1Phil. Migrant Rights Watch vs OWWAFACTS:Petitioners alleged that the OWWA was created by law to provide welfare services to all Filipino overseas contract workers, without limiting the same to member-contributors only. However, because of thepassage of the Omnibus Policies, the OWWA benefts shall be available only to those overseas contract workers who have paid their monetary contribution on a per contract basis.It imposed on the overseas workers the compulsory payment of OWWA membership contribution in the amount of US$25.00, which was originally collected from their employers. This, petitioners contend, is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution for it created a distinction betweenFilipino overseas workers who contributed to the OWWA Fund and those who have not. Respondents countered that the assailed Omnibus Policies do not violate the equal protection clause for the same is germane to the purpose of the law, which requires registration and documentation of overseas workers for their protections from exploitation in foreign countries. Moreover, the prescribed membership fees chargeable to theemployers had long been implemented. On August 31, 2004, the RTC promulgated its Order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. According to the lower court, the determination of constitutionality of the assailed resolution rests, not within its jurisdiction, but within the jurisdiction of this Court. As such, it ruled that the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the subject issuance was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, the lower court held that it could not arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve the constitutionality of the administrative act.On February 18, 2005, petitioners fled the instant petition essentially invoking the following argument:I.THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO. 04-0077 ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION FOR REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE CASES INVOLVING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OR VALIDITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS.Petitioners fault the RTC for abruptly dismissing their complaint for lack of jurisdiction when it is well established in law and jurisprudence that Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality or legality of administrative rules and regulations, such as the Omnibus Policies promulgated by respondents herein. The reliance on our ruling in Fortich v. Corona, petitioners posit, is misplaced for the same involves a resolution issued by the Ofce of thePresident in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Hence, the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not the appropriate remedy in the instant case.In their Comment, respondents counter that petitioners, in fling the instant action with this Court, committed serious procedural error for violating the doctrine of judicial hierarchy of courts. According to respondents, petitioners should have frst fled an appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA), pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.6 Respondents further reiterated the validity of the subject Omnibus Policies.We rule in favor of petitioners.Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the mode of appeal in all cases involving only questions of law shall be by petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 45.7Time and again, this Court has distinguished cases involving pure questions of law from those of pure questions of fact in the following manner:A question of fact exists when a doubt or diference arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query isfactual. On the other hand, there is a question of law when the doubt ordiference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. In a case involving a question of law, the resolution of the issue rests solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.8In the present petition, the appeal interposed by petitioners stems from the Orders of the RTC dismissing their complaint for lack of jurisdiction.The issue raised herein is one of jurisdiction over the subject matter, specifcally, whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioners complaint challenging the constitutionality of the Omnibus Policies issued by respondents.Jurisdiction is the right to act or the power and authority to hear and determine a case.9 It is conferred only by the Constitution or by statute.10 The question as to whether or not the dismissal by the lower court for lack of jurisdiction is proper involves the determination of whether, admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the trial court has jurisdiction over the same in light of the laws governing jurisdiction.11 As such, jurisdiction is neither a question of fact or of factand law but a matter of law. For this reason, We have consistently held that a courts jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is a questionof law,12 and have, in fact, afrmed dismissals by the CA of appeals brought to them involving pure questions of law.13 Considering that only questions of law was raised in this petition, direct resort to this Court is proper.14We cannot, therefore, give credence to the lower courts contention thatthe appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the issuance subject of this case is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Certiorari, as a special civil action, is available only if: (1) it is directed against a tribunal, board, or ofcer exercising judicial orquasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or ofcer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any 2plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.15chanrobleslawIn this case, respondents did not act in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity in issuing the assailed resolution. They were not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending parties to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial nature. Instead, their issuance of the challenged resolution was done in the exercise of their quasi-legislativeand administrative functions within the confnes of the granting law.Hence, contrary to the lower courts contention, certiorari is not the proper remedy in the instant case.As to whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter involved in this case, it is settled in law and jurisprudence that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, executive order, or administrative regulation, as recognized in Section 2(a), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: x x x x(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or afrm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide fnal judgments and orders oflower courts in:(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.16In view of the foregoing provision, the jurisdiction of regular courts involving the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation cannot bedenied. We have had several occasions wherein We afrmed the powerof the RTC to take cognizance of actions assailing a specifc rule or set of rules promulgated by administrative bodies for the power of judicial review is vested by the Constitution not only in this Court but in all Regional Trial Courts.17It was, therefore, erroneous for the RTC to abruptly dismiss the complaint fled by petitioners on the basis of lack of jurisdiction since said court clearly had the power to take cognizanceof the same. In so doing, the lower court failed to ascertain factual issues necessary to determine whether the subject issuance is, indeed,invalid and violative of the Constitution. Considering the settled rule thatthis Court is not a trier of facts,18 a remand of this case to the RTC for the proper determination of the merits of the complaint is just and proper.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED.The Orders of the Regional Trial Court, dated August 31, 2004 and January 14, 2005, in Civil Case No. 04-0077, are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. This case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXI (111), Pasay City, for further proceedings.SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibraryOFELIA FAUNI REYES AND NOEL FAUNI REYES, PETITIONERS,VS.THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., RESPONDENT.DECISIONFACTS:Joseph Fauni Reyes took out two life insurance policies from respondent Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular Life), designating the petitioners as his benefciaries. In September and October 1998, Insular Life issued Insurance Policy Nos. A001440747 and A001440758, respectively, with a total face value of P8,000,000.00in favor of Joseph.On 1998, a charred body inside the trunk of a burnt BMW car that Joseph owned was found in Ternate, Cavite. The petitioners, believing that the charred body belonged to Joseph, fled a claim for death benefts before Insular Life. The latter, however, denied the claim on thegrounds of Josephs alleged misrepresentation and concealment of material facts in life insurance applications.On 1999, Insular Life fled against the petitioners a complaint for rescission of insurance contracts and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati Branch 57. The IssueThe case comes to us with the sole issue of whether the petitioners areentitled to execution pending appeal.The Courts RulingWe deny the petition.The petition has already been rendered moot and academic with the entry of judgment in G.R. No. 189605The existence of an actual case or controversy is a condition precedentfor the courts exercise of its power of adjudication. An actual case or controversy exists when there is a confict of legal rights or an assertionof opposite legal claims between the parties that is susceptible or ripe for judicial resolution. In negative terms, a justiciable controversy must neither be conjectural nor moot and academic. There must be a defniteand concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of the parties who have adverse legal interests. The reason is that the issue ceases to be justiciable when a controversy becomes moot and academic; otherwise, the court would engage in rendering an advisory opinion on what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. The disposition of the case would not have any practical use or value as there is no actual substantial relief to which the applicant would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal or denial of thepetition.There is a fnal judgment when the court has adjudicated on the merits of the case or has categorically determined the rights and obligations ofthe parties in the case. A fnal judgment, once rendered, leaves nothingmore to be done by the court. Consequently, a fnal judgment also becomes executory by operation of law; it becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is fled or perfected. It becomes incumbent for the clerk of court to enter in the book of entries the judgment and the date of fnality of the judgment shall also be deemed to be the date of the entry of judgment. Thereafter, the prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, and the issuance of the writ becomes the courts ministerial duty.3In the present case, the issue of the propriety of discretionary executionhas already been rendered moot and academic with our denial of Insular Lifes petition and issuance of the entry of judgment in G.R. No. 189605. This means that our afrmation of the lower courts rulings on the main case has become fnal and executory. Consequently, the issue of whether the petitioners are entitled to discretionary execution pending appeal no longer presents any justiciable controversy. It becomes the RTCs ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution in favor of the petitioners who are now entitled to execution as a matter of right.In relation to this, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides thata fnal and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within fve years from the date of its entry. A judgment may also be enforced by action after the lapse of fve years and before it is barred by the statute of limitations. The revived judgment may then be enforced by motion within fve years from the date of its entry.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED forbeing moot and academic. No costs.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 187883June 16, 2009ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO, Petitioners, versus SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives, RespondentsG.R. No.187910LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner versusSPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, Respondents.Facts:The two petitions, fled by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullifcation of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress, convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly to amend the 1987 Constitution. In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a defnitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners contend that the House Resolution contradicts the procedures set forth by the 1987 Constitution regarding the amendment or revision of the same as the separate voting of the members of each House (the Senate and the House of Representatives) is deleted and substituted with a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of Congress (i.e., of the members of Congress without distinction as to which institution of Congress they belong to).Issue:Whether the court has the power to review the case of the validity of House Resolution No. 1109.Held:No. The Supreme Court cannot indulge petitioners supplications. Whilesome may interpret petitioners moves as vigilance in preserving the rule of law, a careful perusal of their petitions would reveal that they cannot hurdle the bar of justiciability set by the Court before it will assume jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional disputes.The Courts power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actualcases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties,and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. The case-or-controversy requirement bans this court from deciding abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions, lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive actionAn aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness. In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: frst, the ftness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintif. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when theact being challenged has had a direct adverse efect on the individual challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in.In the present case, the ftness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. In the frst place, petitioners have not sufciently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.The possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standiThe rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to settle only actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach tothe rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of personal injury to the broader transcendental importance doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the 4ignorant and the ignoble to fle petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral defcit.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998FACTS:On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguingthat the action of the SC not only violated the rule on fnality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the fnality of judgment has already been rendered that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in efectgranted reprieve which is an executive function.HELD:No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, andpardons and remit fnes and forfeitures after conviction by fnal judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying thepower of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their fnality.The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his fnal conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3,2006 (and other consolidated cases)D E C I S I O NSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:I.THE FACTSFilipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5,declaring a state of national emergency, thus:NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well asany act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military ofcers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the ofces of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises in the absence of any ofcial of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP ofcers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence. A.PROCEDURAL:1)Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.2)Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing.B.SUBSTANTIVE:1)Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.2)Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.a. Facial Challengeb. Constitutional Basisc. As Applied Challenge A.PROCEDURAL First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.I- Moot and Academic Principle But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a self-starting capacity.Courts may exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: there must be an actual case or controversy; petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.[24] 5Respondents maintain that the frst and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our discussion thereon.An actual case or controversy involves a confict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution.It is defnite andconcrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legalinterest; a real and substantial controversy admitting of specifc relief.The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered moot and academic by President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021.Such contention lacks merit.A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police ofcers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it.Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts?These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions.It must be stressed that an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it afords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: there is a grave violation of the Constitution; the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions.Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution.There is no question that the issues being raised afect the publics interest, involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules.It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition.Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicialreview.In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary. However, they failed to take into account the Chief Justices very statement that an otherwise moot case may still be decided provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance. The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staf and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deploymentand utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP fled a petition seekingto declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.Issues:Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial reviewHeld:The petition has no merit.First, petitioner failed to sufciently show that it is in possession ofthe requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, thePresident did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lackor excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civiliansupremacy clause of the Constitution.The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII ofthe Constitution, to wit:Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.When questions of constitutional signifcance are raised, theCourt can exercise its power of judicial review only if the followingrequisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual andappropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the partyraising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review ispleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question isthe lis mota of the case.[12]The IBP has not sufciently complied with the requisites ofstanding in this case.Legal standing or locus standi has been defned as a personaland substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained orwill sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is beingchallenged.[13] The term interest means a material interest, an interest inissue afected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in thequestion involved, or a mere incidental interest.[14] The gist of thequestion of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake inthe outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adversenesswhich sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the courtdepends for illumination of difcult constitutional questions.[15]In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on itsalleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the6Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts noother basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by theIBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, whileundoubtedly true, is not sufcient to clothe it with standing in thiscase. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groupsand the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBPhas failed to present a specifc and substantial interest in the resolutionof the case.Case Digest: G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000. 342 SCRA 449BAYAN vs Zamora.Facts: Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in efect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. United States panel met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Afairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacifc region. Both sidesdiscussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Afairs, ratifed the VFA. President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ofcially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratifcation, the letterof the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.Issues (justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA; (2) whether the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution; (3) and whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegaldisbursement of public funds derived from taxation.(2) The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.(3) No. In fne, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, the Court as the fnal arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people is then without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such afairs purely executive and legislative in character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which each of the three political branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.Gonzales v. NarvasaFACTS:Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, fled a petition for prohibition and mandamus fled on December 9, 1999, assailing theconstitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on ConstitutionalReform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive OrderNo. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same. Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the groundsthat it is a public ofce which only the legislature can create by way of a law.ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43HELD:The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has sufered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR.If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any injury in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislatures powers to createa public ofce and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR.Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury.Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities.Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standing so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have beendisbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its operational expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Ofce of the President. Being that case, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefted or injured by the 7judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.Republic vs GarciaCivil Case No. 0193 was a petition for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties fled by the Republic of the Philippines against Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife and children in the Sandiganbayan. In prayingfor the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, the Republic maintained that, as a sovereign political entity, it was exempt from fling the required attachment bond. Sandiganbayan issued a resolution ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of the Garcias upon the fling by the Republic of a P1 million attachment bond. On November 2, 2004, the Republic posted the required attachment bond to avoid any delay in the issuance of the writ as well as to promptly protect and secure its claim. Republic fled a motion for partial reconsideration of the October 29, 2004 resolution claiming that it was exempt from fling an attachment bond and praying for the release thereof. Sandiganbayan ruled that there was nothing in the Rules of Court that exempted the Republic from fling an attachment bond. It reexamined Tolentino v. Carlos which was invoked by the Republic to justify its claimed exemption. That case was decided under the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted more than a century ago. Whether or not Sandiganbayan erred in requiring the state to fle a bond? YES.The Sandiganbayan thus erred when it disregarded the foregoing presumption and instead ruled that the Republic should fle an attachment bond. The error was not simply an error of judgment but grave abuse of discretion. Worse, the Sandiganbayan transgressed the Constitution and arrogated upon itself a power that it did not by law possess. All courts must take their bearings from the decisions and rulings of this Court. Tolentino has not been superseded or reversed. Thus, it is existing jurisprudence and continues to form an important part of our legal system. Surprisingly, the Sandiganbayan declared that Tolentino need(ed) to be carefully reexamined in the light of the changes that the rule on attachment ha(d) undergone through the years. According to the court a quo: [Tolentino] was decided by the Supreme Court employing the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) which was enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901 or more than a century ago. That was then, this is now. The provisions of the old Code of Civil Procedure governing attachment have been substantially modifed in the subsequent Rules of Court. In fact, Rule 57 of the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an expanded modifcation of the provisions of the old Code of Civil Procedure governing attachment. Unlike the oldCode of Civil Procedure, the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is noticeably explicit in its requirement that the party applying for an order of attachment should fle a bond. On this, Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution provides: (3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendereden bancor in division may be modifed or reversed except by the court sittingen banc. (emphasis supplied) The Constitution mandates that only this Court sittingen bancmay modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendereden bancor in division. Any court, the Sandiganbayan included, which renders a decision in violation of this constitutional precept exceeds its jurisdiction. Therefore, the Sandiganbayan could not have validly reexamined, much less reversed, Tolentino. By doing something it could not validly do, the Sandiganbayan actedultra viresand committed grave abuse of discretion. The fact was, the revisions of the Rules of Court on attachment, particularly those pertaining to the fling of an attachment bond, did not quash Tolentino. Accordingly, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The January 14, 2005 and March 2, 2005 resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Republic of the Philippines is declared exempt from the payment or fling of an attachment bond for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment issued in Civil Case No. 0193. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to release the P1,000,000 bond posted by the Republic of the Philippines to the Ofce of the Ombudsman. SO ORDERED.ITF VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004.Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test thesystem in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 amodernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely, Phase I Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III Electronic Transmission.8 On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional P500 million. On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Applyfor Eligibility and to Bid". Five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letterto Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award ofthe Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements (many of which have been discussed at lengthin the Petition), they sought a re-bidding.Issue: Whether the petitioner has standing; and Whether the petition is premature.Respondents chorus that petitioners do not possess locus standi,inasmuch as they are not challenging the validity or constitutionality ofRA 8436. Moreover, petitioners supposedly admitted during the OralArgument that no law had been violated by the award of theContract. Furthermore, they allegedly have no actual and materialinterest in the Contract and, hence, do not stand to be injured orprejudiced on account of the award.On the other hand, petitioners -- suing in their capacities astaxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens -- respond that theissues central to this case are of transcendental importance and ofnational interest. Allegedly, Comelecs fawed bidding and questionableaward of the Contract to an unqualifed entity would impact directly onthe success or the failure of the electoral process. Thus, any taint onthe sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the peoplewould inevitably afect their faith in the democratic system ofgovernment.Petitioners further argue that the award of any contract forautomation involves disbursement of public funds in gargantuanamounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws governing thetransaction must be followed strictly.We agree with petitioners. Our nations political and economicfuture virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004elections. Hence, there can be no serious doubt that the subject matterof this case is a matter of public concern and imbued with publicinterest;[18] in other words, it is of paramount public interest[19] andtranscendental importance.[20]This fact alone would justify relaxing therule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this Courtwhenever a case involves an issue of overarching signifcance to oursociety.[21]Petitioners legal standing should therefore be recognized andupheld.Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to suewhen there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds,[22] or ifpublic money is being defected to any improper purpose;[23] or whenpetitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public fundsthrough the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.[24] In theinstant case, individual petitioners, suing as taxpayers, assert amaterial interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly andlawfully used. In the Petition, they claim that the bidding was defective,the winning bidder not a qualifed entity, and the award of the Contractcontrary to law and regulation. Accordingly, they seek to restrainrespondents from implementing the Contract and, necessarily, frommaking any unwarranted expenditure of public funds pursuantthereto. Thus, we hold that petitioners possess locus standi. House of Sara lee vs ReyCynthia Rey, the Accounts Receivable Clerk and later Credit Administration Supervisor, was found to have violated the company policies pertaining to the unauthorized extension of credit periods, noncollection of remittances, non-imposition of penalty charges, authorizing purchases and giving of supervision fees despite non-remittance, etc. As a result, she was dismissed the respondent for breach of trust and confdence. NLRC and CA ruled in favor of ReyISSUE:Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the caseRuling:Yes.While as a general rule, the factual fndings of administrative agencies are not subject to review by this Court, it is equally established that we will not uphold erroneous conclusions which are contrary to the evidence, because the agency a quo, for that reason, would be guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. Nor is this Court bound by conclusions which are not supported by substantial evidence. The substantial evidence rule does not authorize any fnding just as long as there is any evidence to support it. It does not excuse administrative agencies from considering contrary evidence which fairly detracts from the evidence supporting a fnding. Sec. of Justice vs KoyugaFacts:BI Commissioner Andrea Domingo received an anonymous letterrequesting the deportation of respondent as an undesirable alien for having been found guilty of Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State of Washington, United States of America (USA) for attempted possession of cocaine sometime in 1983. On the basis of a Summary of Information,[4] the Commissioner issued Mission Order , Chief of the Intelligence Mission and any available BI Special Operations Team Member to conduct verifcation/ validation of the admission status and activities of respondent and efect his immediate arrest if he is found to have violated the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.Respondent was arrested and charged before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) for violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. Bureau of Commissioners of BI rendered a decision for deportation. Respondent appealed in DOJ which denied his motion. Unaware of DOJs decision, respondent appeal in CA. CA reversed BC and DOJs decision. ISSUE:9whether the exclusive authority of the BOC over deportation proceedings bars judicial reviewRuling:No. It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and that the BOC has jurisdiction over deportation proceedings. Nonetheless, Article VIII, Section 1of the Constitution has vested power of judicial review in the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, as established by law. Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from that of Congress or of the President, the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive department is contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. When acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency are involved, a petition for certiorari or prohibition may be fled in the CA as provided by law or by the Rules of Court, as amended.[30]Clearly, the fling by respondent of a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to assail the order of deportation on the ground of grave abuse of discretion is permitted.Senate vs ErmitaFACTS:On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a wholeissued invitations to various ofcials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project).On September 28, 2005, the President then issued Executive Order 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Ofcials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes, which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took efect immediately.ISSUE:Whether or not the legislative inquiry is subject to judicial reviewRULING:YES. Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of theexecutive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power ofinquiry does not extend to executive ofcials who are the most familiarwith and informed on executive operations.As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, with process to enforceit, is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislativeprocess. If the information possessed by executive ofcials on theoperation of their ofces is necessary for wise legislation on thatsubject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to thatinformation and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.As evidenced by the American experience during the so-calledMcCarthy era, however, the right of Congress to conduct inquiries inaid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse thanexecutive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial reviewpursuant to the Courts certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII ofthe Constitution.Francisco vs. HRErnesto Francisco, Jr. vs. The House of RepresentativesG.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003Carpio Morales, J.:Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the JudiciaryDevelopment Fund (JDF). Then on June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada fled an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The complaint was endorsed and was referred to the House Committee in accordance withSection 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the frst impeachment complaint was sufcient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufcient in substance. On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was fled against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.Issues:whether or not impeachment is subject to judicial reviewHeld:Yes There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercisedthe power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus,in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,[60] this Court ruled that it is well within thepower and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or itsofcials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse ofdiscretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanadav. Angara,[61] in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on theground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petitionraises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of thelegislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle10the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,[62] this Court declared null and void aresolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination,and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of theHouse Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI ofthe Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,[63] it held that the resolution ofwhether the House representation in the Commission on Appointmentswas based on proportional representation of the political parties asprovided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject tojudicial review. In Daza v. Singson,[64] it held that the act of the House ofRepresentatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission onAppointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,[65] itheld that although under the Constitution, the legislative power isvested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power ofthe courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.In Angara v. Electoral Commission,[66] it ruled that confrmation by theNational Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective ofwhether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member ofthe National Assembly.Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention thatthe exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings wouldupset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is tobe interpreted as a whole and one section is not to be allowed to defeatanother.[67] Both are integral components of the calibrated system ofindependence and interdependence that insures that no branch ofgovernment act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.Macalintal vs PET, GR 191618, June 7, 2011Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011(Admin Law, PET, Quasi-judicial power)Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifcations of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration fled by petitioner of the SCs decision dismissing the formers petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4,Art VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on frm footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.Issue:Whether or not PET is constitutional.Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.Held:Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec.4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph ofSection 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry itinto efect.No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power shall be vested inone Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizethe resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.LAMP VS. SEC OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENTLAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), represented by its Chairman and counsel, CEFERINO PADUA, Members, ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR., ELEAZAR ANGELES, GREGELY FULTON ACOSTA, VICTOR AVECILLA, GALILEO BRION, ANATALIA BUENAVENTURA, EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO, NAPOLEON CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ, ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, ROGELIO KARAGDAG, JR., MARIA LUZ ARZAGA-MENDOZA, LEO LUIS MENDOZA, ANTONIO P. PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO REYES, EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA, SECRETARY GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA, Board of Consultants, JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., and BARTOLOME FERNANDEZ, JR.vs.THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, 11and THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE and the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES in representation of the Members of the CongressG.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorariassailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation ofpowers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in efect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction, and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel.ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case; and 2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.HELD:I.A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse efect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufcient reason to say that there indeed exists a defnite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a partyalleges such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difcult constitutional questions. Here, the sufcient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds havebeen illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The ramifcation of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.NOTES:POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;(2) (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, hemust have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;(3) (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and(4) (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.Gutierrez vs HR On 22 July 2010, Baraquel, et al. fled an impeachmentcomplaint (First Complaint) against Ombudsman Ma.Merceditas N. Gutierrez (petitioner) based on betrayal ofpublic trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. On 3 August 2010, a Second Complaint was fled by Reyes, etal. against the same respondent also based on betrayal ofpublic trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were referred by theHouse Plenary to the Committee on Justice at the same time. On 1 September 2010, the Committee on Justice found theFirst and Second Complaints sufcient in form. On 7September 2010, the Committee on Justice, found the Firstand Second Complaints were sufcient in form. On 13 September 2010, petitioner fled a petition for certiorariand prohibition before the Supreme Court seeking to enjointhe Committee on Justice from proceeding with theimpeachment proceedings. The petition prayed for atemporary restraining order. Petitioner: She invokes the Courts expanded certiorarijurisdiction to "determine whether or not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality ofthe Government."12Public Respondent: The petition is premature and not yetripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal aplain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of theproceedings before public respondent. Public respondentargues that when petitioner fled the present petition onSeptember 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond thedetermination of the sufciency of form and substance ofthe two complaints. Hence, certiorari is unavailing. The following day, during the en banc morning session of 14September 2010, the majority of the Court voted to issuea status quo ante order suspending the impeachmentproceedings against petitioner. (Note: In urgent cases, it is amatter of practice for the Court that all the Justices shouldhave been given time, at least an hour or two, to read thepetition before voting on the issuance of the status quoante order. Unfortunately, this was not done.) Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that"no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against thesame ofcial more than once within a period of one year."ISSUE #1: Does the Supreme Court have the power to determinewhether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution inthe exercise of its discretion relating to impeachment proceeding?HELD: YES, under the doctrine of expanded judicial review. TheConstitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to thesole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defnedlimits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially discoverablestandards" for determining the validity of the exercise of suchdiscretion, through the power of judicial review.There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exerciseof judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset thesystem of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to beinterpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeatanother." Both are integral components of the calibrated system ofindependence and interdependence that insures that no branch ofgovernment act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over theLegislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of theConstitution as the repository of the sovereign will.UDK-15143, January 21, 2015IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT v. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY.R E S O L U T I O NLEONEN, J.:This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund and replacing it with the Judiciary Support Fund. Funds collected from the proposed Judiciary Support Fund shall be remitted to the national treasury and Congress shall determine how the funds will be used. Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel this court to exercise its judicial independence and fscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress. This matter was raised to this court through the letter signed by Mijares and addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is a Filipino citizen, and a concerned taxpayerHe fled this petition as part ofhis continuing crusade to defend and uphold the Constitution becausehe believes in the rule of law. He is concerned about the threats againstthe judiciary after this court promulgated Priority Development Assistance Fund case on November 19, 2013 and Disbursement Acceleration Program case on July 1, 2014.The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the President after the promulgation of these cases show a threat to judicial independence.In the frst week of July 2014, Ilocos Norte Representative Rodolfo Farias fled House Bill No. 4690, which would require this court to remit its Judiciary Development Fund collections to the national treasury.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryA week later, Iloilo Representative Niel Tupas, Jr., fled House Bill No. 4738 entitled The Act Creating the Judicial Support Fund (JSF) under the National Treasury, repealing for the purpose Presidential Decree No. 1949. Petitioner argues that Congress gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of judicial independence and fscal autonomy of the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the congress is subject to judicial review13RULING: No.This court resolves to deny the petition.The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution,is subject to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review before this court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are:(1)there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he musthave a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3)the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4)the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.23Petitioners failure to comply with the frst two requisites warrants the outright dismissal of this petition.IThe petition does not comply with the requisites of judicial reviewNo actual case or controversyOne of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of judicial review is the existence of an actual controversy. This means that there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the fling of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee ofapproved bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled billsby each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specifc constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes or procedures of Congress.. . . .. . . To do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and balancesfnely crafted by the Constitution for the three co-equal, coordinate and independent branches of government.34 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)Similar to Montesclaros, petitioner is asking this court to stop Congressfrom passing laws that will abolish the Judiciary Development Fund. This court has explained that the fling of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is not subject to judicial restraint[.]35 A proposed bill produces no legal efects until it is passed into law. Under the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass. It cannot rule on mere speculations or issues that are not ripe for judicial determination.36 The petition, therefore, does not present any actual case or controversy that is ripe for this courts determination.Petitioner has no legal standingEven assuming that there is an actual case or controversy that this court must resolve, petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill. The rule on legal standing has been discussed in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo:37Locus standi is defned as a right of appearance in a court of justice ona given question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefted or injured by the judgment in the suit or the partyentitled to the avails of the suit. Succinctly put, the plaintifs standing isbased on his own right to the relief sought.The difculty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintif who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal ofcial action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is afected no diferently from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufcient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.. . . .This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. Dela Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.38Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial independence is laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite standing to question the constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only afect the judiciary.This court, however, has occasionally relaxed the rules on standing 14when the issues involved are of transcendental importance to the public. Specifcally, this court has stated that:the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed fornontraditional plaintifs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching signifcance to society, or of paramount public interest.39Transcendental importance is not defned in our jurisprudence, thus, in Francisco v. House of Representatives:40There being no doctrinal defnition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specifc interest in raising the questions being raised.A mere invocation of transcendental importance in the pleading is not enough for this court to set aside procedural rules:Whether an issue is of transcendental importance is a matter determined by this court on a case-to-case basis. An allegation of transcendental importance must be supported by the proper allegationsNone of the determinants in Francisco are present in this case. The events feared by petitioner are merely speculative and conjectural.In addition to the determinants in Francisco, it must also be shown that there is a clear or imminent threat to fundamental rights. For this reason, we appreciate petitioners concern for the judiciary. It isoften only through the vigilance of private citizens that issues relating tothe judiciary can be discussed in the political sphere. Unfortunately, theremedy he seeks cannot be granted by this court. But his crusade is not a lost cause. Considering that what he seeks to be struck down is aproposed bill, it would be better for him to air his concerns by lobbying in Congress. There, he may discover the representatives and senators who may have a similar enthusiastic response to truly making the needed investments in the Rule of Law.Petition is DISMISSED.Imbong vs OchoaFacts:A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn, the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products, and to religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude, among others.It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took efect.ISSUES: 1) Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial reviewover the controversy; 2) Whether the RH law is unconstitutional.HELD:1) In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.REMEDIAL LAW: actual case or controversyLest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and ( d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showingthat any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely afected by its operation. In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-defnite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specifc relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse efect on the individual 15challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show thathe has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act.In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken efect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health ofcers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefts. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.2) Is there a locus standi on the part of the petitionerNo. However, pursuant to the doctrine of transcendental importance, Inview of the seriousness, novelty and weight as preedents, not only to the pu!li, !ut also to the !enh and !ar, the issues raised "ust !e resolved for the guidane of all# $fter all, the %& 'aw drastially a(ets the onstitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedo" of religion and e)pression and other onstitutional rights# *indful of all these and the fat that the issues of ontraeption and reprodutive health have already aused deep division a"ong a !road spetru" of soiety, the +ourt entertains no dou!t that the petitions raise issues of transendental i"portane warrantingi""ediate ourt ad,udiation# *ore i"portantly, onsidering that it is the right to life of the "other and the un!orn whih ispri"arily at issue, the +ourt need not wait for a life to !e ta-en away !efore ta-ing ation#.he +ourt annot, and should not, e)erise ,udiial restraint atthis ti"e when rights enshrined in the +onstitution are !eing i"perilled to !e violated# .o do so, when the life of either the "other or her hild is at sta-e, would lead to irrepara!le onse/uenes#0#%# 1o# 1522952uly 9, 2002Montesclaros, et al vs. Comelec, et alFacts:Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK electionto a later date since doing so may render them unqualifed to vote or bevoted for in view of the age limitation set by law for those who may participate. The SK elections was postponed since it was deemed "operationally very difcult" to hold both SK and Barangay elections simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering ofage for membership in the SK.Issue:Whether or not judicial review can be appliedHeld:No. The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners.Under the same law, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fxed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991.RA 9164 which resets and prescribes the qualifcations of candidates and voters for the SK elections was held to be applicable on the July 152002 election. Its constitutionality not having been assailed in the frst place.The Court ruled that petitioners had no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit, that the petition presented no actual justiciable controversy, that petitioners did not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional, and that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents.