A m o o t a n d a c a d e m i c c a s e i s o n e t h a t c e a s e s t o p r e s e n t a j u s ti c i a b l e c o n t r o v e r s y b y v i r t u e o f supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of c o n t r o l l i n g p r i n c i p l e s t o g u i d e t h e b e n c h , t h e b a r , a n d t h e p u b l i c ; a n d ( 4 ) t h e c a s e i s c a p a b l e o f repetition yet evading review.

Actions; moot and academic principle. Verily, in Gancho-on v. Secreatry of Labor and Employment, the Court emphatically stated that:

It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

Actions; moot and academic principle; nature and exceptions. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Although the controversy could have ceased due to the intervening appointment of and assumption by Cadiz as the Solicitor General during the pendency of this suit, and such cessation of the controversy seemingly rendered moot and academic the resolution of the issue of the constitutionality of the concurrent holding of the two positions by Agra, the Court should still go forwards and resolve the issue and not abstain from exercising its power of judicial review because this case comes under several of the well-recognized exceptions obtained, namely: (1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; (4) the case was capable of repetition, yet evading review.

The term statutory interpretation refers to the action of a court in trying to understand and explaining the meaning of a piece of legislation. Many cases go to appeal on a point of interpretation, Indeed, Lord Hailsham, a senior English judge, once said that “probably 9 out of 10 cases heard by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords turn upon or involve the meaning of words contained in statute or secondary legislation.”

Why is this the case? First, laws must be drafted in general terms and must deal with both present and future situations. Often, a law which was drafted with one particular situation in mind will eventually be applied to quite different situations. A classic example is the UK Criminal Justice Act, part of which was originally designed to curb illegal warehouse parties but which was later used to crush demonstrations, often involving people from very different backgrounds to those attending the so-called raves.

Legislation is drawn up by draftsmen, and a draftsman’s capacity to anticipate the future is limited. He may not foresee some future possibility, or overlook a possible misinterpretation of the original intentions of the legislation. Another problem is legislation often tries to deal with problems that involve different and conflicting interests.

Both legal and general English contain many words with more than one meaning. In fact, some of the terms in TransLegal’s Legal English Dictionary have seven or more distinct definitions. With this being the case, even the best drafted legislation can include many ambiguities. This is not the fault of the draftsman, simply a reflection of the fact that where people look at a text from different points of view they will naturally find different meanings in the language used.

Judges in England generally apply three basic rules of statutory interpretation, and similar rules are also used in other common law jurisdictions. The literal rule, the golden rule and the mischief rule. Although judges are not bound to apply these rules, they generally take one of the following three approaches, and the approach taken by any one particular judge is often a reflection of that judge’s own philosophy.

The Literal Rule

Under the literal rule (also: the ordinary meaning rule; the plain meaning rule), it is the task of the court to give a statute’s words their literal meaning regardless of whether the result is sensible or not. In a famous judgment, Lord Diplock in Duport Steel v Sirs (1980) said “The courts may sometimes be willing to apply this rule despite the manifest absurdity that may result from the outcome of its application.” The literal rule is often applied by orthodox judges who believe that their constitutional role is limited to applying laws as enacted by Parliament. Such judges are wary of being seen to create law, a role which they see as being strictly limited to the elected legislative branch of government. In determining the intention of the legislature in passing a particular statute, this approach restricts a judge to the so called black letter of the law. The literal rule has been the dominant approach taken for over 100 years.

The Golden Rule

The golden rule (also: the British rule) is an exception to the literal rule and will be used where the literal rule produces the result where Parliament’s intention would be circumvented rather than applied. In Grey v Pealson (1857), Lord Wensleygale said : “The literal rule should be used first, but if it results in absurdity, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.”

One example of the application of the golden rule is the case of R v Allen – Defendant is charged with bigamy, an offence prohibited in Offences Against Persons Act 1861 which reads “whoever is married, marries another commits bigamy.” The court held that the word “marries” need not mean a contract of marriage as it was impossible for a person who is already married to enter into another valid contract of marriage. Hence, the court interpreted it as “going through marriage ceremony”.

The Mischief Rule

The final rule of statutory interpretation is the mischief rule, under which a judge attempts to determine the legislator’s intention; what is the “mischief and defect” that the statute in question has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy? The classic statement of the mischief rule is that given by the Barons of the Court of Exchequer in Heydon’s Case (1854): “…for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general, four things are to be discerned and considered:

1. What was the common law before the making of the Act?2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?3. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth?4. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judge is always to make such construction or shall suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief and pro private commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.

This system of relying on external sources such as the common law in determining the true intention of the parliament is now seen as part of the purposive approach, the approach generally taken in the civil law jurisdictions of mainland Europe. Although the literal approach has been dominant in common law systems for over a century, judges now appear to be less bound by the black letter of the law and are more willing to try to determine the true intention of the Parliament. The task of the judge is now seen as being give effect to the legislative purpose of the statute in question.

As well as these three rules of interpretation, there are a number of rules that are held to apply when determining the meaning of a statute:

1. The statute is presumed not to bind the Crown2. Statutes do not operate retrospectively in respect to substantive law (as opposed to procedural law)3. They do not interfere with legal rights already vested4. They do not oust the jurisdiction of the courts5. They do not detract from constitutional law or international law

Finally, there are a number of intrinsic (=interal) and extrinsic (=external) aids to statutory interpretation.

Intrinsic (Internal) Aids to Statutory Interpretation

These are things found within the statute which help judges understand the meaning of the statute more clearly.

• the long and the short title• the preamble• definition sections• schedules• headings

Extrinsic (External) Aids to Statutory Interpretation

These are things found outside of the actual statute which may be considered by judges to help them understand the meaning of a statute more clearly.

• dictionaries• historical setting• previous statutes• earlier case law• Hansard• Law Commission Reports• International Conventions