2. specpro case digest 2.pdf

8/19/2019 2. SpecPro Case Digest 2.pdf

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ANCHETA VS. GUERSEY-DALAYGONGR NO. 139868 JUNE 8, 2006

FACTS: Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens whohave resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey

died in 1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting of Audrey’sconjugal share in real estate improvements at Forbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of

stock in A/G Interiors. Two years after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey -Dalaygon. Four yearsthereafter, Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for hisshares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter.

Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s will was admitted to probate, filed a motion

to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audrey’s estate. The motion andproject of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards to Richard’s will alsofiled a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to

respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on theground that under the law of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the

legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is

situated and (2) Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the circumstances.

HELD:

(1) Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated. However, sincethe first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed by her national law. The national

law of the person who made the will shall regulate whose succession is in consideration whatever the natureof the property and regardless of the country where the property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife'sproperties may be found in the Philipppines, however the successional rights over those properties are

governed by the national law of the testator.(2) A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in thedistributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effectis like any other judgment in rem.

However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of

jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a probateproceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his

control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.

Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her willand as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTCOrders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.


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HEIRS OF CASTILLO V. GABRIEL

GR NO. 162934 / NOVEMBER 11, 2005

FACTS: Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo B. Almoradie, died in Malabon City, Metro Manila, leaving

behind a sizable inheritance. A little over a month after Crisanta’s death, her mother, Crisanta Santiago Vda.

de Yanga, commenced an intestate proceeding before the RTC. She alleged, among others, that to her

knowledge, her daughter died intestate leaving an estate being managed by her wastrel and incompetent

son-in-law, Lorenzo, and by two other equally incompetent persons. She prayed that letters of administration

be issued to her son, Mariano Yanga, Jr., also the brother of the deceased, and that she be awarded her

share of the estate of her daughter after due hearing. However, the RTC appointed Lorenzo as administrator.

Meantime, the marriage between Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and Lorenzo Almoradie was declared void for being

bigamous. The RTC then removed Lorenzo as administrator and appointed Mariano, Jr. in his stead.

Belinda Castillo, claiming to be the only legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed a motion for

intervention.

Roberto Y. Gabriel, the legally adopted son of Crisanta Y. Gabriel, filed before the RTC of Malabon City a

petition for probate of an alleged will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. He alleged that

he d iscovered his mother’s will in which he was instituted as the sole heir of the testatrix, and designated as

alternate executor for the named executor therein, Francisco S. Yanga, a brother of Crisanta, who had

predeceased the latter sometime.

On June 2, 1990, Belinda Castillo died. The two (2) special proceedings were consolidated. The probate

court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as special administrator of his mother’s estate.

The heirs of Belinda, namely, Bena Jean, Daniel, Melchor, Michael, and Danibel, all surnamed Castillo, filed

a Motion

praying that they be substituted as party-litigants in lieu of their late mother Belinda, who died.Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, Dolores L. Gabriel, filed a "Manifestation and Motion" where she informed

the probate court of her husband’s death and prayed that she be admitted as substitute in place of her late

husband, and be appointed as administratrix of the estate of Crisanta Gabriel as well.

The heirs of Belinda opposed Dolores’ manifestation and motion. They averred that Dolores was not Crisanta

Gabriel’s next of kin, let alone the lawful wife of the late Roberto.

The lower court appointed Dolores as special administratrix upon a bond of P200,000.00. The probate court

merely noted the motion for substitution filed by the heirs of Belinda,

stating that they were "mere strangers to the case" and that their cause could better be ventilated in a

separate proceeding. The probate court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Belinda’s heirs in itsOrder.

ISSUE: The propriety of the appointment of respondent as special administratrix of the estate left by Crisanta

Yanga-Gabriel.

HELD: The petition is without merit. In ruling against the petitioners and dismissing their petition, the CA

ratiocinated as follows:


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In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest of the estate of the one to

be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, especially in

cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties of factions be represented in the management

of the estates.

In the case at bar, Emilio III and Nenite were legally adopted by Federico, putting them in equal footing with

that of legitimate children and were treated by the decedent and her husband as their own, reared from

infancy, educated and trained in their business, while the relationship o f the re spondent was strained. The

factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession, “love first descends”, for

the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did

her husband, Federico, who legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a

legitimate child. The law of intestacy is founded on the presumed will of the deceased. Love, it is said, first

descends, then ascends, and finally, spreads sideways.

Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall be issued to both the

petitioner, Emilio III and the respondent, Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.


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Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was nothing else for Branch

61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules o f Court.

Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule 73, which states: Where

estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his

death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estatesettled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is

an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The

court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the

exclusion of all other courts…

The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement of the estate of

deceased persons. It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because

such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is

one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.

Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with approximate value of over

P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts.

The different branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent

of and incompatible with each other.

It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, §1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for probate of the will

of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of

the settlement of the estate of the testator after his death.

Lastly, regarding petitioner’s c laim as heir and creditor the Court said that “The private respondent herein is

not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of thelatter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of

intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his

properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedent's

estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate. His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having

been raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the

records show, not supported by evidence.”

The Petition was denied.


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SEDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUISG.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

FACTS: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was the formergovernor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first

marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo,Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the

Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a DecreeGranting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimomarried respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister

of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no c hildren withrespondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18,1992. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement

of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before theRegional Trial Court of Makati City. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the timeof his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro

Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his firstmarriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,

valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondentprayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed

a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimedthat the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because thiswas Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal

personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time ofhis death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued

an Order denying the two motions to dismiss.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at thetime of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its

assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998

ISSUES: Whether or not the venue was properly laid in the case . Whether or not respondent Felicidad has

legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration?

HELD: The Supreme Court finds that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing

the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration wasvalidly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subjectpetition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the b ranches

of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction overMuntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the

subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.


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On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that respondent would qualify as an interested person

who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by v irtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which wasnot denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, butfails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may

be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relationsbetween parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is

void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through thei r work orindustry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co -ownership. In a co-ownership, it isnot necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property

acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their jo int efforts. Hence,the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. The casetherefore is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the evidence to prove the validity of the

divorce between Felicisimo and Merry Lee.


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OCAMPO VS. OCAMPO

GR NO. 187879 JULY 5, 2010

FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo died intestate with no debts, leaving several properties,

mostly situated in Biñan, Laguna. Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), Renato M. Ocampo (Renato) and Erlinda

M. Ocampo (Erlinda) are the legitimate children and only heirs of said spouses. Leonardo used to received

one third (1/3) of the total income generated from the properties of the estate but was discontinued after his

death. The respondents then took possession, control and management of the properties to the exclusion of

the Leonardo’s heirs, herein petitioners.

The RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint administrators of the estate o f the deceased

spouses, and required them to post a bond of P200,000.00 each. Said appointment was later revoked by the

RTC, substituting Dalisay with Erlinda. The RTC took into consideration the fact that respondents were the

nearest of kin of Vicente and Maxima. Respondents filed a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators’ Bond,

praying that they be allowed to enter their duties as special administrators without the need to file an

administrators’ bond due to their difficulty in raising the necessary amount. After eight months, petitioners filed a Motion to Terminate or Revoke the Special Administration and

to Proceed to Judicial Partition or Appointment of Regular Administrator. Petitioners contended that the

special administration was not necessary as the estate is neither vast nor complex, the properties of the

estate be ing identified and undisputed, and not involved in any litigation necessitating the representation of

special administrators. Petitioners, likewise, contended that respondents had been resorting to the mode of

special administration merely to delay and prolong their deprivation of what was due them and cited an

alleged fraudulent sale by respondents of a real property and misrepresentation that petitioners owed the

estate for the advances to cover the hospital expenses of Leonardo, but, in fact, July 5, 2010 were not yet

paid.

The RTC granted petitioners’ Motion, revoking and terminating the appointment of Renato andErlinda as joint special administrators, on account of their failure to comply with its Order, particularly the

posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties and responsibilities as s pecial administrators. The RTC

also appointed Melinda as regular administratrix, subject to the posting of a bond in the amount of

P200,000.00, and directed her to submit an inventory of the properties and an income statement of the

subject estate.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion of the RTC for appointing Melinda as regular

administratrix without conducting a formal hearing to determine her competency to assume as such?

HELD: No. The Court takes into account the fact that Melinda, pursuant to the RTC Order dated March 13,

2008, already posted the required bond of P200,000.00 on March 26, 2008, by virtue of which, Letters of

Administration were issued to her the following day, and that she filed an Inventory o f the Prope rties of the

Estate dated April 15, 2008. These acts clearly manifested her intention to serve willingly as administratrix of

the decedents’ estate, but her appointment should be converted into one of special administration, pending

the proceedings for regular administration.


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VILMA C. TAN VS HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR.

G.R. No. 1665 , March 14, 2008

FACTS: On 4 October 2000, Gerardo Tan died intestate. Private respondents who claim to be the children

of Gerardo Tan filed before the RTC a petition for the issuance of letters o f administration. On the other hand,

petitioners who claimed to be the heirs of Tan opposed the respondent’s petition. Private respondents thenmoved for the appointment of a special administrator and prayed that their attorney -in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim

be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners filed an Opposition to private respondents Motion for

Appointment arguing that none of the private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator

since they are not resid ing in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same

familiarity, experience or competence as that of their co -petitioner Vilma C. Tan who was already acting asde

facto administratrix of his estate since his death. However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court directive to

account for the income of the estate, the court granted Romualdo's appointment as special administrator.

Petiioners filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied by respondent Judge Gedori o. Later on,

petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals and the same was denied, hence the petition for review on

certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court in their selection of a special

administrator.

HELD: The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to theappointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter

lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable. If petitioners really desire to avail themselvesof the order of preference, they should pursue the appointment of a regular administrator and put to an endthe delay which necessitated the appointment of a special administrator. The appointment of a special

administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedentleaves behind a will) or administrative (in the event that the decedent leaves behind no will, as in the Petition

at bar) occasioned by any cause. The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is topreserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefitof creditors and heirs. In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment

of a special administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with thedirectives of the court-appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma were stillappointed special administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought about by her

defiance of the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials


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DR. OLIVIA S. PASCUAL VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA

G.R. NO. 120575 DECEMBER 16, 1998

FACTS: Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 and was survived by (1) his widow, Doña

Adela Soldevilla Pascual; (2) the children of his full blood brother. Wenceslao Pascual Sr. — Esperanza C.

Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose C. Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Guerrero, Erlinda C. Pascualand Wenceslao C. Pascual Jr.; (3) the children of his half blood brother Pedro Pascual — Avelino Pascual,

Isosce les Pascual, Leida Pascual-Martinez, Virginia Pascual-Ner, Nona Pascual-Fernando, Octavio Pascual

and Geranaia Pascual-Dubert; (4) the intestate estate of his full blood brother Eleuterio T. Pascual

represented by Mamerta P. Fugoso, Abraham S. Sarmiento III, Dominga M. Pascual, Regina Sarmiento-

Macaibay, Dominga P. San Diego, Nelia P. Marquez, Silvestre M. Pascual and Eleuterio M. Pascual; and (4)

the acknowledged natural children of his full blood brother Eligio Pascual — Hermes S. Pascual and Olivia

S. Pascual (herein petitioner).

Doña Adela (the surviving spouse) filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pasig, Rizal, a petition

for letters of administration over the estate o f her husband. 3 After due notice and hearing, the CFI appointed

her special administratrix. 4 To assist her with said proceedings, Doña Adela hired, on February 24, 1974,

Atty. Jesus I. Santos, herein private respondent, as her counsel for a fee equivalent to fifteen (15) percent of

the gross estate of the decedent.

When Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 took effect, the petition was reassigned to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of Pasig, Branch 162, presided by Judge Manual Padolina. On November 4, 1985, the heirs of the decedent

moved for the approval of their Compromise Agreement, stipulating that three fourths (3/4) of the estate

would go to Doña Adela and one fourth (1/4) to the other heirs. The intestate court approved said Agreement

on December 10, 1985. On August 18, 1987, while the settlement was still pending, Doña Adela died, leaving

a will which named the petitioner as the sole universal heir. The latter filed at the Regional Trial Court of

Malabon, Branch 72, a petition for the probate of said will. RTC of Pasig denied the motion to reiterate

hereditary rights, which was filed by petitioner and her brother. The Court reasoned that, as illegitimate

children of the brother of the decedent, they were barred from acquiring any hered itary right to her intestate

estate under Article 992 of the Civil Code. 5 On December 17, 1987, it ordered that the private res pondent's

lien in the hereditary share of Doña Adela be entered into the records.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court have jurisdiction to make the questioned award of attorney's fees.

HELD: Petitioner insistently argues that the January 19, 1994 RTC Decision, insofar as it awarded attorney's

fees, was void from the beginning because the intestate court had lost jurisdiction over the person of Doña

Adela due to her death. The argument is untenable. The basic flaw in the argument is the misapplication of

the rules on the extinction of a civil action 19 in special proceeding. The death of Doña Adela did not ipso

facto extinguish the monetary claim of private respondent or require him to refile his claim with the court

hearing the settlement of her testate estate. Had her filed the claim against Doña Adela personally, the rule

would have applied. However, he did so against the estate of Don Andres. Thus, where an appointed

administrator dies, the applicable rule is Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, which requires the

appointment of a new administrator, viz.:


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QUASHA VS LCN CONSTRUCTION CORP.

GR 174873 August 26, 2008

FACTS: Raymond Triviere passed away on 14 December 1987. On 13 January 1988, proceedings for the

settlement of his intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere, before the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63 of the National Capital Region (NCR), docketed as SpecialProceedings Case No. M-1678. Atty. Enrique P. Syquia (Syquia) and Atty. William H. Quasha (Quasha) of

the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, were

appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased in April 1988.

In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their litigation

expenses. Citing their failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under

administration, the RTC denied in May 1995 the Motion for Payment of Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha.

In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata (Zapata), also of the Quasha Law Office,

took over as the counsel of the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the

estate.

On 6 September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment, 3 for their own behalf

and for their respective clients, been paid to either Administrator Syquia or his client, the widow Consuelo

Triviere; nor to the Quasha Law Offices or their clients, the children of the deceased Raymond Triviere;

LCN, as the only remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere filed its

Comment on/Opposition to the afore-quoted Motion on 2 October 2002. LCN countered that the RTC had

already reso lved the issue of payment of litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment filed

by Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of the administrators to submit an accounting of the assets and

expenses of the estate as required by the court.

On 12 June 2003, the RTC issued its Order taking note that "the widow and the heirs of the deceased Triviere,

after all the years, have not received their respective share in the Estate."

The RTC declared that there was no more need for accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate

considering that: There appears to be no need for an accounting as the estate has no more assets except

the money deposited with the Union Bank of the Philippines.

As to the payment of fees of Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, the RTC found as follows: Both the

Co-Administrator and counsel for the deceased are entitled to the payment for the services they have

rendered and accomplished for the estate and the heirs of the deceased as they have over a decade now

spent so much time, labor and skill to accomplish the task assigned to them; and the last time theadministrators obtained their fees was in 1992.

Hence, the RTC granted the second Motion for Payment; however, it reduced the sums to be paid, to wit:

On 11 May 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision essentially ruling in favor of LCN.

The appellate court, however, d id not agree in the position of LCN that the administrators' claims against the

estate should have been presented and resolved in accordance with Section 8 of Rule 86 of the Revised


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Rules of Court. Claims against the estate that require presentation under Rule 86 refer to "debts or demands

of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the decedent during his lifetime and which

could have been reduced to simple judgment and among which are those founded on contracts." The Court

of Appeals also found the failure of the administrators to render an accounting excusable on the basis of

Section 8, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 11 May 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals. The Motion,

however, was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 22 September 2006.

ISSUE: Whether or not THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE AWARD

IN FAVOR OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RAYMOND TRIVIERE IS ALREADY A DISTRIBUTION OF THE

RESIDUE OF THE ESTATE and Whether or not the THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

NULLIFYING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR OF THE CO-ADMINISTRATORS

HELD: The Court of Appeals modified the 12 June 2003 Order of the RTC by deleting the awards of

P450,000.00 and P150,000.00 in favor of the children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively.

The appellate court adopted the position of LCN that the claim of LCN was an obligation o f the estate whichwas yet unpaid and, under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court, barred the distribution of the

residue of the estate.

Petitioners, though, insist that the awards in favor o f the petitioner children and widow of the late Raymond

Triviere is not a distribution of the residue of the estate, thus, rendering Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised

Rules of Court inapplicable.

A perusal of the 12 June 2003 RTC Order would immediately reveal that it was not yet distributing the residue

of the estate. The said Order grants the payment of certain amounts from the funds of the estate to the

petitioner children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere considering that they have not received their

respective shares therefrom for more than a decade..

While the awards in favor o f petitioner children and widow made in the RTC Order dated 12 June 2003 was

not yet a distribution of the residue of the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the estate,

still, they d id constitute a partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the petitioner children and

widow were already being awarded shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been paid or

provided for.

The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court allows the distribution of the

estate prior to the payment of the obligations mentioned therein, provided that "the distributees, or any of

them, gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said oblig ations within

such time as the court directs."

No similar determination on sufficiency of assets or absence o f any outstanding obligations of the estate of

the late Raymond Triviere was made by the RTC in this case. In fact, there is a pending claim by LCN against

the estate, and the amount thereof exceeds the value of the entire estate.

Hence, the Court does not find that the Court of Appeals erred in disallowing the advance award of shares

by the RTC to petitioner children and the widow of the late Raymond Triviere.


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On the second assignment of error, petitioner Quasha Law Office contends that it is entitled to the award of

attorney's fees and that the third paragraph of Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court, is inapplicable

to it. The afore-quoted provision is clear and unequivocal and needs no statutory construction. Here, in

attempting to exempt itself from the coverage of said rule, the Quasha Law Office presents conflicting

arguments to justify its claim for attorney's fees against the estate. At one point, it alleges that the award of

attorney's fees was payment for its administration of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere; yet, it would

later renounce that it was an administrator.

Petitioner Quasha Law Office asserts that it is not within the purview of Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised

Rules of Court since it is not an appointed administrator of the estate. 23 When Atty. Quasha passed away in

1996, Atty. Syquia was left as the sole administrator of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere. The person

of Atty. Quasha was distinct from that of petitioner Quasha Law Office; and the appointment of Atty. Quasha

as administrator of the estate did not extend to his law office. Neither could petitioner Quasha Law Office be

deemed to have substituted Atty. Quasha as administrator upon the latter's death for the same would be in

violation of the rules on the appointment and substitution of estate administrators, particularly, Section 2, Rule

82 of the Revised Rules of Court.24 Hence, when Atty. Quasha died, petitioner Quasha Law Office merely

helped in the settlement of the estate as counsel for the petitioner children of the late Raymond Triviere.

In its Memorandum before this Court, however, petitioner Quasha Law Office argues that "what is being

charged are not professional fees for legal services rendered but payment for administration of the Estate

which has been under the care and management of the co-administrators for the past fourteen (14) years.

The Court notes with disfavor the sudden change in the theory by petitioner Quasha Law Office. Consistent

with discussions in the preceding paragraphs, Quasha Law Office initially asserted itself as co -administrator

of the estate before the courts. The records do not belie this fact. Petitioner Quasha Law Office later on

denied it was substituted in the place of Atty. Quasha as administrator of the estate only upon filing a Motionfor Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, and then again before this Court. As a general rule, a party

cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal. When a party adopts a certain theory

in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would

not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and

due process. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court

need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first

time at such late stage.28

This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. In the interest of justice and within the sound discretion of

the appellate court, a party may change his legal theory on appeal, only when the factual bas es thereof wouldnot require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet

the issue raised in the new theory.

On the foregoing considerations, this Court finds it necessary to exercise leniency on the rule against

changing of theory on appeal, consistent with the rules of fair play and in the interest of justice. Petitioner

Quasha Law Office presented conflicting arguments with respect to whether or not it was co -administrator of

the estate. Nothing in the records, however, reveals that any one of the lawyers of Quasha Law Office was


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indeed a substitute administrator for Atty. Quasha upon his death.

The court has jurisdiction to appoint an administrator of an estate by granting letters of administration to a

person not otherwise disqualified or incompetent to serve as such, following the procedure laid down in

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.

The records of the case are wanting in evidence that Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers substituted Atty. Quasha as co-administrator of the estate. None of the documents attached pertain to the issuance of

letters of administration to petitioner Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers at any time after the demise of

Atty. Quasha in 1996. This Court is thus inclined to give credence to petitioner's contention that while it

rendered legal services for the settlement of the estate of Raymond Triviere since the time of Atty. Quasha's

death in 1996, it did not serve as co-administrator thereof, granting that it was never even issued letters of

administration.

However, while petitioner Quasha Law Office, serving as counsel of the Triviere children from the time of

death of Atty. Quasha in 1996, is entitled to attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P100,000.00 as prayed

for in the Motion for Payment dated 3 September 2002, and as awarded by the RTC in its 12 June 2003Order, the same may be collected from the shares of the Triviere children, upon final distribution of the estate,

in consideration of the fact that the Quasha Law Office, indeed, served as counsel (not anymore as co-

administrator), representing and performing legal services for the Triviere children in the settlement of the

estate of their deceased father.

Finally, LCN prays that as the contractor of the house (which the decedent caused to be built and is now part

of the estate) with a preferred claim thereon, it should already be awarded P2,500,000.00, representing one

half (1/2) of the proceeds from the sale of said house. The Court shall not take cognizance of and rule on the

matter considering that, precisely, the merits of the claim of LCN against the estate are still pending the proper

determination by the RTC in the intestate proceedings.


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THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner,vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIACATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE

OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, respondents.

G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996

NATURE OF THE CASE: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decisiondated November 10, 1994 and the resolution dated January 5, 1995 of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS: Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will naming petitioner and private respondent as his heirs aswell as three grandchildren, all with the petitioner. When Hilario died , the cash component of the estate wasdistributed among the heirs. Petitioner did not take any action for the probate of the will. Four years after the

death of Hilario, private respondents file a petition for probate which the petitioner opposed contending thatthe will was made under undue influence.

Petitioner thereafter leased a property bequeathed to one of the private respondent to third persons. Theprobate court then ordered petitioner to deposit the proceeds to the Clerk Of Court. Petitioner the moved for

the release of certain amounts for the payment of real estate taxes which the court granted. Petitioner againmoved for the release of funds but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses ofadministration and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and

deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titlesto respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of first

ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court has the authority to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate

for the support of the testator's grandchildren.

HELD: Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent'sestate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the deceased'sgrandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to

sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlementof his estate.


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RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. vs. NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEEG.R. No. 178933/ SEPTEMBER 16 2009

FACTS: The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio.

After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of

her estate. The case was docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-2629 entitled In Re: Estate of the Late Beatriz D.Silverio, Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. v. Ricardo S. Silverio Jr., e t al. pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of Makati City, Branch 57 (RTC). On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio,

Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On November

22, 2004, Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as

administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator. On January 3, 2005, the RTC

issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while

appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator. On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio -Dee filed a

Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders. Ricardo

Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate

Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority from this Honorable

Court. Then, on May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order[4] affirming its Order dated January 3,

2005 and denying private respondents motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC als o

authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise his duties as administrator

of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio -Dee to vacate the property at No. 3,

Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.

HELD: In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured fromRicardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in

the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May 31, 2005 Orderof the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal. The implication ofsuch improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period for the filing o f a petitionfor certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case. This means that private respondent has

now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.


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BERMUDO VS. TAYAG-ROXAS

G.R. NO. 172879/ FEBRUARY 2 2011

FACTS: Atty. Ricardo Bermudo (Atty. Bermudo), as executor, filed a petition for his appointment as

administrator of the estate of Artemio Hilario (Hilario) and for the allowance and probate of the latter’s will

before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City. The RTC rendered a decision, allowing the will and

recognizing Roxas as Hilario’s sole heir.

When the decision constituting Roxas as the sole heir became final, Atty. Bermudo who also served as

counsel for her in the actions concerning her inheritance filed a motion to fix his legal fees and to constitute

a charging lien against the estate for the legal services he rendered.

RTC granted him fees equivalent to 20% of the estate and constituted the same as lien on the estate’s

property. Roxas appealed the order to the CA in CA-G.R. CV 53143, which adjusted the lawyer’s fees to 20%

of the value of the land belonging to the estate. Atty. Bermudo subsequently filed a motion with the RTC for

execution and appraisal of the estate on which his 20% compensation would be based.

The RTC granted the motion and ordered Roxas to pay Atty. Bermudo P12,644,300.00 as attorney’s fees

with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. Roxas challenged the order before the CA through a petition for

certiorari.

On December 19, 2005, using a different valuation of the land of the estate, the CA ordered Roxas to pay

Atty. Bermudo a reduced amount of P4,234,770.00 as attorney's fees with interest at 6% per annum.

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing Roxas’ special civil action of certiorari when her

remedy should have been an appeal from the settlement of his account as administrator. 2) Whether or not

the CA erred in holding that Atty. Bermudo, as administrator, is entitled to collect attorney’s fees.

HELD: Petition lacks merit.

1) Atty. Bermudo po ints out that Roxas’ remedy for contesting the RTC order of execution against her should

be an ordinary appeal to the CA. He invokes Section 1, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which

enumerates the orders or judgments in special proceedings from which parties may appeal. But the earlier

award in Atty. Bermudo’s favor did not settle his account as administrator. Rather, it fixed his attorney’s fees

for the legal services he rendered in the suit contesting Roxas’ right as sole heir. Consequently, Section 1

(d) of Rule 109 does not apply.

The fixing of such value at P12,644,300.00 was not app ealable since it did not constitute a new judgment butan implementation of a final one. Being an order of execution, it is not appealable. Consequently, Roxas’

remedy in contesting the RTC’s exercise of discretion in ascertaining what constitutes 20% of the value of

the estate’s lands is a spec ial civil action o f certiorari. 2) Roxas asserts that Atty. Bermudo is not entitled to

attorney’s fees but only to compensation as administrator in accordance with Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules

of Court. But Atty. Bermudo did not only serve as administrator of the estate. He also served as Roxas’

counsel in the suit that assailed her right as sole heir. Atty. Bermudo brought the contest all the way up to


22/34


23/34

TAYAG-ROXAS vs. BERMUDOG.R. No. 173364

FACTS: Atty. Ricardo Bermudo, as executor, filed a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate

of Artemio Hilario and for the allowance and probate of the latter’s will before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of Angeles City. The testator instituted Fermina Tayag-Roxas (Roxas) as his only heir but several persons,

who claimed to be Hilario’s relatives, opposed the petition RTC rendered a decision, allowing the will and

recognizing Roxas as Hilario’s sole heir. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision.

This Court sustained the CA decision. When the decision constituting Roxas as the sole heir became final,

Atty. Bermudo who also served as counsel for her in the actions concerning her inheritanc e filed a motion to

fix his legal fees and to constitute a charging lien against the estate for the legal services he rendered. RTC

granted him fees equivalent to 20% of the estate and constituted the same as lien on the estate’s property.

Roxas appealed the order to the CA. CA rendered a decision that modified the RTC Order, limiting Atty.

Bermudo’s compensation as administrator to what Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court provides and

making his lawyer’s fees 20% of the value of the land belonging to the estate. Atty. Bermudo subsequently

filed a motion with the RTC for execution and appraisal of the estate on which his 20% compensation wouldbe based. RTC granted the motion and ordered Roxas to pay Atty. Bermudo P12,644,300.00 as attorney’s

fees with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. Roxas challenged the order before the CA through a petition

for certiorari. Uusing a different valuation of the land of the estate, the CA ordered Roxas to pay Atty. Bermudo

a reduced amount of P4, 234,770.00 as attorney's fees with interest at 6% per annum. Atty. Bermudo’s

motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed a petition for review before this Court in G.R. 172879.

Roxas also filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the CA decision and when this was denied, she filed

a petition for certiorari with this Court in G.R. 173364.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing Roxas’ special civil action of certiorari when her remedyshould have been an appeal from the settlement of his account as administrator;

2. Whether or not the CA erred in hold ing that Atty. Bermudo, as administrator, is entitled to collect attorney’s

fees; and

3. Whether or not the CA erred in reducing Atty. Bermudo’s attorney’s fees from P12,644,300.00 to

P4,234,770.00.

HELD:

1. Atty. Bermudo points out that Roxas’ remedy for contesting the RTC order of execution against her should

be an ordinary appeal to the CA. He invokes Section 1, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court whichenumerates the orders or judgments in special proceedings from which parties may appeal. One of these is

an order or judgment which settles the account of an executor or administrator. The rationale behind this

multi-appeal mode is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a sep arate and distinct issue

is resolved by the court and held to be final. But the earlier award in Atty. Bermudo’s favor did not settle his

account as administrator. Rather, it fixed his attorney’s fees for the legal services he rendered in the suit

contesting Roxas’ right as sole heir. Consequently, Section 1 (d) of Rule 109 does not apply.


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2. Roxas asserts that Atty. Bermudo is not entitled to attorney’s fees but only to compensation as

administrator in accordance with Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court.But Atty. Bermudo did not only

serve as administrator of the estate. He also served as Roxas’ counsel in the suit that assailed her right as

sole heir. Atty. Bermudo brought the contest all the way up to this Court to defend her rights to her uncle’s

estate. And Atty. Bermudo succeeded. Acting as counsel in that suit for Roxas was not part of his duties as

administrator o f the estate. Consequently, it was but just that he is paid his attorney’s fees.

3. Atty. Bermudo assails the CA’s reduction of his attorney’s fees from P12,644,300.00 to P4,234,770.00. In

fixing the higher amount, the RTC relied on the advice of an amicus curiae regarding the value of the lands

belonging to the estate. But the CA found such procedure unwarranted, set aside the RTC’s valuation, and

used the values established by the Angeles City Assessor for computing the lawyer’s fees of Atty. Bermudo.

The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the CA’s ruling. Given their wide experience and the

official nature of their work, the city assessors’ opinions deserve great weight and reliability.4 The Court must

sustain the CA’s computation based on the market values reflected on the schedule proposed by the Angeles

City Assessor.

Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals.


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SALONGA-HERNANDEZ VS PASCUAL

GR 127165/ MAY 2 2006

FACTS: The case actually centers on two estate proceedings, that of Doña Adela Pascual (Doña Adela)

and the other, her husband Don Andres Pascual’s (Don Andres),who predeceased her. Don Andres died

intestate, while Doña Adela left behind a last will and testament.

On 1 December 1973, an intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Don Andres was

commenced by his widow Doña Adela be fore the then Court of First Instance. Apart from his wife, who bore

him no children, Don Andres was survived by several nephews and nieces from his full-blood and half-blood

brothers. This proceeding proved to be the source of many controversies, owing to the attempts of siblings

Olivia and Hermes Pascual, acknowledged natural children of Don Andres’s brother, Eligio, to be recognized

as heirs of Don Andres. Olivia and Hermes Pascual procured the initial support of Doña Adela to their claims.

However, on 16 October 1985, the other heirs of Don Andres entered into a Compromise Agreement over

the objections of Olivia and Hermes Pascual, whereby three-fourths (3/4) of the estate would go to Doña

Adela and one-fourth (1/4) to the other heirs of Don Andres, without prejudice to the final determination bythe court or another compromise agreement as regards the claims of Olivia and Hermes Pascual.

Subsequently, the Intestate Court denied the claims of Olivia and Hermes Pascual. Said denial was

eventually affirmed by this Court in 1992 in Pascual v.Pascual-Bautista, applying Article 992 of the Civil

Code.

Doña Adela died on 18 August 1987, leaving behind a last will and testament executed in 1978, designating

Olivia Pascual as the executrix, as well as the principal beneficiary of her estate. The will also bequeathed

several legacies and devises to several individuals and institutions. Olivia Pascual then engaged the services

of petitioner in connection with the settlement of the estate of Doña Adela. Their agreement as to the

professional fees due to petitioner is contained in a letter dated 25 August 1987, signed by Atty. Esteban

Salonga in behalf of petitioner and Olivia Pascual. It is stipulated therein, among others, that the finalprofessional fee “shall be 3% of the total gross estate as well as the fruits thereof based on the court approved

inventory of the estate. Fruits shall be reckoned from the time of [Olivia Pascual’s] appointment as executrix

of the estate. The 3% final fee shall be payable upon approval by the court of the agreement for the

distribution of the properties to the court designate d heirs of the estate”.

On 26 August 1987, private respondent, represented by petitioner, commenced a petition for the probate of

the last will and testament of Doña Adela. The petition was opposed by a certain Miguel Cornejo, Jr. and his

siblings, who in turn presented a purported will executed in 1985 by Doña Adela in their favor. After due trial,

on 1 July1993, the Probate Court rendered a decis ion allowing probate of the 1978 Last Will and Testament

of Doña Adela and disallowing the purported 1985 Will. Letters testamentary were issued to Olivia Pascual.

On 27 July 1993, petitioner filed a Notice of Attorney’s Lien equivalent to three percent (3%) of the total gross

estate of the late Doña Adela S. Pascual as well as the fruits thereof based on the cou rt approved inventory

of the estate, pursuant to the retainer agreement signed by and between petitioner and Olivia S. Pascual, on

25 August1987. In an Order dated 4 November 1993, the Probate Court ruled that petitioner’s “notice of

attorney’s lien, being fully supported by a retainer’s contract not repudiated nor questioned by his client Olivia

S. Pascual, is hereby noted as a lien that must be satisfied chargeable to the share of Olivia S. Pascual.”


26/34

This was followed by another Order, dated 11 November 1993, wherein it was directed “that notice be x x x

given, requiring all persons having claims for money against the decedent, Doña Adela S. Vda. de Pascual,

arising from contracts, express orimplied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, for funeral

expenses and expenses of the last sickness of the said decedent, and judgment for money against her, to

file said claims with the Clerk of Court at Malabon.

It was at this stage, that the Intestate Court rendered a Decis ion in Sp. Proc. No. 7554, fi nally giving

judicial approval to the aforementioned 1985 Compromise Agreement, and partitioning the estate of Don

Andres by adjudicating one-fourth (1/4)thereof to the heirs of Don Andres and three-fourths (3/4) thereof to

the estate of Doña Adela. The Intestate Court also awarded attorney’s fees to Atty. Jesus I.

Santos, equivalent to 15% of the three-fourths (3/4) share of the estate of Doña Adela. Olivia Pascual filed a

petition for annulment of the award of attorney’s fees with the Court of Appeals, but the same was denied,

first by the appellate court, then finally by this Court in its 1998 decision in Pascual v. Court of Appeals.

On 26 April 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Writ of Execution for the partial execution of petitioner’s

attorney’s lien estimated at P1,198,097.02. The figure, characterized as “tentative,” was arrived at

based on a Motion to Submit Project Partition. This sum was in turn derived from the alleged value of thetotal estate of Don Andres, three-fourths (3/4) of which had been adjudicated to Doña Adela. At the same

time, petitioner noted that the stated values must be considered as only pro visional, considering that they

were based on a July 1988 appraisal report; thus, the c laim for execution was, according to petitioner, without

prejudice to an updated appraisal of the properties comprising the gross estate of Doña Adela.

On 29 April 1994, Olivia Pascual, through Atty. Antonio Ravelo, filed her comment and/or opposition to the

motion for the issuance of a writ of execution on attorney’s fees. She argued that a lawyer o f an administrator

or executor should charge the individual client, not the estate, for professional fees. On 2 June 1994, the

Probate Court issued the first assailed order denying the motion for writ of execution in v iew of the fact that

“the bulk of the estate of the late Doña Adela S. V da. De Pascual is still tied -up with the estate of the late

Don Andres Pascual, the proceedings over which and the final disposition thereof with respect to the partitionand segregation of what is to form part of the estate of the late Doña Adela S. Vda. De Pascual is pending

with another court On 14 November 1994, Olivia Pascual, filed with the Probate Court a Motion to Declare

General Default and Distribution of Testamentary Dispositions with Cancellation of Administrator’s Bond. It

was noted therein that no creditor had filed a claim against the estate of Doña Adela despite due notice

published pursuant to Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The Probate Court was also informed of the

fact that the proceedings before the Intestate Court had already been terminated by reason of the 14 January

1994Decis ion rendered by the latter court. In response, petitioner filed a Comment/Manifestation

praying that an order be issued:

(1) ordering the annotation of the attorney’s lien on the properties comprising the estate of Doña

Adela Pascual;

(2) a writ of partial execution be issued for the satisfaction of the attorney’s lien of the

undersigned counsel [herein petitioner] in relation to the Ongpin and Valenzuela properties for

the amount ofP635,368.14, without prejudice to the issuance of a writ of execution after the re-

appraisal of the present market value of the estate and the determination of the amount due to

[pe titioner] as attorney’s fees;


27/34

(3) ordering the appointment of a reputable appraisal company to re-appraise the present market

value of the estate of Doña Adela Pascual including the fruits thereof for the purpose of determining

the value of the attorney’s fees of [petitioner]; and

(4) after the re-appraisal of the estate of Doña Adela Pascual a writ of execution be issued for the

full satisfaction and settlement of the attorney’s lien of [petitioner].

On 17 March 1995, the Probate Court issued an order which denied petitioner’s motion for a re -

appraisal of the property and the issuance of a partial writ of execution “for being prematurely filed as there

is no exact estate yet to be inventoried and re-appraised, assuming re-appraisal would be proper, because

the bulk of the estate subject of this case, as far as this court is concerned, has not yet been turned over to

the executrix or to the court itself.” Likewise, petitioner filed an appeal at Court of Appeals. However, CA

affirmed RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not a lawyer who renders legal services to the executor or administrator of an estate can

claim attorney's fees against the estate instead of the executor or administrator.

HELD: As a general rule, it is the executor or administrator who is primarily liable for attorney's fees due tothe lawyer who rendered legal services for the executor or administrator in relation to the settlement of

the estate. The executor or administrator may seek reimbursement from the estate for the sums

paid in attorney's fees if it can be shown that the services of the lawyer redounded to the benefit of the estate.

However, if the executor or administrator refuses to pay the attorney's fees, the lawyer has two modes of

recourse. First, the lawyer may file an action against the executor or administrator, but in his/her personal

capacity and not as administrator or executor. Second, the lawyer may file a petition in the testate or intestate

proceedings, asking the court to direct the payment of attorney's fees as an expense of administration. If the

second mode is resorted to, it is essential that notice to all the heirs and interested parties be made so as to

enable these persons to inquire into the value of the services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his

employment.The character of such claim for attorney's it partakes the nature of an administration expense.

Administration expenses include attorney's fees incurred in connection with the administration of

the estate. It is an expense attending the accomplishment of the purpose of administration

growing out of the contract or obligation entered into by the personal representative of the estate, and

thus the claim for reimbursement must be superior to the rights of the beneficiaries.


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BRIONES VS CAGR NO. 159130 AUGUST 22, 2008

FACTS: Respondent Ruby J. Henson filed a petition for the allowance of the will of her late mother, Luz J.Henson, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC ) of Manila. Lilia Henson-Cruz, one of the deceased’s daughters

and also a respondent in this petition, opposed Ruby’s petition. She alleged that Ruby understated the valueof their late mother’s estate and acted with unconscionable bad faith in the management thereof. Lilia prayed

that her mother's holographic will be disallowed and that she be appointed as the Intestate Administratrix.

Lilia subsequently moved for the appointment of an Interim Special Administrator of the estate of her late

mother, praying that the Prudential Bank & Trust Company-Ermita Branch be appointed as Interim Special Administrator. The trial court granted the motion but designated Jose V. Ferro as the Special Administrator. Ferro, however, declined the appointment.

The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones as Special Administrator of the estate. Atty.Briones accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, and started the administration of the estate.

The trial court directed the heirs of Luz J. Henson to turn over the possession of all the properties of thedeceased to the Special Administrator. Atty. Briones moved that the trial court approve Special Administrators

fees of P75,000.00 per month. These fees were in addition to the commission referred to in Section 7, Rule85 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Atty. Briones filed a Special Administrators Report No. 1 which contained an inventory of the properties in hiscustody and a statement of the income received and the disbursements made for the estate. The trial court

issued an Order approving the report.

The heirs of Luz J. Henson submitted a project of partition of the estate for the trial courts approval.

Atty. Briones submitted the Special Administrators Final Report for the approval of the court. He prayed thathe be paid a commission representing eight percent (8%) of the value of the estate under his administration.

But the respondents opposed the approval of the final report and prayed that they be granted an opportunityto examine the documents, vouchers, and receipts mentioned in the statement of income and

disbursements. They likewise asked the trial court to deny the Atty. Briones claim for commission and thathe be ordered to refund the sum ofP134,126.33 to the estate.

The respondents filed an audit request with the trial court. Atty. Briones filed his comment suggesting thatthe audit be done by an independent auditor at the expense of the estate. The trial court granted the requestfor audit and appointed the accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. to conduct the audit.

The respondents moved for the reconsideration of Order for a special administrator. They also clarified thatthey were not asking for an external audit; they merely wanted to be allowed to examine the receipts,

vouchers, bank statements, and other documents in support of the Special Administrators Final Report andto examine the Special Administrator under oath.

Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari , Prohibition,and Mandamus assailing the Order which appointed accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. as auditors and the

Order which reiterated the appointment.


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Prior the filing of the petition for certiorari , the heirs of Luz Henzon filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC

assailing the Order insofar as it directed the payment of Atty. Briones commission. They subsequently filedtheir record on appeal.

The trial court, however, denied the appeal and disapproved the record on appeal on May 23, 2002 on theground of forum shopping. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

On July 26, 2002, the respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus with the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71844. They claimed that the trial court unlawfully refused to comply with its ministerial duty to

approve their seasonably-perfected appeal. They refuted the trial courts finding of forum shopping bydeclaring that the issues in their appeal and in their petition for certiorari are not identical, although bothstemmed from the same Order of April 3, 2002. The appeal involved the payment of the special administrators

commission, while the petition for certiorari assailed the appointment of an a ccounting firm to conduct anexternal audit.

On the other hand, the petitioner insisted that the respondents committed forum shopping when they assailedthe Order of April 3, 2002 twice, i.e., through a special civil action for certiorari and by ordinary appeal. Forumshopping took place because of the identity of the reliefs prayed for in the two cases. The petitioner likewise

posited that the trial courts error, if any, in dismissing the appeal on the ground of forum shopping is an errorof judgment, not of jurisdiction, and hence is not correctible by certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals err in not dismiss ing the respondents petition for mandamus onthe ground of forum shopping?

HELD:No.

THE COURTS RULING We find the petition devoid of merit as the discussions below will show.

An examination of the RTC Order shows that it reso lved three matters, namely:(1)

the designation of the accounting firm of Alba, Romeo & Co. to

conduct an audit of the administration of Atty. George S. Briones ofthe estate of Luz J. Henson, at the expense of the estate;

(2) The payment of the petitioners commission as the estates Special

Administrator; and(3)

The directive to the petitioner to deliver the residue of the estate tothe heirs in their proportional shares. Of these, only the first

two are relevant to the present petition as the third is the ultimatedirective that will close the settlement of estate proceedings.

The first part of the Order (the auditors appointment) was the subject of the petition for certiorari , prohibition,and mandamus that the respondents filed before the appellate court.The test to ascertain whether or not anorder is interlocutory or final is Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the

merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not it is final.


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The terms of the trial courts order with respect to the appointment or designation of the accounting firm isclear: to immediately conduct an audit of the administration by Atty. George S. Briones of the estate of the

late Luz J. Henson, the expenses of which shall be charged against the estate.

To audit, is to examine and verify (as the books of account of a company or a treasurers accounts). An audit

is the formal or official examination and verification of books of account (as for reporting on the financialcondition of a business at a given date or on the results of its operations for a given period). Black’s Law

Dictionary defines it no differently: a systematic inspection of accounting records involving analyses, testsand confirmations; a formal or official examination and authentication of accounts, with witnesses,vouchers, etc .

Given that the subject matter o f the audit is Atty. Briones Final Report in the administration of the estate ofthe decedent, its preparatory character is obvious; it is a prelude to the courts final settlement and distribution

of the properties o f the decedent to the heirs. In the context of what the courts order accomplishes, the courtsdesignation of an auditor does not have the effect of ruling on the pending estate proceeding on its merits(i.e., in terms of finally determining the extent of the net estate of the deceased and distributing it to the heirs)

or on the merits of any independently determinable aspect of the estate proceeding; it is only for purposes ofconfirming the accuracy of the Special Administrators Final Report, particularly of the reported chargesagainst the estate. In other words, the designation of the auditor did not resolve Special Proceedings No. 99-

92870 or any independently determinable issue therein, and left much to be done on the merits o f thecase. Thus, the Order of the RTC is interlocutory in so far as it designated an accounting firm to audit

the petitioners special administration of the estate.

In contrast with the interlocutory character of the auditor’s appointment, the second par t is limited to the

Special Administrators commission which was fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate. To quote from theOrder: the court hereby. . . 2. Suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator except the payment of his commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate. Under these terms, it is

immediately apparent that this pronouncement on an independently determinable issue the specialadministrator’s commission is the courts definite and final word on the ma tter, subject only to whatever ahigher body may decide if an appeal is made from the court’s ruling.

From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrators commission is no less a claim against the

estate than a claim that third parties may make. Section 8, Rule 86 of the Rules recognizes this when itprovides for Claim of Executor or Administrator Against an Estate. Under Section 13 of the same Rule, theaction of the court on a claim against the estate is appealable as in ordinary cases. Hence, by the express

terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent of the Special Administrators commission effectively, aclaim by the special administrator against the estate is the lower courts last word on the matter andone that is appealable.

While the petitioner’s position may be legally correct as a general rule, it is not true in the present caseconsidering the unique nature of the case that gave rise to the present petition. The petitioner is the special

administrator in a settlement of estate,

The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to

proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final. In thismulti-appeal mode, the probate court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter of the appeal but retains


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BRAZA V. CITY CIVIL REGISTRARG.R. NO. 181174 DEC. 4, 2009

FACTS: Ma. Cristina married Pablo in 1978. Out of their union, Pablo Josef, Janelle Ann, and Gian Carlo

were born. When Pablo died in 2002, and his remains were repatriated to the Philippines, Lucille began

introducing Patrick as a son of Pablo. Ma. Cristina’s investigation revealed that Patrick’s Certificate of LiveBirth indicated he was acknowledged by the late Pablo as his child, and a notation in said Certificate of Live

birth states that he was subsequently leg itimated by virtue of the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on April

22, 1998. She was also able to get a copy of the Certificate of Marriage between Pablo and Lucille. Hence,

Ma. Cristina filed an action under Rule 108 to correct the entries in the birth certificate of Patrick with respec t

to his alleged legitimation; the acknowledgment by Pablo; the use of the last name “Braza”; a directive for

Patrick’s guardians to submit him to DNA testing; the declaration of nullity of his legitimation, as well as the

marriage between Pablo and Lucille, averring that Patrcik could not have been legitimated because the

marriage of Pablo and Lucille was bigamous, hence void. On motion to dismiss by Patrick, the trial court

granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice, holding that in a petition for correction of entry,

the trial court, which had no Family Court, had no jurisdiction to annul the marriage between Pablo and

Lucille; impugn the leg itimacy of Patrick; and subject him to DNA testing. Thus, her case should be ventilated

in an ordinary action. Her motion for reconsidertion denied, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with

the Supreme Court, arguing that the court may pass upon the issue of validity of marriage and questions on

legitimacy even in petitions for corrections of entries, and correct substantial errors therein, citing the cases

of Carino vs Carino, Lee vs. Court of Appeals, and Republic vs. Kho.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction to annul the marriage of respondent and impugn legitimacy of

respondent’s child in a petition to correct entries in local civil register

HELD: The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or

Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and ruleon legitimacy and filiation.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry

in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be

used only to correct clerical, spe lling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical

error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a

transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly

misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may

be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process isproperly observed.

The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the

marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in

connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.


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Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s birth records and

that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.

Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s

marriage as void for being b igamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governe d

not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family

Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.

It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be

questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such

as the petition filed before the court a quo.

Petitioners’ reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.

Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return of one-half of the

death benefits received by the first after the death of the husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage

with the husband while the latter’s marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity

of the two marriages, it being essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.

In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions filed by the therein

petitioners before the lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the

petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to establish that

they are not the latter’s children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all

between the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the name

of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners’ mother and the substitution thereof with “Tiu Chuan” who is their

biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding

contemplated under Rule 108.

In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the entries in theirrespective birth records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their citizenship is “Filip ino,” not Chinese,

because their parents were never legally married. Again, considering that the changes sought to be made

were substantial and not merely innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be

adversarial in nature, upheld the lower court’s grant of the petition.

It is thus clear that the facts in the above -cited cases are vastly different from those obtaining in the present

case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.


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LEONOR VS. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. NO. 112597/APRIL 2, 1996

FACTS: Petitioner Virginia A. Leonor was married to private respondent Mauricio D. Leonor, Jr. in San Carlos

City on March 31, 1960 were they got three children namely Mauricio III, Ned and Don. Mauricio became

unfaithful when he resided in Switzerland studying and working while Virginia stayed in the Philippinesworking as a nurse in Laguna. The herein petitioner instituted a civil action in Geneva, Switzerland for

separation and alimony. Private respondent countersued for divorce.

On February 14, 1991, the lower Cantonal Civil Court of Switzerland pronounced the divorce of the spouses

Leonor but reserved the liquidation of the matrimonial partnership. The said Swiss Court denied alimony to

petitioner. Mauricio’s letter to the abovementioned Court raised the issue of the alleged non-existence of his

marriage to Virginia. Meanwhile, Virginia learned that the solemnizing officer in the Philippines failed to send

a copy of their marriage contract to the Civil Registrar of San Carlos. Hence, on July 11, 1991, Virginia applied

for the late registration of her marriage. The Civil Registrar, finding said application in order, granted the

same. Mauricio prompted to file a petition for the cancellation of the late registration of marriage in the civil

registry of San Carlos City with the RTC Branch 59 of the said town with the following grounds: (a) tardiness

of the registration and (b) nullity o f his marriage with Virginia due to non-observance of the legal requirements

for valid marriage. Mauricio’s petition was filed pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: In disposing of a special proceeding under Rule 108, whether or not the trial court have jurisdiction

to declare the marriage null and void and to order the cancellation of its entry in the local civil registry.

HELD: The Rule on its face would appear that the cancellation of any entry regarding marriages in the civil

registry for any reason is authorized by the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose. However, in

doctrine, the only errors that can be cancelled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical errors,

not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. Where the effect of a correction in

civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and his/her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the

same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial proceeding.

The substantial alterations, such as those affecting the status and citizenship of a person in the Civil Registry

Records, cannot be ordered by the Court unless threshed out in an appropriate action. Further, all parties

who may be affected by the entries should be notified or represented (Rule 108, Rules of Court), and that

the summary proceedings under 412 of the Civil Code only justify an order to correct innocuous or clerical

errors, such as misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding

or generally called clerical errors.

Wherefore, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Art. 412 of the Civil Code,

cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia’s civil status from married to single and of their threechildren from legitimate to illegitimate. Neither does the trial court, under said Rule, have any jurisdiction to

declare their marriage null and void and as a result thereof, to order the local civil registrar to cancel the

marriage entry in the civil registry.

2. specpro case digest 2.pdf

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