FIFTH SECTION FINAL DECISION ON THE ELIGIBILITY of Application No. 50425 / 06 by George Soros against France

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting 31 August 2010 as a Chamber composed of :Peer Lorenzen , President,Renate Jaeger,Jean- Paul Costa,Rait MarusteIsabelle Berro -Lefvre,Mirjana Lazarova TrajkovskaGanna Yudkivska , Judges,and Stephen Phillips , Deputy Section Registrar ,Given the above application lodged on 13 December 2006Given the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,Having deliberated , decides as follows :FACTS

1 . The applicant, Mr George Soros, is an American citizen, born in 1930 and lives in New York. He is represented before the Court by Mr A. Soffer , a lawyer in Paris , New York and Israel. The French Government (" the Government" ) were represented by their Agent, Ms E. Belliard, Director of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.A. The circumstances

2 . The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the parties , may be summarized as follows .3 . The applicant company founded in 1988 Q. F., an important stakeholder investment funds in the American, European and Asian markets . On 12 September 1988, the applicant held a meeting in New York with several investors. Following this, a Swiss banker , M., asked the applicant if he wished to meet P. which envisaged with other investors to acquire securities of a major French bank , S., in order to take control.4 . The applicant mandata one of his advisers , T. , to consider this proposal. On 14 September 1988 , T. B. met a collaborator P., and P. himself, who gave him the proposed project in its different branches and objectives P., namely the acquisition of 35 % stake in the bank S. It was stated to T. that this operation had the support of the government. No letter of confidentiality of this project was signed between the participants in the meeting, although the project was not made known to the general public. On the occasion of contacts continued for ten days , T. received by facsimile draft agreements from B. However, the applicant decided not to participate in the takeover of the bank S. as explanations about the investment strategy and the subsequent management of the bank were vague and lacked the project , he said, seriously.5 . September 19, 1988, after refusing the offer of P., the applicant decided to acquire his company Q. F. a bunch of shares of four French companies recently privatized , the bank S., for a total of $ 50 million . He left his traders to determine the place of purchase and the proportions between the companies. Thus , Q. F. acquired between September 22 and October 17, 1988 , 160,000 shares of the bank S. for $ 11.4 million. Of this amount, $ 7 million were invested in the French market and 4.4 on the market of the London Stock Exchange .6 . Between 19 and 27 October 1988 , that is to say, a few days after it acquired the company Q. F. decided to sell part of the shares of the bank S. , 95 000 of them . The remaining 65,000 were sold a month later , on 21 November 1988. Q. F. realized a profit of approximately $ 2.28 million by buying and reselling quickly these actions , including $ 1.1 million on the French market.7 . Attempted takeover of the bank was revealed to the public October 28, 1988 by a newspaper article . It failed because of a defense strategy of the bank.8 . On 1 February 1989 the Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) decided to investigate the activity of the bank's securities S. between June 1 and December 21, 1988 to examine whether certain transactions were the result of insider trading . During her investigation, she questioned the applicant in writing and T. about the progress of the disputed facts . July 31, 1989 , after the investigation had been completed, the SEC took a decision on the relevant parts of the allegations against the applicant are as follows :" A. There is , in case no precedent for similar situations , the development of practical and financial structures makes it more and more frequent;

b . Against these practices and these structures , the current wording of Article 10.1 [ of Ordinance No. 67-833 of 28 September 1967 ] , does not, in his eyes , trace with certainty border states between licit and illicit ;

c . It is therefore essential that the provisions of Article 10.1 are specified , by any appropriate means to do so, in order to remove for the future , any ambiguity in such matters . "

9 . On 31 July 1989, the COB, which had raised other contentious transactions , decided to inform the prosecutor of Paris the results of its investigation. By letter dated September 5, 1989 , the prosecution asked for further clarification from the SEC on the commission by the applicant of insider trading within the meaning of Article 10.1 of Ordinance No. 67-833 of 28 September 1967 when applicable . By letter of 12 September 1989 , the President of the COB replied as follows:"I can not and you confirm that , with respect to operations performed by four individuals [the applicant] , having been expressly invited by [P. ] to join in the realization of his project , the COB that in the absence of a written rule , a recognized law or ethics recognized by the profession , including the violation has been established practice, the beam elements provided by the survey did not provide him not the case, to trace with certainty the precise boundary between licit and illicit . "

10 . At that time , the Minister of Finance, Mr. Brgovoy , took measures in order to bring more clarity to stock trading . He created such a market ethics committee charged with defining the boundaries between legal and illegal practices. The commission submitted its report January 10, 1990 (see " Relevant domestic law and practice " section, 28 and 29).11 . Following the work of this committee , the Minister of Finance issued an order July 17, 1990 concerning approval of Regulation No 90/ 08 of the COB on the use of inside information (see " law and practical part relevant " , 30). This regulation was intended to clarify the different categories of insiders as well as behaviors that could be accused. According to the applicant , the adoption of this text would be consecutive to the present case .12 . Moreover, the Council of the European Communities adopted a directive Nov. 13, 1989 intended to clarify and harmonize the Member State level the notions of "inside information" and " insider" (see " Relevant domestic law and practice" part , 34).13 . In a letter dated 15 December 1989, the applicant replied to the questions in the context of the investigation by the SEC , and tried to justify its investment.14 . An investigation procedure was opened in 1990 against several persons, including the applicant, suspected of having committed insider trading taking advantage of inside information to intervene in the stock market. During this investigation, which lasted ten years, four judges succeeded . The applicant was indicted March 19, 1993 . During his single hearing June 30, 1993 , like other protagonists of this case which his colleague T., he pointed out that the facts were old and could not remember the exact content of the information it had been issued concerning the collection of securities contemplated by P.15 . The applicant and two other co-defendants , was referred to the criminal court in Paris December 20, 2000 to acquire securities of the bank S. when it had , by its functions, inside information on the evolution of these securities. The removal order was based in particular on the statements of Mr. and T.16 . Before the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris , the applicant raised two objections of illegality of the action. The first was based on the lack of predictability of the law applicable to insider trading . He argued in particular that he had never maintained a professional relationship with the bank S. contrary to the requirements the wording of Article 10.1 of the order of 28 September 1967. The second exception was based on the inability of the court to determine an equitable having regard to the unreasonable length of the proceedings , the facts that took place fourteen years ago .17 . On the merits, the applicant argued that the draft P. had been presented in very vague terms , that at no time did it was clear that this project was confidential and that, consequently , he had never considered being a holder of privileged information , otherwise he would have refrained from investing in this title. He considered that, given the wording of Article 10.1 of the order of 28 September 1967 the conduct could not be considered objectionable when he had passed the orders .

RULES OF REASON18 . In its judgment of 20 December 2002, the court dismissed the first exception because the insider trading, as it was defined at the time of the facts, did not require secondary insiders ( ie ie those who, like the applicant, are not officers of the issuer, but which are considered to have disposed , on the occasion of the exercise of their profession or duties , insider information ) have been professional relationship with the issuer . According to the court , it was only necessary that the applicant had been led by his profession or duties , to know inside information to be considered a secondary trading. DISINI NANTI BISA DIKASIH FOOTNOTES UNTUK TERMS NECESSARY19 . The court then rejected the second plea of illegality in holding that "the unreasonable length of the proceedings, even if it is likely to cause harm to the parties, does not affect its validity and provided n ' not entail ipso facto termination of public action. "20 . On the merits, the court held that "the applicant had been informed about the target and the means to carry out the operation, the extent thereof , the participating investors , the stock pickups , which explained movements recorded on the title ( ... ) and the project presentation, even if it could evolve, was not speculative and contain sufficient detail so that we can consider that the information was privileged . "21 . The applicant was convicted of insider trading and sentenced to pay a fine of tort 2.2 million euros (EUR). He appealed against this decision.22 . On 22 December 2003 , the European Commission adopted a Directive No. 2003/124/EC implementing a previous directive (No. 2003/6/EC ) of the European Parliament relating in particular to the definition of inside information (see the "right part and relevant practice ").23 . In a judgment delivered on 24 March 2005, the Paris Court of Appeal took the same arguments as the High Court and upheld the judgment in its entirety .24 . The applicant's appeal , based in particular on the impossibility of knowing in advance that his behavior was reprehensible, the non-retroactive application of Directive 2003/6/EC and the no unfairness of the procedure due to the time it was dismissed June 14, 2006 on the grounds that " the Court of Appeal , proceeding by a sovereign assessment of the facts of the case and characterize in its entirety , both physical and intentional , the offense with which the accused been convicted (...) , justified its decision . " In contrast, the Supreme Court held that the acquisition of past on the London stock market securities transactions could not constitute insider trading by the French national law. It therefore referred the case to the Court of Appeal of Paris otherwise composed for a decision again on the amount of the fine.25 . In a new judgment of 20 March 2007 , the Paris Court of Appeal ordered the applicant to pay a fine of 940 507.22 for the acquisition of shares of the bank S. the single market the Paris Bourse .B. The law and practice relevant1 . French law26 . Article 10.1 of Ordinance No. 67-833 of 28 September 1967 ( as amended by the Law of 22 January 1988 , applicable to the time) , now Article L. 465-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code, reads as follows :" Will be punished with imprisonment from two months to two years and a fine of 6000 to 5,000,000 francs , the amount may be increased beyond that figure to quadruple the amount of profit that may be realized without that the fine can not be less than the same benefit , or one of these penalties , the persons referred to in Article 162-1 of Act No. 66-537 of 24 July 1966 on commercial companies as amended and people have , during the exercise of their profession or duties , preferred prospects or condition of an issuer of securities or the prospects of a security or information a negotiable futures contract , which will be realized, or knowingly permitted to carry on the market , either directly or through an intermediary, one or more operations before the public is aware of this information. INI LEGAL BASESNYA DALAM PROCEEDINGIn cases where operations have been conducted by a corporation, the officers of law or fact that will be criminally liable for offenses committed . "27 . Article 162-1 of Act No. 66-537 of 24 July 1966 :"The President , CEOs , executive board members of a company , physical or legal persons operating in this company as a director or member of the Supervisory Board and the permanent representatives of legal persons performing these functions are required under the conditions determined by decree , to put in registered form or file shares that belong to themselves or their unemancipated minor children and are issued by the company itself , through its subsidiaries , by the society of which it is a subsidiary or other subsidiaries of that company , when these shares are admitted to official listing on stock exchanges or included in daily record of not admitted to trading values. "28 . The report of the Committee on Ethics market released January 10, 1990 , contains the following passages about the Directive of 13 November 1989 the Council of the European Communities :" [This Directive introduces ] a new category of secondary insiders , poorly explained in French law (...) . While some consider that this category of insiders could be prosecuted as a " fence " of privileged information, there is currently no law in France to confirm this analysis. "

29 . As for the principles governing the use and transmission of privileged information, the report continues:"Despite considerable efforts and joint legislators and judges , there are still situations where neither the text [ of the order of 28 September 1967 ] , the provisions of the European Directive [ 13 November 1989 ] , or the content of the law does allow us to characterize a priori the illegality of certain behaviors while professionals may face situations where they need clear and early indications to exercise their profession in good conditions.

To this end, the Commission (...) has endeavored to clarify this problem of interpretation of existing provisions , liberating principles that can serve as both a guide of conduct for professionals, the basis for regulations of authorities criteria for assessing these behaviors by the authorities responsible for the control or punish them.(...)

Principle # 3:Is wrong transmission or use of inside information for purposes other or to an activity other than those for which it was provided (...) .A wide variety of professionals are brought in the course of their business , to benefit from privileged information about a company : financial intermediaries , institutional investors, service providers (...) .These people , in virtue of their possession of privileged information , [ the obligation to respect ] Principle No. 3 .(...)

Another situation is that of professionals ( investors, bankers , for example) asked to participate in a joint project may cause significant variations in the price of a security (...) .

If information is collected, these [ professional ] can not use it for purposes other than those for which they were solicited.

This duty of abstention should not however be general. Business life should not be blocked by maneuvers of people would reveal their plans to competitors only to neutralize , from a sufficiently precise information serious and credible .

In general , an analysis grid , issue of American jurisprudence (...) can be used in many cases. "

30 . COB Regulation No. 90-08 published in the Official Journal 20 July 1990 reads as follows :Article 3

"People with inside information due to the preparation and implementation of a financial transaction shall not exploit for their own account or on behalf of others , such information on the market and communicate to other purpose or activity other than that for which it is held . "

Article 4

"People who have been provided inside information in connection with the exercise of their profession or duties shall not exploit for their own account or on behalf of others such market information or communicate with other purpose or activity other than those for which it was provided . "

Article L. 465-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code, resulting in particular Act No. 2001-1062 of 15 November 2001 concerning daily security today reads as follows:" A penalty of two years imprisonment and a fine of EUR 1 500 000 , the amount can be increased beyond that figure, up to ten times the amount of profit that may be realized without the fine can be less than the same profit, the fact, for the officers of a corporation referred to in Article L. 225-109 of the Commercial Code , and for people with , on the occasion of the exercise of their profession or duties , privileged information or perspectives on the situation of an issuer whose securities are traded on a regulated market or on the prospects of a financial instrument admitted to trading on a regulated market, make or permit to carry , either directly or through an intermediary, one or more operations before the public is aware of this information .Is punished by one year's imprisonment and a fine of 150,000 the fact , for anyone with the exercise of his profession or duties of inside information on the prospects or condition of an issuer whose securities are traded on a regulated market or on the prospects of a financial instrument admitted to trading on a regulated market to communicate to a third party outside the normal course of his profession or duties .Is punished by one year's imprisonment and a fine of 150,000 euros , the amount may be increased beyond that figure, up to ten times the amount of profit made , without penalty may be less than the same profit, for any person other than those referred to in the two preceding paragraphs , knowingly possessing inside information on the status and prospects of an issuer whose securities are traded on a regulated market or on the prospects development of a financial instrument traded on a regulated market, or make it possible to carry out, directly or indirectly, any transaction or communicate such information to a third party before the public 's knowledge. When the relevant information concerning the commission of a crime or offense , the penalties are increased to seven years ' imprisonment and EUR 1 500 000 if the amount of profits is less than this figure. "

31. Relevant case law :Judgment of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, delivered on 26 June 1995 called the " Southern Beehive ""Whereas if the provisions of Article 10-1 of the Ordinance of 28 September 1967 , such as Directive No. 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 with which they are compatible, prohibit persons who have , in because of their profession or duties , preferred information on the prospects of development of a security , to perform operations on the market before the public was aware , it is provided that such information accurate, confidential , likely to influence the course and determining the value of transactions . "

32 . Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows :Article 8"In terms of offense , the requirement of public action is three full years (...)"

Article 220(in force at the time of instruction )

"The president of the indictment ensures the proper functioning of firms instruction jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. In particular, it satisfies the conditions of application of paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 81 and Article 144 and is working to ensure that the procedures do not suffer any undue delay (...) . "

33 . Article L. 141-1 of the Code of Judicial Organisation :" The state is obliged to repair the damage caused by the malfunctioning of the system of justice.

Unless otherwise stated , this responsibility is taken by gross negligence or a miscarriage of justice. "

2 . Community law

34 . Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 on the coordination regulations on insider trading :Article 1

"For the purposes of this Directive, Inside information : information that has not been made public of a precise nature relating to one or several issuers of transferable securities or to one or several transferable securities, which, if it were made public , would be likely to influence significantly the course of this or these securities (...) "

Article 2" 1 . Each Member State shall prohibit any person who (...) because they have access to this information because of the exercise of his employment , profession or duties , possesses inside information , to acquire or to sell for their own account or for the account of others, either directly or indirectly , securities of the issuer or issuers in this information , exploiting knowingly such inside information.2 . Where the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are companies or other legal persons, the prohibition contained in this section shall apply to individuals involved in the decision to proceed with the transaction on behalf of the legal person in question. "

Article 4"Each Member State shall require the prohibition laid down in Article 2 on any person, other than those referred to in Article who knowingly possesses inside information , including the direct or indirect source could being a person referred to in Article 2 . "

Article 6'Each Member State may lay down more stringent than those laid down in this Directive or additional provisions , provided that such provisions are applied generally (...) . "

Believing that its legislation was in conformity with this Directive , France does not transposed into national law. In a judgment of 26 June 1995 the Court of Cassation found compatible with those of Directive internal provisions (see 31 above ) .35 . Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation :Article 1"For the purposes of this Directive, by (...) " inside information " shall mean information of a precise nature which has not been made public, relating, directly or indirectly, one or more issuers of financial instruments or one or more financial instruments and which, if made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on the price of financial derivative instruments linked to them (...) "

Article 2" 1 . Member States shall prohibit any person referred to in the second subparagraph who possesses inside information from using that information by acquiring or disposing of, or by trying to acquire or dispose of, for his own account or for the account of others , or directly or indirectly, financial instruments to which that information relates.

The first subparagraph shall apply to any person who possesses that information :a) because of his membership of the administrative , management or supervisory bodies of the issuer, orb) due to its participation in the capital of the issuer, orc) because of its access to information because of his job , profession or duties (...) . "

Article 14"Without prejudice to their right to impose criminal sanctions , Member States shall ensure that , in accordance with their national legislation , appropriate administrative measures can be taken or administrative sanctions be imposed against the persons responsible where provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive (...) . "

36 . Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003 laying down detailed rules for the application of Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the definition and public disclosure of inside information and the definition of manipulation market :Article 1" Inside Information1 . For the purposes of Article 1 , paragraph 1 of Directive 2003/6/EC , information is deemed " precise nature " if it indicates a set of circumstances which exists or may reasonably be think that there will or an event that has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur , and if it is specific enough so that we can draw a conclusion as to the possible effect of this set of circumstances or event on the prices of financial instruments or derivatives linked to them .2 . For the purposes of Article 1 , paragraph 1 of Directive 2003/6/EC, the term " information which, if made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of financial instruments or on the price of derivative financial instruments linked to them " information that a reasonable investor would be likely to use as part of the basis of his investment decisions. "

37 . Relevant case law :In the Spector Photo Group NV and Chris Van Raemdonck c / Commissie voor het Bank - , Financie -en Assurantiewezen ( CBFA ) (Case C-45/08 ) of 23 December 2009 , the Court of Justice of the European Union s case is expressed as follows:"(...) Admittedly, Article 14, paragraph 1 of Directive 2003/6 does not require Member States to provide for criminal sanctions against perpetrators of insider trading but merely state that these States are required to ensure that "appropriate administrative measures can be taken or administrative sanctions be imposed against the persons responsible where the provisions adopted pursuant to [ the ] Directive ," Member States is further required to ensure that these measures are "effective, proportionate and dissuasive" . However, given the nature of the offenses and the severity of sanctions that are likely to result , such sanctions may be , for the purposes of the application of the ECHR, qualified criminal sanction ( see, by analogy , judgment of 8 July 1999, Hls / Commission , C-199/92 P , Rec . p. I- 4287 , paragraph 150 , and Eur. DH stops Engel et al. Netherlands from 8 June 1976, series A No. 22, 82, ztrk c . Germany of 21 February 1984 , Series A No. 73, 53, and Lutz c . Germany 25 August 1987, Series A No. 123 , 54) ( .. . ) . "

COMPLAINTS38 . Relying on Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained of not being able to receive a fair trial because of the duration of the investigation procedure and the whole procedure . He argues that the age of the alleged facts did not allow him to remember accurately their progress and hindered the establishment of evidence. According to him , the use of validated by Mifsud c . France was not effective to the extent that it does not result , either a new trial or to drop the charges in the event that the holding of a new trial was unthinkable , as in this case .39 . Relying on Article 6 1, the applicant complains that the investigating judge had referred to the criminal court , and he then held, without sufficient evidence. He criticizes the insufficient motivation of decisions , especially on the preliminary objections of illegality raised before the domestic courts.40 . Relying on Article 6 2, the applicant considers that the domestic courts had violated his presumption of innocence by transferring the burden of proof of his innocence.41 . Relying on Article 6 3 d) , it also criticizes the fact that some witnesses were never interviewed or during training or before the domestic courts .42 . Relying on Article 7, the applicant complained of the lack of predictability law against insider trading when committed the acts for which he was sentenced . He believes that the privileged information was not sufficiently defined and that the elements of the offense were imprecise .43 . He also claims that he was denied retroactive Community provisions which are more favorable to him . It specifically refers to Directive No. 89/592/EEC and relies essentially on the 2003 laying down detailed rules of Directive No. 2003/6/EC as regards the definition and public disclosure of inside information and the definition of market manipulation, insofar as these texts more strictly defined the concept of "inside information" .44 . Relying on Article 14 in conjunction with the substance of Article 6 2, the applicant complains that his two co-defendants did not have to bear the burden of proof in the criminal court and have been released for the benefit of the doubt.

LAW1 . EQUITY OF THE PROCEDUREA. The complaint of the length of the proceedings45 . The applicant considers that the length of the proceedings had infringed its equity to the extent that it has not allowed him to make several years after the fact , the evidence of his innocence. He relied on Article 6 1 and 13 of the Convention , the relevant provisions read as follows:Article 6" Everyone has the right to have his case heard fairly (...) by a court (...) , who will decide (...) the determination of his rights and obligations of civil (...)"Article 13"Everyone whose rights and freedoms set forth in (...) Convention have been violated has the right to grant an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in the performance of their official duties. "

a) The parties' submissions46 . The Government pleaded non-exhaustion of domestic remedies recalling that in Mifsud c . France ((dec. ) [GC], No. 57220 /00, ECHR 2002 -VIII) , the Court held that a complaint of length of judicial proceedings were to be admissible , having been subjected to domestic courts in the context of an action based on Article L. 141-1 above (see " relevant law and practice" above, 33 section). He sees no reason to depart from the statement in this case. He also argues that during the judicial investigation , the complainant has not complained of the length thereof to the judge or the President of the Indictment Division as Article 220 of the Code of criminal procedure in force at that time would allow.47 . The Government states that in the event of any condemnation of France on this point, the applicant can not obtain the cancellation of his conviction, but only the opening of a new procedure. In this case, the period between the date of the facts and the new judgment would be even more important.48 . He also noted that the disappearance of evidence which the applicant complains is its favorable final insofar as , under French law , it is for the prosecution to prove the guilt of an accused and not the latter prove his innocence.49 . The applicant states that it does not complain about the length of the proceedings as such , but the consequences of it on his ability to recall facts and thus to prove his innocence . He intends to argue that the appeal based on Article L. 141-1 of the Code of Judicial organization is not effective in this case since it is a purely compensatory remedy that is not likely to remedy the lack of fairness of the entire procedure and sentencing that followed. It states that the investment for which he was convicted was a common operation as part of its daily activity. He hopes to get his conviction set aside because of alleged lack of fairness . He stated that the investigation procedure was delayed by international investigations on other co- defendants and the judge would have had to sever the business to enable it to be held in the shortest time.b) Findings of the Court

50 . The Court is not called upon to rule on whether the procedure followed in this case took place within a reasonable time and if the applicant had at his disposal an effective remedy in this respect , but to examine whether the passage of time between the alleged acts and the judgment of the applicant could affect the taking of evidence and the rights of the defense. Therefore , it will examine this part of the application only in terms of Article 6 1 of the Convention.51 . It does not therefore consider it necessary to decide the question on which the parties disagree about the effectiveness , in this case, the remedy provided by Article L. 141-1 of the Code of Judicial Organisation , with the grievance anyway inadmissible for the following reasons.52 . The Court observes that the applicant was invited for the first time to respond in writing to questions about the facts at issue in the course of an administrative investigation by the SEC and in a letter dated December 15, 1989 , he brought specific questions that had been asked. It is only in his second interview, June 30, 1993 by a judge, the applicant stated that he did not remember in detail the sequence of events .53. Thus, in 1989 the applicant could not ignore the fact that investigations were ongoing about the disputed facts . From his interview with the COB , a year after the fact, we could reasonably expect from him he prepares for the possibility of prosecution and, consequently, it gathers elements for the preparation of his defense.54 . The Court also noted that under French law , the requirement of public action can be an obstacle to criminal prosecution for acts too old , partly because of the difficulty of gathering , several years after the fact, evidence relating to the offense. However, in this case, when the investigation was opened, the charges against the applicant were not yet covered by the prescription.55 . The Court recalls moreover that its task is to ascertain whether the proceedings as a whole , including the way in which evidence was taken , were fair character required by Article 6 1 ( see, among other Plissier and Sassi v. . France [GC ], no 25444/94 , 45, ECHR 1999 -II) . In this case, it notes that the applicant's conviction is not based solely on the alleged impossibility to accurately answer some questions during the procedure. In particular , the domestic courts are aware of the applicant's statements and those of his partner to do the COB in 1989 and recounting the sequence of events which they were accused .56 . About a possible disjunction procedures , as mentioned by the applicant, the Court finds nothing in the record that has been requested for the national courts , including the judge, at any time during the procedure . This argument can not therefore be considered for the first time by the Court.57 . Given the foregoing, the Court considers that this complaint is manifestly ill- founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 3 and 4 of the Convention.

B. On the complaint of insufficient evidence and motivation58 . In terms of Article 6 1 of the Convention , the applicant complained also have been tried without sufficient evidence and critical insufficient motivation of internal decisions , including the order of referral to the criminal court .59 . The Court reiterates that it is for the national courts to assess the evidence obtained by them ( Plissier and Sassi , cited above, 45 ) and that the principle of subsidiarity, it is not to substitute itself for the national courts to assess whether the removal of the complainant to the criminal court . It notes that in this case the judge and the courts have relied on a number of evidence discussed in adversarial and they considered sufficient to condemn the applicant.60 . As to the complaint of insufficient motivation internal decisions , the Court recalls that it has already held that although Article 6 1 of the Convention required courts to give reasons for their decisions, it could not be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument (Garca Ruiz c . Spain [GC ], no 30544/96 , 26 , ECHR 1999 -I). In this case, the impugned decisions include detailed motivations and do not disclose any appearance of arbitrariness .61 . It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 3 and 4 of the Convention.

C. The complaint alleged infringement of the presumption of innocence62 . The applicant complained of a violation of the presumption of innocence because of the transfer of the burden of proof and the refusal to give him the benefit of the doubt. He relied on Article 6 2 of the Convention, which reads as follows:" Any person charged with an offense is presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. "63 . The Court observes that throughout the complaint that alleged the burden of proof transfer , the applicant complained in reality he was convicted without being able to report , several years after the fact , the evidence of his innocence. In this, the complaint coincides with that derived from the unfairness of the proceedings due to its excessive length .64 . In view of the conclusion it reached above, the Court considers that this complaint should be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 3 and 4 of the Convention.

D. The complaint of the lack of examination of witnesses65 . In terms of Article 6 3 d) of the Convention, the applicant complained of the lack of hearing of several witnesses. This provision reads as follows:" Every accused person has the following minimum rights :(...)d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;(...) "66 . It does not appear from the record that the applicant has requested that these witnesses are interviewed , either before the magistrates , either before the trial courts . Moreover , the Court notes that this complaint was not submitted to the Court of Cassation.67 . Accordingly, this part of the application must be rejected for non -exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 1 and 4 of the Convention.

II . COMPLAINTS FROM ARTICLE 7 OF THE CONVENTIONA. The insufficient predictability of domestic law68 . The applicant complained of the lack of precision of the constituent elements of the offense of insider trading when he was sentenced . He relied on Article 7 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:" 1 . No one may be condemned for an act or omission which, at the time it was committed, did not constitute a criminal offense under national or international law . Similarly there is no heavier penalty imposed than that which was applicable at the time the offense was committed.2 . This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of guilty of an act or omission which, at the time it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by person civilized nations. "

a) The parties' submissions69 . The Government recalls the jurisprudence of the Court that it is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts , to interpret and apply domestic law . He believes that in this case , only the national court has jurisdiction to interpret the order of 28 September 1967 , the Court can not interpret the conventional text . It emphasizes that in this case, the judges did not exceed the scope of their office and found that the elements of the offense were present.70 . On the quality of the law , the Government considers that the impugned provisions were clear and precise enough to determine whether the conduct of the applicant was lawful or not. He cites four decisions of domestic law , prior to the facts of the case, in which the director of a company , informed the gathering of the shares of another company , a financial journalist , financial director of a bank and an officer were convicted of insider trading in close to those of the applicant circumstances. He believes that these judgments could have allowed him to foresee that its conduct was reprehensible. He also cites several articles published in the literature before 1988 and which tended to incriminate the applicant's conduct .71 . The Government said that the report on market conduct, on which the applicant relies , is in reality a " guide behavior" written in a pedagogical perspective clarification and for investors .72 . On the opinion issued by the COB, the Government pointed out that it is purely advisory and not binding on the national courts. In this case, it was designed to help judges understand the facts in their technical aspects and their integration into the financial mechanisms. He noted that the investigation by the COB on the facts at issue was fast and therefore incomplete , and that the judicial inquiry that ensued was , she was much more thorough . He also noted that if the SEC has decided to forward the applicant's case to justice, it is because the Committee considered that the facts alleged against him could constitute a criminal offense.73 . The complainant argues that the relevant time , the law criminalizing insider trading was worded too imprecise to determine with certainty the border between permissible and those operations were prohibited. He believes that , as defined in Article 10.1 of the order of 28 September 1967 , insider trading could only be committed by a professional with a professional link with the target company , which was not his case . He insisted on the lack of case law on insider trading in 1988 and notes in this regard that the cases cited by the Government relates only insiders professionally connected with the target company , unlike the situation in 1988.74 . The applicant also notes that , following the proceedings against him, the government authorities have commissioned a report on the market ethics and amended legislation on insider trading to make it more precise .

b) Findings of the Court75 . The Court considers , in the light of all the arguments of the parties that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law which can not be resolved at this stage of its consideration of the application, but require an examination of the merits .76 . It follows that this complaint can not be declared manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been identified.

B. On the non-application of Community legislation77 . The applicant complained of the non-application during the procedure , community texts that were more favorable to him . He relied on Article 7 of the Convention.a) The parties' submissions78 . The Government pointed out at the outset that only the 1989 directive is invoked by the applicant before the Court while the 2003 was referred to the Court of Cassation.79 . He argues that the Community texts relied only cover the administrative and non- criminal offenses . On this point, it refers to the Spector Photo Group NV judgment delivered on 23 December 2009 by the Court of Justice of the European Union ( CJEU ) (see section "the relevant law and practice "). The Government also argues that the directives at issue do not contain elements more favorable to the applicant that the domestic law at the relevant time . In particular , with regard to the 1989 directive , he said that Article 6 provides that each Member State may provide for more stringent than those of this Directive.80 . The applicant maintains that the 1989 Directive contains specific provisions to define more precisely the concept of privileged information . It therefore reduced the scope of the offense for which he was sentenced by clarifying the elements . In this, the applicant considers that the text was more favorable to him .81 . With regard to the matter in question by Community directives, the applicant points out that if these texts actually seek administrative matters , however , they have undeniable effects on the domestic criminal law to the extent that national courts are frequently called upon to make application or reference to Community law , as was the case in the judgment said the " Southern Beehive " of 26 June 1995 (see section "the relevant law and practice ").

b) Findings of the Court82 . Above all, the Court observes , like the Government, the applicant's complaint , as formulated before the Court concerns only the non-application to the case of the 1989 Directive , the 2003 n 'being invoked before national courts . Therefore , it will examine the complaint that it relates to the 1989 Directive .83 . In addition , the Court also notes that the applicant does not claim that all the provisions of the 1989 Directive contain elements that are more favorable than the national law it. The Court noted in particular that the applicant's complaint relates only to the non-consideration by the domestic courts of Article I of the Directive, which define the concept of inside information more accurately than domestic law, and not the other provisions of this text. The Court will therefore examine the complaint and circumscribed .84 . It considers that this complaint , so defined, is related to that derived from the unpredictability of the French law against insider trading at the relevant time and also based on Article 7 of the Convention. Indeed, the applicant herein argue that the provisions on the basis of which he was convicted were not sufficiently precise and it could not benefit from the clarifications subsequently occurred , including the directive.85 . Accordingly , the Court considers that this complaint raises serious issues of fact and law which can not be resolved at this stage of its consideration of the request and declared admissible.III . ON THE ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION

86 . The applicant complained of discrimination in as much as , according to him , his two co-defendants would not have to bear the burden of proof in the criminal court and they were acquitted for lack of evidence . He relied on Article 14 of the Convention , in substance combined with Article 6 2, which reads as follows :"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in (...) Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex , race, color, language , religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property , birth or other status. "

87 . The Court recalls that Article 14 can not find a apply if the facts of the case do not fall within the ambit of at least one of the substantive clauses of the Convention and its Protocols (Van Raalte c . Netherlands Netherlands, 21 February 1997, 33, Reports of Judgments and decisions 1997 -I).88 . In this case, it concluded previously in manifestly unfounded nature of the applicant's complaint under Article 6 2 of the Convention on account of the alleged reversal of the burden of proof.89 . As to the alleged discrimination because of the release of his co-defendants for lack of evidence , the Court observes that it is not apparent from the record that the applicant was placed in a position similar to theirs , since accusations against co-defendants were different from those for which he was prosecuted .90 . It follows that this complaint must also be declared manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 3 and 4 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court unanimouslyDecides to terminate the application of Article 29 1 of the Convention;Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits of the applicant's complaints under Article 7 of the Convention;Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.Claudia Westerdiek Peer LorenzenRegistrar PresidentDECISION SOROS c . FRANCE

DECISION SOROS c . FRANCE