stalemate meets structural reform! - sicherheitspolitik
TRANSCRIPT
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 05. 2010
Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!
The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact
of the Lisbon Treaty
von Karsten Pötschke
WiSi-Papers
Texte des Bundesverbandes für Sicherheitspolitik an Hochschulen
WISSENSCHAFT & SICHERHEIT
Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!
The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010
A. Introduction
After1 the Cold War the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU)
shaped Europe‟s strategic landscape. During the
last 20 years both organizations have changed their
character tremendously. Having lost its main raison
d´être since the Soviet threat had vanished, NATO
is still in the process of defining its new mission.
Besides maintaining collective defense as its core
function, it is trying to find new uses for its
capabilities. Simultaneously, the European
Communities (EC) have been transformed with the
Treaty of Maastricht (1992) into the European
Union. In order to promote political integration the
EU is successively equipped with powers and
instruments to deal with foreign policy matters. As
part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) the European Union has only recently
begun starting with the EU Summit of Cologne
(1999) to develop an European Security and
Defense Policy (ESDP) as integral part.2 The
European Union strives for the capability to conduct
a broad range of military and civilian operations.
Unfortunately, the parallel development of NATO
and EU has created some friction since
responsibility is not clearly divided among the
organizations.3 In response the EU and NATO
announced a formal “Strategic Partnership” in 2002
almost 10 years after the start of the parallel
1 The author holds a bachelor degree in
International Relations from Dresden University of
Technology. He is currently a LLM (Adv.) candidate in
Public International Law at Leiden University. The
author wishes to thank Professor Frans A.M. Alting von
Geusau and Nicholas Procopenko for their
encouragement and perceptive comments. All errors are
the author’s own. 2 For a good overview of the development of ESDP see Keukeleire, From Taboo to Spearhead 3 Twenty-one countries belong to NATO and the
EU. The six non-NATO members of the European Union
are Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and
Sweden; the seven non-EU members of NATO are
Albania, Canada, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Turkey and
the USA.
development to resolve tensions between the
organizations.4
The objective of the paper is twofold. It strives to
analyze the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the
NATO-EU Strategic Partnership. Therefore, it will
need to review the current state of the partnership
beforehand to identify existing deficits of and risks to
the relationship. By focusing afterwards on selected
revised European Union treaty provisions, the article
will be able to analyze whether existing problems
are mended, ignored, or aggravated. Thereafter, it
will briefly discuss the possible impact of the
development trend of the EU-NATO partnership on
international law. The final conclusion will contain an
outlook of the future development of NATO-EU
relations and, building upon prior findings, some
policy advice.
B. NATO – EU Strategic Partnership before
Lisbon
The following chapter will focus on the description of
the strategic partnership between EU and NATO
before the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty.
Before looking at the links which have been
established between the organizations and how
these organizations cooperated in the field, the
chapter will first briefly address the question why
NATO and EU are doomed to cooperate. Finally, the
persistent problems in the relationship between
NATO and EU will be reviewed.
1. Reasons for a Strategic Partnership
There are several reasons why NATO and EU need
to cooperate thoroughly. The most important ones
are: First, as can be seen comparing the current
NATO strategy as developed at the 1999
Washington Summit5 and the EU strategy with
respect to CFSP and ESDP6, it is apparent that both
4 EU-NATO, EU-NATO declaration on ESDP 5 NATO, Washington Strategic Concept 1999 6 EU, Report on the Implementation of the
European Security Strategy, 1-9
Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!
The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010
organizations have partially overlapping missions
and geographical foci. Both organizations aim to
bolster European defense and crisis management
capacities. In addition, besides having a clear focus
on Europe, both organizations conduct crisis
management operations worldwide. It is important
to note that the EU as an actor who is perceived as
more independent than NATO can be active in
regions where NATO engagement is politically
impossible. The EU missions to Georgia after the
Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, in the Middle
East and in the Ukraine can stand as an example.
Hence, one organization can stabilize regions which
are also of strategic interest to the other.7
Second, the organizations need to coordinate since
they partially build upon the same resource pool. As
some countries‟ militaries have to fulfill roles within
NATO and the ESDP, they have earmarked their
resources for use within both frameworks. Hence,
two problems arise: Availability and interoperability.
Availability is not only an issue when resources are
double hatted and are already used within an EU or
NATO operation yet are needed by the other
organization for its own mission, but also when they
are single hatted since then the other organization
has no access to these resources at all.
Interoperability is important to ensure that national
resources can be used in both NATO and EU roles
and that resources of countries, not being a joint
member of NATO and EU, can be applied
effectively in operations where NATO and EU are
jointly engaged.8
Third, both organizations lack certain capacities that
the other organization can offer. Many of today‟s
7 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 (highlighting
added) 8 Here different training standards and equipment
have proved to be a problem, since NATO rules of
engagement differ from EU rules. See CRS, NATO and
EU, 7 and 20
crises call for a comprehensive approach combining
military and civilian efforts.9 Undoubtedly, the EU is
more proficient than NATO in topics like civilian
reconstruction or the promotion of the rule of law,
but it is still lacking necessary assets to conduct
high intensity combat operation.10
The reality is that
“EU capabilities have become the necessary
complement to NATO‟s military forces in nearly all of
the Alliance‟s current operations.”11
Fourth, both organizations suffer from similar
capacity shortfalls. Joint capacity building is likely to
benefit both organizations and moderate costs for
the member states. The importance of cooperation
to address joint capability shortfalls is highlighted by
the fact that the 2009 EU Report on ESDP
dedicates one third of its section on NATO-EU
relations to the work of the joint EU-NATO
Capability Group.12
Fifth, the number of operations where NATO and
EU Assets are deployed jointly is rising; recent
examples are Afghanistan and the fight against
piracy (Operation Ocean Shield (NATO) and
Atalanta (EU)).13
Sixth, as Shea points out, in an ever more multi-
polar world, where power shifts towards Asia, the
pressure of North America and Europe increases
since both have a common value base resulting in
similar policies.14
9 The Counter Insurgency (COIN) strategy in
Afghanistan is a perfect example of this complex
interplay. See PA Consulting Group, Dynamic Planning
for COIN in Afghanistan; NATO, Afghanistan Report
2009; and US Army, COIN Field Manual 10 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 99; Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 32 11 Shea quote a high ranking NATO official, see
Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 12 EU, ESDP Report 2009, 34; EU, Development
of European Military Capabilities, 6 13 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 14 Ibid., 45
Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!
The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010
To sum up, NATO and the ESDP of the European
Union are realities which cannot be denied by the
other organization. For practical reasons they are
required to cooperate as long as both of them exist.
The next part will explain how the organizations
have structured their cooperation.
2. Conceptual and Institutional Links
The European Union is linked via various
instruments and forums with NATO. The foundation
for formal cooperation was created with the
announcement of a “Strategic Partnership” in 2002
in the joint “EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP”15
. The
cornerstone of this partnership is the Berlin Plus
Agreement of 2003 which gives the European Union
“assured access” to NATO planning abilities and
“presumed access”16
to NATO operational
capabilities for EU-led missions. Furthermore, both
organization confirmed and have constantly
reassured each other that their relationship ought to
be mutually reinforcing and that they respect their
decision making autonomy. Additionally, it was
underlined that the development of ESDP takes
place within the framework of NATO and that NATO
should remain the main organization for the
provision of collective security in Europe.17
Before
the Lisbon Treaty, it seemed that NATO
distinguished itself from the EU via its mandate of
collective self defense which contrasts the EU‟s
more general humanitarian tasks.18
NATO and the EU slowly established institutional
links parallel to the conceptual links. The formal
15 EU-NATO, Declaration on ESDP 16 The agreement reads that NATO will with
“strong likelihood” decide that some listed assets and capabilities will be made available to the EU. See EU-
NATO, Berlin Plus Agreement; see also CRS, FAQ EU,
6; CRS, NATO and EU, 16 17 See for example EU, ESDP Report 2009, 34
and NATO, Straßbourg/Kehl; Duke, Future of EU-
NATO Relations, 28 18 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 30
development commenced with informal “breakfast
meetings”19
between the NATO Secretary-General
de Hoop Scheffer and the High Representative for
CFSP Solana, a former NATO Secretary-General
himself. As the ESDP developed more permanent
structures in 2001, expanded institutionalized
cooperation became viable. Currently, meetings
between the Foreign Ministers of NATO and EU or
the EU‟s Political and Security Committee (PSC)
and NATO‟s North Atlantic Council are common
practice20
. Furthermore, EU and NATO have
established ad hoc working groups addressing
issues such as managing capability goals, the
implementation of the Berlin Plus Agreement, the
exchange of classified information, or the facilitation
of geographical dialog.21
In addition, mission
working groups have been established to coordinate
efforts where NATO personnel are deployed
alongside EU personnel.22
Moreover, the EU has
established a small planning cell at the Supreme
Headquarter Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in
2006 which is reciprocal to the NATO permanent
liaison team to EU Military Staff (EUMS) (since
2005).23
However, it appears that the informal staff
to staff contacts are most important to smooth the
day to day cooperation.24
Moreover, the simple fact
that the majority of member states belongs to both
organizations or is associated at least via programs
like the NATO‟s Partnership for Peace (PfP)
guarantees an exchange of information.25
Looking at the development of the institutionalized
cooperation between the NATO and EU, one is
19 Ibid., 33 20 See NATO, List of Ministerial Dinners. 21 See for example Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96 for the cooperation for the Berlin Plus mission Althea to
Bosnia-Herzegovina 22 CRS, NATO and EU, 16 23 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 33 24 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 25 See EU, ESDP Report 2009, 34-35 for current
cooperation
Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!
The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010
likely to conclude that a healthy relationship
between both of them exists. However, as will be
shown below, this perception is misguiding.
3. Relationship of Field Operations
NATO and EU have conducted a broad range of
missions after the end of the Cold War. The
relationship pattern between them is and ever was
diverse. Both organizations conducted missions
which were totally independent from the other
organization.26
Many of the EU‟s independent
missions, however, made use of the Berlin Plus
Agreement since critical assets such as air transport
capacity were and are missing in the Union‟s
arsenal. The first such independent mission was
CONCORDIA in Macedonia. It seems that the Berlin
Plus Agreement is working quite effectively when
applied.27
The European Union‟s first autonomous
military mission outside the Berlin Plus agreement
was ARTEMIS to the DRC contributing to the
stabilization of the security conditions and the
improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia
in 2003.28
Some of the independent missions
conducted by the EU have in fact been taken over
from NATO; an example is the EU mission
(EUFOR) Althea which replaced NATO‟s in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
In some instances EU and NATO missions run
parallel. Ideally they are complementary like in
Afghanistan. While ISAF focuses on the
development of the Afghan National Army, EUPOL
provides assistance to the Afghan National Police.
Furthermore, the European Union provides
significant funding, personal and material for non-
26 For NATO see Frantzen, NATO and peace
support operations 1991-1999 27 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44; EU, ESDP
Report 2009, 34 28 EU, Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP; for
NATO missions see: NATO, NATO operations and
missions
military activities in Afghanistan even within the
framework of NATO‟s Provision Reconstruction
Teams (PRT). Shea, the Director of Policy at NATO,
concludes that “it is difficult to envisage a major
NATO operation these days in which the EU would
not also be present in a significant complementary
role.”29
However, it seems that some operations are
rather competitive than complementary, which is
especially problematic if shared resources are used.
For instance, NATO and EU were competing to
provide air lift capacities for the African Union‟s
mission in Darfur.30
Also, at the Horn of Africa the
EU mission ATALANTA operates parallel to the
NATO‟s Ocean shield with essentially the same
mandate – prevent piracy.
4. Deficits and Risks
Whereas part 1 identified the opportunities created
by cooperation, this part turns to the other side of
the coin looking at the deficits of and the risks for
the strategic partnership.
The relationship between NATO and EU might look
healthy, but it is in fact crippled for various reasons.
At core of the “stalemate”31
is the fluidity in which
both organizations operate and their overlapping
membership. On the one hand, fluidity refers to the
ever changing operating environment of ESDP and
NATO. They need to deal with issues ranging from
classical national defense, over delivery of
humanitarian aid and out of area crisis management
to “new” threats like terrorism and organized crime.
On the other hand, fluidity refers to the
organizations themselves. NATO and the EU are
involved in a transformation process developing
their structures and strategies. Having three
29 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 30 CRS, NATO and EU, 20; Duke, Future of EU-
NATO Relations, 32 31 This is the term used by former NATO
Secretary-General Japp de Hoop Scheffer, see de Hoop
Scheffer, Transatlantic Leadership for a New Era
Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!
The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010
variables (environment, NATO, ESDP), which are
highly volatile and whose future value is hard to
predict, it seems to be almost impossible to define a
stable and efficient relationship among the EU and
NATO.
On a less abstract level the threats facing the
relationship are: Firstly, the purpose and mission of
NATO are not clearly defined. The strategic
concepts of Rome (1991) and Washington (1999)
are merely interim measures. Since the end of the
Cold War, which rendered collective security less
important, it is constantly looking for a new raison
d´être. While it is looking for a purpose, NATO does
not want the EU to occupy any possible roles it
might want to fulfill itself. This leads to rivalry. The
internal deadlock about strategic future, due to
deadlocked negotiations between the USA and
Europe as well as the Europeans response to fulfill
their vision via ESDP, hinders effective cooperation
between NATO and EU.
Secondly, impacted by either the lack of their own
strategic concepts or their ambiguity, NATO and EU
have not gone past their mutual recognition as
strategic actors in the European security structure.
Despite the limited substantial cooperation32
a
common comprehensive strategy is missing. Thus,
no clear cut burden sharing exists (e.g. NATO
focuses on collective security and robust peace
enforcement, while the EU focuses on policing and
peace keeping and building). The manner in which
NATO and EU cooperate led some to conclude that
the “strategic benefits to Europe‟s security have
resulted more from a happy convergence of the
independent actions of both NATO and the EU than
from a deliberately coordinated policy of these two
32 On issues like: defense policy, crisis
management, capability building for expeditionary
missions, stabilization and reconstruction operations and
security sector reform.
institutions.”33
Furthermore, the absence of a
common strategy and henceforth priority setting
hampers the effective development of capabilities
and creates the controversy about deployment of
commonly used resources.
Thirdly, there is a constant fear of competition for
especially more mobile, high readiness resources
and the fear of independent, uncoordinated action
by one organization.34
This fear is not quite
unfounded. The examples of the USA‟s coalition of
the willing or the competition in support of the AU‟s
Darfur mission are telling. Another stunning example
of lacking coordination is the fight against piracy. At
the Horn of Africa are currently ships from multiple
NATO/EU countries deployed in various missions.
These ships are active under national command, as
part of the NATO Operation Ocean Shield, the EU
Operation ATALANTA, or the US led CTF 151.35
Fourthly, one major reason for the deadlock of EU-
NATO cooperation relates to Turkey. Not only has
the Turkish blockade “reduced to a farce the regular
official meetings between the PSC and the NAC[,]”36
which makes strategic cooperation impossible, but
also everyday cooperation between established
liaison cells is hampered.37
To justify this blockade,
Turkey claims that it cannot pass NATO intelligence
to EU, since non-PfP countries Malta and Cyprus
could benefit.38
Before looking into the reasons for
Turkeys obstruction of coordination of EU-NATO
relations, it needs to be pointed out that Turkey
exerts quite some influence over NATO and EU.
Besides the fact that Turkey can effectively veto any
33 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 34 CRS, NATO and EU, 7; McNamara, CFSP
threatens transatlantic security, 2 35 Wiegold, Wie ernüchternd ist die Piratenbilianz
& Order of Battle (Revised) 36 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96 37 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 34 38 Ibid., 29; Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96-97
Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!
The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010
NATO decision due to the consensus requirement39
,
Turkey‟s geographic location as bridge between
Europe, the Middle East and Asia is of strategic
importance. Furthermore, excluding Russia, it
commands by far the biggest European military,40
hence it has a great potential to support peace
keeping operations. Turkey has already done so in
support of several ESDP mission.41
Turkey‟s behavior derives from various reasons.
Turkey is not interested in seeing a separate
European Security Identity evolve at the decline of
NATO. Additionally, it has virtually no weight in
ESDP as compared to its active role in the Western
European Union before. Ankara is also upset with
the EU because of the slow progress in its
accession negotiations. Furthermore, the historical
conflict between Greece, Cyprus and Turkey over
Northern Cyprus has recently reached new heights.
Additionally, Cyprus is reciprocally blocking Turkish
participation in EU security activities like the EDA. It
is mainly the political disagreement between Turkey
and Cyprus that has “essentially held the entire
ESDP-NATO relationship hostage for years.”42
The deadlock is hampering everything from
strategic debate, over every day exchange of
sensitive information up to the set up of new
missions or the management of existing missions.
For instance, Turkey‟s refusal to let Cyprus
participate in a police training mission in Southern
Kosovo complicates this mission.43
Strategic
cooperation on questions like Afghanistan or Darfur
is impossible. The existing informal channels are
39 NATO, Consensus-Decision Making 40 In fact, it has with 514.000 troops twice as much as Germany (215.000). Russia excluded. For
military comparison see Globalfirepower, Turkey
Military Strength and Globalfirepower, Germany
Military Strength 41 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 98 42 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96-97 43 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 39
not a viable alternative to formal debates and
decisions. Moreover, Turkey also weakened the EU
Battlegroup concept by withdrawing its promised
contribution. Furthermore, the future application of
the Berlin Plus Agreement is also unclear due to
possible Turkish delays. ALTHEA might be its last
mission.44
Fifthly, the current institutional links are weak and
deficient, especially for cooperation on strategic
matters. The Berlin Plus Agreement might have
worked well in the two instances where it was
applied; however, it is too cumbersome and
politically complex to be suitable for some of the
EU‟s envisioned fast crisis response scenarios.
Additionally, it does not explicitly allow strategic
debate. Furthermore, it forces the EU to adapt to
NATO structures.45
Therefore, some like Howorth
conclude that “an entirely new set of arrangements
therefore needs negotiating.” 46
It is highly unlikely
that this is going to happen any time soon especially
because of the Turkish blockade.47
Moreover,
outside Berlin Plus, the capacity to conclude
agreements quickly between NATO and EU to
arrange for joint deployment was hampered48
by the
lack of international legal personality of the
European Union.49
Sixthly, recently the base for the development ESDP
within the framework of NATO known as the three
Ds (no decoupling, no discrimination, no
duplication), a term coined by Madeleine Albright in
1998, is being questioned.50
ESDP challenges all
44 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 97; see also Duke,
Future of EU-NATO Relations, 33; CRS, FAQ EU, 6;
CRS, NATO and EU, 17 45 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 34 46 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 97 47 In fact, Ankara already delayed the conclusion
of the Berlin Plus Agreement by two years, see Howorth,
NATO and ESDP, 97 48 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 45 49 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 30 50 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 100
Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!
The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010
three D‟s by its very design. Duplication is
inevitable. For example, after in 2002 the
compromise to add a small operational planning cell
to EUMS could prevent the establishment of a
separate EU Military Headquarter,51
the 2008 EU
strategic review based on operational experience
concluded that the EU still needed its own military
planning capacity.52
The fear of decoupling is
evident, considering the negative reactions of some
NATO countries because the EU did not consult
NATO before starting its latest autonomous mission
to Congo, even though EU did not request the use
of NATO.53
Yet, on the other hand not only the
Europeans are striving for more independence
through ESDP, but also the USA has recently
detached itself from the NATO framework when it
engaged in “coalitions of the willing”. The reason for
the decoupling process is the growing division
between European and Americans about the
strategic security interest of each region. This
transatlantic divide is best seen in the struggle to
find a new security strategy for NATO.
In conclusion, the problems the NATO-EU
partnership is facing are intrinsically linked to the
problems NATO and the EU face by themselves:
The divide between the their member states about
the proposed role for the organization in the future,
the fear of each organization and member states to
be sidelined in important decisions as well as very
tight military budgets and limited military capabilities
threaten security cooperation among the two
organizations. Furthermore, the assumption that
NATO is the senior partner in the relationship, who
51 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 33-34;
CRS, NATO and EU, 16 52 EU, Report on the Implementation of the
European Security Strategy, 9 53 CRS, NATO and EU, 20
dictates is the terms of the development of ESDP
and the strategic partnership, is under siege.54
5. Interim Conclusion
As has been shown, it is in the interest of North
America and Europe that the EU and NATO
cooperate thoroughly and avoid competition and
rivalry. Crises like in Somalia or Afghanistan call for
long term engagement of NATO and EU.55
The
potential for synergies and greater coherence
exists.56
Yet, the formal relationship between them
is still unsatisfactory or even dysfunctional. Their
relationship is dominated by “political and functional
confusion.” 57
Lately, it seems that “neither entity is
at all interested in a formal division of labour.”58
Cooperation under the Berlin Plus Agreement,
except for existing missions, is steadily declining.59
This is even more surprising as the agreement
offers a partial raison d’être for NATO after the Cold
War, which, henceforth, should be interested in its
implementation. The various deficits identified are
the cause and catalyst for the diminishing scope of
cooperation between NATO and the EU. The Lisbon
Treaty impacts on both will be discussed next.
C. Possible Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on
the NATO-EU Strategic Partnership
Subsequently, selected provisions of the Treaty on
the European Union (TEU) and of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as
revised by the Lisbon Treaty, which are relevant for
the NATO-EU Strategic Partnership, will be
examined. The focus will be on those prominent
provisions which either differ from the Nice Treaty or
54 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 98; CRS, NATO
and EU, 23 55 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 45 56 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96 57 Ibid., 96 58 Ibid., 99 59 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 29
Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!
The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010
will likely have an impact on the Strategic
Partnership.
1. General
Prior to any in depth analysis of the Lisbon Treaty, it
is important to note that the Lisbon Treaty
resembles most of the provisions which already
were contained in the European Constitution; in
total over 90 percent of the structure of the
constitutional treaty have been preserved, and even
more in case of CFSP.60
However, despite that the
provisions on CFSP and ESDP proved to be the
“most uncontroversial” in the negotiation and
ratification process of the treaty,61
significant
academic debate62
about their quality and the
impact on transatlantic relations exists: For
instance, Sally McNamara perceives the Lisbon
Treaty as the “most significant boost to date” of
CSFP that effectively “remov[es] foreign policy form
the intergovernmental sphere and mak[es] it a
supranational EU competence” and that “the Lisbon
treaty represents a major threat to the NATO
alliance.63
Contrary, the International Security
Information Service concludes that many provisions
of the treaty “do not challenge the essential inter-
governmental nature of foreign and security policy
decision making.”64
Undoubtedly, this second
interpretation appears after all more convincing.
First, it might be true that in direct comparison with
the Nice Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty represents a
significant restructuring of CFSP and ESDP;
60 With respect to CFSP only three relevant
changes occurred: First, the ECJs jurisdiction is more
limited with respect to CFSP (Art. 24 TEU); a separate
data protection clause has been introduced, and the
principle of implied powers does explicitly not apply to
CFSP (Art. 352 TFEU); Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 2-5; CRS, FAQ EU, 3 61 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 104 62 A very good summary can be found at Wessels/
Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 3-5 63 McNamara, CFSP threatens transatlantic
security, 1, 10 64 ISIS, Impact of Lisbon, 1
however, keeping that the organic development of
ESDP occurred mainly outside the treaty structure,
the Lisbon Treaty merely “brings the ESDP and all
its development since the Cologne European
Council in 1999 within the Treaty framework.”65
Secondly, despite the formal abolition of the EU‟s
pillar structure, it seems to continue to exist at least
implicitly. For instance, all major substantial
decisions require unanimity66
, only implementation
decisions in non CFSP matters are subject to
qualified majority voting. Yet, in case of vital interest
even implementation decisions can be referred to
the European Council for a decision by unanimity.67
Additionally, Article 31 TEU prohibits any kind of
legislative act. Moreover, Article 24 TEU stresses
that the procedures of CFSP must be strictly
observed, and Article 352 TFEU underlines the
prohibition of the use of implied powers. Therefore,
it can be concluded CFSP and CSDP essentially
remain an intergovernmental matter.68
If it however
represents a threat to NATO and the partnership is
a different matter, which will be discussed below.
65 DGExPo, Lisbon and its implications for CFSP,
3 66 Constructive abstention is allowed (Art. 31 (1)
3rd sentence TEU); see also Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 23 67 Art. 31 TEU in the Nice Treaty the threshold for
referral was lower: Only “important” interests must have
been in stake for a referral. See also Wessels/ Bopp,
Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 24-25 68 So concludes also Wessels/ Bopp, Intuitional
Architecture after Lisbon, 10-11
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The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010
2. EU Objectives and Missions
a) Objective of CFSP and Extended Petersberg
Tasks
As ESDP, now formally CSDP, is an “integral part”
of the Unions CFSP,69
it ought to contribute to the
Union objectives as set out in the Preamble, Article
3 (5) and Article 21 TEU.
In comparison to Nice several differences can be
identified in the Union‟s objectives which can have
an impact on the conceptual relationship between
NATO and EU. Article 3 contains an expanded list
of common values which characterize the EU
internally and that it seeks to promote externally. It
is important to note that the EU has added the
“protection of its citizens” as a new aim. Article 3
and 21, which combines several Nice Treaty
articles, underlines the Union‟s character as a
“civilian power”70
willing to export its values and
promote worldwide development.71
The Lisbon Treaty also updates the ESDP mission
task list.72
Compared to the old TEU this Petersberg
Task73
list seems quite extensive.74
However, if
compared to the latest mission list as set out in the
Head Line Goal 2010 (2004) the task extension
seems less dramatic.75
Yet, it can be seen as
reaffirming of the EU‟s strategic development.
69 Art. 42 (1) TEU 70 Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after
Lisbon, 7-8 71 Articles 11(1), 131, 177, 181a TEU (Nice
version) 72 Article 43 TEU 73 The mission list was only included with the
Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 to the EU. Originally it was a task list compiled by the Western European Union in
1992. See WEU, Petersberg Declaration 74 Article 17 TEU (Nice version) only included
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and tasks of
combat forces crisis management. 75 DGExPo, Lisbon and implications for CFSP, 5-
6
Furthermore, it is remarkable that new list contains
explicitly the task of conflict prevention and post-
conflict stabilization, besides the old tasks of
peacekeeping and peace-making, but also the task
of combating terrorism. In addition, Article 42
stresses the coherent civilian-military approach of
ESD.
In conclusion, the new aims and objective provisions
reflect the EU‟s desire to become a global actor and
crisis manager. On the one hand, the extension of
the Petersberg Tasks can lead to increased
tensions and pressure to coordinate with NATO as it
aims to be active in the same area (e.g. terrorism).
On the other hand provides the EU‟s explicit focus
on prevention and post-conflict stabilization and
civilian-military cooperation potential for a burden
sharing.76
The preamble and Article 3, in particular,
contribute to widening the transatlantic conceptual
divide as they reaffirm the European position on
issues like the respect for the United Nations system
and the preferred mode of conflict resolution.
b) Towards a Truly Common Defense Policy
The Lisbon Treaty maintains the goal of a common
defense policy. However, the language in some
parts of new Treaty is more compelling than in
previous treaties. For instance, the ESDP was
renamed to CSDP. Article 42 (2) TEU now states
that CSDP “shall include the progressive framing of
a common Union defence policy” and “this will lead
to a common defense”. The provisions promote the
doubling of capacities and open the opportunity for
decoupling from NATO strategy. The changed
provisions can especially harm the partnership if
read in conjunction with the new aim of “citizen
protection” as they encroach on NATO‟s core
function.
76 The Operation Active Endeavour in the
Mediterranean is one example, which could lead to
coordination difficulties.
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c) Formal Relationship to NATO
Like previous treaties the revised TEU stresses in
Article 42 (2), directly after it confirmed the
perspective of the developing a truly common
defense policy, that the Union shall respect the
obligations of member states under the North
Atlantic Treaty and that CSDP shall be compatible
with NATO defense policy. Yet, paragraph 2 does
not state that CSDP will be developed within the
NATO policy framework. However, the newly
established provision on mutual assistance77
reaffirms that NATO will “remain[] the foundation of
[…] collective defence and the forum for its
implementation [for NATO members].” The future
will show how much these provisions are a mere lip
service to calm some NATO member states and
improve the relations to NATO. However, the
absence of such provisions would have been
certainly destructive for NATO-EU relations.
3. Institutions and Procedure
a) Longer Presidency, High Representative and
European External Action Service
The Lisbon Treaty aims to provide greater visibility,
stability and coherence in the Union‟s CFSP by
prolonging the presidency of the European Council
to two and a half years78
and the creation of the
“High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy” (HR),79
who is
supported by the newly created European External
Action Service (EEAS).80
The HR will wield
substantial power as he will link the Council to the
Commission by combining the roles of the former
High Representative for CFSP in the Council and
the Commissioner for External Relations.81
77 Art. 42 (7) TEU 78 Article 15 (5) TEU 79 Article 18 TEU 80 Art. 27 (3) TEU 81 ISIS, Impact of Lisbon, 2
Furthermore, besides leading the Foreign Affairs
Council he or she will be the Vice President of the
Commission. The tasks of the HR, inter alia, are to
representing the Union‟s position in International
Organization, to harmonize Member States views
and to preside over the CFSP bodies.
The wish to create greater policy coherence through
new institutional structures is supplemented by
expanding the obligation of member states to
confirm with Union policy. Article 24 (3) TEU adds
to the existing commitment to refrain from any action
which is contrary to the interest of the Union or likely
to impair its effectiveness the obligation to “comply
with the Union‟s action in [CFSP]”. Hence, the
member states‟ obligation to coordinate themselves
is enhanced.82
The impact on the behavioral pattern
of member states remains to be seen.83
The major changes in institutional architecture
certainly do have an impact on NATO-EU relations.
First, they are likely to create greater policy
coherence among the European states, which
eventually will tilt the balance of power in NATO and
in the strategic partnership towards Europe as the
USA will have more difficulties countering pre-
negotiated European consensus. Secondly, as the
HR will make a difference in framing EU policy
towards NATO, its election mechanisms require
some attention. The required qualified majority could
either be achieved through a “pro integration” or “pro
NATO” coalition or from 2017 onward by all 23
smaller member states plus two big states.84
Lastly,
the new architecture has the potential to address the
82 For a detailed description of member states
obligations see Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 12 83 For a detailed explanation of institutional
changes see Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture
after Lisbon, 14-23 especially 16 84 „Big states“ are Germany, France, United
Kingdom and Italy. Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional
Architecture after Lisbon, 20
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Turkey-problem as it allows member states to adopt
decisions with qualified majority if they act upon a
proposal from the HR.85
Hence, the Union could
approve actions that improve the relationship with
Turkey even against the opposition of Cyprus.
However, due to the provisions limitation in case of
“vital interests” and the exclusion of matters with
security and defense implications, it remains to be
seen to what extend the provisions can be applied.
b) EDA
The European Defense Agency (EDA) is not an
invention of Lisbon. It was established by the
Council of Ministers in 2004 “to improve the EU‟s
defense capabilities.”86
It came into being despite
the failed ratification of the Constitutional treaty. It is
the perfect example that “institutional changes
within the CFSP are also pursued without the official
procedure of treaty revisions and ratification”. 87
However, the Lisbon Treaty did not only bring EDA
within the treaty structure, but also highlighted
EDA‟s importance of the improvement of European
military capacities by the frequency and compelling
manner it referred to EDA.88
It underlines the wish
of European states to make the EU also a military
actor on the international scene.89
The EDA is critical in the attempt to encourage
more joint R&D and procurement amongst
European allies. Indisputably, the choices EDA will
make are going to be important for NATO-EU
relations.90
The European capability building can
have “beneficial effects on allied contributions to
NATO,”91
as Duke predicts, but it could also lead to
85 Art. 31 (2) TEU 86 EU, Joint Action, 2004/551/CFSP 87 Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after
Lisbon, 28 88 Mainly Art. 42 (3) and 45 TEU, see also Duke,
Future of EU-NATO Relations, 32 89 ISIS, Impact of Lisbon, 4 90 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 38 91 Ibid., 28
more decoupling and duplication. In order to benefit
the partnership the USA and Europe will have to
agree on common priorities and threats that need to
be countered. Such agreement will depend on the
outcome of NATO‟s strategic debate. Furthermore,
NATO‟s capabilities development mechanism and
EDA need to establish a formal relationship, which
is also less likely today.
4. Other Instruments
a) Mutual Assistance and Mutual Solidarity
Clause
The mutual assistance clause92
and the solidarity
clause93
are important innovations. The solidarity
clause will not directly impact the NATO-EU
relationship as its application is limited to terrorist
attacks and man-made or natural disasters. It has,
however, the potential to supplement NATO efforts
in preventing and reacting towards terrorist attacks
since it includes also non-military actions.
The mutual assistance/defense clause can however
be perceived as a threat to NATO. The including
saving clause, which prohibits the treaty from
prejudging NATO‟s collective defense system, is
merely cosmetic. If the mutual assistance/defense
clause is seen in conjunction with the provisions on
establishing a common defense policy and the goal
of protection of European citizen, it is apparent that
the clause encroaches on NATO‟s core function –
collective self-defense. However, Duke concludes
that despite the provision the EU will not assume a
classical collective defense function.94
Currently, the
EU lacks the military capacity to displace NATO as
92 Article 42 (7) TEU; detailed analysis of the
article can be found at DGExPo, Lisbon and its
implications on CFSP, 8 93 Art. 222 TFEU 94 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 31; also
Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 11
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foundation for Europe‟s defense. Yet, the pure
existence of the clause will put strain on the NATO-
EU relations.
b) Permanent Structured and Enhanced
Cooperation Procedure
In reaction to the existing ESDP rhetoric-resource
gap95
and the Union‟s desire to handle the extended
Petersberg Tasks, the Lisbon Treaty expands the
existing mechanism “Enhanced Cooperation”96
to
ESDP and introduces the new mechanism of
“Permanent Structured Cooperation”97
(PSCo). The
later is especially interesting for the EU-NATO
relationship. Member States “whose military
capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have
made more binding commitment to one another […]
with a view to the most demanding missions shall
establish permanent structure cooperation”. The
PSCo is established by QMV in the Council after
consultation with the HR. The details of PSCo are
laid out in detail in a specific protocol. It defines the
“higher criteria” threshold and calls upon the
participants “to take concrete measures to enhance
the availability, interoperability, flexibility and
deployability of their forces.”98
They shall cooperate
in joint procurement and development programs
and regularly review their commitments with respect
to the changing security environment and the EU‟s
missions. Furthermore, they are called upon to
develop their defense capacities in multinational
forces99
. In fact, PSCo is one of the few CFSP
provisions that clearly show the motivation of
95 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 32 96 Art. 326-334 TFEU 97 Art. 42 (6) icw 46 TEU 98 DGExPo, Lisbon and its implications for CFSP,
7 99 The Battelgroup concept is also included in the
Protocol.
member states to create more than
intergovernmental cooperation.100
The introduction of these mechanisms allows for a
Europe of two speeds; A hard core101
of particular
capable states could now go ahead with further
defense integration. The impact on NATO and the
Strategic Partnership is ambiguous. PSCo is likely
to strengthen European military capacities through
encouraged joint procurement projects and
improved interoperability. Furthermore, PSCo
provides a strong incentive for non participants to
improve their own military capacities in order to join
the PSCo. On the other hand, the risk exist that a
small group of EU nations pool their military
resources “to form an army of 60.000 to undertake
EU missions.” McNamara concludes that since no
additional troops would be enlisted, “either [forces]
who are already committed to NATO [would] be
counted twice, or, in the worst case scenario, troops
[would] be withdrawn from existing NATO
Missions.”102
Additionally, better coordinated and
capable Europeans could also aggravate the
deadlock within NATO and the NATO-EU
relationship since they are more likely to challenge
the USA‟s and NATO‟s leadership.
c) International Legal Personality
The explicit recognition of the Union‟s legal
personality is likely to strengthen the Union‟s
perception as a global actor.103
Additionally, it will
facilitate and accelerate the formal conclusion of
agreements with other international actors, including
NATO, improving the Union‟s reaction time.
100 ISIS, Impact of Lisbon, 4 101 At the beginning these are most likely the
Defense G6: Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain
and Poland. 102 McNamara, CFSP threatens transatlantic
security, 11 103 Art. 37 TEU icw Art. 47 TEU; Wessels/ Bopp,
Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 3
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However, it is unlikely to resolve the political
deadlock preventing the conclusion of any kind of
agreements between NATO and EU.
d) Other
Two other innovations need mentioning. First,
Article 41 (3) provides a procedure “guaranteeing
rapid access to the Unions budget for urgent
financing of initiatives in the framework of” CFSP.
This includes the set up of a rapid start-up fund to
finance ESDP mission.104
Such a measure is likely
to increase the Unions crisis reaction time.
However, it might harm the NATO-EU relations, as
it strengthens the EU‟s crisis first responder
capacities, which impacts the debate on appropriate
roles of NATO and EU.
Second, the Lisbon treaty also institutionalizes the
practice105
to “entrust the implementation of an EU
mission” to a group of member states who are
“willing and have the necessary capacities.”106
This
procedure is similar to the delegation of UN mission
or even NATO non-Article 5 missions to certain
member states. It allows the effective
implementation of ESDP.107
This provision could
benefit NATO because it encourages capacity
development to fulfill delegated tasks. However, it
could also limit the availability of high quality
resources for NATO, as they may be already used
in EU missions.
5. Interim Conclusion
The Lisbon Treaty is not a revolutionary jump in the
development of ESDP, but it cements its progress
and hints the direction of its further development.
One can agree with the conclusions that “it is clearly
104 The provision emulates the current informal
funding practice for missions like Athena. DGExPo,
Lisbon and its implications, 3 105 E.g. Artemis 2003 with France as lead-nation. 106 Art. 44 TEU 107 ISIS, Impact of Lisbon, 4-5
an attempt to dismantle the pillars”108
and that “the
treaty underscores the EU‟s long held ambition to
become a global power.109
Keeping in mind the deficits and risks identified in
chapter B, the question whether the Lisbon Treaty
harms or helps NATO and the Strategic Partnership
cannot be answered easily. On the one hand, for
example, the recognition of NATO as prime
collective defense mechanism is positive. On the
other hand, the affirmation of the creation of a
common defense policy combined with the
introduction of a mutual assistance clause are very
likely to harm the relationship as they fuel the
traditional 3-D fears.110
The impact of other
provisions like the ones aiming at joint defense
procurement needs to be assessed in the light of
future events. Currently, it is not possible to
conclude whether they will help the Alliance, i.e. by
creating a bigger and better resource pool available
to the Alliance, or harm it, i.e. by substituting
armament cooperation in NATO for EU cooperation
and withdrawing resources from the Alliance.
Additionally, the new Treaty stresses the European
perception on foreign and security policy, which is
likely to reinforce the transatlantic divide. The further
development of European crisis management
capacities will also impact the debate on the division
of labor between NATO and the EU. More
importantly, some core problems of the NATO-EU
relationship, like the Cyprus-Turkey deadlock, are
not or only insufficiently addressed.
Therefore, de Hoop Scheffers conclusion that
Lisbon will not unlock the institutional stalemate in
the EU Relationship is probably correct.111
The
108 Ibid., 6 109 McNamara, CFSP threatens transatlantic
security, 9 110 Ibid., 10 111 de Hoop Scheffer, Transatlantic Leadership For
A New Era
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treaty, by setting a clear course towards integration,
is more likely to aggravate the existing deadlock in
NATO and the Strategic Partnership. Following the
ratchet integration model the treaty will put more
pressure on the USA and NATO to adapt to Europe
as Europe‟s position is becoming more rigid.
D. Impact on the Development of
International Law
The current development of the EU-NATO
Relationship, impacted by the Lisbon Treaty, could
have in the long run a profound impact on the
development of international law. Three distinct
modes can be identified.
The first mode is the impact via the “European
approach to security”. Firstly, by acting coherently
(e.g. actions, declarations, voting behavior in UN
General Assembly) the European states could
contribute to the formation of soft law or even
custom. The further development can impact the
legal concept of security (human security, link
between security and development), the concept of
humanitarian intervention and the use of force. The
strict adherence to UN rules is likely to strengthen
the UN system. Secondly, a proactive EU could
promote European values like the rule of law as well
as human rights worldwide.
The second mode results from the cooperation
between NATO and EU. The cooperation could
further develop the law of cooperation among
international organizations, by helping to resolve
such questions as whether an organization can be
held legally responsible for the acts of another when
it shared its assets (logistics, intelligence).
The final mode results from further EU integration.
Because the Union is striving towards future
integration in areas previously reserved for
international-governmental cooperation, it could
help to develop legal rules and regulation governing
a more supranational cooperation. Furthermore, as
EU member states limit their sovereignty by
participating in the ESDP, it seems possible that the
legal concept of sovereignty is impacted, for
example, further limiting the scope of the domain
reserve.
E. Conclusion and Advice
Unfortunately it is true that “despite overlapping
membership and interests, NATO and the European
Union have struggled to establish a cooperative and
complementary relationship.”112
The main problems
bothering NATO-EU relation stem from the
conceptual transatlantic divide, which hampers the
ongoing transformation process of NATO as well as
Turkey‟s blockade of NATO-EU cooperation. The
deadlock in NATO‟s new strategy development and
the hampered EU-NATO strategic partnership are in
harsh contrast to the progressive development of
the ESDP, which can partially be understood as a
reflex to the standstill in NATO and the partnership.
Whereas the EU seems to have found its future role
in nation building and crisis management and is
rapidly developing structures and instruments to
match its vision, NATO is still puzzling where it
belongs to the 21st century.
The Lisbon Treaty, even though not revolutionary,
underlines the EU‟s drive for more independence
and points towards the creation of an “ever closer
union” also in security and defense issues. It is
unlikely to solve the existing deadlocks, but is more
likely to contribute to the transatlantic strategic
divide.
112 CRS, FAQ EU, 6
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The more the pattern of EU progressive‟s
development and its establishment as a global crisis
manager with a comprehensive civilian-military
strategy in contrast to the deadlock in NATO
transformation and EU-NATO relations persists, the
more pressure will come upon NATO to define its
strategy in response to the EU‟s concept.113
It
seems we are at a turning point of the relations
between NATO and ESDP. Until recently, NATO
limited the scope in which ESDP could develop;
henceforth, it might be the ESDP defining what
NATO‟s role in the world should be.
However, this is far from concluding that NATO will
disappear.
In the foreseeable future NATO will
remain an important organization114
for the following
reasons: First, NATO‟s, but especially the USA‟s
and Canada‟s military capacities and knowledge is
still indispensable for the EU and the UN to resolve
high intensity conflicts. Furthermore, although the
transatlantic link has lost importance, the
relationship between North America and Europe is
and will remain special. The European continent is
well aware that several conflicts (e.g. Palestine,
Iran) can only be solved with the help of the United
States.115
The complete decoupling of Europe of
North America is therefore very unlikely. With this
perspective NATO will remain the forum for
transatlantic security and defense cooperation.
Based on the analysis of the relationship of EU and
NATO and the trend shown by the Lisbon Treaty the
following advice may be derived:
113 So concludes also Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 30 114 Howorth explicitly concludes that NATO will
stay the “primary body for coordinating military, security
and defense policy among its 28 member states.”
Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 105 115 EU, Report on the Implementation of the
European Security Strategy, 11
Keeping the history of European integration
in mind, NATO, but in particular the USA,
should accept that CSDP will boost the
EU’s civilian and military capacities to
operate independently from NATO. NATO
should not perceive this as threat to its
existence, but rather accept it as reality and
seize the opportunity to build its new
strategic concept in response to the path
chosen by the European Union.
Remembering its origins and capacities
NATO should retain its character as a
military and (collective self-) defense
organization and be a forum of
transatlantic exchange.
The EU has proven itself as a valuable
crisis manager. It should continue to boost
its own civilian and military capacities to
match its ambitious vision. To preserve the
transatlantic relationship it should refrain
from becoming the second collective self-
defense organization on the continent.
Since both organizations are still evolving,
NATO and the EU should abandon their
attempts to define a common strategic
relationship.116
Rather they should in the
short and medium term improve their ad-
hoc coordination and consultation
mechanism.
The transatlantic divide needs to be
addressed urgently. It can only be closed by
balancing the leadership ambitions of the
EU and the US and mutual understanding of
each other‟s world perception. Bilateral
dialogue between the US and European
116 So concludes also Howorth, NATO and ESDP,
106
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states as well as between the USA and
the European Union should be
improved.
The Lisbon Treaty could not remove the
Turkish blockade of the Strategic
Partnership. It can only be solved if US-
Turkish and EU-Turkish relations are
improved in a comprehensive manner also
outside defense the security realm.117
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de Hoop Scheffer, Jaap (2009): Transatlantic Leadership For A New Era, Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Security and Defence, Agenda followed by a questions and answers session; available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-42311F8E-7F89AABB/natolive/opinions_50116.htm?selectedLocale=en (07.02.2010)
Director General External Policies of the Union (2008): The Lisbon Treaty and its implications for CFSP/ESDP, Briefing Paper, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200805/20080513ATT28796/20080513ATT28796EN.pdf (12.02.2010) (citied as: DGExPo, Lisbon and its implications for CFSP)
Duke, Simon (2008): The Future of EU-NATO Relations – a Case of Mutual Irrelevance Through Competition?, in: European Integration Vol. 30 No. 1, p. 27-43 (cited as Future of EU-NATO Relations)
Frantzen, Henning A. (2005): NATO and peace support operations 1991-1999, policies and doctrines, London/ New York: Frank Class
Howorth, Jolyon (2009): NATO and ESDP - Intuitional Complexities and Political Realities, in: politique étrangère 4 2009, p. 95-106
International Security Information Service (2008): The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP, in: European Security Review No. 37, available at: http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_150_esr37tol-mar08.pdf (01.02.2010) (cited as: ISIS, Impact of Lisbon)
Keukeleire, Stephan (2006): European Security and Defence Policy - From Taboo to a Spearhead of EU Foreign Policy?, in: Bindi, Federiga: The Foreign Policy of the European Union - Assessing Europe's Role in the World, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, p. 51-72
McNamara, Sally (2009): The EU‟s Common Foreign and Security Policy – How it Threatens Transatlantic Security, in: Backgrounder No. 2250, p. 1-12 (cited as: CFSP threatens transatlantic security)
PA Consulting Group (2009): Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan; available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Components/Photo/_new/Afghanistan_Dynamic_Planning.pdf (11.02.2010)
Shea, Jamie (2009): Ten Years of the ESDP – A NATO perspective, in: European Security and Defence Policy, Issue 9, 10 year anniversary issue 1999/2009, p. 44-45
Wessels, Wolfgang/ Bopp, Franziska (2008): The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty – Constitutional breakthrough or challenges ahead?, Research Paper 6 June 2008, available at: http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf_The_Institutional_Architecture_of_CFSP_after_the_Lisbon_Treaty.pdf (17.02.2010) (citied as: Institutional Architecture after Lisbon)
Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!
The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010
Wiegold, Thomas (2009): Wie ernüchternd ist die Piratenbilianz & Order of Battle (Revised), blog entry of 28.12.2009; available at: http://wiegold.focus.de/augen_geradeaus/2009/12/wie-ern%C3%BCchtern-ist-die-piratenbilanz-order-of-battle-revised.html (11.02.2010)
Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!
The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010
G. Appendix
Extracts from the revised Treaty on European Union
118
Article 3 (5) TEU
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.
Article 21 TEU
1. The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.
2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity;
(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law;
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders;
118 Emphasis added.
(d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;
(e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade;
(f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;
(g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and
(h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.
3. The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of the different areas of the Union's external action […].
Article 24
1. The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.
The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded.
The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with the exception […].
2. […], the Union shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the development […] the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States' actions.
Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!
The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010
3. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in this area.
The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.
The Council and the High Representative shall ensure compliance with these principles.
Article 37
The Union may conclude agreements with one or more States or international organisations in areas covered by this Chapter.
Article 42 TEU
1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.
2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.
3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also
make them available to the common security and defence policy. Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to as „the European Defence Agency’) shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.
4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.
5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article 44.
6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43.
7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.
Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!
The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010
Article 43 (1) TEU
The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.
Article 44 (1) TEU
Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. […]
Article 45 (1) TEU
1. The European Defence Agency referred to in Article 42(3), subject to the authority of the Council, shall have as its task to:
(a) contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments […];
(b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods;
(c) propose multilateral projects […], ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes;
(d) support defence technology research, […];
(e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector […].
Article 46 (1) TEU
1. Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation […], which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative […].
Article 47 TEU
The Union shall have legal personality.
Article 222 (1) TEFU
1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:
(a) - prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;
- protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;
- assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;
(b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the
request of its political authorities, in the event of a
natural or man-made disaster.
Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!
The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010
Der Bundesverband Sicherheitspolitik an Hochschulen (BSH) ist der Dachverband sicherheitspolitischer Hochschulgruppen an deutschen Universitäten. Der BSH setzt sich aus sicherheitspolitisch interessierten Studierenden, Doktoranden und Lehrkräften aller Fachrichtungen zusammen. Die Mitgliedschaft im BSH steht allen sicherheitspolitisch interessierten Personen mit akademischem oder praktischem Hintergrund offen, welche die Grundsätze und Ziele des BSR teilen. Grundsätze des BSH Der BSH steht ein für die Verteidigung der Werteordnung des Grundgesetzes. In unserer sicherheitspolitischen Arbeit bildet die Auseinandersetzung mit Bedrohungen dieser Werteordnung einen Schwerpunkt. Zudem ist uns die Aufrechterhaltung der akademischen Freiheit ein besonderes Anliegen. Die Schaffung von Erkenntnis im Wettbewerb der Ideen setzt voraus, daß alle Stimmen gehört werden. Die Arbeit des BSH Die Arbeit des BSH richtet sich an alle Studierenden und erfolgt überparteilich und überkonfessionell. Die Aktivitäten des BSH umfassen:
Sicherheitspolitische Bildungsarbeit an Hochschulen
Akademische Nachwuchsförderung im sicherheitspolitischen Bereich
Wissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit sicher-heitspolitischen Fragestellungen
Weiterbildung- und Qualifikation der Mitglieder im Bereich politische Bildung und Sicherheitspolitik
Impressum Wissenschaft & Sicherheit wird herausgegeben durch die AG Wissenschaft & Sicherheit des BSH und erscheint in unregelmäßigen Abständen. Kontakt und kostenloses elektronisches Abonnement unter [email protected] sowie [email protected] Kontakt: Verband der Reservisten der Deutschen Bundeswehr e.V. - Geschäftsstelle - Zeppelinstraße 7A 53177 Bonn Tel.: 0228/2590 914 Fax: 0228/2590 919 Im Internet www.sicherheitspolitik.de ISSN: 1869-5256 (elektronische Ausgabe „WiSi Papers“) Verantwortlich für diese Ausgabe: Karsten Pötschke Redaktion: Stella Adorf, Johanna Lange, Steve Schlegel