4-it._, —pU..

The struggle for Bunker Hill costthe Marines 48 killed, 313 serious-ly wounded, and hundreds of oth-ers who suffered minor wounds.The number of known Chinesedead exceeded 400 and total casu-alties may have numbered 3,200.The month ended with Bunker Hillin Marine hands.

supporting weapons laid downfinal protective fires that preventedthis latest attack from gainingmomentum. Fate then intervenedwhen the crew of an M-46 tanktriggered the shutter of its search-light and illuminated a force ofChinese massing in a draw. Beforethese soldiers could launch theirassault, fire from tanks, artillery,and mortars tore into the group,killing or wounding many andscattering the survivors.

Even though Marine-supportingweapons had deflected thisplanned thrust, the Chineseregrouped, called in additionalsupporting fire, and plungedahead, The bombardment by mor-tars and artillery attained a volumeof 100 rounds per minute beforeending at about 0400, when theenemy realized that he could notoverwhelm Bunker Hill and calledoff his attack, at least for the pre-sent. When the threat abated,Demas withdrew his company tothe main line of resistance, leavingthe defense of Bunker Hill toCaptain Scranton's Company B.

The quiet lasted only until lateafternoon. At 1640, the Chineseattacked during a thunderstorm,avoiding the use of mortars orartillery, presumably to achievesurprise, but once again the attackfailed. The Chinese refused, how-ever, to abandon their attempts toseize Bunker Hill. At 0040, 16August, a Chinese battalionattacked behind mortar andartillery fire, penetrating to thecrest of the hill. Captain Scranton,whose Company B held the hill,called for reinforcements, and aplatoon from Company I, 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, arrived asthis assault was ending. Theenemy again probed the hill withfire but did not press the attack.Before Company C, 1st Battalion,1st Marines, relieved Scranton'sunit, it came under artillery firethree more times.

The succession of Marine com-panies that took over Bunker Hillhad to repel seven attacks beforethe end of August, but only one,on the night of 25-26 August,threatened to overrun the outpost.

23

The capture of Bunker Hill byColonel Layer's Marines and itssubsequent defense relied on thedeadly use of supporting arms,ranging from the tanks that hadspearheaded the diversion againstSiberia, through mortars andartillery, to aircraft. The search-light-carrying M-46s, for example,helped illuminate Chinese troopsmassing to counterattack the hilland opened fire on them. Marineand Air Force fighter-bombers hitthe enemy on Siberia, helped seizeand hold Bunker Hill, and ham-mered the approaches toStromboli, where F4Us dropped1,000-pound bombs and napalm.Marine MPQ-14 radar directednighttime strikes against Chineseartillery positions. In addition,Marine artillery played a criticalrole, especially the box-me-in firesplanned for emergencies. The 11thMarines fired 10,652 shells in the24 hours ending at 1800 on 13August, a volume not exceededuntil the final months of the war in1953. Although supplies of explo-sive shells proved adequate at thistime, illuminating rounds tended tobe in short supply.

The Marines of 1952 were fight-ing a war of unceasing attrition fardifferent from the succession ofbloody campaigns, interspersedwith time for incorporatingreplacements into units withdrawnfrom combat, that had character-ized the war against Japan. Menand equipment had to be absorbedduring sustained fighting toreplace not only combat losses,but also administrative attrition

Depart,nent of Defense Photo (usMc) A164539

Tired Marines qf Company F 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, unwind during a pausein the fighting on Bunker Hill. Think, artillery, air; and ground Marines partici-pating in the battle gave up one outpost but took another; one that added strengthnot only to the outpost defense but also to the main line.

Casualties and Courageous Hospital Corpsmenhe fighting at Bunker Hill would have been evendeadlier for the Marines had it not been for theirprotective equipment and the excellent medical

treatment available from battlefield first-aid stations tohospital ships off the coast. According to regimental sur-geons, 17 wounded Marines would certainly have diedhad they not been wearing the new armored vest.Moreover, the steel helmet used in World War IT hadagain proved its worth in deflecting or stopping shellfragments or nearly spent bullets. The heavy vest,though it undeniably saved lives, proved an enervatingburden in the heat and humidity of the Korean summerand contributed to dehydration and heat exhaustion,but the advantage of increased safety—along withimproved morale—more than outweighed the disadvan-tages.

The uniformly sloping terrain of Bunker Hill causedthe Hospital Corpsmen assigned to the Marines to set uptheir forward aid stations on the reverse slope, over-looked by the Jamestown Line, to obtain protectionfrom flat trajectory fire and direct observation by theenemy. Wounded Marines being evacuated from the aidstations for further treatment ran the risk of mortar andartillery fire. A shortage of tracked armored personnelcarriers, which would have provided a measure of pro-tection from hostile fire and a less jolting ride than ordi-

24

nary trucks, increased both the danger and the discom-fort. Moreover, the stretcher rapidly became a preciousitem, since so many of the limited supply were beingused for the time-consuming trip to surgical facilitiessome distance to the rear.

The 1st Medical Battalion had three collecting andclearing companies, two of which supported units com-mitted on the division's main line of resistance while thethird supported units on the Kimpo Peninsula. Locatedabout six miles behind the line was the division hospi-tal, a 200-bed facility staffed and equipped to providedefinitive care for all types of cases. Serious cases orcases requiring specialized care were evacuated by heli-copter, ambulance, hospital train, rail bus, or plane to ahospital ship at Inchon, Army Mobile Surgical Hospitals,or to the Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan.

The Surgeon General of the Navy, Rear AdmiralHerbert L. Pugh, evaluated the medical support that heobserved during the Bunker Hill fighting. He declaredthat medical treatment had been successful for a varietyof reasons: the armored vest and steel helmet, of course;skilled Navy surgeons with access to a reliable supply ofblood for transfusions; evacuation by helicopter to sur-gical facilities ashore or, if necessary, to hospital ships;and the courageous effort of Navy Hospital Corpsmenserving alongside the Marines.

courtesy of Frank D. Praytor, USMC

Qn 29 August 192, Major General John T. Selden,shown on the left in the accompanying photo-graph, relinquished command of the 1st Marine

Division. Hi tenure as commanding general, whichbegan in January 1952. earned him the U.S. Army'sDistinguished Service Medal for conducting "successfuloperations against the enemy." During World War II, hehad commanded the 5th Marines on New Britain andserved as Chief of Staff, 1t Marine Division. in the con-quest of Peleliu in the Palau Island-s. After leaving Korea,he served on the staff of the Commander in Chief, U. ,Forces, Europe, until 1953 when he assumed commandof Marine Corps Base. Camp Pendleton, California, fromwhich post he retired in 1955. General Selden died in1964 and was buried with full military honors in

Arlington National Cemetery.Born at Richmond. Virginia, in 1893, Selden enlisted

in the Marine Corps in 1915 and was commissioned and lieutenant in July 1918. Instead of being sent to

France, he received orders to convoy duty in LSS

Huntin,gton Between the World \Xars. he served in Haitiand China and at various posts in the United States. Heattended the Senior Officers' Course at Marine Barracks,Quantico, Virginia, joined the hi Brigade, which formedthe nucleus of the 1st Marine Division, and participatedin maneuvers at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When warcame, he served in a variety of assignments in the Pacificbefore joining the 1st Marine Division in time for theNew Britain campaign.

Command of the 1st Marine Division in Korea passedto Major General Edwin A. Pollock. a native of Georgiawho graduated from The Citadel, South Carolina's mili-tary college, in 1921. He promptly resigned his commis-sion in the Army Reserve and on 1 July accepted anappointment as a second lieutenant in the Marine CorpsReserve. His early career included service in theDominican Republic and Nicaragua, on board ship, andwith various installations and units in the United States.

Promoted to lieutenant colonel in April 1942, he com-manded the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, at Guadalcanal.where on the night of 20-2 1 August, he earned the NavyCross for his Inspired leadership in repulsing a Japaneseattack at the Tenaru River. He became a colonel in

- November 1943 and afterward saw action on New BritainLand at Iwo Jima.

Following the war he served at Marine Corps Schoolsand Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, and at

Headquatlers Marine Corps. As a major general, he tookover the 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, NorthCarolina, before being reassigned to Korea. where hesucceeded General Selden in command of the 1st MarineDivision. General Pollock led the division in Korea from

August 1952 until june 1953, in the final weeks of thewar.

After Korea, General Pollock returned to Quantico asdirector of the Marine Corps Education Center, and thenwas assigned as commander Marine Corps RecruitDepot. Parris Island, South Carolina, before coming hackto Quantico as Commandant of Mad-ne Corps Schools. In19Ô. he was appointed Commanding General, FleetMarine Force, Pacific, followed by a tour as CommandingGeneral. Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, from which post heretired in 1959. General Pollock served in several capa'- -

ities on The Citadel's Board of Visitors before his death,,in 1982.

Change of Command

National Arclitves Photo t5]i) iT-N-,1((,O

caused by a fixed period of enlist-ment and a definite tour of duty inKorea. To help man his combatbattalions, General Selden on 12August directed rear-area units toprovide replacements for the 1stMarines; within two days, some

200 men, most of them volunteers,joined the regiment's infantry units.The Commandant of the MarineCorps, General Lemuel C.

Shepherd, Jr., approved flying 500infantry replacements to Korea.Lieutenant General Franklin A.

25

Hart, in command of the FleetMarine Force, Pacific, requested adelay to make sure he couldassemble the necessary air trans-port; he could, and on 21 Augustthe replacements arrived in Korea.The Commandant also approved

Selden's request to increase by 500men each of the next two sched-uled replacement drafts.

As the month of August woreon, any lull in the action aroundBunker Hill usually coincided witha surge in the fighting elsewhere,usually on the right of the mainline of resistance, the segment heldby the 5th Marines, commandedafter 16 August by Colonel EustaceR. Smoak. On 6 August, whileColonel Culhane still commandedthe regiment, the Chinese beganchipping away at the outpost linein front of the 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, which consisted ofOutposts Elmer, Hilda, and Irene.

Because the battalion mannedthe outposts only in daylight, theChinese simply occupied Elmer,farthest to the southwest, afterdusk on 6 August and employedartillery fire to seal off theapproaches and prevent theMarines from returning after clay-break. The Chinese took overOutpost Hilda on the night of 11August, driving back the Marinessent to reoccupy it the following

morning. The same basic tacticsenabled the enemy to take overOutpost Irene on the 17th. Duringan unsuccessful attempt to regainthe third of the outposts, PrivateFirst Class Robert E, Simanek savedthe lives of other Marines by divingonto a Chinese hand grenade,absorbing the explosion with hisbody, suffering severe though notfatal wounds, and earning theMedal of Honor.

Heavy rains comparable to thedownpour of late July turned roadsinto swamps throughout theMarine sector, swept away a bridgeover the Imjin River, and forcedthe closing of a ferry. Bunkersremained largely unaffected byflooding, but the deluge interferedwith both air support and combaton. the ground. Since the rain fellalike on the U.N. and Chineseforces, activity halted temporarilywhen nine inches fell between 23and 25 August.

The Chinese greeted the newdivision commander, MajorGeneral Edwin A. Pollock, byexerting new pressure against theBunker Hill complex, now held by

26

Captain Stanley T. Moak'sCompany E, 2d Battalion, 1stMarines, attached temporarily tothe regiment's 3d Battalion. On thenight of 4 September, Chinese gun-ners began shelling the outpostand probing its right flank, butsmall arms fire forced the enemy topull back.

The resulting lull lasted onlyuntil 0100 on 5 September., whenChinese mortars and artilleryresumed firing, concentrating onHill 122, Bunker Hill. Apparentlyconfident that the barrage hadneutralized the defenses, theattackers ignored cover and con-cealment and moved boldly intoan unexpected hail of fire thatdrove them back. After regrouping,the enemy attacked once again,this time making use of everyirregularity in the ground andemploying the entire spectrum ofweapons from hand grenades toartillery. This latest effort wentbadly awry when a force trying tooutflank Bunker Hill lost its wayand drew fire from Marines on themain line of resistance. The attack-ers tried to correct their mistakeonly to come under fire from theirfellow Chinese who had penetrat-ed the extreme right of BunkerHill's defenses and may have mis-taken their comrades for counterat-tacking Marines. Amid the confu-sion, Moak's company surged for-ward and drove the enemy fromthe outpost. The Marines ofCompany E suffered 12 killed and40 wounded in routing a Chinesebattalion while killing an estimated335 of the enemy.

Yet another diversionary attackon Outpost Stromboli coincidedwith the thrust against Bunker Hill.The Marines defending Strombolisustained no casualties in breakingup an attack by an enemy platoonsupported by machine guns.

The 2d and 3d Battalions ofColonel Smoak's 5th Marines

The Right of the 1St Marine Division's Line,September 1952

Private First Class Afford L. McLaughlin24year—old native of leeds, Alabama, he listed in the Marine Corps in 19n5.Awarded a Purple F-lean Medal in August 1952. his heroism again was rec-gnized during the struggle on Bunker hill (in the night of 4-5 September

1952, while serving as a machine gunner with Company I. 3d Battalion. 5th Marines.I-Its citation itadt, in pan:

When hostile fi irees attacked in battalion strength during the night. he maintaineda constant flow if devastating tire upon the enemy, alternating employing twomaclune guns. a carbine and hand grenades. Although painftilly wounded, hebravely Fired the machine guns from the hip until his hands hee.inie blistered bythe extreme heat from the weapons and, placing the guns on the ground ii allowthem to cool, continued to defend the isitit in with his carbine antI grenades.Standing up in full view, he shouted words iii encouragement to his comradesabove the din ol battle and, throughout a series of fanatical enemy attacks. sprayed the surrounding area

with de:tdlv fire acci tunting for an estimated one hundred and fifty enemy dead and fifty wounded.

Remarkably, lie survived this baffle, made a ii inlinuing career in the Marine Corps. and eventually retired in

19T7 as a master sergeant.

Hospital Corpsman Third Class Edward C. Benfold

Bornin Staten Island. New Thrk. in 931, he enlisted in the Navy

assigned in 1951 to the Marine (1i tips where he bore the designationical field technician." In Korea. while serving with 3d Battalion, 5th

he wa killed on S September i9S2 I-his Medal of Honor citation reads, in

Benfold resolutely moved from pi sit 'a to position in the Lice of intense hostilefire, treating the wounded and lending words of encouragement. Leaving the pro-tection iii his sheltered position Lii treat the wounded, when the platoon area inwhich he was workiili \v:is attacked from both the front and rear, he moved for-ward to an exposed ridge line where he observed two Marines in a large crater.As he approached the to' men to determine their condition, an enemy soldier

threw two grenades into the crater while 1w' i other enemy charged the position.Picking up a grenade in cach hand. Il( :, Benfold leaped out iii the crater andhurled himself against the onrushing hostile soldiers, pushing the grenades againsttheir chests and killing both the attackers.

In 199-i, the Navy named a guided missile dcstrocr. USS BenJbld (DDG ôSh in his honor.

I)e1,aon,eni of Dekn.cc photo it SMC A49'Thô-A

and wasit ' nied—

Marines,

Navy Medicine Photo Coikcton

—Captain John C. Chapin, tSMCH (Ret)

fought to defend their outpost line—from Allen in the west, throughBruce, Clarence, Donald, Felix,and Gary, to Jill in the east—against a succession of attacks thatbegan in the early hours of 5September. At Outpost Bruce—manned by Company I, 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, underCaptain Edward Y. Holt, Jr.—acompany of attacking infantry fol-lowed up a savage barrage. PrivateFirst Class Alford L. McLaughlin

killed or wounded an estimated200 Chinese, victims of themachine guns, carbine, andgrenades that he used at varioustimes during the fight, and sur-vived to receive the Medal ofHonor. Private First Class FernandoL. Garcia, a'so earned the nation'shighest award for heroism; thoughalready wounded, he threw him-self of a Chinese grenade, sacrific-ing his life to save his platoonsergeant. Hospitalman Third Class

27

Edward C. Benfold saw twowounded Marines in a shell holeon Outpost Bruce; as he preparedto attend to them, a pair ofgrenades thrown by two onrushingChinese soldiers fell inside thecrater. Benfoid picked up onegrenade in each hand, scrambledfrom the hole, and pressed agrenade against each of the twosoldiers. The explosions killedboth the Chinese, as Benfold sacri-ficed himself to save the two

wounded Marines, earning aposthumous Medal of Honor.

When dawn broke on 5

September, Molt's Company I stillclung to Outpost Bruce, eventhough only two bunkers, both onthe slope nearest the JamestownLine, survived destruction by mor-

tar and artillery shells. The com-mander of the 3d Battalion,Lieutenant Colonel Oscar T.

Jensen, Jr., rushed reinforcements,construction and other supplies,and ammunition to the batteredoutpost despite harassing firedirected at the trails leading there.

Marine and Mr Force pilots tried tosuppress the hostile gunners with10 air strikes that dropped napalmas well as high explosive.

On the morning of 6 September,the defenders of Outpost Brucebeat off another attack, finally call-ing for box-me-in fires that tem-porarily put an end to infantryassaults. At dusk, however, theChinese again bombarded the out-post, this time for an hour, beforeattacking with infantry whiledirecting long-range fire at neigh-boring Outpost Allen to the south-west. The Marines defendingOutpost Bruce survived to under-go further attack on the earlymorning of 7 September. TwoChinese companies tried to envel-op the hilltop, using demolitions inan attempt to destroy any bunkersnot yet shattered by the latestshelling.

28

For a total of 51 hours, theenemy besieged Outpost Brucebefore breaking off the action bysunrise on the 7th. At Bruce, thesite of the deadliest fighting in thissector, the Marines suffered 19killed and 38 wounded, 20 morethan the combined casualties sus-tained defending all the other out-posts manned by the 2d and 3d

The 1st Marine Division commander, MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, left, welcomesthe United Nations commander, Gen Mark W Clark USA, to the division's area.Gen Clark had succeeded Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, who took over as SupremeAllied Commander, Europe, from General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.

National Archives Photo (USMc) 127-N-A167677

Private First Class Fernando L. Garcia

Born in 1929 in Iituado, Puerto Rico, and inducted into the Marine Corps in19 1 he was kiJied at Outpost Bruce in the Bunker Hill area on 5 September1952 while serving as a member of Company 1, 3d Battalion. 5th Marines. The

first Puerto Rican to he awarded a Medal of Honor, his citation reads, in part:

\\1iile paiticipating in the defense of a combat outpost located more than one mileforward of the main line of resistance, during a savage night attack by a fanaticalenemy force employing grenades, mortars, and artillery, Private First Class Garcia,although suffering painful wounds, moved through the intense hail of hostile fireto a supply point to secure more hand grenades. Quick to act when a hostilegrenade landed nearby, endangering the life of another Marine, as well as hisown, he unhesitatingly chose to sacrifice himself and immediately threw his bodyupon the deadly missile, receiving the full impact of the explosion.

The enemy then overran his position and his body was not recovered. In his honor, a camp at Vieques inPuerto Rico and a destroyer -suo. t'S Garcia (DE 1O-O. were named after him.

—Captain John C. Chapin, tJSMCR (Ret)

Piiss ii i'i O 1 I\ irtu

Battalions, 5th Marines. Chinesekilled and wounded at OutpostBruce may have totaled 400.

At the left of the line held by the1st Marine Division, the frontage ofthe Korean Marine Corps veeredsouthward, roughly paralleling theSachon River as it flowed towardthe Irnjin. The Korean Marines hadestablished a series of combat out-posts on the broken groundbetween the Sachon and the

Jamestown Line. On the evening of5 September, while the outpostsmanned by the 5th Marines wereundergoing attack, Chinese ar-tillery and mortars began poundingOutpost 37, a bombardment thatsoon included Outpost 36 to thesouthwest and an observation poston Hill 155 on the main line ofresistance, roughly 1,000 yardsfrom the boundary with the 1stMarines.

Chinese infantry, who hadcrossed the Sachon near Outposts36 arid 37, attacked both of them.

29

Two assaults on Outpost 37, whichbegan at 1910, may have been adiversion, for at the same time theenemy launched the first of threeattacks on Outpost 36. The finaleffort, supported by fire from tanksand artillery, overran the hill, butthe Chinese had lost too manymen and too much equipment—atleast 33 bodies littered the hillalong with a hundred abandonedgrenades and numerous automaticweapons—forcing the enemy towithdraw the survivors. TheKorean Marines suffered 16 killedor wounded from the platoon atOutpost 36 and another four casu-alties in the platoon defendingOutpost 37.

Clashes involving the outpostsof the Korean Marine Corps con-tinued. The South Koreans dis-patched. tank-infantry probes andset up ambushes. At first, theChinese responded to this activitywith mortars and artillery, firing adaily average of 339 roundsbetween 12 and 19 September,about one-third of the total direct-ed against Outpost 36. An attackby infantry followed.

Before sunrise on the 19th,Chinese troops again infiltratedacross the Sachon, as they had twoweeks earlier. They hid in cavesand ravines until evening, whenthey advanced on Outposts 36,their principal objective, and. 37,along with Outposts 33 and 31 tothe south. A savage barrage ofmore than 400 rounds tore up thedefenses rebuilt after the 5

September attack and enabled theChinese to overwhelm Outpost 36.Shortly after midnight, a SouthKorean counterattack seized a

lodgrnerit on the hill, but theChinese retaliated immediately,driving off, killing, or capturingth.ose who had regained the out-post.

With the coming of daylight,Marine aircraft joined in battering

Combat Outposts of theSouth Korean Marines,

September 19520 500 1000

Yards'

• 4• utr• -

s4:i1.4*

MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, center, accompanied by C'oI KimSuk Bum, commanding officer of the 1st Korean MarineCo?ps Regiment, talks with members of the 1st Air and Naval

National Archivea Photo (IJSMC) 127-N-A165912

Gunfire Liaison Company concerning Marine air supportfor Korean Marine operations.

enemy-held Outpost 36. Air strikessucceeded in hitting the far side ofthe hill, destroying mortars andkilling troops massing in defiladeto exploit the earlier success. Twoplatoons of Korean Marines—sup-ported by fire from tanks, mortars,and artillery—followed up thedeadly air attacks and regainedOutpost 36, killing or wounding anestimated 150 of the enemy.

In late September, while fightingraged around Outpost 36 in thesector held by the Korean Marines,the Chinese attacked the combatoutposts manned by ColonelLayer's 1st Marines, especially Hill122 (Bunker Hill) and Hill 124 atthe southwestern tip of the sameridge line. The enemy struck first atHill 124, attacking by flare-lightfrom four directions but failing to

dislodge the squad dug in there,even though most of the Marinessuffered at least minor wounds.

The entire ridge from Hill 124 toHill 122 remained under recurringattack for the remainder ofSeptember, especially Bunker Hillitself, where the enemy clung toadvance positions as close as 30yards to Marine trenches. TheChinese frequently probed BunkerHill's defenses by night, and theMarines took advantage of dark-ness to raid enemy positions, usingportable flamethrowers and demo-litioris to destroy bunkers whilefire from tanks and artillery dis-couraged counterattacks.

Tests earlier in the year hadproved the theory that transporthelicopters could resupply a battal-ion manning the main line of resis-tance. The next step was to deter-mine if rotary wing aircraft couldaccomplish the logistical support

30

of an entire frontline regiment. Forthe five-day period, 22-26 Septem-ber, Marine Helicopter TransportSquadron 161 successfully sup-plied the 7th Marines with ammu-nition, gasoline, rations, and madea daily mail run. All but valuablecargo, such as mail, was carriedexternally in slings or wire baskets.

As October began, the Chinesesaluted the new month with heav-ier shelling, the prelude to a seriesof attacks on outposts all acrossthe division front from the KoreanMarine Corps on the left, past the1st Marines and Bunker Hill, to thefar right, where the 7th Marines,commanded. by Colonel Thomas C.Moore, Jr., had taken over from the5th Marines, now in reserve. Tomake communications moresecure, Colonel Moore's regimentredesignated Outposts Allen,Bruce, Clarence, Donald, Gary,and Jill, replacing proper names, in

ItII'lIl(l Actioll ;\Ioiig ttit I..i l1(

'-a-II_iIi.,. s1__

- -— fl

- I

4'

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A165528

Gen Letnuel C. Shepherd, Jr., center, Commandant of the Marine Corps, looks atenemy positions while touring frontline Marine positions. LtCol Anthony fGaputo, left, commanding officer of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, briefs theCommandant on the situation.

alphabetical order, with the ran-domly arranged names of cities:Carson, Reno, Vegas, Berlin,Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle.

On the left, Chinese loudspeak-ers announced on the night of 1October that artillery would levelthe outpost on Hill 86, overlookingthe Sachon River, and warned thedefenders to flee. When the SouthKorean Marines remained in place,a comparatively light barrage of145 rounds exploded on the hilland its approaches, too few to dis-lodge the defenders. On the fol-lowing evening at 1830, theChinese resumed firing, this timefrom the high ground beyond Mill36, and extended the bombard-rnent to all the outposts withinrange. The Korean Marines dis-patched a platoon of tanks tosilence the enemy's direct-fireweapons, but the unit returnedwithout locating the source of theenemy fire. After the tanks pulledback, Chinese artillery fire intensi-fied, battering all the outposts untilone red and one green flare burst

the three, resisted gallantly, forcingthe Chinese to double the size ofthe assault force in order to over-run the position. On 3 October, theKorean Marines launched twocounterattacks. The second ofthese recaptured the crest and heldit until Chinese artillery and mortarfire forced a withdrawal. By lateafternoon on 5 October, theKorean Marines twice regained theoutpost, only to be hurled backeach time, and finally had to calloff the counterattacks, leaving thehilt in enemy hands.

To the south, the Chinese alsostormed Outpost 36 on 2 October.The defenders hurled back twonighttime attacks, but the cumula-tive casualties and damage to thefortifications forced the KoreanMarines to withdraw. The enem.yimmediately occupied the hitl andheld it.

in the night sky. At that signal, the The most vulnerable of theguns fell silent, and infantry three, Outpost 86, lay farthest fromattacked Outposts 36, 37, and 86, the main line of resistance and

Outpost 37, the northernmost of closest to the Sachon River. On the

During Operation .1-laylift in late September, Sikorsky HRS-2 helicopters of HIVIR-161 lft cargo from the 1st Air Delivery Platoon area to the sector occupied by the7th Marines. The cargo net slung under the helicopter greatly increased its 1tcapability.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A166041

31

night of 2 October, a Chineseassault overran the outpost, forcingthe Korean Marines to find cover atthe foot of the hill and regroup. Atmid-morning on the 3d, artillerybarrages and air strikes poundedthe enemy at Outpost 86, scatter-ing the Chinese there and enablinga South Korean counterattack toregain the objective. The KoreanMarines dug in, but on 6 Octoberthe Chinese again prevailed, hold-ing the outpost until a SouthKorean counterattack in the earlyhours of the 7th forced them downthe slope. At about dawn on thatsame morning, the enemy mount-ed yet another counterattack,advancing behind a deadly artillerybarrage, seizing and holdingOutpost 86, and ending this flurryof action on the outpost line infront of the Korean Marine Corps.

Although October passed. ratherquietly for the 1st Marines—except

for recurring probes, patrols, andambushes in the vicinity of BunkerHill—violent clashes erupted alongthe line held by the 7th Marines.The enemy began stubborn efforts,which persisted into 1953, to gaincontrol of some or all of the ninecombat outposts that ColonelMoore's regiment manned on the

high ground to its front.The 7th Marines took over seven

outposts when it relieved the 5thMarines, renaming them, from leftto right, Carson, Reno, Vegas,Berlin, Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle.At the point—later known as theHook—where the frontline veeredsouthward toward the boundarywith the British CommonwealthDivision—the 7th Marines set upOutpost Warsaw. A second newoutpost, Verdun, guarded theboundary between the Marine andCommonwealth divisions. An aver-age of 450 yards separated four ofthese outposts—Detroit, Frisco,Seattle, and Warsaw—which occu-pied hills lower than those on theleft of the regimental line andtherefore were more easily isolatedand attacked.

As they did so often, theChinese began with a diversionarythrust, jabbing at Detroit beforethrowing knockout blows—artillery and mortar fire precedingan infantry attack—at Seattle andWarsaw. An enemy company over-whelmed the reinforced platoonon Warsaw on 2 October, but theMarines fought stubbornly beforefalling back. Private Jack W. Kelsopicked up a grenade thrown into a

Department of Defense Photo (IJ5MC) AU16198

Replacements step ashore at "Charlie Pier" Brought from transports by landingcraft, the Marines would broad waiting trains for the four-and-one-half-hourtrip to the division's lines.

-rawA

L, Conibar natpont (COP).

COP and date withdrawn.

C bour,da,y estebr(sftad 5 Qebbe,.Companion A W,d Daft 'no, llr7 Siresenra after 5 October

The 7th Marines on theDivision's Right,

October 1952

Yerds

32

Private Jack W. Kelso

orn in 1934 in Madera. California. he enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1951.In Korea. he was awarded a Silver Star medal for heroism in August 1952.

a rifleman with Company I. 3d Battalion. 7th Marines, he was killed on2 October 1952 near Sokchon. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

When both the platoon commander and the platoon sergeant became casu-

alties during the defense of a viral outpost against a numerically superiorenemy force attacking at night under cover of intense small-arms, grenade andmortar fire, Private Kelso bravely exposed himself to the hail uf enemy fire in

a determined effort to reorganize the unit and to repel the onrushing attack-ei-s. Forced to seek cover, along with four other Marines, in a near-hy bunkerwhich immediately came under attack, he unhesitatingly picked up an enemygrenade which landed in the shelter, rushed out into the open and hurled it back at the enemy.

Although painfully wounded when the grenade exploded as it left his hand, and again forced to seek

the protection of the bunker when the hostile fire became more intensified, Pri'ate Kelso refused to

remain in his position of comparative safety and moved out into the luc-swept area Ri return the enemy

fire, thereby permitting the pinned-down Marines in the bunker to escape.

Staff Sergeant Lewis G.Watkins

orn in 1925 in Seneca. South Carolina. he enlisted in the Marine Corps in1950. While serving as a platoon guide for Company I, 3d Battalion, 7th

- L Marines, he gave his life on 7 October 1952. His Medal of Honor citation

reads, in part:

With his platoon assied the mission or re-taking an outpost which hadbeen overrun by the enemy earlier in the night, Staff Sergeant Watkins skillfully

led his unit in the assault up the designated hill. Although painfully woundedwhen a well-entrenched hostile force at the crest of the hill engaged the pla-toon with intense small-arms and grenade fire, gallantly continued to lead hismen. Obtaining an automatic rifle from one of the wounded men, he assistedin pinning down an enemy machine gun holding up the assault.

When an enemy grenade landed among Staff Sergeant Watkins and several

other Marines while they were moving forward through a trench on the hillcrest, he immediately pushed his companions aside, placed himself in position

to shield them and picked up the deadly missile in an attempt to throw it outside the trench. Mortally

ounderl when the grenade exploded in his hand, Staff Sergeant Watkins, 1w his great personal valor in

the face of almost certain death, saved the lives of several of his comrades.—Captain John C Chapin. USMCR (Ret)

L)epartnleflt ti L,CTCflSt' Pl,i,wp

bunker that he and four otherMarines from Company I, 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, were man-ning. Kelso threw the live grenadeat the advancing Chinese, but itexploded immediately after leavinghis hand. Although badly wound-ed, Kelso tried to cover the with-drawal of the other four, firing atthe attackers until he suffered fatalwounds. Kelso earned a posthu-mous Medal of Honor, but heroism

alone coutd not prevail; numerical-ly superior forces captured bothWarsaw and Seattle.

The Marines counterattackedimmediately. Captain John H.Thomas, in command of CompanyI, sent one platoon againstWarsaw, but the enemy had tem-porarily withdrawn. The lull con-tinued until 0145 on the morningof 4 October, when a Chinese pla-toon attacked only to be beaten

33

back by the Marines holdingWarsaw.

Meanwhile, Captain Thomasmounted a counterattack againstSeattle early on the morning of 3October, sending out two squadsfrom the company's position onthe main line of resistance. DespiteChinese artillery fire, the Marinesreached the objective, but Seattleproved too strongly held andThomas broke off the counterat-

Second Lieutenant Sherrod E. Skinner, Jr.

om in 1929 in Hartford, Connecticut, he was appointed a second lieutenant inthe \Lirine Corps Reserve i92 and then ordered to active duty. He died hero-ically at The Hook" on 26 October 1952 while serving as an artillery fnriH

obser ci of Battery F, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines. The citation for his Medal f Honoraward reads, in part:

Skinner, in a detemiined effort to hold his position, immediately organized anddirected the surviving personnel in the defense of the outpost, continuing to calldown fire on the enemy by means of radio alone until this equipment becamedamaged beyond repair. Undaunted by the intense hostile barrage and the rapid- P'" ne Phoio U'.SI A3O''ly closing attackers, he twice left the protection of his hunker in order to direct accurate machine-gun fire andto replenish the depleted supply of ammunition and grenades. Although painfully wounded on each occa-sion, he steadfastly refused medical aid until the rest of the men received treatment.

'\ the ground attack reached its climax, he gallantly directed the final defense until the meager supply ofammunition was exhausted and the position oven-un. During the three hours that the outpost was occupiedhy the enemy, several grenades were thrown into the hunker which served as protection for Second LieutenantSkinner and his remaining comrades. Realizing that there was no chance for other than passive resistance, hedirected his men to feign death even though the hostile troops entered the bunker and searched their per-sons. Later, when an enemy grenade was thrown between hini and two other survivors, he immediately threwhimself on the deadly missile in an effort to protect the others, absorbing the full force of the explosion andsacrificing his life for his comrades.

In 1991, Skinner Hall at Quantico, Virginia, was dedicated in his honor.

Second Lieutenant George H. O'Brien,Jr.

om in Fort rth. Fexas, in 1926, he enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve in1949. Ordered to active duty in 1951. he entered Officer Candidate School andwas commissioned in 1952. As a rifle pbtoon leader with Company H. 3d

Battalion, "rh Marines, in the battle for the I-look on 27 October 1952, he was award-ed a Medal of Honor with a citation, which reads, in part:

O'Brien leaped from his tiencli when the attack signal was given and, shoutingfor his men to follow raced across an exposed saddle and up the enemy-held hillthrough a virtual hail of deadly small-arms, artillery and mortar fire. Although shotthrough the arm and thrown to the ground by hostile automatic-weapons lire ashe neared the well-entrenched enemy position, he bravely regained his feet. wavedhis men onward and continued to spearhead the assault, pausing only long enough t)ekn. Ph,o 'ISttT

to go to the aid of a wi unded \larine. Encountering the enemy at close range. he proceeded to hurl handgrenades into the bunkeis and, utilizing his carbine ii' best ad'. antage in savage hand-to-hand combat. suc-ceeded in killing at least three ol' the enemy.

Stmck down by the concussion of grenades on three occasions during the subsequent action, he ckadf'astlvrefused to be c'.•-acuated for medical treatment and continued to lead his platoon in the .issiuIt for a period ofnearly four hours, repeatedly encouraging his men and maintaining superb direction of the unit.

He received a second Purple Heart Medal in January 13. and after the war, he joined the Reserves and was pro-moted to major. —t;aptain John C. Chapin. l.s\1CR (Ret)

tack. As dusk settled over the bat-tleground, Marine aircraft andartillery put down a smoke screenbehind which the counterattackresumed, but the Chinese succeed-

ed in containing the two squadsshort of the crest. To regainmomentum, another squad—thisone from Company A, 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, which had

34

come under the operational con-trol of the 3d Battalion—reinforcedthe other two, but the Chineseclinging to Seattle inflicted casual-ties that sapped the strength of the

:*4

¶

candy, cameras, and toilet articles.

counterattack. While the Marinesregrouped for another assault, the11th Marines pounded the outpostwith artillery fire. At 2225 on 3October, the Marines againstormed the objective, hut Chineseartillery prevailed, and Seattleremained in Chinese hands.

The loss of Outpost Seattle, therecapture of Warsaw, and a suc-cessful defense of Frisco against aChinese probe on the night of 5October did not mark the end ofthe effort to seize the outpostsmanned by the 7th Marines, butonly a pause. The regiment's casu-alties—13 killed and 88 woundedby 3 October when the Marinessuspended the attempt to retakeSeattle—caused the 7th Marines toshuffle units. The 3d Battalion,commanded until 13 October byLieutenant Colonel Gerald F.

Russell, had suffered most of thecasualties. As a result, whileRussell's battalion reduced itsfrontage, the 1st Battalion, under

Lieutenant Colonel Leo J. Dulacki,moved from the regimental reserveto take over the right-hand portionof the Jamestown Line. Dulacki'sM.arines manned the main line ofresistance from roughly 500 yardssouthwest of the Hook to theboundary shared with theCommonwealth Division, includ-ing Outposts Warsaw and \7erdun.Colonel Moore thus placed altthree battalions on line, LieutenantColonel Anthony Caputo's 2dBattalion on the left, Russell's 3dBattalion in the center, and nowDulacki's 1st Battalion on the right.

The 7th Marines completed itsrealignment just in time to meet aseries of carefully planned andaggressively executed Chineseattacks delivered on 6 and 7October against five combat out-posts and two points on the mainline of resistance. The Marinesstruck first, however, when a rein-forced platoon from Company C,1st Battalion, attacked toward

35

Outpost Seattle at 0600 on 6October. Mortar and artillery fireforced the platoon to take coverand regroup, even as the Chinesewere reinforcing the outpost theynow held. The attack resumed at0900. Despite infantry reinforce-ments, air strikes, and artillery, theMarines could not crack Seattle'sdefenses and broke off the attackat about 1100, after losing 12 killedand 44 wounded. The attackersestimated that they had killed orwounded 71 Chinese.

On the evening of the 6th, theChinese took the initiative, by mid-night firing some 4,400 artilleryand mortar rounds against the out-post line and two points on themain line of resistance. On the leftof Colonel Moore's line, the enemyprobed Outposts Carson and Reno,and on the right he stormedWarsaw, forcing the defenders tocall for box-me-in fire that severedthe telephone wire linking the out-post with the Jamestown Line. Thefirst message from Warsaw whencontact was restored requestedmore artillery fire, which by 2055helped break the back of theChinese assault, forcing the enemyto fall back.

The most determined attacks onthe night of 6 October and earlyhours of the 7th hit OutpostsDetroit and Frisco in the center ofthe regimental front. To divertattention from these objectives,each one manned by two squads,the Chinese probed two points onthe main line of resistance that hadalready been subjected to artilleryand mortar bombardment. At 1940on the night of the 6th, an attack-ing company that had gained afoothold in the main trench onDetroit fell back after deadly firestopped the enemy short of thebunkers. Two hours later, theChinese again seized a segment oftrench on Detroit and tried toexploit the lodgment. The Marines

Department of Defense Photo (usMc A165717Riflemen of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, take a break from frontline duty longenough to buy "luxuries" from the regimental Post Exchange truck. The trucktoured the frontline twice a month offering Marines a chance to buy such items

reacted by calling on the 11thMarines to box in the outpost.Communications failed for a time,but at about 2115 the defenders ofDetroit requested variable-time firefor airbursts over the bunkers,which would protect the Marineswhile the enemy outside remainedexposed to a hail of shell frag-ments. The artillerymen fired as theMarines on Detroit asked, hut theoutpost again lost contact withheadquarters of the 3d Battalion.

Two squads set out from theJamestown Line to reinforce theMarines from Company G, 3dBattalIon, 7th Marines, manningOutpost Detroit. The Chinese frus-trated this attempt with artillery firebut in the meantime again aban-doned their foothold on Detroit,probably because of the shower offragments from Marine shells burst-ing above them. The respiteproved short-lived, however, forthe enemy renewed the attackshortly after midnight and extend-ed his control of the hill despitefurther scourging from the 11thMarines. A six-man Marine patrol

reached the outpost, returning at0355 to report that the Chinesenow held the trenchline andbunkers; only two of the Marineswho had manned Detroit escapeddeath or capture. The attempt tobreak through to the outpostended, and by 0630, the Marinesengaged in the effort had returnedto the main line of resistance.

Meanwhile, at about 2000, aChinese company hit the twosquads from Company H that heldOutpost Frisco, north of Detroit.The assault troops worked theirway into the trenches, but airburstsfrom Marine artillery reinforced thesmall arms fire of the defenders indriving the enemy back. TheChinese renewed the attack justafter midnight, and two Marinesquads advanced from the mainline of resistance to reinforceFrisco, only to be stopped short oftheir goal by fire from artillery andmortars. Companies H and I ofRussell's 3d Battalion made furtherattempts to reach Frisco during theearly morning, but not until 0510did a reinforced platoon from

Company I arrive and take control.During the final attack, Staff

Sergeant Lewis G. Watkins, despiteearlier wounds, took an automaticrifle from a more badly injuredMarine and opened fire to keep theplatoon moving forward. When aChinese grenade landed near him,he seized it, but it exploded beforehe could throw it away, fatallywounding Watkins, whose leader-ship and self-sacrifice earned him aposthumous Medal of Honor. Asecond platoon from Company 1joined the other unit atop the hill,and at 0715 Frisco was declaredsecure.

To keep Frisco firmly in Marinehands, however, would have invit-ed attrition and ultimately requiredmore men than General Pollockand Colonel Moore could sparefrom the main line of resistance.Consequently, the 7th Marinesabandoned the outpost. The regi-ment had yielded three outposts—Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle—butforced the Chinese to pay a highprice, estimated to include 200killed. The losses suffered by the7th Marines totaled 10 killed, 22missing, and 128 wounded, 105 ofthem seriously enough to requireevacuation.

Since the Chinese also wrestedOutposts 37, 36, and 86 frOm theKorean Marine Corps, the 1stMarine Division had lost six com-bat outposts of varying tacticalimportance. The lost outposts andthose that remained in Marinehands had no value except to theextent their possession affected thesecurity of the Jamestown Line. Asa result, the Marines remainedwary of mounting major counterat-tacks; to provide continued protec-tion for the main line of resistance,General Pollock would rely onnighttime patrols and listeningposts to supplement the remainingoutposts and replace the capturedones.

During the battles of October 1952, a number of Marine bunkers on theJamestown Line were severely damaged by Chinese mortar and artillery fire.

Department of Defense Photo (U5MQ A167465

36

I,

4.4.

Unlike the 1st Marine AircraftWing, which experienced short-ages of spare parts, especially forits newer planes and helicopters,the 1st Marine Division emergedfrom the outpost fighting with fewsupply problems except for com-munications gear. The Armyhelped with replenishment byreleasing essential spare parts fromstocks in Japan, and new radio,telephone, and teletype equipmentalso arrived from the United States.The Army, moreover, tapped itsstocks for new trucks to replacethe division's worn-out vehicles.To operate the logistics networkmore efficiently, the divisionplaced the re-equipped truck units

in direct support of the infantryregiments instead of keeping themin a centralized motor pool. Thechange reduced both the totalmileage driven and vulnerability toartillery fire. In another attempt toimprove logistics, the Marinesincreased from 500 to 800 thenumber of Korean laborers servingwith each of the front-line regi-ments.

The fighting for the outpoststhat raged early in October dieddown, although the Chinesejabbed from time to time at BunkerHill and continued their nighttime

37

patrolling elsewhere along theJamestown Line. During the lull,Colonel Smoak's 5th Marines tookover the center of the division'sline from the 1st Marines, whichwent into reserve, improving thefall-back defense lines, undergoingtraining, and patrolling to maintainsecurity in the rear areas. As thedivision reserve, the 1st Marinesprepared to counterattack if theenemy should penetrate the mainline of resistance. [ndeed, the regi-ment had to be ready to help blocka Chinese breakthrough anywherein I Corps, which held the westernthird of the United Nations line.

With the 1st Marines now inreserve, Colonel Moore's 7thMarines manned the right of thedivision's line placing all three bat-talions on line and keeping onlyone company from the 3dBattalion in reserve. To replace thiscompany, Lieutenant ColonelCharles D. Barrett, the 3dBattalion's new commander, orga-nized a platoon of cooks, drivers,and other members of the head-quarters into an improvised pla-toon that served as his unit'sreserve. Barrett's thinly spread 3dBattalion manned two combat out-posts—Berlin and East Berlin, thelatter established on 13 October—besides defending the center of theregimental line.

To the left of Barrett's unit, the2d Battalion, 7th Marines, underLieutenant Colonel AnthonyCaputo defended its portion of theregimental line and maintainedthree combat outposts, Carson,Reno, and Vegas. Like Barrett's bat-talion in the center, Caputo'sMarines held a sector with few vul-nerable salients that the aggressiveChinese might pinch off and cap-ture.

Department of Defense Photo (usMc) A166429

The Marine in the foreground reads while others talk or sleep just before jump-ing off into "no-man 's-land" on the Hook.

On the far right of the regimen-tal line, Lieutenant ColonelDulacki's 1st Battalion held thedominant terrain feature in the reg-

Cliiiicse Attack the hook

J1

j

Distant Strikes to Close Mr Supporturing the struggle over the combat outpost line,from late July through early Octohet; the 1stMarine Division benefited from a shift in aerial

strategy. Long-range interdiction, an important elementof U. S. Air Force doctrine, gave way to a policy of hit-ting the enemy wherever he might be, whether exercis-ing control from the North Korean capital of Pyongyangor massing to attack Bunker Hill or some other outpost.

United Nations aircraft hit Pyongyang hard in July andagain in August. The 11 July attack consisted of four sep-arate raids, the last of them after dark. The operation,named Pressure Pump, blasted headquarters buildings,supply dumps, and the radio station, which was silencedfor two days. Of 30 individual targets attacked on the11th, three were obliterated, 25 damaged in varyingdegrees and only two survived intact. On 29 August,three daylight raids damaged 34 targets on a list of 45that included government agencies—among them theresurrected Radio Pyongyang—factories, warehouses,and barracks.

According to Colonel Samuel S. Jack. chief of staff ofthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, a shift of emphasis awayfrom long-range interdiction caused the Far East AirForces to endorse the wing's using its aircraft primarilyto respond to requests for support from the 1st MarineDivision. Even as the Air Force became more coopera-tive, Army commanders complained about the air sup-port they received and began agitating for a moreresponsive system, like that of the Marine Corps, thatwould cover the entire battlefront. General Mark W.Clark, the United Nations commander since May 1952,refused, however, to tamper with the existing system thatin effect gave the Far East Air Forces, an Air Force head-quarters, "coordination control" over the 1st MarineAircraft Wing and channeled requests through a JointOperations Center, Instead, he called for increasing theefficiency of the current arrangement to reduce reactiontime.

During the defense of Bunker Hill in August, 1,000sorties, most of them by Marines, bombed and strafedthe attacking Chinese. In early October, when the fight-ing shifted eastward to the outposts manned by the 7thMarines, the wing flew 319 close air support sorties.

Besides coming to the aid of their fellow Marines onthe ground, crews of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing sup-ported the U. S. and South Korean armies. In July, forexample, eight heavily-armed and armored AU-iCorsairs from Marine Attack Squadron 323 attackedChinese mortar positions, antitank weapons, and troopconcentrations opposing the Republic of Korea's I Corps.Rockers, 1,000-pound bombs, napalm, and 20mm firekilled an estimated 500 of the enemy. Similarly, four

38

National Archives Photo (csMc) 127-N-Al 33864

Co/John P. Condon, left commanding officer of MarineAircraft Group 33, shows BGen Clayton C. Jerome, thearea strafed in the largest Ma rine jet strike of the KoreanWar.

pilots from Marine Fighter Squadron 311 helped the U.S.Army's 25th Infantry Division by destroying threehunkers and two artillery pieces while collapsing some50 feet of trench.

In operations like these, weather could prove as dead-ly as antiaircraft fire. On 10 September, as 22 Panther jetswere returning from a strike near Sariwon, fog settledover their base. Sixteen planes landed safely at an alter-nate airfield, but the others flew into a mountain as theyapproached the runway. killing all six pilots.

Marine helicopters continued to fly experimental mis-sions, as when Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron161 deployed multiple-tube 4.5-inch rocket launchersfrom one position to another, thus preventing Chineseobservers from using, as an aiming point for effectivecounterbattery fire, the dust cloud that arose when therockets were launched. The same squadron, using 40percent of its assigned helicopters for the purpose, deliv-ered enough supplies to sustain the 7th Marines for fivedays. Problems continued to nag the helicopter program,however. The Sikorsky H035-1 light helicopter—usedfor liaison, observation, and casualty evacuation—had tohe grounded in October to await spare parts.

imental sector, the Hook, wherethe high ground that defined theJamestown Line veered sharply tothe south. Outposts Seattle andWarsaw had protected the 1-Took,but only Warsaw remained inMarine hands. To restore the secu-rity of the 1-look, Dulacki set up anew outpost, Ronson, some 200yards southeast of enemy-heldSeattle and 275 yards west of theHook. Ronson guarded the west-ern approaches to the 1-Took, whileWarsaw commanded the lowlandseast of the Hook and a narrow val-

The Hook,26 October 1952

0 100 200 300 400 500Yardsl I

ley leading eastward toward theSamichon River.

If the Chinese should seize theHook, disastrous results might fol-low, for the Hook held the key tocontrolling the Santichon and Imjinvalleys. Its capture could exposethe rear areas of the 1st MarineDivision and force that unit andthe adjacent CommonwealthDivision to fall back two miles ormore to find defensible terrainfrom which to protect the north-eastern approaches to Seoul.Because of the Hook's importance,

Colonel Moore set up his head-quarters on Hill 146 near the baseof the salient.

Opposite the 7th Marines, theChinese had massed two infantryregiments, totaling some 7,000men, supported by 10 battalions ofartillery ranging in size from 75mmto 122mm and later to 152mm. Theenemy, moreover, had learnedduring the fighting at Bunker Hilland along the outpost line to makedeadlier use of his artillery, mass-ing fires and, when the Marinescounterattacked, imitating the box-me-in fires used by the 11thMarines. In preparation for anattack on the Hook, the Chinesemassed their artillery batterieswithin range of the salient, stock-piled ammunition, and dug newtrenches that reached like tentaclestoward the various elements of theoutpost line and afforded coverand concealment for attackinginfantry.

Against the formidable concen-tration of Chinese troops and guns,Colonel Moore's regiment couldmuster 3,844 Marines, officers andmen, supported by 11 Navy med-ical officers and 133 HospitalCorpsmen, three Army communi-cations specialists, and 746 Koreanlaborers with their 18 interpreters.As in the earlier fighting, the 7thMarines could call upon the105mm and 155mm howitzers ofthe 11th Marines, and other Marinesupporting weapons includingrocket batteries, tanks, and aircraft.Army artillery and Air Force fight-er-bombers reinforced the firepow-er of the division.

In the words of Staff SergeantChristopher E. Sarno of the 1stMarine Division's tank battalion:"Korea was an artilleryman's par-adise." rt seemed to him that theChinese always fought by night,making effective use of an arsenalof weapons. The burp guns andmines were bad, Sarno said, but

WarsawSeattle/Ronson

Hook

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' t•ic 0) )"3 /

I

) t

/,0

ILEQEND

A Marine Combat Outpost

Former COP

Tank Road

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c— — — —

39

the worst was the artillery, which"could blast a man's body to bitsso that his remains were picked upin a shovel."

The static battle line obviouslyplaced a premium on artillery,especially the 105mm and 155mmhowitzers of the Army and MarineCorps. Indeed, by mid-October1952 American batteries were fir-ing these shells at a more rapidrate than during the bloody fight-ing in the early months of 1951,when United Nations forcesadvanced beyond the 38th Paralleland conducted offensive opera-tions like Killer and Ripper. By thefall of 1952, firepower, especially

artillery, dominated the battle-ground, as probes, patrols,ambushes, and attacks on outpoststook the place of major offensives.

Because of the demand ofartillery support, the rationing of105mm and 155mm shells becamenecessary. During the last 11 daysof October, a quota prevailed, atleast for purposes of planning. Insupport of the 7th Marines, each105mm howitzer might fire a dailyaverage of 20 rounds and each155mm howitzer 4.3 rounds. The81mm mortars located in each bat-talion also suffered from a shortageof shells, and even hand grenadeswere now scarce. To do the work

of mortars and artillery, ColonelMoore employed tripod-mounted,water-cooled .30-caliber machineguns. These weapons employedthe techniques of World War 1,engaging targets like potentialassembly areas with indirect firebased on map data and adjustedby forward observers, as well asaimed direct fire.

The enemy initiated his attackon the Hook by battering thesalient and its combat outpostswith mortar and artillery fire; anestimated 1,200 rounds explodedamong the trenches and bunkerson the Hook and Outposts Ronsonand Warsaw between dusk on 24October and dawn on the 25th.The Marine defenders, aided bydetachments from the KoreanService Corps, struggled to keeppace with the destruction, repair-ing damage as best they could dur-ing lulls in the bombardment onlyto face new damage when theshelling resumed.

While shoring up trenches andbunkers, the 7th Marines foughtback. In the hardest hit area,Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki's 1stBattalion returned fire with its ownmortars, machine guns, and recoil-less rifles, while the regimentalmortars and tanks joined in.Despite the shortage of high-explosive shells, the 2d Battalion,11th Marines, fired some 400105mm rounds in response to thefirst day's Chinese bombardment,575 rounds on the 24 October, and506 on the 25th, balancing theneed to conserve ammunitionagainst the worsening crisis. Airstrikes also pounded the enemymassing near the Hook and thetwo nearby outposts, includingattacks by four Panther jets fromVMF-311 that dropped high explo-sives and napalm on Chinesetroops massing some 750 yardseast of the salient.

During the 24 hours beginning

Ammunition camets step aside to let litter barriers pass with a wounded Ma rinedurin,g the battle for the Hook.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A1456424

40

L

at 1800 on the 25th, Chinese gun-ners scourged Colonel Moore'sregiment with another 1,600 mor-tar and artillery shells, most ofthem exploding on the groundheld by Dulacki's battalion. Theshelling abated briefly on the 25thbut resumed, convincing the divi-sion's intelligence officer, ColonelClarence A. Barninger, that theenemy was planning a majorattack to overwhelm the Hook andgain control of the SamichonValley. Barninger warned the divi-sion's commander, GeneralPollock, well in advance of theactual attack.

The Chinese fire diminishedsomewhat on the morning of 26October, but the Hook remained adangerous place. On that morn-ing, Lieutenant Colonel Dulackitook advantage of a lull to inspectthe defenses, only to be knockeddown by the concussion from anenemy shell. He escaped withbruises and abrasions and contin-ued his rounds. The intensity ofthe bombardment increased laterin the morning and continuedafter dark in preparation forattacks on Outposts Ronson and

Warsaw and the Hook itself.Chinese troops stormed Ronson

at 1810 on 26 October after threedays of preparatory fire that hadcollapsed trenches, shatteredbunkers, and killed and woundedMarines at both outposts and onthe Hook. At Ronson. 50 or moreof the enemy penetrated the

defensive artillery concentrations,overran the position, and killed orcaptured the members of the rein-forced squad manning the outpost.

At about the same time, aChinese company split into twogroups and attacked OutpostWarsaw simultaneously from theeast and west. A box-me-in bar-rage fired by the 11th Marinescould not prevent the assaulttroops for closing in on thedefenders, led by SecondLieutenant John L. Babson, Jr. TheMarines at Warsaw fought backwith grenades, pistols, and rifles,using the latter as clubs whenammunition ran out. Taking coverin the wreckage of the bunkers,they called for variable-time firedirectly overhead. Hope lingeredthat the rain of shell fragments hadsaved Warsaw, but after four hoursof silence from the garrison,Colonel Moore reluctantly con-cluded that Warsaw was lost, itsdefenders either dead or captured.Lieutenant Babson was one ofthose killed.

While the fate of Warsaw still

National Archives Photo (U5MC) 127-N-A19O52

The crew of Number 5 gun, Battery 4 4th Battalion, 11th Martne.c, loads its155mm howitzer after receiving word to prepare for afire mission.

Chinese shells explode in the valley below as Marines on the Hook move about intheir trenches.

Department of Defense Photo (usMc) A166773

41

remained in doubt and a platoonfrom Captain Paul B. Byrum'sCompany C was preparing to rein-force the outpost, a flurry ofChinese shells battered the Hook.Colonel Moore reacted by sendingCaptain Frederick C. McLaughlin'sCompany A, which Byrum's unithad just relieved, to help CompanyC defend the salient. Moore alsodirected that the 1st Battalion havefirst call on the regiment's supplyof ammunition, In addition, the 1stMarine Division lifted the restric-tions on artillery ammunition firedin support of the Hook's defend-ers.

Under cover of artillery andmortar fire, a Chinese battalionlaunched a three-pronged attackon Dulacki's 1st Battalion. By 1938on the 26th, Chinese infantry firstthreatened the main line of resis-tance southwest of the Hook itself,to the left of the salient and rough-ly halfway to the boundary withthe 3d Battalion. Within a few min-utes, a second attack hit the verynose of the Hook, while a thirdstruck its eastern face. Mingledwith the assault troops were labor-ers carrying construction materialsto fortify the Hook after the threeprongs of the attack had isolatedand overrun it.

The thrust along the ridge thatformed the spine of the Hook con-tinued until the Chinese encoun-tered the observation post fromwhich Second Lieutenant SherrodE. Skinner, Jr., was directing thefire of the 11th Marines. The lieu-tenant organized the defense ofthis hunker, running from coverwhen necessary to replenish thesupply of small arms ammunition.He was still calling down artilleryfire when the attackers overran theHook. He then told his men toplay dead until other Marinescounterattacked. For three hours,they fooled the Chinese whoentered the bunker. Finally, an

mander, and to Col Honsowetz' leftof the 7tbMarine.s.

enemy soldier became suspiciousand threw a grenade inside.Skinner rolled onto the grenade,absorbing the force of the explo-sion and saving the lives of two ofhis men. His sacrifice resulted inthe posthumous award of theMedal of Honor.

To the left of the Hook, theassault force outflanked a platoonof Company C, led by SecondLieutenant John W. Meikle, but hesucceeded in pulling back theflanks to form a perimeter. East ofthe Hook, on the 1st Battalion'sright, other elements of CompanyC formed another perimeter. in the400 yards separating the two, scat-tered groups from Byrum's compa-ny struggled to close the gap.

Help for Company C beganarriving at about 2330, after theChinese had overrun the Hook,when the first elements ofMcLaughlin's Company A, sent toreinforce Byrum's Marines, madecontact with Meikle's perimeter to

42

Col Thomas C Moore, commanding officer

the left rear of the captured salient.The arrival of reinforcementsenabled the members of CompanyC, scattered between the twoperimeters, to form a blockingposition on a ridge running eastand west a few hundred yards tothe rear of the Hook. At 0300 onthe 27th, Colonel Moore commit-ted the regimental reserve,Company H, 3d Battalion. GeneralPollock ordered the 3d Battalion,1st Marines, from the divisionreserve into the sector held byMoore's 7th Marines.

The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,had the mission of counterattack-ing the Chinese who had seizedthe Hook and penetrated theJamestown Line. Anticipating com-mitment in this critical sector, thebattalion commander, LieutenantColonel Sidney J. Altman, hadalready drawn up a basic plan forsuch a counterattack and personal-ly reconnoitered the area. NowAltman's Marines prepared to exe-

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A165743

MajGen PaulA. Kendall, center, i corps commander, receives a tactical briefIngfrom Col Russell E. Honsowetz, operations officer of the 1st Marine Division. To

MajGen Kendall's right is MajGen Edwin A. PollocJe, 1st Marine Division com-

cute that plan. Tank gunners, mor-tar crews, and artillerymen bat-tered the recently capturedOutpost Warsaw, other Chinesetroop concentrations, firing batter-ies, and supply routes. The 1stMarine Aircraft Wing also joined in,as Grumman Tigercat night fightersused the ground-based MPQ radarto hit the main Chinese supplyroute sustaining the attack, drop-ping their bombs less than a milewest of the Hook.

While the 3d Battalion preparedto counterattack the Hook, theenemy made a new thrust at the7th Marines, Early on the morningof 27 October, the Chineseattacked Reno, one of the outpostsmanned by Lieutenant ColonelCaputo's 2d Battalion. Some twomiles west of the Hook, the battal-ion's three outposts formed anarrowhead aimed at Chinese lines,with Reno at the point, Carson on

the left, and Vegas on the right.The pattern of hostile activity

opposite the 7th Marines earlier inOctober persuaded GeneralPollock's intelligence specialiststhat the enemy had given first pri-ority to seizing Caputo's three out-posts. This estimate of Chineseintentions caused the 11th Marinesto plan concentrations in front ofthe 2d Battalion, while Caputo setup strong ambush positions to pro-tect the threatened outposts.

On the night before the assaulton Reno, Captain James R. Floresled a reinforced platoon fromCompany E into the darkness. Thepatrol's destination was a camou-flaged ambush position about 300yards south of Reno and halfwaybetween Carson and Vegas. Atmidnight, noises to the front alert-ed Flores and his men that theenemy had infiltrated betweenthem and the outpost and werepreparing to attack Reno from therear. The ambush force alerted theMarines defending the outpost of

43

the danger behind them andopened fire when the force, esti-mated at two Chinese companies,seemed on the verge of attacking.Although raked by fire from thefront and rear, the enemy foughtback, holding the Marines in checkuntil they could break off theaction and make an orderly with-drawal to the main line of resis-tance.

Quiet enveloped Outpost Renountil 0400 on the 27th, when aChinese platoon attacked from thenorthwest, assaulting in twowaves. The Marines on Reno beatback this first attack, but a secondthrust from the same directionbroke through the perimeter. Thedefenders took cover so that vari-able-time artillery fire burstingoverhead could maul the enemy.The tactics worked to perfection,forcing the Chinese to abandontheir lodgment after some 40 min-utes of fighting

After the ambush by Marinesbehind Rena, while the outpost'sdefenders were fighting off thesubsequent Chinese assaults,Captain McLaughlin's Company Apassed through the line establishedby Byrum's Marines and beganadvancing toward the Hook.Enemy mortar and artillery firestopped McLaughlin's unit short ofthe objective, forcing him to orderhis Marines to dig in and hold theground they had gained.

When Mclaughlin's counterat-tack stalled, Colonel Mooreattached the last of the regimentalreserve—Company H, 3d Battal-ion, under Captain Bernard B.

Belant—to Lieutenant ColonelDulacki's 1st Battalion. At 0505,Belant reported to Dulacki, whodirected him to renew the counter-attack. Within three hours,Company H stood ready to attack

I 2 ENEMY COMPANIESATTACK AT 0030

I

ITENEMY COMPANYATTACK AT 0400

—

//

////

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— ...PLATOON AMBUSH

LIMITS

The Fight for Outpost Reno,27 October 1952

0 100 200 300 400 500Meters "—'—i———-———J

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the Chinese, whose bridgeheadencompassed the Hook itself and acrescent of ridges and drawsextending from the spine of thatterrain feature and embracing asegment of the main line of resis-tance about a half-mile wide.

As Belant led his unit forward, itrapidly covered the first 200 yardsbefore Chinese small arms, mortar,and artillery fire shifted to meet thethreat. The company commanderpressed the attack, however.Second Lieutenant George H.O'Brien, Jr., led his platoon overthe ridge to his front, the menzigzagging as they ran toward theChinese-held trenchline. A bulletstruck O'Brien's armored vest,knocking him down, but he scram-bled to his feet and continuedtoward the enemy, pausing onlybriefly to help a wounded man.Throwing grenades and firing hiscarbine, he silenced the Chineseweapons in a bunker and led hisplatoon toward the Hook itself.This headlong assault, which

Marines climb an improved trail tobring ammunition to machine gun-ners on the Hook.Deparmtent of Defense Photo (usMc) A166423

earned O'Brien the Medal ofHonor, broke through the Chineseperimeter and approached theenemy-held bunkers on the Hookbefore being contained by hostilemortar and artillery fire, Theremainder of Company H widenedthe crack that O'Brien's platoonhad opened and captured threeprisoners as it overran the south-eastern portion of the Hook beforea fierce shelling forced theadvance elements to find coverand yield some of the ground theyhad taken.

Marine aircraft helped CompanyH advance onto the Hook, attack-ing reinforcements moving intobattle and the positions fromwhich the Chinese were firing oradjusting fire. Key targets includedthe former Marine outposts ofIrene, Seattle, and Frisco, alongwith the frequently bombed mainsupply route and those enemytroops trying to dislodge theMarines who had gained afoothold on the Hook. Fire fromMarine tanks and artillery engagedsome of the same targets andproved deadly against trenchesand bunkers that the Chinese hadseized. The howitzers also joinedmortars in counterbattery fire.

At midday on 27 October, afterGeneral Pollock had releasedCompany I, 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, to Colonel Moore's con-trol, the counterattack to regain theHook entered its final phase.Company I would drive the enemyonto the Hook, after whichCompany H, the unit that had pen-etrated the Chinese perimeter ear-lier in the day, was to take over theright of the 1st Battalion's line,relieving Company B, whichwould make a final assault on theHook and recapture both theHook and Outpost Warsaw.

Captain Murray V. Harlan, Jr.,who commanded Company I,launched his attack early in the

44

afternoon. The 1st Platoon, whichled the way, seized the crest of theridge to its front at 1350 and beganadvancing toward the Hookbehind a barrage laid down by the11th Marines. The Chinese reactedto the threat from Harlan's compa-ny with deadly artillery and mortarconcentrations directed against notonly the advancing Marines, butalso Colonel Moore's commandpost and the weapons along theJamestown Line that supported theassault.

Despite severe casualties,Harlan's Marines pushed ahead, attimes crawling from one outcrop-ping in the shell-torn earth toanother. After pausing to reorga-nize at about 1635, the companymoved, a few men at a time, ontothe Hook, regaining the bunkerwhere Lieutenant Skinner had sac-rificed his life for his men and forg-ing ahead against die-hard Chinesein collapsed bunkers and trenches.The deadliest fire came, as always,from enemy mortars and artilleryshells that plunged steeply ontothe Hook before exploding.Company I took such cover as itcould find, but terrain affordedconcealment and greater protec-tion from flat-trajectory than fromhigh-angle-fire weapons.

By midnight on 28 October,Company 13 had threaded its waythrough a maze of shell craters andmoved into position to the left ofCompany I. Shortly afterwardCompany B began what Dulackihad planned as the final assault onthe Hook. Small arms fire and ashower of grenades from theChinese positions stopped theMarines as they attacked with riflesand grenades of their own. Afterexchanging fire with the enemy forperhaps 90 minutes the companyfell back to obtain cover and calledfor mortar and artillery fire. Theshelling battered not only thestrongpoints immediately to the

'rI -

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quency of malfunctions, they didnot appear to be cleaning and car-ing for their weapons, as theyshould. Dulacki also expressedconcern that the Marines hadbecome too willing to seek thecover of bunkers during Chineseattacks, gaining protection fromshell fragments—though not fromsatchel charges or direct hits bylarge-caliber shells—at a sacrificein fields of fire. He believed thatinfantrymen should build and fightfrom individual positions with atleast some overhead cover, ratherthan from large bunkers in whichseveral defenders might be isolatedand attacked with explosivecharges or trapped if a direct hitcollapsed the structure.

with belted ammunition.

front of Company B, but also theenemy's supporting weapons andthe routes of reinforcement andreplenishment that passed throughthe Chinese-held outposts ofWarsaw and Ronson. The Marinesrenewed the assault at 0340, brokethrough, and by 0600 overran theHook. Afterward, elements ofColonel Moore's regiment reoccu-pied Warsaw and Reno, which theenemy bad abandoned.

A dense fog settled over theHook as Lieutenant ColonelDulacki's battalion killed or cap-tured Chinese stragglers and reor-ganized the defenses. The battlefor the Hook and its two outposts,along with the diversionary actionat Outpost Reno, cost the Chinese269 dead and wounded, a numberverified as best the Marines could,and perhaps another 953 casualtiesthat escaped verification. In pre-venting the enemy from gaining a

permanent tactical advantage atthe Hook, the Marines lost 70killed, 386 wounded, and 39 miss-ing, of whom 27 were prisoners ofthe Chinese. At Reno, nine Marineswere killed and 49 wounded.

During the struggle for theHook, Chinese mortars andartillery proved as deadly as usualin both defending against Marineattack and battering Marine defens-es. The enemy sent additional sol-diers immediately behind theassault troops, intending that theyexploit any breakthrough by theearlier waves, but th.e tactics failedto accomplish the intended pur-pose. Lieutenant Colonel Dulackibelieved that the gambit failedbecause too few junior officerswere on hand to commit thereserve at the precise moment tomaintain momentum.

Dulacki also found flaws withhis Marines. Judging from the fre-

45

From the Hook, the fightingreturned to the sector of the SouthKorean Marines on the left of the5th Marines. The most vulnerablepoints along the segment of theJamestown Line held by theKorean Marines were CombatOutposts 39, 33, 31, and 51.Outposts 39, 33, and 31 were locat-ed near the boundary with the 5thMarines and manned by the 5thBattalion, Korean Marine Corps,which had relieved the 3dBattalion on the afternoon of 31October. The 2d Battalion of theKorean Marine Corps maintainedCombat Outpost 51, in front of itslines.

An assault against these fourhilltop outposts would representan extension of the attacks in earlyOctober that had overrun threeother South Korean outposts—86to the south, 36, and 37. The dom-inant terrain feature in this areawas Hill 155 on the main line ofresistance in the sector of the 5thBattalion, a promontory that over-looked not only the Sachon Valley

Department of Detense Photo (usMc) A16642sA Marine casually arrives at a rear aid station for emer,gencv treatment andevacuation to a hospital. Ammunition carrier in the background starts uphill

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and the Chinese activity there, butalso the Panmunjom corridor andits environs. The enemy made noattempt to disguise his designs onthe outposts and ultimately the hill,unleashing a savage bombardment—more than 3,000 rounds duringthe 48 hours ending at 1800, 31

October—that rocked the SouthKorean positions, especiallyOutposts 39 and 33.

The anticipated Chinese attackbegan at 1830 on the 31st, whenthe Chinese probed Outposts 39and 33, apparently in an attempt toexploit any confusion resultingfrom the 5th Battalion's relief ofthe 3d. Artillery fire blocked theseenemy jabs but did not end thenight's fighting. At 2200, an eight-minute bombardment struck thefour outposts in preparation forinfantry assaults against all ofthem.

On the right, a Chinese compa-ny pressured the platoon of SouthKorean Marines holding Outpost31 until 0155, when defensive fireprevailed and the attack ended. AtOutpost 33, another enemy com-pany broke through a perimetermanned by only two South Koreansquads, which clung to parts of thehill until 0515 when, with the helpof artillery fire, they drove off theChinese.

Two enemy companies attackedOutpost 39, the nearest of the fourto Hill 155. The platoon of SouthKorean Marines deployed thereyielded some ground before takingadvantage of defensive artilleryconcentrations to eject the Chineseby 0410. The enemy again probedthe outpost two hours later, butsoon broke off the action on theright of the sector held by theSouth Korean Marines.

On the left, four Chinese com-panies attacked Combat Outpost51, the most heavily defended ofthe four, since an entire companyhad dug in there. It was also the

as not to hamper operations

most remote of the outposts, 2,625yards from the main line of resis-tance, and this vulnerable locationmay have persuaded the enemy toscrimp on shelling. Except for 20rounds of 90mm fire from Soviet-built tanks, the bombardment herewas lighter and less effective thanat the other three outposts. ThreeChinese companies attackedOutpost 51 from the southwest andanother from the north. After someinitial gains, the attack lostmomentum and ended at 0330.

Despite the clashes involvingthe Korean Marines, a lull settledover the division following thefierce action at the Hook. Elementsof the Commonwealth Divisionassumed responsibility for theHook itself on 3 November, but the11th Marines continued to fire insupport of the salient's British

46

defenders. On the night of 18-19November, for example, Marineartillerymen fired some 2,000rounds to help break up a Chineseattack.

Meanwhile, the 1st Marinesreplaced the 7th Marines in man-ning the right of the division'smain line of resistance. On 22November, the 2d Battalion, 1stMarines, in regimental reserve,provided one company forOperation Wakeup, a raid onChinese positions oppositeCombat Outposts Reno and Vegas.The battalion commander,Lieutenant Colonel Charles E.

Warren, assigned the mission toCaptain Jay V. Poage's CompanyD, which attacked just beforedawn. The operation succeededmainly in demonstrating thestrength of the Chinese, whosedefensive fire stopped the attackshort of the objective and frustrat-ed the plan to seize and interrogate

Department of Defense Photo (usMc) M68017

Men of the 5th Marines eat hot chow cooked and brouRht up to them on the front-lines from the battalion command post to the rear Marines often ate in relays so

Life in the Bunkerspon arriving on the Jamestown Line, the 1stMarine Division made use of log-and-sandbagbunkers, which Second Lieutenant William

Watson, described as a simultaneous curse and blessing.Although the structures provided "places of some comfortto which Marines went to get dry and sleep and to escapeincoming [firel," the "sandbag castles" lured men out oftheir fighting positions. Once inside a hunker, the Marinescould be killed or wounded not only by a direct hit by aheavy shell that collapsed the structure, but also by agrenade or explosive charge hurled inside.

Given the vulnerability of bunkers and their effect onaggressiveness, it was no wonder, said Watson, that heand his fellow junior officers had received no formalinstruction in bunker placement or construction. "Theydidn't teach bunker building at Quantico," lie recalled."Who would have dared?" In a Marine Corps trained "toassault and dominate the enemy," anyone foolish enoughto advocate the use of defensive bunkers would probablyhave been shipped at once to Korea where he might wellhave found himself building the very structures that hadresulted in his being sent there.

Life in the bunkers gave rise to unique problems, notthe least of which was trash disposal. As the bunkers andtrenches proliferated on the main line of resistance andthe outpost line, the troops manning them—whetherAmerican or South Korean Marines or Chinese soldiers—generated vast amount of refuse. Both sides, reportedSecond Lieutenant John M. Verdi, a Marine pilot who flewa hundred missions and for a time controlled air strikesfrom a bunker on the sratic battle line, did an adequatejob of policing the main line of resistance, hut the combatoutposts posed a more difficult challenge. By day activityin a confined and exposed area could attract hostile fire,and by night policing up might interfere with plannedfires, the movement of patrols, or the establishment of lis-tening posts. As a result, trash accumulated around theoutposts, especially those of the Marines who not only atemore than their enemy, but consumed food that came incans or packages that could he more easily discarded thancarried away, even with the help of Korean laborers.

Trash attracted rats, nicknamed "bunker bunnies"because of their size. The Marines waged war againstthem but with partial success at best. Verdi recalled thatone Marine used his bayonet to pin a scurrying rat to asandbag, but the screams of the dying varmint proved sounnerving that the hunter had to borrow a pistol to finishoff his prey.

Mines planted by Marines could be as dangerous asthose laid by the Chinese, or so Verdi believed. TheMarines charted their minefields, selecting a starting pointand an azimuth, then planting the mines at specific inter-vals to form rows a certain distance apart. An error withthe compass or a mistake in recording the informationwould render the chart useless, and the map itself mightdisappear, destroyed as a result of enemy action or sim-ply lost during the relief of a unit. A return to mobile war-fare, or a truce that required removal of the old mine-fields, would increase the danger.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A 169578

prisoners. Patrols, ambushes, andless ambitious raids continued forthe balance of the year.

On the same day as OperationWakeup, South Korean police cap-tured two infiltrators in the reararea of the Kimpo ProvisionalRegiment. Although the I-Ian Riverinterposed a barrier to large-scaleattacks, the occasional infiltrator

managed to cross and lose them-selves among the 80,000 civiliansliving on the Kimpo Peninsula. Afew of these infiltrators struck on 1December, ambushing a jeep dri-ving on the main supply route.Some two-dozen bullets tore intothe vehicle, but only one struck thelone occupant, wounding him inthe knee.

47

During 1952, the Korean fightingassumed a pattern far differentfrom that for which the Marinessent to Korea in previous years hadprepared. Mobility gave way tostalemate. The battlefield nowresembled the trench warfare ofWorld War I more than the sudden

a

— S

- r it

Tn December, President-electDwight D. Eisenhower made goodhis campaign promise to "go toKorea," hut it was not yet possibleto predict the consequences, ifany, of his visit. The war remainedunpopular with the American peo-ple, threats posed by the SovietUnion in Europe seemed moredangerous than the Chinese men-ace in the Far East, and the negoti-ations at Panmunjom had stalledover the question whether prison-ers of war could refuse repatria-tion. The only hope, as yet a slimone, for resolving the issue ofrepatriation lay in the adoption bythe United Nations of an Indianproposal to create a special com-mission to address the issue.

amphibious thrusts and rapid cam-paigns of World War TI in thePacific. If the amphibian tractorsymbolized the role of Marines inthe war against Japan, the bunker,built of logs and sandbags on boththe main line of resistance and theline of outposts that protected it,represented the war along theJamestown Line.

The final months of 1952 sawchanges of leadership within the1st Marine Division. On 5November, Colonel Moore handedover the 7th Marines to ColonelLoren E. Haffner, and ColonelHewitt D. Adams replaced ColonelLayer in command of the 1stMarines on the 22d. On 10December, Colonel Lewis W. Waltassumed command of the 5thMarines from Colonel Smoak.Colonel Harvey C. Tschirgi tookover the Kimpo ProvisionalRegiment on 1 December fromColonel Richard H. Crockett, whohad replaced Colonel Staab, theunit's original commander, on 31August. General Pollock remainedin command of the division as thenew year began and the stalematecontinued.

Honors are rendered for President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower during his visit tothe 1st Marine Division. Standing to Eisenhower's left are MajGen Edwin A.Pollock, the division commando;; and Gen Mark W clark, USA., the UnitedNations commander

IstMarniv Historicat Diaty Photo Supplement, Dec52

Department of Defense Photo (UsMc) A167563

Two 48-ton Patton tanks wait to receive firing orders before their Marine driverswheel them up onto earthen ramps behind the main line of resistance where theywould fire on enemy positions as ar/ille;y.

48

ernard C. Nalty was acivilian member of the

Historical Branch, G-3 Divi-sion, Headquarters MarineCorps, from October 1956 toSeptember 1961. He collabo-rated with Henry I. Shaw, Jr.,and Edwin T. Turnbladh onCentral Pacific Drive, a vol-ume of the History of U S.Marine Corps Operations inWorld War II series. He also completed more than 14short historical studies, some of which appeared inLeatherneck or Marine Corps Gazette. He joined thehistory office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961, trans-ferred in 1964 to the Air Force history program, andretired in 1994. Mr. Nalty has written or edited a num-ber of publications, including Blacks in the Military:Essential Documents, Strength for the Fight: A Historyof Black Americans in the Military, The Vietnam War,Tigers Over Asia, Air Power and the Fight for KheSanh, and Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History ofthe U.S. Air Force. In addition, he participated in theMarines in World War II commemorative series, writ-ing C'ape Gloucester: The Green inferno and TheRight to Fight: African-American Marines in WorldWar H.

TillS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines inthe Korean War era, is published for the education and training of'Marines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marinecorps, Washington, ac., as part nf the U.S. Department of Defenseobservance of the 50th anniversary of that war, Editorial costs have beendefrayed in part by contributions from members of the Marine corps1-Jeritage Foundation.

KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DIRECTOR OFM.4R.JNE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS

Colonel John W. Ripley, USMC (Ret)GENERAL EDITOR,

KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Charles R. SmithEDiTING AND DESIGN sEC7IOAç HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIViSiON

W. Stephen Hill, Visual Informariovi. SpecialistCatherine A. Kerns, Visual Information Specialist

11.5. Marine Corps Historical Center1254 Charles Morris Street SE

Washington Navy Yard DC 20374-50402001

PCN 190 00319 700

Ahc,ut the Author

SourcesClay Blair, Jr.. has chosen The

Forgotten War as the title of hisaccount of the Korean conflict, the his-tory of which tends to be overshad-owed by World War 11 and theVietnam War, Detailed though it iscompared to other such histories, theForRotten War: America in Korea,1950-1953 (New York: Times Books,1987) tends to gloss over the final 18months of the war, especially the bat-tles fought by the United StatesMarines, The best account of Marineoperations during 1952 and afterremains Operations in West Korea, vol-ume five of the series (I. S. Marinecorps Operations in Korea, 1950-1953(Washington, D.C.: Historical Division,HQMC, 1972), by LtCol Pat Meid,USMCR, and Maj James M. Yingling,USMC,

Although the official Marine Corpsaccount is essential, Walter G. Hermescontributes valuable additional infor-

mation on Marine Corps operations, aswell as Army activity and the negotia-tion of a ceasefire, in Truce Tertt andFighting Front (Washington, D.C.:Office of the Chief of Military History,United States Army. 1988), a volumeof United States Ar,ni' in the KoreanWar series.

Personal accounts by Marines areincluded in Korean Vignettes: Faces ofWar (Portland, OR: ArtworkPublications, 1996), a compilation ofnarratives and photographs by 201veterans of the Korean War, preparedby Arthur W. Wilson and Norman L.Strickbine.

Other valuable insights and first-hand accounts appear in The KoreanWar.' (',icertain Victory: TheConcluding Volume of an Oral History(New York: Harcourt Bracejovanovich, 1988) by Donald Knox,with additional text by Alfred Coppel.

The Marine Corps Gazette coveredthe professional aspects of the war ina number of articles. Especially impor-tant are "Outpost Warfare," in the

November 1953 issue, and "Back tothe Trenches," (March 1955), both byPeter Braestrup. and LtCol Roy A.Batterton's "Random Notes on Korea,"(November 1955).

The personal papers collected bythe History and Museums Division,Headquarters U, S. Marine Corpsproved extremely helpful. The materi-al on file varies tremendously, includ-ing journals, photographs, letters, nar-rative memoirs, and at least one acad-emic paper, a master's thesis on out-post warfare by Maj Norman W. Hicks,a Korean War veteran assigned to helpwrite the history of that conflict,Among the most valuable of thesewere the submissions by John MinturnVerdi, William A. Watson, and GenChristian F. Schilt.

With the exception of MajGen JohnT. Selden, the senior Marine officersserving in Korea at this time partici-pated in the Marine Corps' oral historyprogram. The interviews with GenChristian F, Schilt and Gen Edwin A,Pollock proved especially valuable.