st martins vs nlrc

8/12/2019 St Martins vs NLRC

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[Modes of Judicial Review -Certiorari]

[G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998.]

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABORRELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS,

respondents.

J. Regalado

Facts:

present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegaldismissal filed by private respondent before the National LaborRelations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No.III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges thathe started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. MartinFuneral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was nocontract of employment executed between him and petitioner norwas his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedlymisappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment bypetitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of InternalRevenue

Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent wasnot its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, theowner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995,

private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseascontract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother ofAmelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, privaterespondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeingthe business

labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationshipexisted between the parties and, therefore, his office had nojurisdiction over the case

NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision

and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediateappropriate proceedings. 5 Petitioner then filed a motion forreconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolutiondated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, 6 hence the presentpetition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse ofdiscretion

Issue: WON NLRC decisions are appealed to CA under Rule 65 (YES, as per

hierarchy of courts doctrine)

Held:


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that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Courtwere eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the specialcivil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle forjudicial review of decisions of the NLRC

The important distinction between them, however, and with whichthe Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civilaction of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction ofthis Court and the Court of Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in theassumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court areallowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention ofCongress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate BillNo. 1495

all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 tosupposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court areinterpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions forcertiorari under Rule 65


[G.R. Nos. L-29959-60. January 30, 1971.]

THE POLICE COMMISSION, represented by its Chairman, Crispino M.de Castro and Jose G. Lukban, Jolly Bugarin, and Vicente Raval,members, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE ELOY B. BELLO,GENARO C. FERRER, and EMERANO BONIFACIO, respondents.

J. Villamor

Facts:

a sworn complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, seriousirregularities in the performance of duty and/or serious neglect ofduty and incompetency was filed by certain persons with theBoard of Investigators of Binmaley, Pangasinan, against hereinrespondents Genaro C. Ferrer and Emerano Bonifacio, Chief ofPolice and Corporal, respectively, of the police force of Binmaley.The said respondents filed a joint answer, after which hearings

were conducted. On March 15, 1967, the Board of Investigatorsmade a report of its investigation containing a finding that "thecharges imputed against respondents were not committeddeliberately or intentionally but, rather, were done through honestmistake," and recommending to the Police Commission that "thecase be dropped with the admonition that the respondents . . .should be more careful in the performance of their official duties."After reviewing the records of the investigation in itsAdministrative Case No. 26, the Police Commission rendereddecision on August 2, 1967, finding the respondents guilty of

serious neglect of duty and ordering their dismissal from the


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service. The respondents filed motions for reconsideration, butthe same were denied

On November 19, 1968, respondents Ferrer and Bonifacio filedwith the court below two separate petitions for certiorari withpreliminary mandatory injunction (Civil Cases Nos. 14718 and14719). In their petitions they contended that the PoliceCommission had no jurisdiction to render a decision in theadministrative case on August 2, 1967, because at that time ithad not yet even published its Police Manual as required bySection 26 of Republic Act No. 4864 (Police Act of 1966); andthat the Police Commission committed grave abuse of discretionin dismissing them from the service. On November 21, 1968,respondent Judge issued in each of the two cases an orderrequiring the Police Commission to file an answer within ten days,and another order ex parte directing the issuance of a writ ofpreliminary mandatory injunction. Pursuant to the latter orders,the corresponding writs were issued on November 22, 1968,upon the filing of a bond by each of herein private respondents

Police Commission filed a motion to dismiss with a prayer for thedissolution of the writs of preliminary mandatory injunction. OnDecember 9, 1968, respondent Judge issued an order denyingthe motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 14718 and directing hereinpetitioner to reinstate respondent Ferrer within twenty-four hoursfrom receipt of the order. On December 10, 1968, a similar order

was issued in connection with respondent Bonifacio's petition inCivil Case No. 14719. On December 12, 1968, petitioner filed amotion for reconsideration (no proof of service of summons)

present petition was filed with this Court. Sought to be annulledare the orders of respondent Judge dated November 21, 1968,requiring petitioner to file an answer and directing the issuance ofa writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in each of the twocases, the aforesaid writs issued on November 22, 1968, and theDecember 9 and 10, 1968 orders denying petitioner's motions todismiss and ordering petitioner to reinstate private respondents.

Petitioner, likewise, seeks to prohibit respondent Judge fromcarrying out and enforcing his order of December 14, 1968, andfrom proceeding with the hearing of the cases

In directing issuance of the writs of preliminary mandatoryinjunction ex parte, respondent Judge stated in his twin orders ofNovember 21, 1968, that there was a prima facie showing in thepetitions that the Police Commission had no jurisdiction to rendera decision in Administrative Case No. 26; that it is alleged in thepetitions that if the petitioners (herein private respondents) arenot immediately reinstated, they will suffer irreparable damage

and injury; and that if the petitioners in the cases eventually winand are found entitled to reinstatement, it will be difficult for them


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to secure payment of back salaries, especially if the Municipalityof Binmaley will not have sufficient funds for the purpose

Issue: WON there is grave abuse of discretion, justifying the issuance of writ of

certiorari (YES)

Held:

writs in question were improvidently issued, and that, moreover,respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinanhad no power to issue such writs against the Police Commission,which holds office in Quezon City

it is improper to issue a writ of preliminary injunction prior to afinal hearing except "in cases of extreme urgency; where the rightis very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bearstrongly in complainant's favor; where there is a willful and

unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest andremonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where theeffect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish andmaintain a pre-existing continuing relation between the parties,recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than toestablish a new relation."

Did private respondents have a clear legal right to be reinstatedto their former positions in the municipal police force of Binmaley?We do not think so. The principal ground on which their petitionsin the lower court are predicated is lack of jurisdiction of the

Police Commission to render a decision in Administrative CaseNo. 26, petitioners contending that the Police Commission had nosuch jurisdiction because it had not yet published a Police Manualwhen it rendered its decision on August 2, 1967

Section 26 of Republic Act No. 4864 (Police Act of 1966): "SEC.26. Saving clause. All pending administrative casesinvolving police service and personnel shall be absorbed by thePolice Commission one hundred days after the publication of thePolice Manual containing rules and regulations relative to suchmatters

Police Manual mentioned in the law, Section 9, Rule XXIII:"SECTION 9. Saving Clause. All administrative casesinvolving members of the police force pending before the city ormunicipal boards, or those with the city or municipal mayors, shallbe turned over to the Board of Investigators concerned, and thosewith the Civil Service Board of Appeals, to the Police Commissionwithin one hundred (100) days after the publication of this Manual

promulgated only or, December 30, 1967, or sometime afterthe rendition of the decision by the Police Commission in itsAdministrative Case No. 26


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considering that private respondents voluntarily submittedthemselves to the jurisdiction of the Board of Investigators, whosedecisions are subject to review by the Police Commission, theyare now barred under the doctrine of estoppel by laches fromquestioning the jurisdiction of the said Commission

Court of First Instance of Pangasinan has no jurisdiction to issuewrits of preliminary mandatory injunction against the PoliceCommission, which holds office in Quezon City, outside theterritorial boundaries of said court

(RELEVANT TOPIC)

private respondents' petitions for certiorari in the lower court arepredicated on two grounds, namely, that the Police Commissionhad no jurisdiction to render a decision in Administrative Case No.26, and that it acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissingrespondent Ferrer, on the flimsy pretext of commandresponsibility, and, with respect to both private respondents, inwantonly overruling the findings and hideously ignoring therecommendations of the Board of Investigators. The first groundis closely interwoven with the November 21, 1968 orders for theissuance of the writs of preliminary mandatory injunction, and wassquarely raised by the parties to the present cases as art issueand ruled upon by this Court.

Allegations: without herein private respondents' presence orknowledge, the Board of Investigators met in session on March 2,

1967, and took ex parte the testimony of Pat. Graciano Aquino,upon which the Police Commission subsequently relied in arrivingat its conclusions; that "the respondent Police Commissioninstead of appreciating the valid acts of the Board enunciated inits findings and recommendations, said respondent depressedthe valid portions of the proceedings of the Board and then gavebloated significance to the result of that isolated illegal act of theBoard, which is the testimony of Pat. Graciano Aquino taken inthe absence of, and without due notice to the petitioner " and thatthe Police Commission, "basing its conclusion from loosely

connected, distorted and insufficient facts, with very apparentprejudice and hostility, ARBITRARILY DISMISSED the petitionerfrom the service for some highly imagined, or at most, very minor,administrative offense

While findings of fact of administrative bodies are entitled to greatweight and should not generally be disturbed, there is graveabuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorariwhen there is such capricious and whimsical exercise ofjudgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction as where thepower is exercised in an arbitrarily or despotic manner by reason

of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an


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evasion of positive duty, or to virtual refusal to perform the dutyenjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law

Considering the allegations of private respondents, as mentionedabove, in their petitions, and considering, further, that the Boardof Investigators of Binmaley which heard the witnesses hadrecommended the dismissal of the case against bothrespondents, we feel without expressing an opinion on themerits of the cases in relation to the second ground that forthis Court to issue a writ of prohibition permanently prohibitingrespondent Judge from proceeding with the cases, as prayed forby petitioner Police Commission, will be to deprive the privaterespondents of their day in court; for then they can no longer bein a position to prove their allegation that petitioner committedgrave abuse of discretion in dismissing them. While it has beenshown that the court below exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing thewrits of preliminary mandatory injunction, it has not likewise beenshown in the present petition nor has it been alleged therein that the entire proceedings in the court below are without or inexcess of the lower court's jurisdiction, or with grave abuse ofdiscretion. In passing it must be mentioned that the doctrine insupport of the theory of non-jurisdiction is not applicable to thisaspect of the proceedings, the power of judicial review not beingconfined to the court of first instance of the locality where theoffice of petitioner is maintained, to the exclusion of the court of

first instance in the locality where private respondents reside

Dispositive: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the writ of certiorari isgranted, and, accordingly the orders of respondent Judge in CivilCases Nos. 14718 and 14719 dated November 21, 1968, insofar asthey direct the issuance of the writs of preliminary mandatoryinjunction, and the orders issued pursuant thereto, are declared nulland void; the orders of December 9 and 10, 1968, are likewisedeclared null and void insofar as they require petitioner to reinstateprivate respondents; and respondent Judge is permanentlyprohibited from carrying out and enforcing his order of December 14,

1968. The writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied insofar aspetitioner seeks to prohibit respondent Judge from proceeding withthe cases, and the temporary restraining order issued by this Courtin relation to the hearing of the cases is hereby dissolved


[G.R. No. 78591. March 21, 1989.]

PURE FOODS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABORRELATIONS COMMISSION, REMIGIO CLAVIO, ANDRES CATUBAY,VIRGILIO UMALI, ORLANDO REY and JORGE DEL ROSARIO,


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respondents.

Facts:

Private respondents Remigio Clavio, Andres Catubay, VirgilioUmali, Orlando Rey and Jorge del Rosario were employees ofpetitioner Pure Foods Corporation.

Petitioner hired private respondents Clavio and Catubay asdrivers, starting 1979 and 1976, respectively; Umali as utility man,starting 1978; Rey as delivery man, starting 1973; and DelRosario as checker, starting 1978. Despite their specificappointments, there were times when respondents Umali and DelRosario were required by their superiors to perform the duties ofa dispatcher

Of all the employees involved from the packaging to the deliveryof the goods, only private respondents were indefinitelysuspended for alleged pilferage as early as March 18, 1981,immediately after the aforesaid incident and without priorinvestigation. Thereafter, their suspension was continued untiltheir dismissal without any notice to them or clearance from thethen Ministry of Labor and Employment.

On May 13, 1983, an order was issued by Director Severo M.Pucan directing petitioner to reinstate private respondents to their

former position with full backwages from the date of theirdismissal until actual reinstatement, and to pay said complainantstheir unpaid wages prior to their dismissal.

Petitioner appealed the order to the Office of the then Minister,Ministry of Labor and Employment. Acting on said appeal, formerDeputy Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr. issued an order settingaside the aforesaid order of Director Pucan and indorsing thecomplaint to the NLRC-NCR-Arbitration Branch for compulsoryarbitration as the nature of the case was not suited for summary

proceeding, the issues involved being evidentiary in nature whichcould be threshed out in a formal hearing.

Labor Arbiter: "WHEREFORE, finding that except for RemigioClavio, the dismissal of the other complainants to be justified,their complaint impugning the same should be, as it is herebyDISMISSED. However, for failure to furnish them with a clearanceapplication for their termination as well as the belated filing of thesame with MOLE, respondent Pure Foods Corporation, should,(sic) as it is hereby, ordered to pay Virgilio Umali, Jorge delRosario, Orlando Rey and Andres Catubay their separation pay of

one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service (sic) theirrespective services and to reinstate Remigio Clavio to his former


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position with one and half (sic) (1-1/2) years of backwages."

NLRC: In favor of private respondents: "WHEREFORE, premisesconsidered the Decision appealed from is, as it is hereby modifiedas aforediscussed. Consequently, respondent is hereby ordered

to reinstate VIRGILIO UMALI, JORGE DEL ROSARIO,ORLANDO REY and ANDRES CATUBAY to their formerpositions without loss of seniority rights and to pay theirbackwages equivalent to three (3) years each withoutqualifications and deductions. Further, respondent is directed toshow proof of immediate compliance to the mandate of thisDecision after ten (10) days from receipt thereof

Petitioner contends that respondent commission committed agrave abuse of discretion in totally reversing the findings of factsof the labor arbiter.

respondents preemptively contend that the questioned decision ofthe public respondent has long become final and executory, forfailure of petitioner to file its motion for reconsideration within the10-day reglementary period, hence the same is no longer legallysusceptible of any amendment, alteration and/or modification.Respondents consequently pray for the dismissal of this specialcivil action for certiorari

Issue: WON certiorari was proper in this case (NO)

Held:

In the case at bar, a motion for reconsideration was belatedly filedby petitioner by reason of which the motion was denied by publicrespondent. In a futile attempt to elide and gloss over an obviousmistake or fatal omission, petitioner then filed this special civilaction for certiorari by imputing to public respondent a supposedgrave abuse of discretion in reversing the findings of facts of the

labor arbiter.

This procedural maneuver is fatally flawed and unavailing on bothcounts. The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorariwill lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts ofrespondent. In the present case, the plain and adequate remedyexpressly provided by law was a motion for reconsideration of theassailed decision and the resolution thereof, which was not onlyexpected to be but would actually have provided adequate and

more speedy remedy than the present petition for certiorari. 11This remedy was actually sought to be availed of by petitioner


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when it filed a motion for reconsideration albeit beyond the 10-day reglementary period. For all intents and purposes, petitionercannot now be heard to say that there was no plain, speedy andadequate remedy available to it and that it must, therefore, beallowed to seek relief by certiorari. This contention is not onlyuntenable but would even place a premium on a party'snegligence or indifference in availing of procedural remediesafforded by law

The filing of such a motion is intended to afford public respondentan opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to itby way of a re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of thecase. Petitioner's inaction or negligence under the circumstancesis tantamount to a deprivation of the right and opportunity of therespondent commission to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly

committed or to vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed. Animprovident resort to certiorari cannot be used as a tool tocircumvent the right of public respondent to review and purge itsdecision of an oversight, if any. Neither should this special civilaction be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequencesof petitioner's own negligence or error in the choice of remedies.Having allowed the decision to become final and executory,petitioner cannot by an overdue strategy question the correctnessof the decision of the respondent commission when a timelymotion for reconsideration was the legal remedy indicated.

In asserting that there was grave abuse of discretion, petitioneradverts to alleged variances in the factual findings of the laborarbiter and the respondent commission. This is inapt anderroneous. Firstly, errors of judgment, as distinguished fromerrors of jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special civilaction for certiorari. Secondly, a careful perusal of the records ofthis case readily reveals that if there is any error by publicrespondent in its analysis of the facts and its evaluation of theevidence, it is not of such a degree as may be stigmatized as agrave abuse of discretion. By grave abuse of discretion is meantsuch capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as isequivalent to lack of jurisdiction, 12 and it must be shown that thediscretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. 13 Forcertiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary andwhimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicialprerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law andcommon law traditions

It is settled to the point of being elementary that the only questioninvolved in certiorari is jurisdiction, either the want or excess

thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the issuance of theextraordinary remedy of certiorari only when the same is so


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grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despoticmanner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, andit must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion ofpositive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined, orto act at all, in contemplation of law, 15 as to be equivalent tohaving acted without jurisdiction

It is, therefore, incumbent upon petitioner to adduce a sufficientlystrong demonstration that the respondent commission actedwhimsically in total disregard of evidence material to and evendecisive of the controversy, before certiorari will lie. In this,petitioner has failed.

special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for thecorrection of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. 16The reason for the rule is simple. When a court exercises itsjurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does notdeprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error iscommitted. If it did, every error committed by a court woulddeprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment wouldbe a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration ofjustice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error ofjudgment that the court may commit in the exercise of itsjurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action ofcertiorari

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. Thedecision of Labor Arbiter Raymundo R. Valenzuela, dated May16, 1986, insofar as it orders the reinstatement of privaterespondent Remigio Clavio and the payment of his backwages ofone and a half years is AFFIRMED. The decision of respondentNational Labor Relations Commission of March 23, 1987 and itsresolution of May 20, 1987 are likewise AFFIRMED

st martins vs nlrc

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