutyandprerogativeofthecerti
fied representativewhich thenonmemberminority isboth
entitled toandboundunder.).Thepowersof thebargain
ingrepresentativearecomparable to thosepossessedbya
legislativebodybothtocreateandrestricttherightsofthose
whom itrepresents.Steelev.Louisville&N.R.Co.,65S.Ct.
226,232(1944).Thedutyoffairrepresentationisthereforea
correspondingduty
imposed
in
exchange
for
the
powers
granted to theUnion as an exclusive representative. Id. It
seemsdisingenuousnot to recognize that theUnionsposi
tionasasolerepresentativecomeswithasetofpowersand
benefitsaswellasresponsibilitiesandduties.Andnoinfor
mationbefore uspersuadesus that theUnion is not fully
andadequatelycompensatedbyitsrightsasthesoleandex
clusivememberatthenegotiatingtable.
b. ContractsandExPostFactoClauseArguments
TheContracts
Clause
provides
that
[n]o
State
shall
passanylawimpairingtheObligationofContracts.U.S.
CONST.art.I,10,cl.1.AstateviolatestheContractsClause
when a change in state lawhasoperated as a substantial
impairmentofacontractualrelationship.Gen.MotorsCorp.
v.Romein,503U.S.181,186(1992)(citationandinternalquo
tationmarksomitted).The relevant inquiryhas threecom
ponents: 1) whether there is a contractual relationship;
2)whetherachangeinlawimpairsthatcontractualrelation
ship;
and
3)
whether
the
impairment
is
substantial.
Council
31oftheAm.FednofState,Cnty.,&Mun.Emps.v.Quinn,680
F.3d875,885(7thCir.2012)(citingKhanv.Gallitano,180F.3d
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No.131264 23
829,832(7thCir.1999)).TheExPostFactoClauseisviolated
bystate
or
federal
legislation
that
makes
an
act
done
before
thepassingofthelaw,andwhichwasinnocentwhendone,
criminal,andpunishes suchaction.Peughv.UnitedStates,
133S.Ct.2072,2081 (2013) (citationand internalquotation
marksomitted).ThepartiesagreethatfortheIndianalawto
violatetheseclausesof theConstitution,the lawmusthave
some retroactive application: it must either impair an al
readyexistingcontractorelsepunishpastconduct.Wefind
thatthelawdoesnotapplyretroactively.
Thisconclusion
is
relatively
easy
to
reach
because
Section
13oftheIndianastatuteprovidesthatthesubstantiveprovi
sionsof the legislationSections8 through12applyonly
tocontractsentered intoafterMarch14,2012,anddonot
applytoorabrogateawrittenororalcontractoragreement
ineffectonMarch14,2012.IND.CODE226613.Themain
objectionPlaintiffAppellantsmakehereistoSection3ofthe
statute.TheyarguethatSection3isasubstantiveprovision
notmentionedinSection13,andthatitthushasretroactive
application.
Ininterpretingthelanguageofastatute,wemustexam
inethelanguageanddesignofthestatuteasawhole.Wells
FargoBank,NatlAssnv.LakeofTorchesEcon.Dev.Corp.,658
F.3d684,694(7thCir.2011)(citationsandinternalquotation
marksomitted).Andwemustalsokeepinmind[t]hepre
sumptionagainst retroactive legislation,whichembodies
a legaldoctrinecenturiesolder thanourRepublic.Vartelas
v.Holder,132S.Ct.1479,1486 (2012) (citationand internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
We
are
inclined
to
agree
that
Sec
tion3isanoddlydraftedprovision.Itresidesinaneighbor
hood of prefatory clauses, nestled amid definitions of key
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24 No.131264
termsandexceptions,butitssubsectionsappearsurprising
lysubstantive:
indeed,
Section
3s
sub
provisions
are
identi
calincontenttothesubsectionsofSection8.However,Sec
tion3smainclauseisdraftedinthelanguageofexception.
Itexplainsthatthestatuteshouldnotbereadtochangethe
lawsof thebuildingandconstruction industry,an industry
thathasitsownsetofelaboratelaborlaws,excepttoprohib
itagreementsofthetypebannedbySection8.Itisadouble
negativeno change except the following changesthat
wouldbemorecomprehensibleifdraftedinthepositive,but
theplacement
of
the
clause
makes
sense
among
the
other
prefatory,exclusionaryclauseslikeSections1(Thischapter
doesnotapply to the following:.)and2 (Thischapter
doesnotapplytotheextentthat.).IND.CODE22661,
2.Inlightofthedesignofthestatuteasawhole,wearesat
isfied that the provision in question is prefatory, not sub
stantive. It simply explains thedomains towhich the sub
stantiveportionsofthestatuteapply.TotheextentthatSec
tion 3 contains substantive language, it is language that
simplypointstothelatersubstantivesectionsoutlawingun
ionsecurityclauses.Thisreadingbestharmonizesthestruc
tureof the statuteand thepresumption against retroactive
legislation.12
12Insupportofourreading,DefendantAppelleesassertthefactthatthe
IndianaCommissionerofLaborhasdisclaimedanyretroactiveinterpre
tationofSection3,butthisisnotpersuasive.Whilethedistrictcourtwas
satisfiedby theCommissioners declaration, terming itbinding under
theprinciplesofjudicialestoppel,itisdifficulttodeterminewhateffect
such declarationswould have on future executive administrations or
officeholders.ButourreadingofthestatuteconvincesusthatSection3isnotretroactive,soweneednotrelyontheconceptofestoppel.
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No.131264 25
c. EqualProtectionClauseArguments
TheEqualProtectionClause of theFourteenthAmend
mentstatesthatnostateshalldenytoanypersonwithinits
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.U.S.CONST.
amend.XIV.Equalprotectionscrutinyistriggeredwhena
regulationdrawsdistinctionsamongpeoplebasedonaper
sonsmembershipinasuspectclassorbasedonadenial
ofafundamentalright.Srailv.Vill.ofLisle,Ill.,588F.3d940,
943(7thCir.2009)(citationsomitted).Ifeitherasuspectclass
orfundamentalrightisimplicated,thegovernmentsjusti
ficationfor
the
regulation
must
satisfy
the
strict
scrutiny
test
topassmusterundertheEqualProtectionClause.Id.Butif
neitherconditionispresent,theproperstandardofreviewis
rationalbasis.Id.
PlaintiffAppellantsarguethattheIndianaRighttoWork
ActviolatestheEqualProtectionClauseintwoways:(1)be
cause it allows free riders to infringe on unionmembers
FirstAmendment free speech rights, and (2)because it al
lows free riders to infringe on the rightofunionmember
ship,which
is
afundamental
right
because
it
involves
the
exercise of First Amendment association and assembly
rights.Weholdthatthelawdoesnotviolatetheequalpro
tection clausebecause itdoesnot implicate a fundamental
right,anditpassesthelowbarofrationalbasisreviewwith
ease.
i. FirstAmendmentFreeSpeechRights
ThestrongerofPlaintiffAppellantstwoequalprotection
argumentsistheassertionthatnonpayorsofRepresentation
Fees will be freeriders who siphon valuable Union re
sourcesawayfromtheUnionspoliticalactivities.Indimin
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26 No.131264
ishingthefinancialresourcesavailableto theUnionforpo
liticalspeech,
Plaintiff
Appellants
argue,
the
Indiana
law
in
fringeson theUnionsFirstAmendment freespeechrights.
We agree that unions have the right under the First
Amendment to express their views on political and social
issues without government interference. Knox v. Serv.
Empls.IntlUnion,Local1000,132S.Ct.2277,2295(2012).
However,PlaintiffAppellantsargument isundercutby
threelongstandingprinciples.First,theSupremeCourthas
statedthatunionshavenoconstitutionalentitlementtothe
feesof
non
member
employees.
Davenport v.Wash. Educ.
Assn,551U.S.177,185(2007).Andmorerelevantly,theFirst
Amendmentprotectstherighttobefreefromgovernment
abridgementofspeech,butitdoesnotrequire[]thegov
ernmenttoassistothers in funding theexpressionofpar
ticular ideas, including political ones. Ysursa v. Pocatello
Educ.Assn, 555U.S. 353, 358 (2009). Stated anotherway,
althoughgovernmentmaynotplaceobstaclesinthepathof
apersonsexerciseoffreedomofspeech,itneednotremove
thosenot
of
its
own
creation.
Regan
v.
Taxation
With
Repre
sentationofWash.,461U.S.540,54950(1983)(internalquota
tionmarksandcitationsomitted).ItmaybetruethattheUn
iondoesnothavemoneyasitwants,andthuscannotexer
ciseitsfreedomasitwouldlike,buttheConstitutiondoes
notconferanentitlementtosuchfundsasmaybenecessary
torealizealltheadvantagesofthatfreedom.Id.at550(in
ternal quotationmarks and citations omitted). A legisla
turesdecisionnottosubsidizetheexerciseofafundamental
rightdoesnot infringe the right,and is thusnot subject to
strictscrutiny.
Ysursa,
555
U.S.
at
358
(internal
quotation
marksandcitationsomitted).
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28 No.131264
membersarenotsuspectclasses.Univ.Proflsof Ill.,Local
4100v.Edgar,114
F.3d
665,
667
(7th
Cir.
1997);
seealsoCityof
Charlottev.Local660, IntlAssnofFirefighters,426U.S.283,
286(1976)([T]hiscourtwouldrejectsuchacontentionifit
weremadethatrespondentsstatusasunionmembersis
suchastoentitlethemtospecialtreatmentundertheEqual
ProtectionClause.).Sinceweagreewith theTenthCir
cuitsassertionthatneitherunionnornonunionstatusim
plicatesafundamentalrightorconstitutesaprotectedclass,
Local514v.Keating,358F.3d743,754(10thCir.2004),weopt
forrational
basis
review
unless
Plaintiff
Appellants
can
as
sert a cognizable fundamental right thathasbeen violated
bytheIndianastatute.
PlaintiffAppellants claim that they never asserted that
unionmembersareasuspectclass.Instead,theytrytocob
bleabrandnewfundamentalrighttounionmembershipout
of the fact that union membership implicates the First
Amendmentrightsof freedomofassemblyand freedomof
association. But besides being intellectually threadbare
consider,for
example,
that
these
same
facts
could
be
mar
shalled to support a fundamental right toCivilWar reen
actmentthislineofreasoningwasrejectedbytheSupreme
Courtlongago.UnionmembersinNorthCarolinaandNe
braskamade thesameargumentwhen theychallenged the
twostatesrighttoworklawsinthelate1940s.Theyassert
ed,interalia,thattheirfreedomofassociationandassembly
was infringed. In Lincoln Federal LaborUnionNo. 19129, v.
NorthwesternIron&MetalCo.,theSupremeCourtstated:
There
cannot
be
wrung
from
a
constitutional
right of workers to assemble to discuss im
provementof theirownworking standards,a
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No.131264 29
further constitutional right to drive from re
munerativeemployment
all
other
persons
who
willnotorcannot,participateinunionassem
blies.Theconstitutionalrightofworkerstoas
semble,todiscussandformulateplansforfur
theringtheirownselfinterestinjobscannotbe
construed as a constitutional guarantee that
noneshallgetandholdjobsexceptthosewho
willjoinintheassemblyorwillagreetoabide
bytheassemblysplans.Forwhereconductaf
fectsthe
interests
of
other
individuals
and
the
general public, the legality of that conduct
must be measured by whether the conduct
conforms to valid law, even though the con
ductisengaged inpursuant toplansofanas
sembly.
335U.S.525,531(1949).
There is no doubt that union workers enjoy valuable
rightsofassociationandassemblythatareprotectedbythe
FirstAmendment.
See, e.g., Thomas v.Collins, 323
U.S.
516
(1945).ButasinLincolnFederal,thatrightalonecannotoper
ateasanoffensiveweapontowrestrightsfromothers:here,
theHoosierworkerswhose rightsnot toassociatewith the
unionareprotectedby thenew legislation.See, e.g.,Harris,
134S.Ct.at2643(notingtheFirstAmendmentinterestsof
thosewhodonotwishtosupporttheunion);Knox,132
S.Ct.at2289(holdingthatcompelledmembershipinapub
licsectorunion,whichtakespositionsduringcollectivebar
gaining
that
can
have
powerful
civic
and
political
conse
quences,canconstituteaformofcompelledspeechandas
sociation that imposes a significant impingement on First
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30 No.131264
Amendment rights (citation and internalquotationmarks
omitted)).Plaintiff
Appellants
must
thus
make
agreater
showing:aclearbasisforhow the lawswillexpresslyfor
bidthefullexerciseofthoserightsbyunionorunionmem
bers, Lincoln Federal, 335U.S. at 530, or even a plausible
demonstration of how allowing nonunionworkers to not
payRepresentationFeeswillsomehowweakenthebondsof
theunionsownassociationandassembly.Theyhavefailed
todo sohere.Rationalbasis review is appropriate for this
equalprotectionclaimaswell.
iii.
TheStatute
Passes
Rational
Basis
Review
Statutesthatdonotencroachonafundamentalrightare
reviewedwithconsiderabledeference.SeeUnitedStatesv.
Moore, 644 F.3d 533, 555 (7thCir. 2011). The pertinent in
quiryiswhetherthestatuteinquestionbearsareasonable
relationtoanyproperlegislativepurpose.Id.at55556.Itis
notour task todiscern thespecific intentof the legislature,
buttodetermineifanyproperlegislativepurposeisserved
byIndianaslaw.
Thedistrict courts analysison thispoint is apt.As the
court stated, [a]belief that the passage ofRight toWork
legislation contributes to a businessfriendly environment
that can attract companies and encouragejob growth pro
vides a legitimate governmental objective that may have
been(andwasinfactclaimedtobe)areasonforthepassage
of IndianasRight toWork legislation. Sweeney, 2013WL
209047 at *8.Weneed lookno further for a rationalbasis.
The Indiana law does not violate the PlaintiffAppellants
rightto
equal
protection.
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No.131264 31
III
We noted at the outset that this legislation prompted
vigorousdebate,bothinthegeneralpublicandtheIndiana
Statehouse. But the legislative history and context of the
TaftHartleyActmakeclearthatthecontroversyisonethat
oughttobeaddressedandresolvedattheleveloflegislative
politics, not in the courts. The statutory question posed is
whether Indianas new law is preemptedby federal labor
law,or threatens theUnionsFirstAmendment rights.The
answerisanemphaticno.RighttoWorklawslikeIndianas
haveexisted
since
before
the
passage
of
the
Taft
Hartley
Act
and the inclusion of Section 14(b) of theNLRA.Congress
specificallyreservedtothestatesthepowertowriteanden
force laws of this nature, in accordance with individual
statesneedsandwisdom.Itisnotourprovincetowrestthis
authority,whichhasbeen intact andundisturbed for over
sixtyfiveyears,fromthestatesanderasethedistinctionbe
tweenrighttoworkstatesandnonrighttoworkstates.
Fortheforegoingreasons,weAFFIRMthedistrictcourts
judgment.
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32 No.131264
WOOD,ChiefJudge,dissenting.Todaysdecision iseither
incorrector
it
lays
bare
an
unconstitutional
confiscation
per
petuatedbyourcurrentsystemoflaborlaw.Inmyview,the
betterviewistheformer:themajorityhassimplymisunder
stood the federal statutory scheme, taken as awhole. The
plain languageof section14(b)of theNationalLaborRela
tionsAct(NLRA)doesnotsupportsuchsweepingforcefor
IndianasRight toWork law.IND.CODE2266.Noruling
of theSupremeCourthasgone this far,and the legislative
historyofsection14(b)(forthosewhoconsideritrelevantat
all)is
inconclusive.
Even
if,
however,
one
thought
that
there
weresomeambiguityintheNLRA,theprincipleofconstitu
tional avoidance provides a powerful reason to reject the
majoritysholding.Iwouldfindsections8(2)and8(3)ofIn
dianas statute, Ind.Code 22668(2), (3), preemptedby
federalstatute.Ithereforerespectfullydissent.
I
It is impossible tounderstandwhat isatstakeandwhy
themajoritysresolutionisinerrorwithoutabriefreviewof
thelabor
law
regime
in
the
United
States.
Inaugurated
in
1935with thepassageof theWagnerAct, 49Stat. 452, the
NLRAreliesonasystemofexclusiverepresentationofbar
gainingunitemployees.See29U.S.C.159(a).That is, ifa
majorityoftheemployeesinadefinedsectionofaworkforce
vote in favor of aparticularunion to represent them, that
unionisrequiredbylawtorepresentalltheworkersinthe
bargaining unitsupporters and nonsupporters, members
and nonmembers, alike. Id.; see IntlAssn ofMachinists v.
Street,367
U.S.
740,
76061
(1961)
(a
unions
status
as
exclu
sivebargainingrepresentativecarrieswithitthedutyfairly
andequitablytorepresentallemployeesofthecraftorclass,
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No.131264 33
union and nonunion). (This is hardly an unfamiliar ar
rangementin
ademocracy.
Even
after
the
most
hotly
con
testedpresidentialelection, thepersonwho isdeclared the
winnerbecomes thePresidentforallcitizens,notjust those
whovotedforhimorher.)Thereisnothinginevitableabout
our systemof labor law; it canbe contrastedwithahypo
theticalregime that ismoreprotectiveofminorityormem
bersonlyunions,underwhichemployeeswhowanttobar
gaincollectivelymightbe free to formamembersonlyun
ion and interactwith their employer on thatbasis.But, to
repeat,that
is
not
the
system
that
the
United
States
has
adopted.
Consequencesflowfrom theunionsstatusastheexclu
sive representative of allmembers of thebargaining unit.
Themostsignificantiswhatisknownasthedutyoffairrep
resentation.SeeSteele v.Louisville&N.R.Co., 323U.S. 192
(1944)(recognizingthedutyoffairrepresentationunderthe
RailwayLaborAct);FordMotorCo.v.Huffman,345U.S.330,
33738 (1953) (extendingduty of fair representation to the
NationalLabor
Relations
Act).
The
duty
of
fair
representa
tionrequirestheexclusivebargainingrepresentative(i.e.,the
union)toservetheinterestsofallmembers[ofthebargain
ingunit]withouthostilityordiscrimination towardany, to
exerciseitsdiscretionwithcompletegoodfaithandhonesty,
and toavoidarbitraryconduct.Vacav.Sipes,386U.S.171,
177 (1967).Thisduty isnot limited to thenegotiationpro
cess; it covers allunion representational activity. See id. at
19091(dutyoffairrepresentationextendstogrievanceand
arbitration);AirLinePilotsAssn,Intl.v.ONeil,499U.S.65,
67(1991)
(We
hold
that
the
rule
announced
in
Vaca
ap
plies toallunionactivity .).TheSupremeCourtsopin
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34 No.131264
ioninAboodv.DetroitBd.ofEduc.,431U.S.209(1977),sum
marizedthe
scope
of
those
duties
well:
Thedesignationofaunionasexclusiverepresentative
carrieswith itgreat responsibilities.The tasksofne
gotiating and administering a collectivebargaining
agreementand representing the interestsofemploy
eesinsettlingdisputesandprocessinggrievancesare
continuing and difficult ones. They often entail ex
penditureofmuch timeandmoney.The services
of lawyers,expertnegotiators,economists,anda re
searchstaff,
as
well
as
general
administrative
person
nel,mayberequired.Moreover,incarryingoutthese
duties, the union is obliged fairly and equitably to
represent all employees , union and nonunion,
withintherelevantunit.
Id.at221(internalcitationandquotationmarksomitted).
As thispassageacknowledges,amajorpartof thework
assigned tomostunionsundercollectivebargainingagree
ments
relates
to
the
administration
of
the
grievance
proce
dure.Grievingandarbitratingclaimsisnotcheap.Theweb
siteoftheTeamstersunioninformsitsmembersthat78%of
theirduesstaywithyourlocalunionforavarietyofpur
poses,includingtheretentionof[a]ttorneystoassistinne
gotiations, grievances, and arbitration. See
http://teamster.org/about/frequentlyaskedquestions
faq#faq06 (this and all otherwebsites cited in this opinion
were last visitedAugust 29, 2014). The LaborArbitration
Rulesof theAmericanArbitrationAssociation,availableby
followingthe
links
in
the
Rules
&
Procedures
tab
at
http://www.adr.org, outline a comprehensive process that
obviouslycostsrealmoney. It isnostretch toestimate that
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36 No.131264
vidually(thatis,thesellercanensurethatonlythebuyerob
tainsthe
benefit),
free
riding
will
not
be
aproblem.
But
if
eachpersoninthegroupobtainsthebenefitofthecollective
goodwhetherornotshepaysforit,thenthereisariskthat
thesupplyofthegoodwilldiminish,orinthelimitingcase
will disappear altogether. See generally Earl R. Burbaker,
FreeRide,FreeRevelation,orGoldenRule?18J.L.&ECON.147,
149150(1975);RussellB.Korobkin&ThomasS.Ulen,Law
andBehavioralScience:RemovingtheRationalityExceptionfrom
LawandEconomics,88CALIF.L.REV.1051,1139(2000).Thus,
forexample,
the
realization
of
the
risk
of
free
riding
by
dis
tributorswhodidnotwant toprovide services thatmanu
facturers valued led antitrust law to change from aper se
prohibition of vertical restraints to a ruleofreason ap
proach.SeeContlT.V.,Inc.v.GTESylvania,Inc.,433U.S.36
(1977); LeeginCreative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S.877(2007).Inoursituation,thenonmemberoftheunion
willreapthebenefitsofbeingrepresentedbytheuniondur
ing a grievance, for instance,but hewill pay nothing for
those benefits, which might include a lay representative,
maybeevena lawyer, investigativeservices,andsoonall
thingsthatcosttheunionrealdollarstoprovide.Inshort,he
will takeafreerideon thedues that theunionmembers
maketotheunion.
Thesameproblemarisesinaunionizedworkplace(that
is,aworkplace inwhichamajorityof theemployeeshave
votedtohaveaunionrepresent them, inanelectionsuper
visedbytheNationalLaborRelationsBoard,orNLRB).Be
causeallmembersofthebargainingunitbenefitasamatter
ofright
from
the
unions
representational
activities
regard
lessofwhethertheyjointheunion,thereisanincentivefor
employeesinthebargainingunittorefusetocontributeto
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No.131264 37
theunionwhile obtainingbenefits ofunion representation
thatnecessarily
accrue
to
all
employees.
Abood,
431
U.S.
at
222.Thebenefitsinthiscase,asinmost,extendwellbeyond
theboostfromunionspeechthat theSupremeCourtfound
inadequate to support a rule requiring nonmember fair
sharecontributionsinHarrisv.Quinn,134S.Ct.2618,2636
37(2014).IdiscussHarrisinmoredetailbelow.
Thequestionisthereforewhetherthelawasitstandsto
dayincludesasolutiontothepotentialfreeriderproblem.If
itdoes,bycreatingawaytorequirenonmemberstopayfor
actualbenefits
received,
then
all
is
well.
If
it
does
not,
then
issues of constitutional magnitude arise. As the Supreme
Courthasrecognized,[t]ocompelemployeesfinanciallyto
support their collectivebargaining representative has an
impactupontheirFirstAmendmentinterests.Id.Buttoex
empt employees from reimbursing a service provider for
workperformedcreatesadifferentconstitutionalissueone
that theSupremeCourthashad little tonooccasion todis
cuss.ButwecangleansomethingfromPhillipsv.Washington
LegalFoundation,
524
U.S.
156
(1998),
which
addressed
the
question whether interest income generated by funds in
lawyerstrustaccounts(IOLTA)wastheprivatepropertyof
theclient.TheCourtheldthatitwas.Thatholdingraisedthe
questionwhetherclientscouldbecompelledtodonatetheir
property toafoundationthatprovidedlegalservices to the
indigent.InBrownv.LegalFoundationofWashington,538U.S.
216(2003),theCourtheldthatifthestatewishedtorequire
the clientsproperty tobe transferred from the IOLTA ac
count to the foundation, its actionhad tobejudgedunder
theTakings
Clause
of
the
Fifth
Amendment.
It
held
that
the
clientspropertyhadbeentakenforapublicusewhenitwas
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38 No.131264
turnedover, see538U.S.at235,but thatno compensation
wasdue,
because
the
petitioners
net
loss
was
zero.
Id.at
240.
ThelessonfromtheIOLTAcasesforusisthatastatelaw
compelling one private party to give property to another
private partymustbe assessed under the TakingsClause.
Thefactthatthosetwocasesinvolvedmoney,whileourcase
involves thecompulsoryprovisionofservices, isofnomo
ment.(This,incidentally,showswhytheplaintiffshavesued
the correct party: it is the Indiana law that is compelling
them todonatevaluableservices to thenonmembersof the
unions,just
as
it
was
state
law
in
Phillips and
Brown that
compelledclientstodonatetheirmoneytothelegalfounda
tions.Compareanteat20.)Servicescostmoney toprovide:
unionrepresentativesmustbepaid,union lawyersmustbe
paid, and collective bargaining is not free. Justice Scalia
flaggedthisprobleminhisseparateopinioninLehnertv.Fer
risFacultyAssn,500U.S.507(1991)(concurringinjudgment
inpart,dissentinginpart):
Wherethestateimposesupontheunionadutyto
deliverservices,
it
may
permit
the
union
to
demand
reimbursementforthem;or,lookedatfromtheother
end,where thestatecreates in thenonmembersa le
galentitlementfromtheunion,itmaycompelthemto
paythecost.Thecompellingstateinterestthatjusti
fies this constitutional rule isnot simplyelimination
of the inequityarisingfrom thefact thatsomeunion
activityredounds to thebenefitoffreeridingnon
members;private speech often furthers the interests
of
nonspeakers,
and
that
does
not
alone
empower
the
statetocompelthespeechtobepaidfor.Whatisdis
tinctive, however, about the free riders who are
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No.131264 39
nonunion members of the unions own bargaining
unitis
that
in
some
respects
theyare
free
riders
whom
the lawrequires theunion tocarryindeed,requires
theunion togo out of itsway tobenefit,evenat the
expense of its other interests. In the context ofbar
gaining,aunionmustseek to further the interestsof
itsnonmembers;itcannot,forexample,negotiatepar
ticularlyhighwage increases for itsmembers in ex
changeforacceptingnoincreasesforothers.Thus,the
freeridership(ifitwerelefttobethat)wouldbenot
incidentalbut
calculated,
not
imposed
by
circum
stancesbutmandatedbygovernmentdecree.
Id.at556.Lehnert itselfdealtwith limitationson theuseby
publicsectorunionsofdissenterscontributions.TheCourts
holding that thestateconstitutionallywasnotpermitted to
compel its employees to subsidize legislative lobbying or
otherpoliticalactivities innowayundermines the forceof
JusticeScaliasobservationsabout thefreeriderproblemas
it relates to the representational services that the unions
mustprovide
to
nonmembers.
Actingwhollywithin theboundaries of the governing
legislation,theSupremeCourthasreconciledthecostlydu
ties imposedby law onunionswith the rights ofworkers
whodonotwish toparticipate in (orpay for) thatunions
nonrepresentational activities. Ithasdone sobydrawinga
linebetweenwhatnonunionmembersofabargainingunit
canandcannotbecompelledtopay theunion.Pursuant to
section8(a)(3)oftheNLRA,29U.S.C.158(a)(3),unionsand
employers
may
require
all
employees
within
a
bargaining
unit(unionmembersandnonmembersalike)topaytheun
ion for the costsassociatedwith theunions collectivebar
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40 No.131264
gainingandcontractadministrationfunctions.See,e.g.,Beck,
487U.S.
at
738.
Beckheld
that
although
section
8(a)(3)
of
the
Act permits an employer and a union to enter into an
agreement underwhich all employeesmustmake certain
paymentstotheunion(essentiallyreimbursingtheunionfor
servicespromisedandrendered),itdoesnotpermittheun
iontocollectfundsfromobjectorsforactivitiesunrelatedto
collectivebargaining, contract administration, or grievance
adjustment.Id.
MycolleaguesbelievethatBeckcharacterizesthoseobjec
torsas
union
members,
and
indeed
at
one
point
the
Court
saysthatthemembershipthatmaybesorequired[bysec
tion8(a)(3)]hasbeen whittleddown to its financialcore.
Id.at745.Butall theCourt is talkingaboutat thatpoint in
the opinion iswhat canbe compelled of employees. Else
where,itmakesclearthattheBeckobjectorswerenotunion
members.Howelsecanonereadthestatementatthebegin
ning of theopinion,where theCourt says [i]nJune 1976,
respondents,20employeeswhochosenot tobecomeunion
members,initiated
this
suit
.
Id.
at
739
(emphasis
added).
Themajority has effectively deleted from theCourts Beck
opinionitsstatementofthepreciseissueitwasdeciding:
Todaywemust decidewhether this provision also
permits aunion, over the objections of duespaying
nonmember employees, to expend funds so collected
on activities unrelated to collectivebargaining, con
tractadministration,orgrievanceadjustment,and, if
so,whethersuchexpendituresviolatetheunionsdu
ty
of
fair
representation
or
the
objecting
employees
FirstAmendmentrights.
Id.at738(emphasisadded).
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No.131264 41
Tojustify its decision to assign the status of statutory
membersto
nonmembers
of
the
union,
the
majority
seizes
onthecommenttowhichIjustreferred,totheeffectthatthe
1947 amendments to theNLRA whittleddown the term
membershipinthestatutetoitsfinancialcore.Thislan
guagecamedirectlyfromNLRBv.GeneralMotorsCorp.,373
U.S. 734, 742 (1963), and so in order to understand it,we
mustlookatthatdecision.Whenonedoesso,itisapparent
that themajoritys reading cannot stand.Nothing ineither
GeneralMotorsorBeckwipedouttheconceptofnonmember
inthe
course
of
defining
the
term
member.
The
passage
in
GeneralMotorsfromwhichthatquoteisliftedisprefacedby
the statement that[u]nder the secondproviso to8(a)(3),
theburdensofmembershipuponwhich employmentmay
beconditionedareexpresslylimitedtothepaymentofinitia
tionfeesandmonthlydues. Id.(emphasisadded).TheCourt
didnotequateinitiationfeesandmonthlyduestothefair
sharepayment that it recognizedaquarter century later in
Beck. The only point itwasmaking inGeneralMotorswas
thatadutytopaybothinitiationfeesandmonthlydueswas
enoughtomakesomeoneamember,eveniftheuniondis
claimed the idea thatmembershipwent alongwith those
payments.Reality, inotherwords, iswhatgoverns;not la
bels.Unsurprisingly,peoplewhoarecompelledtopaypre
cisely the same amount as unionmembers pay shouldbe
considereddefactomembers.Withthisbackgroundinmind,
themajoritysrationalefordisregardingtheCourtsownde
scriptionof theissuethatitdecidedinBeckfallsapart.Beck
makesclearthatobjectorsarenotmembers,butthattheycan
becompelled
to
pay
for
the
services
that
they
consume.
Insodoing,Beckfinetunestherulesgoverningarecog
nized union, on the one hand, and the nonmembers for
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42 No.131264
whom theunion is responsible,on theother. Itdoes soby
holdingthat
while
the
collection
of
dues
unrelated
to
collec
tivebargaining(andotherrepresentationalactivitiessuchas
thehandlingofgrievances)wouldviolate theFirstAmend
mentrightsofthenonmembers,federallawneverthelessen
titles the union to collect fees fixedby their underlying
purposedefrayingthecostsofcollectivebargaining.Beck,
487U.S.at759. Interestingly, theCourtalluded to the free
rider issuewhen it recognized that the legislativejustifica
tion for section 8(a)(3)was to ensur[e] that nonmembers
whoobtain
the
benefits
of
union
representation
can
be
made
topayforthem.Id.
Beforeturningtothewayinwhichtheseprinciplesapply
tothecasebeforeus,IaddafewwordsabouttheSupreme
Courts recentdecision inHarrisv.Quinn, supra.Theques
tioninHarriswaswhethertheFirstAmendmentpermitsa
Statetocompelpersonalcareproviderstosubsidizespeech
onmatters of public concernby a union that they do not
wish tojoinor support.134S.Ct. at 2623.TheCourt an
sweredthat
question
in
the
negative.
It
held
that
the
person
alcareworkerscouldnotberequiredtopayeventheagency
feethatAboodhadauthorized,intheunusualcircumstances
of theirworkplace.TheCourtstressed the fact that thedif
ferencebetweencoreunionspeechandissuessuchaswag
es,pensions,andbenefits forpublicemployees is farmore
elusive than it is for private employees. It commented on
the conceptualdifficultyofdistinguishing inpublicsector
casesbetweenunionexpenditures thataremade forcollec
tivebargainingpurposesandthosethataremadetoachieve
politicalends.
Id.at
2632.
The
Court
also
found
significant
thefactthatthepersonalcareassistantswerehardlypublic
employeesatall: theywerehired, fired,andsupervisedby
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No.131264 43
theclient,andtheywerenoteligibleforahostofstatebene
fits.This
unusual
status,
it
wrote,
has
important
implica
tionsfortheabilityoftheuniontochargeanagencyfee.Id.
at2636.Aboods rationaleisbasedon theassumption that
theunionpossessesthefullscopeofpowersanddutiesgen
erallyavailableunderAmericanlaborlaw.Id.
InHarris,practicallytheonlythingtheunionwasdoing
waspresentingitsviewstothestate.Itcouldnotsetwages,
whichwereestablishedbylaw,andithadnoauthorityover
grievances.Inthatsetting,allthatwasleftwasspeech.Well
establishedprinciples
entitled
the
objectors
to
refuse
to
pay
a
fee that could onlybe subsidizing that speech. TheCourt
uncoverednothingofvaluethattheunionwascompelledto
furnishto theobjectors,andso ithadnooccasion toworry
aboutanycompelledtransferofpropertyorservices.
The casebefore us does not share thosedistinguishing
featuresofHarris.Itconcernsprivateemployersandprivate
employees, not state employees. The rights of employees
whoarenotunionmemberstorefrainfromsubsidizingun
ionspeech
are
fully
protected
by
their
entitlement
to
give
the
uniononlyafairsharethatiscappedbythecostsofrepre
sentational activity.TheHarrisCourt itself recognized that
the casebefore it lacked all of the features that havebeen
understoodtojustifytheagencyfee:
Whatjustifies the agency fee, the argument goes, is
the fact that theStatecompels theunion topromote
andprotecttheinterestsofnonmembers.Ibid.Specifi
cally,theunionmustnotdiscriminatebetweenmem
bersand
nonmembers
in
negotiating
and
adminis
tering a collectivebargaining agreement and repre
sentingtheinterestsofemployeesinsettlingdisputes
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44 No.131264
andprocessinggrievances.Ibid.Thismeansthatthe
unioncannot,
for
example,
negotiate
particularly
highwage increases for itsmembers inexchange for
acceptingnoincreasesforothers.Ibid.Andithasthe
dutytoprovideequalandeffectiverepresentationfor
nonmembersingrievanceproceedings,seeIll.Comp.
Stat.Ann.,ch.5,315/6,315/8,anundertaking that
can be very involved. See, e.g., SEIU: Member Re
sources, available at www.seiu.or/a/members/
disputesandgrievancesrightsproceduresandbest
practices.php(detailing
the
steps
involved
in
adjust
inggrievances).
134 S. Ct. at 263637. Every one of the features thatwas
missinginHarrisispresentinthecasebeforeus.Itherefore
conclude that nothing inHarris undermines either Beck or
theanalysisIhavedescribedthusfar.
II
The questionbefore us is how these principles operate
when
a
state
chooses
to
adopt
a
so
called
right
to
work
law (either by statute or in its constitution). Indiana has
passed such a law. See IND. CODE 2266. Federal law
leaves some room for such state laws,pursuant to section
14(b) of theNLRA, 29U.S.C. 164(b).But the question is
whetherstatelawcancommandtheunion(aprivateorgani
zation)toperformuncompensatedservicesforotherprivate
parties(thenonmembers).Ifthefederallaborlawspreempt
thiskindof state law, then the state lawmustyield. If the
federalstatuteeitherauthorizes thiskindof takingor issi
lent,then
we
must
move
to
the
constitutional
issues
to
whichIhavealluded.
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No.131264 45
Bearinginmindthatweshouldalwaysconsiderstatuto
ryarguments
first,
see,
e.g., SolidWasteAgency ofN. Cook
Cnty.v.U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngrs,531U.S.159,162(2001),I
analyze theNLRAbefore tacklingany constitutional issue.
WeallagreethatthepivotalsectionoftheNLRAissection
14(b), 29 U.S.C. 164(b). Section 14(b)was added to the
NLRAin1947bytheTaftHartleyAct,61Stat.151,aspartof
aneffort toreinincertainunionpracticesthatCongressre
garded as abusive. Entitled Agreements requiring union
membership in violation of State law, section 14(b) states
that:
Nothing in this subchaptershallbeconstruedasau
thorizing theexecutionorapplicationofagreements
requiringmembershipinalabororganizationasacon
dition of employment in any State or Territory in
whichsuchexecutionorapplication isprohibitedby
StateorTerritoriallaw.
29U.S.C. 164(b) (emphasis added). This is the language
thatwemustconstrue.Thequestioniswhatitmeanstosay
thatstates
can
prohibit
agreements
requiring
membership
inalabororganizationasaconditionofemployment.More
particularly,wemustdecidewhethersection14(b)authoriz
es the sweeping prohibitions found in Indianas Right to
Worklaw.Plaintiffschallengebothsection3andsection8of
thatlaw,Ind.Code22663and22668,butIagreewith
themajority that section 3 adds nothing to the picture. I
thereforefocusonsubparts2and3ofsection8,whichpro
videasfollowsinrelevantpart:
Aperson
may
not
require
an
individual
to:
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46 No.131264
(2) pay dues, fees, assessments, or other charges of
anykindoramountto
alabor
organization;
or
(3)pay toacharityor thirdpartyanamount that is
equivalent tooraproratapartofdues, fees,assess
ments,orotherchargesrequiredofmembersofa la
bororganization;
asaconditionofemploymentorcontinuationofem
ployment.
IND.CODE22668(emphasisadded).
Statutoryinterpretation
begins
with
the
plain
language
ofthestatute.UnitedStatesv.Berkos,543F.3d392,396(7th
Cir. 2008).Courts should assume that thepurpose of the
statute is communicated by the ordinary meaning of the
wordsCongressused;therefore,absentanyclearindication
of a contrary purpose, the plain language is conclusive.
UnitedStatesv.Ye,588F.3d411,41415 (7thCir.2009).My
colleagues read theword membership oddly, as aword
thatdescribesbothunionmembersandnonmembersofthe
union.Nonmembers
somehow
morph
into
members,
they
say, if thenonmembersare required topay theunion any
thing, even a fee limited to reimbursement for the services
thatfederal law insists theyareentitled toreceive from the
union.By this logic, IbecomeamemberofChicagosUni
versityClubtheminuteIsomuchaspayformydinneratan
eventhosted there.Thiswould come as a surprise toboth
theClubandme.Onemightevenaskifmoneyissignificant
atall:Iassume thatnonmemberswhoenjoyunionservices
forfreefalloutsideeven themajoritysdefinitionofmem
bership,thoughIdonotknowwhythatshouldbethecase,
iftheyarestillbeingrepresentedbytheunion.Themajority
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No.131264 47
believes that its interpretationof section14(b) iscompelled
bythe
language
of
the
NLRA,
as
interpreted
by
the
Supreme
Court. In addition, it relies very heavily on the legislative
historyoftheTaftHartleyAct,anteat1318.Withrespect,I
donotagreewithitsreadingofthestatutorylanguage,andI
cannot agree that the legislative history has anyparticular
persuasivevalue.
ThedecisionsknownasRetailsClerksIandIImarkedthe
first time theSupremeCourtaddressedastatespowerun
der section 14(b). SeeRetailClerks IntlAssn, Local 1625 v.
Schermerhorn,373
U.S.
746
(1963)
(RetailClerks I)
and
Retail
Clerks Intl Assn, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96
(1963)(RetailClerksII).InRetailClerksItheCourtreviewed
anagencyshopagreementunderwhichallemployeesatthe
companywere required topay fullunion fees,whetheror
nottheywereunionmembers.TheCourthadheldinGeneral
Motors thatanagency shop clause thatwasnotprohibited
bystatelawwasapermissiblesubjectofcollectivebargain
ing. 373 U.S. at 735. But GeneralMotors arose in Indiana,
whichat
the
time
permitted
agency
shop
agreements;
Retail
Clerks I, in contrast, arose inFlorida,whichhas a rightto
work law that forbade thesearrangements.Relyingon sec
tion 14(b) and the righttowork legislation, the plaintiffs
(nonunionizedemployees)broughtalawsuitseekingadec
laration that the agencyshopprovisionwas void.Defend
antsargued,interalia,thatsection14(b)gavestatesonlythe
power toprohibit agreements that required membership
inlabororganizations.Agencyshopagreements,defendants
pointedout,didnotrequiremembership;theymerelyre
quirednonmembers
to
pay
fees
equal
to
membership
fees.
This,defendantsurged,wascompatiblewiththestatute.
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48 No.131264
Thedistrictcourtfoundthatthestatesrighttoworklaw
outlawednot
only
union
shops
(under
which
union
mem
bershipcouldbecompelled)butalsoagencyshops.TheSu
premeCourtaffirmed, finding that[a]t thevery least, the
agreements requiring membership ina laborunionwhich
are expressly permittedby the proviso [to 8(a)(3)] are the
same membershipagreementsexpresslyplacedwithin the
reachof state lawby 14(b). 373U.S. at 751.Pointing to
GeneralMotors, theCourt found that agencyshop arrange
mentswhichimpose[]onemployeestheonlymembership
obligationenforceable
under
8(a)(3)
by
discharge,
namely,
theobligationtopayinitiationfeesandregularduesisthe
practical equivalent of an agreement requiringmember
ship ina labororganizationasaconditionofemployment.
Whatevermay be the status of less stringentunionsecurity ar
rangements,theagencyshopiswithin14(b).Id.at75152
(emphasisadded).
As the statement just highlighted demonstrates, the
Courtwascareful inRetailClerksIto leaveforanotherday
thestatus
of
less
comprehensive
arrangements.
It
observed
that thepetitionersoriginallyhad likened their case to the
GeneralMotorsagencyshop.373U.S.at752n.4.Only later,
uponbriefingandargument,didtheytrytodistinguishtheir
situation from the fullblown agency shop. Id.At that late
hour,theyarguedthattheclauseintheiragreementprovid
ed thatnonunionemployeeswouldcontribute to theunion
for thepurpose of aiding theUnion indefraying costs in
connectionwith its legalobligationsand responsibilitiesas
theexclusivebargainingagentof theemployees in theap
propriatebargaining
unit.
Id.
at
752.
The
petitioners
assert
edthatthislanguageconfinedpaymentsfromnonmembers
tocollectivebargainingpurposesaloneandprohibitedthe
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No.131264 49
union fromusing thepaymentsfor institutionalpurposes
unrelatedto
its
exclusive
agency
functions.
Id.
The SupremeCourt rejected this lastminute attempt to
distinguishGeneralMotors.Itpointedoutthatcontrarytothe
petitionerssuggestion,theclauseatissueimposednoiron
clad restrictiononwhat theunioncoulddowith thepay
mentsitreceivedfromnonmembers,andthustherewasno
safeguardagainsttheunionsuseofthemoneyforinstitu
tional items. Id. at 753. In addition,because theproposed
servicefeewassetatanamountequaltotheunionsiniti
ationfees
and
dues,
which
could
be
used
for
any