, Director of( entral

‘,JIntelligence

Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense

National Intelligence EstimateVolume I—Key Judgments and Summary

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAMRELEASE !IS SANITIZED

4,-,-Freerete."'

NIE 11-13-8111 October 1982

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL .INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of theEstimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National SecurityAgency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State andEnergy.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Deportment of the Army

. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Deportment of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

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NIE 11-13-82

SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Volume I—Key Judgments and Summary

Information available as of 13 October 1982 wasused in the preparation of this Estimate.

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CONTENTS

Page

PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1

KEY JUDGMENTS 3

SUMMARY 7

I. Factors Affecting Future Soviet Ballistic Missile Defenses 7

Military Doctrine and Strategy 7Soviet ABM Programs—Historical Perspective Military Factors S8Political Factors 9Capabilities of Soviet Systems for Ballistic Missile Defense 10

The Moscow System 10New ABM Systems 10Surface-to-Air Missile Systems 14

Capabilities for ABM Deployments 16Upgraded ABM Defenses at Moscow 16Options for Deployments Beyond Treaty Limits 16Radars for Battle Management Support 19Potential ABM Deployment Rates 22

Indications of Postulated ABM De ployments 22Economic Factors 24

II. Prospects for Directed-Energy Weapons 24

Laser Systems 26Ground-Based 26Space-Eased 26

Particle Beam Weapons 26Ground-Based 26Space-Based 26

III. Capabilities of Soviet Ballistic Missile Defenses 27

Upgraded Moscow Defenses Within Treaty Limits 27Expanded Defenses at Moscow 27Widespread ABM Defense 27

IV. Future Soviet ABM Deployments 28

Revisions to the ABM Treaty 28US Withdrawal From the Treat y 29Soviet Abrogation of the Treaty 29

V. Key Uncertainties 32

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This Estimate responds to a request of the President's SpecialAssistant for National Securit y Affairs for a comprehensive assessmentby the Intelligence Community on Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM)defense. It has been prepared for use by the administration inconsidering strategic arms limitation policies, in planning US strategicforce programs, and in reviewing the ABM Treaty. It is intended to pro-vide our best answers to the following questions relevant to US policyand planning decisions:

— What are the objectives of Soviet programs for ballistic missiledefense?

— What are the estimated technical characteristics and perform-ance of present and future Soviet ballistic missile defensesystems and supporting radars?

— What potential do the Soviets have to deploy ballistic missiledefenses beyond the limits of the ABM Treaty during the next10 years or so?

— What is the likelihood that the Soviets will de ploy ballisticmissile defenses in excess of Treaty limits?

While the Estimate highlights factors bearing on the effectivenessof Soviet ballistic missile defenses it does not analyze in any detail thedegree of protection that future ABM deployments would afford theUSSR. We have not performed the analyses of the capabilities of SovietABM systems in a multiple-engagement scenario. The great complexityand severe time constraints inherent in ballistic missile defense opera-tions result in our having major uncertainties in any prediction of howwell a Soviet ABM system would function. Any assessment of SovietABM effectiveness will be an aggregation of the results of technicalanalyses of expected component performance using assumptions aboutthe characteristics of a ballistic missile attack, about some nuclearweapon effects, and about the phenomena associated with ballisticmissiles reentering the atmosphere.

Given the gaps in information and our analytical uncertainties,there are understandably many differing conclusions and opinionsabout the technical characteristics of Soviet ABM systems and compo-nents and supporting radars and about their ca pabilities to perform all

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the functions essential to ballistic missile defense. Some of thesedifferences concern capabilities on which the success or failure of afuture Soviet ballistic missile defense would de pend. We are not likelyto be able to resolve many of these issues within the next several years.Moreover, we have difficulty assigning probabilities to alternativeinterpretations of the evidence. However, the consequences of Sovietacquisition of a ballistic missile defense, despite uncertainties about itseffectiveness, are so serious that even a low probability of such anachievement is cause for concern.

Volume II of this Estimate, -The Analysis, - treats Soviet ballisticmissile defense programs in the detail required b y staff planners andanalysts responsible for policy studies and military assessments. Itsemphasis is on completeness rather than brevity. The importantfindings of the Estimate on the prospects for future Soviet ballisticmissile defense are summarized in volume I.

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KEY JUDGMENTS

The Soviets are upgrading their antiballistic missile (ABM) deploy-ments at Moscow and are actively engaged in ABM research anddevelopment programs. The available evidence does not indicate withany certainty whether the Soviets are making preparations for deploy-ments beyond the limits of the Treaty-100 ABM launchers at Mos-cow—but it does show they are steadily improving their ability toexercise options for deployment of widespread ballistic missile defensesin the 1980s. If the Treaty were abrogated by either the United States orthe USSR, we believe the Soviets would undertake rapidly paced ABMdeployments to strengthen their defenses at Moscow and cover keytargets in the western USSR, and to extend protection to key targets eastof the Urals. Such widespread defenses could be in place by the late1980s or.earl y 1990s.

Since the negotiation of the ABM Treaty in 1972, most of thetrends in strategic forces have been favorable to the USSR. The Sovietsprobably consider that they are much better able to prosecute a nuclearwar than they were in 1972. To reduce damage to the USSR inaccordance with their doctrine and strategy for nuclear war, the Sovietsare continuing to improve the counterforce capabilities and survivabil-ity of their offensive forces, to strengthen their air defenses andantisubmarine warfare forces, and to expand their passive defenses. Inthis context, we believe that an assessment by the Soviets of thecorrelation of strategic forces Would indicate that the continuing •vulnerabilit y of the USSR to ballistic missile attack is a deficiency theywould want to reduce.

We judge that in evaluating the technical performance of the ABMsystems they could deploy, the Soviets probably would not have highconfidence in how well these systems would perform igainst a large-scale, undegraded US missile attack, especially in the late 1980s byimproved US forces. However, the Soviets would probably view theirballistic missile defenses as having considerable value in reducing theimpact of a degraded L'S retaliatory attack if the USSR succeeded incarrying out a well-coordinated, effective initial strike. Also, widespreadSoviet defenses, even if US evaluations indicated the y could beovercome by an attacking force, would complicate US attack planningand create major uncertainties about the potential effectiveness of a USstrike.

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Another view is that the Soviets, in a widespread deployment,would deploy sufficient numbers of ABM systems to enhance theirconfidence in the survival of high-value targets, even in the event of afull-scale US attack.'

If certain features which we have assumed for a new advancedsurface-to-air missile (SAM) system, the SA-X-12, are realized, itspotential contribution to ballistic missile defenses would be of growingconcern as it becomes widely deployed in the USSR and Eastern Europein the mid-to-late 1980s. While we do not believe the SA-5 and SA-10SAM systems are suitable for ABM use as currently configured, theSoviets could, with an unrestricted modification and testing program,probably conduct an overt u pgrade of these systems that would providea potentially important supplement to an ABM defense. There is analternative view that the SA-5 and SA-10 without any upgrading maybe capable of operating in a limited ABM role, and that[

Dupgrade to improve potential ABM capabilities could be per-formed[

A decision by the Soviets on whether to de ploy a widespread ABMsystem would be based primarily on the answer to a crucial question:whether the USSR will face a sufficientl y threatening strategic situationin the late 1980s and beyond, for which an expanded ABM defensebased on their systems now in testing and development would make asignificant difference. If their answer is yes, then they would probablymake the commitments necessary to deploy such defenses despite theeconomic and political costs. Since their answer probably will not beclear-cut, other important factors would bias their decision towardnondeployment:

— The USSR's two-track a pproach—arms control and a militarybuildup—to further its strategic goals has achieved limits on USdelivery vehicles and constrained US defenses, while permittingexpansion of Soviet offensive forces. There are no indicationsthat the USSR is becoming dissatisfied with this approach.

— Under the Treaty the USSR has ABM defenses to protect criticaltargets in the Moscow area while the United States has nosimilar capability.

— The Soviets apparently see the Treaty as having slowed US ABMresearch and development, while they moved ahead with theirown.

'The holder of this view is the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.The holder of this view is the Director. Defense Intelligence Agency.

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On balance, we believe there is a fairly low, but neverthelesssignificant chance (about 10 to 30 percent) that the Soviets will abrogatethe Treaty and deploy ABMs in excess of Treaty limits in the 1980s. Webelieve they would see the military advantages of the defenses theycould deploy as being outweighed by the disadvantages cited above,especiall y of energizing the United States and perhaps its Allies into arapid and sustained growth in overall military capabilities, both conven-tional and nuclear, that could lead to an erosion in the 1990s of Sovietgains achieved in the 1970s and 1980s.

An alternative view notes that Soviet benefits from the Treaty,under current and projected conditions, far outweigh the potential gainsfrom abrogation. As a result, the likelihood of abrogation is consideredto be very low (10 percent or less) in the 1980s unless current conditionschange substantially. This view cautions, however, that the Soviets havea motivation to deploy a widespread ABM system to fill the serious gapin their defenses, and there is a .higher probability of such a deploymentin the 1990s. Moreover, they have the capability to complete such a de-ployment in only a few years.'

Another view holds that the crucial question for Soviet leaders iswhether deployment of ABMs is required to attain Soviet strategicobjectives. According to this view, the following factors should be givengreater weight in judging Soviet motivations for deployment of awidespread ABM defense. Soviet doctrinal requirements for dama ge-limiting ca pability have always provided the motivation to deployABMs both at Moscow and elsewhere. Now, as a result of advances by

• the USSR in ABM technology, the USSR's counterforce advantage overthe United States, and US plans to deploy survivable and hard-target-capable ballistic missiles, the Soviets may no longer deem it necessary to

• restrain themselves from further ABM deployment. They have takenessentially all the steps necessary to prepare for a decision to deploy andhave demonstrated confidence in their current ABM technology bydeploying the new ABM system at Moscow. The Soviets may beexpected to accompany any widespread ABM deployments with anactive-measures campaign to manipulate Western attitudes and actionsand to inhibit energizing the United States and its Allies into sustaininga rapid growth in military capabilities. The holder of this view believesit is not possible with current intelligence data to evaluate and quantifywith confidence the extent to which various factors would influence theSoviets to abandon or retain the ABM Treaty. However, given thepreparations the Soviets have made and the fact that the motivations

I The holder of this view ts the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army.

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discussed above strongly influence Soviet decisions, the main text mayhave understated the prospect for widespread ABM deployment.'

Al3M deployment by the late 1980s or early 199would give the USSRA widespread Soviet

an important initial advantage over the United States in this area. Wehave major uncertainties about how well a Soviet ABM system wouldfunction, and the degree of protection that future ABM deploymentswould afford the USSR. Despite our uncertainties about its potentialeffectiveness, such a deployment would have an important effect on theperceptions, and perhaps the reality, of the US-Soviet strategic nuclearrelationship. According to an alternative view, the Soviet Union will nothave the capability in this decade to deploy ABM defenses which wouldsignificantly affect the US-Soviet strategic nuclear rêlationship.s

• The holder of this view Is the Director. Defense Intelligence Agency.' The holder of this view is the Director. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Department of

State.

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SUMMARY

1. The Soviets' antiballistic missile (ABM) programswould enable them to havc deployed by the late 1980sto early 1990s widespread' ballistic missile defensesthat would have an important effect on the percep-tions and perhaps the reality of the US-Soviet strategicnuclear relationship. Other means envisioned by theSoviets for reducing potential damage to the USSRfrom ballistic missiles—not assessed in this Estimate—include Soviet counterforce strikes on enemy ballisticmissiles and facilities for their control, attacks onballistic missile submarines by Soviet antisubmarinewarfare (ASW) forces, hardening and mobility ofSoviet military forces, and passive defense measures.We believe the Soviets regard ABM as a criticalelement in their future capability to reduce damagefrom a 'US ballistic missile attack.

2. The available evidence does not indicate withany certainty whether the Soviets are making prepara-tions for ABM deployments beyond the limits of theABM Treaty, but it does show that, through their ABMdevelopment and deployment programs, the Sovietsare steadily improving their ability to exercise optionsfor widespread ballistic missile defenses. In makingany decision to deploy ABMs in excess of Treatylimits, we believe Soviet leaders would give firstconsideration to the net effect of ABM deployments ontheir capability to perform the missions called for bySoviet strategy, taking into account likely US strategicoffensive and defensive force deployments. Theywould also consider other factors such as the overallmilitary, political, and economic implications of revis-ing, abrogating, or withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.

I. FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE SOVIET

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES

Military Doctrine and Strategy

3. The Soviets' present military doctrine and strate-gy emphasize offensive operations to neutralize or

'A widepread defense, in the western USSR or nationwide, wouldbe one deployed to protect key military, leadership, and militaryindustrial targets. Although we employ the terms -widespread - and"nationwide'. in the text, it should be noted that many areas of lesserImportance might not be protected by ABM coverage.

eliminate US nuclear forces and reject mutual vulnera-bility as a desirable or permanent basis for the US-Soviet strategic relationship. The Soviets prefer superi-or capabilities to fight and win a nuclear war with theUnited States, and have been working to improve theirchances of prevailing in such a conflict.

4. We have no reason to expect any major alter-ations in Soviet doctrine and strategy during the 1980sand beyond; It is likely that in the future the Sovietswill of necessity be unable to rely as heavily onoffensive forces to destroy US strategic nuclear deliv-ery means. They are clearly aware that US strategicforce modernization programs will make more diffi-cult and less certain the future effectiveness of coun-terforce strikes by the USSR. At the same time, theSoviets are continuing to take measures to reduce thevulnerability of their own strategic offensive forces asthey recognize that fixed-base weapons are becomingincreasingly vulnerable. They will not view thesetrends as requiring them to reduce the offensive,counterforce orientation of their strategy in favor ofsome assured level of survivability, as would be im-plied by a defense-dominated strategy. Rather, theywill see the situation as placing a greater burden onactive and passive defenses to achieve their strategicobjectives.

5. Changes in the future capabilities of Soviet itra-tegic . defenses could have a greater effect on the US-Soviet strategic relationship than at any time in thepast, particularly if there were major reductions in'offensive missiles of the two sides under a new armsagreement. Thus, from the standpoint of the objectivescalled for by their doctrine and strategy, the Sovietsmay have greater incentives in the 1980s and 1990s toacquire a credible ballistic missile defense.

Soviet ABM Programs—Historical Perspective

6. The Soviets apparently formalized programs fordefenses against ballistic missiles early in the 1950s,but our understanding of some of these early programsis quite limited and subject to interpretation. Since the1950s, they have devoted considerable resources toballistic missile defense and have started deployment

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of ABM systems before developmental testing wascompleted. There are differing assessments aboutwhether the history of Soviet ABM research, develop-ment. and de ployments indicates two distinct overallprograms—one for defenses at Moscow and anotherfor a widespread defense—or whether the Soviets havebeen pursuing a single program with several potentialapplications. The question of whether they have beenpursuing a single or dual ABM program has littlebearing on key issues of the technical performance andeffectiveness of the ABM systems and componentsunder development and the USSR's capabilities todeploy them. According to one view, however, thecontinuation of two programs in parallel is indicativeof Soviet commitment to ABM and implies the Sovietsmay intend to deploy defenses beyond Moscow'

Military Factors

7. The Soviets negotiated the SALT 1 agreements toachieve political and military objectives that they •believed could not be attained by Unconstrained devel-opment and deployment of strategic weapons. Fromtheir perspective in 1972, the Soviets expected theABM Treaty to enhance their counterforce capabilitiesby inhibiting the United States from deploying anextensive ballistic missile defense of Minuteman. Atthe same time, they probably assessed that their ownABM systems then under development would beunable to protect critical targets from US missileattacks at least through the 1970s. They hoped tocontinue their own ABM development programs whileinducing the United States to slow down. A key ..issue ishow the Soviets now assess the effect of a continuationof the ABM Treaty limitations on the present andfuture relationship of US and Soviet military power.

8. Since the negotiation of the ABM Treaty, most ofthe trends in strategic forces have been favorable tothe USSR. The Soviets probably consider that they aremuch better able to prosecute a nuclear war than theywere in 1972. To reduce damage to the USSR inaccordance with their doctrine and strategy for nucle-ar war, the Soviets are continuing to improve thecounterforce capabilities and survivability of theiroffensive forces, to strengthen their air defenses andantisubmarine warfare forces, and to expand their

'The holders of this dew are the Director, Defense IntelligenceAgency, and the Assistant Chtel of Staff for Intelligence. Depart-ment of the Army.

passive defenses. In this context, we believe that aSoviet assessment of the correlation of strategic forceswould indicate that the continuing vulnerability of theUSSR to ballistic missile attack is an obvious deficiencythat should be redressed; however, various politicaland economic factors as well as military requirementswould figure in any Soviet decision to deploy ABMs inexcess of the Treaty limits.

9. There is an additional view that to appreciate themilitary factors affecting Soviet attitudes toward ABMsone should consider the totality of the Soviets' commit-ment to a strategic war-fighting capability, as exempli-fied by their continued reliance on the damage-limit-ing forces and measures cited in the precedingparagraph. Their doctrinal requirement for victory in anuclear war dictates acquisition of all military forcesneeded to achieve that objective, including ABMs.'

10. Developments in military technology in the1980s that could increase the Soviets' incentive forextensive deployment of ballistic missile defenses inthe 1990s include advances in ABM technology thatresultcd in a significant increase in system effective-ness and development of survivable radars that couldcontribute to a hard-point ABM defense of ICBMfields. Other technical advances by the United States,however, such as the development of maneuveringreentry vehicles (MaRVs)—evader MaRVs suitable foruse against hard targets—could reduce Soviet incen-tives to undertake widespread deployment of ABMsystems now being developed.

11. An additional view holds that US coUntermeas-ures provide additional incentives for the Soviets toimprove the capabilities of their ABM systems; howev-er, prospects for US countermeasures would have littleeffect on Soviet incentives for undertaking widespreadABM deployments.'

12. Their increasing vulnerability to a ballistic mis-sile attack could influence the Soviets to expand theirABM programs. The growing size and sophistication ofFrench, British. and Chinese ballistic missiles, and thedeployment of Pershing II would be taken into ac-count by the Soviets. Most important, of course, the US

The holders of this view are the Director, Defense IntelligenceAgency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Depart-ment of the Army.

' The holder of this view is the Director, Defense IntelligenceAgency.

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MX and Trident programs would, later in the 1980s.confront the Soviets with much improved hard-targetthreats.

Political Factors

13. A decision on whether to deploy a widespreadABM system would be made by the top Soviet leader-ship, based primarily on military rather than politicalor economic factors. The crucial question for theSoviet leaders is whether the USSR will face a qualita-tively different and sufficiently threatening strategicsituation in the late 1980s and beyond, for which theywould perceive that a widespread AI1M system wouldmake a significant difference. If their answer is yes,then the Soviets would probably make the commit-ments necessary to deploy such a system and wouldaccompany the deployment with a pro paganda blitz tominimize short-term political losses. The answer, how-ever, probably will not be clear-cut to Soviet leadersand important factors would bias their decision towardnondeployment: .

— The primary factor is the continued effectivenessof the method the USSR developed in the early1970s to further its strategic goals. In essence, thismethod has been a two-track approach callingfor arms control and a Soviet military buildup.During the 1970s the USSR achieved limits onthe number of US delivery vehicles through theSALT process, constrained US defenses throughthe ABM Treaty, and gave priority to buildingup its own offensive forces. This two-track ap-proach worked well in the 1970s, and there areno indications that the USSR is becoming dissatis-fied with it.

— A second factor is the advantage the USSRcurrently enjoys by virtue of the ABM defensesto protect critical targets in the Moscow area,even though these defenses will remain limitedunder the ABM Treaty. In contrast, the UnitedStates has no similar capability. Also the Sovietsapparently see the Treaty as having slowed USABM research and development, while theymoved ahead with their own. They would notlightly forgo these advantages and risk stimulat-ing US ABM development and deploymentprograms.

— A third factor is the significant resource commit-ment for such a system, which would have to be

weighed in the resource-constrained environ-ment of the 1980s. Allocation of these resourcesto ABM would probably affect some other mili-tary programs, rather than simply add to theannual growth that has gone into defensespending.

— A fourth factor is the absence of strong leader-ship at the center. There is already a lack of cleardirection under the Brezhnev regime. The re-building of new power and personal relationshipsin the aftermath of Brezhnev's departure are notcircumstances conducive to making the toughdecision to initiate a widespread ABM de ploy

-ment within at least the next several years. Thereis an alternative view that by the time criticaldecisions would have to be made on ABM de-ployment—not expected before the 1990s, ac-cording to this view—the succession process islikely to be complete. It is unlikely, therefore,that the absence of strong leadership will bearsignificantly on Soviet ABM programs in the near.term.)

— The effects of a positive ABM decision on therelationship with the United States and WesternEurope would be counted on the negative side,but if the Soviets felt compelled to deploy awidespread ABM system, this factor would prob-ably not hold them back. The leadership wouldassume that the West would attempt to adjust tothe fact that the USSR was developing substantialABM defenses, but the Soviets would stress thedefensive nature of the system and try to , useWestern public opinion to constrain the freedomof action of Western governments.

14. An alternative view stresses that the crucialquestion for Soviet leaders is whether deployment ofan active ABM defense is required to attain Sovietstrategic objectives. In addressing this question, theSoviets would consider the value . of such deploymentin the context of the totality of their strategic militaryposture, which includes a broad range of damage-limiting forces and tactics. The factors that are listedabove would also certainly affect Soviet judgment, butnot necessaril y toward the negative:

— While the Soviets have every justification forbeing satisfied with their two-track approach of

The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Stall forIntelligence, Department of the Army.

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arms control and military buildup, there arefactors that may convince them that this ap-proach with regard to ABMs has served out mostof its useful life. These include the present levelof the Soviets' ABM technology, their currentICBM counterforce advantage, and the plannedUS deployment of survivable hard-target-capablestrategic ballistic missiles.

— While the ABM defense equation is one-sided inthe Soviet favor, it is not clear that the Sovietsbelieve that further ABM deployments wouldprecipitate US offensive or defensive deploy-ments substantial enough to offset the benefits oftheir own ABM deployments. The Soviets wouldundoubtedly undertake active measures to ma-nipulate Western opinion and lessen such USreactions.

The Moscow System

16. The present ballistic Missile defenses at Moscowconsist of four sites with aboveground launchers andengagement radars, and the large radars—designatedDog House and Cat House—to provide target acquisi-tion and tracking data. (See figure 1.) These defenses—now being upgraded—could provide only a limited,single-layer defense; that is, they could intercept bal-listic missile reentry vehicles (RVs) only outside theatmosphere. These defenses probably could counter asmall attack not accompanied by penetration aids suchas chaff and decoys. Attempting to counter a largernumber of attacking RVs, however, would rapidlyexhaust the available interceptors.

— This view points out that consistency and conti-nuity of party control of military doctrine andderived programs have been a hallmark of Sovietmilitary development and deploymeht. The de-ployment of widespread ABM defenses, a funda-mental doctrinal requirement, involves decisionsover such an extended period of time that it isunlikely to be affected by leadership changes.

— The Soviets could assess the increase in theiroverall strategic strength that could result fromsuch a deployment as adding significantly totheir influence in Western Europe.'

Capabilities of Soviet 5.ystems. for Ballistic Missile

Defense

15. The Soviets' assessment of the capability of theABM systems and components they are developing is akey factor bearing on their policies and programs forballistic missile defense. We do not know how theyassess these capabilities. In our own assessments, thereare uncertainties and differences of view among intelli-gence agencies about some of the capabilities of individ-ual Soviet ABM systems and the potential of some Sovietsurface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to perform in an ABMrole. We have been unable to assess in any detail thedegree of protection from ballistic missile attack that theSoviets could achieve by deployment of the ABMsystems and components they have under development.

New ABM Systems

17. We believe that the upgraded defenses at Mos-cow and any additional ballistic missile defenses theSoviets may deploy in the 1980s will incorporatecomponents currently under development. Of these,the upgraded defenses at Moscow .will apparentlyinclude a new large fixed engagement radar whichmay have capabilities for search and target acquisi-tion; silo launchers; a high-acceleration, short-rangeinterceptor; and a modified version of the exoatmos-pheric interceptor deployed with the original defensesat Moscow. The rapidly deployable system the Sovietsare developing—a site for which could be deployed inmonths rather than years—would consist of trans port-able engagement radars, aboveground launchers, andeither a long-range interceptor or a high-acceleration,short: range interceptor or both. .

18. There are major uncertainties and gaps in infor-mation about' key performance parameters of the com-ponents of ABM systems the Soviets are developing anddeploying. Agencies differ in their analyses and inengineering judgments about these key parameters and,as a result, reach different conclusions about the capa-bilities of Soviet systems to intercept US ballistic missilereentry vehicles. These capabilities would vary, de-pending on various factors—for example, whether tar-get acquisition and tracking data (handover data) wereprovided to the ABM launch site from a remotelylocated radar providing battle management support.

19. The characteristics of Soviet ABM componentsthat have the greatest impact on assessments of theireffectiveness, based on evidence of test activity, in-clude the search and target discriminiation capabilities

• The holder of this view is the Director, Defense IntelligenceAgency.

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Figure 1The Moscow Antiballistic Missile System

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of engagement radars, the target-handling capabilitiesof all radars, and, if MaR Vs arc de ployed, the maneu-verability of Soviet interceptors. Our estimates of thecapabilities of the upgraded ABM defenses the Sovietsare deploying at Moscow and rapidly deployablesystems available to the Soviets are shown in table I.Intelligence Community agencies' differing judg-ments. shown in the table, about the potential capabili-ties of the rapidly deployable Al3M system are basedprimarily on their assessments of the performance ofits target-tracking engagement radar—designated theFlat Twin. The table shows Al3M system capabilitiesfor one-on-one intercepts of current t ypes of US ICBMand submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) RVsnot accom panied by penetration aids. (One-on-oneintercept capabilities do not account for the effects ofmultiple interceptors being used against multiple RVs.)

20. Agency estimates in the table show that, withhandover data, these ABM systems could intercept all

currentl y; deployed tyries .4;if US ICBM and $LBM RVsnot accompanied by penetration aids, with the excep-tion, according to one view,C

21. Operating autonomously, without handoverdata, these systems according to one assessment wouldhave virtually no practical capability to interceptICBM and SLBM. RVs with a single Flat Twin radar.

—1Therefore, for autonomous intercepts, manyFlat 'Twin engagement radars would be needed ateach defense site or in a defended region for defenseagainst multiple RVs arriving simultaneously fromdifferent directions and for defense against MaRVs.°According to another assessment, a single Flat Twinradar would have the ca pability for autonomous oper-ation over a useful threat sector. All-azimuth coverageis not required at all defended regions under a numberof operational conditions. Where extended-azimuthcoverage is desired, multi ple radars could be assignedadjoining angular sectors. This view judges that one

'The holder of this view is the Deputy Director for Intelligence,Central Intelligence Agency. •

' The holder of this dew is the Deputy Director for Intelligence,Central Intelligence Agency.

radar could handle more than the ICBM corridor for adefended region and that several radars could coverthe entire potential strategic ballistic missile threatregion.'

22. For defense against reentry vehicles accompa-nied b y aids, chaff, and decoys

oneassessment is that the estimated limitations in theperformance of Soviet ABM systems make it highlyunlikely that current systems deployed or under devel-opment would be able to discriminate RVsE.

° Another assessment is thatavailable Soviet discrimination techniquesE

Imake it possible that current'could ABM systems eployed or under developmentcould defeat those penetration aids." An additionalview notes that, while such discrimination techniquesmay be available, it is not clear the Soviets are usingthem. In any event, they would be useful only against

C

:would depend on the specific characteristicsof the reentry vehicles and accompanying penetrationaids. Achievement of a good-quality defense wouldrequire multiple interceptors for each MaRV. In addi-tion, even with handover data, multiple Flat Twinradars would be required at a site to be able to defendagainst two or more MaRVs arriving simultaneously,since their trajectories could prevent a single FlatTwin from tracking more than one of them.

' The holders of this view are the Director, Defense IntelligenceAgency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Deport-ment of the Army. -

The holder of this view is the Deputy Director for Intelligence.Central Intelligence Agency.

" The holders of this view are the Director, Defense IntelligenceAgency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Depart-ment of the Army.

The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Staff,Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.

-3= All agen-cies agree that the capabilities demonstrated by a newlarge Soviet radar under development, if incorporatedinto operational systems, would enhance discrimina-tion performance.

23. The capabilities of Soviet ABM systems againstevader-type maneuvering reentry vehicles

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24. Taking these differing estimates into account.we believe it is unlikely that the most critical perform-ance parameters of Soviet ABM components will all beat the more threatening or less threatening end of therange of our present uncertainty about them. In anycase, incremental improvements in the characteristicsof Soviet ABM components under development, aswell as new and follow-on components, are expectedto make Soviet ABM systems more capable in the late1980s and beyond. Thus, the likely technical capabili-ties of Soviet ABM systems which could be deployedappear to be sufficient to inject significant uncertaintyinto any US calculations of the effects of any plannedballistic missile attack.

Surface-to-Air Missile Systems

25. Our assessments of the capabilities of Sovietsurface-to-air missiles to intercept strategic ballisticmissile RVs are summarized in table 1. The only SovietSAMs that any agency believes could potentially beused in 'this role are: the SA-5, i widely deriloi,ed'SAMfirst introduced in the. mid-1960s; the SA-I0, whichfirst became operational in 1980; and the SA-X-12, anadvanced tactical SAM still under development.

26. SA-5 and SA-10. We do not believe the current-ly deployed SA-5 and SA-10 systems are suitable foruse in ballistic missile defense. The Soviets are notlikely to have developed these SAM systems with anABM mission in mind, nor have they overtly conduct-ed the upgrade program required to give these SAMs asignificant ABM capability. We do not believe that theSoviets could covertly upgrade the SA-5 or SA-I0systems to achieve more thar . marginal capabilities tointercept strategic ballistic missile reedtry vehicles.

penetration aids. According to this view, the SA-5,used in conjunction with a dedicated ABM system,could handle some RVs, thereby releasing the dedicat-ed ABM system to defend against more difficulttargets. This view also stresses the significant similar-ities between the SA-10 and the SA-X-12, a systemwith demonstrated antitactical ballistic missile(ATBM) capabilities, and believed to have the poten-tial to intercept some ICBM and SLBM RVs as well.Because of these similarities, it is possible that the SA-10 also has antiballistic missile design features. Thepotential capabilities of the SA-10 are sufficient for itto be used in a preferential defense of small targetareas. In addition, upgrade toimprove potential XBM ca pabilities could be per-formed.

2.'28. We believe that in the absence of the ABM

Treaty restrictions, and with an unrestricted modifica-tion and testing program, the Soviets could upgradethe capabilities of these systems to intercept certainstrategic ballistic missile RVs. Such an upgrade, even ifit provided much less capability than a dedicatedABM system, could be an important supplement to aballistic missile defense—for example, a self-defensecapability, a point defense against ballistic missileslaunched from China or Europe, or possibly againstSLBM RVs.

_29. SA-X-12. We believe the SA-X-12, an advanced

tactical surface-to-air missile system, will have bothantiaircraft and antitacticil. ballistic missile capabili-ties. (See figure 2.) . The system has . two interceptors,one of Which has higher acceleration, speed, and rangethan the other.0

27. An alternative analysis concludes that the SA-5and the SA-10 may have a limited ABM role. Accord-ing to this view, the SA-5 was intended as a dualsystemE

DWith handover data the SA-5system should be capable of providing a limitedregional defense against RVs not accompanied by

3The SA-X-12 system could be ready fordeployment in the next year or so with the lowerperformance interceptor and somewhat later using thehigher performance interceptor.

30. Available evidence suggests that the-SA-X-12 isintended for use by Soviet ground forces. However, asystem with antitactical ballistic missile defense capa-bilities could have many of the features one wouldexpect to see designed into an ABM system. Making a

"The holder of this utego is the Director. Defense intelligenceAgency.

14 .SECRET

Engagement radar Command and control vehicle

Acquisition radar Transloader

Figure 2SA-X-12 System Components

TELAR for lower acceleration interceptor* TELAR for high , acceleration interceptora

TELA - transporter. erector, launcher, and radar.

58769F 9-82

15

wyeeizEire

SECRET

number of assumptions about design features thesystem could have,r weconclude that the 'A-X-12 with the higher acce era-tion interceptor could have the capability to interceptall current types of US ICBM and SLBM RVs except

C. As shown in table 1, theSA-X-12 could have a sign: :cant autonomous capabili-ty to defend a small area against US ICBM and SLBMRVs. There is an alternative view that there areinsufficient data to characterize the capabilities of theSA-X-12 against strategic ballistic missiles as •*signifi-cant." On the basis of less generous assumptions aboutthe system's design features, its capability-would bemarginal."

Capabilities for ABM Deployments

Upgraded ABM Defenses at Moscow

31. The Soviets are in the process of upgrading andexpanding the ballistic missile defenses at Moscow,thus far within the limits of the Al3M • Treaty freefigures 3 and 9):

— The upgraded defenses at Moscow include silolaunchers for a high-acceleration missile to con-duct intercepts within the atmosphere and for along-range missile to conduct intercepts outsidethe atmosphere. As long as the ABM Treatyremains in effect the Soviets will deploy themaximum number-100 launchers—at Moscow.

— While we are not certain of all the componentsthat will make uó the upgraded defenses, the twolarge radars providing tattle management -sup-port (Dog House and Cat House) will probablyremain part of the Moscow defenses.

— A new large phased-array radar is under con-struction near Pushkino north of Moscow, whichwill provide 360-degree coverage and is probablyintended to control ABM engagements. We areunable to judge whether the Pushkino radar willhave the capability for search and target acquisi-tion. If it does, we believe it would be morelikely to have short-range rather than long-rangesearch and target acquisition capabilities. If itwere to have long-range search and target acqui-sition capabilities, the Pushkino radar would

"The holders of this view are the Assistant Chief of Staff,Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, and the Director ofNaval Intelligence, Department of the Navy.

close existing gaps in radar coverage by the DogHouse and Cat House and could provide targetacquisition and tracking data for expanded ABMdeployment in the western USSR. If it were tohave short-range search and target acquisitioncapabilities, it would be able to provide battlemanagement support for defenses at Moscow,reducing the need for the Cat House and DogHouse radars.

Options for Deployments Beyond Treaty Limits

32. We have postulated four options for SovietABM deployments which represent an expansion be-yond ABM Treat y limits of the u pgraded defenses nowbeing deployed at Moscow, with increasing numbersof ABM launchers for defense of areas beyond Mos-cow. For the three options that postulate a widespreaddeferlse, we have assumed a rapidly deployable systemusing components the Soviets are developing, consist-ing of radars for target tracking and missile guidance,aboveground launchers, .a long-range interceptor, anda high-acceleration interceptor like the US Sprint. (Seefigure 5.) These components would provide the Sovietsa two-layer defense—that is, a defense permittingintercepts outside and inside the atmosphere. Thedeployment options we have postulated are:

— Option 1: A 500-launcher defense at Moscow.

— Option IA: A 500-launcher defense at Moscowand 900 aboveground launchers in the westernUSSR.

— Option 2: A500-launcher defense at Moscow and• 1,500 aboveground launchers throughout the

USSR.

— Option 3: A 500-launcher defense at Moscow and3,000 aboveground launchers throughout theUSSR.".

"We emphasize that our four options were created for illustrativePurposes only; In any actual deployment the size, target coverage,and mix of interceptors and supporting radars could be differentFrom those we have assumed. Thus, variations in these factors can bemade for use in US defense anal yses. The numbers of launchers Ineach option represent different levels of effort, and are not basedupon assumed Soviet requirements to defend against • particular USattack or to provide a given level of defense of key targets atMoscow or beyond. In our options we have assumed ABMs would bedeployed to achieve coverage of military and nonmilitary targets ofhigh value to the Soviets. The Soviets might choose a deploymentpattern that would maximize the defense of specific types oftargets—for example, heavy ICBM silos.

16

1 i

eksM i

___I 1I ',

1 \le---------1I,

\I

— — ---..., s Tulap.

,

)1Kaluga

Oka

freeretw

• Operational Galosh launchers(above ground)

0 Silos under construction0 40

Kilomelers

637868 ■082

17

..-.. . IChekhov;

t4Cat House radar ,V

i. ,

-.-.

Sarpukhov 7----," .-..,„ ...__,! (..■..._.,.---------,-----.....;',...S7-

'.' •

. "A13orovske

Figure 3

Present Status of Upgraded Ballistic Missile Defenses at Moscow

Kalinin ' J\r ' ,vo/

Wr.9

Kimry +.\ •, s 1

./

k s ' 1 , "s „,.._ , /

' pain - 8 Galosh iaunchers .....:, •Xr • , P Zagorsitk

. • Jr ' 8 Si-losP.,.8 Galosh launchers3 1

,...et

E - 4 • „Z

18 Galosh launchers. . , __.------','■-•4,- iPhbsekfrarr Pushkino •

, ,/; ON ,.. tiga .„, a , 0 1 - s

----0

Klya

- _..-•B-Pik • t ds '•, • ,

4, -- 7-•-•c_ .

".'( 1\• i clla

) .1i. -47- -- 42- - * 44-

or , 44A;(10 -1.1.0 ' • -ki., \,,.. vv. )

ssoia. ABM rain qtr.."'

- l2 Si t./

Mozhaysk#, . -- ,•-• 8

r; ..e• Probable new Al complex,,

t iE-24

.0•Doi Housen3tlar i •

.- 4 -lb,: -t 1 , .,. .) . ..-,

-8 Silos° 11 8 attlo'sh launchers—?-...\- i' \ .._ ....... •-- -.... 416.. Voskre \ssensk ,_.

ABM supportII i

,,,,, *-.. ----i76 \ 6. ,8 .,

laCility --•, , ', ki

Kolomna4

_

18

Figure 5Potential Elements of a Rapidly Deployable ABM System

Flat Twin Engagement Radar Pawn Shop Guidance RadarLong-Range Interceptorin Canister High-Acceleration Interceptor

Note: Ordwings not io icale.

owSevrerg's'

587830 ,0.82

Radars for Battle Management Support

33. Among the factors affecting the pace of Sovietdeployments are the requirements for radars provid-ing battle management support, about which there areuncertainties and differences of view. While agenciesdisagree about the autonomous capabilities of therapidly deployable ABM system we have assumed,there is agreement that the ABM systems associatedwith the four dep loyment options would operate mosteffectively using handover data from large long-rangesearch and target acquisition radars. The Soviets havea number of large phased-array radars that, to varyingdegrees, could provide ballistic missile early warning,attack assessment, and battle management supportdata. These radars include the two radars at Moscow—Dog House and Cat House—and radars on the periph-ery of the Scwiet Union-15 older Hen House radarsand five new radars operational or under construction.These five new radars will have better capabilities

than the Hen House. The estimated azimuthal cover-age of these large radars, as well as the Pushkino radar,is shown in figure 6.

34. All agencies agree that the large phased-arrayradars on the periphery of the USSR have the techni-cal potential to provide target-tracking data for sup-port of a widespread ABM system, but agenciesdisagree about their suitability—their location andvulnerability—for a battle management support role.Agencies differ about whether the Soviets would de-ploy a widespread ABM system that relied on-theseradars for battle management support, or insteadwould require, to assure the system's effectiveness, anetwork of other radars in the interior of the USSR—prohibited by the ABM Treaty—that have not yetbeen observed to be under construction.

35. One view holds that the ABM defenses that theSoviets could deploy which relied on the peripheral

19

63:: '9 9-V

Sounclaeylopevse,a,, .snot necestap.,

Figure 6Estimated Azimuthal Coverage of Ballistic Missile Detection and Tracking Radars

C> New phased-array radars under construction

ET; Hen House radars

Dog House and Cal House radars

Pushkino radar

20

4E.OR Fri"'

radars for battle management support could be quick-ly and easily overcome by the United States because ofthe vulnerability of the radars to attack. Therefore, thelarge radars are unlikely candidates for the key ele-ments upon which a widespread ABM defense woulddepend:

— The forward locations of the •peripheral radarsand their present limited defenses make themmore vulnerable to destruction by ballistic mis-siles as %%Al as aircraft and cruise missiles. Radarsin the interior would not be vulnerable to thesame degree. The peripheral radars do not fillthe existing gaps in battle management coverageand only look outward, making them vulnerableto blind-side attacks by ballistic missiles, regard-less of the number of ABMs deployed to defendthem.

— Because of their low operating frequencies theyare extremely susceptible to electromagnetic ef-fects (such as,blackotit) of nuclear bursts.:

, warheads detonated . beyond the range,of del nses could render such a radar use;ess for_ T1E inutes to hours.0

3— In order to be potentially effective against cur-rent US ballistic missiles, a ' Widespread ABMdeployment beyond the western USSR wouldrequire a network of four or five new radars. Weassume the new radars Would provide-360-degreecoverage,• and wad be located in the interiorwhere they would be less vulnerable to attack.Finally, we assume the new radars would operateat a higher frequency which would make themless susceptible to nuclear weapons effects."

36. Another view holds that the large peripheralradars, including the older, less capable Hen Houseradars, are suitable for providing battle managementsupport to a svidespread ABM deployment:

— Given the most likely scenarios, it is unlikely thatcruise missiles or aircraft would su pPress theseradars in time to prevent precision tracking ofattacking strategic missiles. In addition, radars

located on the periphery would be no morevulnerable than those in the interior to suppres-sion attacks using ballistic missiles. Likely in-creases in the ballistic missile defense of thePeripheral radars in the course of a widespreadABM deployment would improve their protec-tion from blind-side attacks.

—All radars are susceptible to electromagneticeffects of nuclear bursts, but rendering theseradars ineffective by such means would be asignificant operational undertaking.E.

— Moreover, radars on the periphery would beunaffected by nuclear bursts in the interior.Similarly, nuclear bursts associated with defenseof the peripheral radars would not blind ABMengagement radars in the Interior."

.37. If. for whatever reasons, Ihe . SoViets decided . todeploy ABM defenses in excess of Treaty limits, .webelieve the circumstances surrounding such a decisionwould call for deployments to be in place as rapidly aspossible. To this end, we believe the Soviets wouldmake use of the large radars operational or underconstruction, including those on the periphery of theUSSR. for battle management support. We believe theSoviets would provide some active defenses for theperipheral radars and would make evolutionary im-

.provements in these radars. In addition, the .), wouldprobably construct new radars in the interior toimprove battle management support. The large DogHouse and Cat House radars near Moscow couldprovide battle management support for ABM de ploy

-ments throughout much of the western USSR, as inOption IA. Such a system, in order to be viable, wouldprobably require additional battle management sup-port—from the Pushkino radar (provided it had long-range search and target acquisition capabilities), froma new search radar (possibly at Moscow), and from thelarge peripheral radars. There is an alternative viewthat—while not precluding Soviet deployment of addi-tional acquisition radars for redundancy, possibly even

" The holders of this view are the Deputy Director for Intelli-gence, Central Intelligence Agency. and the Director. Bureau ofIntelligence and Research. Department of State.

"The holders of this view are the Director, Defense IntelligenceAgency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Depart-ment of the Army.

21SCCRCI

large numbers with less sophistication than the periph-eral radars—holds that at present there is no basis inevidence for such an eventuality."

Potential ABM Deployment Rates

38. In assessing Soviet capabilities for ABM deploy-ments we have also considered requirements for sup-

porting command, control, and communications net-works, for production of nuclear materials andwarheads, and for manpower and troop training. Webelieve that these would not be pacing factors in therate of deployment. Launch site construction andABM com ponent production, however, probablywould be. There are uncertainties and differences ofview, as explained in volume II, about the effect ofthese factors on the rate at which the Soviets coulddeploy silo and aboveground ABM launch sites. As aresult of these differences, as well as differences aboutthe requirements for battle management support ra

-dars, we have postulated three forces with differingdeployment rates for each of the deployment optionsdescribed in . paragraph. 32. In all three forces, 'deploy-ment of the expanded defenses at Moscow is paced bythe rate of silo construction. A 500-launcher defense atMoscow could be completed several years sooner ifaboveground launchers were used instead of silos. Allthree force postulations assume, for the purposes of theEstimate, a high-priority program in which the Sovietswould implement the necessary Production and de-ployment initiatives during 1982 (or, in this su pposi-tion, already have taken such initiatives) and that thedeployments in excess of ABM Treaty limits, underthis assumption, would begin about 1985." (Thehood of such deployments is addressed later.) Thethree force postulations are:

— Force A, which is paced by the constructionschedule for engagement radar production,launch site deployment, and, for widespreaddeployments beyond the western USSR, deploy-ment of a network of large new radars.

— Force B, which is paced by the rate of engage-ment radar production and launch site deploy-

"The holders of this Igen, are the Director, Defense IntelligenceAgency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Depart-ment of the Army.

"For purposes of this Estimate, we have arbitrarily chosen 1982as the date for im p lementing the necessary production and deploy-ment initiatives. If the Soviets have alread y made a deploymentdecision, the sustained peak ABM deployment rates we haveprojected could be achieved a year or two earlier.

ments and for which we assume that the radarsoperational or under construction will providethe requisite battle management support.

— Force C, which is based on the same assumptionsas Force B, except that it is paced by the rate oflaunch site construction and not by the rate ofengagement radar production. it also assumes amix of silo and aboveground launchers atMoscow.

39. These three forces for each of the deploymentoptions are shown in figure 7. As a result of ourassumptions more significance should be attached tothe pace of deployments we have postulated ratherthan to their ultimate size and composition. Under thevarious force postulations, significant Soviet ABM de-ployments could be operational by the late 1980s orearly 1990s, as shown in table 2, assuming that theSoviets made the decision to initiate them this year.However, because of differing assumptions about pac-ing factors, the dates of completion of the deploymentscould vary.

Indications of Postulated ABM Deployments

40.E

TI22

,

Figure 7Potential Soviet Deployments Beyond ABM Treaty Limits'

Operational launchers

1982 84 861982 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 2000

'Assumes Soviet deployment decision in 1982: no launcher deploymentsbeyond Treaty limits until 1985. Does not represent judgments about thelikelihood attic deployments shown.

bA 500-launcher defense at Moscow could be completed several yearssooner if aboveground launchers were used.

88 90 92 94 96 98 2000

- Force APaced by engagement radar production and launch site and largeradar construction

Force BPaced by rote dengagement radar production and launch siteconstruction

--Force CPaced by rate of launch site construction; MUMCS ml, a silo andaboveground launchers at Moscow

'787730-10.11.16+

236CCRET

1,000

500

• • , :

01982 84

SOO silo launchers at Moscow

86 88 90 92 94 96 982(200 0 1982 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 2000

Option 2

3.500

3.000

2,500

• 2,000

1,500

1.000

500

Option 3

3.500

3.000

.2,500

2.000

1.500

1.000,

500$00 silo launchers at Moscow3.000 aboveground launchers nationwide

Option lb

MOO

3,000

2.500

2.000

1.500

.500 silo launchers at Moscow1.500 aboveground launchers nationwide

Option IA

3.500

3.000

2.500

2.000

1.500

1.000

500

500 silo launchers at Moscow900 aboveground launchers in western USSR

SECRET

Table 2

Dates of Completion for Postulated Soviet ABM DeploymentsForce A Force B Force C •

500-launcher defense at Moscow (Option 1) •• 1991 1989-91 1988

1.400-launcher defense for key targets in westernUSSR (Option IA) 1991 1989-91 1988

2.000-launcher defense for ke y targets nationwide(Option 2) 1993 1990-92 1988

3.500-launcher defense for key targets nationwide(Option 3) 2000 1995-99 1991

• There is an alternative view that Force C would be implausible because the postulated deploymentrates would seriously compete with the Soviets'ability to carry out other military programs. The holder ofthis view is the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Department of the Air Force.

• A 500-launcher defense at Moscow could be completed several years sooner if aboveground launcherswere used instead of silos.

-Seerel-

42.E

14. While there are differing views about the eco-nomic implications of a widespread Soviet ABM de-ployment on other military programs and on theSoviet economy, we believe .that, if Soviet leadersconcluded. that such a program was necessary, eco-nomic considerations would not deter them frompursuing it. It should be noted, however, that thecircumstances under which the Soviets would embarkon such a deployment would probably involve in-creased efforts in a number of other military programsby the USSR (and the United States). These programsand the cost of the widespread ABM deploymentwould further strain an already strained Sovieteconomy.

•II: PROSPECTS FOR DIRECTED-ENERGY

2 WEAPONS

Economic Factors

43. The estimated 10-year procurement and operat-

ing costs of a widespread, 2,000-launcher ABM de-fense (Option 2) could amount to some 25 percent ofstrategic defense expenditures and about 13 percent ofspending on all Soviet strategic forces. During 1983-92,the estimated costs of a 100-launcher defense underTreaty limits would amount to about 5 percent ofstrategic defense costs and a little over 2 percent of thespending on all strategic forces, similar to the propor-tion of spending for ABMs in the 1970s."

45. The Soviets assessment of their prospects fordeveloping operationally practical directed-energyweapons for ballistic missile defense could affect theirdecision about ABM deployments in excess of Treatylimits. The USSR has been working on military appli-cations of directed-energ y technology as long as andmore extensively than the United States. The Sovietshave the expertise, manpower, and resources io devel-op those directed-energy weapon and military supportsystems that prove to be feasible. Directed-energysystems for ballistic missile defense, if they prove to befeasible and practical, would most likely be used inconjunction with conventional ABM systems and sup-porting radars, at least initially.

"There are considerable uncertainties in the cost-estimatingmethodology applied to Soviet military programs.

24

1

25

SCCRET

46. Of the types of directed-energy technolog y withpotential application to ballistic missile defense, evi-dence is strongest that the Soviets are pursuing devel-opment of high-energy laser ABM weapons. We be-lieve that the Soviets have a program to develop laserweapons for ballistic missile defense, although its fullscope, concept of weapon operation, and status are notclear. There are limited indications that the Sovietshave performed research to investigate the feasibilityof particle beam weapons (PBW).

advances in large-aperture mirrors and in pointing andtracking accuracies. The y would also require verylarge space boosters having perhaps 10 times thecapacity of those now in use. We ex pect the Soviets tohave such boosters in the late 1980s. In view of thetechnological requirements, we do not expect them tohave a prototype space-based laser weapon systemuntil after 1990 or an operational system until afterthe year 2000.

Particle Beam Weapons

Ground-Based

49. Soviet particle beam weapon (PBW) technologyand related efforts have reached a level suitable forconducting experimental research on the feasibility ofseveral applications, including ground-based ballisticmissile defense. We doubt that the Soviets are yetcapable of building PBWs, or that they are close tosolutions for the technical .problems . involved. Webelieve Soviet development of any prototype ground-based PBW, if feasible, would be at least 10 to 15 yearsin the future.

Laser Systems

Ground-Based

47. There are many unknowns concerning the feasi-bility and practicality of ground-based laser weaponsfor ballistic missile defense. We do not know, forexample, how the Soviets would handle the problem ofheavy cloud cover prevalent in many areas of theUSSR containing-facilities the Soviets would want to

'protect: Nevertheless, we are conCerned tibout themagnitude of the Soviet effort. It would be consistentwith Soviet philosophy and practices to deploy aweapon system even if its capability were limitedunder some conditions. There are large uncertaintiesin any estimate of when a Soviet laser weapon couldbe available. We expect that the high-energy laserfacility at the test range will be used during the 1980sfor testing the feasibility of ballistic missile defenseapplications. If feasibility is demonstrated, our judg-ment is that.a prototype ground-baied laser weaponfor ballistic missile defense would theit have to be builtand would not begin testin g until the early 1990s. AnInitial operational capability (IOC) probably would notoccur until after the year 2000. An alternative viewholds that, if tests from this facility prove successful inengaging ballistic missile RVs, the Soviets would nothave to construct a new prototype weapon, and there-fore a deployed ground-based laser weapon system forballistic missile defense could reach IOC by the early-to-middle 1990s."

Space-Based

50. Space-based PBWs would not be encumberedby the atmospheric propagation effects of ground-based PBWs and therefore appear more feasible; theissue is one of developing an operationally practicalsystem. The Soviets have a research program on atleast some of the aspects of Space-based PBWs. Theseweapons would be quite different from the ground-based PBWs; the particle energy and current require-ments would be much lower and the systems require-ments would be far less stressing. Nevertheless, thetechnical requirements for such a system, such asextremely precise pointing and tracking, are severe,and it is unlikely that the Soviets could develop aprototype space-based particle beam weapon to de-stroy hard targets like missile RVs before the end ofthe century. According to one view, systems -intendedto disrupt the electronics of ballistic missiles, requiringsignificantly less power, could probably be developedand deployed in the 1990s."

Space-Based

48. While space-based weapons for ballistic missiledefense are probably feasible from a technical stand-point, such weapons require significant technological

" The holders of this view are the Director, Defense IntelligenceAgency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Depart-ment of the Army.

"The holder of lids view is the Director. Defense IntelligenceAgency.

26

.SCCRCT

III. CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET BALLISTIC

MISSILE DEFENSES

Upgraded Moscow Defenses Within Treaty Limits

51. The projected upgrade of the defenses at Mos-cow with 100 ABM launchers—the Treaty limit—willprovide the Soviets with a much more reliable, two-layer capability to defend critical targets at Moscowagainst an attack by some tens of current types of USRVs and against increasingly so phisticated third-coun-try missiles. Like the present system, the long-range,exoatmospheric interceptors in the u pgraded defensescould intercept RVs targeted against areas well beyondMoscow." In a large-scale attack, the projected 100interceptors would quickly be exhausted, but theymight be effective in preferentially defending selectedtargets in the Moscow area, such as national commandand control facilities. The Soviets may close existinggaps in coverage of radars providing battle manage-ment support of the Moscow systehi, either by con-

.structing a new radar or radars if the Pushkino radardoes not have a long-range search and target acquisi-tion capability-0e, according to one assessment, possi-bly by relying on the large peripheral radars toprovide battle management support."

Expanded Defenses at Moscow

52. The upgrade to the defenses at Moscow isexpected to provide the Soviets with a foundation forexpanding their defenses. With a firepower level ofabout 500 -interceptors (Option 11), the, Soviets couldMake hardened targets around 'Moscow, especiallycommand bunkers, less vulnerable to a substantial USforce of attacking RVs. The leakage likely to resultfrom such an attack would cause severe damage tomost of the aboveground, unhardened facilities and tosome of the hardened target facilities as well. Against asmaller scale attack, a defense like Option I would

"We believe the upgraded defenses at Moscow are intended toprotect targets In the Moscow area. Similarly, the expanded 500-launcher defense at Moscow included in the four deploymentoptions which we postulated was envisioned for defense of targets inthe area of Moscow. However, exoatmospherIc intercepterslaunched from sites at Moscow could intercept US ICBM and SLBMRVs targeted against areas a few hundred kilometers distant. Thedegree of defense afforded targets beyond Moscow would, of course,depend on the number of interceptors available and whetherpenetration aids were used by the attacking force.

"The holder of Slits !stew is the Director, Defense IntelligenceAgency.

allow the Soviets to spread their interceptor coverageto a larger number of targets over a larger area. Theeffectiveness of such a defense against attack by thirdcountries, such as China, would be considerable.

Widespread ABM Defense

53. If the Soviets were to deploy an ABM defenseinvolving as many as 1,400 to 3,500 launchers, as inOptions IA, 2, and 3. assuming the deployed systemswere reasonably effective, the potential effect on theUS strategic missile force would be substantial. A USfirst strike in the face of such a heavy defense wouldbe degraded, perhaps to a significant degree. A USsecond strike would be degraded even more, becausethe lower number and rate of RV arrivals in mostareas would result in lower leakage rates for thedefense.

54. The actual effectiveness of such a defensewould depend, not only on the performance of thedeployed ABM systems, but also on the vulnerabilitiesof key elements of the network and the potential or anattacking force to exploit them. We have not analyzedthese problems in detail. For example, in addition toprotecting the key targets, considerable numbers ofinterceptors would have to be allocated for protectionof the radars providing battle management support.Hundreds of RVs might be required for a direct attackon all these radars for the attacker to have highconfidence of their destruction. An attack to openselected corridors would require considerably' fewerRVs to give the .attackeeigh.confidenct:ln neutraliz-ing the targeted radars

iven the uncertainties involved, the pros-pect ofQGattack with only a few RVs per radar woulddiminish a Soviet planner's confidence in the perform-ance and survivability of the radars. Planning andexecution of an attack to destroy or neutralize theseradars would be more difficult under conditions inwhich the United States rode out an initial Sovietstrike, because of the reduced number of surviving USweapons and the potentially degraded US capability toexecute a coordinated attack.

55. We have not quantitatively assessed, and areuncertain about, the potential ability of a widespread

27

-

SECRET

ABM system to reduce overall damage and to protectkey military functions. It would probably be moreeffective against SLBMs than against ICBMs, if ade-quate coverage of SLBM approaches were provided bybattle management support radars. US countermeas-ures such as decoys, chaff, and maneuvering RVscould reduce its effectiveness.[

In any case, widespread Soviet deploymentof an AU system, even if US evaluations indicated itcould be overcome by an attacking force, wouldcomplicate US attack planning and create major un-certainties for US planners about the potential effec-tiveness of a US strike. Additionally, according to oneview, any evaluation of the effects of a widespreadABM defense to reduce damage should consider thepotential ABM capabilities of the SA-5 and SA-10systems, which could further Complicate US attackplanning."

56. If the capabilities of the SA-X-12 noted in table1 are realized, its potential contribution to ballisticmissile defenses would be of growing concern as itbecomes widely deployed in the USSR and EasternEurope in the mid-to-late 1980s.

IV. FUTURE SOVIET ABM DEPLOYMENTS

57. There are a. number. of situations involvingABM Treaty revisions, abrogation:or withdrawal initi-ated by the United States or the USSR which couldresult in Soviet deployment of ABMs beyond currentTreaty limits. At present, the Soviets apparently valuethe ABM Treaty for both political and military rea-sons; they are probably concerned about a major UScommitment to ballistic missile defense. We do notforesee a Soviet initiative to revise, abrogate, or with-draw from the ABM Treaty within the next severalyears. The Soviets do not need to revise the ABMTreaty limits to support what we believe to be theirnear-term objectives—the currently observed modern-ization of the Moscow ballistic missile defenses. Thereare considerable uncertainties about what situationwill prevail beyond about the mid-1980s. There is analternative view that, while noting that the upgrade to

The holder of this. view is the Director, Defense Intelligence

the defenses at Moscow is currently consistent with thelimits of the ABM Treaty, holds that the evidence isinsufficient to judge whether or not the Soviets havenear-term objectives to deploy beyond the Treaty

CJIT

Revisions to the ABM Treaty

58. The United States is considering ICBM basingoptions which include ABM defenses that could re-quire revision of the ABM Treaty. Any US defense ofMX which the Soviets view as viable would cause abasic reevaluation of their offensive and defensivestrategies. The Soviets' response would depend on anumber of factors, including the size of the additionaldefenses contemplated by the United States. Theywould be r`esistant to a US initiative to defend MX;should the United States insist on Treaty modifica-tions, the Soviets might flatly refuse, thus forcing theUnited States to withdraw from the Treat), to defendMX. Nevertheless, should the Soviets agree to such aUS-proposed modification, it is unclear to us whatconcessions they would try to extract in a revisedTreaty—whether their ABM program objectiveswould be to increase deployments at Moscow, alongthe lines of Option 1, to defend ICBMs, or to establishARM deployment areas elsewhere in the Soviet Union.At a minimum the Soviets probably would make otheradjustments in their strategic forces, such as increasingtheir offensive system deployments and giving thembetter .capabilities to penetrate US ABM defenses:

-- We have not specifically examined a deploymentoption for ICBM defense alone, but the systemsthe Soviets could deploy in the mid-to-late 1980scould be used to provide a degree of ICBMdefense, such as a defense of their heavy ICBMs.

— The advantage of providing a better defense forimportant targets in the Moscow area—intended,for example, to defend against Chinese attacks—could be offset by the disadvantage of allowingthe United States comparable numbers-of ABMsfor defense of ICBMs. We would be concerned,however, that the expanded ABM productionand deployments that such expansion wouldrequire, probably including radars at Moscow to

s' The holder of this view is the Director, Defense IntelligenceAgency. Agency.

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close gaps in battle management coverage, wouldput the Soviets in an improved position to extendtheir defenses beyond Moscow.

We doubt that the Soviets themselves would initiaterevision of the Treaty in order to deploy ABM de-fenses as noted above.

US Withdrawal From the Treaty

59. If the United States were to withdraw from theABM Treaty, we believe that the Soviets would in-crease their ballistic missile deplo y ments and improvetheir capabilities to penetrate a US defense. Whilevarious factors might Potentially constrain Soviet ABMdeployments, we believe that, tinder the conditionsthat would be likely to attend US withdrawal, theSoviets' damage-limiting objectives would almost cer-tainly lead them to rapidly deploy a widespread ABMsystem on the scale of Option 2, for completion in the

• early 1990s, as noted below. They might not immedi-ately begin . such a widespread deployment . after the

• US withdrawal, but rather would expand the Moscowdefenses while assessing US intentions and their own

options.

Soviet Abrogation of the Treaty

60. While all agencies agree that the Soviets are notlikely to abrogate or withdraw from the ABM Treatywithin the next two years or so, there are alternativeviews (see paragraphs 62 to 64) about the chances that

•they would do se) after that time and about the largeradars for battle management support. These alternative views are based in part on differing assessments ofthe potential effectiveness of the ABM defenses theSoviets could have by the late 1980s to early 1990s. Allagencies agree, however, that, if the Soviets abrogated.the ABM Treaty, they would deploy a widespreadABM defense in the western USSR, by the late 1980sto early 1990s, and most agencies agree the defenseswould be extended east of the Urals. To explain theiractions and minimize short-term political losses theSoviets would claim that the United States was aboutto abrogate or that, because of US offensive anddefensive force actions, the USSR was forced to act.

61. We believe that if the Soviets decided to abro-gate or to withdraw from the Treaty at any timeduring the next 10 years, their decision would be based

on the intention to initiate de ployment of a wide-spread system, in both the western USSR and east ofthe Urals. on the scale of Option 2, for com pletion inthe early 1990s:

— If either the USSR or the United States abrogatedthe ABM Treaty, we believe the Soviets woulddeploy a widespread ABM defense using thelarge radars now operational or under construc-tion for battle management support, and wouldconstruct a network of new large radars in theinterior of the USSR, less vulnerable than thoseon the periphery. They would move to enhancethe Moscow ABM defenses—thereby protectingthe highest concentration of national command,control, and communications, political, military,and military industrial targets in the SovietUnion—and would expand these defenses asquickly as possible to cover other critical targetsin the western USSR, including many of theirICBM complexes. A widespread western USSRdeployment could be completed by the late.1980s to early 1990s, if key decisions were Madein 1982, as postulated in the several'options.

— The' Soviets would also deploy by the early 1990sABMs to protect selected important targets eastof the Urals, with battle management supportprovided by the large peripheral radars, and thenby the new interior radars as they becameoperational. Some of these radars also would bebuilt in the western USSR to improve the battlemanagement support capabilities for ABM de-ployments there. The pace of construction of thelarge radars would depend substantially on thedegree of urgency and the availability of neces-sary components; these radars probably could becompleted by the early 1990s.

— The Soviets probably would not have high confi-dence in the capabilities of this widespread ABMdefense against a large-scale undegraded USmissile attack. On the other hand, the Sovietsmight believe that a well-coordinated -initialstrike on US military forces and supporting com-mand, control, and communications facilitieswould result in a poorly coordinated, greatlyreduced US retaliatory strike. The degree ofprotection they tni;,- .%t achieve against this type ofUS attack by a combination of widespread ABM

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defenses, improved air defenses, and passivedefenses might weigh heavily in any Soviet as-sessment of the USSR's ability to satisfy militaryobjectives. We cannot evaluate the extent towhich this factor would influence the Soviets toabrogate the Treaty, but we believe it would bethe key military factor if such a step were taken.

On balance, we believe there is a fairly low butnevertheless significant chance (about 10 to 30 per-cent) that the Soviets will abrogate the Treaty anddeploy ABMs in excess of Treaty limits in the 1980s.We believe the Soviets would weigh the militaryadvantages of such a deployment as being outweighedby the disadvantages, especially that of energizing theUnited States and perhaps its Allies into a rapid andsustained growth in overall military capabilities, both.conventional and nuclear, that could lead to an erosionin the 1990s of Soviet gains achieved in the 1970s and1980s.

' 62, .An alternative view holds that it is unlikely (lessthan a 10-percent chance) that the Soviets would takethe initiative to abrogate the ABM Treaty in the 1980s.Soviet benefits from the Treaty, under current andprojected conditions, far outweigh the potential gainsfrom abrogation. This view is based on the following:

— The ABM Treaty allowed the USSR to signifi-cantly close the gap in ABM research and devel-opment and to surpass the United States in rapiddeployment capability. Furthermore, as noted inparagraph 13,.the Treaty still places a drag on USresearch and development for ABM.

— The asymmetries in the - valtie of a- single . ABMdeployment greatly favor-the USSR. The value ofwhat lies within the Moscow ABM deploymentarea is veil, high, as noted in paragraph 61. Nosimilar concentration exists in the United States.Therefore, the USSR's strong incentive to protectthis asymmetry is another reason why Sovietleaders are unlikely to abrogate the Treaty.

— SALT limits give Soviet defense planners certain-ty about the inventory of US RVs. Thus, whenthe strategic defense of the USSR is planned, theSoviets know the size (outer limits) of attack toexpect. This makes it possible to estimate therequirements for various levels and types ofdefense. Thus, there is a strong Soviet incentiveto retain both the ABM Treaty and the RV limitsunder SALT.

Significant technological breakthroughs by theSoviets that would drastically alter their ABMcapability are unlikely in the 1980s. Even abreakthrough in principle would not be easy toapply in practice within the decade.

In sum, the Soviets have effectively combined forcestructure development with arms control in SALT Iand II, as noted in paragraph 13. Thus the holder ofthis view believes there are virtually no objectivereasons for the Soviets to abandon the treaties unlesscurrent conditions change substantially. This viewemphasizes, however, that, while the probability ofabrogation is very low in the 1980s, the Soviets have amotivation to deploy a widespread ABM system andthere is a higher probability of de ployment in the1990s. To complete their strategic defenses, the mas-sive and expensive air defense system (and the passivedefenses) must be complemented by ABMs. Further-more, their' ABM program would permit widespreaddeployment in only a few years, a time during which,

. at least initially, the deployment could outpace poten-tial US responses." •

63. Another alternative view holds that the Sovietsare unlikely to abrogate the ABM Treaty during the1980s, because the conditions that led to Soviet accep-tance of the Treaty—including the perception of thepotential for US technological and manufacturingcapabilities to outstrip those of the USSR—still pertain;the political costs of abrogation, particularly in West.'ern Europe, would be a further restraining factor; and,finally, the Soviets will not have the capability, todeploy during this decade ABM defenses that couldsignificantly alter the US-Soviet strategic . nuclearrelationship."

64. Another alternative view holds that the follow-ing significant factors should be given greater weightin judging Soviet motivations for deployment of awidespread ABM defense:

— Soviet doctrinal requirements for damage-limit-ing capability have always provided the motiva-tion to deploy ABMs both at Moscow and else-where. The Soviets' restraint in the early 1970s,as noted in paragraph 7, was driven by theoverriding requirements to limit US ABM de-

" The holder of this view to the Assistant Chief of Staff forIntelligence, Department of the Army.

"The holder of this oicao to the Director, Bureau of Intelligenceand Research, Department of State.

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ployments to enable them to achieve a counter-force capability against undefended US ICBMsand by the Soviets' recognition that their systemswere not then capable of adequate defense. Sincethen, however, important changes in the natureof both Soviet and US systems have occurred:Soviet ABM technology has evolved te a pointwhere, as noted in paragraph 20. it is judgedcapable of defending against many kinds ofballistic missile 111Vs; the USSR has achieved aMIRV counterforce advantage; and the UnitedStates is planning to deploy survivable and hard-target-capable hallistic missiles. This view holdsthat, as a result the Soviets now may judge thatthe military advrtage lies on the side of furtherABM deployment and that restraining the Unit-ed States through the ABM Treaty is no longer amilitary necessity! .

— This view notes that the Soviets, in their criteriafor judging adequacy of performance, considereffectiveness in the .total context of their overalldamage-limiting capabilities as part of their planto fight and win a nuclear war. The holder of thisview concludes that, while not providing a leak-proof defense, al widespread ABM deploymentusing present technology and systems under de-velopment, combined with passive defense meas-ures and possibly t ugmented by SAMs performingin an ABM role,could satisfy the requirements ofSoviet military strategy for limiting damage tocritical targets in the USSR. Also, the Sovietswould deploy sufficient numbers of ABM systemsto enhance their confidence in the survival ofhigh-value targets, even in the event of a full-scaleUS attack.

— The Soviets have taken essentially all the stepsnecessary to preparefor a decision to deploy.

iABM radar and nterceptor developments haveproceeded to the point where deplo yments ofviable systems is possible, and they are in theprocess of improving their network of long-rangeacquisition radars r the periphery of the SovietUnion. In this view the Soviet ABM system forwidespread deployment appears to have thegeneral features of a good ABM system designwith the technical potential to engage all current-ly deployed types1 of US ballistic missile RVs.Moreover, confidence in current ABM technol-ogy is demonstrated by deployment of the new

A BM system at Moscow. [j

_Dwinespread ABM defense,the Soviets appear to have an adequate andexpanding production base for such deployment.It is unlikely that they would have carrieddevelopment and testing to the point they havewithout planning for the production base tosu pport a deployment decision. Similarities be-tween components of the rapidly deployablesystem and the new ABM defenses being in-stalled at Moscow demonstrate that at least apartial production base already exists.

— This view—while certainly not precluding Sovietdeployment of additional radars for redundantbattle management support, possibly even largenumbers with less sophistication than the periph-eral radars—holds that they would not be neces-sary and at present there is no basis in evidencefor them. In this view, large fixed acquisitionradars, whether located in peripheral or interiorregions of the Soviet Union, would have the samevulnerabilities.

— The Soviets may be expected to accompany anywidespread ABM deployments with an active-measures campaign to manipulate Western atti-tudes and actions. They would attempt to lessenthe impact of abandoning the ABM Treaty byfocusing attention and blame on the UnitedStates and by taking action to inhibit energizingthe United States and its Allies into sustaining arapid growth in military Capabilities. The Soviets.may therefore perceive long-term military andpolitical advantages as outweighing any short-term political disadvantages connected with arapid wides pread ABM deployment.

On balance, the holder of this view believes that theSoviets have prepared themselves, and may havesufficient motivation, to deploy ABMs beyond presentTreaty limits. The decision for such deployment couldbe made at any time. By initiating a rapid deploymentin the mid-1980s, the Soviets could confront the.United States in a matter of a few years with Sovietballistic missile defenses effective enough to createserious doubts about the credibility of the US nucleardeterrent. The holder of this view believes It is notPossible with current intelligence data to evaluate andquantify with confidence the extent to which variousfactors would influence the Soviets to abandon or

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retain the ABM Treaty. However, given the prepara-tions the Soviets have made and the fact that themotivations discussed above strongly influence Sovietdecisions, the main text may have understated theprospect for widespread ABM deployment."

V. KEY UNCERTAINTIES

Lm The holder of this view is the Director, Defense IntelligenceAgency.

32,s

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