I The Napnleonc Wars

The Napoleonic Wars

For the purposes of study, we have divided Napoleon’s domestic policyfrom his foreign policy, but this Is by and large an artificial partition.As in most countries, domestic policy and foreign policy flow fromeach other and are circumscribed by the domestic and foreign contextat any given time. For example, war, one of the primary tools offoreign policy, requires money, often obtained from taxation, which isa key component of domestic policy. Napoleon’s aggressive foreignpolicy and the compulsion to Empire originated from a number ofimpulses Including the legacy of the Revolution, the traditionalFrench desire to achieve what were considered to be the country’snatural boundaries, the prevailing economic circumstances,Napoleon’s considerable ego, and Europe’s response to these Impulses.

Revolutionary warfareThe French Revolution changed the concept of nation in France, andalso throughout Europe over time. With this change in the nature ofthe state came a resultant transformation In all the enterprises ofstate, from gathering taxes, to choosing leaders. One of the mostprofound changes came in the theory and practice of war. No longerwas war the purview of aristocratic officers commanding_<-ofess1enaI soldiers in the name of a monarch. The revolutionary( ,,1-mies of France, at least initially, were citizen armies. If war was anational action and the people were the nation, then military servicebecame a national duty. The flight of the émigrés had essentiallydecapitated the army, the nobility composing as they had the officercnrp In the Royal army. This opened the officer ranks to men oftalent in a very practical way even as the Declaration of Rights ofMan had done in a theoretical way. Many of Bonaparte’s generalsand later marshals had come through the ranks In a way that hadbeen Impossible In the army of Louis XVI. This new conception ofnation” also allowed for a mass mobilization of men and materialon a scale that had not been seen before as the levee en masse of 1793illustrated. The quality of these material resources was alsoImproving, allowing for more and larger artillery, greater mobilityand improved communication. Military organization was alsochanging by the time of the Revolution. Military theorists, many ofthem French, began to advocate a so-called divisional structure inwhich armies were divided into independent divisions eachContaining all the elements it needed to fight on Its own—cavalrart1I1c, infantry and signals. This allowed for greater mobility andflexibility in deploying forces. Bonaparte would later improve on this

system by bringing several of these divisions together into a corps,which increased the offensive power of the division whilemaintainizig the flexibility and unifying its conirnatid. So it appears,that Napoleon inherited a military Revolution as much as lie,cated one. Perhaps his great organizational genius was the abilityto take each of these innovations in pursuit of a unified vision—Napoic00’5 Imperial vision.

I • The French Revolution arid Napoleon

Warfare as characterized by the Napoleonic Wars was unlike the

continuous conflict inherent In modem total war. Wars, as such,

were more a series of campaigns In which commanders spent weeks,

even months, manoeuverlng their forces into position for a large

pitched battle that might last one or two days. Mobifity and the

provisioning of annles was therefore the key to success, immortalized

In one of Napoleon’s many aphorisms, An army marches on its

stomach”. It Is also why all of Europe was subject to the hardship of

massive armies roaming the Continent feeding themselves on what

they could forage from the countryside.

Napoleon’s opponents: the coalitions

Napoleon seldom faced individual countries as opponents. Such was

the alarm he and an expansionary France engendered in the other

European powers. The contagion of revolutionary ideals also

frightened the established regimes of Europe. When this alarm was

combined with the national aspirations of these same powers, they

were able, at least for short periods of time, to put aside differences

and make common cause against Bonaparte. It Is Important to

remember that each power’s foreign policy did not revolve solely

around defeating Napoleon and restoring the status quo ante

bellum. Bach power had a definite interest in checking Napoleonic st ‘Latin

domination, but each also had its own ambitions and these interests r.iarrinntstata at attalr

were not always complimentary and indeed engendered a measure staitof war

of distrust between the allies.

!‘

Great BritainWhen the Revolution broke out It was greeted by a divided

public opinion in Great Britain and as such It initially drove the

government of William Pitt to the middle. He was worried about

the hnplicatlons of the Revolution for British interests in Ireland

and looked upon radical politics with disdain, but he was o

committed to reforming Britain’s finances and could hardly afford

any Continental adventures. Nevertheless, by the time Europe

lined up against France in 1792, Pitt was eying the Continent with

Increasing concern. Should France take the Channel ports, it would

pose a direct threat to the national interests of Great Britain. By the

end of 1792, the combination of the September Massacres, the

establishment of the Convention, the invasion of the Low

Countries and the trial of the King of France impelled Pitt to take

a more direct role in Continental developments. From 1792 until

Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo in 1815, Britain played a

central role in either fighting the French or financing those

countries that were fighting the French. In many ways the Third

Coalition was cemented together as much by British sterling as it

was by any fear of Napoleonic expansion, After Spanish and

Portuguese citizens rose against French occupiers in 1808, Britain

committed a sizable force to their support sparking the Peninsular

War that would drag on for five years. To these various military,

diplomatic and financial manoeuvres was added the age-old British

strategy of naval blockade.

44

I The çWars

AustriaGeography helped dictate the traditional rivalry between theAustrian Hapsburgs and Prance. A foreign policy goal since the reignof Louis XJV, Prance’s aspiration to reach its natural boundaries,would have to be at the expense of Austrian holdings, particularlyin the Netherlands and among Its client states on the Rhine.The Revolution did nothing to change this situation and in factaggravated it. Marie Antoinette was the sister of the HapsburgEmperor Leopold U and aunt to his successor Frands Ii.The Convention’s attempts to curtail the rights of German princes inthe Rhine region, particularly In Alsace, also threatened AustrianInterests. Austria joined with Prussia In war against Prance In 1792and would wage this war Intermittently until 1815, first againstRevolutionary France and later against Napoleonic Prance.Napoleon’s reorganization of Central Europe and his domination ofthe Italian states ensured this. At times the Austrians did well againstthe Prench armies, particularly at the beginning of the War of theSecond Coalition, 1799—1803. Several decisive defeats at the handsof Napoleon and his marshals forced Austria to make peace with theFrench on Napoleon’s terms at Campo Fonnlo (1797), Lunéville(1801), and Pressburg (1805). In 1809, the Austrians would againrise against Napoleon, notably In what was characterized as a war ofnational liberation, calling on concepts such as liberty andnationalism, concepts born out of the French Revolution. Clearly,military dominance was not enough to control Austria and soNapoleon turned to an equally old ip r r tool, marriage.The Emperor married the Austrian princess Mane Louis, daughterto the Austrian Emperor, in 1801 in an effort both to sire a son andbind the Austrians to him by more than just military defeat. This hadthe awkward consequences, however, of making Napoleon thenephew by marriage of the executed Louis XVI and bringinganother “Austrian woman” to the throne of France.

PrussiaAlthough she was drawn Into a war with France In 1792, PrussIa wasmore interested In developments on her eastern frontier. The statusarid partition of Poland, so thought Frederick William fl, was moreimportant to the future of Prussia, The combined menace of Russiaand Austria in the east, both also deeply interested in the partitionof Poland, impelled Prussia to keep the bulk of her forces in the eastduring the War of the First Coalition. As such, Prussia neverwholeheartedly pursued the war against Revolutionary Prance andabandoned the First Coalition In 1795 after signing the Peace ofBasel. Napoleon would rouse Prussia ten years later with hisreorganization of the German states. Electing to stay out of theThird Coalition, Frederick William m found himself alone andIsolated after the Austro-Russian armies were routed at Ulm andAusterii it was then the turn of the vaunted Prussian army tobe humbled by Napoleon and his grande armée. This combination ofIndecision delay and defeat meant that Prussia would suffer greatly( , In the period 1807—12, but she would return to prominence in thefinal defeat of Napoleonic France in 1815.

Ito

r

-6

? JjJt

45

I ) The French Revolution and Napoleon

RussiaRussia has always had a complicated relationship with Western

Europe. At times it has pursued an almost isolationist stance,

preferring to look either inward or to Asia and Asia Minor as a

focus of its energies. At other times it has become deeply Involved

In the affairs of Western Europe. Such was the case during the

revolutionary period. Prom the enlightened pretensions and

western expansion of Catherine the Great to the would-be

peacemaker Alexander!, Russia played a direct role In the efforts

to check Napoleonic ambition In Europe. Initially Catherine saw

the instabifity in France along with Austria’s and Prussia’s admittedly

half-hearted interest In crusading against the Revolution, as

demonstrated by the contingent wording in the Declaration of

PlDnltz, as a chance to acquire portions of Poland. Only after Prussia

objected did she propose to share Poland with Frederick William in

order to avoid a war. Polish nat1ornIIcm engendered by the partition

and fanned as it was from Paris, kept Catherine’s gaze focused on

Poland throughout the war of the First Coalition. When ‘Iar Paul I

ascended to the throne in 1796, his deep suspicion of the ideals of the

Revolution led him into the Second Coalition and Russia’s armies

into Western Europe. Russia’s ambitions, especially In the

Mediterranean and south-central Asia, often coffided wljth Britlflh

interests and this made co-operation between the two powers

difficult if not impossible at times. This clash caused Russia to

withdraw from the Second Coalition in 1799. After Alexander!, who

was more deeply and genuinely Influenced by the Enlightenment

than his grandmother Catherine, came to the throne In 1802. he

increasingly saw Napoleonic expansion as a threat to any rational and

enlightened system of European diplomacy. It was this enlightened

self-Interest mixed with Alexander’s sizable ego that Impelled Russia

to wade again into the affairs of Western Europe In the War of the

Third Coalition. Alexander’s desire for more economic independence

increasingly alienated Russia from the strictures of the Continental

system eventually provoking the folly of Napoleon’s 1812 invasion.

Alexander I would play a key role in the occupation of France and

the deliberations at the Congress of Vienna.

ACtIVKYCoalition partners

In groups, take the role of one of the following. Representatives: Research and analyse your

• British representativescountry’s decision to join (or not join in the case of

•Prussia) the second coalition against France.

• Prussian representatives•

Reporters: Prepare questions for a news conference

• Russian representatives with the representatives. Your goal is to discover the

• Austrian representatives various reasons for each country’s position and its role

• Reportersin the coalition.

News conference: The representatives present a brief

statement on their country’s position. The reporters ask

questions of the representatives and then write a

newspaper article to report their findings.

4(3

I The Napoleonic Wars

• National Assembly dedams war on the AustiianEmpire, AprIl20, 1792

• Prussia joins with Austria against France• Al1edarmieshadeFanceandtalrardmandbngwy• FrancestopsPn arisatValmSeptember20, 1792• French forces under Dumoudez invade Austrian

Netherlands and defeat Austiians at Jemappes• France occupies Nice, Mainz end Frankfurt,

October 1792• BritainjoinswarinFebruaryll93• France Invades Dutch Republic• Spain joins Coalition, March 1793• French army defeated at Neerwinden• French General Dumouriez detects to Austrian

Apnl 1793• ToubnoiedbyBritlsh,&igustll93• Austrian retreat from France after Battle of Fleunis

in June 1794• France reoccupies Rhineland and Belgium• France occupies Netherlands aid establishes Batavian

Republic as a dent state• By the Peace of Basal, Spain and Prussia withdraw

fromtheWar 1795• French Armies invade German states aass Rhine—

eventually pushed back• NapoleoninvadesltalyanddefeatsAustiiansand

Sardinians - Sardinia withdrew from war

• Napoleon leads French expedition to Egypta 8hRoyaINavydestiRanchfleetatBattieqf

Nile, 1798a Coalitiontonnsin 1799a Austtlans undqr Ardichiler Charles drove Rend back

across Rhinea Russian General Suvarpv commanding a Austro

Russian army dewe French from most of Italianholdings

a Suvarev invaded Helvetic Republic (Switzerland)a BritisharmytlghtFrenchtoastandstiilbithe

Netherlandso French forces defeat Russians in Switzedand -

Russians withdraw from Coalition• The French under Napoleon defeat Austrians at Battle

of Marengo June 1800 forcing Austrians to negotiate• Ottomans invade Egypt• Royal Navy under Nelson destroys Danish fleet at

Battle of Copenhagen

Peace of Basal, May 1795• Between France, Spain, and Prussia• Prussia withdrew from the war• Prussia ceded Rhineland to France• France recognized Prussian dominance in Northern

Germany• France obtained resources from the rich territory• Spain withdrew from the warTreaty with Dutch Republic, May 1795• Set up Batavian Republic• DutchforcedtopaidawarindemnitytoFrance• DutchfoitedtobannioneytoFmnceatfavourable

interesta SouthemDutchterritodescededtoFrancea DutoayforFrenchoccup4ngforcesPeace with Sardinia, May 1796• Nice and Savoy permanently transferred to France

Napoleon sets up Cisalpine RepublicVenice partitioned between France and AustriaTreaty of Campo Fom October 1797

• BetweenFranceandAustrla• Austriaquitswar• Austria recognized Frendi possession of Belgium and

Rhineland and control of Italian statesBritain remained at warNapoleon grins valuable experience as a civil administratorand diplomat while his reputation in France soared.Frarce briefly holds Egypt, but its army withdraws afterOttoman invasion In 1801Russian forces withdraw to Central and Eastern EuropeFrance maintahied control of Italy and SwitzerlandPeace of LunévIlle, 1801• Between France and AustrIaa French holding In Italy were enlarged• FrancedalmedleftbankofRhlne• Belgium absorbed into France• Thscany to beconie independent state• PapalStatestobecontrolledbythePcpe• Austria left Second CoalitionAustria lost influence among the German statesPeace of Miiens, Mardi 1802• Between Britain and France• British to return Cape Colony to Bataviai Republic• Trinlda4 Tobago and Coylon to Britain• France withdraw troops farm Papal States• Maltatobeneutral• Island of Minorca to SpainThe end of the War of the Second Coalition led to a briefperiod of peacefrom 1802 to 1803.

.EwaCoallifon(c

Coalition,1793—97

SecondCoalition,1799-802

Austria

Prussia

Britain

Spain

Sardinia

Britain

Russia

Austria

OttomanEmpire

47

• BritalnandFrancegotowarifllBo3• Angered by Napoleon’s reorganization of Central

Europe, Francis II of Austria joins Britain in ‘the lhheCoalItion, 1805

• Russia under Alexander I joins coalition in return forBritish subsidies

• Napoleon prepares to invade Britain

• NponmovestivoCentralEuropetofeceAustro-Russian forces

• Napoleon defeats Austrians at IJbn, October 1805• The Royal Navy defeats Ranco-Spanish fleet at

TraMgai October 1805

• Napoleon defeats Austro-Russian army atAusterlitz December 1 805—Austria withdrawsfrom Coaltion

• Russian armies withdraw behind her bottlers• Napoleon defeats Prussians at Jena and Auerst&It,

October 1806• Napoleon fights Russian armies to a standstill at Eylau

in February 1807 and defeats them at Friedland inJune 1BOZ

• Russia and France make peace with Treaty of 1%it,July 1807

• AstsiaoseainagainstNapoleonIn 1609• The Frendi were victorious in the battles of Landshut

arid EdmiGhiAfter suffering a major defeat at WaWam, theAustriam again dforpe

• After the catastrophic Russia Campaign, Napoleonrebuift his forces and won the battles of Ltltzen,Bautzen and Dresden

• Napoleon was defeated atthe battle of Nations hiOctober 1813

• Napoleon’s forces were driven from Germanyarid Spain

Treaty at Prburg, December 1805

• Austriatoprindemn1tYtOFmflCe• Austria to give land to Napoleon’s German allies

• VedcegtventoKingdomofltaly• Austrian withdrew from Third Coalition

Trafaigar cemented British control of the seas from therest of the 19th century and secured Britain from invasion

Russian armies retreat to Russia

Prussia, threatened by Napoleon’s reorganization ofGerman states, forced to act alone against France after

she did not join the Coalition.

Tlilsit,JLlly 1807• Between France, Russia and Prussia• France woidd aid Russia against Ottomans• RussiawouldjointheContinentalSystem• ialastlandtoKlngdomofWestphahaandthe

Grand Dudiy of Warsaw• France occupied Bede

Treaty of Schnbninn1October 1809• AusoupCarinthia,Carrio1a,andportsonthe

Adriatic• Poles celvedGalkia• Bavariansreceivedpartofthel\trd• Austria paid indemnity• Austria joined Continental System

Napoleon woold eventually many the Austrian PrincessMarie Louis

Napoleon surrenders, abdicates and is sent into e.Ie on

the isiand of Elba

Discussion point:

Q What advantages doesa dictatorship have overdemocracy?

Under what circumstancesmight people give updemocratic rights to a dictator?

. The French Revolution and Napoleon

Britain

Ausa

Russia

Sweden

Britain

0-Third andFoUrthCoalitiOfl1805-1807

FifthCoalitiOn,1809

SixthCoalition,1812—1814

0

Britain

Austria

Russia

Sweden

German

The impulse to EmpireIt is common to see the French Revolution as having ended In

1799 when Napoleon assumed the position of First Consul. While

this is by and large true, It is Important to remember that the ideals

of the Revolution—ideas like democracy, nationalism, liberty,

constitutlonalism—did not end in 1799. These ideas had spread

across Europe as much on the winds of populism as on the tips of

French bayonets. It Is a deep historic irony that while these ideals

spread across Europe. Napoleon had transformed France Into a

48 stable dictatorship all with the appearance of a legitimacy garnered

from plebiscites and popular demonstrations. By 1804, France had

i • The French Revolution and Napoleon

Theflerlin Deaees, 1806 Thesewerethe Decrees that prohibited countriesunder Napoleonic control from tradingwith Great Britain or her dependents,inaugurating the Continental System.It also provided for the confiscationof neutral ships that had stopped InBritish ports.

Discussion point: The Mahan thesisAlfred Mahan was a 19th-century American naval officer andstrategist After studying the Anglo-French wars of the 18th centuryhe developed what became known as the Mahan Thesis. Histhesis posited that in these conflicts it was naval power thatdetermined the outcome. Without control of the sea, no colonialpower can win a protracted conflict with a state that does controlthe sea. Mahan’s ideas were very influential in the arms race thatled up to the First World War.

In looking at the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, whatevidence can you find that supports Mahan’s Thesis? Whatevidence contradicts it? Does Mahan’s thesis hold true forconflicts in the 19th and 20th centuries?

The Continental SystemBy 1807 Napoleon had beaten the powers of Continental Europe Intoa reluctant submission, and yet Britain persisted In her resistance to aEuropean order In which Prance held sway. As long as Britain heldout the hope of flnndal aid to Continental allies willing to resistNapoleonic control, his Empire could not be secure. Yet to bestBritain required a fleet and Napoleon’s had been smashed by Nelsonat Trafalgar in 1805. HIs answer was a scheme of economic warfareknown as the Continental System.

The Continental System Was essentially a reverse blockade. Napoleonforbade any of the territories under his control from trading withGreat Britain. The Idea was not new. The Convention, Directory andConsulate bad all tried some form embargo before. The difference inNapoleon’s attempt was that he was In a position to force compliance

on close to the whole of Europe, something out of the reach of theprevious French governments. Also, the previous attempts had beenmore about boosting French commerce than it was about hurtingBritish commerce. Napoleon hoped to destroy the revenue Britainreceived from trade and thus bring It If not to Its knees than at leastto the negotiation table.

The Berlin Decrees of November 1806 brought the System intoeffect, but only after the Treaty of Thsit ensured Russia’s participationdid the system begin to wound British commerce, slashing herexports by up to 20 per cent. In terms of British Imports, much of the

( timber, tar and hemp for the British Royal Navy came from theBaltic, now shut off from British trade. Napoleon strengthened theterms of the Decrees by demanding a certificate of place of origin forall goods. Any ships visiting a British port were subject to confiscationalong with their cargo. When that, too, failed to bring the resultsNapoleon desired, he declared that any ship from a neutral countrysearched by the Royal Navy on the high seas was also subject toseizure. For its part a British “order in council” of 1807 declared thatneutral shipping could enter a Continental port only after It hadpassed through a British port.

Predictably, the Continental System hurt Continental commerce asmuch as It did British commerce, provoking a deep bitterness amongstall participants. Smuggling wasrampant and because the Frenchwere the only ones really committedto enforcing the System, It sappedtheir manpower while at the sametime rendering the embargo veryIneffident. lb this was added thehardship of the British blockade,which bit deeply Into not onlyoverseas trade but also coastal tradewithin Europe. Napoleon was forcedto take ever more drastic measures toenforce compliance induding theinvasion of Portugal, Spain and most

52 disastrously Russia.

0

j

0 I

9- C 0 z 0

0

1 The Napoleonic Warsiberlan adventures and Russian winters4ottugai had long had a close relationship with Great Britain,\)

iting back to the Middle Ages. Through much of thegevolutlonary and Napoleonic Wars ft had managed to remainneutral. Neutrals fared well under the Continental System, butwhen Napoleon insisted that Portugal adhere to the embargo,portugal resisted and in 1807 Napoleon Invaded, through Spain.The French quickly occupied Portugal and then turned theirattention to her reluctant Spanish ally. Napoleon sent a large armyunder Murat to take control of Spain in 1808, placIng his brotherJoseph on the throne and Incurring the wrath of patrioticSpaniards. This started the Peninsular War.

• TOK LinkWhat Is evidence?

• When Napoleon’s troops invaded Spain it• sparked a brutal guerrilla war that sapped• the energy of the Napoleonic Empire and

spread suffering throughout the Ibedan: Peninsula. Spanish artist Fraridsco Goya: depicted the horrors of this conflict in a• number of major paintings and the print• portfolio known as Ilie Disasters of War’: produced in 1810—14. Study the prints

,,below and answer the questions that

,) follow.

Source-based questionsI What are the value and rirnitations of

using these prints as histarical evidence?2 What rcIe does emotion play in them?

How does this affect their use as: a ce?

3 What do they reveal about Goya’sopinions of war In general and specificallythe Peninsular War? What leads you to

condusions?4 Of what propaganda value might these

images have been forthe Spanish• . nationalist resistance?

C:AndthsnohelpformthelheDeisofWar’byFranciscocoya. 53

Andth*Ibecists,froni ‘The DisastaisofWar’ b, RanciscoGoya.

1 a The French Revolution and Napoleon

The Peninsular War was a new kind of war In a number of ways.

First, It cast Napoleon and the French not as the liberators, but as the

oppressors. The nationalism popularized by the French Revolution

now took root In Spain against the French. This resistance took an

Innovative form—gueriUa war. From the very beginning of the French

occupation, anti-French riots bad broken out In Madrid. Citizens

banded together in Irregular units and attacked French forces. In some

areas lull-scale revolts erupted. Bach act of resistance was met with

savage repression, which in turn provoked equally savage reprisals

against French forces and officials. Although the SpnIch regular army

had only 100,000 troops, SpanIsh natlonpllcm and the guerifla

concept multiplied that many times over. Soon the British took

advantage and in August 1808 landed troops under Arthur Wellesley,

the future Duke of Wellington, in Portugal. Weflesley commanded a

cmfl army with skill and determination. With the co-operation of the

Spanish citizens, be drove the French from Portugal. Over the course

of the next six years, the stagnant Peninsular War would sap

Napoleon’s energy, flirnnces and manpower.

The example of Span1h resistance and Its own growing sense of

nationalism swept through Europe. But this natIoni1cm was far from

monolithic. It could be liberal or conservative, secular or clerical. It could

be bourgeois or aristocratic, republican or monarchical It manifested

itself in the Austrian War of Liberation, but also In the Polish

nationalists’ support for Napoleon. Regardless, the majority of this

burgeoning nationalism Increased resistance to Napoleonic rule. By the

end of 1810, resistance became more entrenched and threatening when

ar &frymuiar I formally wIthdrew Russia from the Continental System.

The Continental System had been damaging to Russian Interests in

a number of ways. Economically It had cut Into Russian exports to

Britain and not fully replaced them with CozltInfntal trade.

The promises of Rncs1in domh,ince In Asia Minor and south central

Asia held out by Napoleon at flInt were never realized and the French

support for these endeavors never materhilfred. specifically the

partition of the Ottoman Umpire. Personally, Alexander I, himself a

man of considerable ego, becameembittered at his role of understudy to

Napoleon’s starring role In the affairs of

Burope. lb Alexander it fitted neither

his own stature nor that of the Russian

Umpire. He had had his own ambitions.

For his part, Napoleon rationalized the

need to woo the lar in practical terms.

If the Continental System was to work,Russia must participate. A Russiandefeat would remove the possibility of

an Anglo-Russian alliance and keep theBritish Isolated.

Napoleon seemed to welcome theimpending dash and, while makingovertures to solve the impasse

54 diplomatically, he began militarypreparations In earnest. Military

n

Marshal Ney was one of a number oftalented marshals who commandedNapoleon’s armies. Davout Soult,Lan nes, and Murat were young mewho benefited from the opening at ,)the higher ranks to men of talentrather than birth.

What role did these menplay in Napoleon’s victoriesin battles such as Austerlitz,iena, Wagram, and Ulm7What does this tell us aboutNapoleon’s leadership style?

Marshal Ney bringing Napoleon’s &encki rear guard out of Russia th heavy

losses, 1812.

1 The Napoleonic Wars

r .lutlon had always suited Napoleon, he was more sure-footed whilemmandlng armies than he was In negotiation, diplomacy requiring

‘Thnd nuance. Spain notwithstanding, this approach had alwaysed for the Bmperoi and he duly thought this campaign would

oceed as his others had—a few weeks of manoeuvre followed by onetwo decisive battles after which he would bring the ‘Thar to heel by

ay of a treat . Alexanderandhls generaishad a differentwarlnrnhid.

apoleon massed an enormous force for his Invasion of Russia—auly Imperial Army of dose to 700,000 soldiers. These soldiers cameom all over the Empire. Only some 300,000 were French with)ughly the same number raised from the Emperor’s Germanoldings. Beyond this there were Italians, Portuguese, Swiss, Poles,nd Dutch. The Austrians were forced to provide 30,000 troops andie Prusslans 20,000 troops. Subtracting those on supply and garrisonuty, Napoleon had more than 400,000 men to subdue the Russians.his mammoth force lumbered Into Russia In June 1812.

‘he Russians did not offer battle In the early part of the campaign.‘his was partially by design—Russian forces were being recalled fromouth-western Europe—and partially due to poor co-ordination andlow deployment. As the Russian army retreated, they left little for thenemy to forage, creating a supply problem for the French that was:oinpounded by poor logistics and Increasingly precarious supply lines.rhroughout the summea harassing tactics by the Rticclanq and disease,lt Into Napoleon’s forces. By early September It seemed that the

mpemr would get his wish. 120,000 Russians under General Kutusov

( ‘t the French on the march to Moscow at Borodino. Napoleon’s0,00O troops technically won the day, but both armies were badlymauled In the process. Moscow was now open to Napoleon and heoccupied the largely abandoned city on 14 September. Within days, theremaining citizens of Moscow set fire to their city.

Robbed of the satisfaction of a Russian surrender, the comfort ofbillets, necessary provisions, and apparently his legendary militaryacumen, Napoleon reluctantly ordered retreat on October 17.Since the invasion In June his forces had shrunk continually whilehis enemy’s had Increased. The supply problems that had plaguedhim from the beginning of the Invasion now grew Into a crisis.And to all this was added the looming Russian winter. As thegrande armée retreated, Kutusov began a series of attacks that theFrench were Ill-equipped to repel. By the time his remainingmarshals dragged what was left of the grande armie out of RussiaIn December 1812—Napoleon had already returned to Paris toquell a coup d’etat—battle, capture, starvation, desertion, disease,and exposure had reduced It to less than 100,000, only a fractionof which Were capable of fighting.

His enemies, quicic to recognize Napoleon’s predicament, were readyI°POuxce once the opportunity presented itself. By 1813, italy wasIn revolt. Wellington swept the French from Spain. Prussia, Austria,Sweden quickly joined with Russia in another coalition and smashedI hastily raised French army at the Battle of Leipzig In October 1813.Depos by his senate in March 1814, Napoleon abdicated on April 4and awaited terms from the allies.

1’

AcdVItYhIThe Russian CampaignAnalyse the role played by eachof the following elements inthe French defeat in Russia.

• Strategy

• TactIcs

• Supply

• lioops

• Leadership

• Geography

• Climate55