stare decisis research.docx

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Ting vs. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009

This doctrine of adherence to precedents orstare decisiswas applied by the

English courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now

Chief Justice) Reynato S. unos discussion on the historical de!elop"ent of this

legal principle in his dissenting opinion inLambino v. Commission on

Elections#$%&is enlightening'

The latin phrasestare decisis et non quieta movere"eans stand

by the thing and do not disturb the cal". The doctrine started with the

English Courts. lacstone obser!ed that at the beginning of the *+th

century, it is an established rule to abide by for"er precedents where thesa"e points co"e again in litigation. As the rule e!ol!ed, early li"its to

its application were recogni-ed' (*) it would not be followed if it were

plainly unreasonable (%) where courts of e/ual authority de!eloped

conflicting decisions and, (0) the binding force of the decision was the

actual principle or principles necessary for the decision not the words or

reasoning used to reach the decision.

The doctrine "igrated to the United States. 1t was recogni-ed by

the fra"ers of the U.S. Constitution. According to 2a"ilton, strict rules

and precedents are necessary to pre!ent arbitrary discretion in thecourts. 3adison agreed but stressed that 4 4 4 once the precedent

!entures into the real" of altering or repealing the law, it should be

re5ected. rof. Conso!oy well noted that 2a"ilton and 3adison disagree

about the counter!ailing policy considerations that would allow a 5udge

to abandon a precedent. 2e added that their ideas re!eal a deep internal

conflict between the concreteness re/uired by the rule of law and the

fle4ibility de"anded in error correction. 1t is this internal conflict that

the Supre"e Court has atte"pted to deal with for o!er two centuries.

1ndeed, two centuries of A"erican case law will confir" rof.Conso!oy6s obser!ation althoughstare decisisde!eloped its own life in

the United States. Two strains ofstare decisisha!e been isolated by legal

scholars. The first, nown as vertical stare decisisdeals with the duty of

lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases

in!ol!ing the sa"e facts. The second, nown as horizontal stare

decisisre/uires that high courts "ust follow its own precedents. rof.
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Conso!oy correctly obser!es that !erticalstare decisishas been !iewed

as an obligation, while hori-ontalstare decisis, has been !iewed as a

policy, i"posing choice but not a co""and. 1ndeed,stare decisisis not

one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.

1t is also instructi!e to distinguish the two inds ofhori-ontalstare decisisconstitutionalstare decisisand statutorystare

decisis. Constitutional stare decisisin!ol!es 5udicial interpretations of

the Constitution while statutory stare decisisin!ol!es interpretations of

statutes. The distinction is i"portant for courts en5oy "ore fle4ibility in

refusing to applystare decisisin constitutional litigations. Justice

randeis6 !iew on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional

litigations still holds sway today. 1n soothing prose, randeis

stated' Stare decisisis not . . . a uni!ersal and ine4orable co""and. The

rule ofstare decisisis not infle4ible. 7hether it shall be followed or

departed fro", is a /uestion entirely within the discretion of the court,

which is again called upon to consider a /uestion once decided. 1n the

sa"e !ein, the !enerable Justice 8ranfurter opined' the ulti"ate

touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we

ha!e said about it. 1n contrast, the application ofstare decisison 5udicial

interpretation of statutes is "ore infle4ible. As Justice Ste!ens e4plains'

after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent

course of decision by other federal 5udges and agencies, it ac/uires a

"eaning that should be as clear as if the 5udicial gloss had been drafted

by the Congress itself. This stance reflects both respect for Congress6role and the need to preser!e the courts6 li"ited resources.

1n general, courts follow thestare decisisrule for an ense"ble of

reasons, viz.' (*) it legiti"i-es 5udicial institutions (%) it pro"otes

5udicial econo"y and, (0) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise,

courts refuse to be bound by thestare decisisrule where (*) its

application perpetuates illegiti"ate and unconstitutional holdings (%) it

cannot acco""odate changing social and political understandings (0) it

lea!es the power to o!erturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of

Congress and, (9) acti!ist 5udges can dictate the policy for future courtswhile 5udges that respectstare decisisare stuc agreeing with the".

1n its %::;year history, the U.S. Supre"e Court has refused to

follow thestare decisisrule and re!ersed its decisions in *


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constitutional a state law re/uire"ent that races be segregated on public

transportation. 1nBrown, the U.S. Supre"e Court, unani"ously held that

separate . . . is inherently une/ual. Thus, by freeing itself fro" the

shacles ofstare decisis, the U.S. Supre"e Court freed the colored

A"ericans fro" the chains of ine/uality. 1n the hilippine setting, this

Court has liewise refused to be strait5aceted by thestare decisisrule inorder to pro"ote public welfare. 1nLa BugalB'laan !ribal "ssociation#

$nc. v. %amos, we re!ersed our original ruling that certain pro!isions of

the 3ining =aw are unconstitutional. Si"ilarly, in Secretary of &ustice v.

Lantion, we o!erturned our first ruling and held, on "otion for

reconsideration, that a pri!ate respondent is bereft of the right to notice

and hearing during the e!aluation stage of the e4tradition process.

An e4a"ination of decisions onstare decisisin "a5or countries

will show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered

before o!erturning prior rulings. These are worability, reliance,

inter!ening de!elop"ents in the law and changes in fact. 1n addition,

courts put in the balance the following deter"inants' closeness of the

!oting, age of the prior decision and its "erits.

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow

thestare decisisrule in constitutional litigations isPlanned Parentood

v. Casey. 1t established a 9;pronged test. The court should (*) deter"ine

whether the rule has pro!ed to be intolerable si"ply in defying practical

worability (%) consider whether the rule is sub5ect to a ind of reliancethat would lend a special hardship to the conse/uences of o!erruling and

add ine/uity to the cost of repudiation (0) deter"ine whether related

principles of law ha!e so far de!eloped as to ha!e the old rule no "ore

than a re"nant of an abandoned doctrine and, (9) find out whether facts

ha!e so changed or co"e to be seen differently, as to ha!e robbed the old

rule of significant application or 5ustification.#$0&

De as!ro vs. "#, $%ril 20, 2010

7e deny the "otions for reconsideration for lac of "erit, for all the "atters being

thereby raised and argued, not being new, ha!e all been resol!ed by the decision of

3arch *>, %:*:.
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?onetheless, the Court opts to dwell on so"e "atters only for the purpose of

clarification and e"phasis.

First' 3ost of the "o!ants contend that the principle ofstare decisisis

controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or

abandoning (alenzuela.#*&

The contention has no basis.

Stare decisisderi!es its na"e fro" the =atin "a4i"stare decisis et non quieta

movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. 1t

si"ply "eans that a principle underlying the decision in one case is dee"ed of

i"perati!e authority, controlling the decisions of lie cases in the sa"e court and

in lower courts within the sa"e 5urisdiction, unless and until the decision in

/uestion is re!ersed or o!erruled by a court of co"petent authority. The decisionsrelied upon as precedents are co""only those of appellate courts, because the

decisions of the trial courts "ay be appealed to higher courts and for that reason

are probably not the best e!idence of the rules of law laid down.#%&

Judicial decisions assu"e the sa"e authority as a statute itself and, until

authoritati!ely abandoned, necessarily beco"e, to the e4tent that they are

applicable, the criteria that "ust control the actuations, not only of those called

upon to abide by the", but also of those duty;bound to enforce obedience to the".#0&1n a hierarchical 5udicial syste" lie ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind

the lower courts, but the courts of co;ordinate authority do not bind each other. The

one highest court does not bind itself, being in!ested with the innate authority to

rule according to its best lights.#9&

The Court, as the highest court of the land, "ay be guided but is not

controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new "e"bership, is not

obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it deter"ines, after re;

e4a"ination, to call for a rectification.#$&The adherence to precedents is strict and

rigid in a co""on;law setting lie theUnited @ingdo", where 5udges "ae law as

binding as an Act of arlia"ent.#&ut ours is not a co""on;law syste" hence,5udicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A 5udicial

pronounce"ent in an earlier decision may befollowed as a precedent in a

subse/uent case only when its reasoning and 5ustification are rele!ant, and the

court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and 5ustification to be applicable to

the case. The application of the precedent is for the sae of con!enience and

stability.
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8or the inter!enors to insist that (alenzuelaought not to be disobeyed, or

abandoned, or re!ersed, and that its wisdo" should guide, if not control, the Court

in this case is, therefore, de!oid of rationality and foundation. They see" to

con!eniently forget that the Constitution itself recogni-es the innate authority of

the Court en bancto "odify or re!erse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in

any decision rendered en bancor in di!ision.

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