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STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME

NEPAL

September 2011

Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal

Kathmandu, Nepal

State Safety Programme, Nepal

CONTENTS

Foreword ii

Abbreviations iv

Chapter 1. General 1

1.1 Introduction 1

1.2 Purpose 1

1.3 Scope 1

1.4 Definitions 1

1.5 SSP Concept 3

1.6 Document Control 5

1.7 Distribution List and Record of Copies of the SSP Document 5

Chapter 2. State Safety Policy and Objectives 7

2.1 Civil Aviation Policy, 2007 7

2.2 Nepal’s Aviation Legislative Framework 7

2.3 Safety Responsibilities and Accountabilities 11

2.4 Accident and Incident Investigation 11

2.5 Enforcement Policy 12

Chapter 3. State Safety Risk Management 15

3.1. Safety requirements for service providers SMS 15

3.2 Agreement on service provider’s safety performance 16

Chapter 4. State Safety Assurance 20

4.1 Safety oversight 20

4.2 Safety data collection, analysis and exchange 22

4.3 Safety data driven targeting of oversight by CAA on areas of greater concern or need 24

Chapter 5. State Safety Promotion 26

5.1 Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety information 26

5.2 External training, communication and dissemination of safety information 27

Appendices Appendix A. Nepal’s Safety Policy Statement Appendix B. Nepal’s Safety Regulatory Functional Chart Appendix C. National Aviation Safety Team (NAST) Appendix D. Acceptable Level of Safety Appendix E. State Safety Programme-Gap Analysis Appendix F. Critical Elements of a Safety Oversight System

Amendmend No 1

January 2013 Page i


FOREWORD

As a signatory of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Nepal is

committed to implement the provision made on Convention and its Annexes

including related documents for the safe, regular and efficient air transport

within its area of jurisdiction. Article 37 of the Convention states:

Each contracting State undertakes to collaborate in securing the highest

practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and

organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in

all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation.

ICAO Annexes 1, 6, 8, 11, 13 and 14 require Contracting States to establish a State

Safety Programme (SSP), in order to achieve an Acceptable Level of Safety (ALoS) in

civil aviation. An SSP is defined as an integrated set of regulations and activities in a

State aimed at improving safety. The Safety Management Manual (SMM), Doc 9859

describes basic safety concepts, as the foundation upon which to understand the

need for both a Safety Management System (SMS) and a State Safety Programme

(SSP) as well as how these safety concepts are embodied into the ICAO SARPs.

The SSP plays an important role in identifying, monitoring and maintaining the

effectiveness of the various elements our safety systems. The concept of

establishing an ALoS attempted to complement the current approach to safety

management based on regulatory compliance with a performance based approach.

The civil aviation acts and associated regulations confer on CAAN the obligation to issue

necessary requirements, directives, manuals and documents for the systematic

implementation of ICAO SARPs. As the regulatory authority of the civil aviation in the

country, Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN) is responsible to develop SSP and

implement it in coordination with other agencies responsible for civil aviation safety.

This State Safety Programme (SSP) Nepal, 2011 has been promulgated by the

authority vested in Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal under provision made on

Rule 81 of Civil Aviation Rules, 2052 (1995).

The SSP Nepal identifies and describes current arrangements and outlines the steps

we need to continue to take in order to respond to safety challenges in the future.

(Tri Ratna Manandhar) Director General Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal

Page ii September 2011


ABBREVIATIONS

ADREP Accident/incident data reporting (ICAO)

AEP Aerodrome emergency plan

AIRPROX Aircraft proximity

ALARP As low as reasonably practicable

ALoS Acceptable level of safety

AMO Approved maintenance organization

AOC Air operator certificate

ASR Air safety report

ASRB Aviation Safety review board

ATC Air traffic control

ATM Air traffic management

ATS Air traffic service(s)

ATC Air Traffic Control

CAAN Civil aviation authority of Nepal

CAR Civil Aviation Requirements

CDA Continuous Descend Arrival

CFIT Controlled flight into terrain

CRM Crew resource management

Doc Document (ICAO)

ERP Emergency response plan

FDA Flight data analysis

FDM Flight data monitoring

FOD Foreign object (debris) damage

GoN Government of Nepal

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation

LOA Letter of Agreement

MOR Mandatory occurrence report

MOTCA Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation

NAST NCAR

National Aviation Safety Team Nepalese Civil Airworthiness Requirements

OJT On-the-job training

QA Quality assurance

QC Quality control

SARPs Standards and Recommended Practices (ICAO)

SDCPS Safety data collection and processing systems

SMM Safety management manual (ICAO Doc 9859)

SMS Safety management system(s)

SOPs Standard operating procedures

SRM Safety risk management

SSP State safety programme

STP Standard Training Package

USOAP Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (ICAO)

September 2011 Page iii


RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

Revision No. Date Entered by

Page iv September 2011


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September 2011 Page v


1. GENERAL 1.1 Introduction International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) into the ICAO Annex 1 –

Personnel Licensing, Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft, Annex 8 — Airworthiness of

Aircraft, Annex 11 — Air Traffic Services, Annex 13 — Aircraft Accident and Incident

Investigation and Annex 14 — Aerodromes require ICAO Contracting States to establish a

State Safety Programme (SSP) in order to achieve an Acceptable Level of Safety (ALoS) .

For the implementation of the requirements of Safety Management System, the Civil Aviation

Authority of Nepal (CAAN) has promulgated this State Safety Programme, Nepal (SSP Nepal),

2011 under the power conferred by Rule 81 of Civil Aviation Rules, 2052 (1995). 1.2 Purpose The purpose of the State Safety Program, Nepal is to achieve an Acceptable Level of Safety (ALoS) in civil aviation operations. 1.3 Scope The SSP Nepal provides an overview of civil aviation safety programme to the personnel involved in

safety regulations as well as to all stakeholders with a responsibility of SMS implementation.

1.4 Definitions Acceptable level of safety. Minimum degree of safety that must be assured by a system in actual practice.

Accident. An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, in which: a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of: — being in the aircraft, or — direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have become detached from the aircraft, or — direct exposure to jet blast, except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally available to the passengers and crew; or b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which: — adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and — would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component,

except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine, its

cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennas,

tires, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the aircraft skin; or c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible. Note 1.— For statistical uniformity only, an injury resulting in death within thirty days of the date of the accident is classified as a fatal injury by ICAO. Note 2.— An aircraft is considered to be missing when the official search has been terminated and the wreckage has not been located. September 2011 Page 1

State Safety Programme, Nepal Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). A publication issued by or with the authority of a

State and containing aeronautical information of a lasting character essential to air navigation.

Air operator certificate (AOC). A certificate authorizing an operator to carry out specified commercial air transport operations.

Approved maintenance organization. An organization approved by a Contracting State, in accordance with the requirements of Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 8 — Aeroplane Maintenance, to perform maintenance of aircraft or parts thereof and operating under supervision approved by that State. Note.— Nothing in this definition is intended to preclude that the organization and its supervision be approved by more than one State.

Approved training organization. An organization approved by a Contracting State in accordance with the requirements of Annex 1, 1.2.8.2 and Appendix 2 to perform flight crew training and operating under the supervision of that State.

Certification, A process performed by the appropriate authority in order to approve an established provider of Aviation related services.

Certified aerodrome. An aerodrome whose operator has been granted an aerodrome certificate.

Flight data analysis. A process of analysing recorded flight data in order to improve the safety of flight operations.

Hazard. A condition or an object with the potential to cause injuries to personnel, damage to equipment or structures, loss of material, or reduction of ability to perform a prescribed function.

Incident. An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation. Note.— The types of incidents which are of main interest to the International Civil Aviation Organization for accident prevention studies are listed in the Accident/Incident Reporting Manual (ADREP Manual) (Doc 9156).

Investigation. A process conducted for the purpose of accident prevention which includes the

gathering and analysis of information, the drawing of conclusions, including the determination

of causes and, when appropriate, the making of safety recommendations.

Level of safety. Degree of safety of a system, representing the quality of the system, safety-wise, expressed through safety indicators.

Operations specifications. The authorizations, conditions and limitations associated with the air operator certificate and subject to the conditions in the operations manual.

Safety. The state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk management. Page 2 September 2011

State Safety Programme, Nepal Safety indicators. Parameters that characterize and/or typify the level of safety of the system.

Safety management system. A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures.

Safety measurement. The quantification of the outcomes of selected high-level, high consequences events, such as accident and serious incident.

Safety performance measurement. The quantification of the outcomes of selected low-level,

low-consequence processes, such as the number of foreign object debris (FOD) events per

specified number of ramp operations, or the number of unauthorized ground vehicle events on

taxiways per a specific number of airport operations or during a specified period of time

Safety programme. An integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety.

Safety risk. Assessment, expressed in terms of predicted probability and severity, of the consequences of a hazard, taking as reference the worst foreseeable situation. Note. — Typically, safety risks are designated through an alphanumeric convention that allows for their measurement.

Safety risk management. A generic term that encompasses the assessment and mitigation of the safety risks of the consequences of hazards that threaten the capabilities of an organization, to a level as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). Safety risk probability. The likelihood that an unsafe event or condition might occur.

Safety risk severity. The possible consequences of an unsafe event or condition, taking as reference the worst foreseeable situation. Safety targets. Concrete safety objectives to be achieved.

Service Provider. The term refers to any organization providing aviation services. The

term includes approved training organizations that are exposed to safety risks during

the provision of their services, aircraft operators, approved maintenance

organizations, organizations responsible for type design and/or manufacture of

aircraft, air traffic service providers and certified aerodromes, as applicable.

1.5 SSP Concept

An SSP is defined as an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving

Safety. It includes specified safety activities that must be performed by the State, and

regulations and directives promulgated by the State to support fulfillment of its

responsibilities concerning safe and efficient delivery of aviation activities of the State.

An SSP is a management system for the management of safety by the State. The implementation of

an SSP must be commensurate with the size and complexity of the State‘s aviation system,

September 2011 Page 3

State Safety Programme, Nepal and may require coordination among multiple authorities responsible for individual elements of civil aviation functions in the State.

SSP framework

SSP Nepal has been developed in accordance with the ICAO SSP framework that consists of four components and eleven elements:

1. State safety policy and objectives

1.1 State safety legislative framework

1.2 State safety responsibilities and accountabilities 1.3 Accident and incident investigation 1.4 Enforcement policy

2. State‘s safety risk management 2.1 Safety requirements for service providers SMS 2.2 Agreement on service providers‘ safety performance

3. State‘s safety assurance

3.1 Safety oversight 3.2 Safety data collection, analysis and exchange 3.3 Safety-data-driven targeting of oversight of areas of greater concern or need

4. State‘s safety promotion 4.1 Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety information 4.2 External training, communication and dissemination of safety information.

The two core operational activities of an SSP are State safety risk management and State

safety assurance. These two core operational activities take place under the umbrella provided

by the State safety policy and objectives and are supported by the State safety promotion.

These four components constitute the basic building blocks of an SSP, in that

they represent the four overarching safety management processes that underlie

the actual management system (SSP).

Relationship between an SSP and an SMS

The safety management SARPs are aimed at two audience groups: States and service

providers. States are responsible for developing and establishing an SSP, whereas

service providers are responsible for developing and establishing an SMS. States are

responsible, as part of the activities of their SSP, to accept and oversee the development,

implementation and operational performance of the service provider‘s SMS. The basic objective of a State, through its SSP, is to ensure, to the extent possible, public

safety during service delivery by service providers. This objective is achieved by defining

the ALoS for the SSP, and through the control of safety risks within the State by the two

‗operational components‘ of the SSP: safety risk management and safety assurance. Page 4 September 2011


1.6 Document Control

The copy of the SSP Nepal will be made available to all regulatory staff having safety oversight responsibilities.

Changes to this document will be achieved by a re-issue of the entire document rather than by the amendment of individual pages.

It is the function and responsibility of the National Aviation Safety Team (NAST) to

review the document at least annually to ensure the relevance and currency of all

Legislation, Regulations, CAA Requirements and Advisory Circulars etc.

1.7 Distribution List and Record of Copies of the SSP Document

The total number of copies of this SSP document produced for use by the CAA

officials is shown as below. One printed copy of the SSP has been designated as the

―Master Copy‖. Some users are provided with a printed copy of the SSP document

while others are given an electronic copy. This is also indicated in the table below.

Copy SSP Document User Name Print (P) Signature Date Date No. Electronic Provided Returned

(E)

1 Director General P/E

2 Dy. DG Regulatory P/E

3 Director Aviation Safety P/E

Department

4 Director Aerodrome P/E

Safety and Standards

Department

5 Director ANS Standards P/E

9

10

11 Technical Library P



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2. STATE SAFETY POLICY AND OBJECTIVES 2.1. Civil Aviation Policy, 2007 The Civil Aviation Policy, issued by Government of Nepal (GoN) in 2007 incorporates specific provision for enhancing safety in Nepalese civil aviation.

The goal of this policy is the development of air transport system with a liberal sky policy ensuring

private sector participation, so as to make air services in Nepal safe, reliable, standard, and easily

accessible to the general public. In order to achieve this goal, the policy has laid down various

objectives while ensuring the highest standards of flight safety and aviation security.

More specifically, Clause 4.3 of the policy clearly states that top priority will be

accorded to the compliance of the Standards and Recommended Practices

(SARPs) of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for the

enhancement of flight safety. It further states that the safety oversight capacity

will be strengthened by developing required institutional and legal infrastructure.

Additionally, Clause 4.17 of the policy states that the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN)

shall be strengthened as an efficient aeronautical regulatory authority to effectively carry out

the activities of regulation, control and expansion of the civil aviation sector.

The Aviation Policy, 2063 can be accessed on Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal website: www.caanepal.org.np

2.2. Nepal‘s Aviation Legislative Framework

Legislative System in Nepal Constitution is the fundamental law of Nepal. Nepal‘s Parliament has the power to promulgate

other laws for the implementation of various provisions made in the Constitution. Laws

promulgated under the power of legislative body are referred to as Acts. The government of

Nepal can formulate various regulations under the powers given by the respective Acts.

Additionally, government organizations (like CAAN) can issue and enforce necessary

Requirements, Directives and Manuals exercising the authority of respective regulations.

Primary Aviation Legislation The Civil Aviation Act, 1959 and Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal Act, 1996 constitute

the primary legislative framework for the regulation of civil aviation in Nepal.

Civil Aviation Act,1959 The Civil Aviation Act of 1959 confers upon the GoN the power to formulate regulations on the

establishment of aerodromes; prohibition of flight in a certain portion of Nepal‘s air space or

conditions of its operation; provision relating to the protection of public life; compensation


State Safety Programme, Nepal issues relating to aerodrome construction; prohibition, control, restriction and regulation on

transportation of certain goods by air; issuance of License to Airline Operators, Aerodrome

Operators, Aircraft Maintenance Organizations, other Aviation Organizations; Aircraft Accident

Investigation; Search and Rescue Service; noise control and environment protection.

Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal Act, 1996 The Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal Act of 1996 was promulgated to establish

Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN) as an autonomous regulatory body for

civil aviation as well as the services provider for aerodrome and ANS services.

The regulatory aspects incorporated in this Act are:

Issuance, suspension and revocation of operating certificate to airline

operator, aerodrome operator, aviation training organization, aircraft and

its parts production, maintenance and test organizations

Issuance, suspension and cancellation of license to personnel Registration of civil aircrafts and issue Nationality Marks

Issuance, suspension and revocation of Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A)

Inspection of aircraft, hangar, aircraft operation activities and aircraft maintenance organization‘s functioning

Coordinate Search and Rescue Operation

Implementation of Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) of the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation

Issuance of Order and Direction to any government or non-government personnel working

in airports with regard to the passenger service, facility and security; aerodrome security;

and security of aircraft, flight, and personnel involved in flight operation.

Under the power conferred by the Act, Government of Nepal can promulgate various regulations to

implement the provisions of the Act. The regulations relating to safety are as follows:

CAAN- Civil Aviation Regulation, 2002 Exercising the power given by the Clause 34 of Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal Act, 1996, CAAN-

Civil Aviation Regulation, 2002 was issued amplifying the regulatory functions of CAAN to include

inter-alia Personnel Licensing, Aircraft Registration, Certification, Airworthiness of Aircraft, Flight

Operations, and Flight Permission. This Regulation also empowers CAAN to formulate necessary

requirements, directives and manuals to implement the provisions of the Regulation.

Rule 80 of this Regulation empowers CAAN to issue orders and directions to

concerned agencies or persons in the matters of Aircraft Registration; aircraft

inspection and certification; aerodrome infrastructure and aircraft equipments; duty

and responsibility of pilots, ATCs and Maintenance Personnel; Instrument and Visual

Flight Rules; Air Traffic Services; Aircraft Accident Investigation; Provision of

Meteorology Services for Aviation; Air Navigation Facilities and Equipments.

Page 8 September 2011

State Safety Programme, Nepal Civil Aviation Rules, 1995 Civil Aviation Regulation, 1995 promulgated under the Clause 3 of Civil Aviation Act, 1959,

authorizes CAAN to enforce provisions of Annexes (or its parts) to the Convention on International

Civil Aviation and also formulate necessary requirements, directives and manuals to implement its

objectives. Rule 79 of the Regulation empowers CAAN to issue orders and directives to concerned

agencies on the various matters relating to the civil aviation operations.

CAAN- Airport Certification Regulation, 2004 Airport Certification Regulation, 2004 was enforced under the Clause 34 of Civil Aviation

Authority of Nepal Act, 1996. This regulation requires that the International Aerodrome for the

operation of public air transport service shall obtain aerodrome certificate from CAAN.

Application can also be made to obtain aerodrome certificate for the operation of domestic

airport of the use of public air transport service. The Regulation has made detailed provisions

regarding the certification of aerodrome used for public air transport service.

Civil Aviation (Accident Investigation) Rules, 1967 This regulation was promulgated under the Clause 5 of Civil Aviation Act, 1959 and relates to

aircraft accident investigation. It designates Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation (MOTCA) as

the body for carrying out aircraft accident investigation. The Regulation authorizes MoTCA to

constitute investigation commission in the aftermath of civil aircraft accidents. The nature of

investigations carried out under this Regulation is purely technical in nature and does not

intend to apportion blame or liability and the report thereof cannot be presented before the

court as the evidence for civil or criminal proceedings.

Operating Regulations In order to incorporate the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) of ICAO in Nepal's

national regulatory framework, the following Civil Aviation Requirements (CARs) have been

issued by CAAN under the authority of Rule 84 of CAAN-Civil Aviation Regulation, 2002

Flight Operations Requirements (FOR)

Nepalese Civil Airworthiness Requirements (NCAR)

Civil Aviation Requirements (PELR)

Civil Aviation Requirements (Rules of the Air)

Civil Aviation Requirements (Maps and Charts)

Civil Aviation Requirements (Units of Measurement)

Civil Aviation Requirements (Aeronautical Telecommunication)

Civil Aviation Requirements (Air Traffic Services)

Civil Aviation Requirements (Search and Rescue)

Civil Aviation Requirements (Aeronautical Information Services)

Safety Management System Requirements

Manual of Aerodrome Standards,Nepal



Exemption Procedures for Non-compliances at Aerodromes

Procedures for Continuing Surveillance Inspection at Aerodromes

Dangerous Goods Handling Requirements(DGHR)

Nepalese Flying School Requirements (NFSR)

Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal also issues directives, advisory circulars and

guidance materials for the effective implementation of the regulations. A number

of procedural manuals are issued by the CAAN for providing guidance to its staff

in order to perform their duties and responsibilities effectively.

Civil aviation regulations can be accessed on Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal website: www.caanepal.org.np

Organizations involved in Civil Aviation

Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation (MoTCA) The MoTCA is the policy making body for matters relating to civil aviation in Nepal. The MoTCA, in

consultation with CAAN and other ministries formulates rules and regulations necessary for safe,

and regular civil aviation system in the country. The MoTCA is also responsible for inter-ministerial

coordination in matters of civil aviation. MoTCA also constitutes accident investigation commission

for the investigation of civil aircraft accident within Nepal‘s territory.

Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN) The CAAN, an autonomous regulatory body for civil aviation is responsible for the regulation

of civil aviation in Nepal. Roles and responsibilities of the CAAN are stipulated in the CAAN

Act and related regulations. While implementing the national aviation policy issued by the

GoN, the CAAN also formulates the safety policy in civil aviation and is therefore responsible

for the establishment, maintenance and continuous improvement of SSP.

Department of Hydrology and Meteorology (DoHM) DoHM is responsible for providing Meteorological Services necessary for civil aviation in

Nepal in accordance with Annex 3 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. CAAN

and DoHM have exchanged a ‗Letter of Agreement‘ (LOA) detailing the modus of

providing meteorological services. Presently, DoHM provides meteorological services at

six airports in the country, including Tribhuvan International Airport, Kathmandu. At other

airports, weather information is provided by local ATS personnel based on tower

observation from automatic meteorological equipment operated by CAAN.

Civil-Military Co-operation In Nepal, military aircraft operate from civil airports, use common airspace and

share services and facilities meant for civil aviation. Nepali Sainik Biman Sewa

(NSBS), the flying wing of Nepal Army, carries out search and rescue operations.


State Safety Programme, Nepal 2.3. Safety Responsibilities and Accountabilities Ratification of the Chicago Convention of 1944 places the obligation of implementing the SARPs to

the Convention as per Article 37. As stated in Section 1.1 of this chapter, the civil aviation acts and

associated regulations confer on CAAN the obligation to issue necessary requirements, directives,

manuals and documents for the systematic implementation of ICAO SARPs.

As the regulatory body of civil aviation in Nepal, CAAN is also responsible for the

establishment, maintenance and continuous improvement of the SSP. The holders of

certificates issued by the CAAN are required to satisfactorily demonstrate that their

management systems adequately reflect an SMS approach. The anticipated result from this

approach is tangible improvement in safety management and practices. The CAAN shall

endeavor to develop requirements and specific operational policies that build upon sound

safety management principles in active consultation with all stakeholders. CAAN shall also

endeavor to allocate sufficient resources for discharging its safety oversight responsibilities

effectively. The Safety Policy Statement of CAAN is attached as ―Appendix A‖.

The Director General of CAAN is designated as the accountable executive of SSP and is

responsible for ensuring that all levels of management deliver the highest level of safety

performance within CAAN. It shall be the duty of the director general to develop and implement

requirements and specific operational policies that build upon safety management principles.

The director general of the CAAN is responsible for the implementation, operation and the supervision of the SSP and coordinate, the activities of the various state aviation organizations as necessary under the SSP. 2.4. Accident and Incident Investigation Civil Aviation (Accident Investigation) Rules, 1967 mandates the Ministry of Tourism

and Civil Aviation (MoTCA) to constitute accident investigation commissions in the

aftermath of civil aircraft accidents. In the absence of a dedicated state agency to

look after the compliance with Annex 13 SARPS, experts from different aviation

disciplines usually are nominated as the member of such investigation commissions.

As a practice, the CAAN investigates aircraft incidents.

Accident investigations carried out under The Civil Aviation (Accident Investigation)

Rules, 1967 are pure technical in nature as specified in Annex 13 to the Convention

on International Civil Aviation. Final Report of the accident investigation is made

public and safety recommendations are usually implemented accordingly.

The functional organization structure of the State regulatory system of Nepal is attached in ―Appendix B‖.


State Safety Programme, Nepal 2.5. Enforcement Policy

Legal Provisions Various provisions in the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal Act, 1996 specifically in

Section 5, 7, 25 and 31 of this Act authorize the CAAN to enforce its regulations.

CAAN-Civil Aviation Regulation, 2002 empowers Director General of CAAN for the certification

of Airline Operator, Maintenance Organizations and Aviation Training Schools, Aerodromes;

issuance of license, approval and authorization to aviation personnel; and permission of

aircraft operation within Nepalese air space. Rule 6, 13, 20, 29, 40, 44, 48, 50, 52, 64, and 84 of

this Regulation confers various enforcement authorities to the Director General of CAAN.

Breach of existing civil aviation rules and regulations is considered as a punishable offense and

draw various administrative and monetary penalties depending on the nature and circumstances of

breach. Director General of the CAAN in exercise of the authority may suspend, cancel or even

revoke certificates, licenses, approvals, authorizations and permissions issued by him.

Enforcement Approach As required by SMS, CAAN has developed a flexible enforcement approach based in following two general principles:

To develop enforcement procedures that allow service providers to deal with,

and resolve, certain events involving safety deviations, internally, within the

context of the service provider‘s SMS, and to the satisfaction of the authority.

No information derived from safety data collection and processing systems (SDCPS)

established under SMS shall be used as the basis for enforcement action.

CAAN recognizes that voluntary compliance with the regulations is the most progressive

and effective approach to aviation safety. CAAN remains committed to enforcing the

regulations in a fair and firm manner. Concern about potential consequences is not taken

in to consideration while determining the appropriate enforcement actions.

Enforcement Procedure Non-compliance of aviation regulations may occur for many different reasons, from a genuine

misunderstanding of the regulations, to disregard for aviation safety. CAAN's enforcement

procedure recommends following actions in case of any violation of CAAN regulations:

Encouraging open communication between alleged offenders and enforcement

authority, especially in cases where there are mitigating circumstances;

Providing oral counseling for minor violations where there is no threat to aviation safety;

Informing offenders their right to have penalties reviewed by the Director General of CAAN; and



Ensuring that repeat offenders and those who willfully disregard aviation safety are dealt with firmly

After the introduction of SMS, operators and service providers are required to

take remedial, corrective and preventive action to address safety deficiencies

internally. Some operational and technical matters of safety concern may be

addressed and dealt with entirely through ‗compliance base‘ processes.

The enforcement policy is not applicable in following conditions:

In cases where evidence indicates that there exists a deliberate effort to conceal non-compliance.

If the service provider fails to provide confidence in its means of hazard identification and safety risk management.

If the service provider is a recurrent violator. A recurrent violator is a violator who, in the past twelve months has had the same or closely related violation.

In such circumstances, the penalty matrix of the enforcement procedures will be applicable.



3. STATE SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT CAAN is performing its safety responsibility through existing regulatory mechanism

of civil aviation in the country. As outlined in Chapter 2, there are various legislative

frameworks to strengthen the safety oversight capacity of CAAN. Safety Management

System is the new approach introduced by ICAO to improve the safety culture within

aviation industry. CAAN is committed for the effective implementation of SMS within

the jurisdiction of its regulatory responsibility.

3.1. Safety requirements for service provider‘s SMS

CAAN has enacted SMS requirements, 2010 which requires service provider to

establish, maintain and adhere to a Safety Management System (SMS) that is

appropriate to the size, nature and complexity of the operations authorized to be

conducted under its operations certificate and is acceptable to CAAN. A service provider SMS is required to include, as a minimum:

identifies safety hazards

ensures the implementation of remedial action necessary to maintain agreed safety performance

provides for continuous monitoring and regular assessment of the safety performance

aims at a continuous improvement of the overall performance of the safety management system

The implementation of SMS involves a progressive development. The following

four phased approach to SMS implementation plan has been proposed to service

provider subject to the approval of CAAN.

Phase 1: Planning SMS Implementation Phase 2: Reactive Safety Management Processes Phase 3: Proactive and predictive safety management processes Phase 4: Operational Safety assurance

The sample of timeline for the implementation of each phase is given in Appendix I (i) of SMS Requirements, 2010.

A service provider is require to develop and maintain formal means for effectively collecting,

recording, acting on and generating feedback about hazards in operations, which combine

reactive, proactive and predictive methods of safety data collection. Formal means of safety

data collection shall include mandatory, voluntary and confidential reporting systems.


State Safety Programme, Nepal The hazard identification process includes the following steps:

reporting of hazards, events or safety concerns;

collection and storing the safety data

analysis of the safety data; and

distribution of the safety information distilled from the safety data.

The CAAN requires a service provider to develop and maintain a formal risk management

process that ensures the analysis, assessment and mitigation of risks of consequences of

hazards to an acceptable level during the provision of its services.

The safety risks of the consequences of each hazard identified through the hazard

identification processes are required to analyze in terms of probability and severity of

occurrence, and assessed for their tolerability.

National Aviation Safety Team (NAST) Nepal SMS implementation is a coordinated approach that requires the involvement of all safety

related departments within CAAN. The departments responsible to oversight airline

operation, ATS operation and Aerodrome operation are individually responsible for the

monitoring of SMS implementation of concerned service provider.

To ensure the effective SSP implementation a high level National Aviation Safety team

(NAST) Nepal is essential that comprises the representatives of all safety departments,

including Aerodrome Operations, ANS Operations and aviation legal wing. The NAST Nepal

is responsible for the overall evaluation of SSP implementation, review of safety risks,

determine the acceptable level of safety, suggest respective oversight department on SMS

matter and continuous improvement of SSP.

The NAST Nepal will seek and review safety information and identify risk issues that are of

strategic importance, ensure appropriate action plans are identified to mitigate these risks,

and propose documented safety plans to senior management for their approval. The NAST

Nepal will aim to assess the tolerability of aviation risks using both objective and subjective

methods.

The composition of NAST Nepal and its duties and responsibilities is given in ‘Appendix-C’ 3.2. Agreement on the service provider’s safety performance

The service providers holding CAAN certificates are required to demonstrate that their

management systems adequately reflect SMS approach. The expected result of this

approach is improved safety management, and safety practices, including safety reporting

within the civil aviation industry. In order to achieve the highest level of the safety

performance of the service providers, the CAAN has to agree with individual service

providers on the safety performance of their SMS.

Amendmend No 1

Page 16 January 2013

State Safety Programme, Nepal The safety performance of each SMS is required to agree separately between the CAAN and

individual aviation organization. Agreed safety performance should be commensurate with the

complexity of an individual aviation organization‘s specific operational contexts. The safety

performance of an SMS is expressed by safety performance indicator values and safety

performance target values and is implemented through action plans.

Safety Performance Indicator The safety performance indicator values are short-term, measurable objectives reflecting

the safety performance of an SMS. They are expressed in numerical terms and should be

obvious, measurable and linked to the safety concern of an SMS. The safety performance

indicator value will differ between segments of the aviation industry, such as aircraft

operators, certified aerodrome operators and ATS providers. The examples of safety

performance indicator for these different service providers are given here.

a) An aircraft operator has identified the approach and landing phases of flight

operations at non-precision approach aerodrome as one major safety concern

to be addressed by its SMS. In this case, a safety performance indicator value

might be: 10 unstable (or non-conforming) approaches per 1000 landing at

aerodromes served by non-precision approaches.

b) A certified aerodrome operator has identified safety concerns regarding foreign

object debris (FOD) in ramp operations to be addressed by its SMS. Here, a safety

performance value might be: 15 FOD events in the apron per 10,000 operations.

c) An ATS provider has identified airport operations safety as one major safety

concern to be addressed by its SMS. Here, a safety performance indicator valued

can be: 0.8 Cat A and B (most serious) runway incursions per million operations.

These safety performance indicator values fulfill the conditions: they are expressed in numerical

terms; they are obvious, measurable and linked to the safety concerns of their respective SMS.

These safety performance indicators reflect safety performance measurement.

Safety Performance Target Safety performance target values are long-term, measurable objectives reflecting the safety

performance of an SMS. Safety performance target values are expressed in numerical terms,

and should be obvious, measurable, acceptable to stakeholders and linked to the safety

performance indicator of an SMS. With reference to the safety performance indicators

expressed above, the safety performance target values can be expressed as follows:

a) The aircraft operator defines the safety performance target value as: within the

next three years, reduce by fifty percent the number of unstable approaches per

1000 landings at aerodromes served by non-precision approaches.

b) The certified aerodrome defines the safety performance target value as: by 2010, reduce FOD events in the apron to 8 per 10,000 operations.



c) An ATS provider has defined safety target value as: 0.8 Cat A and B (most serious) runway incursions per million operations.

These safety performance target values fulfill the conditions: they are expressed in numerical

terms; they are obvious, measurable and linked to the safety concerns of their respective SMS.

These safety performance target values reflect safety performance measurement.

Action Plans Actions plans are the tools and means needed to achieve the safety performance

indicator values and safety performance target values of an SMS. They include the

operational procedure, technology, systems and programs to which measures of

reliability, availability, performance and/or accuracy can be specified. Examples of

action plans to achieve the safety performance indicator values and safety

performance target values of an SMS given above would be as follows:

a) Development and implementation of constant descent arrival (CDA)

procedures at aerodromes of non-precision approaches. b) Develop and implement RNP-AR Approach procedure in TIA.

c) Implement a thrice-daily walk-in ramp inspection program, develop and

implement training course for drivers and install taxiway signage. d) Installation of ASDE/X at aerodrome.

e) Implement a specific criteria for manning of ATC units and their leisure break procedure.

f) Introduce automation in ATC system.

The safety performance indicator values and safety performance target values of the safety

performance of an SMS may be different, or they may be the same. When assessing whether

specific safety performance indicator values and safety performance target values of the safety

performance of an SMS are different or the same, following aspects must be considered:

a) The availability of resources within the service provider to turn the safety performance

indicator value into a more demanding safety performance target value.

b) How expensive the action plans deemed necessary to change the value of

the safety performance indicator into a more demanding value of the

safety performance target are.

c) Whether the assessment of the safety risks of the consequences of the hazard

addressed by the safety performance indicator and safety performance target falls

in the tolerable region of the safety risk management process, should the safety

performance indicator value and safety performance target value remain the same.



4. STATE SAFETY ASSURANCE The long-term, strategic objective of an SSP is the improvement of safety in the State. To fulfill

the long-term strategic objective, the organization of an SSP aims at two short-term, tactical

objectives: efficient and effective delivery of safety responsibilities and accountabilities by the

State, and efficient auditing of safety responsibilities and accountabilities by the State. The

notion of SSP brought in a principled and structured manner one way of organizing the safety

responsibilities and accountabilities of a State and measuring the effectiveness with which

safety responsibilities are discharged and safety accountabilities are fulfilled by the State.

Safety improvement is the long-term objective of SSP.

4.1 Safety oversight

The State‘s safety oversight function is the part of the SSP and a fundamental component

of its safety assurance. Safety oversight is the primary responsibility of CAAN to ensure

implementation of the safety-related requirements stipulated in different CARs

promulgated by CAAN in line with Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and

associated documents of ICAO. Safety oversight function of CAAN is aimed to assess the

safety level of service providers in comparison to that required by the CARs. CAAN is

committed to perform its safety oversight responsibilities based on both compliance

based safety environment and performance based safety environment.

CAAN safety oversight organization The three different departments within the CAAN that are responsible for carrying out safety oversight functions are:

Aviation safety department: responsible for the safety oversight of Air transport Industry

Aerodrome standard and safety department: responsible for the safety oversight of the aerodrome operations

ANS standard and safety department: responsible for the safety oversight of air navigation services

Safety Audit Safety audit focuses on the integrity of the organization‘s SMS and periodically assess the

status of safety risk controls. As with other requirements, the auditing requirements are left at

a functional level, allowing for a broad range of complexity, commensurate with the complexity

of the organization. While audits are ―external‖ to the units involved in activities directly

related to the provision of services, they are still ―internal‖ to the organization as a whole.

Audits are not intended to be in-depth audits of the technical processes but rather they are

intended to provide assurance of the safety management functions, activities and resources of

line units. Audits are used to ensure that the structure of the SMS is sound in terms of staffing,

compliance with approved procedures and instructions, levels of competency and training to

operate equipment and facilities and maintain required levels of performance, etc.


State Safety Programme, Nepal CAAN carries out safety audit on periodic basis prior to the renewal of Operating

Certificates of service providers. Safety audits verify the status of implementation of

the elements and functions, on a compliance/noncompliance basis. Safety audit of

airline operators is more effective than other service providers. Since CAAN itself is

the service provider in the field of aerodrome operation and Air Traffic Services,

internal oversight mechanism yet to be strengthened.

Random Inspections and Checks For the assessment of implementation status of safety requirements, random

inspections and checks are considered as effective tools. It is the policy of the CAAN

to carry out random inspections and checks of national carriers to assess the safety

compliance at actual operating scenario. The CAAN inspectors are actively involved

in ramp inspection of domestic carriers at different airports of the country.

Foreign Airlines‘ Inspection States are entitled, by Article 16 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation,

to search aircraft from other States on landing and departure and to inspect the

certificates and other documents prescribed by the Convention and its Annexes,

provided there is not reasonable delay to operation.

Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft, Part I – International Commercial Air Transport (Aeroplanes)

and Part III – International Operations (Helicopter) requires States to establish a programme

with procedures for the surveillance of operations in their territory by a foreign operator and

for taking appropriate action when necessary to preserve safety.

The CAAN has provided required training to its inspector on foreign airlines‘

inspection. The procedure for the inspection of foreign carrier is given in Flight

Operations Inspection Manual (FOIM) issued by the CAAN.

ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme At the present time, the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP)

audits States‘ safety responsibilities in a comprehensive manner following a basic

architecture prescribed by the relevant Annexes to the Convention. Accordingly, each

State must implement eight critical elements of safety oversight and USOAP audits verify

the status of implementation of the elements and functions, on a

compliance/noncompliance basis. Once the SSP concept is implemented throughout

States, USOAP will audit the SSP through an approach based on a continuous monitoring

concept, rather than on the elements and functions of the safety oversight.

Acceptable Level of Safety (ALoS) The ICAO safety management SARPs introduces the notion of acceptable level of safety (ALoS) as

the way of expressing the minimum degree of safety that has been established by the State and


State Safety Programme, Nepal must be assured by an SSP. The ALoS is expressed through the safety indicator values and safety target values.

The ALoS related to an SSP must be developed based upon judicious combination of

safety measurement and safety performance measurement. Safety measurement

represents high-level/high-consequence outcomes, whereas, safety performance

measurement represents low-level/low-consequence outcomes.

The establishment of ALoS should involve close liaison between the regulator and

service provider so that both the SSP and service provider‘s SMS have similar ALoS.

While determining ALoS, it is necessary to consider various factors such as the level

of safety risks that applies, the cost/benefit of improvements to the system, and

public expectation on the safety of the aviation industry.

ALoS should also commensurate with the complexity of individual service provider‘s

specific operational context and their availability of resources to address safety risks.

Once the safety indicators and safety targets have been selected, the level of safety

representing the state aviation system can be established. ALoS is delivered through

action plans. They include operational procedure, systems and programmes to which

measures of reliability, availability, performance and/or accuracy can be specified.

Since the safety data collection and analysis capabilities of service providers have not yet

been fully developed in Nepal, it is very difficult to select quantitative safety indicators and

safety targets. NAST Nepal will liaison with service providers to determine the ALoS in the

context of Nepal. The guidelines for the establishment of ALoS are attached in ‗Appendix-D‘.

4.2. Safety data collection, analysis and exchange Effective safety reporting is a cornerstone of the management of safety and the gate for

safety data acquisition. CAAN Safety Management System Requirement, 2010 has made

provision in the part of service provider to develop and maintain safety data collection

and processing system (SDCPS) that provide for the identification of hazards and the

analysis, assessment and mitigation of safety risks. A service provider‘s SDCPS should

include reactive, proactive and predictive methods of safety data collection.

Mandatory Occurrence Reporting System Annex 13 to the Convention requires contracting state to establish a mandatory

incident reporting system to facilitate collection of information on actual or potential

safety deficiencies. CAAN is committed to establish effective safety reporting based

on MORS. Nepalese Civil Airworthiness Requirements (NCAR) issued by CAAN

requires airline operators to report CAAN about the defects to aircraft and its

components. The list of reportable defects is enlisted in NCAR C 7.



Mandatory Bird Strike Reports Under mandatory bird strike reporting system, a pilot operating in Nepal‘s airspace is required

to report the event of bird strike to the CAAN. The bird strike reports received are processed,

analyzed and evaluated to assess the severity of bird activity at Nepal‘s airports.

Voluntary Incident Reporting System Annex 13 to the Convention recommends that ―a State should establish a

voluntary incident reporting system to facilitate the collection of information that

may not be captured by a mandatory incident reporting system.‖

One very important aspect of the recommended voluntary reporting system is covered in

Annex 13, paragraph 8.3 by providing that ―a voluntary incident reporting system shall be

non-punitive and afford protection to the sources of the information.‖

SMS Requirements, 2010 requires service provider to encourage personnel to submit voluntary incidents which:

a) Facilitate collection of information that may not be captured by a mandatory incident reporting system;

b) Is non-punitive; and

c) Afford protection to the sources of the information to encourage the reporting of such information.

Confidential Reporting Systems Confidential reporting systems aim to protect the identity of the reporter. This is one

way of ensuring that voluntary reporting systems are non-punitive. Confidentiality is

usually achieved by de-identification, and any identifying information about the

reporter is known only to ―gatekeepers‖ in order to allow for follow-up or ―fill in

voids‖ in the reported event(s). Confidential incident reporting systems facilitate the

disclosure of hazards leading to human error, without fear of retribution or

embarrassment, and enable broader acquisition of information on hazards.

Once acquired, safety data must be analysed to turn data into information and

finally mitigation or response activities to hazards by the organization as a

consequence of the safety information developed.

One of the most influential aspects of an organizational culture in terms of the management of

safety is that it shapes safety reporting procedures and practices by operational personnel.

Identification of hazards is a fundamental activity underlying the management of safety. An

operational environment in which operational personnel have been trained and are constantly

encouraged to report hazards is the prerequisite for effective safety reporting.


State Safety Programme, Nepal Just Culture The safety policy should actively encourage effective safety reporting and, by

defining the line between acceptable performance (often unintended errors) and

unacceptable performance (such as gross negligence, recklessness, violations

or sabotage), provide fair protection to reporters.

The CAAN and service providers within its responsibility should take into consideration

the advantages and disadvantages of the adoption of safety and ―just culture‖, and any

cultural and legal implications. For purposes related to the management of safety, the

process that needs to be promoted, nurtured and defended is effective safety reporting;

the ―criminalization of error‖ is of lesser relevance.

The protection of safety information from inappropriate use is essential to ensure its continued

availability, since the use of safety information for other than safety-related purposes may inhibit the

future availability of such information, with an adverse effect on safety. The CAAN‘s audits of SMSs

should pay particular attention to this matter during providers‘ auditing.

The Safety Policy Statement of the Accountable Executive, the Director General of CAAN has made

commitment to establish provisions for the protection of safety data, collection and processing

systems (SDCPS), so that people are encouraged to provide essential safety-related information on

hazards. It further states to promulgate an enforcement policy that ensures that no information

derived from any SDCPS established under the SSP or the SMS will be used as the basis for

enforcement action, except in the case of gross negligence or willful deviation.‖

4.3. Safety data driven targeting of oversight by CAA on areas of greater concern or

need Once the mandatory, voluntary and confidential safety reporting systems are in place

and operational, on the basis of collected data and their analysis with respect to

hazards and potential safety risks on operations, NAST Nepal will review existing

and, if necessary, define new procedures that will prioritize auditing of those

identified areas of greater safety concern or need. Review of occurrences must be

embedded and detailed into the processes of safety oversight management system. Page 24 September 2011


5. STATE SAFETY PROMOTION

The safety effort of a State cannot succeed by mandate or mere strict implementation

of policies. Safety promotion nurtures individual and organizational behavior towards

safety culture. An effective safety promotion mechanism plays a significant role in

supporting the core operational objectives of an SSP.

5.1 Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety Information Internal training The CAAN is the regulator of civil aviation as well as the service provider of ANS and

Aerodrome operations. The CAAN‘s training activity is intended to develop a detailed

plan and programme of training for its both regulatory and service provider staffs.

The CAAN has allocated enough budgets for the internal training to its staffs.

Civil Aviation Academy under the CAAN is responsible for the development of

various training courses for the CAAN staffs. Civil Aviation Academy has developed

training course on SMS for regulatory and service provider‘s staffs. CAAN has

developed and delivered SSP/STP to its Safety Oversight Manager under the ICAO

Train air programme as deemed necessary. CAAN has continuously endeavoring to

develop trained and skilled inspector staffs of safety oversight responsibilities.

Besides training, the CAAN is regularly conducts safety related seminars and workshops. The

main purpose of these activities is to develop a positive organizational culture in terms of

safety and exchange of information and experience for the effective SMS implementation.

Internal communication and dissemination of safety information Collected safety information through the established mandatory and confidential

(voluntary) incidents and hazards reporting systems are communicated to the

respective CAAN staff responsible for safety oversight of service providers.

Communicated information may be used for investigation or for information only.

When action was taken on the communicated information this should be documented

and stored for traceability, history and should be reflected in the periodic reports.

Each safety oversight departments of the CAAN must inform all serious incidents to

NAST Nepal. The concerned oversight department will communicate to NAST Nepal for

any changes in the risk assessments that result from different evaluation processes. The

concern department will also share and coordinate safety information among NAST Nepal

and other Safety Inspectors. Additionally, the CAAN would promote two-way

communication of safety-related information within organization and support

development of an organizational culture that promotes an effective and efficient SSP. Page 26 September 2011


5.2 External training, communication and dissemination of safety information

External training The CAAN is regularly organizing training programmes to enhance SMS implementation

capabilities of service providers. Through the Civil Aviation Academy, CAAN has

developed SMS training courses targeting service providers. CAAN is also conducting

orientation classes to the service providers to help in their SMS implementation.

External communication and dissemination of safety information To foster effective SMSs among service providers under the CAAN responsibility, provide

education and support development of an overall organizational culture, the CAAN in line

with this SSP will promote awareness of safety risks and two-way communication of

safety-relevant information. The responsible departments for safety regulation conducts

regular meeting and interaction with service providers, in order to keep them advised

about the regulatory developments and required course of action.

All the annual or periodic reports produced by the CAAN that address safety will be

communicated to the service providers for their information and education. Any changes

in the objectives or safety risk evaluation methods or any similar taken safety-related

action or activity by the CAAN will also be communicated to service providers.

The CAAN communicates and disseminates critical safety-relevant information

through Circulars, NOTAMs, AIC, confidential letters and electronic mailing

system. Non-critical safety-relevant information are communicated through

CAAN website, CAAN Newsletter and annual CAAN Report.



Appendix A- Nepal‘s Safety Policy Statement Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN) is the regulatory body of civil aviation in Nepal. The

management of civil aviation safety in Nepal is one of the major responsibilities of CAAN. CAAN is

committed to developing, implementing, maintaining and constantly improving strategies and

processes to ensure that all aviation activities that take place under its oversight will achieve the

highest level of safety performance, while meeting both national and international standards.

Director General of CAAN is responsible for the implementation, operation and the supervision of the SSP and coordinate as appropriate, the activities of the various State aviation organizations encompasses under the SSP. As the Accountable Executive of SSP, Director General of CAAN is committed to:

a) ensure that all levels of management are accountable for the delivery of the

highest level of safety performance within CAAN,

b) develop requirements and specific operational policies that build upon safety management

c) consult with all segments of the aviation industry on issues regarding regulatory development;

d) support the management of safety in the State through an effective safety reporting and communication system;

e) interact effectively with service providers in the resolution of safety concerns;

f) ensure that within the CAAN, sufficient resources are allocated and personnel have the proper skills and are trained for discharging their safety responsibilities;

g) conduct both performance-based and compliance-oriented oversight activities,

supported by analyses and prioritized resource allocation based on safety risks;

h) promote and educate the aviation industry on safety management concepts and principles; i) oversee the implementation of SMS within aviation organizations; j) ensure that all activities under oversight achieve the highest safety standards;

k) establish provisions for the protection of safety data, collection and processing

systems (SDCPS), so that people are encouraged to provide essential safety-

related information on hazards, and there is a continuous flow and exchange of

safety management data between the regulator and service providers;

l) establish and measure the realistic implementation of our SSP against safety indicators and safety targets which are clearly identified; and

m) promulgate an enforcement policy that ensures that no information derived from

any SDCPS established under the SSP or the SMS will be used as the basis for

enforcement action, except in the case of gross negligence or willful deviation.

This policy must be understood, implemented and observed by all staff involved in regulatory activities of the CAAN.

(Tri Ratna Manandhar)

Director General

Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal September 2011 Page 29


Appendix B- Nepal‘s Safety Regulatory Functional Chart

Government of Nepal Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation

Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal Aircraft Accident Investigation *

Aviation Safety Department ANS Standard Department Aerodrome Standard Department

Airport Engineering

Personnel Licensing

Air Traffic Services

Airworthiness

Meteorological Services

Electro-Mechanical

Flight Operations Aeronautical Information Rescue and Fire Fighting

Communication,

Navigation, Surveillance

Search and Rescue

* Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation constitutes Aircraft Accident Investigation

Commission for the investigation of civil aircraft. Page 30 September 2011


Appendix C- National Aviation Safety team (NAST)

The composition of National Aviation Safety team (NAST) as stated in 3.1 of Chapter-3 is as follows:

1. Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN)

A. Regulator

Dy. Director General, Air Transportation and Regulation Directorate Coordinator National Coordinator (USOAP CMA) Member Director, Flight Safety Standard Department Member Director, ANS Safety and Standards Department Member Director, Aerodrome Safety and Standards Department Member Director, ICAO Int’l Affairs & Legal Department Member Dy. Director, Accident/Incident Investigation Division Member Secretary

B. Service Provider

Director, Flight Operation Department Member Director, Airport Operation Department Member

2. Airline Operator

A. Schedule Operator

Representative, Nepal Airlines Corporation (Quality Assurance) Member

Representative, Nepal Airlines Corporation (Flight Operations) Member

Representative, Buddha Air Pvt. Ltd. (Quality Assurance or Flight Operations) Member

Representative, Yeti Airlines Pvt. Ltd. (Quality Assurance or Flight Operations) Member

Representative, Guna Air Pvt. Ltd. (Quality Assurance or Flight Operations) Member

B. Helicopter Operator

Representative, Mountain Helicopter Pvt. Ltd. (Quality Assurance or Flight Operations) Member

3. AOAN

Representative, Airline Operator Association of Nepal (AOAN) Member

Amendmend No 1

January 2013 Page 31

State Safety Programme, Nepal Duty and Responsibility

Determine the safety data to be collected and submitted by the various departments responsible for safety oversight in regular interval.

Upon receipt of such data initiate action to determine for the establishment of the

acceptable level of safety for SMS implementation and amend it for continuous

improvement.

Coordinate with departments responsible for safety oversight for the effective implementation of SSP

Review the potential safety risks identified by the concerned safety oversight department with the help of available safety data

Assess the mitigation actions established to reduce the potential risks

Suggest respective oversight department on SMS matters

Evaluate the existing mechanism of safety oversight and suggest for improvement if required

Prepare plan and programme for the effective implementation of SSP.

Advice Director General on the matter of SSP implementation.

Act for the continuous improvement of SSP Implement the decision made by the regional and international safety groups/teams

formed under International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

It is the responsibility of individual departments to carry out safety oversight functions and effective implementation of SMS within their jurisdiction.

The NAST Nepal can invite other officials from CAAN as well as from stakeholders in the meeting if deemed necessary.

Meeting The meeting of NAST Nepal shall be held at least once in every three months, and, as deemed necessary.

Amendmend No 1

Page 32 January 2013


Appendix D- Acceptable Level of Safety

1. ALoS representing Safety Measurement

In initial stage of SSP implementation, the safety indicator values and safety target

values relating to ALoS will likely to express through quantitative action statements

on selected high-level/high-consequences outcomes like accidents and serious

incidents rates. It can be also applied to represent high level state function such as

the status of development/implementation of primary aviation safety legislation or

absence thereof, the status of development/implementation of operating regulations

or the absence thereof, and the level of regulatory compliance within the State.

Some examples of ALoS relating to safety measurement may include the following:

Safety 1. Reduce by [number] the number of / Maximum of [number] CFIT and target approach and landing accidents per [number] departures.

values 2. Minimum of [number] high-severity events captured through the State

MOR yearly.

3. Minimum of [number] inspections of operators completed quarterly.

4….

Action 1. CFIT training package distributed to industry and supported by training plans courses.

2. Effective implementation of SMS with SMS training to all staffs of service provider.

3. Revision and, if necessary, update of hiring policy. Inspection manual updated.

4….

Safety 1. [Number] CFIT and approach and landing accidents per [number] departures. indicator 2. [Number] high-severity events captured through the State MOR yearly.

values 3. [Number] inspections of operators completed quarterly.

4….

State Will comply with all applicable international Standards.

2. ALoS representing Safety Performance Measurement

When an SSP becomes mature, the safety indicator values and safety target values relating to ALoS

will likely to express through quantitative action statements on selected low-level/low-

consequences processes, such as the number of foreign object debris (FOD) events per specified

number of ramp operations, or the number of unauthorized ground vehicle events on taxiway


State Safety Programme, Nepal per a specific number of airport operations or during a specified period of time. Some

examples of ALoS relating to safety performance measurement may include the following:

Safety target values

Action Plans

Safety indicator values

State

3. SSP Transition

1. Reduce by [number] the number of / Maximum of [number]

non-conforming approaches (NCA) at 5 international airports per [number] arrivals by [date].

2. Reduce by [number] the number of / Maximum of [number] Cat B and C

runway incursions at international airport per [number] operations by

[date]. 3. Reduce by [number] the number of/ Maximum of [number]

apron FOD events at international airport by [date]. 4….

1. Constant descent arrival (CDA) procedures implemented.

Arrival procedures charts designed for stabilized approaches.

2. Installation of ASDE/X at international airport. 3. Increase the number of apron inspections, training to airline

personnel on apron safety. 4….

1. [Number] non-conforming approaches (NCA) at international

airports per [number] arrivals. 2. [Number] Cat B and C runway

incursions at international airport per [number] operations. 3. [Number] apron FOD events at international airport. 4…. Will comply with all applicable international Standards.

Initial ALoS (Safety measurement)

Quantification of outcomes

of selected high-level/high-

consequence events

Quantification of selected

high-level State functions

State Safety Assurance

Safety oversight

Safety data collection,

analysis and exchange

Safety data driven targeting of oversight on areas of greater concern or need

Mature ALoS

(Safety measurement

and safety performance

measurement) Quantification and outcomes of selected high-level/high-consequence events

Quantification of selected

high-level State functions

Quantification of outcomes

of selected low-level /low

consequence events



Appendix E- State Safety Programme - GAP Analysis

The gap analysis checklist that follows can be used as a template to conduct a gap analysis. Each question is designed for a ―Yes‖ or ―No‖ response. A ―Yes‖ answer indicates that the State already has the component or element of the ICAO SSP framework in question incorporated into its safety system and that it matches or exceeds the requirement. A ―No‖ answer indicates that a gap exists between the component/element of the ICAO SSP framework and the safety system in the State.

ICAOreference (Doc Aspect to be analysed or question to be answered Answer Status of implementation 9859)

Component 1 — STATE SAFETY POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES

Element 1.1 — State safety legislative framework

Has [State] promulgated a national safety Yes

legislative framework and specific regulations that No

define the management of safety in the State?

Has [State] defined the specific activities related Yes

to the management of safety in the State in which No

each [State] aviation organization must

participate?

Has [State] established requirements, Yes

responsibilities and accountabilities regarding the No

management of safety in [State] by its aviation

organizations?

Are the legislative framework and specific Yes

regulations periodically reviewed to ensure that No

they remain relevant and appropriate to the

State?

Are [State] legislative framework and specific Yes

regulations periodically reviewed to ensure that No

they are up to date with respect to international

standards?

Has [State] established a safety policy? Yes

No

Is [State] safety policy signed by the [State] SSP Yes

Accountable Executive or a high authority within No

[State]?

Is [State] safety policy reviewed periodically? Yes

No

Is [State] safety policy communicated with visible Yes

endorsement to all employees in all [State] No

aviation organizations with the intent that they

are made aware of their individual safety

responsibilities?

Has [State] developed documentation that Yes

describes the SSP, including the interrelationship No

between its components and elements?

Does [State] have a record system that ensures Yes

the generation and retention of all records No

necessary to document and support the SSP

activities?

Does the record system provide the control Yes

processes necessary to ensure appropriate No

identification, legibility, storage, protection,

archiving, retrieval, retention time, and

disposition of records?

Element 1.2 — State safety responsibilities and accountabilities

Has [State] identified and defined the State Yes

requirements, responsibilities and accountabilities No

regarding the establishment and maintenance of

the SSP?

Do the requirements include directives and Yes

activities to plan, organize, develop, control and No

continuously improve the SSP in a manner that

meets [State] safety objectives?



Do the requirements include a clear statement Yes

about the provision of the necessary resources for No

the implementation and maintenance of the SSP?

Has [State] identified and appointed an Yes

Accountable Executive as the qualified person No

having direct responsibility for the

implementation, operation and supervision of the

SSP?

Does the [State] SSP Accountable Executive fulfil Yes

the required job functions and responsibilities? No

Does the [State] SSP Accountable Executive Yes

coordinate, as appropriate, the activities of the No

different State aviation organizations under the

SSP?

Does the [State] SSP Accountable Executive have Yes

control of the necessary resources required for No

the proper execution of the SSP?

Does the [State] SSP Accountable Executive verify Yes

that all personnel of [State] aviation organizations No

understand their authorities, responsibilities and

accountabilities with regard to the SSP and all

safety management processes, decisions and

actions?

Are safety responsibilities and accountabilities, at Yes

all levels, defined and documented? No

Element 1.3 — Accident and incident investigation

Has [State] established, as part of the Yes

management of safety, an independent accident No

and incident investigation process, the sole

objective of which is the prevention of accidents

and incidents, and not the apportioning of blame

or liability?

Does [State] maintain the independence of the Yes

accident and incident investigation organization No

from other State aviation organizations?

Element 1.4 — Enforcement policy

Has [State] promulgated an enforcement policy? Yes

No

Does the enforcement policy establish the Yes

conditions and circumstances under which service No

providers are allowed to deal with, and resolve,

events involving certain safety deviations

internally, within the context of the service

provider‘s safety management system (SMS), and

to the satisfaction of the appropriate State

authority?

Does the enforcement policy establish the Yes

conditions and circumstances under which to deal No

with safety deviations through established

enforcement procedures?

Has [State] established the controls which govern Yes

how service providers will identify hazards and No

manage safety risks?

Do those controls include requirements, specific Yes

operating regulations and implementation No

policies for the service provider‘s SMS?

Are requirements, specific operating regulations Yes

and implementation policies based on identified No

hazards and analysis of the safety risks of the

consequences of the hazards?

Are requirements, specific operating regulations Yes

and implementation policies periodically No

reviewed to ensure they remain relevant and

appropriate to the service providers?

Is there a structured process within [State] to Yes

assess how the service providers will manage the No


State Safety Programme, Nepal safety risks associated with identified hazards,

expressed in terms of probability and severity of

occurrence?

Is there a [State] policy in place that ensures Yes

effective safety reporting of safety deficiencies, No

hazards or occurrences?

Does [State] policy on reporting of safety Yes

deficiencies, hazards or occurrences include the No

conditions under which protection from

disciplinary and/or administrative action applies?

Element 2.2 — Agreement on the service provider‘s safety performance

Has [State] individually agreed with service Yes

providers on the safety performance of their No

SMS?

Is the agreed safety performance commensurate Yes

with the complexity of the individual service No

provider‘s specific operational context?

Does the agreed safety performance consider the Yes

individual service provider‘s resources to address No

safety risks?

Is the agreed safety performance expressed by Yes

multiple safety indicators and safety targets, as No

opposed to a single one, as well as by action

plans?

Is the agreed safety performance periodically Yes

reviewed to ensure it remains relevant and No

appropriate to the service provider?

Component 3 — STATE SAFETY ASSURANCE

Has [State] established mechanisms to ensure an Yes

effective safety oversight function? No

Has [State] established mechanisms to ensure Yes

that the identification of hazards and the No

management of safety risks by service providers

follow established regulatory controls?

Do established mechanisms include inspections, Yes

audits and surveys to ensure that regulatory No

safety risk controls are appropriately integrated

into the SMS of service providers?

Do established mechanisms ensure that Yes

regulatory safety risk controls are practised as No

designed?

Do established mechanisms ensure that Yes

regulatory safety risk controls have the intended No

effect on safety risks?

Are regular and periodic reviews conducted Yes

regarding [State] ALoS? No

Do reviews consider changes that could affect Yes

[State] SSP and its ALoS, recommendations for No

improvement and sharing of best practices across

the State?

Are regular and periodic reviews conducted to Yes

assess if [State] SSP and its ALoS remain No

appropriate to the scope and complexity of the

aviation operations in the State?

Is there a process to evaluate the effectiveness of Yes

changes related to the SSP? No

Element 3.2 — Safety data collection, analysis and exchange

Has [State] established mechanisms to ensure the Yes

capture and storage of data on hazards and safety No

risks at both the individual and aggregate State

level?

Has [State] established mechanisms to develop Yes

information from the stored data and to promote No

the exchange of safety information with service

providers and/or other States as appropriate?

Has [State] established an acceptable level of Yes

safety (ALoS) related to its SSP? No

Does [State] ALoS related to the SSP combine Yes



elements of safety measurement and safety No

performance measurement?

Is [State] ALoS commensurate with the complexity Yes

of aviation activities within [State]? No

Is there a formal process within [State] to develop Yes

and maintain a set of parameters to measure the No

realistic implementation of the SSP?

Element 3.3 — Safety-data-driven targeting of oversight of areas of greater concern or need Has [State] developed procedures to prioritize Yes

inspections, audits and surveys towards those No

areas of greater safety concern or need?

Is the prioritization of inspections and audits the Yes

result of the analysis of data on hazards, their No

consequences in operations, and the assessed

safety risks?

Component 4 — STATE SAFETY PROMOTION

Element 4.1 — Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety information Does [State] provide internal training, awareness Yes

and two-way communication of safety-relevant No

information within [State] aviation organizations?

Are there communication processes in place Yes

within [State] to ensure that information about No

the SSP functions and products is made available

to [State] aviation organizations in a timely

manner?

Is there a process for the dissemination of safety Yes

information throughout [State] aviation No

organizations and a means of monitoring the

effectiveness of this process?

Are communication processes (written, meetings, Yes

electronic, etc.) commensurate with the size and No

scope of the [State] aviation organizations?

Are safety information and information about the Yes

SSP functions and products maintained in a No

suitable medium?

Element 4.2 — External training, communication and dissemination of safety information Does the [State] provide external education, Yes

awareness of safety risks and two-way No

communication of safety-relevant information?


within [State] that allow the SSP to be promoted No

nationally and internationally?

Is there a formal process for the external Yes

dissemination of safety information to [State] No

service providers and a means of monitoring the

effectiveness of this process?


within [State] to ensure that information about No

the SSP functions and products is made available

to [State] service providers in a timely manner?

Are communication processes (written, meetings, Yes

electronic, etc.) commensurate with the size and No

scope of [State] service providers?

Are safety information and information about the Yes

SSP functions and products established and No

maintained in a suitable medium?



Appendix F – Critical Elements of a Safety Oversight System (EXTRACT FROM ICAO DOCUMENT 9734 SAFETY OVERSIGHT MANUAL PART-A)

ICAO has identified and defined the following critical elements of a State‗s safety oversight system: CE-1 Primary aviation legislation The provision of a comprehensive and effective aviation law consistent with the environment and complexity of the State's aviation activity and compliant with the requirements contained in the Convention on International Civil Aviation. CE-2 Specific operating regulations The provision of adequate regulations to address, at a minimum, national requirements

emanating from the primary aviation legislation and providing for standardized

operational procedures, equipment and infrastructures (including safety management and

training systems), in conformance with the Standards and Recommended Practices

(SARPs) contained in the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

Note: The term ―regulations― is used in a generic sense to include but is not limited to instructions, rules, edicts, directives, sets of laws, requirements, policies, and orders. CE-3 State civil aviation system and safety oversight functions The establishment of a Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and/or other relevant authorities or

government agencies, headed by a Chief Executive Officer, supported by the appropriate and

adequate technical and non-technical staff and provided with adequate financial resources. The

State authority must have stated safety regulatory functions, objectives and safety policies. Note: The term ―State civil aviation system― is used in a generic sense to include all

authorities with aviation safety oversight responsibility which may be established by

the State as separate entities, such as: CAA, Airport Authorities, Air Traffic Service

Authorities, Accident Investigation Authority, and Meteorological Authority. CE-4 Technical personnel qualification and training The establishment of minimum knowledge and experience requirements for the technical personnel performing safety oversight functions and the provision of appropriate training to maintain and enhance their competence at the desired level. The training should include initial and recurrent (periodic) training.

CE-5 Technical guidance, tools and the provision of safety-critical information The provision of technical guidance (including processes and procedures), tools

(including facilities and equipment) and safety-critical information, as applicable, to

the technical personnel to enable them to perform their safety oversight functions in

accordance with established requirements and in a standardized manner. In addition,

this includes the provision of technical guidance by the oversight authority to the

aviation industry on the implementation of applicable regulations and instructions.

CE-6 Licensing, certification, authorization and approval obligations The implementation of processes and procedures to ensure that personnel and organizations performing an aviation activity meet the established requirements before they are allowed to exercise the privileges of a licence, certificate, authorization and/or approval to conduct the relevant aviation activity.


State Safety Programme, Nepal CE-7 Surveillance obligations The implementation of processes, such as inspections and audits, to proactively ensure that aviation licence, certificate, authorization and/or approval holders continue to meet the established requirements and function at the level of competency and safety required by the State to undertake an aviation-related activity for which they have been licensed, certified, authorized and/or approved to perform. This includes the surveillance of designated personnel who perform safety oversight functions on behalf of the CAA. CE-8 Resolution of safety concerns The implementation of processes and procedures to resolve identified deficiencies impacting aviation safety, which may have been residing in the aviation system and have been detected by the regulatory authority or other appropriate bodies.

Note: This would include the ability to analyse safety deficiencies, forward recommendations, support the resolution of identified deficiencies, as well as take enforcement action when appropriate. Page 40 September 2011

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