6. Self-Regulated Learning and Academic Achievement: A Vygotskian View

Mary McCaslin Rohrkemper

We have all encountered the frustration of "hard" learning. It is a common experience. Some of us are able to cope with it, whereas others are not. The ability to take charge offrustration and maintain the intention to learn while enacting effec­tive task strategies in the face of uncertainty-taking charge of one's motivation, emotion, and thinking-is what I call adaptive learning. I refer to this process as adaptive learning rather than self-regulation because I want to stress inter- rather than intra-individual states; a Vygotskian perspective highlights the role of the social/instructional environment in the development of adaptive learning. By social! instructional environment I refer to parents, teachers, tasks, and peers that students influence and are influenced by as they engage in learning, be it about themselves, their community, or two-digit division.

I argue that a Vygotskian perspective of self-regulated learning is one that stresses socialization processes and that the internalization of the social!instructional environments of home and school must be considered if we are to fully understand adaptive learning in students' classroom performance. A specific learning event is not isolated from prior experience; present intrapersonal consequences can be related to former and ongoing interpersonal influences.

In this chapter I will first outline the context of emergent Vygotskian theory in the Soviet Union of the 1920s, because a theory about social mediation and the histori­caJ nature of consciousness demands a historical perspective. Second, I will focus on three interdependent concerns within a Vygotskian perspective that are especially relevant to the development of adaptive learning: (a) multiple functions of language, (b) internalization processes and the nature of change, and (c) methodology and unit of analysis. Third, I will briefly describe three lines of recent research in develop­mental, clinical, and educational psychology that inform Vygotskian ideas. Finally, I will provide a detailed analysis of reported inner speech, which is at once the mechanism for the internalization of the social/instructional environment and the vehicle for adaptive learning. In the analysis I will illustrate the influences of home and school and the functions of task difficulty in reported inner speech.

B. J. Zimmerman et al. (eds.), Self-Regulated Learning and Academic Achievement© Springer-Verlag New York Inc. 1989

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Historical Context of Vygotskian Theory

A discussion of Vygotsky necessarily involves a discussion of Marx because Vygotsky was an avowed Marxist and his theory can be seen as one attempt to operationalize the Marxist analysis of social change. Three tenets of Marxism­concerning language, consciousness, and the process of change-will be discussed briefly as their extensions figure prominently in Vygotsky's thinking. First, Engels' (1890) theory of human evolution proposed that language developed as a result of human activity and the need for cooperative labor. Language distinguishes man from animal (for extended discussion, see Slobin, 1966).

Second, Marx defined consciousness as a property ofthe human brain that was the result of a gradual accumulation of small quantitative changes, which account for a qualitative change (see also, Gray, 1966). Furthermore, consciousness is an active constructor of experience and organizes and controls behavior. It is the ability to control one's behavior that frees the individual from specific situations. One is able to anticipate, plan, and direct one's actions toward non-immediate goals. For Marx, this ability to plan, to imagine, and to formulate a course of action before implemen­tation was peculiar to humans (see Marx, 1867).

The third basic Marxist tenet is the dialectic process. The dialectic is that process by which contradictions are seen to merge and transcend into a higher truth. The dialectic implies growth; there is a hierarchical ordering in thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. As extended by Marx and Engels, it informs how to change the world, not merely interpret it (Marx, 1844; Marx & Engels, 1888).

In the aftermath of the October 1917 revolution, the new Soviet government faced the task of extensive reorganization. In revolutionary times total rejection of the sta­tus quo is status quo. In the Soviet Union, however, the situation was more complex because of the embodiment of the Marxist doctrine sketched above. The doctrine has obvious appeal to a new government faced with the task of reeducating a huge peasant class in order to shape it into vosepatanii novova Sovetskovo cheloveka, the character of the new Soviet man. Such a person would need to cope with rapid change while simultaneously instigating that change.

We return to Vygotsky, who arrives on the scene in 1924 at the Second Psy­choneurological Congress in Leningrad. The prevailing psychological view at that time did not attend to subjective experience. Vygotsky nonetheless challenged the dominant view by speaking of the relation between conditioned reflexes and cons­cious human behavior. On the strength of his remarks, he was invited to join the Institute of Psychology in Moscow. His partnership there, with Luria and Leontiev, which Luria referred to as the troika, continued until Vygotsky's death a decade later. It is during this time that Vygotsky formulated his ideas on the social media­tion of learning and the role of consciousness, within a decidedly Marxist perspec­tive. Luria (1979) recalled:

... in Vygotsky's hands, Marx's methods of analysis did serve a vital role in shaping our course. Influenced by Marx, Vygotsky concluded that the origins of higher forms of conscious behavior were to be found in the individual's social relations with the external world. But man is not only a product of his environment, he is also an active agent in creating that environ-

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ment. . .. We needed, as it were, to step outside the organism to discover the sources of specifically human forms of psychological activity. (p. 43)

Hence, by going "outside the organism" Vygotsky went beyond the biological processes that he believed to dominate only at birth and examined the individual's mediation of experience, an experience that is at once cultural- in that it represents socially structured tasks and tools- and historical, in that it reflects the "storehouse" of what we today call "semantic knowledge" (language-based information), "learn­ing to learn" strategies and procedures (e.g., rehearsal, elaboration), and "metacog­nitive awareness" (conscious monitoring of one's cognitive strategies). Luria (1979) discusses this storehouse as having" ... enormously expanded man's powers, mak­ing the wisdom of the past analyzable in the present and perfectible in the future" (p. 44). The contrast between Luria's image of the realm of psychology and current information-processing theorists' dispassionate and bounded discussion of the func­tion of metacognition may provide the reader with some feeling for the social/politi­cal context of Soviet psychology.

Vygotsky's Theory of Language

THE SECOND SIGNAL SYSTEM

The ultimate focus of this discussion is on the functions of inner speech. Engels' theory of the evolution of language is the starting point. Engels posited that com­municative, social language evolved from and with human labor and was peculiarly human-it is what distinguishes man from animal. Similarly, Pavlov (1927) made the critical distinction between what he termed the "first" (perceptual) and "second" (linguistic) signal systems. Pavlov observed the abrupt nature of human conditioning and the nongeneralizability of animal classical conditioning data to humans. He hypothesized that the second signal system was the cause of differences between human and animal learning and that, whereas in one sense speech has removed man from reality, in another, " ... it is precisely speech which has made us human" (as quoted in Slobin, 1966, p. 112).

Thus, for Pavlov, as for Engels, speech was peculiar to humans, and, in interaction with the first signal system (perception), allowed mastery of the environment as opposed to control by its stimulus properties. Language, then, is responsible for the human ability to direct and mediate behavior. The mediational and self-directive role of the second signal system became the cornerstone of Vygotsky's research and theorizing.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-DIRECTIVE LANGUAGE

At birth the human infant is controlled by the physical properties of the environ­ment, by the first signal system. Initially, the child reacts to words not by their meanings, but by their sounds, that is, by their physical stimulus properties. As the child's language develops, words gradually acquire meaning independent of their stimulus properties. After repeated exposure to word meanings by other persons in

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their social/instructional environments, children subsequently become able to expose themselves to word meanings, and thereby direct their own behavior. Thus, the child acquires the facility to direct and control her own behavior as well as com­municate with others through language. Vygotsky was concerned with the multiple functions of semantic, meaningful language-of the second signal system-with how this occurs naturally and acquires two distinct functions: communication with others and self-direction (see also, Zivin, 1979).

The developmental sequence of the two functions of language, communication with others and self-direction, is from social or interpersonal to self-directive or intrapersonal. The implications of this progression are critical. Not only does language acquire two distinct functions, but the source of self-directive inner speech is the social environment. Sources of both types of speech - external communication and internal self-direction - reside in the second signal system, that is, in the cul­tural, historical, social language environment.

The structure and function of each type of speech differ, however. Inner speech, in contrast to the grammatically correct communicative speech, is more economi­cal. As it branches off communicative (external) speech, ultimately the "speech structures mastered by the child become the basic structures to his thinking" (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 51). Inner speech, then, is the opposite of external speech. External speech involves turning thought into words, whereas inner speech involves turning words into thought (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 131). Inner speech is thinking in pure meanings and is the link between the second signal system of the social world and the thought of the individual. Because of the evolution of language, from first to second signal system, Vygotsky could claim (as quoted by Leontiev & Luria, 1968, p. 342) that by mastering nature we also master ourselves.

CONTRASTING PoSITIONS

Vygotsky's theoretical interests in language development are frequently confused with the interests of two colleagues, Luria and Piaget, who were also working on language development in the 1920s and 1930s. Vygotsky differed from Luria in the area of focus and methodology and from Piaget in theory development and data interpretation.

In contrast to Vygotsky, who focused on the semantic and self-directive capacity of the second signal system, Luria focused on the child's transition from the first to the second signal system. Thus, Luria examined the stimulus properties oflanguage, those impulse qualities that also can regulate behavior through sound and condition­ing, and designed conditions that would elicit a transition from one signal system to the other. His research methods involved a degree of intrusiveness and direct experimental manipulation. In contrast, Vygotsky's studies were confined to obser­vations of what he considered naturally occurring self-directive speech, what Piaget called "egocentric" speech, which consists of words spoken aloud in the presence of others. It resembles social or communicative speech, but does not require a response or even the attention of a listener.

It is probably fair to say that Vygotsky's theorizing about the emergent dual func­tion oflanguage owes much to his disagreement with Piaget (1983) on the source and

6. A Vygotskian View of Self-Regulated Learning 147

function of egocentric speech. Although Vygotsky felt Piaget had revolutionized child study, he disagreed with Piaget's basic premise: that the earliest forms of thought are autistic, with logic occurring sometime later, and egocentric speech the connective link. Vygotsky's disagreement fueled a line of research that replicated Piaget's clinical method and setting, but added difficult elements that would frus­trate the child so that "by obstructing his free activity we made him face his prob­lems" (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 16). Results indicated that children's egocentric speech increased when faced with difficulties.

Vygotsky, like Piaget, interpreted this as support for the premise that speech is an expression of the process of becoming aware. Vygotsky also maintained, however, that egocentric speech becomes an instrument in the seeking and planning of a solu­tion to a problem. It is self-directive. In contrast to Piaget, Vygotsky did not consider egocentric speech ultimately to be "corrected" and, thus, to disappear, but rather to be the transition between external and inner speech. It already serves the function of inner speech, but remains similar to social speech in its structure. As inner speech develops, egocentric expression decreases because "behind the symptoms of dissolu­tion lies a progressive development, the birth of a new speech form;' that is, inner speech (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 135). Thus, the progression of multiple functions of language from social to egocentric to inner speech.

Dynamics of Change: Processes of Internalization

SOCIAL NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The sequence of language development, from interpersonal and communicative with others to intrapersonal and self-directive, squarely locates the emergent capac­ity for "self"-regulation in the interpersonal realm. Vygotskian theory adheres to cultural-historical evolution and the development of consciousness; thus the role of the social environment is preeminent. Vygotskian theory (Luria, 1969) " ... con­ceives of mind as the product of social life and treats it as a form of activity which was earlier shared by two people (originated in communication), and which only later, as a result of mental development, become a form of behavior in one person" (p. 143). The psychology of the individual is a multiplicative product of his social encounters. Hence, adaptive learning begins in the social world.

EMERGENT INTERACTION

"Emergent interaction" has been coined by Wertsch and Stone (1985) to capture the dynamics of internalization of the interpersonal realm in the Vygotskian perspective. An understanding of the emergence of self-directive inner speech requires an appreciation of emergent interaction, the process of internalization that integrates the important social/instructional environments in the child's experience-the interpsychological, cultural world-with the child's natural developmental pro­cesses. Internalization, then, is not replication or mere "introjection" of the exter­nal. Rather, it is inherently social and interactional, and at its core is the mastery of signals -language.

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This conception of internalization embeds the individual within her culture; it blurs the distinction between self and other that is more readily accepted in main­stream American psychology. Within a Vygotskian framework, the interplay of the social/historical and the natural in the formation of consciousness informs ques­tions about the relationship between social cognition and intrapersonal awareness and understanding. The individual is intricately a part of the perceived social world; thus self-knowledge is not independent of knowledge of others. One could argue, then, that reports about self are not interpretable without a context of "perception of others" within which to analyze them; nor is a student's specific intrapersonal approach and response apparent in a learning situation without understanding the interpersonal influences of home and school. The efficacy of this argument is demonstrated in the final section ofthis chapter, "Emergent interaction and adaptive inner speech: An illustration;' which traces the sources and nature of reported inner speech of one sixth-grade student.

EDUCATIONAL ApPLICATIONS

The stress on social and emergent interaction is obviously compatible with the social/political goals of the Soviet Union of the early twentieth century. It is compat­ible with educational goals in the United States as well. Vygotsky's constructs have been gladly received in the educational community, most notably his notion of the "Zone of Proximal Development:' Vygotsky identified this zone as a sort of "gap" or the difference between what a learner cannot do alone yet can do with help from a teacher or more capable peer. The basic tenet of this construct is that tasks that learners can initially do only with assistance, they come to do independently as they incorporate the structure or the "scaffolding" (Palincsar & Brown, 1984) of the assistance.

Vygotskian theory is a theory about fundamental change through the internaliza­tion of the social/instructional environment. It at once empowers the social/instruc­tional environment and the individual, a provocative formula for education. A Vygotskian perspective is inherently political. This is not unique to Vygotsky-all psychological theories are inherently political. Perhaps the construct of self­regulation simply magnifies the broader issue. One need consider the extent to which enhancing the development of self-regulated learning is for the purpose of individual empowerment, to free the individual from the immediate environment by enabling self-direction and planfulness, or to merely energize for the purpose of greater, introjected, "other" control.

It seems especially problematic that educators remain unaware of this, because a bits-and-pieces approach in the classroom in the belief that one is politically "neutral" often results in applications that are anything but neutral. The cooperative group of homogeneous high-ability learners is a frequent and obvious example. Hence, one cannot simply implement tools like the "Zone of Proximal Develop­ment" or "inner speech" without an understanding of the emergent interpsychologi­cal developmental premise that underlies them. Educators' decontextualization of such concepts does not promote an informed understanding of motivated class­room learning.

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Methodological Issues and the Unit of Analysis

METHODOLOGICAL DEMANDS OF VYGOTSKY'S 'THEORY

The study of naturally occurring self-directive inner speech that originates in the interpersonal realm within a theoretical framework of "emergent interactionism;' places considerable demands on the researcher to design informative methodology. It is seldom achieved now, with all the technical advances in tools and accrued wis­dom of the past 60 years. It was not readily obtained by Vygotsky, either. A recurring argument among Vygotskian scholars concerns inconsistencies in Vygotsky's research in meeting the demands of his theory. Davydov and Radzikhovski (1985), among others, have distinguished "between Vygotsky the methodologist and Vygotsky the psychologist."

Vygotsky the methodologist did not readily accept elicited behavior as indicative of behavior that occurs naturally. He opposed subjective and introspective reports and would not directly ask a subject to report her thoughts. He did manipulate task structures, however, and would change a task to increase its frustrating potential, thus requiring self-directive speech. Vygotsky's rejection of direct-questioning tech­niques meant that he confined his research on self-directive inner speech to observa­tions of egocentric speech in difficult, novel, or frustrating task conditions. Because he considered egocentric speech to be self-directive speech on its way inward, he had to infer the dynamics of inner speech from these observations.

Vygotsky the psychologist voiced concern about the false dichotomy that charac­terized much of psychology at the turn of the century and continues today. He antici­pated present-day attempts to integrate "will" with "skill" (see Como & Mandinach, 1983; Como & Rohrkemper, 1985; Paris, 1988; Rohrkemper & Bershon, 1984; Rohrkemper & Como, 1988) when he wrote (Vygotsky, 1962):

We have in mind the relation between intellect and affect. Their separation as subjects of study is a major weakness of traditional psychology since it makes the thought process appear as an autonomous flow of "thoughts thinking themselves;' segregated from the fullness oflife, from the personal needs and interests, the inclinations and impulses, of the thinker. . . . [The present approach] demonstrates the existence of a dynamic system of meaning in which the affective and the intellectual unite .... It permits us to trace the path from a person's needs and impulses to the specific direction taken by his thoughts, and the reverse path from his thoughts to his behavior and activity. (p. 8)

Thus, although Vygotsky's own research did not address the interplay ofthe affective with the intellectual, he recognized the need to examine their organization-that is, their dialectical integration-and the futility of examining either facet in isolation from the other and from their emergent interactional origins with the social/instruc­tional environment.

UNIT OF ANALYSIS

Vygotsky's concern with the integration of the affective and intellectual did not lead him to a concern with the structure and nature of tasks that would afford that integration. What is now seen as a major shortcoming in Vygotsky's theorizing likely

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stems from his shortcomings as a methodologist. Although Vygotsky used difficult tasks to stimulate egocentric speech, he did not appreciate their theoretical implica­tion, and instead viewed them as a discrete tool.

Vygotsky (1962) had set out to establish a unit of psychological analysis that differed from the elemental approach that "analyzes complex psychological wholes into elements" (p. 3). He posited instead the notion of unit, " ... a product of analy­sis, which, unlike elements, retains all the properties of the whole and which cannot be further divided without losing them" (p. 4). Vygotsky believed that the basic unit of verbal thought that met these requirements was word meaning.

Wertsch (1985), like Zinchenko (1985), claims that developments within semi­otics have challenged the position of word meaning as the basic unit of analysis in psychology, and offers instead the construct of "activity" that embodies tool­mediated, goal-directed action. Wertsch (1985) maintains that the construct of activity applies "to the interpsychological as well as the intrapsychological plane, and it provides an appropriate framework for mediation" (p. 208).

This perspective is consistent with implications of recent work on the role of task difficulty and the form and dual nature of reported inner speech that integrates the affective with the intellectual (Rohrkemper, 1986; Rohrkemper & Bershon, 1984; Rohrkemper, Slavin, & McCauley, 1983). These studies indicated, as Vygotsky (1978) would predict, that tasks that do not require striving do not challenge, and therefore, do not enhance the development of self-directive inner speech. In each study, reported inner speech was an integral element of tool mediation and main­tenance (or transformation) ofthe goal, but best understood with knowledge of the perceived task that afforded its employment.

Tool-mediated, goal-directed action as the basic unit of analysis is consistent with Vygotsky's discussion of the study of internal processes. His concern with the limits of introspection and subjective report led him to consider ways to externalize inter­nal processes, "connecting it with some outer activity;' because only then would objective functional analysis be possible (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 132). It is perhaps use­ful to once again consider the distinction between Vygotsky the methodologist and Vygotsky the theoretician. Here we see that his research methods embodied the notion of task to allow examination of self-directive speech rising to the occasion of tool mediation. In this instance, however, Vygotsky the theorist failed to rise to the occasion of his methodology.

Recent Research Related to Self-Directive Inner Speech

Much current research informs constructs posited by Vygotsky. This volume illus­trates the key place self-direction and self-regulation occupy in present educational and psychological theory and practice. In this section, three areas of research related to inner speech are noted. No attempt is made to be exhaustive; rather, the goal is to highlight the emergence and refinement of inner speechlike constructs from three perspectives in psychology: developmental, clinical, and educational.

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Developmental Psychology

Within a developmental perspective, the quality of children's thinking changes over time from initially being embedded in physical action to ultimately being strategic and abstract. Some important questions for researchers within this tradition concern differences between types or stages of thought, transitions between stages, and regression to kinds of thinking that are less sophisticated than what is possible. Paris and Byrnes (this volume) discuss additional developmental considerations.

TRANSPOSITION RESEARCH

Transposition problem tasks were designed to understand the quality of young chil­dren's problem-solving strategies as compared with older children and adults. These studies (e.g., Stevenson, 1970) repeatedly showed that young children (and animals) use identification strategies that indicate the associative nature of their thinking. They fail to use their knowledge strategically. In contrast, older children and adults use more sophisticated relational strategies, indicating the qualitative changes that occur as children's thinking develops. Hence, associative thinking is considered more primitive and usually less efficient than the types of cognitive strategies that emerge with development. A researcher within a Vygotskian tradition would likely note as well the transition from the first to the second signal system and the emer­gence of self-directive speech during this period.

MEDIATIONAL DEFICIENCY

What happens when children who developmentally should possess and enact more sophisticated cognitive strategies do not use them? Mediational-deficiency research (e.g., Kendler & Kendler, 1962) examines those situations in which children's think­ing, as indicated by their responses to problems, does not appear to live up to the sophistication of their language. In these cases, thought is not being mediated or car­ried by language, and conversely, thought is not informing language. The apparent lack of a relationship between thought and speech is called a "mediational" defi­ciency. Within a Vygotskian framework, the child is functioning outside the inter­face between thought and speech and, therefore, is not engaging in self-direction. From a Piagetian perspective, the child is engaging in "merely verbal learning;' without understanding or operative knowledge.

PRODUCTION DEFICIENCY

A more frequent problem that emerges in developmental investigations concerned with the presence and use of cognitive strategies is "production deficiency" (e.g., Flavell, Beach, & Chinsky, 1966; Flavell & Wellman, 1977). Production deficiency refers to those situations when the individual possesses a cognitive skill but fails to produce or use it when it would be helpful or more efficient. This area of research began with memory-list experiments comparing memorization strategies used by

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children and adults. A protypicallist in these studies might be: desk, hat, sandwich, chair, coat, apple, blackboard, shoes, milk. Persons indicating production defi­ciency are those who possess all necessary concepts and language and understand relationships that are relevant, but do not think to enact this strategic knowledge when learning the list. Instead they engage in rote repetition: the less efficient and more primitive associative strategies of young children. In Vygotskian terms, they do not engage in the level of thinking that their capacity for self-direction affords.

Clinical Psychology

Concern with inappropriate behavior and maladaptive "internal dialogues" under­lies a program of research by Meichenbaum and colleagues that operationalizes one way to influence what individuals "say" to themselves-their inner speech-and their subsequent behavior (Meichenbaum, 1977; Meichenbaum & Asarnow, 1979; Meichenbaum & Goodman, 1971). Meichenbaum has outlined an instructional design for internalization that is appropriate for clinical settings and also informs larger educational contexts.

PROGRAM COMPONENTS

Meichenbaum's program, called Cognitive Behavior Modification, combines ele­ments of functional language development, socialization processes, cognitive strategy training, and principles of behavior modification. It has three basic inter­dependent components. First, cognitive behavior modification provides active instruction in what to say to yourself in given situations, that is, what inner speech is facilitative, stressing that inner speech is an internal dialogue, not a monologue. The therapist/teacher actively models coping by "thinking aloud" strategies that help overcome adversive affect and maintain the intention to reach a goal. The therapist/ teacher also actively models mastery and "thinks aloud" mastery strategies so the individual knows what the goal looks like when it is achieved and can have some insight into the kinds of covert self-talk and thinking required to attain it. Second, appropriate behavior is taught simultaneously with facilitative internal dialogue. Third, the therapist/teacher directly reinforces and supports self-reinforcement of congruence between internal dialogue and subsequent behavior.

INSTRUCfIONAL DESIGN

The ultimate goal, internalization of the internal dialogue instruction, or in Vygot­skian terms, of the socialization of inner speech, begins with direct instruction and guided demonstration by the therapist/teacher or more capable peer. A reasonable task is selected, one that the individual is unable to accomplish alone, but can do with assistance. In Vygotskian terms, it is within the individual's Zone of Proximal Development. Instruction within the individual's zone changes as the individual acquires expertise, so that shifts in directness occur and degree of support is fluid. Ultimately the therapist/teacher withdraws the instructional props through syste­matic fading procedures.

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Meichenbaum's research program operationalizes and refines Vygotskianlike constructs; it has produced much supportive evidence in clinical and educational settings. It lends support as well to the efficacy of integrating the affective and the intellectual in adaptive learning. Meichenbaum's work provides supportive illustra­tions of Vygotsky's theory of functional language and self-directive inner speech, and the social origins of that self-directive inner speech, at least as one remedial source when the individual's self-direction is found not adaptive, or wanting. For educational applications of self-verbalization, see also Schunk (this volume).

Educational Psychology

Research in classrooms within an educational psychology tradition focuses on class­room learning as it occurs "naturally;' as in a developmental tradition, and as it can be changed, as in a clinical tradition. Researchers have examined students' naturally occurring inner speech as a function of task variables, such as novelty, difficulty, and structure, and as a function of individual difference variables, such as age, ability, gender, and attitude toward learning (e.g., Ames, 1984; Anderson, 1981; D:.\.mico, 1986; Peterson, Swing, Braverman, & Buss, 1982; Rohrkemper, 1986). Investiga­tors have also attempted to change students' naturally occurring inner speech. Studies have focused on motivational components, cognitive strategies, and their combination (e.g., Como, Collins, & Capper, 1982; Dweck, 1975; Pressley & Levin, 1983; Schunk, 1981).

The research program described here attends to reported inner speech as a func­tion of task difficulty, type of social/instructional environment, and individual differences among learners. It can be considered an elaboration of a Vygotskian perspective that incorporates insights from attribution theory (e.g., Weiner, 1985), information-processing theory (e.g., Simon, 1969), social-learning theory (e.g., Bandura, 1977), and socialization research (e.g., Baumrind, 1971). This discussion highlights the implications of emergent interaction for the nature of students' reported inner speech during classroom learning.

CONCEPTION OF CHANGE

One way to conceptualize "emergent interaction;' or the dynamics of change that involve school-aged children, is to consider the cooccurence of developmental processes with a change in socialization. Thus, children experience an increase in the number of social/instructional environments in their lives at about the same time that they become capable of being in control of themselves rather than controlled by the stimulus properties of the social/instructional environment.

Exposure to an increased number of social/instructional environments requires adaptive learning, that facility to take charge of one's self and one's learning in the face of uncertainty and frustration. Some social/instructional environments are more informative and/or congruent, and thus facilitate adaptive learning better than others. Striking inconsistencies between home and school can occur, as, for exam­ple, in the different norms surrounding helping behavior, usually valued at home yet often considered cheating in school (Good, personal communication, 1988). And

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some learners are better able to handle the transition to multiple social/instructional environments, recognizing and coping with similarities and differences, than are others.

It is useful to consider the differences in social/instructional environments stu­dents experience because they not only make demands on students, but they are also simultaneously sources of empowerment as students internalize and mediate their experiences (Halperin, 1976; Rohrkemper, 1984; 1985). As students acquire more experience in school they begin to see it as a social/instructional setting distinct from home. At the same time, they develop an increasing facility with the second signal system and emergent capacity for self-direction. One hypothesis to emerge from this scenario concerns the extent to which the capacity to integrate the home and school social/instructional environments is an important determinant of the development of functional inner speech and, hence, adaptive learning.

THE FUNCTION OF INNER SPEECH IN ADAPTIVE LEARNING

Inner speech guides thought and action in nonautomatic "effortful" (Posner, 1979) cognition. Two types of inner speech have been identified that reflect concern with the integration of the affective and the intellectual (Rohrkemper, 1986; Rohrkemper & Bershon, 1984; Rohrkemper, Slavin, & McCauley, 1983). Self-involved inner speech reflects control over the self through enhancing motivational and affective statements. Task-involved inner speech reflects control over the task through problem solving, strategic instructional statements afforded by the task, and modifi­cation of the task if necessary and possible. Together, self-involved and task­involved inner speech enable adaptive learning by allowing students to modify the task or the self, and by enabling them to initiate and transform tasks.

Results indicate that students differ in the fluidity of their reported inner speech, the sophistication of the task-involved strategies that they can employ, and in the types of affective and motivational configurations that enable them to persevere. These findings are consistent with the data described in the developmental and clini­cal domains. Interest here, however, concerns the origins of these individual differ­ences through the process of emergent interaction.

It seems reasonable to hypothesize that, even given developmental and task differences, the sources of task-involved inner speech are more readily identifiable and homogeneous and tied to specific school learning or, if found lacking, to student ability level. In contrast, sources of self-involved inner speech are likely more varied, reflecting multiple influences from home, school, and peers. An example may be helpful. The following were excerpted from interviews with two sixth-grade girls discussing how they handle the "hard stuff" in math. Their reports are typical for their age group when reporting inner speech associated with difficult tasks.

It should be kept in mind, however, that these students were discussing their approaches to coping with learning stress in general. Inner speech involves turning words into thought; here we have compounded the process by requesting the path­way to be made prototypical and then communicative for others. Thus, the density and structural differences that are theorized to characterize inner speech have been

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stereotyped and diffused in the translation. The reports are, nonetheless, informa­tive in that they provide clues about the functions of inner speech.

A lot of times I get sick of things so I just want to stop. And I do ... I always, whenever I'm working and I just get sick of working and I just stop because I can't stand it anymore. I think of things that are, I like to do. Like in school, I'm going to play with my friends. I think, "Urn, all the things that are fun that we do, and stuff. But I have to get this done and right before I can go and do that."

Compare this student's self-involved, strategic use of fantasy, combined with real­world contingencies to keep her on task, with her classmate's strategies. Whereas the first student's reported inner speech indicates that learning was a means to the goal (fun time with friends), the second student's reported inner speech indicates motivational and emotional supports that are enabling, that are the means to the goal of learning. See Como (this volume) for other examples of self management strategies.

Well, I think I'm going to get them all wrong. And I kind offeellike I have to get up and walk around and think about it. I feel like I have to stop and work on something else for a little bit. I might get up and work on spelling for a minute 'cause that's pretty easy and I don't have to think about it, 'cause spelling I just know the answers and they're right there. I can think about the math and what I'm going to do .... [It's time for a break] when I get pretty frustrated and think to myself you can't do this and I start tearing, I start biting my pencil then I know I have to get up and do something else. I just I get so frustrated with it I can't think ... I start to fiddle with my hands, go like that. I know I have to do something else. 'Cause I really get mad. I don't take a real long [break] time, maybe just ten minutes. Then I come back to work again. Just to get it out of my mind for a minute.

Both students conclude with similar procedural or algorithmic task-involved strategies to reach solution. Their self-involved paths to that solution illustrate the range and complexity of self-directive inner speech and its dynamic interplay with one's general comprehension of oneself as a learner. The examples underscore the question of internalization, and in so doing, move us away from locating the psycho­logical solely within the individual. We look instead to the nature of the multiple social/instructional environments that, through emergent interaction with the individual, result in unique learner constructions and reconstructions of self­direction. Thus, understanding how a student copes with present learning frustra­tion involves some understanding of how prior and ongoing socialization influences of home and school have been internalized.

We look as well to the specific events that allow this development, to the types of tasks that stimulate inner speech. As stated earlier, tasks that do not require striving do not challenge and therefore do not provide the opportunity for the development of adaptive inner speech. Similarly, tasks that are too prescriptive do not allow students to learn about themselves as learners and therefore do not enhance the development of self-directive inner speech (see also, Rohrkemper & Como, 1988). One implication of this interplay between task demands and the development of adaptive, functional inner speech concerns how to design tasks that will enhance the integration of self-involved and task-involved inner speech so that each is mutually supportive. A concern with classroom task is emerging in the educational literature

156 M. McCaslin Rohrkemper

(see Mergendollar, 1988). How patterns of inner speech associated with task difficulty inform differences associated with task structures is one important ques­tion for educational practice.

In sum, students differ in their affective and intellectual strategies for coping with differing tasks. What distinguishes a Vygotskian orientation from the traditional developmental, clinical, and educational perspective is interest in the emergent interaction between the developing individual and the changing contexts of his multiple social/instructional environments. This internalization process, in inter­action with tasks that are challenging and informative, results in unique construc­tions of self and fluidity of functional inner speech, and hence, adaptive learn­ing. The perspective sketched here, highlighted in the illustration that follows, attends to interpersonal influences on intrapersonal experience, namely, self­directive inner speech.

Emergent Interaction and Adaptive Inner Speech: An Illustration

This section is excerpted from a case study of the internalization of multiple social/instructional environments, as manifested through reported inner speech. In this excerpt, the relationship between inter- and intrapersonal perception and reported inner speech while actually engaged in problem solving is examined in one student's coming to cope with learning frustration. One purpose is to illustrate the embeddedness of self-directive inner speech in the interpersonal influences of home for one 12-year-old, 6th-grade, moderate-ability, female student, "Nora." A second purpose is to illustrate the dynamics of adaptive inner speech.

The Social/Instructional Environment of Home

EXPECTATIONS: EFFORTFUL LEARNING AND EFFORTFUL PERFORMANCE

Nora's mother describes a home where each family member has diverse roles and varied experiences and each has a profile of accomplishments. In this family, per­sonal "achievement" is multifaceted, something the mother intentionally models because "wherever we are, we adapt to wherever we are."

')\dapt" in this situation roughly translates into "do the best you can." Effort is highly valued and effortfullearning is emphasized more than ready learning associ­ated with ability, so much so, that Nora's mother is concerned that Nora does not "earn" her way because "she learns easily and doesn't need much study." There is no premium on high native ability.

Effortful performance is distinct from effortfullearning in Nora's family. Effortful performance essentially concerns acting responsibly. It is always expected. Indepen­dent of the difficulty of the task, be it frustrating or boring, you are to apply a "Let's get to it" attitude and do the task responsibly and as best you can. This approach to responsible behavior means that in Nora's family certain mistakes are "OK" (e.g.,

6. A Vygotskian View of Self-Regulated Learning 157

those that occur in spite of sustained effort, or that are due to legitimate lack of awareness), whereas others are not (e.g., those due to lack of sustained effort, or failure to act responsibly). Suggestions for improvement are confined to the motiva­tional and self-management domains. Morality is intertwined with effort, self­awareness, self-reliance, and the golden rule. Given the high value home places on effortfullearning, one hypothesis that emerges is that sanctioned mistakes followed by effort may well be the most valued behavior.

PERCEPTION OF NORA

Nora's mother describes her in terms of personality and values, as "coming into her own groove":

I don't see intellect ... I think her strong points are knowing who she is right now, who she really is. I can't help repeating this, but her morals are really very strong now, and she doesn't care about the kids, being trendy .... You know, she doesn't need to go along with the tide. She's just a good kid. She's just a normal twelve-year-old kid .... She's just enjoying life.

Nora's teacher agrees and it made her mother, "really feel good. Like rve done my job right to have grown up this kid."

The Social/Instructional Environments of Marble School

Nora attends a neighborhood K-6 elementary school, "Marble;' located in a city of nearly 60,000. There are three distinct messages about the relative value of effort, ability, and achievement for 6th-grade students at Marble. Although the primary purpose of this excerpt is to illustrate the interpersonal influences of home on Nora's intrapersonal experiences in school, home influences are best interpreted within the context of the multiple social/instructional environments afforded by school. By necessity, however, discussion of norms held by Nora's principal, teacher, and classmates will be brief. Readers are referred to the case study for more complete discussion.

PRINCIPAL EXPECTATIONS: EFFORTFUL ABILITY

Marble School is located in a school district whose motto is "one year's growth for every child" as defined by scores on the standardized achievement tests admin­istered each spring. Marble's principal expects to exceed district-level goals. Accord­ingly, she has created a school climate in which high ability combined with effort that results in high standardized achievement-test scores receives the highest acclaim.

TEACHER EXPECTATIONS: EFFORTFUL ACHIEVEMENT

Nora's teacher values successful, effortful, achievement. In this classroom, like Nora's home, effort is always expected. An important difference, however, is the linking of effort to outcome. At home, effort per se, independent of outcome, is

158 M. McCaslin Rohrkemper

required. For Nora's teacher, effort is defined in large part by the outcome because tasks are believed appropriately structured so that, with effortful cognition, stu­dents will successfully learn. Thus, at home one can evaluate one's effort by the value and intention that underlie the process; in this classroom the outcome of effort must be known to determine its value.

CLASSMATE EXPECTATIONS: EFFORTLESS ACHIEVEMENT

Nora is in 6th grade. And for these sixth-grade students, ability is defined by rate. As Stipek (1984) and others have discussed (Ames, 1988; Nichols, 1984), by sixth grade, students are well ensconced in a compensatory perception of ability and effort such that more expended effort indicates less expendable ability. Effort takes time. Amount of time spent on task is a public index of effort readily available to students as well as classroom researchers. Only these sixth graders are not apt to equate "time on task" with motivation or opportunity to learn; rather, they are more likely to infer level of ability. Hence, the fourth effort/ability message in Nora's social/instructional worlds emerges: Effort is inversely related to ability; one's personal worth is defined in large part by one's ability. Albeit by a differing route, the students arrive at a hierarchy similar to their principal's. Nora's teacher's and, espe­cially, her mother's "codes for goodness;' based as they are in effort, the controllable aspect of learning, define the "also rans."

Nora

ACHIEVEMENT PROFILE

Nora is an '',N' student, who consistently receives the highest-level "effort/conduct" ratings on her report card. Her teacher describes her as of "moderate ability" and "positively motivated" relative to her peers.

INTERPERSONAL AND INTRAPERSONAL PERCEPTION LINKAGES

Nora was interviewed about her perceptions of four, hypothetical, moderate-ability female classmates doing a math assignment. Each student was either effortful and ultimately successful; effortful and ultimately unsuccessful; effortless and ulti­mately successful; or effortless and ultimately unsuccessful. After each vignette, Nora was asked first to describe the portrayed event; predict the hypothetical character's inner speech during the described process and after the result was known; and predict what was going to happen next. She was then asked which character she was most like in general, when work was difficult, and when it was easy. Nora saw each character as unique, but she prioritized the effort cue in each vignette. Effort overwhelmed outcome. The data described here concern only one character, Margaret, portrayed as effortful and ultimately successful, whom Nora saw as most like herself when the work was difficult. In describing Margaret, Nora said:

6. A Vygotskian View of Self-Regulated Learning 159

She takes a long time to do her stuff. At first, she doesn't understand it, but then, she finally figures it out. She thinks she is going to do ok on her test.

Margaret's predicted inner speech is similar, moving from an initial concern with her confusion to concerns about the obtained grade. It also discounts the difficulty of the task, thereby reconstructing a "hard-won" learning perception into a merely success­fullearning perception:

At first .... "I don't think that I understand this. It seems really hard, and I might not get it right. I might not get a good grade on this .. " Later, when she figured it out she would say that, "This wasn't very hard and I made it through."

Nora predicts that Margaret's" ... Mom's going to be really proud of her, because her mom knows that she's not very good at math, and she tries her best." Nora volun­teers home involvement. There were no questions in the interview nor in casual conversation that asked for discussion of home.

Nora compares herself with Margaret when confronting difficult tasks, because of their similarities in rate: "I try to get my work done. I don't usually finish when it's time." She reportedly remains task-focused when she is coping with difficult tasks, rather than becoming undone with detrimental self-involved inner speech: "[I think] just about the problems. Ijust think of what I'm going to do when they come up, how I'm going to figure them out." Her account of how she is going to "figure them out" consisted of task-involved strategies aimed at understanding the work and self­reliance. Nora breaks problems into steps, goes on when stuck and then returns if there is time; if not, then on another occasion.

Nora also admired Margaret the most of the four characters, because "she seems to be a person who's into her own ... she's not into a group. A person who doesn't want to make up or doesn't hang around with a lot of people. She ... she's not .... very bright .... " Nora is her mother's child.

INNER SPEECH DURING TASK ENGAGEMENT

Nora's self-perception and retrospectively reported inner speech indicated she likely took an adaptive approach to learning. That is, she appeared "hardy" when con­fronted by frustration, and thus able to modify the task or herself when confronting that frustration. Of primary interest were the adaptive strategies that Nora engages in that allow her to continue to strive. Nora's internalization of home values indi­cated that she would likely engage in self-managing, self-involved inner speech to keep trying, especially after a mistake, and to keep it in perspective, especially if feeling frustrated. Her understanding of classroom routines and procedures indi­cated she likely would report general, heuristic, task-managing task-involved inner speech that would include going on and then coming back to a problem, and using available resources.

Finally, Nora's understanding of mathematics (as an ''P;.' student and one who scored a 9.0 grade equivalent on the standardized achievement test) indicated she likely would report more sophisticated task-involved inner speech that would include problem reformulation and concerns about conceptual representation in

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addition to algorithmic procedures. How Nora would integrate these multiple tools, embedded as they are in differing aspects of her social/instructional worlds, was of particular interest.

Nora participated in an individual problem-solving interview that included atten­tion to reported inner speech associated with problem difficulty and student con­struction and reconstruction of the experience. A math problem set (14 problems) was designed with the classroom teacher so that the student would likely confront problem difficulty as it was intended: relatively easy, moderately difficult, or highly difficult problems. In practice, however, problem difficulty is coconstructed by the student and the task; thus, although Nora experienced a range of problem difficulty, specific problems were not necessarily experienced as intended.

Resources were available and Nora was told to use them if she wished. They included extra pens, paper, ruler, the classroom math text, and a math book not used in their class. Nora was instructed to read each problem aloud and trained in the "Think Aloud" method, which required her to say her thoughts aloud while working on the problems. She was observed and tape recorded. When finished, and using her worksheet, Nora was asked to assess problem difficulty, recall her inner speech, and to predict how well she had done. One week later, Nora was again asked to recall her inner speech, how she felt about the experience, and how well she had done. The data reported here will be limited to illustrations of Nora's typical inner-speech reports during each of the three levels of problem difficulty: relatively easy, moder­ately difficult, and highly difficult problems.

When confronting relatively easy problems, Nora immediately began the algo­rithmic solution. She did not reconstruct or reformulate the problems in a metacog­nitive task-involved sense; rather, the problem was perceived as a whole and the already-known solution strategy employed. Reported inner speech was confined to the algorithmic procedures associated with the task, and appeared concurrent with, and sometimes subsequent to, Nora's writing. She did not report any engagement in self-involved inner speech, be it reflective, directive, or evaluative. Solution times with these problems were less than 30 seconds.

Afterward, Nora wasn't able to elaborate on the easy problems. They were easy "because ... I don't know ... [they're] easy for me." Nora also identified the easy problems as boring "because I already know them. And sometimes I like to move on." She recalled no unreported inner speech when solving the easy problems.

Problems defined as moderately difficult were not necessarily evenly experienced by Nora. The following are excerpts from her reported inner speech during 2 objec­tively defined moderate difficulty problems that Nora later described as hard. It seems that one of the reasons the problems were recalled as among the most difficult was because Nora recognized them as something she had either done before or as similar to something already done and she was unable to complete them with cer­tainty. Thus, her transformations of the problems were limited to plausibly correct transformations, and she had the added burden of performance expectations due to prior exposure.

In each case, as instructed, Nora first read the problem. She then reread a segment.

6. A Vygotskian View of Self-Regulated Learning 161

I did this on a SAM [district level mastery tests] ... [slowly rereads problem] ... so, take 2 into 2,000 [continues with algorithm] ... 2 goes into 4 two times, and bring down the ... 2 times 2 is 4, and oh ... do it on another paper [scrap paper, picks up where left off] ... 2 ... [rereads part 1] I'm just going to do the same thing I did ... [continues algorithm] bring down the one, 2 doesn't go into one ... That is [pause] how many were badly damaged by the storm. [Now on step 2 of the word problem: sketches circle] How do you divide a circle 2,418 times? ... put that into a fraction. You can reduce it. No, you can't. [pause] I got this one wrong, too. I don't believe we just did this and I don't know how to do it. [To interviewer:] Can I think, and then can I say what I thought later? [pause, continues with algorithm] ... Now, I just need to figure out what 7/8ths is a number of. Well, it's not I [sighs, "oh God;' con­tinues with algorithm, inserting numbers in circle diagram. Looks at interviewer:] This is going to be wrong, but ... 3/8ths can't be reduced ... make a better circle [redraws circle] 3/8 is like 1/3. I'm going to make a guess and say 912. OK. [Problem-solving time: 8 min, 36 s]

There are several points to underscore in this report. First, Nora recognizes the problem as something familiar. The familiarity likely increases anxiety, however, as evidenced in Nora's subsequent self-beration. Nonetheless, upon recognition, Nora rereads the problem slowly and begins solution attempts. She deals with the problem subparts, identifying where she will begin. She then copies the problem on another piece of paper, a sort of "fresh start" strategy, as she advises in an earlier interview. Nora then reconstructs the problem and transforms the representation into a drawing that she later, laughingly, described as not helpful because she couldn't divide it into so many pieces.

Nora's report indicates she comprehended the limits of her reconstruction during problem solving as well. The task-involved dialogue that ensues, where she directs herself to a procedure, then corrects that direction, is immediately followed by chagrined self-involved reflection. It is noteworthy, however, that Nora takes con­trol of the interview parameters and then reengages in task-involved strategies. She is aware of how she feels, but she is not undone by those feelings. Nora continues to try-to a point. She then closes the problem, anticipating error, by taking a guess. Later, Nora diagnosed her difficulty as due to starting the problem wrong and then not being able to think another way. She (correctly) expected to get this problem wrong, but noted that she "finished:' Compare Nora's reported inner speech with a similarly difficult problem:

[Rereads problem segment. Quickly looks back to earlier problems.] Oh, ok ... lover 8 and 5 over .... they have to be changed to the same denominator so the common denominator is 2, and [pause] oh, wait, this is just like the first one! Ys and %, so the common denominator is 2. And then .... What did I do the first time? [pause] Oh my God, I did it wrong the first time. Oh. 2 x 4 is 8, oh, yeah, [continues algorithm] ... So it would be .... and then take the 2 into 15, because its an improper fraction .... So ... the fraction would be 11 take away 2, plus 7, is 9 and ~ .... that would be [pause] oh no [pause] oh, oh [pause] you have to borrow ... make this .... you have to make that a common denominator ... that's the same as ... [pause] ~ [sigh]. [Problem-solving time: 4 min, 45 s]

Nora reformulates the problem and, unlike the earlier example, a result of the reformulation is recognition. Nora's self-involved inner dialogue indicates that she realizes the limits of familiarity and the difference between recognition and under­standing. Again there is evidence of task-involved correction, but the perceived general "success" of the task-involved strategies precludes any intrusion of debilitat-

162 M. McCaslin Rohrkemper

ing self-involved inner speech. Nora later described her problem with this as algorithmic error: "I just ... somehow I got 6 goes into 10 evenly." Nora (correctly) predicted her answer would be wrong.

As each of these examples indicate, when coping with moderately difficult tasks, even those that she feels she "should know;' Nora remains task involved. Task involvement includes the more routinized algorithmic procedures and the more directive problem reformulations and procedural corrections. Nora is aware of herself as a problem solver, but does not let negative self-perceptions interfere with task reengagement. At some point in situations of continued difficulty, however, she seems to recognize the limits of sheer effort and changes task goals from understand­ing to completion.

When confronted with highly difficult problems, Nora attempted either to get information to make them more comprehensible or she transformed them into something that was comprehensible:

[After rereading the problem twice, looking at interviewer] What's "points"? [Selects math text not used in class, opens to "perimeter;' moves lips, closes book.] I don't know how to do that one, so I am going to move on to number 9. [Problem-solving time: 2 min, 50 s]

As the report indicates, Nora could not make the problem comprehensible. She con­sulted potential resources in an instrumental way, and, when this was not helpful, she diagnosed that she did not understand and moved on. In the follow-up interview, Nora indicated that she knew she had "never seen" it before, but found the problem interesting because it had some words she understood, but others she wasn't sure of. She looked in the math text, but the examples it used did not match the problem, so it was not helpful (the text provided figures, the problem called for constructing a figure).

Nora's transformation strategy is evident in another highly difficult problem:

[Reads "ratio" as "radio"] What? [Rereads problem] ... ok. [Rereads second part of problem] 70 kg ... umm ... 1:50. [rereads] 70 kg. 1:50. Oh. I'm still thinking about the problem ... 70 kg. 70 kg I can lift. 70. I'm going to think this one with my brother. My brother is about 70 and he can lift 50 pounds. [Sighs, begins multiplication algorithm] I'd say 50. [On to part 2:] I can lift (pause). I can lift Michael [brother], who is 70 kg. KG! Oh, my, ok. 50 kg and 70 kg. [Problem-solving time: 7 min, 0 s]

In this instance, Nora radically transformed the problem into operations and charac­ters she could understand. She wrote in her brother and changed the demands of a ratio problem (An ant can lift 50 times its mass. If it were the same for humans, what could a person whose mass is 70 kg lift) to what amounts she and her brother could, in fact, lift. When describing her thinking in the follow-up interview, Nora recalled:

Well, I started thinking about it, and I didn't know how to do it that way, I didn't even know a way to do it, so I just compared it with my brother, because my brother is about 70 kilo­grams. [She switched strategies] because it was taking too long, I did it. It was taking too long, and there was no way I knew how to do it.

Interestingly enough, when discussing which problems were the most difficult, Nora did not name either of these. Rather, her subjective experience of the most

6. A Vygotskian View of Self-Regulated Learning 163

difficult problems were those that she knew something about yet required effortful cognition that was not necessarily going to result in solution. Problems that she did not recognize as something she "ought" to understand did not elicit stressful self­involved inner speech. Rather, they appear to take on the qualities of puzzles­interesting and lacking accountability.

RECONSTRUcrION OF THE PROBLEM SOLVING INTERVIEW

One week later, Nora reported feeling "OK" during, and "tired and happy" after, the interview. She recalled saying to herself, "I can go on if it is too hard and some of them are really hard and some easy." She estimated that she got about "half right, half wrong;' thought overall it was "pretty hard;' and only liked it a "little bit."

Closing Comments

UNIT OF AcrIVITY

Wertsch's (1985, p. 208) notion of the basic unit of psychological analysis as "tool­mediated, goal-directed action" receives support in this illustration. Inner speech differentially mediates tasks. And tasks differentially mediate inner speech. Nora's reported inner speech is most schoollike when she is engaged in solving problems of moderate difficulty. Her reported inner speech is also most homelike when engaged in these tasks. In contrast, too-difficult tasks do not engage self-directive speech in the same way. They are beyond Nora's self-expectations; she does not have the strategies to make the problems accessible and thereby accountable.

Too-easy tasks do not require effortful cognition. Thus, Nora does not engage self­directive inner speech. At most the reported inner speech consists only of reflective or evaluative components. Task-involved reflective ("It's an addition problem;' fol­lowed by automatic procedures) or evaluative ("That's an easy one") inner speech by itself does not facilitate the continued development and refinement, and therefore power, of task-involved inner speech. And self-involved reflective ("rve done this before") or evaluative ("I did that fast") inner speech by itself does not promote self­knowledge that enhances coping with tasks that are stressful.

The level of task difficulty that appears to promote the engagement of both task­involved and self-involved inner speech is the moderately difficult task. Moderately difficult tasks afford the integration of the affective and the intellectual in the media­tion of goal-directed action and, hence, the development of adaptive learning.

EMERGENT INTERAcrION

As her mother said, Nora has "come into her own;' yet she is clearly embedded within her culture, intricately a part of multiple social/instructional environments. Nora's self-knowledge, her intrapersonal awareness, is best understood within the context of interpersonal influences, perceptions of others, and her own develop­mental processes. She has uniquely negotiated, integrated, and reconstructed the

164 M. McCaslin Rohrkemper

social/instructional environments she encounters as she copes adaptively with the demands of classroom learning.

IMPLICATIONS FOR A VYGOTSKlAN PERSPECTIVE AND EDUCATION

Inner speech can be understood as a function of self-direction, developed through emergent interaction with social/instructional environments, that is engaged by tasks that require tool-mediated, goal-directed action. Hence, emergent interaction between the developing individual and the multiple social/instructional environ­ments of her experience, and the opportunity to expand and build upon one's knowledge through the use and refinement of self-directive tools, underlie the development of adaptive learning. It begins in the social, interpersonal world.

A Vygotskian perspective is at once empowering and challenging. It demands much of educators. One important implication for education appears to be the design of classroom tasks that will enhance the integration of the affective and the intellec­tual in students' self-directive inner speech and, thus, engage adaptive learning. Another implication is that we must carefully scrutinize the social/instructional environments that we design because these settings are not merely "places" for education, but are an integral part of the educative process. Finally, the Vygotskian perspective suggests that we need to consider the implications of student adaptive learning and plan for the challenges it will provide so that we may rise to the occa­sion of our students.

Acknowledgments. This work is dedicated to the memory of Hugh V. Perkins, Professor Emeritus of the Institute for Child Study of the University of Maryland. Perk challenged and took issue with nearly every idea in this chapter and supported the effort to convince him otherwise.

The case-study illustration in this chapter is part of the Adaptive Learning Study and is excerpted from'~ Case of Emergent Interaction and Adaptive Inner Speech." It was supported in part by the Junior Leave Program of Bryn Mawr College and a Spencer Postdoctoral Fellowship. Interview transcription costs were undertaken by the Center for Effective Elementary and Middle Schools of Johns Hopkins Univer­sity. The author would like to thank Thomas L. Good, Jere Brophy, Kathy Carter, Lyn Como, Nedra Fetterman, and Dale Schunk for their comments on an earlier version. Special thanks to John Rohrkemper and Robert Russell for their help along the way.

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