1. STATUTE AND THEIR ENACTMENT

- Title

Lidasan vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 29089, Oct. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 496

Effect if Title Does Not Completely Express the Subject

Facts: Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur," was passed. Lidasan came to know later on that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precints for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating Dianaton, it would be including in the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato.

ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province - Cotabato - to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?

HELD: The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.

- Steps in the Enactment of the Statute

Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630

Facts: These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."

Issue: Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious freedom?

Held: No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for

regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."

The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution

Arroyo vs. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, Aug. 14, 1997

Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House;Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious;Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules; andWhether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted. Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed. Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the

contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.

- Evidence of Due Enactment of Statutes

Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. I

Journal – Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory

Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."

**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the

Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.

Casco Phil. Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347

Journal – Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in same law. In compliance, Casco paid the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea and formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBP issued the vouchers for refund (pursuant to Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the bank’s auditor refused to honor the vouchers since he maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2, par 18 of RA 2609 which provides: "The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:

"XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users." The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBP’s auditor. Casco maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be construed as "urea and formaldehyde" He further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and, "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea formaldehyde", not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”.

HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. "Urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from "urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde" The opinions of any member of Congress does not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Morales vs. Subido, 26 SCRA 150

Journals vs Enrolled Bill

Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelor's degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief , Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for "failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position." Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:

"Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. - No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher."

Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police department of a city …” can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:

'No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.'

Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or has served as chief of police with exemplary record." Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into the matter.

HELD: The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain

matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

Astorga vs. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714

Journal – When to be Consulted

In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to Vice-Mayor Astorga presumably under authority of RA 4065. Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. Respondent denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said “law” passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as HB 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the HOR and was thereafter approved by the HOR. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the HOR for approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is still vald and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to determine if the said law was validly enacted.

HELD: The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. This SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding

such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.

- When Statute Becomes Effective

Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446

Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in the Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents contend, among others that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the OG is indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Art. 2 of NCC.

HELD: The interpretation given by respondent is in accord w/ this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the OG is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-- for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, w/c is the 15th day following its publication-- but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.Respondent's argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws w/ the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Art. 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the OG, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. xxx The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. The clear object of the law is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws w/c are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. W/o such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of w/c he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. It is needless to say that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.

Yaokasin vs. Commissioner of Customs, 180 SCRA 591

FACTS: On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags/ sacks of refined sugar, which were being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs.

On June 7, 1988 the District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the seized sugar to the petitioner Yaokasin.

On July 15, 1988, the Collector of Customs reversed his order to release the seized sugar since it is still subject for review by the Commissioner of Customs since it is adverse to the government citing the Customs Memorandum Order No. 20-87. This CMO implements Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan, which is under P.D. No. 1, dated September 24, 1972. This section 12 states that a decision of a Collector of

Customs in seizure and protest cases adverse to the government is subject to review by the Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary of Finance. When no decision is rendered after 30 days by either commisioner or secretary, the decision of the Collector of Customs shall become final and executory.

The petitioner objected the applicability of the Sec. 12 of the reorganization plan and the CMO No. 20-87 on the ground that they had not been published in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE: Is the enforcement of the Sec. 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and thereafter CMO No. 20-87 valid when these laws have not been published in the Official Gazette?

DECISION: Yes. CMO and Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan is enforceable. The requirement of Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 since it is only an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs to his subordinates, namely the customs collectors. Also in the Commonwealth Act No. 638, which enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, states that administrative orders and proclamations shall be published except when these have no general applicability. CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons, hence no general applicability therefore need not be published in the Official Gazette.

Bagatsing vs. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306

Facts: In 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 7522, regulating the operation of public markets and prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls and providing penalties for violation thereof. The Federation of Manila Market Vendors Inc. assailed the validity of the ordinance, alleging among others the non-compliance to the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.

Issue: Whether the publication requirement was complied with.

Held: The Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code id a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. Section 17 of the Charter speaks of “ordinance” in general. Whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to “ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges” in particular. While the Charter requires publication, before the enactment of the ordinance and after approval thereof, in two daily newspapers of the general circulation in the city, the Local Tax Code only prescribes for publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government or by posting the ordinance in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. Being a general law with a special provision applicable in the case, the Local Tax Code prevails.

- Language of the Statute That Shall Prevail

Roldan vs. Villaroman, 69 Phils. 12

- Manner of Computing Time

CIR v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., G.R. No. 162155, Aug. 28, 2007.

- Prospective and Retrospective Operation of Statutes

People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phils. 764

FACTS: Petitioner Guillermo Sumilang was convicted of the crime of arson by the CFI of Laguna. Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence. A petition for certiorari was filed but denied by the Supreme Court. A motion for reconsideration of the said decision for certiorari was also denied on July 17, 1944. The copy of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed on the same date, July 17, 1944, to the address of the petitioner’s attorney. The attorney now alleged that he did not receive the notice because “he was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerrilla officer of the Markings guerilla”. Hence the prayer for petition to file pleading or motion to the Court with a basis of the suspension, through a resolution of the Court dated October 1, 1945, of Sec 8 Rule 53 of the Rules of Court. The resolution provides that judgment shall be entered upon expiration of the fifteen days from notice of such judgment to the parties in accordance with the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:Should the resolution of the Court dated October 1, 1945 be given retroactive application to decision made on July 17, 1944 thus allowing petitioner to file a motion or pleading?

DECISION:No. The decision of the Court on July 17, 1944 already became final before the resolution took effect on October 1, 1945. Procedural laws, of which the Rules of Court and the resolution are examples, are retroactive in the sense and to the extent that it applies only to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.

Salcedo vs. Carpio, 89 Phils. 254

Tiu San. Vs. Republic, 96 Phils. 817

FACTS:Petitioner, Tiu San alias Angel Gomez was denied certificate of naturalization on June 3, 1953 by the court due to his conviction on April 25, 1952 for a violation of a municipal ordinance of Lucena, Quezon that occurred during the intervening two years from promulgation of the decision for naturalization dated July 13, 1950 pursuant to R.A. No. 530. The petitioner alleged that, with reference to R.A. No. 530 Sec. 1 clause (3), this provision is not applicable to the case at bar since the violation of the aforementioned ordinance occurred prior to the enactment of the said R.A. No. 530.

ISSUE:Should R.A. 530 be given retrospective effect?

DECISION:Yes. By virtue of Sec 4 of R.A. No. 530, except with reference to the date of the hearing of the petition for naturalization, the said Act was meant to have a retrospective operation. This section of the Act provides:

“This Act shall take effect upon its approval, and shall apply to cases pending in court and to those where the applicant has not yet taken the oath of citizenship...”

Chavez vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, 9 SCRA 412

Aquilino de los Reyes bought of a parcel of Riceland with theintention of working it himself but he could not take possession of the landbecause the then incumbent tenant, Pablo Chavez, did not want to surrender theland to its new owner. According to Pablo Chavez his son Eugenio Chavezwas working the land for him, he was 74 years of age already.

Aquilino de los Reyes filed a petition with this Court againstPablo Chavez asking for authority to dispossess said tenant but suit was dismissed.

Then, Pablo Chavez died of old age (senility) on October 21, 1958. When he died the law governing tenant andlandowner relation is Republic Act No.1199. Under this statute the tenancy relationship between the petitionerChavez and respondent De los Reyes was terminated by reason of such death.

On April 8, 1959 Eugenio Chavez filed apetition, this time R.A. No. 1199 was amended by R.A. No. 2263. Unlike R.A. No. 1199, he amendment providesfor the continuance of the relationship in the event of the tenant’s death orincapacity “between the landholder and one member of the tenant’simmediate farm household who is related to the tenant within the second degreeof consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land himself personally …”.

Issue: Can R.A. No. 2263 be applied retroactively?

Held: Republic Act 2263 cannot be applied retroactively.

Since the law in force on October21, 1958, when the tenant Pablo Chavez died, was Republic Act 1199, underwhich the tenancy relationship between him and respondent De los Reyes wasterminated by reason of such death, the subsequent enactment of Republic Act2263 did not operate to confer upon petitioner any successional right tocontinue as tenant.

In Ulpiendo v. CAR the Court ruled that “The amendment to section 9, RepublicAct No. 1199 by Republic Act No. 2263 providing for the continuance of therelationship in the event of the tenant’s death or incapacity “between thelandholder and one member of the tenant’s immediate farm household who isrelated to the tenant within the second degree of consanguinity and who shallcultivate the land himself personally …” which took effect on 19 June1959, cannot be applied retroactively.” To hold otherwise would lay openthis particular provision of the law to the objection of unconstitutionality,on the ground that it impairs a substantive right that has already becomevested.

Buyco vs. PNB, 2 SCRA 682

Facts: The petitioner was indebted to respondent which was secured by a mortgage of real property. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate that is more than sufficient to cover the loan which he offered as payment for the deficit on April 24, 1956.

Respondent denied the offered payment due to its amended Charter which provides that "...the authority herein granted shall not be used as regards backpay certificates", enacted on June 16, 1956 as RA 1576.

Petitioner filed this case praying that the respondent be compelled to accept his Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate as payment of his obligation.

Issue: Can RA 1576 be applied retroactively?

Decision: NO. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided" (Art. 4, New Civil Code).

This has bearing on the case at bar inasmuch as the herein mentioned Act does not contain any provision regarding its retroactivity.

Therefore, the present case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in question was made.

Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. CIR, 96 SCRA 342

Facts: CTA decision ordered the petitioner CIR to refund to the Cebu Portland Cement Company, respondent, P 359,408.98 representing overpayments of ad valorem taxes on cement sold by it. Execution of judgement was opposed by the petitioner citing that private respondent had an outstanding sales tax liability to which the judgment debt had already been credited. In fact, there was still a P4 M plus balance they owed. The Court of Tax Appeals, in holding that the alleged sales tax liability of the private respondent was still being questioned and therefore could not be set-off against the refund, granted private respondent's motion. The private respondent questioned the assessed tax based on Article 186 of the Tax Code, contending that cement was adjudged a mineral and not a manufactured product; and thusly they were not liable for their alleged tax deficiency. Thereby, petitioner filed this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not assessment of taxes can be enforced even if there is a case contesting it.

Held: The argument that the assessment cannot as yet be enforced because it is still being contested loses sight of the urgency of the need to collect taxes as "the lifeblood of the government." If the payment of taxes could be postponed by simply questioning their validity, the machinery of the state would grind to a halt and all government functions would be paralyzed. That is the reason why, save for the exception in RA 1125 , the Tax Code provides that injunction is not available to restrain collection of tax. Thereby, we hold that the respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in its order.

Taclan vs. Court of Appeals, 12 SCRA 319

Eugenio vs. Drilon, 252 SCRA 106

FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots.Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of non-development on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spousesRelevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed forannulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 “TheSubdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”, the Human SettlementsRegulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstatePrivate Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him ofthe payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitionerclaims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not beengiven retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-paymentof the amortizations.ISSUE:W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect. HELD:No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse ofdiscretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even thosecontracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly providefor retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakableintent of the law. “The intent of the statute is the law.”

Alunan III vs. Mirasol, 276 SCRA 501

2. AMENDMENT, REVISIONS, REPEALS

A. Amendments

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Social Security Commission, 1 SCRA 10

FACTS:Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that “Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Archbishop of Manila” be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161, otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954.Petitioner contends that the term “employer” as defined in the law should— following the principle of ejusdem generis--- be limited to those who carry on “undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain,” because the phrase “activity of any kind” in the definition is preceded by the words “any trade, business, industry, undertaking.ISSUE: W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can be applied in this case.HELD: No. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the

plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. The definition of the term “employer” is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included.

Estrada vs. Caseda, 84 Phils. 791

Facts: On September 5, 1945, plaintiff brought this suit, for unlawful detainer, because one of her married daughters was going to occupy them by the first of the following month; that defendant refused to leave. On October 13, 1945, Judge Mariano Nable, then of the municipal court, gave judgment for plaintiff with order for defendant to pay the rent from October 1, 1945, at the rate of P26 a month. On the case being appealed to the CFI, Judge Rafael Dinglasan presiding, cited "Commonwealth Act No. 689. The court correctly held that the fact that the premises under lease were needed by plaintiff's married daughter was not comprehended in the said Act. The requirements to evict occupants were provided in above-mentioned Act, which was approved on October 15, 1945. Section 14 of that Act provided that the same "shall be in force for a period of two years after its approval." Republic Act No. 66, approved on October 18, 1946, amended section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689 so as to read as follows: "Section 14. This Act shall be in force for a period of four years after its approval."

Issue: Whether or not there is retroactivity of the amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 689 By RA No. 66.

Held: Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act No. 66, cannot be given retroactive effect. The provision of Republic Act No. 66 amending section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689, related back to, and should be computed from the date of the approval of the amended act, that is October 15, 1945. The period as thus construed expired on October 15, 1949.The cause of action in the case at bar arose before the passage of the Acts. An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute had been repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form had been adopted in its stead.

Neri San Jose vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp. 98 Phils. 38

FACTS:Appellee Paz Neri San Jose paid in full settlement of her loan plus interests the sum of P7, 162.59 on March 14, 1951. By virtue of the amended section 2 of RA No. 401 (approved on June 18, 1949) by RA No. 671 which took effect on June 16, 1951, appellee wished to recover the amount of P2, 162.59 which was charged to him as interest payment by the appellant Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. This interest payment should be condoned as stated by the amendatory law. The appellee contends that it is a rule of statutory construction that amendatory laws are to be considered as forming part of the original from the date of the latter’s enactment, or retroacts to the date of the original.

ISSUE:

Should the amended act, RA No. 671, retroact to the date of the original law, RA No. 401?

DECISION:Yes but with an exception. When a statute is amended and re-enacted the amendment should be construed as if it had been included in the original act; but it cannot be retroactive unless plainly made so by the terms of the amendment.

Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games andAmusement Board, 107 Phils. 151

Sarcos vs. Castillo, 26 SCRA 853

FACTS: Sarcos, an independent candidate, won in the 14 November 1967 elections, asMayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur. Castillo charged Sarcos with misconduct anddishonesty in office. Such act alleged constituted connivance with certain privateindividuals, to cut and fell timber and selling of the timber cut, for own use andbenefit, within the communal forest reserve of the municipality of Barobo, Surigaodel Sur, to the damage and prejudice of the public and the government.As early as 18 April 196 there was already a charge under oath for abuse of officialpower in consenting to and authorizing the violations of forestry laws was filedagainst petitioner by Municipal Council of Barobo. It was on the basis of thisadministrative complaint that the Castillo filed petition ordering the immediatesuspension of Sarcos from position as Mayor saying that the acts committed bymayor Sarcos affects his official integrity, the petition was in accordance with theSec.5 of RA 5185- Decentralization Act of 1967.ISSUES: WON Provincial Governor is vested power to order preventive suspension of Mayor Sarcos under RA 5185 HELD / RATIONALE: No. Castillo as governor lacks authority to order the preventive suspension of thePetitioner, Sarcos. According to the Decentralization Act of 1967, particularly theparagraph dealing with preventive suspension: "…The President, Provincial Boardand City or Municipality Council, as the case may be, shall hear and investigate thetruth or falsity if the charges within 1- days after receipt of such notice." It was theformer law Sec. 2188 of Rev. Adm. Code which gives power to the Governor toorder preventive suspension, however, it was already repealed by theDecentralization Act of 1967.The court was also lead to the suspicion that politics was a cause for the order byGovernor of the preventive suspension of the Mayor, being an independentcandidate thus of a different political persuasion.The writs of certiorari and prohibition are then granted. The preventive suspensionorder by Castillo is annulled and set aside. Mayor Sarcos to be reinstated to his position.The Decentralization Act, to which the decision in this case is based, amended /repealed Sec. 2188, Rev. Adm. Code. The former law provides that the provincial governor, if the charge against a municipal official was municipal official was one affecting his official integrity, could order his preventive suspension. It was repealed by the RA NO. 5185 Sec. 5 which provides that now it is the provincial board which has been granted the power to order preventive suspension

B. Revisions and Reenactments

Montelibano vs. Ferrer, 97 Phils. 228

American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, 101 Phils. 386

Facts: New York’s Education Law requires local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grade 7 to 12, including those in private schools. The Board of Education contended that said statute was invalid and violative of the State and Federal Constitutions. An order barring the Commissioner of Education (Allen) from removing appellant’s members from office for failure to comply with the requirement and an order preventing the use of state funds for the purchase of textbooks to be lent to parochial schools were sought for. The trial court held the statute unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint since the appellant have no standing. The New York Court of Appeals, ruled that the appellants have standing but the law is not unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or Not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).'

Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices.It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.WHEREFORE, defendant shall return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 142

Ortiz vs. Comelec, 62 SCRA 612

Facts: The petitioner was appointed as COMELEC Commissioner by then President Marcos for a term expiring on May 17, 1992. Following the installation of the Aquino government, the petitioner submitted a "courtesy resignation" which was accepted by President Aquino. The petitioner requested for payment of retirement benefits by invoking RA 1568, as amended by RA 3595 and re-enacted by RA 6118, which was denied by the respondent on the ground that he is "not entitled to retirement benefits under RA 1568, as amended" without specifying the reason therefor.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to retirement benefits as provided by RA 1568 and re-enacted by RA 6118.

Decision: YES. RA 6118 as a retirement law is remedial in character which should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to benefit thereby. This is, as it should be, because the liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced.

C. Repeals

U.S. vs. Soliman, 36 Phils. 5

Gaerlan vs. Catubig, 17 SCRA 376

Facts: In the 1963 elections, among the registered candidates for councilors in the eight -seat City Council of Dagupan were Gregorio Gaerlan and Luis Catubig. The latter obtained the third highest number of votes and was proclaimed one of the elected councilors while the former lost his bid. Gaerlan went to the Court to challenge Catubig’s eligibility for office on the averment of non-age. Catubig was born in Dagupan City on May 19, 1939. At the time he presented his certificate of candidacy on September 10, 1963, he was 24 years, 3 months and 22 days; on election day, November 12, 1963, he was 24 years, 5 months and 24 days; and at the time he took his oath of office as councilor on January 1, 1964,3 he was 24 years, 7 months and 13 days. Whether his age be reckoned as of the date of the filing of certificate of candidacy, or the election date, or the date set by law for the assumption of office the - result is the same. Whichever date is adopted, still, respondent was below 25 years of age. The judgment held Catubig ineligible and declared his seat vacant. Catubig appealed and alleged that the question of age eligibility should be governed not by R.A. 170, and not by R.A. 2259. Republic Act No. 484 amending, inter alia, Section 12 of the Dagupan City Charter, took effect on June 10, 1950; whereas, Republic Act No. 2259 became law on June 19, 1959 - nine years later. R .A . 170, as amendedSec. 12 x xx the elective members of the Municipality Board shall be qualified electors of the city, residents therein for at least one year, and not less than twenty- three years of age. xxx" R .A .2 2 5 9Sec. 6.No person shall be a City Mayor, Vice-Mayor, or Councilor unless he is at least twenty-five years of age, resident of the city for one year prior to his election and is a qualified voter.

Issue:Whether or not Sec. 12 of R.A. 170 of the Dagupan City Charter, as amended, has been repealed by Sec. 6 of R.A. 2259

Decision: Yes. The judgment appealed from was affirmed. The question of whether or not a special law has been repealed or amended by one or more subsequent general laws is dependent mainly on the intent of the Congress in enacting the latter. The discussions on the floor of Congress show beyond doubt that its members intended to amend o r repeal all provisions of special laws inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 2259, except those which are expressly excluded from the operation thereof. In fact, Section 9 of R.A. 2259 states that

All Acts or parts of Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations in consistent with theprovisions of this Ac t, are hereby repealed.Section 1 of R.A. 2259 makes reference to "all chartered cities in the Philippines”, whereas Section 8 excludes from the operation of the Act "the cities of Manila, Cavite, Trece Martires and Tagaytay", and Section 4 contains a proviso exclusively for the City of Baguio, thus showing clearly that all cities not particularly excepted from the provisions of said Act are subject thereto. The only reference to Dagupan City in R.A. 2259 is found in Section 2 stating that voters in said city, and in the City of Iloilo, are expressly precluded to vote for provincial officials. Since Dagupan City is removed from the exceptions of R.A. 2259, it stands to reason itself that its charter provision on the age limit is thereby repealed. Until Congress decrees otherwise, we are not to tamper with the present statutory set-up. Rather, we should go by what the legislative body has expressly ordained. It is accordingly held that respondent is disqualified on the ground of non -age because at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, at the time of the election, and at the time he took his oath of office, he was below the age of 25 years.

Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Assn. Vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377

Facts: On December 26, 1964, Jose y. Feliciano, chairman and general manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the president may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the national economic council as embodied in its resolution no. 70, series of 1964.On December 28,1964, the cabinet approve d the needed importation after the said referral of the president. The chairman Jose y. Feliciano of the rice and corn administration announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding for February 1, 1965. The said facts were all pursuant to a certain provision in republic act 2207.Considering the said importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the petitioners together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant petition before this court asking for a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents.

Issue:WON RA 2207 was impliedly repealed by RA 3452?

Held:Republic Act 2207 still stands. RA 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when there is shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These two laws, therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.A repealing clause in an Act which provides that “all laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly” is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts.The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no such inconsistency.Wherefore, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this court is hereby dissolved. Cost against petitioners.

Lagman vs. City of Manila, 17 SCRA 579

Facts: Petitioner was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public service Commission to operate for public service fifteen (15) auti trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers and freight. Pursuant to the said certificate, petitioner who is doing business under the name and style of “Marco Transit”, began operating twelve (12) passenger buses along his authorized line.On june 17, 1964, the Municipal Board of respondent City of Manila, in pursuance to section 18, paragraph hh, of RA no. 409, as amended (otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila), enacted ordinance no. 4986, entitled “an ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets within the City of Manila, and for other purposes”, which the city mayor approved. The pertinent provisions of said ordinance includes;“Section 1. As a positive measure to relieve the critical congestion in the City of Manila, which has grown to alarming and emergency proportions, and in the best interest of public welfare and convenience, xxx”Petitioner Lagman claims that the enactment and enforcement of ordinance no. 4986 is unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void. He contends that regulation and control relating to the use of and traffic of which are vested, under Commonwealth Act no. 548, in the Director of Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. He also contends that the public Service Commission has the only right to enact Ordinance amending or modifying a certificate of public convenience granted by the said office. In compliance with Sec. 16(m), public service Act.

Issue:WON R.A. no. 409, as amended (Revised charter of the City of Manila) prevails over Commonwealth Act no.

598 and Public Service law (C.A. no. 146, as amended)?

Held:Republic act no. 409 prevails. The said act is a special law and of later enactment than C.A. no 548 and the Public Service law (C.A. no 146, as amended) so that even if a conflict exist between the provisions of the former and the latter acts, Republic Act no. 409 should prevail.Although the Public Service Commission is empowered, under Sec. 16(m) of C.A. no 146 to amend, modify or revoke certificates of public convenience after notice and hearing, there is no provision which can be found in this statute vesting power in the Public Service Commission to superintend, regulate or control the streets of the city of manila or suspend its power to license or prohibit the occupancy thereof. On the other hand, this authority is conferred upon the city of manila. The power vested in the public service commission under section 16(m) is, therefore, subordinate to the authority granted to the said city under section 18(hh) of its revised charter.Furthermore, C.A. no. 548 does not confer an exclusive power or authority upon the Director of public works------to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the use of and traffic on national roads and streets. This being the case, section 18(m) of the revised charter of the city of manila is deemed enacted as an exception to the provisions of C.A. no. 548, for repeals by implication are not favored, and special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general law, in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.Wherefore, petition for prohibition is hereby dismissed. With cost against petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman.

National Power Corp. vs. Arca, 24 SCRA 231

Facts:On December 26, 1963, the Philippine Power and Development Company(PPDC) and the Dagupan Electric Corporation (DEC), in their own behalf and on that of all the electric plant operators, who are members of the Philippine Electric Plant Owners' Association (PEPOA), filed an injunction suit to restrain enforcement by the NAPOCOR of a revised rate of charges for electric power and energy sold by the latter, which was scheduled to take effect on January 1, 1964. The petition alleged that the unilateral revision by NAPOCOR of the rate and its imposition upon PPDC and DEC of the amended contracts embodying said new rates, without first submitting them to arbitration, was in gross violation of the provisions of the current contracts between them.

Issue:Whether Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 120 has been repealed by R.A. 2677.

Held:Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 120 has not been repealed by R.A. 2677. The court held that a special law, like Com. Act No. 120, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, like Republic Act. No. 2677, although the terms of the general statute are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law, in the absence of a clear intent to repeal. There appears no such legislative intent to repeal or abrogate the provisions of the earlier law. From the explanatory note to

House Bill No. 4030, that later become Republic Act No. 2677, it was explicit that the jurisdiction conferred upon the Republic Service Commission over the public utilities operated by government-owned or controlled corporations is to be confined to the fixing of rates of such public services, ' in order to avoid cutthroat or ruinous and unfair competition detrimental to operators and to the public interests.

People vs. Pimentel, 288 SCRA 542 (1998)

FACTS: 1983. Tujan charged with subversions under RA 1700 with warrant of arrest issued. On June 5, 1990, Tujan was arrested and caught with .38 caliber revolver. On June 14, 1990, he was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of subversion (PD 1866) Tujan filed motion to quash invoking protection versus double jeopardy (Art. III, Constitution; Misolas v. Panga; and Enrile v. Salazar: alleged possession absorbed in subversion. It was granted by the trial court and the court of appeals.

ISSUE: WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double jeopardy in view of the previous charge under RA 1700.

Ratio: No.1. Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117 Revised Rules of Court state that for double jeopardy to occur, acquittal, conviction or dismissal in previous cases must have occurred. In this case, first case was not even arraigned yet.2. They are different offenses. R.A. 1700 punishes subversion while PD 1866 punishes illegal possession of firearms.

However, since RA 7636 totally repealed subversion or RA 1700, and since this is favorable to the accused, we can no longer charge accused with RA 1700 even if they didn’t raise this issue. PD 1866 should be amended to mere illegal possession of firearms without furtherance of subversion

Held: RTC and CA reversed and set aside. RA 1700 charge dismissed. PD 1866 change amended. Release Tujan.