succession+case+doctrines+(midterms) nia

8/13/2019 Succession+Case+Doctrines+(MIDTERMS) NIA

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3C

SUCCESSION

CASE DIGESTS

Arts. 774 777

1. Bonilla v. Barcena

In this case, the action to quiet title instituted

by the late Barcena while she was still alive was

dismissed by the lower court saying that the heirs had

no legal capacity to sue. The SC held that the

deceased can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing

the case at bar. The records of this case show that the

complaint was filed while Barcena while still alive

and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction overher person. rt. !!! provides that "the rights to the

succession are transmitted from the moment of death

of the testator.# $hen Barcena died, her claim or

right to the parcels of land in litigation was not

e%tinguished by her death but was transmitted to heirheirs upon her death.

2. i!"oco v. Intestate o# $ra%ante

In this case, &ragante applied for acertificate of public convenience. fter his death, the

certificate was issued to his intestate estate, to which

petitioner opposed contending that substitution of the

legal representative of the estate should not have

been allowed. The SC held that such certificate

would be certainly be property, and the right to

acquire such a certificate, by complying with the

requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in hislifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial

administrator after his death.

3. $&le v. $&le

The heirs &ule in this case opposes the

appointment of an administrator upon the ground that

the deceased left no debts and that his property hadalready been partitioned among his children during

his lifetime. The SC held that in the absence of debts

e%isting against the estate, the heirs may enter upon

the administration of the property immediately. If

they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. Ifthey desire to partition it among themselves and can

do this by mutual agreement, they also have that

privilege. The rights to the succession of a person are

transmitted from the moment of his death' in other

words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of theproperty of the deceased ancestor. The administrator

has no right to intervene in any way whatsoever in

the division of the estate among the heirs when they

are adults and when there are no debts against the

estate.

4. 'eirs o# t(e ate Do!in%o N. Nicolas v.

)etro*an+

Surviving spouse (osefa mortagaged their

conjugal property to )etroban* which was laterforeclosed. The SC held that petitioners, as children

and therefore compulsory heirs of deceased

+omingo, acquired ownership of portions of the lots

as their legitime upon the death of their father or

prior to the foreclosure of mortgage and the filing by

the respondent ban* of its petition for the issuance of

a writ of possession. They should not be deprived oftheir legitime by the enforcement of the writ of

possession thus such should not include parts of the

two lots pertaining to petitioners. ote that in this

case, as shown by the records, the estate of +omingo

has not been judicially or e%tra-judicially settled.

Arts. 77, - 7,2

. A&stria v. /e0es

etitioners in this case pray for the

annulment of the will of the deceased alleging its

intrinsic validity. They are contending that had the

deceased *nown that the adoption of erfecto was

spurious and was thus not a compulsory heir, she

would not have instituted him. The SC held that thewill, which alone should provide the answer, is mute

on this point or at best is vague and uncertain. The

Civil Code provides that the words of the will are to

receive an interpretation which will give to every

e%pression some effect, rather than once which will

render any of the e%pressions inperative. Testacy is

favoured and doubts are resolved on its side,

especially where the will evinces an intention on the

part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole

estate, as was done in this case.

. DC 'olin%s v. CA

The question in this case is whether or not

the Contract of /ease with 0ption to Buy entered into

by the late Bartolome with petitioner was terminatedupon her death or w1n it binds her sole heir even afterher demise. The SC held that as a general rule, heirs

are bound by contracts entered into by their

predecessors-in-terest e%cept when the rights and

obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by

23 their nature, 43 stipulation or 53 provisions of law.

In the case at bar, there is neither contractual

stipulation nor legal provision ma*ing the rights and

obligations under the contract intransmissible. There

3C Succession Case Digests (Midterms)Diaz, Garcia, Ingles, Machuca

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is no personal act required from the deceased

Bartolome apart from the obligation to deliver

possession of the subject property to petitioner upon

the e%ercise by the latter of its option to lease the

same which may very well be performed by her heir.

Articles 7,,-7

7. Dionisio vs. Dionisio

The will was in Tagalog and was translated

in Spanish by the oppositor as well as by the official

court interpreter. If the oppositor6s translation was

correct then the attestation clause would not have

been made in accordance with the law. The membersof the court held that the interpretation of the court

interpreter is correct and in conformity with the

idiomatic usage of the Tagalog language.

!77 8 in case of doubt, interpretation that

will ma*e the disposition operative shall be preferred.

!92 8 4 modes of interpreting, the one thatwill prevent intestacy will be preferred.

,. In re 5ill o# /iosa

The will was e%ecuted prior to the

enactment of an act which required additional

formalities. The question is which law will govern:

SC ruled that the law at the time the will was

e%ecuted will govern. ;ence the additional

formalities need not be complied with.!9< 8 validity of a will as to its form

depends on the law in force at the time of e%ecution

. Enri6&e8 et al. vs. A*aia8 et al.

;olographic will was e%ecuted before the

enactment of the ew Civil Code. rior to the said

code, holographic wills were not allowed. SC ruled

using !9provided of course it complied

with the formalities then required3

lso, SC added that if a will was void under

the law during its e%ecution and a subsequent law is

passed which does away with certain formalities, thewill does not become valid.

Articles 7-,93

19. Ba%tas vs. :a%&io

Testator6s body was paraly?ed on the left

side, his hearing was impaired, he had lost his power

of speech, his head fell to one side, and saliva ran

from his mouth. ;owever, he retained the use of his

right hand and was able to write fairly well. The

question is whether or not the testator was of sound

mind. SC ruled that the presumption of a sound mind

was not rebutted.$itnesses testified that the testator wrote the

disposition in pieces of paper' he was as*ed whether

they were indeed dispositions to which he nodded hishead in affirmation' and the will was read to him out

loud.

11. ;a< T&a v. ;a< Ca &an

It was shown that from the bed in which

Tomasa was lying, it was possible for her to see thetable on which the witnesses signed the will. $hile

the rule is absolute that one who ma*es a will must

sign the same in the presence of the witnesses and

that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each

other, as well as in the presence of the one ma*ing

the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of thesignatures made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the

signatures are made where it is possible for each ofthe necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see

the signatures placed upon the will.

12. Sanc(o vs. A*ella

0pponent alleged that the testator6s mental

faculties were not functioning normally anymore'

that she had poor eyesight1hearing' that she urinatedwithout *nowing' that she had very poor memory. SC

ruled that senile debility, blindness, deafness, or poor

memory is not by itself sufficient to incapacitate a

person from ma*ing his1her will. In this case, the

records showed that the testator6s mental faculties

were functioning well.

lso, the fact that the testator included in

her dispositions property that she had already donated

does not indicate mental insanity. t most, it is

merely forgetfulness.

13. Gonales vs. Gonales e Car&n%con%

Two alleged wills were presented for

probate to which the petitioner opposed presenting an

instrument revo*ing the said wills allegedly e%ecuted

by the testator. The family physician who attended tothe testator during her last illness and saw her on theday the said instrument was allegedly e%ecuted,

testified that during that time the testator was in a

comatose and unconscious state. SC upheld this

testimony as against the testimony of attesting

witnesses tending to imply that the testator was of

sound mind.

Arts. ,9 - ,9


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14. :a0a v. Tolentino

+eceased placed her thumb mar* on every

page of the will. ;er lawyer wrote her name under it.othing was noted on the attestation clause that the

deceased directed the lawyer to write her name.

;eld@ Aalid. not necessary that theattestation clause in question should state that the

testatri% requested the lawyer to sign her name

inasmuch as the testatri% signed the will by her thumb

mar*.

1. Ta*aoaa v. /osal =1,2>

0n the first page >which contained the entire

testamentary dispositions3, the testatri% signed at the

bottom, while the witnesses signed at the left-hand

margin. 0n the second page which contained the

attestation clause, the testatri% signed at the left hand

margin, and the witnesses signed below theattestation clause. The attestation clause also did not

state the number of pages.;eld@ Aalid. The signatures of the

instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first

page of the will attested not only to the genuineness

of the signature of the testatri% but also the due

e%ecution of the will as embodied in the attestation

clause.

The objects of attestation and of subscription

were fully met and satisfied when the witnessessigned at the left margin of the sole page which

contained all the testamentary dispositions.

The failure to state the number of pages

would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact

that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will

that it is really composed of only 4 pages duly signed

by the testatri% and her instrumental witnesses.

1. A&ela v. CA =299>

$ill was two pages long. The number of

pages were also not stated in the attestation, only a

blan* was there.

The will was not properly ac*nowledged.

>"ilagdaan *o at ninotario *o ngayong 2 ;unyo,

dito sa )anila.#3

The witnesses also did not sign under theattestation clause but on the left hand margin of the

page.

;eld@ Invalid will.

Issue of number of pages@ no substantial

compliance in this case because no statement in the

attestation clause or anywhere else in the will itself as

to the number of pages which comprise the will.

Issue of witnesses not signing under the

attestation clause@ the signatures to the attestation

clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the

statements contained in the attestation clause itself.

the attestation clause is separate and apart from the

disposition of the will. They should sign below it.

Issue of not properly ac*nowledged@contrary to rt 7. c*nowledgement is the act of

one who has e%ecuted a deed in going before some

competent officer and declaring it to be his act ordeed. )oreover, will must be ac*nowledged and not

merely subscribed and sworn to. notarial will that

is not ac*nowledged before a notary public by the

testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if

it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.

17. G&errero v. Bi(is =2997>

The will was ac*nowledged by the testatri%

and the witnesses at the testatri%6s witnesses in DC

before a notary public who was commissioned for

and in Caloocan City.

;eld@ Invalid. otary public was actingoutside the place of his commission, and this did not

satisfy rt 7. o notary shall possess authority todo any notarial act beyond the limits of his

jurisdiction.

1,. De Gala v. Gonales

Testatri% signed using a thumb mar*. In the

attestation clause, it is not mentioned that the testatri%

signed by thumb mar*. But, in the last paragraph ofthe will, she mentioned that she signed it using her

thumb mar*.

;eld@ Aalid. It appeared in the attestation

clause that the signature was affi%ed in the presence

of the witnesses, and the form of the signature is

sufficiently described and e%plained in the last clause

of the body of the will. It may be conceded that the

attestation clause does not, standing alone, quite meet

the requirements of the statute, but ta*en in

connection with the last clause of the body of thewill, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the

legislative intent.

1. C&evas v. Ac(acoso

The attestation clause in this case was

signed by the testator, but signed below his name bythe witnesses. The clause was made by the testatorhimself more than by the instrumental witnesses.

;eld@ Aalid. It substantially complies with

the statue. The apparent anomaly is not serious to

invalidate the will, it appearing that right under the

signature of the testator, there appear the signatures

of the 5 witnesses.

Arts. ,97 - ,9


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29. Testate o# t(e ate A*aa vs. A*a"a

lthough the attestation clause does not

indicate the number of witnesses a close inspection ofthe will shows that three witnesses signed it. The

question of the number of the witnesses is answered

by an e%amination of the will itself and without theneed for presentation of evidence aliunde.

Arts. ,19 - ,1

21. A"ero vs. CA

=equirements under rt 725 and 72E on theauthentication of changes and signing and dating of

dispositions refer only to the validity of the

dispositions, but not its probate. If the testator fails to

sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is

that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such

failure, however, does not render the whole testamentvoid.

Arts. ,29 - ,27

22. Unson vs. A*ella

will can be admitted to probate,

notwithstanding that one or more witnesses do not

remember having attested it, provided the court is

satisfied upon the evidence adduced that the will hasbeen e%ecuted and signed in the manner prescribed

by law. s a general rule, the attesting witnesses

must be produced when there is opposition to the

probate. But there are e%ceptions to this rule, for

instance, when the witness is dead, cannot be served

with process of the court, or his reputation for the

truth has been questioned, or he appears hostile to the

proponent.

Arts. ,2, ,37

23. )olo vs. )olo

subsequent will, containing a clause

revo*ing a previous will, having been disallowed, for

the reason that it was not e%ecuted in conformity with

the formal requirements as to the ma*ing of wills,cannot produce the effect of annulling the previouswill, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.

Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation.

It is the intention of the testator that the revocation of

previous will is dependent upon the validity of a

subsequent will. The failure of the new testamentary

disposition, upon whose validity the revocation

depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a

suspensive condition, and hence prevents the

revocation of the original will. The operation of the

doctrine depends upon the intention of the testator at

the time of the revocation of the first will.

24. Ga%o vs. )a!&0ac

The law does not require any evidence of the

revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved.$here a will which can not be found is shown to be

in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the

presumption is, in the absence of other competent

evidence, that it was cancelled or destroyed. The

same presumption arises where it is shown that the

testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be

found after his death.

2. 'eirs o# /oseno asa! vs. U!en%an

The purported last will and testament of

testator could not properly be relied upon to establish

petitioner6s right to posess the subject lot because,without having been probated, the said last will and

testament could not be the source of any right. Beforeany will can have force or validity it must be

probated. rt 757 is e%plicit when it says "no will

shall pass either real or personal property unless it is

proved and allowed in accordance with the =ules of

Court.#

Arts. ,3 - ,3

26. /e0es v. CA

The natural children of the deceased in thiscase are questioning the intrinsic validity of the will

on the ground that his compulsory heir cannot be one,

as theirs was an illicit relationship. SC held that as a

general rule, courts in probate proceedings are

limited to pass only upon the e%trinsic validity of thewill sought to be probated. There are, however,

notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity

was first determined as when the defect of the will is

apparent on its face and the probate of the will may

become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically

invalid. The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed

upon because "practical considerations# demanded it

as when there is preterition of heirs or thetestamentary provisions are doubtful legality. In this

case however, There was never an open admission ofany illicit relationship. Thus, there was no need to go

beyond the face of the will.

2. Balana0 v. )artine

The basic issue in this case was whether the

probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic


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validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or

formal validity, and in declaring it void. The SC held

that in view of the unusual provisions of the will,

which are of dubious legality, the trial court acted

correctly in passing upon the willFs intrinsic validityeven before its formal validity had been established.

The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony

if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.But the probate court erred in declaring, that

the will was void and in converting the testate

proceeding into an intestate proceeding

notwithstanding the fact that it previously gave effect

to the surviving husbandFs conformity to the will and

to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which

presumably included his one-half share of theconjugal estate. The rule is that Gthe invalidity of one

of several dispositions contained in a will does not

result in the invalidity of the other dispositions,

unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not

have made such other dispositions if the first invalid

disposition had not been madeG.

2". )aca! v. Gat!aitan

/eonarda and (uana reciprocally assigned their

respective property to one another conditioned upon

who might die first, the time of death determining the

event upon which the acquisition of such right by the

one or the other depended. This contract, as any other

contract, is binding upon the parties thereto.Inasmuch as /eonarda had died before (uana the

latter thereupon acquired the ownership of the house,

in the same manner as /eonarda would have acquired

the ownership of the automobile and of the furnitureif (uana had died first. (In this case, the court

essentially sustained the validity of survivorship

agreements.)

2#. /ori%&e v. /ori%&e

$hen +omingo =odrigue? died intestate, he

was survived by his widow, Concepcion &eli%, his

children grandchildren. The widow, children and

grandchildren of the deceased entered into an e%tra-

judicial settlement of his estate, consisting of one-

half of the properties allegedly belonging to the

conjugal partnership. The widow later on questionedthe validity of this e%trajudicial partition, saying that

she entered such contract under duress, violence and

intimidation.

The SC agreed with the trial Court that the

evidence was not convincing that the contracts of

transfer from the widow to her daughter, and from

the latter to her mother and stepfather were e%ecuted

through violence or intimidation >this was done to

allegedly convert paraphernal property into

conjugal3.

$hat is more decisive is that duress being

merely a vice or defect of consent, an action based

upon it must be brought within four years after it hasceased' and the present action was instituted only

after 47 years after the intimidation is claimed to

have occurred, and no less than 9 years after thesupposed culprit died. 0n top of it, appellant entered

into a series of subsequent transactions with appellees

that confirmed the contracts that she now tries to set

aside. Therefore, this cause of action is clearly

barred.

Arts. ,49 - ,3

3$. :ecson v. Coronel

0ppositors essentially question that validity

of the will on the ground that it would have been too

impossible that they, as relatives, would be left with

nothing as this was not normal in hilippine customs.The SC held that there is nothing strange in the

preterition made by +olores Coronel of her blood

relatives, nor in the designation of /oren?o ecson as

her sole beneficiary. &urthermore, although the

institution of the beneficiary here would not seem the

most usual and customary, still this would not be

nullper se.

In the absence of any statutory restrictionevery person possesses absolute dominion over his

property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he

pleases without regard to natural or legal claim upon

his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisitecapacity to ma*e a will, and the disposition of his

property is not affected by fraud of undue influence,

the will is not rendered invalid by the fact that it is

unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust.

Arts. ,4 - ,

31. Non v. CA

etitioners in this case are asserting co-

ownership of the property while respondents claim

that they are the absolute owners by virtue of a deed

of donation e%ecuted in their favor. The SC ruled forrespondents. $hen Airginia . Aiado died intestate in

2974, her part of the conjugal property was

transmitted to her heirs H her husband (ulian and

their children.. The inheritance, which vested from

the moment of death of the decedent, remained under

a co-ownership regime among the heirs until

partition. very act intended to put an end to

indivision among co-heirs and legatees or deviseeswould be a partition although it would purport to be a


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sale, an e%change, a compromise, a donation or an

e%trajudicial settlement. The Court found the

instruments e%ecuted showing donation were validly

e%ecuted.

Articles ,7-,79

32. ?a. De Aranas vs. Aranas

etitioners were assailing the stipulation in

the will which provided that the testator6s nephew

shall have usufructuary rights and be the first

administrator of certain properties' and that upon his

death or refusal to continue to act as

usufructuary1administrator, the administration shallpass to the anyone of the sons of his brother.

etitioners contended that this violated rt. 7!, CC.

SC ruled that there was a limitation to the

right of the nephew, namely his death or his refusal.

The disposition must be respected J given effect.

Kpon the death or refusal of the nephew, the propertycan be disposed of subject to the limitations provided

in rt. 75 concerning fideicommissary substitution.

Articles ,71-,,

33. /a!ire v. ?a. De /a!ire

The deceased was survived by his spouse, 4

grandnephews, and his companion. The administrator

submitted a partition to the court which divided theestate into 4@ one-half would go to the widow in

satisfaction of her legitime' the other half, which is

the free portion, would go to the grandnephews'

however, 215 of the free portion is charged with the

widow6s usufruct and the remaining 415 with a

usufruct in favor of the companion.

The grandnephews opposed the substitution

on the ground that the 2stheirs are not related to the

substitutes within the 2stdegree.

SC ruled that the fideicommissarysubstitution is void. The substitutes >grandnephews3

are not related to the companion within one degree.

In effect, the SC ruled that "one degree#

means "one generation# and not "one designation.#

So, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be

either a child or a parent of the 2stheir.

34. )iciano vs. Bri!o

Testator is a Tur*ish national who stated in

his will that the institution of legatees therein is

conditional insofar as the said legatees must respect

the testator6s will to distribute his property in

accordance with the laws of the hilippines. SC ruled

that this condition is void because it is contrary to

law. Knder the old civil code, the national law of the

testator should govern his testamentary dispositions.

Articles ,,-93 =e@ce

3. /osales vs. /osales

etitioner was the widow of the son of thedeceased. In other words, the deceased is the mother-

in-law of the petitioner. Issue here was w1n a widow

is an heir of her parent-in-law: SC ruled that the

widow is neither an intestate nor a compulsory heir.

There is no law which entitles the widow to inherit

from her mother-in-law by her own right or by the

right of representation.lso, rt. 77! refers to the estate of the

deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse

is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of

a parent-in-law where the surviving spouse is

considered a 5rdperson.

3. Barit&a vs. CA

The deceased died while driving a tricycle

which collided with a bus. The widow e%ecuted a

release of claim and an affidavit of desistance

discharging the owner of the bus from all

actions1claims arising from the accident for a certain

sum of money. The parents of the deceased thereafter

filed a claim for damages against the bus owner. SC

ruled that the widow and her son are the successors-in-interest authori?ed to receive payment. The parents

shall only succeed when the decedent leaves no

legitimate descendants. $hile the surviving spouse is

a concurring compulsory heir.

37. De Ahehe3, he ac*nowledged petitioner as his

natural daughter and also designated her as his only

heir. etitioner filed an action against respondent

claiming parcels of land which she allegedly

inherited from the deceased. =espondent contends

that the petitioner is the legitimate child of the mother

and the person to whom she was married.SC ruled that the issue of paternity is immaterialconsidering that the deceased died without any

compulsory heir and that he instituted the petitioner

as his lawful heir in his will.

0ne who has no compulsory heirs may

dispose by will all of his estate or any part of it in

favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

Art. ,1


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