T I N I G N G M I G R A N T E

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JUNE 2013 ISSUE

President Benigno Aquino IIIs mid-term in offi ce can only be characterized by the further intensifi cation of a labor export policy that has become more sophisticated, more aggressive and more detrimental to the rights and welfare of Filipino migrants and their families.

Published by: Migrante International

Summing-Up of the State of Migrants under Aquino (SUMA): Mid-Term Assessment(2010-2013)

Increased forced migration refuteseconomic growth

In its three years in offi ce, the Aquinoadministration has recorded the biggest number of OFW (overseas Filipino worker) deployment since the labor export policy was implemented in the 1970s.

From an additional 1.35 million OFWs in October 2011, a fi gure higher by 5.3 percent than the additional 1.281 mil-lion OFWs from January to October 2010, a total of 1,850,463 (Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, POEA) OFWs have been deployed to work abroad by the end of 2011. Of this number, 1,384,094 are land-based while 466, 369 are sea-based.

As of June 2012, 4,884 OFWs have been leaving the Philippines on a daily basis (Source: IBON Foundation). This is a far cry from the 2,500 OFWs per day record when Aquino assumed offi ce in 2010 (Department of Labor and Employ-ment, DOLE).

These fi gures make the Aquino administrations claims of a reverse mi-gration phenomenon exceedinglyincom-prehensible. In May, DOLE Sec. Rosalinda Baldoz announced that OFWs are opting to return to the country because more in-dustrial sectors are catching up in terms of labor package and training. The Aquino

government attributes a reverse migra-tion in the offi ng to the 7.8 percent GDP growth in the fi rst quarter of 2013 the highest in Aquinos term. However, inde-pendent think-tank IBON Foundation as-cribes the growth to election-spending dur-ing the fi rst two quarters of 2012, and other factors that belie any claims of the Aquino government of sustainable, comprehensive and inclusive growth.

The Aquino governments claim is further discredited by data showing that the Philippines still has the worst un-

employment rate in East Asia. Latest data from the National Statistics Offi ce (NSO) showed the countrys unemployment rate rose to 7.5% this April, the highest under Aquino.

According to the latest survey by the Social Weather Station (SWS), the Philippines has a 27.2 percent unemploy-ment rate or more than 11.1 million Filipi-nos are jobless as of March 2013. This is a 3.7 percent increase from the 23.5 percent unemployment rate recorded in the last

2001 866,590 661,648 204,951 2002 891,908 682,315 209,593 2003 867,969 651,938 216,031 2004 933,588 740,586 229,002 2005 988,615 740,632 247,983 2006 1,062,567 788,070 274,497 2007 1,077,623 811,070 266,553 2008 1,376,823 974,399 261,6142009 1,422,586 1,092,162 330,4242010 1,470826 1,123,676 347,1502011 1,850,463 1,384,094 466,369

Table. 1 Increasing deployment of OFWs

Land-based Sea-basedTotal No. of OFWs DeployedYear

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quarter of 2012 and a far cry from the un-employment fi gures of its Asian neighbors, namely, Singapore (1.7%), Malaysia (3%), Korea (3%), China (4.1%), Taiwan (4.3%), Vietnam (4.4%) and Indonesia (6.5%).

For 2012, IBON estimated the number of unemployed Filipinos at 4.4 million (increase of 48,000 from 2011) while the number of underemployed has reached 7.5 million (increase of 349,000 from 2011), showing a signifi cant 20 per-cent increase in underemployment from the year before.

In his past State of the Nation Addresses (SONA), Aquino attempted to downplay the jobs crisis by claiming lower unemployment rates (1.4 million jobs cre-ated in 2011 and 3.1 million jobs created in 2012). However, he failed to mention that the jobs created were either short-term, contractual or highly disproportional to the ever-growing laborforce.

By 2012, the growing number of job loss in growing sectors belied any attempts to face-lift the fi gures. On the third quarter of 2012, wholesale and retail recorded 728,000 job losses, real estate 45,000 job losses, fi nancial and insurance 15,000 job losses and agriculture 694,200 job losses (IBON).

To cover-up the record-high jobs crisis in the fi rst quarter of 2013, Mala-canang placed a very unbelievable Labor Force Survey data of a mere 7.2 percent a very huge discrepancy from fi gures released by the NSO, SWS and other eco-nomic surveys. Presidential Spokesperson Edwin Lacierda even cited that the peak in unemployment in the fi rst quarter of 2013 was a result of an employment bonanza during the Christmas season when season-al jobs were on the rise.

On the other hand, those who do land domestic jobs still suffer very low wages. Since 2001, the gap between the mandated minimum wage and the family living wage (FLW) in the National Capital Region (NCR) had considerably widened. In 2001, the minimum wage was 52 per-cent of the FLW. By March 2013, the P456 NCR minimum wage is only 44 percent of the P1,034 FLW. In 2012, Aquino further widened the gap by implementing a two-tiered wage scheme that essentially impos-es a wage cut from a wage freeze policy.

from page 1

Minimum wage

2001 P265 (52% fl w) P509 P244

March2013 P456 (44% fl w) P1,034 P578

Table 2. NCR Mandated Minimum Wage vs. Family Living Wage (FLW)

Family living wage Wage gap

Source: IBON Foundation, estimates on data from NWPC

Worsening joblessness feeds on already chronically low wages, with the current minimum wage grossly inadequate to sustain even the most humble of fami-lies. Family incomes are not keeping up with the infl ation. By the end of 2012, the average family in NCR lived on P22 to P37 a day (IBON data).

Social service spending, more-over, has not improved under Aquino. The government has failed to allot enough re-sources to address shortages and insuffi -ciencies in education, health, housing and welfare services. Social services share in the GDP has continued to drop in light of annual budget cuts and privatization of public utilities (IBON).

Aquino also claimed that his ad-ministrations Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program reduced poverty, an exag-gerated and unscientifi c boast, if anything. Being a benefi ciary of the CCT is not tan-tamount to a family emerging from below poverty line. It is not sustaining and offers merely band-aid solutions to the problems of joblessness and low wages. Aquino also failed to mention that the cash dole-out supposedly for 100,000 families would only hold for fi ve years, during and after which no prospective jobs, wages or liveli-hood are available to benefi ciaries.

The present administration is also second place in terms of poor land distribu-tion among post-Marcos regimes. Depart-ment of Agrarian Reform Sec. Gil de los Reyes already admitted that they would not be able to fi nish land distribution in time for the 25thanniversary of the Com-prehensive Land Reform Program (CARP) on June 10 leaving some 500,000 hect-ares or almost half of DARs target for land distribution undistributed by 2014, affect-

ing at least 1.1 million farmers. The most controversial land up for distribution is the Aquino-Cojuangco-owned Hacienda Lu-isita that remains undistributed to this day despite favourable ruling by the Supreme Court for farmers and farm workers. This comes as no surprise from a president who hails from a landed clam and family of ha-cienderos.

In truth, the supposed economic growth is not translating to economic relief for the people but rather to more wealth for a privileged few. According to the National Statistical Coordinating Board (NSCB), poverty incidence in the country remained unchanged, recording a 27.9 percent pov-erty rate in the fi rst semester of 2012. Com-pared with the 2006 (28.8 percent) and 2009 (28.6 percent) fi rst semester fi gures, the poor quality of life that minimum wage earners can afford has not improved at all since Aquino took offi ce.

The NSCB reported that 22 out of 100 families were estimated to be poor in the fi rst semester of 2012 while 13 out of 100 Filipinos lived in extreme poverty during the same period. Based on the lat-est SWS survey last January, 54 percent of 10.9 million families now consider them-selves poor, with perception of poverty ris-ing nationwide.

The gap between the rich and the poor has also further widened, with the income of the top one percent of families equivalent to that of the bottom 30 per-cent of households (IBON). According to Forbes, 11 of the richest Filipinos made it to its top billionaires of the world, enjoy-ing a net worth of USD$13.2 billion as of March 2013.

In search of jobs higher wages and livelihood, the number of OFWshasin-

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creased signifi cantly since Aquino took offi ce. In fact, the number of jobless Fili-pinos has risen to unprecedented heights from 2001 to 2010 and continues to reach record-high levels under Aquino. By 2012, at least one-fourth of the coun-trys labor force has gone abroad to fi nd work. According to the January 2012 Labor Force Survey (LFS), 64.3 percent of Filipinos are unemployed and actively looking for jobs.

According to DOLE, there are now 12 million OFWs abroad. Migrante International pegs the number of over-seas Filipinos between 12 to 15 million, to include undocumented OFWs. The International Organization for Migration

(IOM) still places the Philippines as the fourth leading migrant-sending country in the world, next only to China, Mexico and India. According to data from the POEA, 1.5 million Filipinos were deployed abroad on the start of Aquinos term in 2010. This fi gure is 50,000 or 3.4 percent higher than the deployment rate in 2009.

Of present, overseas Filipinos are scattered in at least 239 countries situated in at least six continents, namely, Asia, Australia, North America, South America, Africa and Europe. The biggest popula-tion is located in the United States (3.5 million based on the 2010 US Census); next is Saudi Arabia (1.8 miliion based on POEA data); and Canada (639,686 based

on Commission on Filipinos Overseas data). There is also a big concentration of Filipinos in the United Arab Emirates, Australia, Qatar, Malaysia, Japan, Unit-ed Kingdom, Hong Kong and Singapore. In the Philippines, about 30 to 40 percent of the total population is remittance-de-pendent.

Majority of OFWs are still de-ployed in Saudi Arabia, UAE and Hong Kong. Most are in the service sector working as domestic workers, hotel and restaurant staff and caregivers, in manu-facturing as factory workers, while a few tens of thousands are working abroad as professionals.

Seafarers still constitute the biggest sub-sector of OFWs. The Philippines is still one of the biggest maritime countries, with Manila still in the list of the biggest most important ports in the world. According to the In-ternational Labor Organization (ILO), the Philippines is still the top source of seafarers. An esti-mated 8,000 to 10,000 seafarers are added to the total deployment every year.

Philippines 28.1%Russia 6.8%Ukraine 6.3%China 6.2%India 5.0%Indonesia 4.0%Poland 3.5%Greece 2.8%Turkey 2.5%Myanmar 2.3%

Table 4. Number of seafarers in the world, 2003 = 1,250,000 or 67% of deployment

Source: POEA

A closer look into overseas deployment data would show that of the total number land-based OFWs deployed in 2010, 781,966 were re-hires while only 341,966 were new hires. The number of new hires decreased by 2.2 percent com-pared to 2009 (349,715) and 2008 (376,973) data. In the past three years, there was a slight decrease in the number of new hires deployed. In the fi rst quarter of 2011, for instance, ac-cording to POEA, only 380,188 new hires were deployed or 3.9 percent lower than the 395,189 deployed in 2010.

Table 5. Type of Worker and Hiring (Source: POEA, 2010)

Table 3.Number of Deployed Overseas Filipino Workers by Type of Hiring (2008-2010) Source: POEA (2010)

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The POEA attributed the decrease in the number of new hires to the global economic crisis that erupted in 2008. The downtrend in deployment in the fi rst quar-ter of 2011, it said, was the result of the crisis in the Middle East-North Africa re-gions and the multiple disasters in Japan. The agency further said that the decrease in deployment of new hires should not be interpreted as a drop in demand for OFWs in the global market. By the end of 2012, the POEA was confi dent that it had reached its target job orders and deployment for the year. True enough, from January to May 2013 alone, the POEA reported that it had already processed a total of 367,738 job or-ders for OFWs. From the downtrend in 2011, OFW deployment has picked up consider-ably despite ongoing crises in host coun-tries to date, policies such as the Nitaqat or Saudization, stricter immigration poli-cies and criminalization and deportation

of millions of undocumented OFWs. If the government is attributing a so-called re-verse migration due to these factors, then it is right on spot. Since 2010, thousands upon thousands of OFWs in distress have been deported or forcibly repatriated back to the country due to civil unrests, calami-ties, economic instabilities and other simi-lar factors in migrant-receiving countries. Atpresent, some 120,000 OFWs are being affected by the Saudization pol-icy. Of this number, about 28,000 are di-rectly affected by the crackdowns being imposed by the Saudi government on un-documented migrant workers. The impact of these policies on the Philippine economy will be graver than the Aquino administra-tion lets on as Saudi Arabia remains the top destination of OFWs. Meanwhile, similar immigration and labor policies are already being im-plemented elsewhere in the Middle East, particularly Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and

Oman. Stricter immigration measures are also in effect in host countries in Europe, Canada and America. Combined with the continuous repatriation of distressed OFWs in Egypt, Syria and Libya, and the depor-tation of undocumented OFWs in Europe, Canada and the United States, then a re-verse migration phenomenon could be ex-pected in the coming months. But to attribute a reverse mi-gration due to the recent GDP growth is outright deceitful and misleading. With the record-high unemployment rate and the lack of a comprehensive and sustainable reintegration program for returning OFWs, a so-called reverse migration will not be tantamount to the Aquino governments claims that OFWs are opting to come home for good. Filipinos will not be stopped from being forced to leave the country in search for greener pastures abroad. And so the cycle continues.

Remittances and intensifi cation of labor export

Remittances from OFWs remain at record-high from 2001 up to the present despite the global economic crisis. Statis-tics from the BangkoSentralngPilipinas (BSP) show that it had reached a whop-ping USD$20 billion by end of 2011, from USD$18.8 billion in 2010. During the fi rst fi ve months of 2011, an estimated USD$7.9billions were remitted, 6.18 per-cent higher than remittances during the same period in 2010. Remittances reached another all-time high in the end of 2012 at

USD$23.8 billion. For 2013, the BSP again recorded a faster growth rate of remittances in April after a supposed sluggish growth in March. Money transfers coursed through formal banking grew at an annual rate of 6.1 per-cent to USD$1.8 billion in April, faster than the three percent growth recorded in March

which was the slowest in three years. In the fi rst four months of 2013, OFW remittances reached USD$6.9 billion, or a 5.7 percent increase. The central bank data also showed that personal remittances those coursed through banks and hand-carry transfers and in kind reached a total of USD$2 billion in April, or an increase of seven percent from a year, totalling to USD$7.7 billion in the fi rst four months of 2013. According to the World Bank, the Philippines is still the fourth biggest remit-

tance-receiving country next to India, China and Mexico. It is no secret that the Philip-pine economy relies mainly on remittances to keep it afl oat. By 2010, despite the global economic crisis, remittances had already made up 8.7 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP), surpassing the share of tra-ditional exports of agricultural products.

1)United States 7,825,607 7,323,661 7,862,207 3,232,0732)Canada 1,308, 692 1,900,963 2,022,611 830,8633)Saudi Arabia 1,387,120 1,470,571 1,544,343 616,1934)United Kingdom 776,354 859,612 888,959 382,3475)Japan 575,181 773,561 882,996 381,1926)U.A.E. 621,232 644,822 775,237 307,9647)Singapore 523,951 649,943 734,131 317,7868)Italy 678,539 521,297 550,515 242,4119)Germany 304,644 433,488 448,204 194,47510)Hong Kong 406,134 339,552 362,524 148,873

Country 2008 2009 2010 Jan-May 2011

Table 5. Top 10 OFW Remittance-Sending Countries

Source: BSP (2010)

This can be attributed to the fol-lowing factors: (a) OFWs compensate the dwindling dollar and peso exchange rates by sending more amounts to their fami-lies back home; (b) OFWs get double or triple jobs to offset effects of the crisis in both host countries and the Philippines; (c) OFWs resort to more borrowing/loan-ing to be able to send money back home, especially during holiday and enrolment seasons; (d) OFWs are now sending sav-ings they had acquired over the years, if

any; and, (e) the number of un-documented OFWs sending remit-tances through informal banking and hand-carry transfers have con-siderably increased. In a study made by the ILO, more and more OFWs have been looking for additional sources of income on top of their regular jobs in order to survive the economic crisis. No matter, what is obscured from the fi gures is the fact that in-creasing remittances means mil-lions of Filipinos have to slave it out even harder in foreign shores just to continue sending money to their similarly hard up families in the Philippines. And the govern-ment cannot only but rejoice. However, the continuous in-crease does not necessarily trans-

late to economic growth, nor does it auto-matically translate to higher investments for families of OFWs factors that are supposed to have contributed greatly to the GDP growth. The latest survey of the BSPs Consumer Expectations Survey conduct-ed on the second quarter of 2013 showed

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that the increase of households in the high-er-income group with savings was over-shadowed by the decline in savings among households in the low- and middle-income groups. Of the total number of 5,884 num-ber of households, 525 respondents in the survey were remittance-dependent fami-lies. Of this number, 95.4 percent said that remittances from their relatives abroad were spent mainly for food, 67% for edu-cation, 54.9% for medical expenses, and 42.1% for debt payments. The percentage of remittance-dependent families that used remittances for savings fell signifi cantly, from 42.5% to 39.4% during the fi rst quar-ter of 2013. The latest BSP report also attested that OFW households that allotted part of their remittances for investments such as the purchase of real estate and other real properties suffered a steep drop compared to previous years. Savings, if any, were pri-oritized for emergency, education and hos-pitalization.

Table 6. Graph from BSP Consumer Expectations Report, 2013

With the impending price hikes of basic utilities, tuition fee increases and privatization of services and hospitals, this fi gure is expected to further decline in the coming years.

Further, although annual remittances in-creased amid the global economic crisis, its growth rate has been decreasing in recent years. From a 25 percent record growth in 2005, it dropped to a lowest 5.6 percent in 2009, a year after the global economic erupted.

Case study 1 (as of February 2011):

A remittance-dependent family with four (4) family members based in Cubao, Quezon City spends an aver-age of P14,500 per month:

Food P6,000 (P200/day)Rent P1,500 (one room) LPG P400 (2 Superkalans/month) Electricity P600Water P250Toiletries (soap, shampoo, etc.) P900 Transportation costs of children to school P3,360 P14 x 2 daily fare of 4 children to and from school

TOTAL: P14,510

Their breadwinner is a domestic work-er in Saudi Arabia. She sends P21,000 every three (3) months, or P7,000 a month. Her remittance falls P7,500 short of her familys monthly expens-es. With the impending fare hikes and electricity, water and LPG fee hikes, her monthly remittance will barely support her family.

For an OFW who has three (3) chil-dren attending private school (1 in high school and 2 in elementary) and their mother, a P20,000 monthly remittance is barely enough. With the impending fee increases (tuition and fare hikes), he has to maintain two or three jobs to sus-tain their daily needs and compensate for the defi cit in his monthly remittance:

Water P1,600 (projected increased rate by July)Electricity P3,500 (projected increased rate)Internet P1,000

Case study 2 (as of February 2011):

Tuition fee P4,500x 3 = P13,500 (monthly deposit, projected increased rate)Funds for high school projects P3,000Funds for elementary projects P2,000Allowance for school children per week P5,000 (projected increased rate)Groceries P3,000 (maintained, but will buy less)

TOTAL: P32,600 (sum does not yet include expenses for utilities, rental, food and other basic needs)

Table 7. Trend in Remittance (Source: POEA, BSP)

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In the US where 50 percent of remittances originate, the growth rate had decreased from 7.8 percent in 2008 to 7.3 percent in 2009. It had a slight increase to 7.9 percent in 2010 but has been suffering a steady decline since the US debt crisis ensued.

The continuing decrease in growth rate is a constant worry for the Aquino gov-ernment. If the trend continues, the govern-ment will be in big trouble because it relies mainly on remittances for foreign exchange revenues.

Table 8. Relationship of Remittances to Other Philippine External Income (Source: BSP, ADB, WORLD BANK, DOT, INQ7)

This explains the Aquino admin-istrations desperation to further seek job markets abroad and intensify its labor ex-port program. Through remittances, the government earns exponentially without having to shell out much capital invest-ment. Even funds for labor outmigration management through agencies such as the POEA and the Overseas Workers Wel-fare Administration (OWWA) are directly sourced from OFWs or recruitment agen-cies and employers through various fees. (See section on State exactions)

The Aquino administration, while mouthing local job generation as its core program to eliminate forced migration, continues to hail the remittance boom to further promote labor export in the attempt to offset the downtrend in the remittance growth rate. To do this, it has become more aggressive in implementing labor export, hence, the Aquino administrations active lobbying for job markets and signing of bilateral agreements with host countries in the past three years.

Since 2010, Aquino had em-barked on 26 state visits to different coun-tries around the world and each time came home with promises of foreign investments and lucrative job markets. At the rate he is going, he is expected to surpass former President Gloria Arroyos infamous jun-kets abroad which reached 77 in her nine years in offi ce. Ironically, most of Aquinos trips abroad wherein he met Filipino com-munities were always sprinkled with trivial anecdotes about OFWs but he has consis-tently remained mum on issues that belea-guered OFWs during his term despite his promises and posturing.

Further, the Aquino administra-tion contradicts itself on claims of supposed improved local job generation resulting in reverse migration when it has further tailored the public education system for a

more aggressive labor export program.

The K to 12 educational system would only mean more OFW deployment abroad and the Aquino administration is systematically targeting the countrys young labor force. It is aimed mainly to re-inforce cheap semi-skilled youth labor for the global market.

According to the Department of Education (DepEd), the K to 12 will im-prove chances of youth employment and that it will ensure that 18-year-old gradu-ates will be employable even without a college degree. The DepEd plans to achieve this through a so-called special-ized Senior High program that focuses on a curriculum that will enable students to acquire Certifi cates of Competency (COCs) and National Certifi cations (NCs)in ac-cordance with Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) Training Regulations.These certifi cates, without doubt, will be in compliance with requirements for overseas deployment, not much different, for example, with the Ar-royo administrations TESDA-accredited Supermaids program.

What the K to 12 system is doing is boosting cheap semi-skilled youth labor through a so-called professionalization of the young labor force mainly in labor markets abroad but unfortunately ignores the very causes of forced migration, name-ly, lack of local jobs, low wages, landless-ness and poor social services. The K to 12 system sadly undermines the youths very signifi cant role in nation-building because it is geared towards providing cheap semi-skilled youth labor to the global market in-stead of for domestic development.

The youth suffer the highest unem-ployment incidence compared to other age groups. Almost half of the unemployed are 15 to 24 years old while almost a third are

25 to 34 years old. Young workers, mostly semi-skilled, make up approximately 10.7 percent of the total Filipino labor migra-tion program. The K to 12 system would only mean more OFWs, younger and more trained to be docile, cheap laborers abroad in exchange for remittances.

Aside from OFW remittances, labor export also provides a tempting al-ternative to the unemployed and underem-ployed. Because of this, the government is not obliged to create jobs that offer decent wages and instead it becomes convenient to evade responsibility of implementing policy reforms to turn the economy around.

The countrys economic situation has not improved under Aquinos unre-formed government policies. Development policies, including Aquinos Philippine De-velopment Plan (2011-2016), continue to rely heavily on foreign investment, export-import dependence, debt and the so-called free market principles from which a more intensifi ed and aggressive labor export pol-icy is entrenched.

Aquinos essential economic thrust is clear-cut: stick to adherence to policies of neoliberal globalization, imple-ment these more thoroughly and system-atically through his Private-Public Part-nership (PPP), and selectively implement social protection programs like the CCT.

For OFWs, Aquino has employed the same impetus. The situation of OFWs has gone from worse to worst in Aquinos three years. Since Aquino took offi ce, it had been especially more gruelling for OFWs and their families. Policy-wise, there are no indications that Aquino would instil much-needed reforms to curb forced migration and deviate from a policy of labor export. If anything, the Philippine economys de-pendence on labor outmigration and remit-tances has become unparalleled under the

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Aquino administration.Government neglect of OFWs in distress For the fi rst time in history, four Filipinos were executed abroad under one presidency. The number of Filipinos on death row has increased from 108 to at least 125 (Migrante database). At least 7,000 Filipinos are languishing in jails abroad without legal assistance and at least 25,000 are stranded and awaiting repatria-tion in the Middle East alone.

In his three years, Aquino failed to address the immediate evacuation and repatriation of OFWs affected by confl icts, calamities and crackdowns in the MENA region. The so-called one-country team approach of the DFA, DOLE and OWWA is non-functional, and is usually charac-terized by the said agencies blaming each other for lapses and inaction in the urgent repatriation of and assistance for OFWs in distress.

The most recent sex-for-fl ight expos, for instance, is an exploitation borne out of the Aquino governments fail-ure to address stranded OFWs demands for free, urgent and mass repatriation. Abuse of OFWs by erring embassy and consulate offi cials have long been rampant and usu-ally intensify during crisis events, such as crackdowns on undocumented OFWs in the Middle East.

Abusive embassy and consulate offi cials take advantage of the desperation of OFWs in distress. The sex-for-fl ight issueis not an isolated matter that has noth-ing to do with the overall condition of stranded OFWs seeking immediate repatri-ation from the Aquino government in light of the Middle East crackdowns.

Of present, thousands of stranded OFWs in the Middle East continue to call for immediate repatriation from the Phil-ippine government. Efforts, so far, have been slow and uncertain. Only some 250 stranded OFWs have been repatriated by the Aquino government since June. With only a few days remaining before the re-sumption of the Saudi crackdowns on July 3, the Aquino government might be facing a tremendous nightmare as at least 4,500 undocumented OFWs are still awaiting re-patriation in Riyadh and Jeddah alone.

Some 12,000 OFWs are undocu-mented and in danger of arrests in the whole of Saudi Arabia.Failure to repatriate the stranded OFWs in time will defi nitely

result in more and graver human rights abuses against stranded OFWs.

The Aquino government has also failed in curbing human and labor traffi ck-ing of OFWs.

The Philippines remains as one of the top source/sending countries for human traffi cking in different parts of the world. Filipinos, mostly women and children, are being traffi cked for labor and/or sexual trade to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Sin-gapore, Japan, South Africa, North Ameri-ca and Europe.

The Aquino government con-servatively estimates the number of Fili-pino victims of traffi cking from 300,000 to 400,000, with the number of children victims ranging from 60,000 to 100,000. Many of them migrate to work through le-gal and illegal means but are later coerced into exploitative conditions, drug trade or white slavery.

The situation has become so alarming that the US government, for al-truistic reasons, had warned the Philippine

government to get its act together lest it re-mains under Tier 2 of the US Department of States Traffi cking in Persons Report.

This year, the Aquino regime pur-sued cosmetic reforms, among them sign-ing the Expanded Anti-Traffi cking in Per-sons Act, which upgraded the Philippines to Tier 1, meaning that the country has complied with the minimum standards for the elimination of traffi cking.

The 2003 Anti-Traffi cking in Per-sons Act, otherwise known as Republic Act 9208, defi nes traffi cking of persons as the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victims consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking ad-vantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefi ts to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitu-tion of others or other forms of sexual ex-

Worst anti-migrant policies: A look back on how Aquino addressed OFW concerns

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ploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

This defi nition of traffi cking in persons sets a very thin line between hu-man traffi cking and illegal recruitment, es-pecially for our OFWs.

Government efforts have hardly scratched the surface of the anti-traffi cking campaign, however much it lauds itself in the media. For one, it only has 17 anti-traf-fi cking prosecutors in the Department of Justice and 72 prosecutors in regional DOJ offi ces.

And though it has set up the In-ter-Agency Council against Traffi cking in Persons (IACAT), it has only received a total of 146 cases of human traffi cking for investigation in 2010. Compare this, for example, with an average of 1,500 cases yearly that Migrante International receives, majority of which are related to human and sex traffi cking, illegal recruitment and drug-related cases.

The ratio of resolu-tion of cases of human traf-fi cking/illegal recruitment in agencies such as the IACAT or POEA are close to nil, with most of perpetrators or recruitment agencies being given mere administrative sanctions only to be able to operate again.

Also, many victims, with the help of Migrante International and other con-cerned organizations, have fi led charges of violations of RA 9208. Unfortunately, the government lacks the political will to fully address the cases. There are also reports of immigration and police offi cers who are coddlers of traffi cking syndicates but, so far, no public or government offi cial atany levelhas been prosecuted.

Budget cuts

Aquinos national budget is one concrete manifestation of the governments thrust to further intensify the governments labor export policy while prioritizing prof-its over people.

During Aquinos term, funds for direct services for OFWs were slashed in the National Expenditure Program. For fi s-cal year 2012, budget for OFWs only got a less than one percent share(0.17 percent) in

the P1.8 trillion national budget.

Direct services for OFWs from concerned agencies, namely specifi c items under the DFA, DOLE, POEA, Department of Justice (DOJ) as lead agency of the IA-CAT, Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) and the Offi ce of the President (OP), were decreased. Budget for OFW welfare and services in the said agencies suffered an 18 percent cut (P792 million) from 2011s sum of P3.8 million. This translated to a pitiful per capita spending of P261.83 for the 15 million overseas Filipinos.

Moreover, while funds for wel-fare and services for OFWs decreased, increases were made on the DOLE and POEA budgets mainly for their marketing and job placement purposes despite dec-larations from Aquino from past SONAs that these agencies would focus on local job generation and more incentives for re-

turned OFWs to address forced migration.

One major consequence of budget cuts on OFWs direct services and welfare was the closure of ten embassies, consul-ates and posts in different countries around the world. As of July 31, 2012, embassies in Caracas in Venezuela; Koror, Palau; Dublin, Ireland and consulates general in Barcelona, Spain and Frankfurt, Ger-many have ceased to operate. Embassies in Stockholm, Sweden; Bucharest, Roma-nia; Havana, Cuba; Helsinki, Finland; and consulate in Saipan in Northern Mariana Islands closed down on October 31, 2012.

State exactions

Under Aquinos term, state exac-tions from OFWs were further institution-alized and aggravated through the Aquinos signing of Administrative Order 31. AO 31 legalizes state exactions and taxation on

OFWs by effectively calling on all govern-ment heads and agencies to rationalize the rates of their fees and charges, increase their rates and impose new fees and charg-es.

Since 2010, the government had imposed numerous other fees from OFWs pre- and post-departure the increase in e-passport fees, mandatory Pag-Ibig con-tributions, Philhealth premium cost hike, mandatory medical insurance, Affi davit of Support fees, to name a few. A study by Migrante International estimates that since 2010 the Aquino gov-ernment has been collecting an average of at least P26,267 from every overseas Filipino worker (OFW) processed by the POEA. This amount is higher than the av-erage P18,000 the government collected before 2010. If 4,500 OFWs leave daily to work abroad, the government earns an av-

erage P124 million a day, or roughly P45.26 billion yearly, from processing fees and other costs shouldered by OFWs.

Dismal rights and welfare program

The Aquino government has high-ly praised itself for its supposed efforts to work with labor-receiving governments to formulate both formal and informal agree-ments meant to ensure that OFWs condi-tions are within nationally- and internation-ally-accepted standards. These, however, are more wishful thinking than reality.

The truth is, OFWs are plagued with an assortment of issues and problems throughout the entire migration cycle yet the Aquino government has barely done any decisive action to support and pro-tect OFWs and their families. The Aquino governments ability to uphold Filipinos migrants rights and promote their welfare has lagged behind its apparent success in

Table 9. Fees charged to OFWs (per contract)

76 signatures (for different types of document requirements) P7,600E-passport fee (minimum) P1,200POEA fee (for new hires) P7,500OWWA fee (USD$25) P1,075Pag-Ibig mandatory contribution P600Mandatory insurance coverage (minimum premium USD$144) P6,192Philhealth (minimum) P1,200

TOTAL P25,367

T I N I G N G M I G R A N T E

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pursuing its policy of labor export.

The efforts and outcomes are un-even. On one hand, efforts are systematic, sustained and deliberate on regulatory mat-ters facilitating the departure of OFWs and receipt of remittances. These have resulted in record numbers of Filipinos overseas. On the other hand, efforts are spotty, par-tial and erratic on matters relating to giving migrants protection and support at home or abroad.

There is even a lack of accurate, comprehensive and timely information about migrant workers themselves. During the height of repatriation efforts in Syria, for example, the OWWA and the DFA of-fered confl icting information on the average deployment costs needed to negotiate with Syrian employers for the release of OFWs from their contracts. The OWWA said that it had set the average deployment costs at USD$2,500 per OFW while the DFA pegged it at USD$3,000 to USD$4,000. Even the fi gures for total population of OFWs in Syria did not match. The same case can be said in the ongoing repatriation of stranded OFWs in Saudi. Simply put, ef-forts will continue to be futile if concerned agencies cannot even agree on basic facts.

All these highlight the steady rise of violations of migrants rights. Many OFWs and migrants organizations have gone so far as to characterize the govern-ment as criminally negligent in its re-peated abdication of taking primary re-

sponsibility for protecting migrants and their families.

Despite these, the Aquino govern-ment continues to promote labor export. While it is true that, compared to other la-bor-sending countries, the Philippines has a relatively sophisticated and well-developed legal framework to protect the rights and welfare of migrants and their families, this has largely been pushed by force of circum-stance of the rapidly increasing numbers of OFWs that have been victimized by viola-tions of rights and the resounding clamor of a growing number of OFWs, their families and advocates who have managed to orga-nize among themselves.

Even measures deemed signifi -cant by government such as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act (RA 10022, amended RA 8042),Anti-Traf-fi cking in Persons Act (RA 9208) and the Overseas Absentee Voting Act (RA 9189) have not been implementedand fulfi lled under the Aquino administration. Cosmetic reforms are certainly no match to gargan-tuan problems emanating from the labor export policy, rendering these laws inutile. Hence, no amount of legislation can offer full protection, much less deterrecurring problems of maltreatment, insuffi cient so-cial and welfare services,government fail-ures and violence against OFWs.

The OWWA Omnibus Policies (OOP), for instance, which was passed under the presidency of Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo in2003, con-tinues to be in force to this day. But the OOP limits the benefi ts and welfare services en-titled to OFWs among itsprovisions are the termination of OWWA membership upon ex-piration of employment contract; restriction of voluntarymembership to two years; selective repatriation of migrant workers in times of crises, epidemics and wars; and thegranting of the sole deciding au-thority to the OWWA Board of Trustees with regard the management of OWWA funds.

Also under the OOP, only active mem-bers of OWWA could avail of the services

and benefi ts consisting of a life insurance-for natural death, insurance for accidental death, disability benefi ts, scholarship pro-grams, repatriation andreintegration. Oth-ers, such as medical insurance and health benefi ts, have either been privatized or taxed from OFWsand/or employers.

Under the current OWWA policy, only active members of OWWA could avail of the services and benefi ts that include aP100,000 life insurance (for natural death), and P200,000 insurance (for accidental death), disability benefi ts,scholarship pro-grams, repatriation and reintegration pro-grams.

There is also a lack of comprehen-sive and sustainable reintegration program for returned OFWs. What the Aquinogo-vernment offers are mere dole-outs and band-aid solutions that are not long-term solutions to unemployment, lowwages and lack of social services.

Most of the governments reinte-gration programs for returned OFWs are made up of loans and one-time livelihood programs. Most recently, returned OFWs are complaining about the P2 billion OW-WAreintegration program that Aquino in-augurated in 2011 because of its stringent requirements for collateral and onerousin-terest rates.

Aquino also failed to investigate allegations of misuse and corruption of the OWWA funds. The plunder case fi led againstformer president Arroyo for mis-use and corruption of OWWA funds, for instance, was initiated by private citizens andorganizations and not the Aquino ad-ministration.

Double standard foreign policies

Throughout his presidency, Aqui-no has been criticized for his double stan-dard foreign policies. More often than not, such policies have had direct effects on the welfare and well-being of OFWs in their host countries.

In the case of the Sabah dispute, the Philippine governments passivity and lack of political will to protect national interest virtually emboldened and gave li-cense to Malaysian forces to attack our fel-lowmen.

Sabah is one of the most common destinations of traffi cked Filipinos, mostly women. It is also one of the most common transit points of traffi cked Filipinos on their way to other parts of Asia. As a re-

T I N I G N G M I G R A N T E

10 J U L Y 2 0 1 3

sult of the Aquino governments refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Sabah claim, crackdowns conducted by the Ma-laysian government against Filipinos be-came more rampant.

In its handling of the Sabah con-fl ict, the Aquino government exposed its double standards and contrasting motiva-tions and interests vis a vis the Spratlys and Panatag Shoal issues. It remains aggres-sive in the Spartlys issue to promote and justify increased US troops presence in the Asia-Pacifi c region while it is passive in the Sabah issue to appease Malaysia which plays a lead role in the ongoing peace ne-gotiations between the MILF and the Phil-ippine government.

The same can be said on how the

Aquino government handled the confl ict with Taiwan with regard the alleged killing of a Taiwanese fi sherman by the Philippine Coast Guard. OFWs in Taiwan suffered the backlash of the Aquino governments cal-lous, incompetent and undiplo-matic handling of the issue. The Aquino government attempted to justify the killing by assert-ing that the Taiwanese fi sher-man poached on Philippines seas. Only later did it conduct an investigation when OFWs in Taiwan were getting the brunt of attacks.

On the other hand, the Aquino administration was

lenient with the US Navy for damaging the Tubbataha reefs. Aquino said that the US Navy showed sensitiv-ity by apologizing. He also refused to address questions on the US ships presence in Philippine seas and instead said that he saw no reason to involve the contentious Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in the Tubbataha issue.

While continuously harping on how the gov-ernment is ready to de-fend sovereignty amid ter-ritorial disputes, Aquino nevertheless shows his puppetry and subservience to US economic and ter-ritorial interests.

Conclusion

In the past three years, the Aquino government had been aggressive in craft-ing programs and services aimed at facilitatingand encouraging migration. While acknowledging the many social costs, these were effectively down-played. Rather, it has resolutely promoted labor export as unequivocally benefi cial for migrants and their families. This is par-ticularly done by overstat-ing supposed development

benefi ts for the economy andthe income benefi ts for households.

The economic compulsion of the Aquino government to keep exporting Filipinos to maintain or, especially, to in-creaseremittances unfortunately overrides and precludes undertaking any measures that, directly or indirectly, constrict thefl ow of migration even if such measures would immediately and, in the long-run, prevent the incidence of abuses andmigrant rights violations.

Filipinos are being forced to mi-grate because of desperation. The econo-mys lack of development resulting in job loss, low wages and lack of livelihood at home is the primary push factor. OFWs have borne witness to how insincere, in-sensitive and inept the Aquino government is in upholding and securing the protection and welfare of OFWs. Instead, it showcas-es a more blatant and unapologetic labor export policy that exploits OFWs cheap labor and foreign remittances.

To genuinely address the prob-lem of forced migration, economic policies should focus on developing the national economy by advancing local industries, ag-riculture and basic services.

Migrante International fully sup-ports the call and struggle for national in-dustrialization and genuine land reform as the ultimate solution to the problem of forced migration and to end the labor ex-port program.