MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2020ME120Docket: Oxf-19-426Argued: July15,2020Decided: October13,2020Revised: April6,2021Panel: MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HUMPHREY,HORTON,andCONNORS,JJ.

STATEOFMAINEv.

PHILIPFLEMINGJABAR,J.

[¶1]PhilipFlemingappealsfromajudgmentofconvictionoftrafficking

in prison contraband (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 757(1)(B) (2020), unlawful

possessionofascheduleddrug(ClassD),17-AM.R.S.§1107-A(1)(C)(2020),

andviolatingaconditionofrelease(ClassE),15M.R.S.§1092(1)(A)(2020),

enteredbythetrialcourt(OxfordCounty,Stokes,J.)followingajurytrial.1For

thereasonsthatfollow,wevacatethejudgmentsofconvictionandremandthe

mattertothetrialcourtforfurtherproceedings.

1 The jury found Fleming guilty of Count 1 (trafficking in prison contraband) and Count 3

(unlawful possession of a scheduled drug). Flemingwaived his right to a jury trial for Count 4(violatingaconditionofrelease),whichwassimultaneouslytriedtothecourt. Count2(domesticviolenceassault)wasdismissedpriortotrial.

2

I.BACKGROUND

A. FactualBackground

[¶2]Viewingtheevidenceinthelightmostfavorabletotheverdict,the

juryrationallycouldhavefoundthefollowingfactsbeyondareasonabledoubt.

SeeStatev.Ouellette,2019ME75,¶11,208A.3d399.

[¶3] OnMarch6,2019,PhilipFleming,whoidentifiesasaBlackman,

wasarrestedfordomesticviolenceassault(ClassD),217-AM.R.S.§207-A(1)(A)

(2020).HewasplacedinhandcuffsandtransportedtotheOxfordCountyJail.

Upon his arrival, a corrections officer (C.O.) conducting Fleming’s intake

opened the rear door of the cruiser and asked Fleming the “standard three

questions”thatheasksindividualsbroughtintothejail:(1)whetherFleming

wassuicidal,(2)whetherFleminghadanydrugsorweaponsonhimorinside

ofhim,and(3)whetherFleminghadreceivedmedical treatment in thepast

48hours. Withregardtothesecondquestion,Flemingansweredthat tohis

knowledgehedidnothaveanydrugsorweaponsonorinsidehim,andthathe

“ha[d]alreadybeenpatteddown.”TheC.O.warnedFlemingthatitwouldbea

ClassCoffensetobringanycontrabandintothejailwithhim;thiswarningalso

2 This arrest for domestic-violence assault initiated the sequence of events underlying the

remainingchargesontheindictment.AlthoughoriginallyincludedasCount2oftheindictment,thischargewasdismissedpriortotrial.

3

appearedonasignpostedattheentrytothejail.Flemingdidnotrespondto

theC.O.’swarning.

[¶4] Fleming was then brought into the booking room where his

handcuffswereremovedandapatdownsearchwasperformed.Atthattime,

thearrestingofficer informedtheC.O. thatFlemingwasgoing tobecharged

“withdrugparaphernalia.”Inlightofthisinformation,theC.O.broughtFleming

into a holding cell to conduct a strip search. When Fleming removed his

undergarmentstheC.O.“noticedthattherewasaplasticbagwrappedaround

[Fleming’s]penis.”3Atthatpoint,FlemingandtheC.O.“bothkindoflookedat

eachother and then [Fleming] look[ed] downand said, [‘T]hat’s notmine, I

don’tknowhowthatgotthere.[’]”TheC.O.didnotaskFleminganythingabout

theplasticbagbeforeFlemingvolunteeredthatthebagdidnotbelongtohim.

Following Fleming’s statement, however, the C.O. asked “whose it may be.”

Flemingtoldtheofficerthatitbelongedtothegirlandthat“she[was]tryingto

set me up.” The C.O. testified that the contents of the bag appeared to be

“crack.”4 TheC.O.never informedFlemingofhisMiranda rights and, to the

C.O.’sknowledge,FlemingwasnototherwiseinformedofhisMirandarights.

3ItwasundisputedthattheplasticbagmusthavebeenwrappedaroundFleming’spenispriorto

hisarrest.

4Testingsubsequentlyconfirmedthatthesubstancewascocainebase.

4

B. ProceduralHistory

[¶5] A four-count indictmentwas filed against Fleming, charginghim

with (1) trafficking in prison contraband (Class C), 17-AM.R.S. §757(1)(B);

(2)domesticviolenceassault(ClassD),17-AM.R.S.§207-A(1)(A);(3)unlawful

possession of a scheduled drug (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. §1107-A(1)(C); and

(4)violatingaconditionofrelease(ClassE),15M.R.S.§1092(1)(A).5

1. JurySelection

[¶6]JuryselectiontookplaceonJuly8,2019.Flemingrequestedeleven

race-relatedvoirdirequestionsthatwouldexplorethepotentialjurors’beliefs

and experiences—both positive and negative—with regard to African

Americans.6Inadditiontoidentifyingracialbias,defensecounselprofferedas

areasonforaskingthequestions,“Isuspectthatwe’dbeluckyifafractionof

[jurors] have had or currently have African American friends, family or

5 Fleming was originally charged by criminal complaint with Count 1, trafficking in prison

contraband(ClassC),andCount2,domesticviolenceassault(ClassD),onMarch6,2019;hepleadednotguiltytoboth.Accordingtothedocketrecord,heneverenteredapleaonCounts3and4.

6 Thequestionswere: (1)DoyouhaveorhaveyoueverhadanyAfricanAmericanrelatives?(2)DoyouhaveorhaveyoueverhadanyAfricanAmericanfriends?(3)Doyouhaveorhaveyouever had any African American co-workers? (4)Do you have or have you ever had any AfricanAmerican acquaintances? (5) Have you ever had any negative experiences with an AfricanAmerica[n]?(6)HaveyoueverhadabadexperiencewithanAfricanAmerica[n]?(7)HaveyoueverhadagoodexperiencewithanAfricanAmerica[n]?(8)DoyouhaveanynegativeopinionsorbeliefsaboutAfricanAmericans?(9)DoyoubelievethatAfricanAmericansarelesstruthfulandhonestthanwhiteAmericans?(10)DoyoubelievethatAfricanAmericansaremorelikelythanwhiteAmericanstocommitcrimes?(11)ThedefendantinthiscaseisanAfricanAmerican.Foranyreason,willitbedifficultforyoutofairlyandimpartiallydecidethiscase?

5

acquaintances. SoIthinkit’sfairthatthedefendanthaveknowledgeofwho

thosepeople . . . are, so thathe . . . can rationally exercisehisperemptory

challenges.”

[¶7] ThecourtrejectedFleming’sproposedquestionnairebuthadthe

prospective jurors complete a questionnaire that required them to answer

“yes”or“no”tothefollowingfourquestions:

1. Wouldyoufinditdifficulttobefair, impartialandobjectiveifthewitnesses,victimand/ordefendantareofadifferentraceorethnicitythanyou?

2. Basedonyourlifeexperiences,wouldyoudecidethecredibilityofawitnessoractionsofapersondifferentlybecauseof thatperson’sraceorethnicity?

3. Haveyouhadanyadverseproblemsorconfrontationswithapersonofadifferentethnicity?

4. Ifyouanswered“Yes”toanyoftheabovequestions,willitbedifficult for you to decide this case fairly, impartially andobjectively?

Beforethedistributionofthejurorquestionnaires,thecourtinstructedthejury

poolontheimportanceofbasinganydecisionontheevidenceinthecase,and

notonany“preconceivedbelief”or“preconceivedprejudices”theymighthave.

Jurorswhoanswered“yes”toquestions1,2,or4wereautomaticallyremoved

fromthejurypool.7Thejurorswhoresponded“yes”toquestion3but“no”to

7AsFlemingnotesinhisbrief,thejuryselectiontranscriptisnotentirelyclearastotheremoval

ofjurorsbasedontheiranswerstothesequestions.However,itappearsthatonlythejurorswhoansweredthattheycouldbeimpartialremainedinthejurypoolatthispoint.

6

question 4 underwent additional voir dire. As a result of this process, one

additionaljurorwasstrickenforcause.

2. MotiontoSuppress

[¶8] Fleming filed a motion to suppress seeking to suppress the

statements hemade to the C.O., and a suppression hearingwas held on the

morningoftrial.ThecourtgrantedFleming’smotiontosuppresswithregard

tothestatementhemadeinresponsetotheC.O.’squestionofwhetherFleming

hadanydrugsorweaponsonhim. ThecourtdeniedFleming’smotionas it

pertained to the exchange that took place during Fleming’s strip search. It

foundthatFleming’sstatementduringthestripsearch,“Itisnotmine,Idon’t

know how it got there,” was a spontaneous volunteered statement and the

C.O.’sfollow-upquestionwasdesignedtoclarifythatambiguousstatement.

3. Trial

[¶9]Aone-dayjurytrialwasheldonJuly11,2019.Attrial,theparties

arguedoverthecourt’sinstructionsontheissueoftheculpablementalstate

requiredby17-AM.R.S. §757(1)(B) andhow theparties couldaddress this

issueintheirarguments.FlemingarguedthattheStateshouldbeprohibited

fromarguing thathis intent topossessprison contraband couldbe inferred

from his failure, despite warnings, to disclose to the officers that he had

7

something wrapped around his penis. Over Fleming’s objection, the court

opinedthatthewarningwasrelevanttoFleming’sculpablementalstateand

allowed the State to argue that point.8 Indeed, in her closing argument the

prosecutorarguedthatFleming’sintenttopossessprisoncontrabandcouldbe

inferred from both his failure to disclose his possession in response to the

warnings given to him and his explanation for the plastic bag upon its

discovery.

[¶10]ThejuryreturnedguiltyverdictsonCount1,traffickinginprison

contraband (ClassC), andCount3, unlawfulpossessionof a scheduleddrug

(ClassD).ThecourtfoundFlemingguiltyofCount4,violatingaconditionof

release(ClassE).

[¶11]ThecourtenteredajudgmentofconvictionforCounts1,3,and4,

andsentencedFlemingtooneyearinprisonforCount1,sixmonthsinprison

on Count 3, and six months in prison on Count 4, all to run concurrently.

Flemingtimelyappeals.M.R.App.P.2B(b)(2).

8Flemingrenewedthisargumentinapost-trialmotionforajudgmentofacquittaloranewtrial

on Count 1, arguing that the State could not prove Fleming had the intent to possess prisoncontraband.ThecourtonceagainrejectedthisargumentinanorderdenyingFleming’spost-trialmotions.

8

II.DISCUSSION

[¶12]Flemingraisestwoprimaryissuesonappeal:(1)whetherthetrial

court abused its discretionwhen it denied Fleming’s requested race-related

voirdirequestions,and(2)whetherthetrialcourterredinpartiallydenying

Fleming’smotion to suppress. Becausewearevacating the convictionsand

remandingthecaseforanewtrial,weaddressbothissuestoprovideguidance

tothepartiesandthetrialcourt.

A. VoirDire

[¶13]Flemingassertsthatthefourvoirdirequestionscontainedonthe

court’s questionnaire were insufficient to uncover racial biases among

potentialjurors.Recognizingthatourearlierdecisionsmaynothaveprovided

sufficientguidanceinthisarea,weholdtodaythatthequestionnaireusedby

thetrialcourtwasinsufficient.Inordertoallowthepartiesandthecourtto

ensure that jurors chosen to sit in judgment will base their decisions on

evidenceratherthanbiasorprejudice,wemusttaskthetrialcourtswithdoing

more.

[¶14] In a recent decision addressing this issue, we noted that “the

purposeofthevoirdireprocessistodetectbiasandprejudiceinprospective

jurors,thusensuringthatadefendantwillbetriedbyasfairandimpartiala

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juryaspossible.”Statev.Roby,2017ME207,¶11,171A.3d1157(quotation

marksomitted).Wehavealsoheldthata“trialcourtisnotrequiredtoconduct

voirdirepreciselyinthemannerrequestedbyadefendantsolongasthevoir

direprocessissufficienttodisclosefactsthatwouldrevealjurorbias.”Statev.

Bethea,2019ME169,¶16,221A.3d563(quotationmarksomitted).Although

neitherholdingisincorrect,neitherhasprovidedthetrialcourtswithsufficient

guidance.Weattempttoaddressthatlackofguidancetoday.

1. TurnerandBethea

[¶15] Thirty-five years ago, inState v. Turner,we explained that “the

United States Supreme Court has noted that ‘there is no constitutional

presumptionof jurorbias fororagainstmembersofanyparticularracialor

ethnic group. . . . [O]nlywhen there aremore substantial indications of the

likelihoodof racial or ethnicprejudice affecting the jurors . . . does the trial

court’s denial of a defendant’s request to examine the juror’s ability to deal

impartially with this subject amount to an unconstitutional abuse of

discretion.’”495A.2d1211,1212(Me.1985)(quotingRosales-Lopezv.United

States,451U.S.182,190(1981)).AlthoughthedefendantinTurnerwasaBlack

womanchargedwithprostitution,westatedthatthecasewas“freeofanyracial

overtones,”andnotedwithapprovalthatthetrialcourtaskedtheprospective

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jurors“whetheranythingaboutthedefendant’sracewouldmakeitdifficultfor

[them]toserveimpartially.” Id.at1212,1213. Nojurorssaiditwouldand,

concluding“[t]herewasnoreasontosuspectthatthemembersofthepanelhad

notrespondedtruthfully,”weheldthat“voirdirewassufficienttoexposejuror

prejudicebasedonthedefendant’srace.”Id.at1213.

[¶16]Forthefirsttimeinthethirty-fiveyearssinceTurnerwasdecided,

wewerepresentedwiththeissueofwhetheravoirdireprocesswassufficient

toidentifyracialbiasinStatev.Bethea,2019ME169,221A.3d563. Bethea

arguedthathewasdeniedhisconstitutionalrighttoafairtrialwhenthetrial

court did not include his proposed race-related questions in the juror

questionnaire.Id.¶15.Explainingthattherewassignificantoverlapbetween

the fivequestionsdesigned touncoverracialbias thatwere includedon the

questionnaireandBethea’sproposedquestions,weheldthat“[t]hecourtdid

notabuseitsdiscretionindecliningtoworditsquestionspreciselyasBethea

requested.”Id.¶¶17-18.ThetrialcourtinBetheaaddedavoirdirequestion

in response to Bethea’s request for additional inquiry on racial prejudice,

askingwhetherthepotentialjurorshad“anynegativeviews”or“anynegative

experiences”withpeoplewhoareAfricanAmericanorBlack.Id.¶¶9,17.We

held thatby “includ[ing] fivequestions related to raceon thequestionnaire,

11

incorporating some of Bethea’s suggestions; excus[ing] any juror whose

answerstothosequestionssuggestedanyracialbias;andpermitt[ing]Bethea

toaskfollow-upquestionstopotentialjurorsduringindividualvoirdire,”the

trialcourthad“thoroughlyprobedtheissueofracialbiasandactedwithinits

discretioninitsconductofvoirdire.”Id.¶19.

[¶17] The trial court in this casedidnothave the guidance fromour

decisioninBethea—issuedinDecember2019—whenFleming’sjuryselection

tookplaceinJuly2019.Inaddition,inouraffirmanceoftheBetheatrialcourt’s

actions,wemayhavefailedtostatewithanyrealclaritythatwewereadopting

a standard stricter than that applied in Turner. To clear up any lingering

questions,wedosonow.Wheneveratrialincludes“racialissues,”Turner,495

A.2dat1213,trialcourtsarerequiredtothoroughlyprobetheissueofracial

bias.9

9UndertheprimacyapproachappliedbythisCourt,seeStatev.Chan,2020ME91,¶34,---A.3d

---(Connors,J.,concurring),wefirstlooktotheMaineConstitution,withfederalprecedentservingaspotentiallypersuasivebutnotdispositiveguidancewithrespecttoconstitutionalprovisionswithsimilargoals.TotheextentthatthefederalcounterpartstoMaine’srequirementofanimpartialjury,foundinart.I,§6oftheMaineConstitution,aredeemednottoimposetheinquirywemandatetoday,seeRosales-Lopezv.UnitedStates,451U.S.182,192(1981),weconcludethattheMaineConstitutiondemandsmore.SeeBennettv.State,161Me.489,495-96,214A.2d667(1965)(noting“thegreatimportanceweattachtotheconstitutionalentitlementofapartyaccusedofcrimetoanimpartialjurytrial”).

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2. RacialBiasinVoirDire

[¶18]Today’spracticalrealityisthat“[m]anyyearsofresearchfocusing

on the judicial system demonstrates that, at nearly every point, from school

discipline to death sentences, results are unduly skewed along lines of race,

ethnicity,orothergroupidentity.” Am.BarAss’n,AchievinganImpartialJury

(AIJ)Toolbox1,https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications

/criminaljustice/voirdire_toolchest.pdf(footnotesomitted).

[¶19]HereinMaine,theU.S.CensusBureauestimatesthat94.4%ofthe

populationidentifiesasWhite,whilejust1.7%ofMainersidentifyasBlackor

African American. U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts: Maine (July 1, 2019),

https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ME/PST045219. These

demographicswilloftenleadtoajurywitharacialmakeupthataprosecutoris

forbidden from purposely seeking under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79

(1986).10

[¶20]Questioningpotentialjurorsabouttheirexplicitviews,opinions,

or beliefs about people of a different race is a critical step in achieving the

10AsFlemingobserved,oftentimesitwillsimplynotbepossibletoincludeBlackjurorsonaBlack

defendant’sjurygiventheoverwhelminglyWhiteracialmakeupofthestate.ThisisespeciallytrueofcertaincountiesinMaine,suchasOxfordCounty,wherelessthanonepercentofthepopulationidentifies as Black or African American. See U.S. Census Bureau,Quick Facts:OxfordCounty,Maine(July1,2019),https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/oxfordcountymaine/PST045219.

13

ultimate goal of the voir dire process: detecting bias and prejudice in

prospectivejurors.SeeRoby,2017ME207,¶11,171A.3d1157.Inorderto

uncoverpotentialracialbiasesorprejudices,trialcourtsshouldinquireduring

voir dire whether prospective jurors have any negative opinions or beliefs

aboutindividualsorgroupswhosharethedefendant’sraceorethnicity.Asking

thisexplicitquestionisanecessarysteptowardensuringthateachdefendant—

regardless of race or ethnicity—is “tried by as fair and impartial a jury as

possible.”Id.(quotationmarksomitted);seeAlexander,MaineJuryInstruction

Manual§2-4Dat2-18to-19(2019-2020ed.). Inordertothoroughlyprobe

the issue of racial bias, the trial court should then exercise its discretion in

permittingfollow-upquestionstopotentialjurorsduringindividualvoirdire.

SeeBethea,2019ME169,¶19,221A.3d563.

[¶21]Overthepastdecade,legalscholarshiphasrecognizedtherolethat

implicit or unconscious racial biases and in-group favoritism play in the

administration of justice. See, e.g., Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the

GordianKnotofImplicitBiasinJurySelection:TheProblemsofJudge-Dominated

VoirDire,theFailedPromiseofBatson,andProposedSolutions,4Harv.L.&Pol’y

Rev.149,152(2010)(“Lawyers,judges,andotherlegalprofessionalsneedto

heightentheirawarenessandunderstandingofimplicitbias,itsroleinourcivil

14

andcriminaljusticesystem,andinparticular,theproblemsthatitcreateswith

regard to juries.”); Robert J. Smith et al., Implicit White Favoritism in the

CriminalJusticeSystem,66Ala.L.Rev.871,895(2014)(“Atthecoreofresearch

on implicit in-group favoritism is the principle that people automatically

associatethein-group,or‘us,’withpositivecharacteristics,andtheout-group,

or ‘them,’ with negative characteristics.”).11 As our understanding of these

conceptsevolves,sotoomustthewayweconfronttheminouradministration

ofjustice.

[¶22] Itmaybedifficult touncoverandaddress implicit racialbiases

amongpotentialjurors,butthatdoesnotlessentheimportanceofdeveloping

methods to confront these biases in our justice system. We echo the other

courtsthathavenotedtheimportanceofdoingsoandinstructourtrialcourts

to be proactive about addressing implicit bias. See State v. Berhe, 444 P.3d

11Variouscourtshavealsodiscussedtheprevalenceofimplicitracialbias.See,e.g.,Statev.Plain,

898N.W.2d801,817(Iowa2017)(“Whilethereisgeneralagreementthatcourtsshouldaddresstheproblemofimplicitbiasinthecourtroom,courtshavebroaddiscretionabouthowtodoso....Westronglyencouragedistrictcourtstobeproactiveaboutaddressingimplicitbias....”);UnitedStatesv.Ray,803F.3d244,259-60(6thCir.2015)(“[W]erecognizetheprovenimpactofimplicitbiasesonindividuals’behavioranddecision-making.Socialscientistshaveexaminedextensivelythetheoryofimplicitbias inrecentdecades,especiallyas itrelatestoracialbias.”(footnoteomitted)); seealsoStatev.Collins,No.CR-12-4755,2013Me.Super.LEXIS8,*2-3n.1(Jan.11,2013)(“Manystateshaveappointed commissions and task[] forces to look at racial bias in the criminal justice system.Repeatedlythesecommissionshavereachedthesameconclusionthatracialbiasaffectsourcriminaljustice system. Bias includes unfounded stereotypes about African Americans, which we mustacknowledge exist. . . . Speaking up against the conscious andunconscious bias that impacts ourcriminaljusticesystemandoursocietyinsomanywaysistheonlywaytoeradicateit.”)

15

1172,1180-81(Wash.2019)(“[I]mplicitracialbiascanaffectthefairnessofa

trialasmuchas,ifnotmorethan,‘blatant’racialbias.However,implicitracial

biascanbeparticularlydifficulttoidentifyandaddress.Nevertheless,asour

understanding and recognition of implicit bias evolves, our procedures for

addressingitmustevolveaswell.”(citationsomitted)).

3. Fleming’sJurySelection

[¶23] Unlike thequestionnaire inBethea,2019ME169¶9,221A.3d

563, the questionnaire used in this case failed to incorporate Fleming’s

requested question of whether the potential jurors harbored “any negative

opinionsorbeliefs”abouteitherAfricanAmericansorBlackpeople.12

[¶24]GiventhelackofanyquestionsthatdirectlyaddressedFleming’s

concerns about the jurors’ contact with or opinions about people who are

AfricanAmericanorBlack,thevoirdireprocesswasnot“sufficienttodisclose

factsthatwouldrevealjurorbias.”Statev.Lowry,2003ME38,¶11,819A.2d

331.

12ThequestionnaireinBetheaincludedthequestion“Doyouhaveanynegativeviews[of]orhave

youhadanynegativeexperienceswithpeoplewhoareAfrican-American/black?”–aquestionthatoverlappedwithBethea’sproposedquestions.Statev.Bethea,2019ME169,¶¶8-9,221A.3d563.The questionnaire given to Fleming’s jury pool asked, “Have you had any adverse problems orconfrontationswithapersonofadifferentethnicity?” Itdidnot,however, includeevena singlequestionaskingaboutthejurors’viewsoropinionsofAfrican-AmericanorBlackpeople.

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B. MotiontoSuppress

[¶25]Althoughwevacatetheconvictionsandremandthecaseforanew

trialbasedonthevoirdirequestions,wealsoaddressthesuppressionissue.

The denial of amotion to suppress is reviewed for clear error as to factual

issuesanddenovoastoissuesoflaw.Statev.Diana,2014ME45,¶11,89A.3d

132.Flemingcontendsthatthecourterredindenyinghismotiontosuppress

his statement, because the C.O.’s question, “whose [bag] it may be,” was

custodial interrogation forMiranda purposes. Fleming asserts that he was

prejudicedastoCount1bytheadmissionofthisstatementattrial.13Thereis

nodisputethatFlemingwasincustody;thepartiesdisputeonlywhetherthe

C.O.’squestionconstituted“interrogation”underMirandav.Arizona,384U.S.

436(1966).“[A]court’sconclusionthatalawenforcementofficer’scomment

didnotconstituteinterrogationwillbeupheldunlesstheevidenceshowsthat

acontraryinferencewastheonlyreasonableconclusionthatcouldhavebeen

13 Flemingconcedes that theerrorwasharmlesswith respect to theconvictionsonCounts3

and4.

17

drawn.” State v. Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶ 6, 991 A.2d 806 (quotation marks

omitted).

1. Interrogation

[¶26] “[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to

expressquestioning,butalsotoanywordsoractionsonthepartofthepolice

(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police

shouldknowarereasonablylikelytoelicitanincriminatingresponsefromthe

suspect.”RhodeIslandv.Innis,446U.S.291,301(1980)(footnotesomitted).

“[B]rief,neutralquestionsthatarenotpartofanefforttoelicitaconfessionor

admissiondonotconstituteinterrogation.”Reese,2010ME30,¶8,991A.2d

806.

[¶27] In State v. Dominique, 2008ME 180, ¶ 13, 960 A.2d 1160, the

defendantwasarrestedandbroughttothepolicestationtotakeanIntoxilyzer

test. After the administeringofficer explained theprocedure, thedefendant

stated,“It’snotgoingtowork,though.”Id.Theofficerrepliedtothedefendant’s

unprompted statementwith “No?” Id. The defendant gave an incriminating

response.Id.Weheldthattheofficer’s,“No?”wasatmost“afollow-upquestion

forclarificationpurposes”andthatitcouldnotbeinferredthattheofficerknew

orshouldhaveknownthathisfollow-upquestion“waslikelytoelicitsomekind

18

of incriminatingresponse.” Id.¶14. Weexplainedthatthedefendantcould

havemadehis initial statement for anynumber of reasonsunrelated to the

questionofwhetherhewasoperatingundertheinfluence.Id.

[¶28]AnumberoftheUnitedStatesCircuitCourtsofAppealhavealso

addressedwhether follow-upquestions tovolunteered statements implicate

Mirandaconcerns.InAndersenv.Thieret,903F.2d526,531-32(7thCir.1990),

anunwarneddefendantspontaneouslyvolunteeredthestatement,“Istabbed

her,”while hewas in custody for reasons unrelated to any stabbing.14 The

SeventhCircuitheldthat“thepoliceofficer’sresponsivequestion,‘Who?,’did

notrequirefullMirandawarningsbeforeitsutterance.”Id.at532.Thecourt

described the officer’s question as “a neutral response, intended to clarify

Andersen’spuzzlingdeclaration;itwasnotcoerciveinterrogationthatMiranda

seekstoprevent.”Id.

[¶29]Recognizingthat“follow-upquestionscantakeavarietyofforms,”

theSecondCircuithasopinedthat“[c]arefulinquiryintotheunderlyingfacts

andcircumstancesmaythusbenecessarytodeterminewhetherasuspectina

14 The defendantwas not in custody as a suspect for an unsolvedmurder as the result of a

stabbing;rather,hewasincustodyforadisorderlyconductchargearisingfromanincidentreportedbyhismother.Andersenv.Thieret,903F.2d526,528(7thCir.1990).Hemadethestatementfiveminutesintothecarrideaftersomeconversationabout“theweaponthatthedefendant’smothersaidhehad,”whichthedefendantdeniedpossessing.Id.Afteran“intervalofsilence”thedefendantblurtedoutthathehad“stabbedher.”Id.Atthispoint,thepoliceasked,“Who?”Id.

19

particularcasewouldhavereasonablyunderstoodthatthefollow-upquestions

were seeking only to clarify information already volunteered rather than to

compelfurther incriminatorydisclosures.” UnitedStatesv.Rommy,506F.3d

108,133(2dCir.2007)(footnoteomitted)(quotationmarksomitted);seealso

Tolliverv.Sheets,594F.3d900,921(6thCir.2010)(“Thedifferencebetween

permissiblefollow-upquestionsandimpermissibleinterrogationclearlyturns

onwhetherthepoliceareseekingclarificationofsomethingthatthesuspect

has just said, or whether instead the police are seeking to expand the

interview.”); United States v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 940 (5th Cir. 1997)

(holdingthat“whenasuspectspontaneouslymakesastatement,officersmay

requestclarificationofambiguousstatementswithoutrunningafouloftheFifth

Amendment”);United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019, 1032 (4th Cir. 1985)

(holding that officer’s question, “Why?,” in response to defendant’s

spontaneousstatement,“Youcan’ttakethat,”madeduringtheexecutionofa

searchwarrant,didnotamounttointerrogation).15

15Variousstatecourtshavealsoaddressedtheissue.See,e.g.,Statev.Walton,41S.W.3d75,84-86

(Tenn.2001)(collectingcasesandholdingthatfollow-upquestionstoanunmirandizeddefendant’svoluntary statement are permissible, “unless the officer has reason to believe that the follow-upquestions are ‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response,’” in which case “Mirandawarningsmustbegivenbeforeanyanswerstothefollow-upquestionsareproperlyadmissible”).

20

[¶30] Whether the trial court erred in denying Fleming’s motion to

suppress thusturnsonthenatureof theC.O.’s follow-upquestion. Thetrial

courtfoundthatFleming’svolunteeredstatement,“Itisnotmine,Idon’tknow

how itgot there,”wasanambiguousstatementand that theC.O.’s follow-up

questionwasdesignedtoclarifyFleming’svolunteeredstatement.Wereview

these findings for clear error, see Diana, 2014 ME 45, ¶ 11, 89 A.3d 132,

consideringthecircumstancespresentatthetimethequestionwasasked,see

Innis,446U.S.at300-02.

[¶31]Inthiscase,thestripsearchwasbeingconductedbecauseFleming

was discovered with drug paraphernalia, the C.O. knew Fleming had not

receivedMirandawarnings, the C.O. had personally warned Fleming of the

consequences of bringing contraband into the jail, and the C.O. believed an

explanation from Fleming was warranted as to “why the plastic bag was

wrappedaroundhispenis.”Inthiscontext,theC.O.shouldhaveknownthatthe

follow-upquestion—regardlessofhowbriefitmayhavebeen—wouldelicitan

incriminating response from Fleming. This is especially true given that an

“incriminating response” is “any response—whether inculpatory or

exculpatory—thattheprosecutionmayseekto introduceat trial.” Innis,446

U.S.at301n.5(emphasisinoriginal).

21

[¶32]Unlikethefollow-upquestionsinDominique,2008ME180,¶15,

960 A.2d 1160, it is difficult to conclude that the C.O.’s follow-up question,

asking“whoseitmaybe,”wasmerelyaclarifyingquestion.SeealsoAndersen,

903F.2dat531-32;Rhodes,779F.2dat1032.Fleming’sstatementstatedonly

thatthebagwasnothisandthathedidnotknowhowthebaggotthere.The

problemwiththatstatementisnotthatitisambiguous;theproblemisthatit

seemstotallyimplausible.Askingwhothebagmaybelongtoseekstoexpand

Fleming’s implausible statement,not clarifyanambiguousone. SeeTolliver,

594F.3dat921.

[¶33]WeconcludethattheC.O.’squestionaboutwhosebagitmaybe

wasacustodialinterrogationforMirandapurposesandthetrialcourterredin

denyingFleming’smotiontosuppresshisrespondingstatement.

2. HarmlessError

[¶34]Wemustnextconsiderwhethertheerrorwasharmless.SeeState

v.Dobbins,2019ME116,¶38,215A.3d769.“Anyerror,defect,irregularity,or

variance thatdoesnotaffectsubstantial rightsshallbedisregarded.” M.R.U.

Crim.P.52(a).“Aconstitutionalerrormadeattrialmaybedeemedharmlessif

we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the trial record as a

22

whole,thattheerrordidnotcontributetotheverdictobtained.”Statev.Larsen,

2013ME38,¶23,65A.3d1203(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶35]Amajorissuedisputedbythepartiesattrial,aswellasinFleming’s

post-trial motions, was whether the State could prove that Fleming “acted

intentionallyandvoluntarilyinpossessingthedrugswhileinofficialcustody.”

IntheState’sclosingargumentanditsrebuttal,theprosecutoremphasizedthe

statement Fleming made in response to the C.O.’s question. In her closing

argument,theprosecutorposited:

The State would suggest that the defendant’s statementsimmediatelyafter[theC.O.]observedthebaggyandthesubstanceandthedrugs,that’snotmine,that’smygirl’s,sheistryingtosetmeup.TheStatewouldsubmitthatthejurycaninferfromthosestatementsthedefendantknewhehaddrugsonhim,heknewhewasgoingtothejail,heknewhewasgoingtogetsearchedatthejail,andallthewhilehepossessedthesescheduleddrugs.

(Emphasisadded.)Theprosecutorreiteratedthispointinherrebuttal:

Thedefendantwasexplicitlywarnedby [theC.O.] that if hehaddrugs and he went past that point, he could be charged with aClassCtrafficking,that’swhathappened.Thedefendantknewthat.Heheardthosewarnings.Hearguablyknewhewasinpossessionofthesescheduleddrugs.TheStatewouldsuggestthatthesearetheconsequencesofthedefendant’sactions. Bybypassingthosewarningsgiventohim,byattemptingtopassblameofpossessionof those drugs, remember the first thing he saidwas, that’s notmine,thatwasmygirl’s,sheistryingtosetmeup.Heknewhehadthem.Hewastryingtonotgetcaughtwiththem.

23

[¶36] This seemingly innocuous statement, that the contraband

belongedtohisgirl,whowastryingtosetuphim,doesnotcontainmuchinthe

wayofincriminatingevidence.However,theStatereliedonthestatementto

establishFleming’sintent—positingthataninferencecouldbedrawnfromthe

statementthatFleming“knewhewasgoingtojail”whilepossessingthedrugs.

[¶37] To begin the harmless error analysis, we must examine the

meaningof“intent”asthetermisusedin17-A§757(1)(B).16Section757isa

verybroadstatutethatencompassesconductfarbeyondthestatute’stitle—

“Traffickinginprisoncontraband.”17-AM.R.S.§757.“Theinterpretationofa

statuteisalegalissuewereviewdenovo.”Statev.Jones,2012ME88,¶6,46

A.3d1125.

16AlthoughFleming’sdecisionnottoraisethisargumentasanindependentissueonappeal(e.g.,

by challenging the court’s denial of his post-verdict motion for a judgment of acquittal or bychallengingthejuryinstructionsontheintentelement)couldindicateawaiveroftheissue,wetreatthe issue as properly raised in light of its development in the context of Fleming’s suppressionargument,theunusualcircumstancespresentinthiscase,andFleming’spreservationofthisissueattrialandinhispost-trialmotions.SeeStatev.Bard,2018ME38,¶36,181A.3d187;Statev.Wilbur,278A.2d139,148(Me.1971).

Inanyevent,ourconclusionthatthecourt’sdenialofFleming’smotiontosuppresswaserroneousrequiresustoundertakeaharmlesserroranalysis.Wecannotcompletetheanalysiswithoutfirstinterpreting 17-A M.R.S. § 757(1)(B) to determine what intent is required under the statute.However,wedonotaddresstheargumentFlemingraisedbelow—thatthetrialcourt’sinterpretationof section 757(1)(B) would violate a defendant’s right against self-incrimination by forcing adefendanttoadmittohavingcontrabandonhimwhenheiswarnedthatpossessionbeyondthepointinquestionwouldbeinviolationoflaw—becauseFlemingdidnotproperlyraisetheissueonappealanditsresolutionisunnecessarytoourharmlesserroranalysis.

24

[¶38] Section757(1)(B)provides, “Aperson is guilty of trafficking in

prison contraband if . . . [b]eing a person in official custody, the person

intentionally makes, obtains or possesses contraband.” Scheduled drugs,

includingcocainebase,areconsidered“contraband”asthattermisusedinthe

statute.Seeid.;17-AM.R.S.§§1101-1102(2020).Forthepurposesofsection

757,

“officialcustody”meansarrest,custodyin,oronthewaytoorfroma courthouseor a jail, police station,houseof correction, or anyinstitution or facility under the control of the Department ofCorrections,orundercontractwiththedepartmentforthehousingofpersonssentencedtoimprisonment,thecustodyofanyofficialof the department, the custody of any institution in anotherjurisdictionpursuanttoa[concurrent]sentence...oranycustodypursuanttocourtorder.

17-AM.R.S.§755(3)(2020);see17-AM.R.S.§757(2)(2020).

[¶39] It is clear from the plain language of section 757(1)(B) that a

person’s intent to make, obtain, or possess contraband must exist

contemporaneously with the official custody. Despite the statute’s title, a

violation may occur in the course of any official custody. A defendant’s

possessionofcontrabandwhileinofficialcustodycannotbe“intentional”for

purposes for section 757(1)(B) unless the defendant intended to have the

25

contrabandwhile inofficial custody. Unlike statutes inother jurisdictions,17

Maine’s statute does not create a separate offense or greater penalty for

possession once the threshold to a prison is crossed—section 757(1)(B) is

applicablefromthemomentadefendantisfirstplaced“inofficialcustody.”18If

wewere to interpret the statute as requiringonly that adefendanthave an

intent topossess “contraband”at somepoint, and that thedefendant in fact

endedupincustodywhileinpossessionofthatcontraband,defendantswould

berequiredtopredicttheprecisemomentatwhichtheywouldbearrestedor

placed inofficialcustodyso that theycould informlawenforcementof their

possessionofcontrabandpriortothatmoment.Thisisawhollyunreasonable

interpretationofsection757(1)(B).

17Whileanumberhavecourtshaveaddressedthisissueinthecontextoftheirstates’equivalent

statutes,Maine’sstatutehasafarbroaderreachbecauseitappliestoanypersoninofficialcustody—notjustinconfinementfacilities,asprovidedbyotherstates’statutes.SeeStatev.Fowle,819S.E.2d719,720(Ga.Ct.App.2018)(statutemakingitillegal“tocomeinsidetheguardlinesestablishedatanystateorcountycorrectionalinstitution”withcertainitems);Statev.Barnes,747S.E.2d912,917(N.C.Ct.App.2013)(increasedpenaltyforunlawfulpossessionoccurring“onthepremisesofapenalinstitutionorlocalconfinementfacility”);Peoplev.Gastello,232P.3d650,653n.3(Cal.2010)(statuteonly applicable to placeswhere inmates or prisoners are located);Taylor v. Commonwealth, 313S.W.3d563,565(Ky.2010)(statuteapplicabletoapersonwho“knowinglyintroduces...contrabandintoadetentionfacilityorapenitentiary”);Statev.Carr,No.M2007-01759-CCA-R3-CD,2008Tenn.Crim.App.LEXIS753(Tenn.Crim.App.Sept.26,2008)(statuteexclusivetopenalinstitutions).

18Instateswhereadefendanthascommittedanewoffenseassoonashecrossesintoaprisonorjail while possessing contraband, courts seem to draw a distinction between possessing drugsoutsideofjailandinsidejail.ThisisnotthecaseunderMaine’sstatute,becausepossessionwhileinanyofficialcustodyviolatessection757(1)(B).

26

[¶40] The State admitted during oral argument that, under its

interpretationof thestatute, it couldchargesomeonearrested foroperating

under the influencewith a violation of section 757(1)(B)—a felony—if that

person had contraband on their person at the time of their OUI arrest.

Moreover,because“contraband”isdefinedbysection757(2)toincludecertain

items otherwise lawful to possess, under the prosecution’s interpretation, a

person who is in legal possession of an item considered contraband under

section757(2), suchasa lawfullyowned firearm,wouldautomaticallybe in

violationof thestatute ifplacedunderarrest forany crime—evenwhen the

arrestwasunexpected.Thisinterpretationfarexceedsthepurposeandintent

ofthestatuteasexpressedinthetitle:Traffickinginprisoncontraband.

[¶41] Given the broad reach of this statute as expressed by the

prosecution, it ishardtoconcludethattheadmissionofFleming’sstatement

washarmless.Forourconstructionofthisstatutenottobeoverlybroad,and

nottoencompassmerepossessionatthetimeofone’sarrest,theStatewould

havetoprovethatthedefendantwas,atthetimeheinitiallyplacedthedrugs

onhisperson,awarethathewasgoingtobeplaced inofficialcustody. It is

irrelevantwhetherFleming,whilepossessingthedrugsandunabletodispose

ofthem,learnedthathewasgoingtojail—whatmattersiswhetherFleming

27

formedanintenttopossessthedrugsafterhelearnedhewasbeingtakeninto

officialcustody. Noevidencewaspresentedattrial tosupportatheorythat

Flemingintendedtopossessthecontrabandwhileinofficialcustody.Infact,it

was undisputed that Fleming must have wrapped the plastic bag around

himselfprior tohisarrest,andtheStatepresentednoevidencetoshowthat

Fleming anticipated being placed in official custody when he did so. The

testimony at trial made it abundantly clear that Fleming could not have

physicallydisposedofthedrugsoncehandcuffed.

[¶42] In this case, the court should not have credited the State’s

argumentthatFleming’sanswertothefollowupquestionwasevidenceofhis

intent because it showed that he “knew he was going to jail.” We are not

convinced that theerror inadmitting theresponsedidnotcontribute to the

verdictobtained.SeeLarsen,2013ME38,¶23,65A.3d1203.Theerrorwas

thereforenotharmless.

III.CONCLUSION

[¶43]Weholdthatthetrialcourterredinitshandlingofthevoirdire

process,andwevacatethejudgmentsofconviction.Additionally,weholdthat

28

thetrialcourterredinadmittingFleming’sresponsetotheC.O.’squestionand

thattheerrorwasnotharmless.19

Theentryis:

Judgments vacated. Remanded for furtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.

ChristopherS.Berryment,Esq.(orally),Mexico,forappellantPhilipFlemingAndrew S. Robinson, District Attorney, andAlexandraW.Winter, Asst. Dist.Atty.(orally),OfficeoftheDistrictAttorney,SouthParis,forappelleeStateofMaineOxfordCountyUnifiedCriminalDocketdocketnumberCR-2019-30106FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY

19 Wealsotakethisopportunity,aswedidatoralargument, toquestionwhetherachargeof

trafficking in prison contraband—which requires proof that the person intentionally possessescontraband while in official custody—is appropriately used against persons who are arrestedinvoluntarilywith no indication of any intent to go into official custody (as opposed to personsreportingtoserveasentenceorinresponsetoanoutstandingwarrant).Here,thereisnoindicationthatFlemingknewhewasgoingtobearrestedandbroughttothejailfacility.