agrawal. state formation

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State Formation in Community Spaces? Decentralization of Control over Forests in the KumaonHimalaya, IndiaAuthor(s): Arun Agrawal

Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Feb., 2001), pp. 9-40Published by: Association for Asian StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2659503Accessed: 18-04-2015 22:15 UTC

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2/33

StateFormationn Community

Spaces?Decentralization f

Control

verForests

n

the

Kumaon

Himalaya, ndia

ARUN AGRAWAL

To reflectponhistorys also, nextricably,o reflect

ponpower.

Guy

Debord

[196731994)

In

the early artof thiscentury, 916 and 1921 were specially ryyearsn the

Kumaon

region

f

the

ndian

Himalaya.

n

each

of

these

years,

orest

ires

acked

he

countryside,urning eyond

he

power

of the colonialBritish

overnment

o

control

or

extinguish.

t was

not ust

the

dryweather

hat

was

to

blame.Villagers

n

Kumaon

set

the

forest

n

fire;

the

dry

weather

merely helped

their efforts

long.

The

containment f this "planned incendiarism"was one of the main planks of the

scientific

orestry

hat the colonial state' had

begun

to

introduce

n

the hills

in

the

lastquarter f the nineteenthentury,

nd

especially

rom round

1910.2

For

the

hill

residents ho relied n

a

mixture

f

ivestock earing nd agriculture,

and for

many

of

whom

fire

ncouraged

he

production

f

fresh

rasses, overnment

attempts oprevent iring erealways

o

remain

"source

f

complaint" Smythies

Arun Agrawal [email protected])s AssociateProfessor f

Political Science t Yale

University.

I

would like

to

acknowledge he thoughtful omments f

Bina

Agrawal, haradChari,

Michael Dove, Rebecca Hardin, Robert Harms, Donald Moore, Hugh Raffles, jay Skaria,

and twoanonymous eviewers. havealso benefited reatly romssues

raisedby participants

in

the Environmental olitics Seminar

t the

University

f

California, erkeley

nd in the

Agrarian tudies Colloquium Series t Yale University. he fieldresearch

or he paper was

conducted

sing

research undsmade available

by

the

Tropical

Conservationnd

Development

Program t the University f Florida and

the

Worldwide Fund

for

Nature.

Grant

#SBR

9905443 from heNationalScienceFoundation nd Grant#96-42825-WER from he Mac-

Arthur oundation unded art of the time spentwriting he paper.

'Later n thepaper, will find eason o examinebrieflyhe notion f"the colonial tate,"

at least in

relation

o

interdepartmentalivalrieswithin

he

state,but

for

he moment use

thephrasewithout

n

indication f tsfraught ature. ome recentwritings ave lso examined

issues of periodization nd internal ivision n relation o the colonial state n the Indian

Himalaya Rangan 2000; Saberwal 000).

2Twoother lements hat heForestDepartment aw as crucial n itsattempts o nscribe

scientific

orestry

n

Kumaon were

a) prevention

f

grazing,

nd

(b) stoppingvillagers

rom

lopping

trees or odder r

fuelwood.

TheJournal fAsianStudies 0, no.

1

(February 001):9-40.

(C

2001

by

the Association orAsian

Studies,

nc.

9

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/33

10 ARUN AGRAWAL

1911, 59).

In

1916 close to 200,000 acresof forest

n

Kumaon

Circlewereburntn

441 separate ires, nd 282

of thesewere counted s intentional.3o "voice" their

socialprotest, illagersetfiregainandagain nsomeplaces. nAiradeo, or xample,

fires ontinued

or

hree aysand

two

nights,

nd

"new

fireswere tarted ime after

time, directly counter-firing

ine was successfullyompleted"

Champion 1919,

358).

For

1921

the relevant igures

re

even higher. he areaof forests

hat

was

fired

roseto 272,000 acres.Of the 819 offenceshatweredetected,

95 wereknown o be

incendiaryGuha 1989, 52,

107, 116).

These were just the fire-relatedffences. he total

numberof forest-related

infractions

n

Kumaon was

farhigher.The new regulationsntroduced nder the

auspices of

the colonial

government,

nd

designedand implemented y its Forest

Department,made llegala range fwhatmightbe called customary

ses offorests.4

The protests hatensued signaledhow important orests ere n the hill economy.

The role of forests

n

the economy

ontinues ven today

to be significant. espite

better

transport, igh

levels

of

emigration,

nd

increasing

market

pressures,

significantroportion

fvillagers' eedsfor odder, uelwood,ubsistence imber,

nd

some medicines s met from

urrounding

orests.5

n

the

earlypart

of the

century,

villagers

must

have

depended

n

forestso an even

greater

xtent.

t

is not

surprising

that

when

ome ofthese

veryday

ivelihood ctivitieswererenderedllegalas

a

result

of

new laws,

ruralresidents rticulated

heir

unwillingness

o

accept

the draconian

laws

in

forms

hat

rangedfrom

he

strikingly isible,

as in

fires, o the far

more

difficulto detect, uch as continued

se offodder nd firewood.

The enforcement achinery

f the

state, nstitutionalized

n

the shape of the

Forest Department, etected

a huge numberof breachesof forest aw. Figure

1

graphically epicts

he nformation

or

ome of the

earlyyears

f

the century.

n this

same

period,

the

number

of

people employedby

the Forest

Department

lso

rose

dramatically:between 1911

and

1921, permanent

employees

in

the Forest

Department

ncreased rom hirty-five

o

nearly ne hundred KFGC 1921).

The

growth

n the

number

f

ruleviolations

nd

convictions

etween

911

and

1933

can

thusbe seen,

at

least

in

part,

s

a

resultof the

higher

evels of enforcement ade

possibleby

a

larger

workforce.

Evenmore trikinghanthe relativelymall riseoverall n cases and convictions

from

911

to

1931,however,

s

the

conspicuous

ncrease

n

forest-relatedonvictions

between

911

and

1921

and

then

he

equally rapid

fall

by

1933.

Even with

missing

informationor ome of the ntervening ears,

his

rise

nd

fall

s

visible

n

Figure

1

as

a

rough

nverted v."

By 1926-27,

it

is evident

hat the

number

f cases

and

convictions

ad come

down to

more r ess their

re-1912-13

levels.

This

paper

uses

the rise nd

fall

n

the evel of

rule

nfractionss indexed

n

the

available

records

nd

the

provisional xplanation

f

this

rise

and fall

s its

point

of

departure.

he

decline

3The terms planned" and "intentional" efer implyto the perceptions f ForestDe-

partment fficials

hat

the fire

n questionwas

a

protest gainst

he state.

4"Custom" nd "customary"

refraught

erms n

thewakeof

rgumentsbout "inventions

of traditions." use them mainlyto signal

that

the new laws

paid little attention o how

forests ereconnected

o

rural

ivelihoods.

heir

passage was

motivatedmainlyby a concern

to raise taterevenues nd resulted

n a legal frameworkhatrestrictednd restructuredre-

vailing ivelihood ractices.

5Data collected from wenty-eightillages where conducted

fieldwork n 1989-90,

1992, and 1993 show

that

ocal

forests rovidevillagerswith approximately 8 percent

f

theirfodder equirements, 2 percent f needed fuelwood, nd

39 percent f construction

timber.



4/33

STATE

FORMATION IN

COMMUNITY SPACES? 11

16000

'

14000

0

i 12000

o

10000

,

8000

co

?

6000

0

c'

4000

2000

-

* - -

0

- I I I

I I I

-

I

I I

I

.

s9~~~~~l

C9 N9

9 9

9 9b

6S

63 6

Year

Convictions

-Infractions

Figure 1. Infractions

f

Forest aws

and

Convictions,

Kumaon,

1911-33.

in

the

cases

and

convictions,

eginning oughly

n

1922, signals profound

hift

n

the

character

f control ver

forests

n

Kumaon. f the

modern tatecan

be

seen as a

"principle

f

organization"Lloyd

and

Thomas

1998, 3),

then the

natureof this

principle egan

to

change

n

the

1920s

in

Kumaon.

The

change

ontinues

o

mature

today, ueled

y

the

resources

ontained

n

close

to

4,000 squarekilometers

f

forests

that

villagers

ave come to control.

ut

the transferf

control

ver

forests

o

villagers

has served he nterests

f

the state

s

well

as

those

of

ruralKumaoni residents. ew

fires

n

Kumaon

today

can

be seen

as

"planned

incendiarism." he idiom of

participatorymanagement

that

animates

much discourse on environment nd

developmentand

some tate

policy-making)

as

come

partially

o nform he

use

and

management

f

forests

n Kumaon.6And

along

the

way,

Kumaon

villagers'

ollective

identities,

he nfusion f

power

nto

the

procedures

f forest

se,

and the

nature f

state

uthority

ave

registered

heir wn

transformations.

For

these

reasons,

he

1920s

constitute

n

important

ecade

in

the

history

f

forest se in Kumaon. The governmentppointedtheKumaon ForestGrievances

Committee

KFGC)

in

1921

to

examine

he

continuing rotests

f

villagers gainst

new

regulations.

ome

of

its recommendationso

change

the relations f forest

management

n

Kumaon took nto

ccount he

most

pressing

emands

osedthrough

the

protests.

t

is not

a

coincidence

hat

1921-22,

the

years

hat

aw

the

ppointment

of

the KFGC

and

the

mplementation

f some of

ts

recommendations,

re also the

6Fora discussion f some of the recognition y colonial tates o strike balance

between

conservationnd other spirations f tate-formation,ee Bryant nd Bailey 1997,Peluso 1992.



5/33

12 ARUN AGRAWAL

years

hat mark reduction

n

the evels of violence.

The

relaxation f statecontrol

overforests oincidedwith

the diminution f

nfractions

elated o forest

aws.

The paper traces nd showshow someof the mperativesf forestmanagement

by

the tate

n the

early

wentieth

entury

avewormed

heir

way

ntocurrent

fforts

at managementfforests y communities.7he landscape nd discourse fresource

management

n

Kumaon

prefigures,dmittedly

n an

analogical

rather han

causal

sense,many

ecent

diomsof

community-based

onservation.he

seventy-yearistory

of decentralized orest

management

n

Kumaon,

where

everyday ractices round

forest

se bear

the mark f state-facilitatedocal

institutions,ntersects nexpectedly

with more

recent

efforts o

bring community

o

the fore of conservation.

he

importance f the role of communitys evidentfrom he factthat more than fifty

countries laim to

be

working

oward

greater articipation

f ocalities n

resource

managementnd control FAO 1999). In India alone, ForestDepartment fficials

claimthat he

widely

hailed

Joint

orest

Management rogram

as

ed

to

partnerships

between

hestate nd more han

23,000

forest

rotection ommittees, elping

both

manage

18

percent

of

India's forestsmore

effectivelyNeeraj Kumar, personal

communication, uly 2000).

In

describing

nd

thinking istoricallybout some

of

the

practices

f forest ontrol

n

Kumaon,

this article

provides

means to reflect

critically

n the morerecent fforts.

The description

f how

villagers manage forests

n

Kumaon

through the

constitutionfforest ouncilswould be incomplete

f

t

were o remain ccupied nly

with a consideration f efficiencynd equity, or an enumeration f rules and

infractions,

r attention o

compliance

nd resistance.8 n attention o

these,

o the

decentralization

nd

bureaucratization

f

resource

se,

is

crucial

to

understanding

changes

n

the nature

of

control.

State

formation

n this

context an be seen to

correspond

o

activities

hat

contribute

o the

formalization

nd

systematization

f

social

action

and,

in

so

doing,

consolidate

r

complicate

he

division

between

tates

and societies.9

t

would

include

a)

the creation f new rules to define he limitsof

7Although sprinkle erms uch s "local," "community,"nd "state" iberally hroughout

the paper, without n insistent ttention nitially o theirproblematic tatus, t should be

evident hat hetoneofthepaper s oriented o recognizingheir raughttatus. n examining

the multiple nterconnectionsf the putativelyocal community ith "states" nd "markets"

and "external" orces, he arguments n the paper contribute o highlighting he complex

sociality nd strategies f erritorialization

hat

go

into heconstructionf he ocal

Appadurai

1996; Barbesino1997; Brenner 998; Raffles 999). See also Sivaramakrishnannd Agrawal

1998 for

n

efforto moveawayfrom

he

ocal /global dichotomy

n

relation

o

strategiesf

spatialization.

8An

mmense iteraturen community-basedesourcemanagement

xamines

ach

of hese

three hemes.Considerationsfefficiencyave received erhaps hegreatestttention

n

the

valuableworkof resource conomistswho have writtenboutdifferentnstitutional orms or

managing ommonresourcesCheung 1970; Ciriacy-Wantrupnd Bishop 1975; Dasgupta

and Heal 1979; Gordon 1954). In recentyears, fcourse, sustainability" as emerged s a

thirdgoal

with the

existing nes

of

equity nd efficiencyRedclift 987). The literature rom

scholars

f

common roperty

as been

perhaps

he

mostcareful

n

examining ropertys rules

and rights. cholars f commonshave

shownhow

human actions re shaped by the creation

of new rulesof resourcemanagement. strom 1990) remainshe seminal ext n the ubject.

For an

introductionnd insightfulreatmentf the nature fresistance nd compliance, here

is still no better ext hanScott's 1985) magisterial thnographyfSedaka.

91do not enter nto a discussionof the vast literaturehatengages the issue of state

autonomy nd state-society elations.

ome

representativeccounts

are

available

in

Evans,

Rueschemeyer,nd Skocpol 1985); Jessop 1990); Migdal (1988); Migdal, Kohli, and Shue

(1994).



6/33

STATE FORMATION IN COMMUNITY SPACES?

13

what is permissible,b) the institution

f

organizationaltructures

o enforce uch

rules, nd c)

the

ncorporation

nd

undermining

f alternativeoci for

he

exercise

f

power. State officials,n consequence, ncreasingly ecome the interpretersnd

enforcersfwhat s permissibles state-making roceeds pace.'0

But

such

a

Weberianperspective

n the

systematization

f forest-use

ractices

must be supplemented. tate

formation

roceeds

n

part by

coercion

ut

in at

least

equal measureby local initiative, y

the

willing participationf those over whom

newforms f tatepower ome to hold sway Corrigan nd Sayer 985).

In

this

paper,

the

supplement akes the form f

an

argument bout how the changingnature f

control

epends

n

changing trategies fpower

nd

relationships etween tate nd

community

ctors."

n

the

process,

he

nterests

f the

state

nd of

community,

nd

even

what we

understand

s

state

nd

community,

ome to

be redefineds well.

At

thesame time, n understandingf the reciprocal econstructionsf state uthority

in

new domains nd the willingness f rural ubjects

o

redefine heir dentities

n

relation

o stateprojects an fruitfullye elaborated y ooking t somethinghat s

often een s rather

mundane: owproblems f ocal mplementation

nd

enforcement

are solved.

In

examining roblems f local implementationnd their mpact on

humans,

who are

always

ocated

n

unequal

relations f

power, his paper follows

oucault's

insight

hat

the exercise

f

power

s "a

way

n

which certain ctions

maystructure

the fieldof other

possible

actions"

1982, 222). Rather han seeing

nstitutionss

separate romocial networkscf.Foucault1982, 224), however, treat hem s part

of,

and

closelytied to, existingnetworks f social relations.They are

congealed

relations

f

power, ut they

re also

a

prompt

o

action, goad to newconfigurations

of

power.Thus,institutions

re

as much the ocus and objectofpower

truggles s

they

re

supplementarytructuresbove society Foucault 1982, 222).

The

theoretical

rguments

n

the

paper

re

based

on an

examination f

trategies

that

tate ctors ollowed o extend heir ontrol ver orestsndthe ffortsf

villagers

to reassert heir ontrol

ver forests: actors

hat

proved

nstrumental

n

the

birth

process

f the

forest ouncils nd

in

shaping

he

relationshipsmong

different

tate

actors,

ouncil

members, rdinary illagers,

nd forests. he creation

f

the

councils,

discussed n the sectionthatfollows, an be taken as a landmarkn thechanging

rationalities

f

ruleand definitionsf nterestsnd

strategies

hatdifferenttate nd

local

community

ctors

count as

significant.

n

analysis

of

the

operation

f the

councils

nd of he

relationship

f

ommunity anagers

ith

heir

illage

onstituents

and state ctors

ccupies

henext wo

ections. hese

sections ontain he

groundwork

that demonstrates he

emergence

f new interests

nd

alliances

among

state

and

community

ctors.

They

are also the

basis

for

he

final ection

f the

paper,

which

showshow

some of the

earlier nterests f state nd local actors ame

together,

ome

10The xtension f rules, r the ncorporationf territorieshrough uchrules ntostate

formations,s not necessarily threat. ut see Brow,who argues hatdevelopmentnSriLanka

incorporates

illages

nto

regional nd national ircuits fpower nd exchange: Various ocial

practices hathad served o mark he nhabitants f the same village as members f distinct

community

ereunder hreatwhile others ad

already een abandoned" 1996, 6).

11An mportant spectof the changes n the forms fpower nd identity s related o

the

strategies f spatialization

hathave

been worked ut

in

Kumaon over he course f theeight

decadesfollowinghe ppointmentfthe KFGC. Observationsnplace-related

dentities

hat

insistupon questioning he ideasofstability nd harmony ften ssociatedwith

community

are especially aluablein this regard Carter,Donald, and Squires 1993, xiv;

Massey 1994;

Rose 1997).



7/33

14 ARUN AGRAWAL

wereredefined,nd still others ame nto sharper elief nd opposition.

he dispersal

of state ontrol o communities nd the nternalizationf ruleby villagers s directly

tied to the trategiesfmanagementhat hecouncilshavecraftedver hepast seven

decades.

The

History

of

Changing

Forest

Regulations

in

Kumaon

The causesfor he ncreasing umber f nfractionsfforestaws after 911, even

if

they re not specifically emonstrated, ave been reasonably

well established y

Guha 1989). Between1911 and 1917, the ForestDepartmentransferredore han

3,000 square

miles of forests

o

the

mperial

Forest

Department

n

greater umaon

(KFGC 1921), ofwhichnearly ,000 squaremileswere ocated

n thethree resent-

day

districts f Kumaon:

Nainital,Almora,

nd

Pithoragarh.'2

he colonial tatehad

made a

number

f nroads

between1815

and

1910

to curtailprogressivelyhe area

of

forests nder

he control f ocal

communities

nd to

use

forests o extract

imber

forrevenue.But its latest ncursions

aised the

special

ire of the

villagers.

Their

grievances

were

particularly

cute

because

of the

elaborate

new rules thatspecified

strict estrictionsn

lopping

and

grazingrights,

estricted se of

non-timber

orest

products, rohibited

he extension f

cultivation,

nhanced he aborextracted rom

thevillagers, nd increased he number fforest uards.The lastalteration aised he

level

and

nature ffrictionetween orestuards nd thevillagewomen nd children

who harvested

roducts

rom he forest.

Althoughgovernment

fficials sserted hat the new laws were never

trictly

enforced,

he added restrictions

hippedvillagers

nto

widespread

rotest.Villagers

simplyrefused

o

accept

the

rules

and

the fundamental ssumption ndergirding

them:

that

the statehas

a

monopoly

ver

all

natural esources

t

deems significant.

The bestefforts

f

governmentfficials

ailed o convince he

villagers

hat heforests

belonged

o the

government.

he officers

ho

had

designed

he new and settlement

hadhopedthat he residents f the hills "wouldgradually ecome ccustomed o the

rules s

gazetted

nd that

ontrol

may

be

tightened

s

years o

on"

(KFGC 1921, 2).

But

hill-dwellers ashed these

sanguine hopes. Many

of theiractions were

at an

individual evel,oriented

o

extracting

orest

roducts

ike fodder nd fuelwood

nd

grazing

livestock.But the infractionslso reveal

an

interesting atternoverall,

showing

he

collusive

nd social nature f their

protests.

etween

1917

and

1921,

the

averagenumber

of individuals onvictedof each detected nfraction overed

between

ive nd six. After

926,

the

average ropped

o fewer

han

wo.

Collectively

organized

breaches

f forest aw thus occurred armore often n the earlier

eriod.

Although

do not

have access

to

testimony

rom

illagers,

heirdissatisfactions

clear, s is the fact hattheir esponses ccur n a farmorecollective ashion n the

earlier

eriod

than after

926.

In

light

of this

observation,

t

is hard to

accept

the

official

uggestions

hat

Kumaon

villagers

brokerules

nitially

ecause

they

never

half understood he

rules

that

were

made and oftenhad

vague

ideas of the entries

within heir

ights

ists"

KFGC 1921, 2). Villagers

understood he rules

nd their

implications nly

too

well,

and

they

cted

collectivelygainst

he

rules,

with

ll that

12Since completed ield

work, hedistricts fAlmora nd

Pithoragarh avehad two new

districts arved ut of them:

Bageshwar nd Champawat.



8/33

STATE FORMATION IN COMMUNITY SPACES? 15

suchactionsmply

n terms

f ointdiscussions nd

understandings

nd

renegotiation

of what hould

count

s

personal

nterest.

The incessant, ftenviolent,protestsforced he government o appoint the

Kumaon Forest Grievances Committee to look into the local "disaffection."

Comprising government

fficials nd

local political leaders,'3the Committee

examinedmore than five housandwitnesses rom ll

parts

of

Kumaon.

It

used the

resulting vidence o make nearly hirty ecommendations.he

Committee elt

hat

manyof the protests illagersmade were imply result funenforceableulesthat

interferedirectly ith ctions fvillagers imed t securing

livelihood.

t

advocated

the repealof all restrictionsn lopping of fodder rom ak trees, hemainsource f

food

for ivestock

n

thewinter eason, nd on grazing f ivestock

n

the

forest. hese

two sets of restrictions

ere

responsible ormostof the breaches f forestaws.

The Committee lso recognized he social powerdynamics urrounding he

enforcementf the new aws when

an

agent

of the

state, uch

as

a

forest

uard,was

empowered

o cite

villagers

for

actions

that

constituted

or them

no more than

everyday se of the

forests

ut

were seen

as infractions

nder the

law.

In

such

a

situation, ot onlywould

a

largenumber fguardsbe

needed o enforce

he

aw, but

the

enforcementtself

would

promote

issatisfaction

mong

those

being

cited.As the

Committee bserved, any attempt

o

strictlynforce

heserules

would lead to riot

and

bloodshed" KFGC 1921, 3).

The rules lso

created pportunities

or

guards

to

extract

ribes

orminor nfractions.he

Committeeuggested

hat orest

epartment

employees

would

be prevented

rom

arassing illagers, specially

wherewomen nd

childrenwere

nvolved,

f

theyguarded nly smaller

rea of forest nd

if

they

were

kept busy

n

other

epartmental

ork.'4

The most

significantuggestions

f the

Committee

were twofold:

1)

dereserve

the

larger art of

the

newly

reated

Reserved orests etween

1911

and

1917,

and

(2) lay

the

foundations

or

reating ommunity

orests

hatwould

be

managed

under

a

broad

set of

rules

framed

y the government, ut

forwhich

villagers hemselves

would

craft

he

specific

ulesfor

veryday

se to fit

ocal

conditions. he

government

took

both theserecommendations

eriously.nitially,

t reclassified eserved

orests

that had

been

taken

over

by

the Forest

Department etween1911

and

1917

into

Class andClass I forests.lass Reserved orestsontained road-leavedree pecies

used

primarily

or odder

nd fuel

by villagers.

lass

I

forests

ften

omprised

maller

patches

f

forests

less

than

one or two

square miles)

ocated

close to the

village.

All

theseforests ere

transferredo the Revenue

Department

nd,

in

time,

could

come

to

be

controlled

yvillagers yfollowing specific rocedure

s

described

n the

1931

Forest

Panchayat

Rules. Class

II

Reserved Forests

were those stocked

with

commercially

orevaluable

pecies.

These ncludedChir

Pinus

oxburghii),

al

Shorea

robusta),

eodar

Cedrus eodara),

nd

Cypress Cupressusorulosa).

lass II

forests ere

retained

nder he control

f the Forest

Department.

131nitially,he Committeehad threemembers: he District

Commissioner f Kumaon,

the Member of the LegislativeCouncil fromGarhwal, nd a

Conservator rom he Forest

Service.

An

additional

member,

he chairman

f the

Municipal

Board from

Almora,

was

also

appointed s a representativef the region KFGC 1921).

14That

rules nd newprograms

an

often e the tage t which orrupt ractices re nacted

behind the curtain s

thoughtfullyescribed

or

plains village

in

India

(Gupta 1995).

Al-

thoughGupta is less interested

n

providing causal analysis

f

corruption, is arguments

throw ignificantight

on

the relationship etween discursivelyroduced tate,discussions

of

corruption

s

they

become current

n

the

public sphere,

nd the effects n the lives of

villagers.



9/33

16 ARUN AGRAWAL

The government lso passed the Forest Council Rules of 1931. These rules

permitted illageresidentso create orestouncils nd bring nder heir wn control

forestands thathadbeentransferredo theRevenueDepartments Class Reserved

Forests

nd

Civil Forests.

his

step

can

be seen,

n

some cases,

s

the formalizationf

village nstitutionshat

had

influencedheuse ofmanyforests

n

theKumaon Hills

before

910 (Somanathan 991).

Wherethese nformalocal institutions ad

existed,

theyhad been critical n influencing ow villagers sed forests.nstitutionalimits

on

harvesting

rom he forestwere

enforced y villagers hemselves ithoutmuch

helpfrom he state.The ForestCouncil Rules have been modified wice since their

formation:

nce n 1971

and

again

n

1976. The provisions

f

the Rules are currently

once

moreunder onsideration

or

evision.

The actions f the British olonial tatefly gainst he grainof claimsthat ssert

a steady tomization fvillage communities nder the impact of scientific orestry

and

capitalist evelopment

ed

by the

colonial

tate Guha 1989, 55;

cf.

Grove1995).

The

actual process s

somewhatmore

complex.

At

least

in

Kumaon,

state officials

redefinedhe

forms

f nterventionnd

renegotiated he

terms f their nteractions

with

villagersby taking

nto

account the context f interventions.tates

may,

n

general, e

oriented

o

systematize

nd mold

the world

ccording

o

principles

hat

simplify

ocial

organization

nd

make

it

more

predictable Scott 1998).

But where

state actions

run

into

unexpected bstacles,

r where

ubject populationsrespond

vociferouslygainst

cumbersome

egal encroachments,

tate

officials an

also create

innovative new formsof control through decentralized nforcement. ven if

decentralized

orms f

controldo not

rely

on

coercive nforcement

nd

systematic

simplification,

he effects

may

match state

objectives

of

greater

order and

predictability.

The colonial government's

fforts

o establish forest ouncils parallel recent

environment-related

nitiativesn a

largenumber f countriesFAO 1999). Pressures

resulting

rom

fiscal runch, dvocacy y

national

Non-Government rganizations

(NGOs)

and international

onors,

nd the

nability

f states o

regulate

esource

se

coercively

ave ed

manygovernments

o devolve ontrol verresources oward ocal

communities

n a manner

esembling

hat occurred n Kumaon

Gibson

and Marks

1995; Kothariet al. 1998; Poffenbergernd McGean 1996; Western nd Wright

1994).

The

ostensible

easons

for

such

incorporation

re

also stated

to

be greater

participation

nd involvement f communities

n

the

management

f

resources,

s

they

were

n

Kumaon.

But as localities re

drawn nto

networks f

powerregulated

by

the

state,

new

political relationships

etween tate officials

nd local

actors,

nd

among

ocal

actors,

lso

emerge.

In

the case of forest

management

n

Kumaon

at

least,

he colonial tate eems o

have

steppedback,butonly

to

jumpbetter.

t

redefined

ts intervention

y refining

theterms f ontrol.

he division f

forestsnto wo

categories-Class

/

Civil Forests

under he control f the Revenue

Department

nd Class

II

Forests nder he control

of the ForestDepartment-should be interpretedo signify he outcome of two

processes.

he first s

the

departmental ivalry

hat was

sparked

nto

being by

the

creation

f the Forest

Department

n

1868

and

by

the

passing

of a

huge

swathe f

territory

nder ts control

n

the name of the

protection

f

forests.'5 he

increasing

"5The istory fthis truggle

n

Kumaon can be read nShrivastava1996). Examinations

of such conflictsn

neighboring

imachal Pradesh

Saberwal 1997)

and

in

the more

distant

Bengal (Sivaramakrishnan996) are also available. Some of the ideas that providedForest

Department ersonnel he

founding ogic of rguments gainstdeforestationre carefullynd

persuasively istoricized

n

Richard

Grove'swork

1994, 1995).



10/33


controlof the ForestDepartment vervast stretches f

land,

and

the revenues

t

generated y auctioning imber rom

he

ands under tscontrol,

ivaled

nd outgrew

the revenues rom and.'6 The transfer f all the Class I forests o the Revenue

Departmentwas the outcomeof a bureaucratic truggle

hat was

in

part resolved

againstthe interests f the ForestDepartment. t was

only a partialvictory or he

Revenue Department, owever, ecause the Forest

Department till kept

the

more

denselywooded tracts nder ts own purview s Class

II

Reserved orests.

The

second spectofthe redefinitionf and rights s thatover ime significant

proportion f the forestedand

in

Kumaon has come to be

managedby villagers.As

Table

1

shows, illagersmanagenearly 0 percent fforestsn Almora nd 30 percent

in Pithoragarh. hese are the same forests hat he Forest

Department ought o take

over

between 910

and

1916.

The control

xercised yvillagers nfolds, owever,

n

ways hatmatch heobjectives f state fficials. any ofthetypes fregulationshat

the

colonial tate

had

wanted

o

enforcere nowcraftednd mplemented yvillagers.

This new way of administeringorest egulationss not

only

more

effectiveut

has

also simultaneouslyed to

a

tremendous eduction

n

the

expenses

ncurred

y

the

Forest Department on enforcement.

A

large number

of

forest-management

organizations

t the

village

evel-forest ouncils-have

come

nto

being

over

he

ast

seventy ears ohelp

state fficials

rotect

orests. ut their

uthority

ver ocal forests

is only

a

corollary f state claims. Indeed, the village-basedforest-management

processesn Kumaonmayevenbe seen as expressions f

state uthority. o evaluate

thisclaim,consider ow forest ouncils n Kumaonmanageforests.

Institutional

Landscapes

of

Collective Forest

Management

n

Kumaon

Nearly

three housand orest ouncils

odayformally

manage

and control

bout

a

quarter

of the

forests

n

the

three

districts

f

Kumaon

(Nainital, Almora,

and

Pithoragarh).

ost

of these ouncils re single-village

ouncils,

nd thus

significant

proportion fKumaonvillages,nearly 5 percent, as chosen o create orest

ouncils.

Table 1 presentsnformationn theforestreaunderdifferentorms f nstitutional

arrangements

orforests

n

Almora and

Pithoragarh.'7

he broad

parameters

hat

define heformal

management ractices

f

the

forest

ouncils re

aid out n theForest

Council Rules of

1931,

as amended

n

1976 (Ballabh

and

Singh 1988).

These rules

form he state-definedimits f ocal

autonomy. illagers

annot lear-fell

he

forest,

they annotmpose

fines

eyond specified

mount

and

only

withtheconsent

f

the

person eingfined), hey

an

raise

revenues

nly hrough

ertain imited

ources, hey

16Whiledoing fieldwork

n

1990-91, and

then

again

in

1993,

I

stayed

ften

n

Forest

Rest Houses, constructedn the earlieryears f the twentiethentury.n the more remote

locations, hesewere mongtheonlymarks f tate uthority,ocated midst

omeof

hemost

striking andscapes nd providing nparalleled iewsof the Himalayan

peaks.Architecturally

distinct rommore recent overnment onstructions,heseearlier

uildings,

with theirfire-

places, high ceilings,rugs, and leaky roofs, ecalled period when

the ForestDepartment

enjoyedgreater elative ignificance

han

today

n the

administrationfKumaon's and-based

resources.

17Although

Nainital is one of the threedistricts

n

Kumaon,

it

has only a fewforest

councils

approximatelywo hundred

n

comparison

o

nearly

hree housand

n

Almora

nd

Pithoragarh). nly

a

small proportion f Nainital is hilly, nd theforest ouncils xist only

in

the hillyparts f Kumaon.



11/33

18 ARUN AGRAWAL

Table 1. Forests n Kumaon

NameofDistrict

Almora

Pithoragarh

Percentf

Percentf

Area TotalForest

Area TotalForest

Institutionalrrangement

Forest epartment 550 13 1401 42

Revenue epartment 423 10 534 16

VillageControl 2959 70

1001 30

Private 296 7

400 12

Note:Figuresor rea re nsquare ilometers.

Source: istrict ollectorateecordsnAlmora nd Pithoragarh.

must take recourse o established egal procedures o resolve

onflicts,

nd

so

on.

Where conflicts

ver

nterpretation

nd

application

of

rules

spill

over nto formal

channels

f

dispute

esolution nderwritten

y

the ndian

tate

district

nd

provincial

revenue/judicialuthorities),erious ossesbecomeunavoidable.

or xample,

f

parties

to

a

disputetake their uarrel o district r state courts, hecase may dragon for

decadeswithout

eing resolved.

The ForestCouncil Rules, like

all

rules, re interpreted

iversely y thosethey

are supposed o govern, he varying nterpretationsorminghe foundation f many

differentctions.

onsider ne

example.

he modified ules of

1976 sought

o restrict

the abilityof villagersto harvest ive treesfortimber.

Where the 1931 Rules

permitted illagers

o

cut trees, he 1976 Rules explicitly

orbade nyone

rom

utting

more

than

one live treewithoutpriorpermission rom hree

differentovernment

officials:he District

Collector, he Conservator

f

Forests, nd the DivisionalForest

Officer.

n

1978

the

villagers

n

Majhkhalibegan

to seek

permission

rom he

District

Collector

o cut

fourteen hir

(Pinus roxburghii)

rees

fortimber o

repair

homes.

Council

records

ndicate

hat

for

nearly

hree

years

he

villagers

ontinued

o

pursue

the matterformally.Their repeated applicationsto the Revenue and Forest

Department

fficials

eceived

no

response.Ultimately,

he

villagers ave up.

In

the

minutes f council

meetings

or

1982,

two entries

ttract otice.The first

ndicates

that winter ce storm elled ourteenhir trees. he second

was

a

resolution

y

the

council members

o

use the fourteen allen

nd "dead"

trees o

repairdwellings

n

the

village

Collectively,

he

Rules constitutemore

of a

frameworkor he

management

f

forests

ather han

straitjacket

hat

definesocal

forest-managementractices.

ural

residents, hrough heir lected

forest

ouncils,possess ubstantial

owers

o create

concreterestrictions o

prevent

ertain

types

of forest

use and facilitate

thers.

Villagers ote to elect between ive nd nine councilmembersnd the council eader

from mongvillage residents. he council

n

many f thevillagesmeetsfrequently,

its

members

iscuss, raft,

nd

modify pecific

ules thatwill

govern

withdrawal f

forest

roducts,

nd it

creates

monitoring

nd

sanctioning

mechanisms

n an

efforto

enforce he rules

t

has crafted s well as

the Forest

Council Rules framed

y

the

government.

he

allocative ffects f rules

range

from

eing

moreor less

equitable

to extreme

nequality

n the

distribution

fforest

roducts. he council

elects

uards,

fines

ule-breakers, anages inances,

nd maintains record f ts

meetings, ccounts,

and local rule

nfractions.

n

many

of the

cases,

the

guard

selected

by

the council s



12/33

STATE

FORMATION IN COMMUNITY SPACES? 19

paid by contributionsrom he

village households. he

council has other ources f

income s well and usuallydeploys ts net earnings oward ublic activities uch as

construction f schoolbuildings,religious elebrations,r purchase fcollectively

used utensils.'8

Councils

njoy bvious

eeway

n

defining

ow to

manage

ocal forests. he limits

of

thisrange, owever,

re often

rought

nto

display.

These imits re

exposed

n the

normalizedmeans of control

hroughwhich the Revenue

and

ForestDepartments

articulatewith the councils.

But

they are even more strikingly isible when

recalcitrant illagers o not

observe ome of the more basic principles pon which

the councils are founded:the authority f the councils to impose finesor the

demarcation f the

and on which ouncil

forestsre ocated.

The ForestCouncil

Rules

provide

or

upport

o the

councilsfrom

he Revenue

and Forest Departments o facilitaterule enforcementnd the maintenance f

vegetation

n

theforests.

he

asymmetricuthoritativexchanges

within

illages

nd

between

village

residents

nd

government

fficials re

at once overlaid

by

informal

relations f powerand influence

hat

written tatements elineating he bounds of

authority escribe nly

mperfectly

t

best.Over the

past sixty ears,

he

relationship

that

has evolvedbetween illageusers nd theForest nd RevenueDepartments as

been one in

whichvillagers

nd

their ouncilshave

ncreasingly

ome to

depend

on

government epartments

or

ctivities elated o the

management

f

their orests.

The

formationf

the forest ouncils

requires hepresence

f

governmentfficials

from he RevenueDepartmentndthe formal ransferf and-managementights o

thecouncil.The forest

ver

which ights nd capacities o manage reto be transferred

is mapped and registered ith

the patwari the village-levelRevenue Department

official). lections o

the forest ouncil are held

under

the

supervision

f

the forest

council

nspector.

he

council s

expected

o meet

regularly, eep

records f

meetings,

and maintain ccounts. he forest ouncil

nspector, ho

is under he control f

the

office f

the district

magistrate,

s

empowered

o

inspect

ll

recordsmaintained

y

the councilsunder

his control.

Civil administration

t

the ocal

evel

n

thedistricts

fKumaon

hingesupon

the

district

magistrate-an

office

hat

melds

together

he

tasksof collection f

revenue,

administrationf ustice, nd thedelivery fdevelopment.With thereorganization

of

theNew Reserved

orests ntoClass

I

and

Class

I

forests

n

1931,

and

thetransfer

of

all

Class

I

forests

o the Revenue

Department,

he district

magistrate merged

s

the mostcrucial fficial

n the

management

f the forest

ouncils, specially

fter he

1976 modifications

n

the Rules of

1931.

The district

magistrate

s

responsible

or

ensuring

hat

the forest

ouncilsfunction

n

accordance

with

the

provisions

f the

Rules.

n

Almora

district,

or

xample,

hedistrict

magistrate

s

supposed

o

supervise

the working f nearly

wo thousand orest

ouncils.

A number f officialsssisthim:

the forest ouncilofficer

usually

he sub-divisional

agistrate,

r

SDM)

at

the

tehsill

subdivision

evel and two

to

three orest ouncil

nspectors

n

each subdivision. ub-

divisionalmagistratesuperviseheactivities f number fforest ouncil nspectors,

who

perform

he

nitty-gritty

asksof

supervising

lections

o the

forest ouncil

nd

themaintenance fregisters,

ccounts,

nd

minutes f

meetings.

Given theenormous

burden uch

supervisory

asks

mpose

on the

nspectorabout

four

hundred ouncils

fall

underthe domain

of each forest

ouncil

nspector),

nd

their imited

resources,

the inspections re

perfunctory

nd

spotty

ffairs.

orest

ouncil

nspectors

eldom

18Thus,hey eem omeetmany

f he esign rincipleshat re haracteristicf uccessful

common roperty anagementnstitutions

s

discussed

yOstrom1990).



13/33

20 ARUN AGRAWAL

manage to inspectmore than fifty orest ouncils

n a

year.The ones inspected

re

usually he ones more ccessible y

road.

The forest ouncilsdo not possess he coercive uthorityo enforce he rules hey

create

except by moving

the

judiciary.

n

cases

of

disputes

with

users, hey

must

depend significantly,venexclusively,

n

prompt esponse

rom he

officials

f the

RevenueDepartment, uch as

the

patwari,

or the

forest

ouncil nspector. hus, if

a

userrefuses o pay the mposedfines, r continues o harvest

enefitsn infringement

of

xisting ules,

r

encroaches pon the

and

demarcated

s council orest,he ouncils

do notpossess hecoercive owersnecessaryobring uch

a

recalcitrantser o book.

Without

quick

and

adequate support

rom he revenue

fficials,

ule-breakers

ften

continue

sing

the forest

n

defiance f

the

forest ouncils' ttempts

t

enforcement

of rules.Officials

n the

Revenue

Department

who are

supposed

o

help

the councils

mustperform hostofother utiesthatmostofthembelievehavepriority ver he

tasksrelated

o

forest ouncils.

For

manyforest ouncils

hen, ne of the most evere

problems s enforcement.

Whereas he Revenue

Department

fficials nderwritehe enforcementf

rules,

the Forest Department coordinates

the commercial harvest

of

productsfrom

community

orests

nd

provides

echnical ssistance o

develop

them. The

Forest

Council Rules

stipulate

hat the Forest

Department

hould

prepare omprehensive

working lans

for ll the forest ouncils.

n

practice,

owever,

his

rule

has seldom

been observed.As

a result t has

been

underthe

mpetus

f the recent

mphasis

f

the Indian governmentn treeplantation hat the Civil & Soyamand the Soil

Conservation

ings

of

the

Forest

Department

ave undertaken ome

plantation

n

forest ouncil

and.

Except

for ome

very

recent

ases,

n

most nstances

he

Forest

Departmenthas planted exotic species

on

community

orestlandshathave little

subsistence

alue for

villagers. urther, efore

he

councilcan sell any of ts timber

or

resin,

t

must eek

pproval

rom

he

relevant uthoritiesn

theForest epartment.

Like the interactions ith the RevenueDepartment fficials,hesecan take

a

long

time

owing

to other utiesthatreceive

reater riority.

request o cut even a few

trees rom hecouncilforestantakeup to twoyears efore

t

is finally rocessed y

Forest nd Revenue

Department fficials.

This descriptionf the nstitutionalrrangementsituates he forest ouncils s

locallyfixed artners

n

the managementfforests,ubordinateo the employees f

the

Forest nd

RevenueDepartments.

heir

asymmetric

elationswith government

officials

ast

the

officials

n the role of arbiters

n

cases of

disputes

between

illagers

and forest ouncil fficeholders.heir bility o exercise ontrol ver

he

use

of

forests,

in the

absence

of

authority o impose sanctions

n

rule-breakers,

epends n large

measure

n the

willingness

f

villagers

o accord

uthority

o councils.But forest sers

can

also

question

and

undermine he

capacity

of

the councils.

They

can do so

by

showing

n

unwillingness

o

limit

theirharvests

f

forest esources.

hey

also

do so

more

explicitly y contesting

he fines

mposed by

the councils.

n

each

of

these

situations, he councils need to invoke the cooperation f government fficials,

simultaneously emonstrating

heir inks

to

the

state

and

theirweakerposition

n

thispolitico-managerialelationship.

Forest Protectionby CommunityManagers

In most of the forest ouncils, the basic rules for managing the forest nd

restrictingillagers rom singforest roducts re drafted ithin he first ear r two



14/33


oftheformationnd election fthecouncil.After hat, hekey ctivity fthecouncil

is the enforcementf rulesto restrict he evelsof forest roducts hat re harvested.

Many villagers greethatprotection s necessary.n Dhanachuli, village on the

border

f Almora nd

Nainital district, villager

used the

heavy

monsoons o make

the point: "Do you see this rain? Do you see the crops n the fields? he rain can

destroy

he

standing rop.

But

even

f

the weatherweregood, the crop

can

still get

destroyed y thieves

f

there re no guards.

t

is the same with the forest. ou plant

a shrub,you give it water,you take care of t. But if you don't protect t, cattle an

eat it. The forests for s, butwe have to takecareof t,

f

wewant

t

tobe there or

us."'19Another

illager,

rom

Guniyalekh located near Dhanachuli),pointed

to

the

difficultiesf enforcement

n a

meeting f the council: Until we get the maps, egal

recognition,marked boundaries

of

the local forest},

thel

council cannot work

properly. he people from har

[a

neighboring

illagel

tell us that heforests theirs.

We should

not

enter

t. So

we

can

guardpart

of

the

forest,

nd

we

don't know

which

part

to

guard}. Since 1984 whenthepanchayat as formed, e have been requesting

the papers hat howtheproper imits o we can manageproperly, rotect ur forest.

But what an one do ifthegovernmentoes notevenprovide hepapers?"20 second

villager

n

the same

meetingadded, "Mister,

his is

Kaljug.21 No

one listens

to

authority.

o

we mustget support

rom

he government

o make sure that

villagers

don't

ust chop

down whatever

hey

want."

Other

villagers

ad differenttories

o

tell. When asked how councilrules ould

be enforcedmoreeffectively,ne said, "Whyshould councilsmake rulesto stopus

from sing grasses nd wood from he forest? he forests necessary or griculture,

for

ivestock,

or

home,

formanure.

Why

shouldwe not

be able

to use it?"22 One of

the women fromDhanachuli complained bout the guards that the forest ouncils

hire: The wretched

uard

s

always

fter s. He is worse

han

heforest

departmentl

guard.

At

leasttheforest uarddoesn't top us

from

etting uelwood, ven

from

he

Reserved orest.'

23

The members

f

the forest ouncils re more

uniformly

n favor

of

protection

han

the

ordinary illagers.

This is

not

surprising. ot only

do the

council

members

nd eaders

rganize rotection,

ut

they

re

chiefly

enand

belong

to the

upper

castes.24

The expressionsfconcern ysomevillagers nd mostoftheofficialsftheforest

councils are reflected

n the different eans councilshave devised

to

protect

heir

forests.

n

some of the

villages,

he

duty

f

guarding

he

panchayat

orest otates rom

one household

to another.

Ghurkuna, village

with

only

lower-caste

esidents,

followed his

strategy

f

protection.

ecause

t

is

a

small

village

with

relatively oor

households,

he

council could not raise the

necessary

ontributions

rom

village

households

to hire

a

guard.

But

many

of

the

villagers expressed

n interest

n

protecting he forest

rom esidents f other

nearby illages.

The duration

f

guard

duty

for

ach household

an

vary

rom

day

to

a

week overthe course f

a

year

nd

19Interviewno. 2 with ShankarRam, Tape 1, translatedy

Kiran

Asher.

20Interviewo. 13 with Bachi Singh,Tape 5, translated y Kiran Asher.

2'In Indian mythology, aljug is the fourth nd the final ra before ime resumes gain

to proceed hrough he same sequenceof eras: Satjug,Ttreta,Dwapar, and thenKaljug. It is

the timewhendharma ives way to adharma nd established

uthority ails.

22Interviewo.

14

with GauriShankar, ape 5, translated y

Kiran

Asher.

23lnterviewo. 3 with Gauri Devi, Tape 1, translated

y Kiran Asher.

240f

the twenty-eightases

I

studied,only one council

had a woman as a member. n

multicaste illages,brahmansnd

rajputs

onstituted he

majority f the membership: 2 per-

cent.



15/33

22 ARUN AGRAWAL

depends

n

largepart on the size of the forest nd the number

f

households

n

the

village. Villages whose forests re large n relation o theirhouseholdsmay allocate

guard dutyfor nlypartof the year. n general,maintaining uard duty t least for

the four wintermonths s essential. The frequency f rule infractionsncreases

significantly

n

winterbecause the forest s often he

most convenient r the

only

source f fodder nd fuelwood n this eason.

Although some councils rotate protection responsibilities mong village

households, his s not the most commonoption. Some households re chronically

deficient

n

undertakinghe patrolsnecessary o protect

he

forest,

nd it

is easy

for

more nfrequentree iders ot to contribute heir abortoward rotectionnd notto

be

detected. here re

two

lternativeptions.Both nvolve iring

ne or

more uards.

As thefirst ption, he ouncil an hire guard, ndvillagehouseholds hen ontribute

a monthly r annual sum to defray he guard's salary.Direct payment rom he

households oward he guard's salary s customary hen

the council

does not have

independent ources f income or when ts cash income s relativelyow. Councils

that

earn ncomefrom he sale of forest roducts fodder, piphytes, razingpasses,

or fuelwood

undles),25

rom

membership

eesfrom

illagers,

r

through

share

of

the sale of commercial roducts

hat

the ForestDepartment

harvests rom

illage

forests,

ftenhire

guards directly.When

a

council deploys

his second

option,

the

guard's alary

s

paid

from

he general

unds f

the

council.

The

sentiments

n favor

f forest rotection

hat

some villagers xpressed,

nd

the means of protection hat manyof the councilshave devised,

n

one sense only

indicate he ubiquity f the actions hatmake forest rotection necessity s far s

councils re concerned.

he recordsmaintained y the councils

ndicate hat

villagers

break

rules,

ften

n

large

numbers. onversations

n

the

villages

ell

a

similar

tory,

even

permitting

he nferencehat ctual

evels fviolations

frules

rescribing

orest

use must

be

far

higher

han thosedetected

by

the council

guards.

Because councils

seek

to

restrict he

use of

the same productswhose use

the Forest

Department

was

trying

o

regulateearlier

n the

century,

ule infractionsre inevitable.Table

2

presents nformationn eight villages,based on the written

ecordsmaintained

y

the

village

forest ouncils.The information

n

the table

can be used to make several

points,

ut

want o draw

ttention

o two.

First,

here s

a

close

relationship

etween

a forest ouncil'sexpendituren hiring guardand the number frule nfractions

listed n councilrecords. econd, he evel of ruleviolations

eemsto

be veryhigh.

The

figures

n

the table make

it

obvious

that

village

residents

outinely

reak

rules reated

y

the forest ouncils.The

above

nformation

s from subset f

all

the

forest ouncils

that

maintainedrecordsfrom

mong

the

twenty-eight illages

I

studied.Several

about ten)

councilsdid not maintain

egular

ecords.

Nor

did

they

hold

meetings ften.

ut

where ecords erekept,

nd where

ouncils ried o enforce

their

rules, rule-breaking

s endemic. Minor infractions

ccurred lmost

daily.

Villagers

ntered

he

forest

when

t

was

closed

to

them,

ut

grasses

nd

leaffodder

in

excess f whatwas

permitted, athered uelwood, razed nimals,

ollected tones

and slate forhouseconstruction,nd sometimes elled rees.26 he seemingparadox

25ln

almost ll the cases,forest ouncils ell forest roducts nlyto village residents. he

practice s formalized ven n the termused to describe hosewho can buy forest roducts:

haqdar,

n

Urdu word meaning rightholder."

26Again, hese offences re very imilarto those

Guha

(1989)

describes orthe

period

1917-33. The main differences in the extent o which villagers sed fire o protest

gainst

the regulationsmposedby the colonial state. n present-day umaon, fewvillagers esort o

this means of regulating odder roduction r protesting gainstthe regulationsmposedby

the forest ouncils.



16/33


Table 2. Detection f

Rule Infractionsy ForestCouncilGuards n

Kumaon: 1977-19921

Averagennual Averagennual

Number f

meetings

amount

pent

n numberfdetected

Name

of

village

held

peryear

protection

in Rs.)

rule nfractions

Airadi 3

790 32

Banua 6

2835 156

Bhagartola 10

3100 192

Ladfoda 3 2840 121

Miraini 8

832 62

Lohathal

4

1850 109

Nagilagaon 5 2500 89

Tangnua

4

175

8

Source: orest

ouncil ecords

t the

village evel;

ata

ollected

uring ieldwork,990-

1993

'The

figures

refor

even ears

electedt random rom he

ecords aintained

y

theforest

councils.

of "the

higher

he

protectionffort,

he

higher

herule

violations"

s

easily xplained.

Villagers

lso

break

rules

n

the

villages

where here

re

no

guards,

r where

guards

do not

report

ule violations

and

as

a

result,

he council

records

o not contain

informationboutruleviolations). ut either heforestouncilsnsuchvillagesmake

little efforto protect he forest r enforce he

rules,

or

theyhave few resources

t

theirdisposalto enforce ules.

Thus,

t

is not

surprising

hat

the councils

hat

pend

the higher mountson protection eem also to have higher nstances f villagers

illegallyusingproducts rom he forest.

In

the eightvillages

forwhich studied ocal

records, he veragenumber frule

violations s

nearlyninety er

year.

This is

almost

certainly gross

underestimate.

None

of the

village

forest ouncils

perfectly

etects

esidents'

ctions n the forests.

Whether he councils

ttempt

o

deploy

mutual

monitoring

r

hire

guards,

most of

theactions fvillagers

n

the forest emain idden

from

heviewof the council even

if

many

re

visible

to

villagers).

n

Bhagartola,

he

teashop wner,

who himself elies

on firewood rom he forest o

keep

his stove

going,

aid as muchwhenhe described

how theworldworks: To

what xtent an

you keep

watch ver heforest?

owadays

even one's own

property

s not safe

f

your yes

re not

on

it

twenty-four

ours.

The

forests

big,

and

there

s

just

one

guard.

How

far

an he

makerounds

ftheforest?'

27

Although

here s

no

way

to know for

ure,

conversations

ith the

villagers

eft

general mpression

hat the

councils

detect no more than

20

percent

f

all

rule-

violating

ehavior.

The

eightvillages

n

the

table

vary

n

size,

n

the

amount f forest

heymanage,

in proximityo markets,nd in levels ofout-migration. s a group, they re not

visibly

ifferent

rom ther

illages

n the hills.

f

the

figures

or hese

ightvillages

resemble

what

happens

in

villages

in

Kumaon

in

general,

the total number

of

27Suchentimentstand

n

sharp ontrast,

f

ourse,

o

other

xpressed

dioms

n

which

villagers

ndicate

hat

veryone

nows hat

appens

n

a

village.

he

point

s

that t

s almost

impossible

o catch omeone

n

the ct s

they

re

aking

ut

fodderr

firewood,

ven

f here

is a

general

warenessfhow

pecific

ndividualsct.

n

other

tudies f

village

ife r ife

n

small groups, t is a commonplace hat members now a greatdeal about thosewith whom

they nteract requentlyAgrawal1997a).



17/33

24 ARUN AGRAWAL

infractionsn a year s striking. or the twelve housand r so

villages n the three

districts fKumaon, even the

detectedrule violationswill add up to more than a

million nstances f rulebreaking nnually.And this may be only 10 to 20 percent

of all ruleviolations

Compare his figure

with

the performancef the ForestDepartment hat Guha

reports rom he earlier art

of the century. he ForestDepartment etected round

twenty-fiveundred uleviolations nd convicted bout ten thousand

ersons ach

year

t

the

peak

of

protests gainst ts

attempts

o

take

overKumaon forests. ven

f

one takes ntoaccount he

fourfold opulation ncrease hathasoccurredn Kumaon

since the earlypart of this

century, nforcementy the ForestDepartmentwas

far

more mperfect. o achieve

ven this mperfect egulation

f

village ife, he Forest

Department

ad

to increase ts size and expenses ignificantly.his drastic

ncrease

in department ffortso protect nd police forests esulted n widespread rotests

throughout he region. The

policy of indirectpolicing, even internalpolicing,

emerged

rom hat

failed xperience f

trying

o

extend

direct ontrol.

By dividing

its forest

oldings

ntotwo

differentroups Class

I

and

ClassII

forests)

nd

allowing

villagers o takeover hemanagementfthe more catteredorests

hat

re also more

critical or

aily

ubsistence elated o

cooking,

ivestock

aising,

nd

agriculture,

he

ForestDepartment nabled

the emergence f

a

new form

f

systematic

egulation.

The costsof controllingnd

managing hesenearly hree housand cattered atches

of

vegetationwere, are,

and will

be prohibitive

or the Forest

Department.

The

attenuation f whatproperty ights heoristswould call ownership as, however,

reduced the cost of policing vegetationby displacing them onto the

villagers

themselves.

In

conjoiningpolicywith policing, refer xplicitly o Foucault's

suggestive

observations

hat

eepolicy s "the set of means

necessary

o

make the state ncrease

from

within." Political economy tselfdevelops when

it

becomes clear that the

resources-populationroblem an no

longerbe fullymanagedthrough

coercive

regulatory ystem . .

"

(Foucault

[19941

1997, 69-70).

It

was

precisely

his

realization hat

ed

to

the appointment

f

the Kumaon

ForestGrievances ommittee

in

1921

and the

passing

f

theForest ouncil Rules

n

1931.

In

contrast o theearlier

efforts f the state to excludevillagersfromforests-deemedstatepropertynd

monopoly-the

new

regulations

mark somewhat ifferent

trategy

o

deploypower

to

manage resources. heydependon the emergence

nd cultivation f the sense

among village

elite that

the

local

forests re theirs.

Archivalrecords

rom

he late

nineteenth nd

early

twentieth

enturies,

when the

colonial

government

as still

attempting

o take over he

bulk

of Kumaon

forests,

how

that

common

omplaint

of

Forest

epartment

fficials as

that t

was

nearly mpossible

o catch

villagers

who

broke ulesbecause

they

efused

o inform n

each other.

ven

villageheadmen,

who

were

upposed

o

prevent

orest-related

nfractions,

ere

unreliable

Shrivastava

996,

168-88).

In

contrast, illage

council

eaders

oday omplain

hat

government

fficials

do notprovide hem ufficientupportnapprehendinghosewhobreak ouncil ules.

The

handing

ver

of

ocal forests o

villagers

nd their

onversionnto

council-

managed

forests as

wrought remarkable ransformation

n

the character f local

rules.

The new

regulations enetrate

eeper

nto

existing

ocial relations n

villages

and

create

multiple

channels

of

engagement

between

state officials nd

village

residents. ut not

all

these

ngagementsre

conflictual.

nstead,

ome

villagers those

who are

officials

n

the forest

ouncils)

ome to redefine

heir nterestss consonant

with hose

ftheForest nd RevenueDepartments.venwhile hey nd their

amilies

remain orest sers, heybecomethe agentsof state-facilitatedrotection

ithin

he



18/33


village.

Another

group

of

villagers forest sers) continues

o

be defined s the

opponents

f

protection. speciallyprominent

n this

redefinition

f

protectorsnd

users,official onserversnd incorrigible arvesters,re women and lower-caste

villagers see

next

section).The locus

of

the conflict etweenmanagement nd use

shifts.

t

is no

longerbetween ormallymployed tateofficials

nd

villageresidents.

Instead,

t

resideswithin hevillage, ven f ts ife epends

ltimately n the anctions

available

from he tate.

ts characteristiceature ecomes

onsent, ven

f

his onsent

is

ultimately ounded n the threat f coercion. ts chief

nstrumentemains ower,

but

it

is

power

exercised

through

numerous ocalized

points

of

engagement.

Reshaping

f

ndividual ctions s still ts principal im, but

t

is tobe accomplished

by making

the

villagers esponsible

or

management

nd

thereby

wareof the need

for

protection. hus, the decentralizationf regulationsmakes

villagers ccomplices

in their wn control.

AllocationRegimes and Their Effects

State control

ver forests reates

ypical nequalities

n

the

allocationof forest

products nd asymmetriesn the definitionsfsubjectivities.

hese inequalities nd

asymmetries inge upon

how

particularpeoples and groups

connect

with

state

managers.Some groupsand peoples are better ble to traverse he lines of state

authority

hat

permit the conversion f public resources nto

private profits.

Asymmetricistribution

f

benefits

nder ouncil

managementccurs oth s

a

result

of the

type

of rules some

councils create

and fromthe

unequal

enforcement

f

seemingly qual

rules.

If

villagers

are

accomplices

n their own

control,

their

complicity

s

non-reciprocal

nd

unequal.

Over the

past seventy ears,

orest

ouncilshave created

n

enormous

ange

of

rules.These rules

definewho can take

whatfrom

where

t what imeforwhat

purpose.

The "who"

refers

o

"right

holders

n

the

forest,"

who

may

be defined

y gender,

residencytatus,

r

access to monetary ower.The

"what"

ncludes odder,ivestock

grazing, uelwood fdifferentizes, imber,medicinal lants, ndstones, mong ther

products. imilardiversity haracterizeshe referentsf "where," when,"and the

uses to which harvested

products

are

put.

This tremendous

ariation n

rules

notwithstanding,

e must lso

acknowledge

hat he

objective

ehind

ivingvillagers

the

power

o create ules

was

to

regulate

nd

give shape

to an

even

greater iversity

of

forest-use

atterns

nd

everyday ractices

hathad

existed.

The

processes hrough

which

village

councils

re

empowered

o

create

nd enforce ules

go

hand in hand

with other

processes

hat

make rule

design,

rule

enforcement,

nd rule infractions

visible

to

powerful

u

agrawal. state formation

Documents