State FormationA Historical Systems Approach

This is a revised version of a paper originally written in 1995 as part of an honours degree project. It is somewhat academic in nature, so be warned. While my opinions on some of the issues discussed herein have changed somewhat, my theoretical interests are substantially similar to those in this paper.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction

HYPERLINK "http://phrontistery.info/statform.html" \l "ii" II. Illusory Dichotomy: Coercion and integration in early states

HYPERLINK "http://phrontistery.info/statform.html" \l "iii" III. Illusory Pyramid: Egalitarianism and the growth of complexity

HYPERLINK "http://phrontistery.info/statform.html" \l "iv" IV.Illusory Force: Processes and causes of social evolution

HYPERLINK "http://phrontistery.info/statform.html" \l "v" V. Illusory Universality: Systems and history

HYPERLINK "http://phrontistery.info/statform.html" \l "vi" VI.Conclusion: Implications for future state research

I. Introduction

No thing great is created suddenly, any more than a bunch

of grapes or a fig. If you tell me that you desire a fig, I

answer you that there must be time. Let it first blossom, then

bear fruit, then ripen.

Epictetus, The Discourses, I, 15

The study of state formation, and social evolution in general, has

fallen out of fashion in recent years, particularly among ethnologists.

However, there is no methodological justification for this collapse,

although some researchers have been convinced to abandon this topic.

Relying on evidence from archaeology, ethnohistory and ethnology, I argue

that despite the serious errors committed by some scholars of political

evolution, the general evolutionary framework is essentially valid. I feel

that an approach to state formation generally informed by systems theory is

essential and workable; however, consideration must be given to the specific

historical conditions extant in any specific state society. We must come to

recognize that societies are neither infinitely particular nor widely

generalizeable, and that while many causal factors may lead to state

formation, trends of increasing political complexity are evident in widely

divergent societies. I offer the proposal that many aspects of societies

which are invisible to archaeologists can be fruitfully studied by

ethnographic and ethnohistorical research, and that interdisciplinary co-

operation is essential if the evolutionary framework is to be refined.

Upon opening a discussion of a topic which is no longer popular in the

anthropological literature, one must consider whether it has failed due to

the irrelevance of the paradigm, or due to other circumstances. What has

gone wrong with the study of the state among ethnologists? Certainly, one

might argue validly that overly broad synchronic comparisons have been made

between societies separated widely in their history and geography. The

method adopted by Claessen and Skalnk in their Early State Project which

seeks to define the state by a number of structural characteristics, while

useful for purposes of description, has little explanatory value in and of

itself, although it makes no such claim (Claessen 1978). Other scholars,

arguing purely from (often dogmatic) theoretical positions, which may

require that the data be made to fit the theory, seem always to fail the

test of generalizability. Does it make sense, however, to reject the

subject altogether, or should we seek rather to refine our theories? It is

the second approach which seems most fruitful, and which I adopt throughout

this paper.

It is apparent, upon examining recent scholarly works on the study of

the state, that archaeology has come to have a greater effect on the topic

within anthropology. Indeed, Karl Hutterer has argued that sociocultural

anthropologists no longer have any role to play in this subject. I dispute

strongly the claim that "it will be necessary to shift the responsibility

from ethnology to archeology" in order to construct evolutionary sequences

(Hutterer 1991: 237). It is essential, however, that the ahistorical,

synchronic ethnographic models which are used primarily for taxonomic

purposes be re-examined in light of the specific trajectories developed by

ethnohistorians and archaeologists.

I should also make clear to what I am referring as "a state". As a

preliminary definition, I suggest the following: a form of government in

which there exists centralized authority, hierarchical differences in access

to power and basic resources between individuals, reinforced by

institutionalized coercion, usually accompanied by the decline of kin

structures. As such, there is no reason to see these characteristics of

"the state" as more important than any other agglomeration of

characteristics. However, the recurrence of particular sets of traits in

diverse areas of the globe (Mesoamerica, South America, Africa, India,

China, etc.) indicates that there may still be some use in talking about

"state formation" as opposed to the more general "political evolution".

Political evolution, then, is the process by which societies change their

structures through time, generally in the direction of greater complexity.

I do not intend to discuss issues of social collapse or "devolution" in this

paper; certainly, the value of such terms within an evolutionary framework

can be debated.

There appear to be four fundamental illusions which some state

theorists have fallen under. Firstly, too much emphasis has been placed on

the dichotomy between coercive and integrative theories of the state,

leading to overly polarized positions which obscure the complex reality of

societies. Next, false notions of hierarchy and progress have led some to

see state formation as an end point of social evolution rather than part of

an ongoing process of increasing social size and complexity. Third, the

systemic forces which cause social evolution to occur have been

misidentified and misinterpreted by scholars under the influence of

paradigms from elsewhere in the life and social sciences. Finally, many

have existed under the illusion that state formation is a process which

imposes centralization upon non-state societies, rather than being an

outgrowth of their existing institutions and historical practices. I intend

not only to dispel these four illusions but to replace them with

constructive means by which anthropologists should revive state formation as

a worthwhile area of study.

II. Illusory Dichotomy: Coercion and integration in early states

The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or

composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be

good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that

where they are well armed they have good laws.

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, ch. 12

Until very recently, theorists on the topic of state formation have

largely been polarized into two schools: conflict theorists, who emphasize

the coercive role of the state in increasing and legitimating inequality,

and integration theorists, who point to the state's greater redistributive

ability as its primary causal feature. Neither of these two extreme

positions is wholly satisfactory in every state, and I would hazard that

neither is sufficient explanation in any state. As Machiavelli astutely

noted almost four centuries ago, both laws and arms make a good prince, and

it is impossible to have one without the other.(1)

The history of the study of states could theoretically be extended

back to the ancient philosophers, and thenceforth to the Enlightenment

philosophes such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. It is evident that the

tension between social contract, or integration models, and social conflict,

or coercive models, extends throughout this period, as argued effectively by

Haas (1982). In the anthropological literature on states, one would expect

no objection to the claim that most Marxists and materialists adopt coercive

models, while those emphasizing managerial functions would propound

integrative theories of state formation. However, the considerable evidence

on both sides of the debate (which I do not intend to review in detail)

immediately leads one to suspect that neither theory is wholly satisfactory.

Scholars who argue for the primacy of warfare as causal agent in state

formation have generally combined the two orientations of integration and

conflict due to the nature of their "prime mover". Webster notes that

warfare facilitated "the emergence and survival of privileged managerial

groups" (1975: 469) in order to co-ordinate military efforts and marshal

resources. However, this integrative role is contrasted with his assertion

that "Concentration of power is integrally related to concentration of

wealth, and derives from it" (1975: 468). This apparent contradiction

suggests that while initially, the need for integration enabled meritorious

or cunning individuals to acquire control over these resources, coercion and

differential access to resources reinforced this position due to the

resulting power differential.

Warfare is surely a necessary but insufficient condition for state

formation. However, this position, which has been advocated by Cohen (1978:

46) as part of complex events which synthesize various factors leading to

the centralization of authority, in no way argues that warfare is a prime

mover in social evolution. Neither do I accept the conclusion of Naroll and

Divale that because cross-cultural studies do not show a correlation between

warfare and territorial growth that "peaceful diffusion is more likely than

warfare to be the primary mechanism of selection in cultural evolution"

(1976: 121). The causes and consequences of warfare are both varied and

closely intertwined with other social events in societies. Warfare is

neither indicative of "coercion" or "integration", but requires that both

factors operate simultaneously. Surely we can accept that war has serious

influences on political leadership and social structure without arguing that

its presence somehow determines the future of the society.

The greatest methodological problem which scholars have faced in

interpreting archaeological data on archaic states is the establishment of

causal links which would support or reject the conflict or integration

positions. How, for instance, can data whose date can only be placed

accurately within a century be used to establish whether warfare preceded

the state, or the other way around, and so on? This problem is faced most

clearly by Haas (1982) in attempting to re-evaluate the archaeological data

on the "primary civilization", and is not completely resolved. However, we

do have a number of instances of historical state formation in Polynesia,

Africa and elsewhere, for which such details are known. Might it not be

productive, then, to examine the better known ethnohistorical examples in

order to aid in constructing analogies in order to understand the lesser

known archaeological states?

The best evidence we have, then, suggests that both coercion and

integration have their place in state formation. I offer the complementary

proposition that the dichotomy between the two is both unnecessary and

unimportant. Whether a mechanism is coercive or integrative is not the

primary determinant of its importance for the formation of states. The

excessive focus on the polar opposition of these two principles may stem

from the philosophes and their proposals of "social contract" and "social

coercion", neither of which were based on any real evidence, anthropological

or otherwise. Thus, while we may maintain that organizing irrigation

systems is "integrative" while enslaving one's conquered enemies is

"coercive", I offer as a testable hypothesis the notion that there may be

more important guiding principles of state formation as yet undiscovered.

III. Illusory Pyramid: Egalitarianism and the Growth of Complexity

There is no steady unretracing progress in this life; we

do not advance through fixed gradations, and at the last one

pause ...

Herman Melville, Moby Dick, ch. 111

A great deal of ink has been spilt over the question of typology of

societies with regards to their political evolution. The classic theories

of Service (1962) and Fried (1967) are seminal in this matter. Each is

generally concerned with how egalitarian (or band) societies evolve through

intermediate stages into modern states. I agree with Upham that Service's

band-tribe-chiefdom-state and Fried's egalitarian-ranked-stratified-state

models "do not exist in their entirety in the real world; they are

categorical representations of reality that condense meaningful variability"

(Upham 1990: 89). The fact that these typologies are constructions does

not, however, eliminate their value as analytical tools, as long as we

understand that they have limited explanatory value and do not reflect the

fullness of social reality. The term "state" certainly should not be used

as a predictor of the existence or absence of specific traits associated

with state societies.

It should be emphasized that "egalitarian" societies are by no means

characterized by complete equality but of course are stratified in terms of

authority by age, sex and personal ability (Service 1975: 49). Trigger

reports that in many cases, even economic equality is not achieved within

these societies due to differences in merit and the perceived generosity (or

lack thereof) of individuals (1985: 50). The evolution of political

inequality should therefore not be treated as the origin of this inequality,

which has its basis in nature, but rather, in the true meaning of evolution,

its "unfolding". Likewise, "complex" societies often maintain considerable

vestiges of their earlier egalitarian condition, as evinced by the retention

at least somewhat of kinship and reciprocity as important principles in

states. I am, then, referring only to ideal types in the use of

"egalitarian", "complex" and other such terms, while acknowledging that

real-world societies are always found somewhere on a continuum of

complexity.

Regardless of the existence of broad stage-like categories, the way in

which these categories are related to one another has been fundamentally

misinterpreted. It is customary to imagine a "hierarchy" of political

evolution, with states at the pinnacle, chiefdoms and tribes in the middle

and band societies at the bottom. This pyramidal analogy can be found in

many structural Marxist arguments, such as that of Friedman (1975) and

Kristiansen (1991) which place the state at the centre of a spatial

hierarchy with chiefdoms and tribes on the periphery. It is essential,

however, that we examine the consequences of this geometric-spatial model of

social evolution for the errors of cause and effect which it engenders.

Kristiansen asserts that chiefdoms "are in many cases, perhaps most

cases, a secondary development" and that simpler societies are merely

devolved polities separated by geography or other circumstances from the

states upon which they are dependent" (1991: 27). This argument is wholly

teleological and obscures the processes by which such hierarchies of

societies (which certainly exist in colonial and post-colonial regions) are

formed. How, then, do we explain the existence of chiefdoms in places such

as pre-contact Polynesia, where states were unknown and ties to outside

state structures non-existent? It is extremely arrogant of those in state

societies to assume that merely because they can enforce dependence on

smaller-scale societies that such societies are somehow created by the

spatial relations between core and periphery.(2) Such attitudes also reveal a

hidden bias: that states are somehow the culmination or end-point of

processes of social evolution, and that modern nation-states have somehow

transcended the evolutionary paradigm. It is entirely possible for change

to be directional without being teleological.

I wish to make my point emphatically clear: political systems are not

arranged hierarchically, excepting specific instances where there is a

relationship between a central (core) state and various less complex

polities in the periphery. Gall and Saxe offer the following caution

regarding taxonomic classifications:

Since the taxonomy is concerned with trends of increasing

complexity, we should not assume that this is the only trend in

nature or that it is "progressive" in nature.... Nor does this

taxonomy substitute for an analysis of cultural processes.

Rather it provides a frame for assessing what is there and what

changes have taken place in the relationships between the

variables as it developed and why (1977: 257).

A hierarchy is a real structure, expressing relations of information

exchange and power between real entities. Hierarchical constructions of

evolutionary taxa do not express such relations, but rather describe a

fictitious evolutionary pattern which inevitably leads towards the state.

There always exists a danger that this model will become a straw man by

which some may seek to discredit the notion of the state. We should seek to

express the concept of complexity in quantifiable (if not perfectly so)

terms, before we may continue with the study of social evolution.

How, then, should we describe the directional process of increasing

complexity which characterizes social evolution? The most profitable

course, I think, is to adopt linear models which have descriptive value

based on real-world data such as settlement size, subsistence form and the

presence or absence of political traits. While researcher bias certainly

may influence a measurement for a single society, if trends are visible

throughout many societies, the cross-cultural research will have described

something with at least some basis in social reality. This sort of project

is undertaken by Carneiro (1967) using forty-six randomly selected

societies, in which population size is plotted against the number of

organizational traits present. Indeed, a fairly reliable logarithmic linear

correlation between the two variables exists.

What the sorts of studies that Carneiro and others have done

accomplishes is to establish variation between societies. What it does not

do is establish the variation of this change over time. However, as Jerome

Rousseau notes, "we do know something of archaic relations of production",

and may reasonably assume that hunter-gatherers of today, while certainly

different from archaic ones, possess the same basic subsistence forms and

political traits (Rousseau 1985: 38). We know further that "all primitive

nonegalitarian societies were not primordial, in the sense that they all

were preceded by egalitarian societies" (Khazanov 1985: 94); that is, the

original state of humanity was (relative) egalitarianism, and all non-

egalitarian societies are transformations of earlier egalitarian ones.

These factors, then, form the basis for the claim that societies generally

increase in complexity through time. (3)

However, once we have established the linear model as one based in

factual data rather than speculation and teleology, what do with it? It is

important to realize that we cannot simply read the course of human history

by travelling up our new line of state formation. There are inevitable dips

and gullies in the process of state formation, as cities collapse, chiefdoms

divide, and polities everywhere experience periods of stability with little

structural transformation. We must be cautious, recognizing that a

descriptive model can do nothing for our understanding of process and

causation until we examine the specific histories of state societies.

However, this caution has not been heeded by all scholars. One of the

most egregious conclusions reached by those scholars who place descriptive

characteristics of states above the factors causing them is that of

Carneiro. Carneiro notes that the number of autonomous political entities

extant in the world has declined steadily from the beginning of humanity to

the present, and that as the number of states grows smaller, their size

grows larger - fair enough, so far. He then asserts that the curve of

declining polities leads inevitably to one conclusion: the emergence of a

world state (Carneiro 1978: 222). To do so, he invokes the principle of

competitive exclusion, an idea borrowed from biological evolution which

states that two species cannot coexist using the same niche indefinitely,

and one will eventually prevail, forcing the other to evolve or die out

(Carneiro 1978: 221).

Carneiro's contention that there is an inevitable decline in the

number of political groups requires that one accept that independent

aggregates existing in pre- and proto-human periods were also "political

groups". Otherwise, one would have to acknowledge that there was a time in

human history when there were no political groupings at all, followed by an

increase, which produces a curve rather unlike Carneiro's. Taken to its

extreme, all biological populations are in fact autonomous political groups

in Carneiro's sense of the term. We must also consider whether the

conditions of harsh competition and warfare required for this model actually

existed. Furthermore, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that the

world state is an inevitable result. Carneiro here confuses directionality

with teleology, a similar error to the pyramidal fallacy of the state

described above, when it is entirely unknown where the curve of autonomous

polities might be leading. We cannot predict "where" social evolution may

be going, simply because it is not "going" anywhere at all, but rather

processes acting at the present act to shape the future without any inherent

goal or end point.

The conclusion which we must draw from this analysis is clear. The

pyramid must be toppled, not only because it presents a misguided geometry

of political systems, but also because this analogy has resulted in the

rejection of social evolution entirely as a legitimate process. Yet the

limitations of the linear model of evolution must also be recognized. There

is surely a trend towards increasing complexity among societies over time;

however, due to the vagaries of societal collapse and stagnation, we cannot

clearly place the descriptive template of settlement size and political

differentiation atop the overall causal scheme of political evolution.

There is the ever-present danger that, as Carneiro and others have done, we

will extend the general evolutionary curves into predictive and explanatory

models which ignore or devalue process. What, then, can be done to

establish the process by which this evolution occurs?

IV. Illusory Force: Processes and Causes of State Formation

Evolution is not a force but a process, not a cause but a law.

John, Viscount Morley of Blackburn (1838-1923)

The linear model of state formation which I have presented suffers

from a further defect of great consequence, hopefully not a fatal one.

While the linear model has descriptive value, it has little or no

explanatory value. Merely establishing that the Chinese state has greater

differentiation among its political officials than do !Kung San bands tells

us nothing as to what causal factor or factors led to Chinese society being

as complex as it is. It also cannot explain why the !Kung San did not

develop inequality to the same degree. Although many scholars from

different fields have tried to explore the mechanisms of state formation, no

synthesis has been reached, as many of these models are purely speculative

and have no basis in ethnographic data. This flaw cannot be easily

addressed using synchronic ethnographic studies, but must be examined in

light of historical and archaeological data.

The question of evolutionary mechanism is central to social

evolutionary theory. On the one hand, biological models of adaptation have

been introduced in many forms to explain how each stage of political

evolution is "selected for" by virtue of their adaptive advantages. On the

other, we have materialist arguments from both cultural ecologists and some

Marxists which see the alteration of political structures as a response to

environmental conditions or to the mode of production of the society. Both

of these arguments have a certain amount of merit; selection of some sort

obviously occurs among societies, while material conditions undoubtedly

influence the emergence of states due to their centrality for human

existence. While certainly these arguments have lost much of their

explanatory force as universal predictors, it would be erroneous to assume

that they are no longer advocated. Indeed, due to the relative parsimony of

biological and "crude" materialist arguments, they retain a degree of

respectability as theories of state formation that I do not feel is

warranted.

Attempts by evolutionary biologists to explain the emergence of the

state have used the term "evolution" in a purely reductionist sense of an

increase in adaptive fitness in a particular environment. Jack Hill, a

parasitologist, suggests that it is a given that human beings will

inevitably seek greater prestige for the reproductive advantage it will give

them. States, then, are the culmination of a never-ending quest for greater

and greater prestige in order to have more offspring (Hill 1994: 224).

Hill's analysis, however, is wholly teleological as it assumes that the end

result (the state) is "adaptive" and then determines why it might be

adaptive for people to seek out this adaptive state.

Why, for instance, do states not evolve among chimpanzees, since it is

also true that the great apes have dominance hierarchies that give them

greater reproductive success? Have hunter-gatherers such as the !Kung San

somehow missed out on the opportunity to gain reproductive success by not

evolving to a "state" level of organization? While Hill is certainly right

that a desire for power and prestige is an essential part of any leader

assuming command of a group, any increase in reproductive fitness in the

leader would necessarily be offset by the loss in reproductive success of

the underlings. In fact, why would close-knit bands of kin have any

competition for prestige at all, since one would be reducing one's inclusive

fitness by competing with close kin?

Hill does not account for the acceptance of the non-prestigious of the

laws and ordinances of those who gain prestige -why would one not simply

leave, or eliminate one's leader, or use other means to reduce the resultant

inequalities? He must assume that all states evolved in highly

circumscribed environments with strong competition for prestige, a situation

for which he provides no evidence. The final blow to Hill's argument

derives from the fact that in hunter-gatherer bands stratified by age and

sex, and thus young men know that they have only to wait for a few years

until their status rises, along with their reproductive success. There is

no reason to overthrow the leadership in such a stable situation, and there

is no evidence that this is how social evolution actually occurred. While

there are certain correlations between the acquisition of power and the

continuation of one's line, Hill has reduced a complex situation to such a

ridiculous degree that his argument has no merit whatsoever.

Roger Masters equates political evolution with game theory in

evolutionary biology, specifically the classic Prisoner's Dilemma. Masters

contends that the inevitable result of individual rational choices would be

some sort of "social contract" in which it is "natural" that the benefits of

law and government outweigh its costs (Masters 1982: 446-447). His sources

on state origins are those of Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, without

consideration of the anthropological evidence which suggests that the

"social contract" is an illusion of Western philosophers rather than a real

phenomenon. Masters' contention that the state is caused when equals gather

together to determine codes of proper or "altruistic" conduct supposes that

this "natural state of equality" existed (Masters 1982: 442), while I have

suggested above that it did not. This analysis falls prey to the same sort

of fault as Hill's, in that it may explain something about human sociality

but that it fails to consider the non-emergence of states as an equally

relevant fact as their actual formation. It is clear that while there may

be correlations between state formation and biological adaptive advantages,

evolutionary biologists have failed completely to produce adequate causal

agents for political evolution.

Having explored the ridiculous arguments from the biologists, let us

turn now to the materialists, whose arguments regarding state formation can

be separated roughly into two distinct groups. The first, Marxist and neo-

Marxist scholars, argue that material conditions and the mode of production

of a society are essential in transforming its political structures and

ideological behaviour. The other, called by some "vulgar Marxists", are

cultural ecologists who argue that a society's environmental conditions are

the primary determinants of its social structure and evolution. While both

of these arguments fail, they fail for different reasons, as I will detail

below.

Marxist arguments on state formation no longer rely extensively on the

writings of Marx himself; certainly, few would be found who still argue that

all societies must pass through a capitalist phase before reaching "the end

of history" with the advent of communism. Charles Maisels, a neo-Marxist,

rejects the notion that there is one universal line of evolution. Instead,

he argues that there are at least two divergent lines: one, that of east

Asia and the Andes, leading to the so-called "Asiatic" mode of production,

and the other, found in Mesopotamia, leading to a "city-state" system of

urban centers (1987: 331). The Marxist line of thought regarding state

formation generally requires the conversion of human beings and their

labour-products into use by wealthy elites (see Tosi 1976). As such, it is

a "coercion" theory which has as its primary mechanism the interaction of

material and human factors.

Marxists have certainly come farther than many in their emphasis on

historical processes and structural and ideological change in societies.

However, many Marxist scholars still have a tendency to see state formation

according to an orthodox Marxist scheme for which there is little evidence. (4)

For instance, Patterson's description of the "pre-capitalist" Inca state

requires that one accept that "capitalism" is the inevitable successor to

whatever sort of "pre-capitalism" existed among the Inca (Patterson 1991).

I believe this to be entirely unsupported. Furthermore, the direct

translation of material conditions into ideology seems overly simplified;

while certainly one's subsistence method and production relations influence

one's way of thought, the notion that they are thereby determined seems a

bit far-fetched.

Many cultural ecologists have been centrally concerned with the

evolution of states, arguing that the primary mechanisms of cultural

evolution and the creation of states derive from the physical environment.

Heirs to the legacy of White and Steward, ecological models are not

necessarily deterministic, and are often quite refined with regards to the

interplay of cultural and material factors. Carneiro's argument that state

formation can only occur in highly circumscribed physical environments is of

this sort, as it recognizes that there is always the possibility that

"social circumscription" by other human populations may have the same effect

(Carneiro 1970: 737). Few scholars would now argue for a direct translation

of ecological circumstances into political expansion or contraction

(however, see Harris 1977). Terry Rambo, a cultural ecologist, presents his

case eloquently:

To a considerable extent, we have moved beyond use of gross

environmental variables (e.g. rain forests, deserts) into making

of quite fine-grained descriptions of the specific local

habitats within which specific cultural groups are functioning

(Rambo 1991: 92).

Environmental and ecological factors are such persuasive candidates

for "prime mover" status simply because they are so clearly related to means

of subsistence. The development of agriculture is surely the key to the

production of surplus, which is a necessary condition if a society is to

have non-producers among its leaders. However, most ecologists know very

well that agriculture is not adopted in many places where a surplus might be

produced, simply because of the intensive labour required (see Boserup

1965). We also need to explain, then, why states did not form in every

place where the environment was suitable; to do so, we must regard

environmental factors as necessary but insufficient conditions, as with so

many other factors. While ecologists have gone beyond the Marxists in

recognizing that societies are not simply material conditions writ large,

Marxist thought is much more amenable to the sort of historical thinking

which I feel is essential in order to understand the interaction of

variables in social systems.

We have seen that the evolution of the state has very different

features from evolution in nature. It should also be evident that states do

not represent crude transformations of material and ecological conditions,

as advocated by some cultural ecologists and Marxists. Nevertheless, it is

clear that societies represent systems of some sort, and are not merely

agglomerations of individuals even in the most undifferentiated of peoples.

By "system" I mean only any organized assembly of inter-related components,

and as such many types of systems (mechanical, organic, astrophysical,

social, etc.) can be identified. A key insight which is raised by Walter

Buckley is that a system "is not to be confused with the structure or

organization its components may take on at any particular time" (1967: 5,

italics in original). It may thus be said that while there are evolutionary

systems or social systems, there are only state structures which are the

physical manifestations of a social system at any given time.

Lest the reader think I am advocating some sort of metaphysical force

behind such systems, I must emphasize that systems are entirely the result

of human actions, the natural and constructed environment and the

interaction of the two. Nevertheless, the consequences of systems and the

structures they produce are often indifferent to or even contradictory to

the desires of their human components. Anyone who has ever invested in the

stock market is well aware that it is a system in which each actor desires

financial gain, and yet often the market can crash, causing financial harm

to all individuals concerned. Most social systems are, of course, far more

complex and cannot be so easily described. It is the job of the systems

theorist to explain how human actors and actions and the physical

environment are the sole causal agents which result in the creation of state

structures.

An important (and much misused) concept in systems theory is that of

feedback, of which positive (deviation-enhancing) and negative (deviation-

reducing) are the two forms. Buckley notes that feedback should not be

"equated simply with any reciprocal interaction between variables" (1967:

52). The classic example of negative feedback is a thermostat; when a

change to the initial condition of the system occurs (increase or decrease

in temperature), the system is sensitive to the change and responds by

reducing the deviation (either by sending a signal to introduce more heat or

by sending another signal to turn the heat off). To witness positive

feedback in action, the stock market example above is instructive. As soon

as any slight decrease occurs in a stock or a negative circumstance arises,

the system's sensors (human actors) react by attempting to sell the stock

before a more drastic decrease occurs. Since the market then has less

demand than supply, the overall effect (feedback response) is an increased

rate of decline. In the case of state formation and social evolution, it is

positive feedback with which we are most concerned, although negative

feedback and homeostasis are important and ongoing processes which

maintain stability in all societies, whether or not they are states.

Perhaps the most influential systems theorist working within a

cultural evolutionary framework has been Kent Flannery (Flannery 1972).

Flannery suggests that cultural evolution is most adequately explained

"multivariant causality" in which various factors are interrelated in a

complex of feedback loops, causal chains and other relationships (Flannery

1972: 423-424). By rejecting "prime movers" such as population pressure or

warfare, without denying the importance of such factors, multivariant

causality allows that these factors may operate in different directions, and

that each social system is unique. One may debate the value or existence of

Flannery's "generative rules" of the state as too simplistic or incomplete

scenarios. However, this objection does not require the rejection of the

theory, but rather careful research to test its validity.

Systems theory has been used with moderate success to analyze

instances of state formation among archaic civilizations which are known

archaeologically. Examining evidence in southwest Iran from Mesopotamian

sites, Wright and Johnson conclude that "only multiple variable changes"

could produce vast shifts in the political economy and exchange networks

present (1975: 284). The shift towards greater political centralization and

the loss of autonomy among smaller centres may have overloaded the existing

system's capability to process information, leading to the creation of

hierarchies to govern the new system. While Wright and Johnson admit that

their research is unsuccessful in that it is unable to answer what specific

causal factors led to the creation of centralized redistributive centres,

they offer a model which can be tested in order to explain specific

instances of state formation.

J. Stephen Athens attempts to criticize the systems approach of

Flannery, Wright and Johnson, arguing instead from an ecological perspective

that "an understanding of the evolution of complex social systems can only

proceed through an examination of factors relating to the stability of

agricultural production and the use of relevant variable dimensions of

analysis" (1977: 377). He claims that system theories "are unsuccessful

because they cannot predict state formation" (Athens 1977: 360). Certainly,

no one has ever claimed the usefulness of any model, including that of

systems theory, to predict when state formation will occur. Athens,

however, assumes that a theory which successfully addresses the question of

causation will be fully equipped for prediction. By arguing that any

successful theory of state formation should be universally applicable,

Athens forces himself into a position where he must reject any theory such

as systems theory which postulates that many possible evolutionary

trajectories can lead to the formation of similar structures. His argument

that multivariant causation is unfounded is therefore a highly tautologous

one.

Systems theorists have a response to Athens' qualms regarding

causation in the concept of equifinality. This is defined by Buckley as the

principle that a final condition of a system may be achieved by any number

of developmental routes (Buckley 1967: 60). To attempt to separate out

distinct causes, or even to emphasize one as primary, may not be useful

because the result is unknown until it emerges. The "final" result of the

interplay of factors is not merely the cumulation of causes to produce an

effect, but a process of interaction and amplification. It is thus not

possible to predict the emergence of the state with any regularity, or to

separate causes from their end result. Given that the evidence regarding

state formation suggests that there is no single factor that is sufficient,

and that even the necessity of many factors can be debated, it seems

reasonable to see whether different equifinal models of state formation can

be created.

A word of caution is necessary before continuing. Systems theory as a

model creates testable hypotheses, not complete accounts of incidences of

state formation. It should be acknowledged that these are not mechanical,

electronic or organic systems, but human creations, subject to the vagaries

of human existence and random chance. We must recognize that something as

simple as the untimely death of one's leader can have profound

consequences on history (as it did on the Mongol hordes), and there is nothing

like a hurricane to crush an incipient rebellion and unite individuals in a

rebuilding effort. Charles Spencer discusses the effect of the eruption of

the volcano Xitle as a precipitating event for the conquest of Cuicuilco by

the early Mesoamerican state of Teotihuacan (Spencer 1990: 22). As noted

above, the consequence of this randomizing factor is that we never know

exactly what parts of the system have priority in a given society, rendering

prediction impossible. And in no way do I mean to imply that because a

system is stable (has achieved equilibrium or homeostasis) that it is

"adaptive", to use a much-misused term. As Rappaport notes, "Social systems

... can make mistakes of which biological systems may be incapable"

(Rappaport 1977: 51). Still, recognizing this fact, we should proceed with

the knowledge that even an imperfect system is not a random aggregate, but a

structured grouping.

V. Illusory Universality: Systems and History

History abhors determinism but cannot tolerate chance.

Bernard de Voto (1897-1955)

I have placed myself thus far in the "systems theory" camp of

evolutionary explanation. However, I feel that this is a necessary but

insufficient means of depicting social evolution. After all, the day after

the stock market crashes, life goes on, and the rules of the game are the

same. Yet when societies evolve, they often undergo fundamental structural

change. I now intend to come to some sort of analysis regarding the changes

of such structures over time: in short, to indicate and explore the

fundamentally historical nature of social systems.

I have, so far, rejected any of the claims of evolutionary biology as

to its applicability to processes of state formation. However, there is one

respect in which the two types of systems, social and biological, are

clearly similar and in which a useful analogy can be drawn. It is self-

evident that all evolutionary processes are essentially historical processes

which do not operate in some sort of vacuum. There has been a recent

movement among some evolutionists to modify the Darwinian paradigm of

evolutionary biologists, in recognition of the historical constraints which

limit the variation which can exist within populations. At the forefront of

this movement is Harvard biologist Stephen Jay Gould, whose works The

Panda's Thumb and Bully for Brontosaurus suggest that neither biological nor

cultural evolution can be understood in ahistorical terms (Gould 1980).

This principle of historical constraint aids in explaining why humans have

four limbs rather than some other number. Since humans' evolutionary

predecessors - fish, reptiles and other mammals - all had four limbs, it is

not possible for that trait to have been selected against, since no better

variation existed within those species (and even if one evolved as a

mutation, it would almost certainly be non-adaptive).

Indeed, just as the panda cannot simply evolve a thumb out of nowhere,

but must rely on existing morphological traits in order to produce an

adaptive advantage, Gould asserts that cultural evolution may operate

according to similar historical principles. He cites the example of the

retention of the suboptimal QWERTY keyboard as a historical quirk which is

now retained because of the incredible inertia that would have to be

overcome in order to change to a better system (Gould 1992: 71-72). While,

by his own admission, Gould's perspective on cultural evolution is that of

an interested amateur, there has been little consideration given to these

sorts of constraints among most social evolutionists, other than vague

statements to the effect that "of course, there are some historical

particularities in such-and-such society". Consequently, these

particularities are usually dismissed as being of little importance.

However, I see no reason to make such a broad assumption, and, indeed, many

scholars have begun to consider issues of historical constraints when

examining the evolution of particular societies.

A recent paper by William Keegan and Morgan Maclachlan, whose

ethnohistorical and archaeological analysis of the Bahamas traces the

evolution of Taino avunculocal chiefdoms, suggests ways in which political

evolution might be given its proper historical context. They assert that

the traditional (initial condition) of Taino matrilineality, bolstered by

the emergence of avunculocal residence due to internal warfare, led to

structural changes and a shift towards greater political differentiation

(Keegan and Maclachlan 1989: 620). One consequence of this change was a

shift in settlement pattern towards settlement clusters and larger towns,

"resulting from a male's desire to participate in his own lineage while

resident with his wife's" (Keegan and Maclachlan 1989: 624). With larger

population units came the inevitable need for co-ordination and conflict

resolution through the power of a chief. Environmental factors must also

have played a major role in Taino evolution. Keegan and Maclachlan remark

that avunculocal chiefdoms are always found in highly circumscribed

environments such as the Bahamas because they entail a great deal of

internal conflict that can only be resolved upon the emergence of one

dominant clan in order to produce stability (1989: 622). Finally,

technological changes such as the advent of large ocean-going canoes for

trade further bolstered the need for leadership and co-ordination among the

Taino in order to marshal resources (Keegan and Maclachlan 1989: 626).

We see in the emergence of Taino chiefdoms that (at least) four

distinct elements of the society - residence pattern, kinship structure,

physical environment and technology - act in combination to create a system

by which political evolution is the favoured or "natural" outcome. It would

be nave to regard any one of these as a "prime mover". The removal or

alteration of any one of those factors would have altered the evolution of

Taino political centralization, perhaps even halting it. It is quite

probable that if there had not been a great deal of initial conflict due to

the circumscribed environment, that disaffected Taino clans could depart the

region. It is equally likely that without the initial condition of

matrilineality, the men of the clans would have no reason to desire

clustered settlement patterns. We must also consider that, as this is a

historical system: what happens once political evolution occurs? The new

"initial conditions" are not only matriliny and warfare, but the presence of

canoes, long-distance exchange and chiefs. If the new technology is used to

migrate, thus removing the factor of environmental circumscription, will the

chiefs lose their power? My point is not to describe "what if" (for we

certainly cannot use a systems model for prediction) but to explain "what

for" and "from what" certain institutions developed, and to understand the

processes by which this might occur.

I will turn now to an examination of the consequences of a historical

perspective on social evolution to one of the key problems in the study of

state formation: the distinction between primary (or pristine) and secondary

states. Most authors make a strong distinction between the two types of

state. Jonathan Haas claims that in every known ethnographic case of state

formation, the situation has been "contaminated" by the presence of outside

complex societies (Haas 1982: 51). Anatolii Khazanov notes that "the states

founded as a consequence of the expansion or colonial policies of more

developed states - which hence represented a kind of secondary developed

states - were definitely not early ones, even at the time of their origin"

(Khazanov 1978: 79). Jerome Rousseau, in discussing the prerequisites of

inequality, asserts that "societies transformed by more developed modes of

production (and this applies eminently to the colonial situation) cannot be

expected to follow this sequence" (1985: 45).

One would certainly have to concede that the distinction between

primary and secondary states is a meaningful one at least with regards to

its basic definition. There is no apparent reason, however, to sharply

divide episodes of state formation on these lines any more than along the

axis of circumscribed vs. non-circumscribed states, or distinguishing the

presence or absence of long-distance trade. Two reasons come to mind

immediately as to why the primary-secondary distinction might come to assume

a logically prior position in the description of states. Firstly, many

early researchers were seeking "prime movers" rather than considering a

multivariant scheme. An inevitable consequence of this quest would be that

secondary states had to be relegated to "impure" status in order to study

the single cause which resulted in primary state formation. Inevitably,

cultural diffusionism came to be looked down upon as a secondary process,

unworthy of study. A second reason might be cultural arrogance; we do not,

for instance, often think of Anglo-Saxon state formation as a secondary

process, or somehow "contaminated". Just because the processes of state

formation among the Iroquois or the Zulus were relatively recent does not

deny their validity.

An important issue which most scholars have not raised is why, given

contact between large centralized states and smaller, non-state societies,

certain societies developed into states and others did not. Why did the

Zulus and Polynesians respond as they did, by evolving centralized political

institutions of their own? Why did other societies such as the Iroquois,

who were at the same "level" of evolution as the first two, not do so until

much later? And why did other areas, such as the Pacific Northwest, not

evolve states at all? It seems ridiculous to claim that all instances where

diffusion occurred should fall under the rubric of "secondary states". The

number of truly "pristine" formations is very small, perhaps as low as two

(see Wright and Johnson 1975). Why, then, do we insist on making much ado

about nothing by continuing to ignore the processes of state formation right

on our historical doorstep?

It is already very well-known among anthropologists that various

institutions and structures may take different forms when imposed on or

borrowed by societies to which those institutions are not native. Alan

Macfarlane discusses capitalist economics as a cultural creation of the

West, specifically England, in The Culture of Capitalism (Macfarlane 1992).

The creation of pseudo-Christian cargo cults in New Guinea is well-

documented, as are various forms of syncretic religion which derive from

contact between organized religions and the religious beliefs and traditions

of conquered and colonized peoples. There is no reason, then, other than

blind insistence on the existence of "pure" political forms, to argue that

the diffusion and/or imposition of state structures occurred in a pure, non-

contested form.

The position taken by Barbara Price regarding secondary state

formation is quite close to my own. Price argues that secondary state

formation depends on a dialectic approach in which the relationship is not

simply one of the more complex society "imposing" the state upon the

simpler, but upon careful consideration of the conditions of both the state

and the non-state society, and the degree of contact between the two (Price

1978). However, where Price and I diverge is in her materialist assertion

that it is the amount of energy use of each society alone which determines

the resultant secondary state structure. For reasons I will detail below, I

believe that the situation in many secondary states is far more complex than

the expression of material factors. I will do so by considering two cases:

the Iroquois of the Great Lakes region of North America, and the Zulu of

southeastern Africa.

The evolution (or, more accurately, the homeostasis) of the Iroquois

has been well-documented by Bruce Trigger in a manner generally consistent

with a systems-information theory perspective. He notes that immediately

prior to and at the time of contact with Europeans, Iroquois society

possessed many of the necessary conditions for statehood: a great potential

for agricultural surplus production, the presence of warfare, long-distance

trade with and borrowing from more complex Mississippian peoples, and

concentrated villages under the control of chiefs (Trigger 1990: 124-127).

However, despite material conditions and stresses similar to those creating

states elsewhere, Iroquois society did not become significantly

differentiated during this period. Trigger attributes the non-emergence of

state structures to a concerted effort to maintain social equality through

censure of those seeking political gain, and through rewarding generosity

(1990: 136). The fact that "[t]he material benefits of chiefly office were

more than counter-balanced by its expenses" which included dispensing goods

ensured that those seeking political gain were discouraged from doing so

(Trigger 1990: 133). Only much later, when colonial rule was at its height

and the Iroquois found themselves under more circumscribed conditions and

engaged in large-scale wars, did state formation occur.(5)

From a systems perspective, it is evident that many factors ensured

homeostasis in the resultant political structure by means of negative

feedback. Trigger thus concludes that egalitarianism is not merely a

"default" option for societies, but must be explained, just as the creation

of states which result from the uncoupling or dissolution of such factors

require analysis (1990: 145). The example of the Iroquois is also

instructive in that ideological and cultural factors, presumably retained

from an earlier period, take precedence over material and ecological factors

which provide impetus towards social inequality into the system. It is

evident, then, that human social systems are not merely slaves to their

environment but have the potential to organize themselves along a variety of

ideological principles which help in determining the course of social

change.

In the case of Zulu state formation, a "successful" instance (meaning

only that a state was actually formed), the situation is quite different,

and yet the systemic principles involved are very much the same. Service

discusses the Zulu case briefly, noting that the personal traits of its

first ruler, Shaka Zulu, were of secondary importance to the more gradual

transformations in the politico-legal system (1975: 116). Stuart Romm, a

political scientist, re-examines the Zulu data in a systems-oriented light,

tracking the responses of various actors to changing military and political

conditions, culminating in the end of homeostasis and the formation of the

Zulu state. He argues that the eventual stabilization of Zulu rule under

Mpande, its third king, was a result of his willingness to compromise with

traditional chiefs, whereas his predecessors required brutal force and

coercion to maintain their positions (Romm 1986: 637).

The fundamental difference between the Iroquois and Zulu situation can

be equated directly with the question of positive and negative feedback.

Romm argues forcefully that pre-state polities "will be most subject to

these disequilibrating tendencies when economic, social, and military

conditions are such that actors of this nature are able to attract followers

and mobilize resources" (1986: 611). Since the Zulu kings Shaka, Dingane

and Mpande were able to revise the traditional chiefly ideologies in order

to gain power, the constraints on state formation were removed. The two

factors of personal military might and ideological considerations,

previously holding each other in check, become coupled and positive feedback

is the result. The conclusion that Romm reaches is inevitable: "one cannot

have 'just a little' sociopolitical change" (1986: 641). Of course, not all

instances of state formation are as rapid as the Zulu case, which was

hastened by other factors such as the British and Boer colonizers.

Although both the Iroquois and Zulu cases of political evolution (or

its absence) are "secondary" formations, both show the remarkable properties

of systems in the same way as detailed by systems theorists such as

Flannery. Furthermore, with the cumbersome requirement of a single prime

mover discarded, it is possible to re-integrate diffusion as a legitimate

source of cultural evolution. My proposition, therefore, is this: The

distinction between primary and secondary states, if it is to be retained,

must be reduced in importance and its weight considered in all cases of

state formation. In systemic terms, diffusion from states or responses to

contact with states provide impetus for structural change to the initial

conditions of the system. Whether there is positive feedback (probably

leading to a state) or negative feedback (inertial forces preventing state

formation) depends on the initial system under consideration, the nature and

degree of unbalancing forces, and the interaction of the two. The

structural change which occurs may then be considered a new set of "initial

conditions" so to speak, upon which the evolutionary process may work.(6)

VI. Conclusion: Implications for Future State Research

Time is a sort of river of passing events, and strong is

the current; no sooner is a thing brought to sight than it is

swept by and another takes its place, and this too will be swept

away.

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations IV, 43

Throughout this paper, I have traced the construction of four

fundamental illusions regarding state formation. I have also, I hope, shown

that despite these illusions, there is a process of social evolution which

exists at the core of them all. If I have succeeded, the illusions should

be stripped away, bringing us closer to an understanding of the processes

that have constrained and governed the evolution of all societies, and which

still continue to act upon them today. It would, of course be overly

arrogant to claim that I have not at the same time constructed my own

illusions; much work needs to be done before state formation can be

resuscitated from its dormant state.

I have indicated that the fundamental complexity of all political

systems prohibits their reduction to a small number of categories in which

one or a few scenarios lead to the development of the state as the

"pinnacle" of human political evolution. Instead, we should recognize that

the same processes that occurred in the past continue to operate now, both

upon small-scale and industrial states, albeit in a greatly modified form.

Is it possible that we will someday refer to the state as just one of many

stages in the evolution of societies? The question of what such a future

"post-state" might look like is one for the astrologer, not the

anthropologist. Nevertheless, Western societies should recognize that they

too are embedded in these historical processes.

I am certainly not the first to suggest that all universal models of

state formation are grossly oversimplified; most scholars, I suspect, regard

this sort of theoretical simplicity as wrong. Nevertheless, the trend among

some scholars to consider only what can be found in the archaeological

record as potential causes has led to a sort of "methodological"

simplification that I contend is entirely unnecessary. Rather than

searching for "pure" or "pristine" states in the earth, I offer that it may

be equally profitable (albeit in a different manner) to study the "messy"

states of the historical and ethnographic record. While the situation

thereby becomes muddled with regards to state formation, we should avoid

oversimplifying a topic simply due to an outdated notion of the purity of

earlier times. Historical events, "Great Men" (and Great Women), kinship

structures, and other elements may all have played important roles in

determining the course of any particular society's political evolution. If

we are to reject any of these, it should not be because we cannot find them

in the earth but because we cannot find room for them in our model of state

formation.

It may be that ethnographic study of modern states is no longer a

viable alternative to archaeology, inasmuch as all human social systems are

now under the control of Western-style state structures. However, it is

inevitable, insofar as archaeologists recognize prehistoric states as human

systems, that some degree of analogy will always be required between living

human societies and the archaeological record. In this respect, I am in

agreement with Gledhill (1988: 24), who asserts that the problems inherent

in creating such comparisons "may not preclude archaeologists from

continuing to draw insights about process from ethnographic and

ethnohistorical cases, if we handle such analogies with greater care". I

would go further and suggest that the invisibility of certain elements in

the archaeological record has caused their role in societies to be

overlooked, emphasizing instead what has survived the tests of time. If

this is the case, then it is essential that we examine modern societies of

all degrees of political complexity in an attempt to create meaningful

dialogue between the sub-disciplines of archaeology and ethnology on the

nature of the state.

While there have certainly been many errors committed by early state

theorists, many of these do not pose insurmountable barriers to the

discernment of patterns of long-term directional social change. We must

gain a clearer understanding, not only of the descriptive characteristics of

complex polities, but also of the interrelated causal factors - ecology,

warfare, trade, ritual, kinship, cultural diffusion, personal achievement,

and others - which lead to their creation. Anthropologists should come to

recognize the systemic features of societies so that the process of their

evolution can be understood more fully. Above all, however, human systems

must be recognized as historical systems, in which the initial conditions of

the system play a key role in constraining its structural change. We must

cease our search for the "pristine" or "pure" state of the past, which

probably never existed, and look at the real examples around us. It is

essential to examine societies of particular examples of these constraints

in action, so that we may not fall off the thin ledge between excessive

particularism and radical determinism. Rather than rejecting the

evolutionary paradigm altogether, a critical examination of its failures and

shortcomings can thus lead to a greater understanding of its relevance for

contemporary theory.

Notes

(1) Unlike Service (1975: 23), I do not regard Machiavelli

solely as an early "coercion theorist", for he does recognize

the need for the prince to have the consent of his subjects in

many circumstances.

(2) Such insistence on the creation of state "templates" which

are imposed upon and eliminate earlier settlement patterns has

been successfully refuted by Nocete (1994) with regards to

locational analysis such as Central Place Theory.

(3) Of course, social evolution in no way negates the

possibility of no change in complexity - "stagnation", for lack

of a better term, or societal collapse or "devolution". As I

show later, these instances are useful in the study of the

evolutionary process and, in fact, the exceptions prove the

rule that societies tend to increase in complexity.

(4) I do not include the "structural Marxists" such as

Friedman and Godelier in this camp, for many scholars

influenced by Marxist thought emphasize material factors along

with ideological and cultural factors in state formation.

(5) This occurrence would be an instance of negative feedback,

since the newly introduced structure would tend to reduce the

deviation caused by the initial condition of circumscription.

(6) The reader may note certain similarities between this

approach and the Hegelian dialectic (thesis + antithesis =

synthesis), with each instance of change producing a new set of

initial conditions.

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