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Soviet Union: A Country Study

Force Projection on the Periphery

The Soviet armed forces have exercised their "external function" mainly on the periphery of the Soviet Union. They occupiedeastern Poland in 1939 and annexed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940 (see Prelude to War, ch. 2). Subsequently, during WorldWar II they "liberated" Eastern Europe from German rule andthen incorporated it into a bloc of socialist states (see Appendix C).

The Soviet Union managed to turn these territories into an outpost of socialism, as well as into a defensive buffer against an invasion from the West. This buffer became increasingly v~uable

to the Soviet Union both as an extension of Soviet air defenses tothe end of the Soviet defense perimeter and as a potential springboard for an offensive against NATO.

In 1956 the Soviet Union set a precedent for military intervention "in defense of socialism" when it suppressed the uprising thatthreatened communist rule in Hungary. In August 1968, the SovietUnion again intervened militarily in Eastern Europe when it invaded Czechoslovakia in response to the Czechoslovak reformmovement begun in the spring. The invasion later was justifiedon the basis of the doctrine of "limited sovereignty" of socialiststates. Also known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, the doctrine was firstenunciated on September 21, 1968, in a Pravda editorial, to justifythe invasion. Because Czechoslovakia and Hungary lie on the Sovietdefense perimeter, national security considerations, in addition toideological and political concerns, undoubtedly played a part inthe Soviet decision to intervene.

The December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan was another casein which doctrinal concerns and interests of state security coalesced(see Asia, ch. 10). Although nominally nonaligned, Afghanistanwas, according to Soviet arguments, well on its way to socialismin 1979, and a reversal was unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Inaddition, because Afghanistan borders the Soviet Union, Sovietleaders sought to prevent it from aligning itself with the West orfrom becoming an Islamic republic allied to Ayatollah SayyidRuhollah Musavi Khomeini's Iran. The invasion, although "correct" according to Soviet ideological criteria, plunged the SovietUnion into one of the longest local wars (see Glossary) it had everfought, second only to the 1939-40 Soviet-Finnish War, in whichover 100,000 Soviet troops died. In 1988 the Soviet leadershipdeclared that it would negotiate a troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and seek a political settlement. On April 14, 1988, Sovietforeign minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze signed an agreement inGeneva providing for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989.

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Missile cruiser SlavaCourtesy United States Navy

The invasion of Afghanistan tarnished the Soviet image abroad,where the invasion was perceived and condemned as an act of aggression. Some Western analysts regarded it as an unprecedentedextension of the Brezhnev Doctrine of "socialist internationalism"to a country that was nonaligned and thus not part of the worldsocialist system (see Glossary). A majority vote in the United Nations (UN) censured the invasion as a flagrant intervention in theinternal affairs of a sovereign state. Soviet leaders hoped that the1988 Geneva agreement, which stipulated a unilateral withdrawalof Soviet forces, would placate world opinion and repair the political damage done by the war.

The only benefit that the Soviet Union appeared to have derivedfrom the war in Afghanistan was the use of Afghan territory totrain Soviet troops to fight in mountainous terrain and to test Sovietweapons. However, Soviet concepts ofoffense and combined arms,and Soviet troops and weapons, fared poorly in the difficult mountain terrain. Tanks were of little use in ground combat in narrowmountain passes. The Soviet military learned that helicopters wereof greater importance in the mountains because helicopters couldcarry out air attacks and could land troops on enemy territory. TheSoviet military also found that the enemy's surface-to-air missilesposed a grave threat to attacking Soviet aircraft. Thus, the Soviet

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Union probably decided to withdraw from Afghanistan not onlyfor political but also for military reasons.

Military Presence in the Third World

The Soviet Union has sought to restructure international relations and to achieve a world socialist system largely through political influence; however, it has not reneged on the promise ofmilitaryaid for revolutionary movements in the Third World under theprinciple of "proletarian internationalism" (see Glossary). Sovietleaders reaffirmed this principle in the 1986 party program (seeGlossary) of the CPSU. Yet the Soviet Union has also sought toadvance Soviet state interests by gaining a military foothold in strategically important areas of the Third World.

Because of the dual and often contradictory nature of Soviet objectives in the Third World, the Soviet military has had successesand failures in its dealings with it. Two large-scale, successful Sovietsupported interventions took place, in Angola in 1975 and in Ethiopia in 1977. In both places the Soviet Union provided arms andmilitary advisers and used Cuban troops to help pro-Soviet elements consolidate power. By contrast, in 1976 the Soviet Unionsuffered a reversal in Egypt where, after years of massive militaryassistance, the Egyptian government asked Soviet advisers to leave,canceled access for the Soviet Naval Forces, and abrogated theTreaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Similarly, Somalia, once the most important Soviet client in sub-SaharanAfrica, abrogated its friendship treaty in 1977 because of the Soviettilt toward Ethiopia and denied use of naval facilities at Berberato the Soviet Naval Forces. In the 1980s, combating "counterrevolution" in the Third World was not an unqualified success for theSoviet military, which, for political reasons, had shunned directintervention in countries far from Soviet borders. In the 1980s,Soviet military aid to allied regimes in Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, and Cambodia was unable to rid these beleaguered Marxistregimes of "counterrevolutionary" resistance forces.

The Soviet Union has long been the world's major supplier ofmilitary advisory assistance. According to the United States government, in 1986 about 21,000 Soviet and East European military advisers (most of whom were Soviet advisers) were stationed in ThirdWorld countries, including about 8,000 in Africa, almost 6,000in the Middle East, and about 3,000 in Afghanistan. The SovietUnion has also used military "proxies," or allied forces, to substitute for or buttress Soviet military advisers serving in Third Worldcountries. Advisers and combatants from Cuba, Vietnam, theDemocratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), the People's

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Military Doctrine and Strategic Concerns

Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), and EasternEurope-particularly the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and Bulgaria-have been used in various Third World countries, such as Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique.

Despite ideological setbacks, the Soviet Union has derived considerable military-strategic advantage by establishing bases andnaval access in the Third World. In the 1980s, facilities were available to the Soviet Union at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, Aden andthe island of Socotra in South Yemen, Massawa and the island ofDahlak in Ethiopia, Luanda in Angola, and Maputo in Mozambique. Part of a worldwide Soviet military support structure, suchinstallations increased Soviet influence in the Third World. American analyst Alex Alexiev has argued that Soviet arms deliveriesto certain countries have actually been attempts to pre-position warmateriel in case of global war. Alexiev believed such pre-positioningto have taken place in Libya, where Soviet deliveries increased thenumber of tanks and armored personnel carriers from 175 in 1971to 4,400 in 1983. Similarly, South Yemen had 50 tanks and noarmored personnel carriers in 1975, while in 1982, after Soviet shipments, it had 450 modem tanks and 300 armored personnel carriers.

In 1989 Soviet global military initiative appeared to be on hold.On the one hand, Gorbachev declared his' 'solidarity with the forcesof national liberation and social emancipation" throughout theglobe. On the other hand, his "new thinking" in foreign and military policy deemphasized "military-technical solutions" to theworld's problems and seemed to promise fewer Soviet military forays into the Third World and less interference in the internal affairs of socialist allies. Many Western observers believed thatGorbachev wanted to replace emphasis on Soviet military powerwith an approach that combined economic, political, and militaryinstruments of power.

Arms Control and Military ObjectivesSince the late 1960s, the Soviet Union has made arms control

an important component of its foreign and military policy. Sovietpublic diplomacy liberally used arms control and disarmament slogans. Arms control proposals and signed agreements, however, havebeen carefully coordinated with doctrinal requirements and weaponsprograms.

Soviet objectives in all areas of arms control-strategic, space,intermediate-range nuclear, and conventional weapons-have been,first, to help avert a world war, and, second, to prevent the erosion of Soviet capability for fighting such a war. If efforts to avertwar were to fail, Soviet leaders required that their armed forces

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be able to fulfIll military missions and win all military conflicts.War was to be avoided by entering into agreements that wouldlimit an adversary's weapons and forestall the adversary's development of a war-winning military posture. Capability for fightingand winning a war was to be continued by acquiring the necessary arsenal within the constraints of an agreement and by maintaining it against all odds.

Strategic Arms ControlStrategic arms control imposes limitations or stipulates reduc

tions in the numbers of Soviet and United States intercontinentalnuclear weapons that are capable of reaching each other's homelands. Weapons limited have included ICBMs, SLBMs, bombersarmed with nuclear bombs and cruise missiles, and antiballisticmissile systems. Motivated by its desire to avert a nuclear war andto be prepared to fight one, the Soviet Union has sought strategicarms control agreements that would limit United States nuclearcapabilities for intercontinental attack but would permit the SovietUnion to amass a strategic arsenal for fighting and winning anuclear war.

Averting a World War

According to the worst-case scenario, still accepted by Soviet planners in 1989, a world nuclear war could start with a disarming firststrike on the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear weapons and on itsstrategic command and control centers (see Military Art, this ch.).An arms control agreement that is advantageous to the Soviet Unionwould help deter such a calamity by constraining the strategic forcesofthe United States and denying it the weapons needed to executea strategic attack with impunity.

Before agreeing to limit its strategic forces, the Soviet Unionwanted at least numerical equality with the United States. Whenarms control was first discussed in the early 1960s, under no circumstances were Soviet leaders willing to settle for a "minimumdeterrent." For example, when President Lyndon B. Johnson proposed in January 1964 to freeze both Soviet and United States strategic missiles at existing levels, the Soviet Union refused becausethe "freeze" would have codified their strategic inferiority. Yetin 1969, after the Soviet Union began to deploy the third generation ofICBMs (the SS-9, SS-l1, and SS-13) and was developingthe fourth generation (the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19), it agreedto hold the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT-see Glossary)with the United States. In 1972 the negotiations resulted in thesigning ofthe Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) and of

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the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic OffensiveArms. Essentially, both agreements froze the deployment of strategic defensive and offensive armaments.

Because the Soviet Union wanted to continue the buildup of itsstrategic offensive forces, it accepted the offensive arms limitationgrudgingly. Its main motive in signing the agreements resultingfrom the first series of SALT negotiations, known as SALT I, wasto prevent the United States from deploying an effective defenseagainst ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union clearly preferred a vulnerable adversary that would be deterred from striking by theprospect ofmassive Soviet retaliation on the adversary's unprotectedweapons, economy, and population.

Retaining a Capability to Fight and to Win

In addition to deterring a nuclear world war, Soviet strategicforces were expected to fight it and to win it. SALT I was acceptable to the Soviet military not only because it made war less likelybut also because the Soviet military would have the capability tocarry out its intercontinental strike mission even in a worst-casescenario. By limiting defensive systems to one installation in eachcountry, the ABM Treaty guaranteed that Soviet missiles couldsuccessfully penetrate United States airspace.

Because SALT I limited the number of ballistic missile launchers but not the number of warheads, the Soviet Union was ableto increase its intercontinental missile arsenal. It used new technologies to equip its land- and sea-based strategic missiles with several warheads, known as multiple independently targetable reentryvehicles (MIRVs). The Soviet military also greatly improved theaccuracies of its missiles, especially the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs.

In 1979, when President Jimmy Carter and General SecretaryLeonid Brezhnev signed the second SALT agreement in Vienna,the Soviet Union had 5,000 warheads on its strategic missiles, anincrease of 2,500 since 1972. By 1986 the number of Soviet strategic warheads exceeded 10,000. Thus neither of the SALT agreements significantly constrained Soviet nuclear modernization andthe growth of the Soviet arsenal, whose ultimate aim was to holdat risk the vulnerable United States force of land-based Minuteman III missiles.

Soviet leaders objected to United States proposals in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), a new round of talks toreduce nuclear arsenals, that began in June 1982, because, if accepted, such proposals would have cut in half the number of SovietICBMs, their principal war-fighting component. In the mid-1980s,when it began deploying the fifth generation ofICBMs (the mobile

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SS-24 and SS-25 missiles, to assume part of the SS-18 mission),the Soviet Union began to show interest in reducing the numberof its heavy SS-18 missiles. Since their deployment in 1974, theUnited States had viewed the SS-18s as the most threatening anddestabilizing component of the Soviet arsenal. In 1989 the Sovietleaders continued to link reduction of the SS-18s to severe restrictions on the testing of SDI. First unveiled by President Ronald W.Reagan in March 1983, SDI promised to yield advanced technologies for a North American antimissile shield. Should SDI provefeasible, it could render Soviet nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, according to some Western specialists.

This prospect alarmed the Soviet military because such a shieldcould prevent it from attaining its two most important military objectives: avoiding wars and being prepared to fight them. In 1989the Soviet Union appeared willing to agree to deep cuts in its offensive weapons in order to derail SDI or at least to force the UnitedStates to ban SDI-related tests in space for a minimum often years.

Objectives in SpaceSoviet interest in space, both for peaceful and for military use,

has been intense since the 1950s. During talks on limiting the military use of space, Soviet negotiators have tried to block development of defensive and offensive United States space systems. Atthe same time, the Soviet Union has conducted extensive researchin military space-based technologies.

Negotiations

Attempts to limit the military use of space began soon after theSoviet Union rejected President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1958proposal to prohibit all military activity in space. The rejection wasunderstandable because the Soviet Union had just launched thefirst artificial earth satellite, Sputnik, and was interested in deployingmilitary reconnaissance satellites. In 1963, however, the SovietUnion signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty with the United Statesand Britain, prohibiting the explosion of nuclear weapons in theatmosphere, and in 1967 it became party to the Outer Space Treaty,which banned the deployment of nuclear weapons in earth orbitand on celestial bodies.

In March 1977, President Carter, concerned about Sovietresumption of antisatellite tests, called for talks about banning antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. Although the United States pressed fora comprehensive ban on such systems, the Soviet Union was unwilling to dismantle its operational ASAT in view of the heavy andstill growing United States dependence on reconnaissance satellites.

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After three rounds of negotiations, the talks were suspended inDecember 1979 after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.

In international and bilateral forums, the Soviet Union tried toderail advanced space defense plans. In 1981,1983, and 1984, theSoviet Union, anxious to prevent deployment of a United Statesballistic missile defense system in space, submitted three separatedraft treaties to the United Nations. Each treaty proposed to banweapons stationed in orbit and intended to strike targets on earth,in the air, and in space. The treaties would have blocked the development of a space-based ABM system and precluded militaryuse of vehicles like the space shuttle. In March 1985, bilateral talkson space and space weapons limitations between the United Statesand the Soviet Union opened in Geneva. In early 1989, the SovietUnion had not achieved its principal objective in the talks-to derail SDI.

Soviet Space Weapons Development

Since the Sputnik launch in 1957, the military potential of spacehas fascinated Soviet leaders. The 1962 and 1963 editions ofSokolovskii's Military Strategy advocated development of a militarycapability in space. In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union developedthe fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS)-a nucleararmed space weapon with a depressed trajectory. The 1967 OuterSpace Treaty neutralized the FOBS threat, but the Soviet Unionretained an interest in undertaking offensive missions in space aspart of its combined arms concept. In 1971 it acquired a groundbased orbital' ASAT interceptor, the stated purpose of which wasdefensive but which could also attack satellites in near-earth orbit.The Soviet Union developed a variety of satellites that in 1989 werecapable of reconnaissance, missile-launch detection, attack warning, command and control, and antisatellite functions. The SovietUnion also had impressive manned space programs with militaryimplications, mostly aboard the Saliut and Mir space stations. Inaddition, by 1989 the Soviet Union had explored advanced spaceweapons, both defensive and offensive, using lasers, particle beams,radio frequencies, and kinetic energy. Although Soviet negotiators at the Geneva space talks portrayed Soviet space efforts aspeaceful, in the late 1980s Soviet scientists and military strategistscontinued to study space in their search for new weapons and military options.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Arms Control

Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) are nuclear weaponssystems with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. They could

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be used in a theater operation either at the outset of hostilities orafter nuclear escalation on the battlefield. INF arms control became a Soviet concern in the 1980s, when United States nuclearmissiles were deployed in Western Europe to offset new Soviet INFdeployments on Soviet territory. Although the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) led to the dismantlingof the most threatening, longer-range INF missiles, capable of hitting Soviet territory, Soviet strategists viewed complete denuclearization of Europe as the most desirable end of INF arms control.

Threat Reduction

Since the 1950s, the Soviet Union has viewed United Statesnuclear weapons deployed in Europe and capable of striking theSoviet Union as being particularly threatening. The Soviet military first formulated its preemptive nuclear strategy in the 1950sto neutralize the threat of United States strategic bombers armedwith nuclear weapons and stationed in Europe. In 1979 NATOdecided to offset Soviet deployments of the new intermediate-rangeSS-20 missiles by deploying new United States nuclear systemsin Western Europe. These systems-l08 Pershing II missiles and464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs)-could reach Sovietterritory. The Soviet military regarded both systems as a gravethreat because of their high accuracy and because of the PershingII's short flying time (under ten minutes). The Soviet Union asserted that both the Pershing lIs and the hard-to-detect GLCMscould make a surprise strike against the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union tried both antinuclear propaganda and negotiations to forestall the NATO deployments. Formal negotiationsbegan in November 1981, at which time the United States proposedthe" global zero option," banning or eliminating all United Statesand Soviet longer-range intermediate nuclear forces (LRINF), including Soviet SS-4s, SS-5s, and SS-20s, and the United StatesPershing lIs and GLCMs. The Soviet Union rejected the "globalzero option" and insisted on including the British and Frenchnuclear components in INF reductions.

In October 1986, at the Reykjavik Summit, the Soviet Unionceased insisting on including British and French weapons in anINF agreement. Nevertheless, it attempted to link an INF agreement to strategic arms reductions and to the renunciation of SDI.Only after Soviet negotiators abandoned all linkages and agreedto destroy all Soviet longer-range and shorter-range INF in Europe and Asia and to permit on-site inspection were they able toachieve their goal: the eventual removal of the Pershing lIs andGLCMs that are capable of reaching Soviet territory.

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The INF Treaty, signed on December 8,1987, in Washingtonby President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, stipulated that each party would eliminate all of its intermediate-range missiles and their launchers. These missiles included Soviet SS-4, SS-5,SS-20 longer-range INF (with ranges between 1,000 and 5,500kilometers), and SS-12 and SS-23 shorter-range missiles (withranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometers). The treaty called forthe destruction of about 2,700 United States and Soviet missiles.

Denuclearization of Europe

SinCe the 1950s, Soviet leaders have sought complete removalof nuclear weapons from Western Europe. Stripping Europe ofnuclear weapons not only would reduce the nuclear threat on theSoviet periphery but also would make easier a Soviet conventional offensive in Europe. In 1988, even before the INF agreementhad been ratified by the United States Senate, Soviet spokesmenwere advocating removal ofall nuclear weapons from Europe. Theyespecially focused on NATO's tactical nuclear weapons arsenal,deployed mainly in the Federal Republic of Germany (WestGermany).

In late 1987, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze asserted that onINF agreement was a step toward denuclearization and that its signing proved that "the Soviet Union and the United States have finally spoken together the first word in a nuclear-free vocabulary. "Soviet and Soviet-sponsored denuclearization initiatives in Europehave included several proposals for a nuclear-weapon-free corridorin Central Europe (submitted between 1956 and 1987 by the SovietUnion, Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia), as well asfor nuclear-weapon-free zones in Northern Europe, the Balkans,and the Mediterranean. If such zones were established, the UnitedStates and NATO would have to withdraw nuclear weapons notonly from Europe but also from the surrounding seas.

Conventional Arms Control

For many years, the Soviet Union could not reconcile conventional arms control with its military objectives of avoiding warsand being prepared to fight them. Soviet operational concepts havecalled for numerical superiority in conventional forces both to deterthe adversary from starting a war and to destroy the adversary'sforces and armaments and occupy its territory should a war breakout. Yet deep reductions in Soviet armed forces have a precedent:Khrushchev reduced conventional forces by more than 2.1 million personnel between 1955 and 1958, and he announced furtherreductions of 1.2 million troops in 1960.

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Since Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, the Soviet military hasfrowned on personnel reductions. In the 1960s, when United Statessecretary of state William Rogers suggested negotiations to reducearmed forces in Europe, the Soviet leaders resisted bitterly. Theyfinally agreed to negotiate in exchange for United States participation in a European security conference. The Mutual BalancedForces Reduction (MBFR) talks began in 1973 but remainedstalemated for years. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Sovietconventional buildup in Europe progressed. Soviet leaders showedinterest in the talks only in December 1975, when the Westernproposal included a reduction in United States tactical nuclearweapons in Europe.

In 1987 the Soviet Union called for a new forum to discuss thebalance of conventional forces in Europe' 'from the Atlantic to theUrals." Soviet leaders appeared to espouse the new Soviet strategic concepts of "reasonable sufficiency" and nonprovocativedefense, and they maintained that reductions in conventional forcesshould make it impossible for either side to undertake offensive actions and launch surprise strikes. However, the Soviet militaryresisted a defensive concept because deep cuts in personnel andarmaments such as tanks could prevent Soviet forces from pursuing their military objectives under the doctrine calling for victory.

In December 1988, Gorbachev announced unilateral reductionsin Soviet armed forces. Soviet forces were to be reduced by 500,000men by 1991. Soviet forces in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area wereto be reduced by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces, and 800 combat aircraft. Several Soviet tank divisions were to be withdrawnfrom Eastern Europe, together with assault-landing and assaultriver-crossing units. Soviet and East European divisions were tobe reorganized, with a major cutback in the number of tanks.During 1988 and 1989, the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries also announced unilateral reductions in manpower and conventional armaments.

In 1989 the Soviet leadership appeared to be interested innegotiating seriously on conventional arms control in order toreduce the threat of new Western weapons and operational concepts, to create a "breathing space" for internal economic and social restructuring, and to divert manpower and resources to thecountry's economy. New negotiations on Conventional Forces inEurope (CFE) opened in March 1989. Both Warsaw Pact andNATO negotiators expressed interest in stabilizing the strategicsituation in Europe by eliminating capabilities for initiating surprise attacks and large-scale offensive actions.

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Although Gorbachev proclaimed his commitment to a doctrinethat emphasized war avoidance, diplomacy, and the achievementof political goals with political means, the Soviet military continuedto press for high-quality military capabilities, commensurate withperceived present and future threats to Soviet national security. Soviet military authorities endorsed Gorbachev'sarms control efforts as well as the concepts of parity and "reasonablesufficiency." Nevertheless, they supported Gorbachev's pragmaticpolicies largely in the hope that a renewed economy would helpcreate a modern industrial base. Such a base, they believed, wouldmake it possible not merely to counter Western emerging technologies but also to produce fundamentally new weapons for thetwenty-first century.

A transformation of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact, as proposed by Soviet leaders in 1989, would necessitate that both sidesadopt a defensive, no-victory doctrine, stressing negotiations andrestoration of the status quo. On the Soviet side, this would callfor rejecting or circumventing Marxist-Leninist dogma and forrevising political goals. Only then could the rewriting of Soviet military art yield a strategy, operational art, and tactics based ongenuinely defensive principles, excluding deep offensive operations,massive counteroffensives, and the requisite capabilities. In 1989,however, Soviet military doctrine still bore the burden of MarxistLeninist revolutionary ideology predicting the eventual worldwideascendancy of socialism.

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Most original sources on Soviet military doctrine, policy, andstrategy are available only in Russian. However, a good introduction to Soviet military thought, The Soviet Art of War, edited byHarriet F. Scott and William F. Scott, is a judicious combinationof the editors' commentaries and of excerpts from translated writings of Soviet military authorities. Paul D. Kelley's Soviet GeneralDoctrinefor War, a 1987 publication ofthe United States Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (USAITAC), contains adetailed treatment of Soviet military doctrine and military science.Students of Soviet tactics should also consider William P. Baxter'sThe Soviet Way of Waifare, in which the author discusses the offensive and defensive options of Soviet tactical combat. MichaelMccGwire's Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy offers a comprehensive overview of Soviet strategic and military objectives andof Soviet operational planning. Finally, the annual Department of

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Defense publication Soviet Military Power presents the official UnitedStates Department of Defense view of Soviet military developments.

For the reader who would like to study Soviet military thought,the United States Air Force series of translations of Soviet military monographs is invaluable. Among the most illuminating andthought-provoking in the series are the 1972 translation ofthe 1968classic, Marxism-Leninism on War and the AfflVI, and the controversial Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics by V.E. Savkin.Although the heavy emphasis on nuclear weapons in both worksappeared outdated in the 1980s, the doctrinal tenets and many ofthe strategic and operational concepts remained valid. ScientificTechnical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs, edited by N.A.Lomov and published in 1973, is an important reminder thatnuclear weapons were only a stage in the technological revolutionand that other revolutionary developments may follow. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

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Chapter 18. Armed Forces andDefense Organization

Facets of the armed forces

IN 1988 THE ARMED FORCES of the Soviet Union celebratedtheir seventieth anniversary. As old as the Soviet state, they havebeen highly integrated into its political, economic, and social systems. The missions of the Soviet armed forces were to defend theSoviet Union and its socialist (see Glossary) allies, to ensure favorable conditions for the development of the world socialist system(see Glossary), and to assist the national liberation movementsaround the world. The armed forces have defended communist parties that dominated Soviet-allied socialist countries as well as theSoviet Union. They also have projected military power abroad tohelp pro-Soviet forces gain or maintain political power. Thus, thearmed forces have provided the military might that is the basis ofthe Soviet Union's claim to be a superpower with global interests.To ensure that the military pursues these largely political objectives, the Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union (CPSU) controlledthe armed forces through a combination of political indoctrination,co-optation, and party supervision at every level.

The Soviet armed forces, the world's largest military establishment, in 1989 had nearly 6 million troops in uniform. The armedforces had five armed services rather than the standard army, navy,and air force organizations found in most of the world's armedforces. In their official order of importance, the Soviet armed services were the Strategic Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, Air Forces,Air Defense Forces, and Naval Forces. The Soviet armed forcesalso included two paramilitary forces, the Internal Troops and theBorder Troops.

The Soviet Union has always been a militarized state. One-fourthof the entire Soviet population in 1989 was engaged in militaryactivities, whether active duty, military production, or civilian military training. Yet the sheer size of the armed forces has not translated directly into combat power. Manpower, training, logistics,equipment, and economic problems combined to limit the operational effectiveness of Soviet forces. Many servicemen were assignednonmilitary duties that in many other countries were performedby civilians.

Organizational Development and Combat ExperienceImmediately after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the Bolshe

viks (see Glossary) merged their 20,000-man army, the Red Guards,with 200,000 Baltic Fleet sailors and Petrograd garrison soldiers

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who supported the Bolsheviks. Bolshevik leader Vladimir 1. Lenindecreed the establishment of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Armyon January 28, 1918, and Leon Trotsky was the first commissarof war. The Bolsheviks recognized the importance of building anarmy under their control; without a loyal army, the Bolshevik organization itself would have been unable to hold the power it hadseized.

The early Red Army was egalitarian but poorly disciplined. TheBolsheviks considered military ranks and saluting to be bourgeoiscustoms and abolished them. Soldiers elected their own leaders andvoted on which orders to follow. This arrangement was abolished,however, under pressure of the Civil War (1918-21), and rankswere reinstated (see Civil War and War Communism, ch. 2).

Because most professional officers had joined the anti-Bolshevik,or White, forces, the Red Army initially faced a shortage of experienced military leaders. To remedy this situation, the Bolsheviks recruited 50,000 former Imperial Army officers to commandthe Red Army. At the same time, they attached political commissars to Red Army units to monitor the actions of professional commanders and their allegiance to the Russian Communist Party(Bolshevik), the name of the Bolshevik organization as of March1918. By 1921 the Red Army had defeated four White armies andheld off five armed, foreign contingents that had intervened in theCivil War.

After the Civil War, the Red Army became an increasinglyprofessional military organization. With most of its 5 million soldiersdemobilized, the Red Army was transformed into a small regularforce, and territorial militias were created for wartime mobilization. Soviet military schools, established during the Civil War,began to graduate large numbers of trained officers loyal to theparty. In an effort to increase the prestige of the military profession, the party downgraded political commissars, established theprinciple of one-man command, and reestablished formal militaryranks.

During the 1930s, Soviet leaderjoseph V. Stalin's five-year plansand industrialization drive built the productive base necessary tomodernize the Red Army. As the likelihood of war in Europe increased later in the decade, the Soviet Union tripled its militaryexpenditures and doubled the size of its regular forces to matchthe power of its potential enemies. In 1937, however, Stalin purgedthe Red Army and deprived it of its best military leaders (see ThePeriod of the Purges, ch. 2). Fearing or imagining that the military posed a challenge to his rule, Stalin jailed or executed an estimated 30,000 Red Army officers, including three of five marshals

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and 90 percent of all field grade officers. Stalin also restored theformer dual command authority of political commissars in RedArmy units. These actions were to severely impair the Red Army'scapabilities in the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-40 and in WorldWar II.

After occupying the Baltic states and eastern Poland under theterms of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1939, the SovietUnion demanded territorial concessions from Finland in late 1939(see Foreign Policy, 1928-39, ch. 2). When the Finnish government refused, the Red Army invaded Finland. The resulting warwas a disaster for the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Unionhas not published casualty statistics, about 100,000 Red Armytroops are believed to have died in the process of overcoming thesmall, poorly equipped Finnish army.

The Red Army had little time to correct its numerous deficiencies before Adolf Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa, which began his war against the Soviet Union, on June 22, 1941. At thebeginning of the Great Patriotic War (see Glossary), the Red Armywas forced to retreat, trading territory for time. But it managedto halt the Wehrmacht's blitzkrieg in December 1941 at the gatesof Moscow. In 1942 the Wehnnacht launched a new offensivethrough the Volga region aimed at seizing Soviet oil resources inthe Caucasus. At this critical moment, Stalin reinstituted one-mancommand and gave his field commanders more operational independence. The Red Army encircled and destroyed Gennan forcesin the city of Stalingrad in a battle that ended in February 1943.In the summer of 1943, the Red Army seized tfie strategic initiative, ·and it liberated all Soviet territory from German occupationduring 1944. After having driven the German army out of EasternEurope, in May 1945 the Red Anny launched the final assault onBerlin that ended the Great Patriotic War. The Red Anny emergedfrom the war as the most powerful land army in history. (Afterthe war, the army was known as the Soviet army.) The defeat ofthe Wehrmacht had come, however, at the cost of 7 million military and 13 million civilian deaths among the Soviet population.

From the late 1940s to the late 1960s, the Soviet armed forcesfocused on adapting to the changed nature of warfare in the eraof nuclear anns and achieving parity with the United States in strategic nuclear weapons. Conventional military power showed its continued importance, however, when the Soviet Union used its troopsto invade Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to keepthese countries within the Soviet alliance system (see Appendix C).In the 1970s, the Soviet Union began to modernize its conventionalwarfare and power projection capabilities. At the same time, it

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became more involved in regional conflicts or local wars (see Glossary) than ever before. The Soviet Union supplied arms and sentmilitary advisers to a variety of Third World allies in Africa, Asia,.and the Middle East. Soviet generals planned military operationsagainst rebels in Angola and Ethiopia. Soviet troops, however, sawlittle combat action until the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. They fought a counterinsurgency against the Afghanrebels, or mujahidin, for nearly eight and one-half years. An estimated 15,000 Soviet soldiers had been killed and 35,000 woundedin the conflict by the time Soviet forces began to withdraw fromAfghanistan in May 1988. All 110,000 Soviet troops deployed inAfghanistan had been withdrawn by February 1989, according toSoviet authorities.

Strategic Leadership of the Armed ForcesFour main organizations controlled the Soviet armed forces. The

Defense Council, which included the highest party and militaryofficials in the Soviet Union, was the supreme decision-making bodyon national security issues. The Main Military Council, the Ministry of Defense, and the General Staff were strictly military organizations.

Defense CouncilThe Soviet Constitution states that the Presidium of the Supreme

Soviet forms the Defense Council. First mentioned by the Sovietpress in 1976, the Defense Council has been the organ throughwhich the CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet, and theCouncil of Ministers supposedly exercised supreme leadership ofthe armed forces and national defense. In reality, these bodies carried out the Defense Council's decisions on issues concerning thearmed forces and national defense.

The general secretary of the CPSU has normally been the chairman of the Defense Council and the only member of the DefenseCouncil identified in the Soviet media. As chairman of the DefenseCouncil, the general secretary has also been the supreme commander in chief of the Soviet armed forces. The chairman of theCouncil of Ministers, the chairman of the Committee for State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti-KGB), the ministerof internal affairs, the minister of foreign affairs, and the ministerof defense have also probably served as members of the DefenseCouncil. Their official duties have enabled them to implement decisions reached in the Defense Council. The Defense Council hasbeen described as a working group of the Politburo, and its decisions

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have probably been subject to ratification by a vote in a full meeting of the Politburo.

The Defense Council has made decisions on political-militaryand military-economic issues, using analyses and recommendationsit received from the Main Military Council, the Ministry ofDefense, and the General Staff. The Defense Council, accordingto some Western authorities, would approve changes in militarydoctrine and strategy, large operations, the commitment oftroopsabroad, and the use of nuclear weapons. It has decided on majorchanges in the organizational structure of the armed services andthe appointment or dismissal of high-ranking officers. In addition,the Defense Council has been the highest link between the economy and the military, which were also intertwined at lower levels.The Defense Council has determined the size of the military budget.It has approved new weapons systems and coordinated the activities of the Ministry of Defense with those of ministries and statecommittees engaged in military research, development, and production.

Main Military CouncilThe Main Military Council was made up of the top leadership

of the Ministry of Defense. The minister of defense was its chairman. The three first deputy ministers of defense, the eleven deputyministers of defense, and the chief of the Main Political Directorateof the Soviet Army and Navy were members of the Main MilitaryCouncil.

In peacetime the Main Military Council has been responsiblefor the training, readiness status, and mobilization of the armedforces. It coordinated the activities of the five armed services andresolved interservice disputes over the allocation of roles and missions, material resources, and manpower. The Main MilitaryCouncil also presented the Defense Council with the economic andbudgetary requirements of the armed forces, based on the forcestructure proposed by the General Staff and the armed services.

In wartime the Main Military Council would become the headquarters (stavka) of the Supreme High Command (Verkhovnoeglavnokomandovanie-VGK) of the armed forces. The Main Military Council would then report through the minister of defense tothe supreme commander in chief and the Defense Council. TheSupreme High Command would control military operationsthrough the General Staff and subordinate commands.

Ministry of DefenseThe Ministry of Defense, an all-union ministry (see Glossary),

was technically subordinate to the Council of Ministers, as well

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as to the Supreme Soviet and the CPSU Central Committee. In1989 it was, however, larger than most other ministries and hadspecial arrangements for party supervision of, and state participation in, its activities. The Ministry of Defense was made up of theGeneral Staff, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Armyand Navy, the Warsaw Pact, the five armed services, and the mainand central directorates (see fig. 28). The minister of defense hasalways been either a leading CPSU civilian official or a GroundForces general; the position has presumably been filled on therecommendation of the Defense Council with the approval of thePolitburo, although the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has madethe formal announcement. The three first deputy ministers ofdefense were the chief of the General Staff, the commander in chiefof the Warsaw Pact, and another senior officer with unspecifiedduties. First deputy ministers of defense have also been selectedfrom the Ground Forces. In 1989 the eleven deputy ministers ofdefense included the commanders in chief of the five armed services as well as the chiefs of Civil Defense, Rear Services, Construction and Troop Billeting, Armaments, the Main PersonnelDirectorate, and the Main Inspectorate.

The Ministry of Defense directed the five armed services andall military activities on a daily basis. It was responsible for fielding, arming, and supplying the armed services, and in peacetimeall territorial commands of the armed forces reported to it. TheMinistry ofDefense has been staffed almost entirely by professionalmilitary personnel, and it has had a monopoly on military information because the Soviet Union has lacked independent defenseresearch organizations frequently found in other countries. Thismonopoly has given high-ranking Soviet officers undisputed influence with party and government leaders on issues, ranging fromarms control to weapons development to arms sales abroad, thataffect the position and prestige of the armed forces.

General Staff

The General Staff has been the center of professional militarythought in the Soviet Union. Like the Ministry of Defense, theGeneral Staff has been dominated by the Ground Forces. In 1989the chief, two first deputy chiefs, and three deputy chiefs of theGeneral Staff were all Ground Forces officers. The General Staffhad five main directorates and four directorates. They performedstrategic and operational research and planning, provided strategicmilitary intelligence and analysis to the Defense Council, dealt withforeign military attaches, and gave occasional press briefings onpolitical-military issues.

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In wartime the General Staff would become the executive agentof the Supreme High Command, supervising the execution of military strategy and operations by subordinate commands. The General Staff would exercise direct control over the three combat armsof the armed forces that operate strategic nuclear weapons andwould coordinate the activities and missions of the five armedservIces.

The Armed ServicesThe general organization of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Ground

Forces, Air Forces, Air Defense Forces, and Naval Forces at thecommand level paralleled the organization of the Ministry ofDefense. The commander in chief of an armed service was an administrative rather than an operational commander. He equipped,trained, and supplied the forces of the service, but operationalcontrol rested with the Defense Council and was exercised throughthe General Staff.

Each armed service had two first deputy commanders in chief,one of whom was chief of the main staff for the service (see fig. 29).The other had unspecified duties. The deputy commanders in chiefwere numerous. They commanded the combat arms and otherbranches of the service. Some deputy commanders in chief wereresponsible for premilitary and combat training, military education institutions, rear services, or armaments for the service as awhole. The armed services also had deputy commanders in chiefwith specialized duties. For example, the Strategic Rocket Forceshad a deputy commander in chief for rocket engineering. Otherdeputy commanders in chiefhad responsibilities that were unknownto Western observers. The commander in chief, first deputy commanders in chief, and deputy commanders in chief, together withthe chief ofthe service's political directorate, represented the military councilor top leadership of the service.

The main staff of each service planned the operational emRloyment of its service in coordination with the General Staff in theMinistry of Defense. In peacetime the main staff controlled theterritorial commands or components of a service.

Strategic Rocket Forces

The Strategic Rocket Forces, the newest Soviet armed service,in 1989 were the preeminent armed service, based on the continuedimportance of their mission. Their prestige had diminished somewhat, however, because of an increasing emphasis on conventionalforces.

The Strategic Rocket Forces were the main Soviet force usedfor attacking an enemy's offensive nuclear weapons, its military

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MAIN COMMUNICATIONSMAIN DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE

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Figure 28. Organization of the Ministry of Defense, 1988

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facilities, and its industrial infrastructure. They operated all Sovietground-based intercontinental, intermediate-range, and mediumrange nuclear missiles with ranges over 1,000 kilometers. The Strategic Rocket Forces also conducted all Soviet space vehicle andmissile launches.

In 1989 the 300,000 Soviet soldiers in the Strategic Rocket Forceswere organized into six rocket armies comprised of three to fivedivisions, which contained regiments of ten missile launchers each.Each missile regiment had 400 soldiers in security, transportation,and maintenance units above ground. Officers manned launch stations and command posts underground.

In 1989 the Strategic Rocket Forces had over 1,400 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 300 launch control centers, andtwenty-eight missile bases. The Soviet Union had six types of operational ICBMs; about 50 percent were heavy SS-18 and SS-19ICBMs, which carried 80 percent of the country's land-based ICBMwarheads. In 1989 the Soviet Union was also producing new mobile, and hence survivable, ICBMs. A reported 100 road-mobileSS-25 missiles were operational, and the rail-mobile SS-24 wasbeing deployed.

The Strategic Rocket Forces also operated SS-20 intermediaterange ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and SS-4 medium-range ballisticmissiles (MRBMs). Two-thirds of the road-mobile Soviet SS-20force was based in the western Soviet Union and was aimed atWestern Europe. One-third was located east of the Ural Mountains and was targeted primarily against China. Older SS-4 missiles were deployed at fixed sites in the western Soviet Union. TheIntermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), signedin December 1987, called for the elimination of all 553 Soviet SS-20and SS-4 missiles within three years (see Intermediate-RangeNuclear Forces Arms Control, ch. 17). As of mid-1989, over 50percent of the SS-20 and SS-4 missiles had been eliminated.

Ground ForcesDespite its position as the second service in the armed forces hier

archy, the Ground Forces were the most politically influential Sovietservice. Senior Ground Forces officers held all important postswithin the Ministry of Defense as well as the General Staff. In 1989the Ground Forces had 2 million men, organized into four combat arms and three supporting services.

Motorized Rifle Troops and Tank Troops

Combat elements of the Ground Forces were organized intocombined arms and tank armies. A combined arms army included

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Figure 29. Typical Organization oj an Armed Service, 1988

three motorized rifle divisions and a tank division. A tank armyhad three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division. In thelate 1980s, the Ground Forces began to field corps that were morethan twice the size of a single division. In 1989 the Soviet Unionhad 150 motorized rifle and 52 tank divisions in three states ofreadiness (see Glossary). A motorized rifle division had 12,000 soldiersorganized into three motorized rifle regiments, a tank regiment,an artillery regiment, an air defense regiment, surface-to-surfacemissile and antitank battalions, and supporting chemical, engineer,signal, reconnaissance, and rear services companies. A typical tankdivision had 10,000 soldiers organized into three tank regimentsand one motorized rifle regiment. In 1989 the Ground Forces alsoincluded eight brigades of air assault, or air-mobile, units that conducted helicopter landing operations.

The Motorized Rifle Troops have been mechanized infantry since1957. The Soviet Union has fielded a new model of armored

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personnel carrier (APC) every decade since the late 1950s, and in1967 it deployed the world's first infantry fighting vehicle (IFV).Similar to an APC, the tactically innovative IFV had much greater firepower, in the form of a 73mm main gun, an antitank missile launcher, a heavy machine gun, and firing ports that allowedtroops to fire their individual weapons from inside the vehicle. In1989 the Soviet Union had an inventory of over 65,000 APCs andIFVs, with the latter accounting for almost half of this inventory.

The Soviet Ground Forces viewed the tank as their primaryweapon. In 1989 the Tank Troops had five types of main battletanks, including the T -54/55, T-62, T-64, T-72, and T-80. Thegreater part of the total tank inventory of 53,000 consisted of older,although still higWy potent, T -54/55 and T -62 tanks.

Rocket Troops and Artillery

The Rocket Troops and Artillery have been an important combat arm of the Ground Forces because of the Soviet belief that firepower has tremendous destructive and psychological effect on theenemy. In 1989 the Ground Forces had eighteen artillery divisions,in addition to the artillery and missile units organic to armies anddivisions. Artillery and surface-to-surface missile brigades were attached to each combined arms or tank army. An artillery regimentand a surface-to-surface missile battalion were parts of each Sovietmotorized rifle and tank division. In 1989 the Rocket Troops andArtillery manned 1,400 "operational-tactical" surface-to-surfacemissile launchers.

The December 1987 INF Treaty between the United States andthe Soviet Union called for the elimination of all short-range ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometers. Thetreaty required the elimination ofmore than 900 Soviet SS-12 andSS-23 missiles. As ofmid-1989, all SS-12 missiles had been eliminated. All SS-23 missiles had to be eliminated before the end of1989, according to the terms of the treaty. After the reductions mandated in the treaty, the Soviet battlefield missile inventory will stillcontain over 1,000 modern SS-21 missiles with a range of about100 kilometers that were not covered in the treaty as well as olderSS-l missiles, a large number of unguided free rocket over ground(FROG) missiles, and Scud missiles. These tactical missiles candeliver nuclear or chemical weapons as well as conventional munitions.

In 1989 the Rocket Troops and Artillery had approximately30,000 artillery pieces; of these, 10,000 were capable of firing conventional high-explosive, nuclear, or chemical rounds. Since the1970s, this powerful combat arm has fielded more than 5,000

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self-propelled 122mm and 152mm howitzers, 152mm and 203mmguns, and 240mm mortars. These artillery pieces, which are mounted on tank chassis, have replaced some towed artillery pieces. TheRocket Troops and Artillery also had truck-mounted multiple rocketlaunchers, each with forty tubes, to provide massive fire supportfor the Ground Forces.

Air Defense of Ground Forces

The Ground Forces relinquished control of air defense for theirfield formations in 1948 when the National Air Defense Forceslater renamed the Air Defense Forces-became an independentarmed service. In 1958, however, Soviet air defense was decentralized again, and the Ground Forces acquired antiaircraft gunsand formed tactical air defense units. In the 1960s, air defense became an integral combat arm of the Ground Forces. Since then,Air Defense of Ground Forces has been independent from the AirDefense Forces, although coordination of their respective operations remained necessary.

Air Defense of Ground Forces was equipped with a potent mixof antiaircraft artillery as well as surface-to-air missiles to defendGround Forces units against attacking enemy aircraft. During the1970s, the Soviet military introduced five new self-propelled airdefense and radar systems into its force structure. In 1989 AirDefense of Ground Forces operated 5,000 surface-to-air missilesand 12,000 antiaircraft guns organized into brigades, regiments,and batteries. As of 1989, combined arms and tank armies hadair defense brigades equipped with high-altitude SA-4 surfaceto-air missiles. Motorized rifle and tank divisions had air defenseregiments with the mobile SA-6 or SA-8 for medium- to low-levelprotection. Ground Forces regiments had SA-9, SA-13, andZSU-23-4 antiaircraft gun batteries. Motorized rifle and tank battalions had surface-to-air missile platoons equipped with new lowaltitude, shoulder-fired SA-16 and older SA-7 missiles.

Chemical Troops, Engineer Troops, and Signal Troops

The Chemical Troops, Engineer Troops, and Signal Troops wereindependent branches that provided support to all the military services, but principally to the Ground Forces. The chiefs of theseservices reported directly to the minister of defense. Units of theChemical Troops, Engineer Troops, and Signal Troops respondedto the in-branch chief regarding administrative and technical mattersbut were operationally subordinate to the commander of the formation to which they were attached. Chemical Troops, Engineer

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T-72 tankCourtesy United States Defense Intelligence Agency

Troops, and Signal Troops were organized into battalions and companies within armies and divisions.

The general mission of the supporting troops was to facilitatethe advance of the Ground Forces and to eliminate obstacles blocking their path. The Signal Troops'operated tactical radio and wirecommunications networks and intercepted enemy signals for combatintelligence purposes. They also operated strategic undergroundcable, microwave, and satellite communications systems. TheEngineer Troops were principally combat engineers. They operated the self-propelled bridging vehicles and amphibious ferries thattanks and armored vehicles depend on to cross deep rivers. In wartime the Engineer Troops would also clear mines, antivehicle obstacles, and battlefield debris for the Ground Forces.

The mission of the Chemical Troops was to defend the armedforces against the effects of "weapons of mass destruction"nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. With 50,000soldiers in 1989, the Chemical Troops constituted the world's largest NBC defense force. The Chemical Troops would perform NBCreconnaissance; mark contaminated areas; and decontaminatepersonnel, weapons, and terrain during wartime. They operated30,000 armored combat vehicles equipped for NBC reconnaissanceand truck-mounted systems equipped to spray decontaminating

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solutions on the surface areas of tanks, combat vehicles, and aircraft. The Chemical Troops demonstrated the use of helicoptersfor NBC defense during the large-scale radiation cleanup operation after the Chernobyl' (see Glossary) nuclear reactor accidentin April 1986. In 1989 the Chemical Troops did not operate offensive delivery systems. Yet the strength of Soviet chemical defenseprovided an offensive potential by enhancing the ability of Sovietforces to fight on contaminated battlefields. Thus, supported bythe Chemical Troops, Soviet forces were better prepared than anyother in the world for NBC operations.

Air ForcesIn 1989 the Air Forces had 450,000 personnel in three combat

arms and one supporting branch, the Aviation Engineering Service. The Air Forces also provided and trained prospective cosmonauts for the Soviet space program. Air Forces personneloperated all military aircraft except aircraft belonging to the AirDefense Forces and the Naval Forces. In 1989 the Air Forces wereorganized into air armies consisting of several air divisions. Eachair division had three air regiments with three squadrons of abouttwelve aircraft each.

Strategic A ir A nnies

The Strategic Air Armies were organized in the late 1970s fromelements of Long-Range Aviation. Their mission was to attack theenemy's strategic delivery systems and infrastructure, includingmissile and bomber bases. The Strategic Air Armies were organizedinto five air armies of bomber aircraft of several types. In 1989these included Tu-95 long-range strategic bombers, a type firstdeployed in the late 1950s and continuously upgraded since then.Since the early 1980s, more than seventy of these bombers havebeen modified to carry air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). Anew intercontinental-range bomber, the Tu-160, which also bearsthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) designation Bl;:l.ckjack, became operational in 1989. In the late 1980s, long-rangebombers carried a small, but increasing, percentage of all Sovietstrategic nuclear weapons.

Although its name implies an intercontinental mission, most Strategic Air Armies aircraft were medium- and short-range bombers.In 1989 the Soviet Union had Tu-16, Tu-22, and Tu-26 mediumrange bombers. The Tu-16 and Tu-22 aircraft entered service inlarge numbers in the early 1960s. The Tu-26, sometimes calledthe Tu-22M and designated the Backfire bomber, was first fieldedin 1974. In 1989 the Strategic Air Armies also included Su-24

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fighter-bombers, which had a combat radius of over 1,000 kilometers. Medium-range bombers and fighter-bombers would support military operations by striking the enemy's nuclear deliverysystems, airfields, air defense systems, and command, control, andcommunications facilities in a theater of war.

Frontal Aviation

Frontal Aviation was the Soviet Union's tactical air force assignedto the military districts and the groups of forces. Its mission wasto provide air support to Ground Forces units. Frontal Aviationcooperated closely with the Air Defense Aviation arm of the AirDefense Forces. Protected by the latter's fighter-interceptors, Frontal Aviation in wartime would deliver conventional, nuclear, orchemical ordnance on the enemy's supply lines and troop concentrations to interdict its combat operations. It would be under theoperational control of Ground Forces field commanders. In 1989Frontal Aviation was divided into sixteen air armies composed offighter, fighter-bomber, tactical reconnaissance, and electronic warfare aircraft.

In 1989 Frontal Aviation operated about 5,000 fixed- and rotarywing combat and reconnaissance aircraft, which included 270Su-25, 650 Su-17, and 1,050 MiG-27 ground attack aircraft. Italso operated 450 MiG-29 and 350 Su-24 deep interdiction fighterbombers, in addition to the 450 that belonged to the Strategic AirArmies. The Air Forces used the heavily armed Su-25, first deployed in 1979, effectively during the early years of the war inAfghanistan when mujahidin forces lacked modern air defensesystems.

During the 1980s, the Soviet Union doubled the size of its forceof helicopters. Helicopter regiments and squadrons were attachedto Frontal Aviation's air armies to provide tactical mobility for,and additional fire support to, the Ground Forces. The Mi-6, Mi-8,and Mi-26 helicopters would transport motorized rifle units andequipment into battle or land assault units behind enemy lines.The Mi-24, often referred to as the Hind, was the most heavilyarmed helicopter in the world. It was used extensively in both firesupport and air assault roles in Afghanistan. In 1989 the SovietUnion was testing a new helicopter, the Mi-28, designed to be anantitank helicopter.

Military Transport Aviation

Military Transport Aviation provided rapid strategic mobilityfor the armed forces. Its missions were to transport the AirborneTroops for rapid intervention by parachute and to supply and

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resupply Soviet forces abroad, and deliver arms and military equipment to Soviet allies around the world. In 1989 Military Transport Aviation had five air divisions, including 200 An-12, 55 An-22,340 Il-76, and 5 An-124 transport aircraft. Having entered service only in 1987, the An-124 was the first Soviet transport thatcould lift outsized equipment such as main battle tanks.

In addition to these military transports, in wartime the 1,600aircraft of Aeroflot, the national airline, would be used to augmentthe capabilities of Military Transport Aviation (see table 46, Appendix A). For this reason, the Ministry of Civil Aviation closelycoordinated its activities with the General Staff and the Air Forces.Aeroflot flight crews, for example, were reserve officers of the AirForces. Moreover, in 1989 the minister of civil aviation was anactive-duty general officer.

Military Transport Aviation assumed a high-profile role in foreign policy in the 1970s when it airlifted weapons to such alliesas Egypt, Syria, Ethiopia, and Angola. In December 1979, its transport aircraft flew 150 sorties to drop and land an Airborne Troopsdivision and its equipment into Afghanistan. Western analysts estimated that Military Transport Aviation can lift one AirborneTroops division a distance of 4,000 kilometers. With Aeroflot transports and passenger aircraft, three divisions can be lifted at once.

Air Defense ForcesThe National Air Defense Forces became a separate armed ser

vice in 1948 and were given the mission of defending the Sovietindustrial, military, and administrative centers and the armed forcesagainst strategic bombing. After Air Defense of Ground Forces wasformed in 1958, the National Air Defense Forces focused on strategic aerospace and theater air defense. Around 1980 the NationalAir Defense Forces yielded responsibility for theater antiaircraftsystems to Air Defense of Ground Forces and was renamed theAir Defense Forces. In 1989 the Air Defense Forces had more than500,000 personnel and operated the world's most extensive strategic air defense network.

Antiaircraft Rocket Troops and Air Defense Aviation

In 1989 the Antiaircraft Rocket Troops manned 12,000 strategicsurface-to-air missile launchers at 1,400 sites inside the SovietUnion. These forces were organized into brigades of launch battalions. Soviet SA-3 and SA-5 antiaircraft missiles, first producedin the 1960s, together with older SA-1 and SA-2 missiles, constituted over 90 percent of the Soviet surface-to-air missile inventory.In ~he late 1980s, the new SA-lO was entering service to replace

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MiG-23 fighter aircraft armed with antiaircraft missilesCourtesy United States Navy

Scud-B ballistic missile on a transporter-erector-launcherCourtesy United States Defense Intelligence Agency

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SA-1 and SA-2 missiles. The Soviet Union also had another antiaircraft missile, the SA-12, under development. Western authorities believed the SA-10 and SA-12 had improved capabilities todestroy aircraft and missiles at low altitudes. In support of the AirDefense Forces, the Radiotechnical Troops operated 10,000 groundbased air surveillance radars for surface-to-air missile operations.In addition, the air defense systems of the Warsaw Pact countrieswere highly integrated into the Soviet network, effectively extending the range of Soviet early warning capabilities.

The other combat arm of the Air Defense Forces, Air DefenseAviation, had the mission of preventing aircraft and cruise missiles from entering Soviet airspace. In wartime it would strive toestablish air superiority and provide air cover for Frontal Aviation's deep strike and ground attack aircraft. In 1989 Air DefenseAviation had 2,000 fighter-interceptor aircraft organized into airregiments. The Su-15, MiG-23, and MiG-25, first produced inthe late 1960s and early 1970s, constituted 80 percent ofAir DefenseAviation's inventory. The Soviet Union's newest interceptors, theMiG-31 and Su-27, deployed in the early 1980s, represented 10percent of the force in 1989. The MiG-29, which first appearedin 1984, may also eventually be deployed with Air Defense Aviation. These new fighter-interceptors had "look-down, shoot-down"radars for engaging aircraft and cruise missiles penetrating Sovietairspace at low altitudes. Since the mid-1980s, the Soviet Unionhas built four new airborne warning and control system (AWACS)aircraft on an 11-76 airframe. These AWACS aircraft have improvedAir Defense Aviation's ability to direct interceptors against enemybombers, fighters, and cruise missiles in aerial combat.

Although equipped with numerous modern weapons systems,the Air Defense Forces have made operational errors that haveraised serious questions about their command, control, and communications systems and training. In September 1983, Soviet interceptors shot down a South Korean passenger jet that strayed intoSoviet airspace over Sakhalin. In May 1987, Mathias Rust, a citizenof the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), flew his private airplane into Soviet airspace and landed in Red Square inMoscow. As a result, the commander in chief of the Air DefenseForces, a former fighter pilot, was fired and replaced with a highranking Ground Forces officer who had extensive combined armsexperience.

Missile and Space Defenses

Missile and space defenses have been effective arms of the AirDefense Forces since the mid-1960s. In 1989 the Soviet Union had

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the world's only operational antiballistic missile (ABM) and antisatellite (ASAT) systems.

The Soviet Union deployed its first ABM defense system aroundMoscow in 1964. It consisted of surface-to-air missiles that couldbe launched to destroy incoming ballistic missiles. The Soviet leadershave continually upgraded and developed the capabilities of thisinitial system. A major modernization of interceptor missiles beganin the late 1970s, and by 1989 the Soviet Union had up to thirtytwo improved SH-04launchers in operation and a fundamentallynew SH-08 interceptor missile under development. The newestSA-10 and SA-12 surface-to-air missiles reportedly also had a limited capability to destroy cruise, tactical, and possibly even strategic ballistic missiles. Such a capability would tend to blur thedistinction between missile defense and strategic air defense systems.

In 1989 the Radiotechnical Troops operated eleven ground-basedradars and numerous satellites to provide strategic early warningof enemy missile launches. They also manned six large phasedarray radars for ballistic missile detection. These radars could alsoserve as target acquisition and tracking radars to guide ABMlaunchers as part of a nationwide defense against ballistic missiles.In 1989 the Soviet Union was buifding three additional sites forphased-array radars.

The Soviet Union has had an operational ASAT interceptor system since 1966. In wartime it would launch a satellite into the sameorbit as an opponent's satellite. The ASAT satellite would thenmaneuver nearby and detonate a conventional fragmentation ora nuclear warhead to destroy its target. Thus, the interceptor systemhas posed a threat to an adversary's command, control, and communications, navigation, reconnaissance, and intelligence-gatheringsatellites in low-earth orbits, a capability that would be critical inwartime.

By 1989 the Soviet Union was spending an estimated US$l billion annually on scientific research into advanced technologies withpotentially great ASAT and ABM applications, including groundbased laser, particle beam, radio frequency, and kinetic energyweapons. Soviet space programs also served Soviet missile and spacedefenses. In ~989 the Soviet effort in space was a broad-based onethat included approximately 100 launches yearly, development ofa reusable space shuttle and a spacecraft, and deployment of a thirdgeneration manned space station. These capabilities could also beused, for example, to conduct military operations in space, to repairand defend satellites, or to build and operate weapons platforms.

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Many Western analysts have concluded that the military directsthe Soviet civilian space program.

Naval ForcesBefore 1962 the Soviet Naval Forces were primarily a coastal

defense force. The Cuban missile crisis and United States quarantine of Cuba in 1962, however, made the importance of oceangoing naval forces clear to the Soviet Union. In 1989 the SovietNaval Forces had nearly 500,000 servicemen organized into fivecombat arms and gave the Soviet Union a capability of projectingpower beyond Europe and Asia.

Submarine Forces

Submarines were the most important component of the SovietNaval Forces. In 1989 the Soviet Union had the largest numberof ballistic missile submarines in the world. Most of the sixty-twoballistic missile submarines could launch their nuclear-armed missiles against intercontinental targets from Soviet home waters. Thedeployment ofmobile land-based ICBMs in the late 1980s, however, could reduce the importance of ballistic missile submarinesas the Soviet Union's most survivable strategic force.

Soviet attack submarines have had an antisubmarine warfare(ASW) mission. In wartime the attack submarine force-203 boatsin 1989-would attempt to destroy the enemy's ballistic missile andattack submarines. Since 1973 the Soviet Union has deployed tendifferent attack submarine classes, including five new types since1980. In 1989 the Soviet Union also had sixty-six guided missilesubmarines for striking the enemy's land targets, surface combatantgroups, and supply convoys.

Surface Forces

Between 1962 and the early 1970s, the Soviet Union's WorldWar II-era Naval Forces became a modern guided missile cruiserand destroyer force. In addition, in the late 1970s the Soviet Unionlaunched its first nuclear-powered Kirov-class batde cruiser, its thirdclass of guided missile cruisers, and two new classes of guided missiledestroyers. These surface forces have had the peacetime task of supporting Soviet allies in the Third World through port visits andarms shipments as well as visibly asserting Soviet power and interests on the high seas. In wartime, they would conduct both antiship and antisubmarine operations.

A variety of auxiliary ships supported the Naval Forces and thearmed forces in general. In 1989 the Soviet Union operated sixtythree intelligence-gathering vessels, manned by naval reservists andequipped with surface-to-air missiles. It also had the world's largest

716

Kiev-class helicopter carrier Baku in the Mediterranean Sea.Three helicopters are parked on the flight deck.

Oscar-class nuclear cruise missile submarineCourtesy United States Navy

717


fleet of oceanographic survey and marine research vessels. Over500 ships gathered and processed data on the world's oceans thatwould be crucial to the Soviet Union in wartime. In 1989 elevenspecially equipped vessels, including the new Marshal Nedelin class,monitored and tracked Soviet and foreign space launches . YetWestern experts have noted that the Soviet Naval Forces still lackedenough specialized underway replenishment vessels to provide adequate logistical support to naval combatants at sea.

Naval Aviation

Naval Aviation was primarily land based; its main mission wasto conduct air strikes on enemy ships and fleet support infrastructure. The importance attached to its antiship mission was shownby the fact that Naval Aviation has received almost as many Tu-26bombers as have the Strategic Air Armies. Naval Aviation alsoprovided ASW and general reconnaissance support for naval operations.

In 1989 Naval Aviation consisted of nearly 1,000 fIxed-wing aircraft and over 300 helicopters. The Naval Aviation fleet included130 Tu-26 and 230 Tu-16 medium-range bombers armed with airto-surface cruise missiles for carrying out antiship strikes. NavalAviation also had 100 Su-17 and Su-24 fIghter-bombers that provided close air support to Naval Infantry. Older aircraft in NavalAviation's inventory have been converted into ASW and maritimereconnaissance platforms.

Since the 1970s, the Soviet Naval Forces have attempted to overcome their major weakness-fleet air defense beyond the range ofland-based aircraft-by deploying four Kiev-class aircraft carriers.These carriers each had a squadron ofYak-38 fIghters. In the late1980s, the Soviet Union was also constructing and fItting out itsfIrst two Tbilisi-class carriers. Western observers expected that avariant of the new Su-27 or MiG-29 fIghter would become the mainSoviet carrier-based aircraft. Soviet carriers also operated Ka-25and Ka-27 naval helicopters for ASW reconnaissance, targeting,and search-and-rescue missions.

Naval lrifantry

In the early 1960s, Naval Infantry became a combat arm of theSoviet Naval Forces. In 1989 Naval Infantry consisted of 18,000marine troops organized into one division and three brigades. NavalInfantry had its own amphibious versions of standard armoredvehicles and tanks used by the Ground Forces. Its primary wartime missions would be to seize and hold strategic straits or islandsand to make seaborne tactical landings behind enemy lines. TheSoviet Naval Forces had over eighty landing ships as well as two

718


Ivan Rogov-class amphibious assault docks. The latter were assault ships that could transport one infantry battalion with fortyarmored vehicles and their amphibious landing craft. At seventyfive units, the Soviet Union had the world's largest inventory ofair-cushion assault craft. In addition, many ofthe Soviet merchantfleet's (Morflot) 2,500 oceangoing ships could off-load weapons andsupplies in an amphibious landing.

Coastal Defense Forces

Protecting the coasts of the Soviet Union from attack or invasion from the sea has remained one of the most important missions of the Naval Forces. To defend an extensive coastline alongthe Arctic and Pacific oceans and the Baltic, Black, and Caspianseas, the Soviet Union has deployed a sizable and diverse force.Defending naval bases from attack has been the primary focus ofthe Coastal Defense Forces. In 1989 the Coastal Rocket and Artillery Troops, consisting of a single division, operated coastal artillery and naval surface-to-surface missile launchers along theapproaches to naval bases. A large number of surface combatants,including light frigates, missile attack boats, submarine chasers,guided missile combatants, amphibious craft, and patrol boats ofmany types, also participated in coastal defense.

Airborne Troops and Special Purpose ForcesThe Soviet Union had substantial specialized forces having mis

sions and subordinations distinct from those of the regular military services. The Airborne Troops, subordinated to the SupremeHigh Command in wartime, were closely linked to the GroundForces and to Military Transport Aviation. The Special PurposeForces (Voiska spetsial'nogo nazacheniia-Spetsnaz), designed tooperate deep behind enemy lines, were controlled by the GeneralStaffs Main Intelligence Directorate (see Glossary).

In 1989 the Airborne Troops were more numerous than all theother airborne forces of the world combined. The Airborne Troopsconsisted of seven divisions. Each division had 7,000 troops organized into three paratroop regiments and an artillery regiment.The Airborne Troops had specially designed air-transportable and,in some cases, air-droppable equipment. Their inventory includedlight infantry fighting vehicles for transporting and protecting airborne forces on the ground and self-propelled 85mm assault gunsto provide them with firepower.

The Airborne Troops were the primary rapid intervention forceof the armed forces. They spearheaded the Soviet invasions ofCzechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979 by seizing the

719


airports in Prague and Kabul, respectively. The performance ofthe Airborne Troops in Afghanistan raised their status as an elitecombat arm.

The Spetsnaz has been the subject of intense speculation amongWestern experts because little is known about it. In 1989 the SovietGround Forces had about 30,000 Spetsnaz troops organized intosixteen brigades. In 1989 the Soviet Naval Forces also had fourelite naval Spetsnaz brigades trained to reconnoiter, disrupt, orsabotage enemy naval installations and coastal defenses. OneWestern view held that, in wartime, small Spetsnaz teams wouldbe assigned reconnaissance missions up to several hundred kilometers behind enemy lines. Spetsnaz units would then provideSoviet forces with targeting data on important enemy rear area facilities. Another view was that Spetsnaz troops would be emplacedweeks before a war to assassinate the enemy's political and military leaders; to sabotage its airfields; to destroy its nuclear weaponsfacilities; and to disrupt its command, control, and communications systems. Proponents of this view asserted that Spetsnaz teamsassassinated the unpopular Afghan communist leader HafizullahAmin before the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan in December 1979.

Rear ServicesIn 1989 a deputy minister of defense served as chief of Rear Ser

vices for the Soviet armed forces. The Rear Services supplied the·armed forces with ammunition, fuel, spare parts, food, clothing,and other materiel. In 1989 the chief of the Rear Services had ninemain and central directorates and four supporting services underhis command. The deputy commanders in chief for rear servicesof the armed services, the deputy commanders for rear servicesof territorial commands, and nearly 1.5 million soldiers reportedto him.

The Central Military Transportation Administration was theprimary traffic management organization for the armed forces, coordinating and planning supply movements by all means of transport. The Central Food Supply Administration both procured foodfrom civilian agricultural enterprises (see Glossary) and op~rated

a military state farm (see Glossary) system to supply troops, particularly those serving in remote areas. Similarly, the CentralClothing Supply Administration had its own clothing factories tomanufacture uniforms and specialized gear. The main and central directorates operated post exchange, health care, and recreational facilities for military personnel. The Rear Services alsoprovided financial reports on armed forces activities to party andgovernment organs.

720


The chiefof the Rear Services commanded the Railroad Troops,Road Troops, Pipeline Troops, and Automotive Troops. The mission of these supporting services was to construct and maintain theSoviet Union's military transport infrastructure. The AutomotiveTroops, for example, provided the drivers and mechanics neededto maintain and drive cargo trucks loaded with supplies from railheads to operational units in the field. After the initial airlift ofSoviet forces and equipment into Afghanistan in December 1979,these troops built permanent rail lines, roads, and pipelines bet~een the Soviet Union and Afghanistan to resupply the Sovietforces in that country. .

Formerly divided among independent maintenance, medical, andmotor transport companies, the provision of rear services in Sovietregiments has become the responsibility of unified materiel support units. As in most armies, these materiel support units weresubordinate to operational commanders, although they worked withthe next highest chief of rear services on technical matters.

Construction and Troop Billeting was an independent supporting service, similar to the Rear Services, headed by another deputyminister of defense. Construction and Troop Billeting served asa large, mobile force of cheap labor to erect military bases and troopquarters as well as civilian and government buildings. The servicehas been used to complete high-priority projects and to work inharsh environments. Construction and Troop Billeting has builtmilitary installations in the Soviet Far East since 1969, major airports, and the Moscow Olympics complex. The service has alsoworked on Siberian natural gas pipelines and the Baykal-AmurMain Line (BAM-see Glossary).

Civil DefenseCivil defense was another part of Soviet strategic defense. It origi

nated with the large-scale relocation of defense industries from thewestern Soviet Union to east of the Ural Mountains in 1941. Civildefense reappeared in the late 1940s as antiaircraft units were attached to Soviet factories to defend them against strategic bombing. By the early 1970s, the emphasis on civil defense increased,and the chief of Civil Defense became a deputy minister ofdefense.Each union republic had a general officer as the chief ofcivil defensein the republic.

In 1989 the purpose of civil defense was to provide protectionfor leadership and population in wartime and to ensure the SovietUnion's ability to continue production of military materiel duringa nuclear or a protracted conventional war. Officers from CivilDefense were attached to union republic, oblast (see Glossary), raion

721


(see Glossary), and municipal governments, as well as to largeindustrial and agricultural enterprises, and assigned to supervisecivil defense work, organization, and training. These staff officersdeveloped and implemented detailed plans for the wartime relocation of important defense industrial facilities and the evacuationof labor forces to alternative sites. They supervised the construction of blast shelters and other installations to ensure that thesestructures could withstand nuclear strikes. Civil Defense operateda network of 1,500 underground shelters that could protect 175,000top party and government officials. In 1989 Civil Defense had150,000 personnel.

After a nuclear exchange, the civil defense effort would be directed at reestablishing essential military production through decontamination, first aid, and civil engineering work to clear collapsedstructures and to restore power supplies, transportation, and communications. Civil Defense trained in peacetime by conductingsimulations of the aftermath of a nuclear attack and small-scaleevacuation exercises. It was also called on to fight fires, conductrescue operations, decontaminate areas affected by nuclear andchemical accidents, and provide natural disaster relief.

Specialized and Paramilitary Forces

Under Soviet law, two armed services were outside the controlof the Ministry of Defense but were nonetheless part of the Sovietarmed forces. These services, the Internal Troops and the BorderTroops, were subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs andthe KGB, respectively. Although often termed "militarized police,"the Internal Troops and the Border Troops were military organizations, equipped, like motorized rifle regiments, with tanks andarmored personnel carriers.

Internal Troops

In 1989 the Internal Troops had a personnel strength of about340,000 soldiers. These troops had the mission of suppressingdemonstrations, revolts, riots, strikes, or other challenges to theregime that the militia (police) could not contain (see InternalTroops of the Ministry ofInternal Affairs, ch. 19). The use ofInternal Troops instead of the Ground Forces in these situationshelped to preserve the favorable image of the latter with the population. In extreme circumstances, the Internal Troops also servedas the party's counterweight to the military services.

In addition to these peacetime roles, the Internal Troops also havebeen assigned wartime missions. In time of war, they would support frontline operations by providing rear security against enemy

722


sabotage, defending supply and communications lines, and operating prisoner-of-war and penal battalions. In the early days of WorldWar II, the Internal Troops manned machine gun detachmentslocated behind Soviet frontline units. The detachments were chargedwith firing on Red Army soldiers who tried to retreat or desert.

Border Troops

The mission of the Border Troops, which included 230,000 personnel in 1989, was to prevent unauthorized entry by foreignersinto the Soviet Union and to keep Soviet citizens from leaving thecountry illegally (see Border Troops of the Committee for StateSecurity, ch. 19). The troops patrolled clearly demarcated stripsalong Soviet state frontiers that contained antivehicle obstacles,fences, and barbed wire. The Border Troops used guard dogs,sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment and sensors, andhelicopters to perform their duties over vast, sparsely populatedfrontier regions.

The Border Troops also guarded the Soviet Union's oceanicfrontiers. Its Maritime Border Troops operated within the twelvemile limit of Soviet territorial waters and were equipped withfrigates, fast patrol boats, hydrofoils, helicopters, and light aircraft.

In wartime the Border Troops would become a frontline combatservice. Stationed on the frontiers, Border Troops units absorbedthe brunt of Nazi Germany's surprise invasion of the Soviet Unionin June 1941 and fought defensive actions against the German army.The Border Troops also saw combat action in 1969 in border clasheswith Chinese soldiers on islands in the Ussuri River.

In addition to the Border Troops, the KGB had other troopsengaged in military-related activities that were not mentioned inlegislation governing the armed forces (see Internal Security Troops,ch. 19). The KGB controlled elite units that guarded the highestparty officials and stood a continuous ceremonial guard at the LeninMausoleum. The special KGB signal troops also operated communications linking the party with the Ministry of Defense andthe major territorial commands. Another KGB armed force guardedsensitive military, ,scientific, and industrial installations in the SovietUnion and, until the late 1960s, controlled Soviet nuclear warheadstockpiles.

Territorial Organization of the Armed ForcesThe armed forces had a peacetime territorial organization that

would facilitate a rapid shift to a wartime footing. In 1989 the SovietUnion was divided into sixteen military districts and four fleets (seefig. 30). In addition, one flotilla, two naval squadrons, and six majorgroups of forces were stationed outside the Soviet Union.

723

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Military DistrictsMilitary districts were the basic units of Soviet military adminis

tration. The system of sixteen military districts had evolved inresponse to the Soviet Union's perception of threats to its security. For example, in 1969 the Turkestan Military District was divided to create the Central Asian Military District and enable theSoviet Union tQ double its military forces and infrastructure alongthe border with China. In wartime most military districts wouldbecome fronts (see Glossary).

Senior Ground Forces officers have always commanded militarydistricts, and experience in commanding a military district was apparently a prerequisite for promotion to most of the importantMinistry of Defense positions. Commanders of military districtshave deputy commanders responsible for specific military activities. Each military district had a military council, which includedthe commander of the district, his first deputies-one of whom wasalso chief of staff-the chief of the political directorate for the district, and the first secretary of the party bureau of the union republicin which the district was located.

Military districts were combined arms formations. A militarydistrict commander controlled not only the Ground Forces in thedistrict but also the Air Forces and the Air Defense Forces (seefig. 31). The commanders of the Air Forces and the Air DefenseForces reported to the district commander on operational mattersas well as to the main staffs of their services. The military district'sofficers worked closely with party and government officials to planwartime mobilization and rear services, civil defense, and militarytraining for civilians. They supervised military training in bothcivilian and military education establishments located in the district. Military districts coordinated activities with the BorderTroops, which had a system of ten districts organized separatelyfrom the military districts.

In 1989 twelve of Frontal Aviation's sixteen air armies were stationed in the most important military districts. Western expertsdisagreed over the organization of the system of air defense districts. Some argued that as many as ten air defense districts, separatefrom military districts, still existed. It seemed more likely, however,that when the National Air Defense Forces became the Air DefenseForces after 1980, all remaining air defense districts were integratedinto the military districts. At that time, commanders of the AirDefense Forces became deputy commanders of the military districts. Only the Moscow Air Defense District continued to bementioned in the press, possibly because it operated the ABM

725

Sov£et Un£on: A Country Study

MILITARY DISTRICTCOMMANDER

Ir T I

CHIEF OFFIRST DEPUTY

THE POLITICAL COMMANDER FIRST DEPUTYCOMMANDERDIRECTORATE CHIEF OF STAFF

l--LHr COMMANDERS OF DEPUTY COMMANDER IGROUND FORCES FOR COMBAT TRAINING

r COMMANDER 1- H DEPUTY COMMANDER IOF AIR FORCES FOR ARMAMENTS

I COMMANDER OF~ HDEPUTY COMMANDER FOR IAIR DEFENSE FORCES REAR SERVICES

I CHIEF OF~ H DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR ICHEMICAL TROOPS MILITARY EDUCATION

INSTITUTIONS

rCHIEF OF r- H DEPUTY COMMANDER ISIGNAL TROOPS FOR CIVIL DEFENSE

rCHIEF OF }- H DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR IENGINEER TROOPS CONSTRUCTION AND

TROOP BILLETING

H DEPUTY COMMANDER IFOR PREMllITARY TRAINING

H CHIEF OF IPERSONNEL

H CHIEF OF PHYSICAL ITRAINING AND SPORTS

H SPORTS COMMITIEE I

H MILITARY PROCURACY I

Y MILITARY TRIBUNAL I

Figure 31. Organization of a Typical Military District, 1988

726


system that protected the capital city and the National CommandAuthority.

In 1989 the Ground Forces had sixty-five divisions, kept at between 50 and 75 percent of their projected wartime strengths, inthe westernmost military districts of the Soviet Union. The GroundForces also had fifty-two divisions at less than half their wartimelevels in the Siberian, Transbaykal, Central Asian, and Far Eastmilitary districts along the border with China and twenty-six lowreadiness divisions in the Transcaucasus, North Caucasus, andTurkestan military districts.

Fleets, Flotillas, and SquadronsThe command organization of the four fleets was similar to that

ofthe military districts. The fleet commander had a deputy for eachof the combat arms of the Naval Forces, and he supervised the navalbases and ports in the fleet's area. Each fleet had a Naval Aviationair army, a naval Spetsnaz brigade, and several battalions of theCoastal Rocket and Artillery Troops. The fleets reported to theMain Staff of the Naval Forces; in wartime they would come underthe operational control of the Supreme High Command and theGeneral Staff. Although the Naval Forces operated numerous flotillas on inland seas and large lakes, only the Caspian Flotilla wasoperational in 1989.

The Northern Fleet, based at Murmansk-Severomorsk, was themost important Soviet fleet, having a force of over 170 submarinesin 1989. The Pacific Fleet, based at Vladivostok, had the best amphibious and power projection capabilities ofthe Naval Forces. In1989 it had the only Naval Infantry division, two aircraft carriers,and 120 submarines. In wartime the Northern and Pacific fleetswould become components of oceanic theaters of military operations (teatry voennykh deistvii-TVDs; see Offensive and DefensiveStrategic Missions, ch. 17). The Baltic and Black Sea fleets, as wellas the Caspian Flotilla, would become maritime components of continental TVDs in wartime.

Since the mid-1960s, the Naval Forces have increasingly beendeployed abroad. In 1964 the Mediterranean squadron became thefirst permanently forward-deployed Soviet naval force. Since itsinception, it has usually had thirty-five to forty-five ships. In 1968the Soviet Union established an Indian Ocean squadron of fifteento twenty-five ships. Access to ports and airfields in Vietnam, Syria,Libya, Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen(South Yemen), and Seychelles in the 1980s has enabled the SovietNaval Forces to repair their ships, fly ocean reconnaissance flights,and maintain these forward deployments. In 1989 Cam Ranh Bay

727


in Vietnam had the largest concentration of Soviet vessels outsidethe countries of the Warsaw Pact.

Groups of Forces Stationed Abroad

In 1989 the Soviet Union had six major groups of forces stationed abroad. The groups of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe included thirty Ground Forces divisions and four air armies in theGerman Democratic Republic (East Germany), Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (see Appendix C). These groups offorceshave been in Eastern Europe since 1945 and have been used onseveral occasions to suppress anticommunist uprisings in those countries and keep them within the Soviet alliance system. They havealso been the main concentration of Soviet forces against NATO.They were continuously manned and equipped at wartime levels.The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany was the most importantSoviet territorial command. In 1989 it had 400,000 troops organizedinto nineteen divisions and five armies. Its importance was underscored by the fact that it was commanded by a commander in chief,like the five armed services.

When the cuts announced by Gorbachev in December 1988 arecompleted in 1991, 50,000 Soviet troops and six Soviet tank divisions will have been withdrawn from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (see Conventional Arms Control, ch. 17).

In addition to its forces stationed in Eastern Europe, the SovietUnion continued to maintain a large troop presence in Afghanistanthroughout most of 1988. The Soviet 40th Army's four divisionsand other forces-116,000 troops in all-had been fighting inAfghanistan for nearly nine years by late 1988. In mid-1988 theSoviet Union began a full-scale withdrawal from Afghanistan. Thewithdrawal was completed by early 1989. The Soviet Union hasalso had forces stationed in Mongolia since that country becamean ally in 1921. Under a plan articulated in a 1986 Vladivostokspeech, Gorbachev withdrew one Soviet division, leaving four inMongolia.

The Party and the Armed ForcesThe CPSU had three mechanisms of control over the country's

armed forces. First, the top military leaders have been systematically integrated into the highest echelons of the CPSU and subjected to party discipline. Second, the CPSU has placed a networkof political officers throughout the armed forces to influence theactivities of the military. Third, the KGB, under the direction ofthe CPSU, has maintained a network of officers and informers inthe armed forces.

728


Political-Military Relations

Fearing the immense popularity of the armed forces after WorldWar II, Stalin demoted war hero Marshal Georgii K. Zhukovand .took personal credit for having saved the country. After Stalin'sdeath in 1953, Zhukov reemerged as a strong supporter of Nikita S.Khrushchev. Khrushchev rewarded Zhukov by making him minister of defense and a full Politburo member. Concern that thearmed forces might become too powerful in politics, however, ledto Zhukov's abrupt dismissal in the fall of 1957. But Khrushchevlater alienated the armed forces by cutting defense expenditureson conventional forces in order to carry out his plans for economicreform. Leonid I. Brezhnev's years in power marked the heightof party-military cooperation because he provided ample resourcesto the armed forces. In 1973 the minister of defense again becamea full Politburo member for the first time since 1957. Yet Brezhnev evidently felt threatened by the professional military, and hesought to create an aura of military leadership around himself inan effort to establish his authority over the military.

In the early 1980s, party-military relations became strained overthe issue of resource allocations to the armed forces. Despite a downturn in economic growth, the chief of the General Staff, Nikolai V.Ogarkov, argued for more resources to develop advanced conventional weapons. His outspoken stance led to his removal in September 1984. Ogarkov became commander in chief of the WesternTVD, a crucial wartime command position that exists primarilyon paper in peacetime. He was retired under Gorbachev and assumed a largely ceremonial post in the Main Inspectorate. His influence was considerably diminished, although he continued topublish in the military press.

Gorbachev, who became general secretary in March 1985, wasa teenager during the Great Patriotic War and apparently neverserved in the armed forces. He has downgraded the role of the military in state ceremonies, including moving military representativesto the end of the leadership line-up atop the Lenin Mausoleum during the annual Red Square military parade on November 7. Gorbachev used the Rust incident in May 1987 as a convenient pretextfor replacing Sergei Sokolov with Dmitrii T. Iazov as minister ofdefense (see Air Defense Forces, this ch.). Gorbachev has also emphasized civilian economic priorities and "reasonable sufficiency"in defense over the professional military's perceived requirements.

Military Representation in the PartyAs of 1989, only two career military ministers of defense had

become full Politburo members. Since 1984 the minister of defense

729


has been only a candidate member. The top leaders in the Ministry of Defense, however, have been regularly elected as membersor candidat~ members of the Central Committee. Central Committee membership apparently has come with certain importantposts and major field commands. The military presence in the Central Committee has varied little over time, normally constitutingbetween 7 and 12 percent of this influential body.

Military officers with full membership on the Central Committee have generally included the minister of defense, the first deputyministers of defense, the deputy ministers of defense, the chief ofthe Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, thechief and one or two members of the Main Inspectorate, the commander of the Moscow Military District, and the commander inchief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. At the TwentySeventh Party Congress in February-March 1986, full CentralCommittee membership was granted to the commanders of theWestern and Far Eastern TVDs.

Candidate members of the Central Committee from the armedforces have included the commanders of all the military districtsand fleets, the first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorateof the Soviet Army and Navy, the chiefs of the political directoratesof the armed services, and the chairman of the Voluntary Societyfor Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy (Dobrovol'noeobshchestvo sodeistviia armii, aviatsii i flotu-DOSAAF; see Glossary). All military representatives on the Central Committee werealso deputies of the Supreme Soviet. Other military officials wereelected to the party's Central Auditing Commission (see CentralAuditing Commission, ch. 7).

Party-military interaction also occurred at lower levels, and itenabled the armed forces to coordinate their activities with localparty officials and draw on them for assistance. The commandersof military districts and fleets were usually members of the partybureau and deputies of the supreme soviet of the republic in whichthe district or fleet was located (see Intermediate-Level Party Organizations, ch. 7). Other senior military officers sat on oblast, raian,or city party committees.

Party Control in the Armed Forces

The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navywas responsible for party control over the armed forces. It organized, conducted, and reported on political and ideologicalindoctrination in the armed forces, supervised the military press,and monitored the ideological content of military publications.

730


The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navywas subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, as well as to the CPSUCentral Committee. It had the official status of a Central Committee department and reported to the Central Committee outsidethe military chain of command (see Secretariat, ch. 7). These reportsincluded information on the political attitudes and reliability ofarmed forces personnel and high-ranking officers in particular. TheCentral Committee's Party Building and Cadre Work Departmentused the information on political reliability supplied by the MainPolitical Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy to approve ordeny appointments, assignments, and promotions of professionallyqualified officers at the rank of colonel and above (see Nomenklatura, ch. 7).

The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navysupervised a network of political organizations and officers withinthe armed forces. Every armed service, territorial command, andsupporting service had a political directorate. Service branches, divisions, and military education institutions had political sections,which were smaller than directorates. Each political section hada small staff that included a chief, a deputy chief, several seniorpolitical instructors, and officers responsible for ideology andpropaganda, party organizational work, and the Komsomol (seeGlossary). A party commission of high-ranking personnel was attached to each political directorate and section. A deputy commander for political affairs was assigned to each unit of company,battery, and squadron size or larger (see fig. 32). Smaller militaryunits had primary party organizations (PPOs-see Glossary). EachPPO had a secretary, and secretaries met in their regiment's orship's party committee to elect a party bureau. About 80 percentof all companies in the Ground Forces had party organizations.They were present in half the company-sized units of the armedforces as a whole.

A deputy commander for political affairs (zamestitel' komandirapo politicheskoi chasti-zampolit) served as a political commissar ofthe armed forces. A zampolit supervised party organizations andconducted "party political work" within a military unit. He lectured troops on Marxism-Leninism (see Glossary), the Soviet viewof international issues, recent CPSU decisions and documents, andthe party's tasks for the armed forces. For Soviet military personnel, political training averaged between two and four hours everyweek. It was usually squeezed into what might otherwise be offduty hours and was therefore widely resented. The zampolit wasalso responsible for resolving morale, disciplinary, and interpersonal

731


POLITBURO

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

PARTY BUILDINGAND CADRE WORK

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COORDINATION ----ICOMMAND

Figure 32. Apparatus of the Communist Party of the SovietUnion in the Armed Services, 1988

problems, which were chronic in military units. These problemsoften involved poor living conditions, conflicts among different nationalities, and poor attitudes toward training. Like the old political commissars, the modern zampolit remained responsible forkeeping soldiers, and even entire frontline combat units, fromdeserting or defecting.

732


Since World War II, the zampolit has lost all command authority,although retaining the power to report to the next highest political officer or organization on the political attitudes and performance ofthe unit's commander. Negative reports from the zampolit could exertc~nsiderable influence on the course of a commander's career. Yetunder the principle of one-man command, tension between professional and political officers has decreased. Commanders were fullyresponsible for the political state of the troops under them, and thisresponsibility forced them to allow adequate time for politicaltraining.

In 1989 over 20 percent of all armed forces personnel were CPSUor Komsomol members. Over 90 percent of all officers in the armedforces were CPSU or Komsomol members. The figures for partymembership were even higher in such armed services as the Strategic Rocket Forces or the Border Troops, in which political reliability has been especially crucial. The Komsomol was importantin the armed forces because most soldiers and young officers werein the normal age-group for Komsomol membership.

The KGB has been another instrument of party control over thearmed forces. Its Third Chief Directorate had special counterintelligence sections that operated within regiments. The "specialsections" used networks of informers inside units to monitor foreign contacts of armed forces personnel and to protect militarysecrets. Unknown to a commander or zampolit, a KGB officer couldbe reporting on their political attitudes, outside of military or MainPolitical Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy channels.

Military EconomicsWith the notable exceptions of Khrushchev and possibly Gor

bachev, Soviet leaders since the late 1920s have emphasized military production over investment in the civilian economy. As a result,the Soviet Union has produced some of the world's most advancedarmaments, although it has been unable to produce basic consumergoods of satisfactory quality or in sufficient quantities (see Industrial Organization; The Consumer Industry, ch. 12).

Defense SpendingIn 1988 military spending was a single line item in the state budget,

totaling 21 billion rubles (for value of the ruble-see Glossary), orabout US$33 billion. Given the size of the military establishment,however, the actual figure was at least ten times higher. Westernexperts have concluded that the 21 billion ruble figure reflectedonly operations and maintenance costs. Other military spending,including training, military construction, and arms production, was

733


possibly concealed within the budgets of all-union ministries andstate committees. The amount spent on Soviet weapons researchand development was an especially well-guarded state secret. Sincethe mid-1980s, the Soviet Union has devoted between 15 and 17percent of its annual gross national product (GNP-see Glossary)to military spending, according to United States governmentsources. Until the early 1980s, Soviet defense expenditures rosebetween 4 and 7 percent per year. Since then, they have slowedas the yearly growth in Soviet GNP slipped to about 2 percent onaverage. In 1987 Gorbachev and other party officials discussed theextension of glasnost' to military affairs through the publication ofa detailed Soviet defense budget. In early 1989, Gorbachev announced a military budget of 77.3 billion rubles, but Westernauthorities estimated the budget to be about twice that.

Military Industries and ProductionThe integration of the party, government, and military in the

Soviet Union has been most evident in the area of defense-relatedindustrial production. The Defense Council made decisions on thedevelopment and production of major weapons systems. TheDefense Industry Department of the Central Committee supervisedall military industries as the executive agent of the J;;:>efense Council. Within the government, the deputy chairman of the Councilof Ministers headed the Military Industrial Commission. The Military Industrial Commission coordinated the activities of manyindustrial ministries, state committees, research and developmentorganizations, and factories and enterprises that designed andproduced arms and equipment for the armed forces.

The State Planning Committee (Gosudarstvennyi planovyikomitet-Gosplan) had an important role in directing necessarysupplies and resources to military indu·stries. The main staff anddeputy commander in chief for armaments of each armed servicefirst determined their" tactical-technical" requirements for weaponsand equipment and forwarded them to the General Staff, whichevaluated and altered them to conform to overall strategic and operational plans. Then the deputy minister of defense for armamentstransmitted the General Staffs decisions to industrial ministriesengaged in military production. He controlled several thousandsenior military officers who represented the military within theindustrial ministries. These military representatives supervised theentire process of military production from design through final assembly. They inspected, and had the authority to reject, alloutput not meeting the military's specifications and quality controlstandards.

734


In 1989 the defense industry consisted of a number of industrialministries subordinate to the Council of Ministers. The names ofmost of these ministries did not indicate the types of weaponsor military equipment they produced. The Ministry of MediumMachine Building manufactured nuclear warheads. The Ministry of General Machine Building produced ballistic missiles (seefig. 33; Machine Building and Metal Working, ch. 12). Otherministries, such as the Ministry of Automotive and AgriculturalMachine Building, also produced military equipment and components, but to a lesser extent of their total output.

These defense industrial ministries operated 150 major arms assembly plants in addition to the more than 1,000 factories thatproduced components for military equipment. Each ministry hada central design office and several design bureaus attached to it.The design bureaus, named for the chief designers who headed themin the past, built competing prototypes of weapons based on themilitary's specifications. The central design office then selected thebest design and, if the military approved it, began serial production. The aircraft design bureaus were best known because Sovietaircraft carry their designations. The Mikoian-Gurevich (MiG) andSukhoi (Su) bureaus designed fighters; the Antonov (An), IIiushin(II), and Tupolev (Tu) bureaus developed transport and bomberaircraft. The Mil (Mi) and Kamov (Ka) bureaus designed helicopters.

The high priority given to military production has traditionallyenabled military-industrial enterprises to commandeer the bestmanagers, labor, and materials from civilian plants. In the late1980s, however, Gorbachev transferred some leading defense industry officials to the civilian sector of the economy in an effortto make it as efficient as its military counterpart.

Military Technology

The Soviet Union has taken an incremental approach to military research and development. The military has deployed earlyversions of weapons and equipment with limited capabilities andhas gradually improved them. The same basic weapons system hasusually been fielded over a period of years in several different variants. Arms designers have relied heavily on integrating components from earlier models into new systems in order to providestability and compatibility in the production process. The armedforces have tended to favor weapons that were produced in massquantities, were reliable, and were easy to use in combat over expensive, complex, and technologically superior armaments. Following this rule of simplicity, the Soviet Union has produced many

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outstanding and tactically innovative weapons. Nevertheless, it hasha;d difficulties producing more sophisticated systems, such as largeairframes, small nuclear reactors, and quiet submarine propellers.These problems have forced it to resort to technological espionageand to copying Western designs. The State Committee for Scienceand Technology has tasked KGB officers and other Soviet officialsin Western countries to acquire the components or technologiesneeded to produce certain armaments.

Uniforms and Rank InsigniaIn 1989 the uniforms and rank insignia of the Soviet armed forces

were similar for all services, except the Naval Forces. Uniformsof officers and enlisted men differed only in the quality of the material used, not in their cut and style. The services could be distinguished from each other by the colors of the shoulder boards, thecollar tabs, and the service hat bands. In each service, the uniformsfor women generally were of the same color and fabric as thoseprovided for men. Marshals, generals, and admirals wore doublebreasted uniform coats. All services, except the Naval Forces, usedfull-length, medium gray, winter overcoats. Lower ranking enlistedpersonnel wore olive drab short overcoats. Naval personnel woreblack overcoats in winter. In general, Soviet naval uniforms (incut, color, and style) and rank insignia resembled those offoreignnavies.

Each service generally had five categories ofuniforms: full dress,dress, service, field, and work, with variants for winter and summer.Full dress uniforms were worn during such special military occasions as formal reviews, parades, annual service holidays, ceremonies conferring promotions or military decorations, and when takingthe military oath or performing in honor guards. Dress uniformswere used for national anniversaries, such as the that of the Bolshevik Revolution; for official receptions; while attending the theater;and as otherwise ordered. Service uniforms were worn for routineduty and during off-duty hours. Field uniforms were Worn duringtraining, maneuvers, and firing exercises. Work uniforms wereworn while performing equipment maintenance, fatigue detail, andconstruction tasks.

The colors of the uniforms varied according to the service andthe category of uniform. Full dress uniforms were sea green forthe Ground Forces and the Strategic Rocket Forces and nonaviation components of the Air Forces and the Air Defense Forces. Aviation components' uniforms were blue. Officers of all services woregold belts, breeches, and boots with full dress uniforms. The dressuniforms resembled the full dress uniforms, except that long trousers

737


and low quarter shoes were worn. The service unifonns and fielduniforms for all services were olive drab. Officer field uniforms hadcolor-suppressed insignia instead of gold, and the garrison cap orsteel helmet was substituted for the service hat. The work uniformfor all services was a field unifonn devoid of rank insignia. It wasusually an old field uniform or overalls worn as a protective garment over a field uniform.

Each of the Naval Forces four categories of uniforms (full dress,dress, service, and work) had seasonal variants. The full dressuniforms-white for summer and navy blue for the remainder ofthe year-were worn with dirks and white gloves. Dress uniformswere less ornate than full dress uniforms, and ribbons replacedmedals. Service uniforms were the same as dress uniforms, butwithout dirks and white gloves. A summer service uniform variation had a blue jacket and a garrison cap instead of a service hat.Junior enlisted personnel wore service unifonns, which were white,navy blue, white top and blue bottoms or the reverse, or other variants in winter and summer. Their jumpers had broad light bluecollars with three white stripes. Shipboard work uniforms wereeither gray or khaki. Lower ranked seamen wore visorless hats withblack bands and pigtail ribbons in the back.

All services exhibited rank insignia on shoulder boards, usinga system of gold stripes with gold stars on colored backgroundsand colored piping on the edges (see fig. 34; fig. 35; fig. 36). Navalofficers also wore sleeve stripes. Shoulder boards of marshals, general officers, and admirals possessed large stars on broad, ornategold stripes with piping on the edges. Shoulder boards of field gradeofficers displayed three longitudinal gold stripes and smaller goldstars, and those of company grade officers had two longitudinalgold stripes and even smaller stars. Shoulder boards of warrantofficers had two or three gold stars superimposed on a gold checkerboard pattern. Enlisted ranks were indicated by transverse orlongitudinal gold stripes on shoulder boards.

The background colors of shoulder boards, collar tabs, and servicehat bands varied with the service and the branch of service. TheStrategic Rocket Forces had black shoulder boards, as did theRocket Troops and Artillery, Engineer Troops, Tank Troops, andcertain other components of the Ground Forces. The MotorizedRifle Troops had red shoulder boards. The Air Forces and aviationpersonnel ofthe Air Defense Forces had light blue shoulder boards,as did the Airborne Troops. The Naval Forces had navy blue shoulder boards (see table 54, Appendix A). Metallic insignia of goldor silver were also employed to identify selected branches of theservices. Personnel belonging to one service or branch but serving

738


in another wore the background color prescribed for the latter service or branch. For example, members of an artillery battalion,which was a component of a motorized rifle division, wore the redshoulder boards and collar tabs of the Motorized Rifle Troops butdisplayed the crossed cannon insignia of the Rocket Troops andArtillery on their collar tabs. The Airborne Troops wore the lightblue background color of the Air Forces, but with the insignia ofthe Airborne Troops on their collar tabs. An exception allowed theAdministration Troops, Medical Troops, Military Procuracy,Quartermaster Troops, and Veterinary Troops to wear the colormagenta-prescribed for their branches regardless of assignment.The shoulder boards of enlisted personnel of the armed forces, except the Naval Forces, had large Cyrillic letters identifying the particular component. For instance, the Cyrillic "CA" signified Sovietarmy and was used for the five services except the Naval Forces;other letters identified the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Border Troops of the KGB, and other elements.

Military ManpowerAccording to the Soviet Constitution, all citizens had a "sacred"

duty to defend the Soviet Union, to enhance its power and prestige, and to serve in its armed forces. The armed forces have beenmanned through conscription based on the provisions of the 1967Law on Universal Military Service. In 1989 about 75 percent ofSoviet armed forces personnel were conscripts, and 5 percent werecareer noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The professional officercorps constituted 20 percent of the armed forces. An extensivereserve and mobilization system would augment regular forces inwartime. The Soviet Union also had a compulsory premilitary training program for the counfry's youth. In the late 1980s, the number of draft-age youths was stable, but fewer Russians and morenon-Russians were being inducted into the armed forces.

Premilitary TrainingMilitary and physical fitness training began at the age of ten in

the Pioneers. Their activities emphasized military-patriotic indoctrination, marching, and discipline. The Pioneers also guardedSoviet war monuments and participated in military sports gamesheld every summer since 1967. In the games, children were dividedinto commanders, staff, and troops for maneuvers that simulatedpartisan warfare behind enemy lines. Members of the Komsomol,age fourteen and older, participated in more sophisticated militarygames.

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When the terms of service for soldiers and sailors were reducedby one year in 1967, the government introduced general preconscription military training. The institution ofpreconscription training was designed to compensate for the reduced length of militaryservice by providing basic military training prior to induction.

DOSAAF organized and conducted premilitary training foryoung men and women between the ages of sixteen and eighteen.In principle, every secondary or vocational-technical school, factory, and collective farm (see Glossary) in the Soviet Union hada DOSAAF organization. Millions of Soviet teenagers received 140hours of instruction in military regulations, small arms, grenadethrowing, vehicle operation and maintenance, first aid, civil defense,and chemical defense. This training enabled them to learn advancedmilitary skills more quickly after conscription. The Soviet presshas claimed that each year 75 million people were involved in over300,000 DOSAAF programs nationwide. DOSAAF also had itsown publishing house and monthly journal.

Each union republic had a DOSAAF organization headed bya chairman and a central committee. DOSAAF worked closely withthe ministries of education and the state committees for physicalculture and sports in the union republics; it also maintained closerelations with the deputy commanders for premilitary training inthe military districts. The Premilitary Training Directorate withinthe Ministry of Defense supervised DOSAAF, yet the DOSAAFbudget was separate from that of the Ministry of Defense.. The best DOSAAF clubs were found in the Russian Republic,which included 51 percent of the population in the late 1980s and75 percent of the territory. The clubs offered specialist training,such as skiing, parachute jumping, scuba diving, motorcycle driving, seamanship, flying, and radio and electronics maintenance,which were not available in the other republics. Yet many DOSAAForganizations throughout the country lacked qualified or full-timemilitary instructors. Providing time and facilities for DOSAAFtraining was an added burden on schools and factories. In 1989the southern Soviet republics were often criticized in the militarypress for having poor premilitary training programs and sendingunprepared recruits to the armed forces. One Western observerestimated that only half the Soviet troops actually received prescribed DOSAAF instruction prior to induction. Approximatelyone-third of all inductees, however, possessed a technical militaryspecialty that they had learned in a DOSAAF club.

ConscriptsUnder the 1967 Law on Universal Military Service, all male

citizens must serve in the armed forces beginning at the age of

742


eighteen. The conscription period for servicemen was two yearsexcept for sailors, which was three years. The 1967 law reducedthe conscription period from three and four years, respectively, toprovide more labor for the economy. A nationwide system of over4,000 military commissariats (voennye komissariaty-voenkomaty; sing.,voenkomat-see Glossary) at the republic, oblast, raion, and city levelswas responsible for conscription and veterans affairs. A voenkomatwas accountable to the commander of the military district in whichit was located. All males had to report to a voenkomat when theyturned seventeen. The induction commission of the voenkomat gavepotential recruits a physical examination and reviewed their schooland DOSAAF training records.

Each year over 2 million eighteen-year-olds have reported tovoenkomat induction commissions. They have reported in the springand the fall depending on whether their birthdays were in the firstor second half of the year. Based on quotas assigned by the GeneralStaffs Main Organization and Mobilization Directorate, the voenkomat either assigned recruits to one of the armed services or granteddeferments. Assignments were based on the physical attributes, education, skills, and political background of individual conscripts. Theservices that required technical abilities or high reliability, therefore, received conscripts with the highest qualifications. For example, the Airborne Troops accepted only recruits that had beenfully trained in parachute jumping by DOSAAF. By contrast, theGround Forces and the Rear Services have had to take less qualifiedinductees. Overall, however, 90 percent of servicemen have hada secondary education.

The voenkomaty granted about one-quarter of eighteen-year-oldmen deferments from service because of ill health or family hardship. Eighteen-year-olds were also exempted from service if theywere enrolled in a higher education institution. They were required,however, to participate in the reserve officer training program ofthat institution. Those who had participated in such training programs could serve as little as a year of active duty after graduation. In 1982 education exemptions were restricted to those enrolledin a list of institutions approved by the Ministry of Defense. Youngmen not conscripted into the armed forces at eighteen remainedliable to induction until age twenty-seven. The number of mendeferred and later conscripted was probably small, however. Deferments were reportedly obtained from some induction commissionsfor a bribe of 1,000 rubles. The practice has been common enoughthat the Law on Universal Military Service mentioned punishmentfor granting illegal deferments. Soviet law did not provide for aconscientious objector status. In 1987, however, a pacifist group

743

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called Trust took advantage of Gorbachev's policy of glasnost' toprotest compulsory service in the armed forces.

Life in the Soviet Armed Forces

On the day before beginning to serve in the armed forces, Sovietconscripts have traditionally attended an induction ceremony inwhich local CPSU officials and veterans gave patriotic speeches.The next day, they were transported directly to the military unitin which they would serve 'their two- or thre~-year tours of duty.Neither the conscripts nor their families knew its location beforehand. After one month of basic training that reviewed their premilitary training, conscripts took the military oath in their regiments.In the oath, conscripts swore to guard state and military secrets,to master the craft of war, to protect state property, and to defendthe homeland and government without sparing life or blood.

Soviet troops lived under harsh conditions and strict discipline.The practice of stationing troops in isolated areas outside their homerepublics or regions and the system of internal passports kept thedesertion rate relatively low; the location of Soviet troops far fromtheir home region also enabled them to be deployed more easilyagainst a rebellious local population. Troops had about an hourper day of "free" time, much of which was used for additionalpolitical training and mandatory sports activities. Leave and temporary passes were not issued as a matter of course. New conscriptscould also expect to be harassed by soldiers in their second yearof service. Such hazing occasionally spilled over into physical abuseand theft by senior soldiers against first-year troops. Conscriptswere paid between 3 and 5 rubles per month, about enough to buycigarettes. Low pay for conscripts conserved the Ministry ofDefense's resources, but soldiers often became burdens for theirfamilies, who sent them money.

The rate of alcoholism among military personnel was reportedto be higher than in society as a whole, a fact that could be attributed to the boredom and isolation of life in the barracks. Inaddition, the expense and difficulty involved in obtaining alcoholoften resulted in petty corruption and the sale of military supplieson the black market. Soldiers were confined to the stockade forminor infractions of this type. They were sent to penal battalionsfor more serious offenses, and time spent there did not count astime toward their discharge.

Units trained six days every week in winter and summer cycles.The majority of parade drill, tactics, weapons, chemical defense,political, and physical training took place in garrison. The armedforces have strictly limited live firings of weapons, field exercises,

745


days at sea, and flight time. The average s~rviceman might participate in several three-day regimental exercises and possibly onelarger exercise in the military district in a two-year tour of duty.In addition to their military training, units have often been calledon to help with harvesting. The semiannual turnover of conscripts,one-quarter of total conscript manpower, has meant that new inductees were constantly being assimilated into the armed services.This turnover and the two-year service term made it difficult totrain and retain specialists to work on sophisticated weaponssystems.

Semiannual discharge orders from the minister of defense releasedtroops completing their active duty and automatically enlisted themin the reserves. These troops also had the option of reenlisting asextended service soldiers or applying to become noncommissionedofficers. Few did so, however. On returning home, released conscripts had to register as reserves with the uoenkomat and report toit changes in their residence, health, education, or family statusuntil their reserve obligation ended at age fifty.

Noncommissioned Officers

The armed forces had a very low percentage of noncommissionedofficers (NCOs) compared with other armies of the world and evenfewer career NCOs. Soviet NCOs were essentially conscripts. Atthe time of induction, each uoenkomat selected a few recruits to become NCOs. After training for from several weeks to six months,these new NCOs were assigned to units, but their authority overother conscripts was limited by their youth and inexperience.Moreover, because only 5 percent of Soviet military personnel wereNCOs, junior commissioned officers had to perform many tasksassigned to sergeants in other countries' armies. The armed forceshave made an effort to build a career NCO corps in order to retain needed skills, improve small unit leadership, and make a military career more attractive to conscripts. For example, in 1972 theMinistry of Defense instituted the NCO rank of warrant officerbetween the ranks of sergeant and junior officer. NCOs could alsoattend a six- to nine-month specialist course to become platoon commanders and company technicians.

National Minorities in the Armed Forces

The military tried to give the impression that soldiers of different nationalities served together harmoniously, but the number ofarticles in the military press devoted to relations between ethnicgroups itself indicated the persistence of nationality conflict withinthe armed forces. Rather than contributing to nation building,

746


service in the armed forces reportedly was more likely to increaseethnic and linguistic consciousness. In the late 1980s, the SovietUnion's non-Slavic minority groups comprised one-quarter oftheconscript pool. Western experts estimated that, as Slavic birthratesdeclined, by the year 2000 one-third of draft-age males would benon-Slavic.

The armed forces, however, appeared to have mechanisms inplace for maintaining control over national minorities in their ranks.The armed forces have been dominated by Slavs in general andRussians in particular. Russian has been the only language of com'mand, and Slavs constituted 80 percent of all combat personneland 95 percent of the officer corps. Although more non-Slavs willhave to be drafted in the future, a pervasive inability, or unwillingness, to read or speak Russian among non-Slavic, and particularly Central Asian, recruits has impeded their training andadvancement in the military. Because the Russian language wasnot taught to conscripts in the armed forces, non-Slavs have beenlimited to assignments in nontechnical and noncombat positions.Most Central Asian conscripts were assigned to Construction andTroop Billeting and served their two years in construction battalions. They received little combat training.

The military leadership viewed non-Slavs as potentially unreliablefrontline troops. For example, Central Asian Muslim soldiers weredeployed in Afghanistan during the early days of the war but hadto be withdrawn because they sympathized with their coreligionistsin that country. Moreover, non-Slavs were rarely assigned to theelite armed services. They were, however, recruited to serve withthe Internal Troops in the Russian Republic because they couldbe counted on to suppress any disturbance in areas inhabited byethnic Slavs.

Women in the Armed Forces

Under the Soviet Constitution, women had the same legal obligation as men for the defense of the Soviet Union and have beencalled on to discharge it. A women's battalion existed at the timeof the Bolshevik Revolution and during the Civil War. Approximately 800,000 women served in both combat and noncombat rolesduring World War II. According to the 1967 Law on UniversalMilitary Service, women with medical or other special training mustregister for the draft, but they have not been inducted. Womenbetween nineteen and forty may vqlunteer for active duty. In wartime women would be drafted for "auxiliary or special duty." The1967 law did not specify whether they would be used in combat.In the late 1980s, an estimated 10,000 to 30,000 women were

747


serving in the armed forces in medical, communications, and administrative support positions. Women ,were not admitted to military education institutions, and few became officers. Many Westernobservers believe that the armed forces will have to rely more onwomen in the future as the number of available Slavic men declines.

OfficersThe profession of officer in the armed forces has been presti

gious and well respected in the Soviet Union. The number of officerswas very large, in part because the armed forces have containeda large number of conscripts and relatively few NCOs. The presenceof a political officer, or zampolit, in every company or battery alsohas significantly raised the total number of officers.

As of 1989, the Soviet Union had the world's largest officer training system. At the secondary level, it had eight Suvorov militaryschools and the Nakhimov Naval Secondary School to preparefifteen- and sixteen-year-old cadets, who were often sons of officers,for direct admission into higher military education institutions.

In 1989 the Soviet Union had about 140 higher military schools,which trained officers for each armed service or combat arm. Youngmen between seventeen and twenty-one who had a secondary education could apply for admission into higher military schools. Servicemen under the age of twenty-three could also apply. Admissionwas based on a competitive examination in Russian language andliterature, Soviet history, physics, and mathematics, as well as athorough review of an applicant's political and educational background.

Each hig~er military school had over 1,000 cadets and trainedeither command, engineering, or political officers for a particularcombat arm (see table 55, Appendix A). The four- or five-year curriculum of command schools included about 60 percent militaryscience, weapons, and tactics instruction and 40 percent generalsciences education and political training. Cadets in political or engineering schools received correspondingly more political or technical instruction. Upon graduation cadets received universitydiplomas and were commissioned as junior lieutenants. The highermilitary schools and reserve officer training programs in about 900civilian higher education institutions produced about 60,000 newofficers for the armed forces each year.

Junior officers remained in their assignments for long periodsand were evaluated for promotion every four years based on theirprofessional k:nowledge, performance, and moral-political capabilities (see Glossary). Some junior officer promotions were almostautomatic because the time-in-grade requirement for advancement

748


in rank was only two years. Officers' monthly pay ranged between150 rubles for lieutenants and 2,000 rubles for generals, which wasconsiderably more than the salary of most managers in the civiliansector.

Officers had greater opportunities to commit infractions of military law than ordinary servicemen, and their most common criminaloffense was bribery. Officers inspecting units accepted bribes inreturn for overlooking training deficiencies, accidents, or disciplinary breaches. The misuse ,of state property, and vehicles in particular, was also widespread. According to the Law. on UniversalMilitary Service, however, officers could be discharged for committing acts that disgraced their titles.

Upon reaching the rank of senior lieutenant or captain, manyofficers began to prepare for competitive examinations to enter oneof seventeen military academies. Candidates for admission wererequired to have held a regimental command position and receivedexcellent ratings and to have been endorsed by the political directorate of their command or serv'ice. The two- or three-year program of a Soviet military academy was similar to command andstaff training or war colleges in Western countries. Each armedservice and combat arm had its own academy. The Frunze Military Academy, the most prestigious at its level, specialized in combined arms training but was attended predominantly by GroundForces officers. Advanced study in military academies involvedmajor military science research projects that were frequently published in books or articles. Military academies awarded diplomasequivalent to master's or doctoral degrees in the West. They alsoconducted correspondence courses leading to similar degrees.

Graduation from a military academy was practically a requirement for advancement to higher rank. In particular, graduationfrom the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, the highest-levelacademy, was a prerequisite for appointment to important Ministry of Defense and General Staff positions. Among its graduateshave been the ministers of defense of the Warsaw Pact countries.High rank has brought a salary of as much as 2,000 rubles monthlyand other perquisites that come with being part of the elite. Forexample, many generals had summer homes reportedly built withgovernment construction materials and military manpower.

Officers were not under pressure to advance in rank, and higherranking officers were not forced to retire early from the armed services. In theory, an officer could serve as ajunior lieutenant untilage forty. Mandatory retirement began at age forty and went upto age sixty for major generals. Above this rank, general officerscould get extensions and were effectively exempt from mandatory

749


retirement. In practice, many officers who resisted retirement wereput to work in civil defense or DOSAAF organizations. Highranking officers often moved into the Ministry of Defense's MainInspectorate as senior inspectors or became the heads ofhigher military schools or academies.

Reserves and Wartime MobilizationThe Soviet Union had the world's most elaborate system ofwar

time mobilization, although it was not certain that the system wouldbe as impressive in action as it was on paper. Soldiers retained areserve obligation until age fifty. For officers, the reserve obligation extended to sixty-five. Thus, Western specialists estimated thatover 50 million males were reservists. Local voenkomaty maintainedrecords of residences and other data that would be important inmobilizing the reserves.

Reserves were divided into two categories of three classes basedon age and the amount of refresher training they were supposedto receive after mobilization. Reserves were subject to periodic callups for active duty or training in the local garrison. The amountof reserve training actually conducted varied greatly.

In 1989 the Soviet Union had about 9 million servicemen whohad been discharged from active duty in the preceding five years.Only 3 million of them would be needed to bring all active GroundForces divisions to full strength in fewer than three days. Westernanalysts speculated that large numbers of additional divisions couldbe created within two to three months using civilian trucks andlarge stockpiles ofolder weapons and equipment. Such forces couldbe employed effectively against NATO's second echelons, as wellas against less formidable opponents.

Reserves, together with additional manpower and equipmentmobilized in wartime, would substantially augment the considerable strength of the peacetime Soviet military. Long favored bythe political leadership, the military has received a large proportion of the human and material resources of the Soviet Union.Guided and controlled by the CPSU, the military's strategic leadershave organized, trained, and equipped the Soviet armed forces tocapably fulfIll their assigned missions.

... ... ...

The single most complete work on the Soviet armed forces isHarriet F. Scott and William F. Scott's The Armed Forces of the USSR.The Department of Defense's Soviet Military Power, the eighth edition of which was published in 1989, contains information about

750


Soviet forces that is not availabie to the public elsewhere. The MilitaryBalance, issued annually by the International Institute for StrategicStudies, is a consistently accurate and independent source of information on the size of the Soviet defense effort. Coverage of current developments in Soviet weapons, tactics, strategy, and militaryleadership can be found in the regular columns and feature articles of many defense-oriented journals. The Air University LibraryIndex to Military Periodicals, edited by Emily J. Adams, is an excellent resource for locating these articles. The Soviet Armed Forces ReviewAnnual, edited by David R. Jones, provides coverage of changesin the Soviet military from year to year. Richard A. Gabriel andEllen Jones have written extensively on the troops behind Sovietweapons and equipment. Inside the Soviet Army, by a Soviet officerwho defected to the West and writes under the pseudonym ViktorSuvorov, also contains revealing insights into the operation of andlife in the armed forces. (For further information and completecitations, see Bibliography.)

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