some thoughts on belief dynamics
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Some Thoughts on Belief Dynamics
Rajesh Kasturirangan
National Institute of Advanced Studies
Bangalore, India
1. Introduction. When I first started watching American football, I was amazed by the
extent to which the game was ordered plays being transmitted from coach to
quarterback to other players like a functioning army, only much better paid. At the same
time, I was ambivalent about a sport that restricted individual creativity to a minimum (as
I perceived it at that time). Then one day I saw a player who was about to be tackled
make an impromptu toss to another player, who ended up scoring a touchdown. That
spark of spontaneity was celebrated by all from the commentators to the fans and, of
course, the players on the scoring side. Sports thrive on these moments, when unscripted
actions lead to unanticipated outcomes; it is these little moments that can turn the tide,
and conversely, a small error can snatch defeat from the arms of victory. A good sport is
one that allows spontaneous moments like the one described above, especially if its to
retain an emotive fan base. Then, there was that fateful day in 1823 when a bored
schoolboy playing soccer on the grounds of Rugby, the well known public school (i.e.,English-speak for private school), took matters in his hands so to speak. That day,
William Webb Ellis, with fine disregard for the rules of football (soccer) as played in his
time, first took the ball in his arms and ran with it, thus originating the distinctive feature
of the Rugby game.
The curious scientist might ask Why did the first action become an acceptable part of
football, while the second is considered such an outrage that it led to a whole another
sport altogether? Life is not that different either. The religious fundamentalist who
insists on a strict interpretation of a sacred text and enforces social relations consistent
with that interpretation, is often more than happy to call his friends on their cell phone to
tell them about his understanding of the same text. So when is a belief change acceptable
and when is it not? Some new beliefs and actions are so egregious that the originator is
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rebuked, ostracized or worse and others are embraced as the next new thing. Indeed,
beliefs wouldnt change if someone didnt come along and say something different, but,
as we all know, some changes are more acceptable than others. So heres my question Is
it possible to study beliefs theoretically and computationally in a manner thats sensitive
to the circumstances in which beliefs (or as is more likely, a cluster of beliefs) are
altered?
2. Decision Theory and Belief Dynamics. The dominant paradigm for studying the
above question is what I call The Decision-Theoretic Strategy. In this strategy, it is
assumed that beliefs are formed and communicated within a rational framework, i.e., the
agents forming, holding and communicating their beliefs do so on the basis of a rational
(could be bounded rationality) system for evaluating and changing their beliefs. Of
course, there can be several models of rationality Logic, Game theory and Probability
(Bayesian Probability) are all competing models of rationality and can all be used
profitably in modeling the rational norms for holding and justifying a belief. For
example, one could assume that people who advocate the use of violence do so because
they have studied the use of violence in the past or see themselves as playing a game with
the authorities and have a rational means to evaluate the extent to which violence will
further their goals. A game theoretic model may study how the two sides are willing to
make concessions and how one of the sides, by using violence as one of its moves can
bargain for better concessions. In this game theoretic framework, violence as a move
would have an optimal state, and presumably agents using violence would try to attain
this optimal state.
3. Stability versus Decisiveness. A lot of the literature on beliefs is tied to decision
making, where utility based models are useful though the Atran sacred values paper
suggests that simple notions of utility will not be able to capture why people switch
strategies under certain circumstances. In other words, beliefs are tied to theories of
choice, especially in economics. What if most beliefs are removed from any
considerations of choice and are only weakly determined by ultimate goals? Consider the
actions of the football player who threw the ball to his colleague to his fellow player.
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That act was only partially determined by the need to score a touchdown, since that goal
is always present in any football drive. In that situation, there are far too many contingent
factors that are equally if not more important.
Similarly, let us take food practices (eating beliefs) as an example. In a restaurant
situation, utility based considerations may apply (say, price versus taste). However most
of the world doesnt eat in restaurants most of the time. We eat at home where you eat
what your mother has made. End of story. There is no choice. I may have preferences, but
I dont have a choice. Even the person who tells you what to do might not have a choice
in becoming a leader - Mom has to be Mom, no one else can be Mom. In other words,
leaders are rarely selected by "free choice" i.e., unbiased voting.
I would say that in most daily life situations, we acquire and exercise our beliefs in
contexts where there is a pretty stable pattern of behaviour, and furthermore, that
behaviour is heavily over constrained rather than under constrained, which means that
there are multiple solutions to decision making problems that are all roughly the same in
their attractiveness. From a satisficing perspective, there is no choice or decision to be
made since most routes to the solution are roughly equivalent.
In other words, while the current study of belief dynamics focuses on forms of utility
maximisation as the fundamental dynamical principle, I believe that beliefs are learnt,
transmitted and altered during the course of routine activities where efficiency
considerations are part of the dynamics but not necessarily the most important one. In
certain economic situations we might all be rational actors (though Kahnemann and
Tversky would say otherwise), but that only goes to show that we know how to act
appropriately in economic situations. Why should we assume that eating food is like
buyingfood? I suggest that the study of the dynamics of beliefs should turn away from
economic decision making contexts that are highly non-generic and start thinking about
daily life phenomena like eating food, driving to work, saying your prayers, making
phone calls, all of which are highly ritualized and strongly constrained, where most of the
time things work as you expect and you never have to make a decision (if at all that
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option is even available). In other words, the world hangs together just fine for most
people most of the time since it is "deeply regular". The science of beliefs should be
about the study of these deep regularities.
4. A Preliminary Definition. I want to define the theoretical notion of beliefs with these
daily life activities in mind. Consider eating practice. In most western cultures, people eat
with a knife and fork, with the fork on the left of the plate and the knife to the right. In
India, in most places, people eat with their right hands. Both of these eating practices are
beliefs. What is common to them (and to all beliefs in my account) are three things they
are acts that are shared across a community, they are remarkably stable over time
(compared to the time scale of the act of eating) and they come in tightly coupled clusters
(for example, in western cultures, the decision to put the fork to left and the knife to the
right is paired with other decisions about where the soup spoon goes etc). In general, I
define a belief as follows:
Definition. A Belief is astable social actdirected towards a community such that:
(a) Generically, the Believer wants the community to share the contents of that
belief
(b) Generically, the community wants to acceptthat belief.
(c) Beliefs come in clusters, a modal combination of acts that are interrelated
within a larger frame (say eating).
(d) The goal of the community is to make sure that each cluster of beliefs is
transmitted successfully across time.
Given these beliefs about beliefs, I would like to point out one principle and three aspects
of belief networks. The principle, coherence, is simple to state but hard to model. To
understand coherence at the simplest level, one notes that beliefs are fundamentally
public and social, not internal states and therefore, beliefs are meant to be shared.
Therefore, the structure of beliefs should obey the constraint that they are meant to be
shared.
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(a) Since beliefs are social acts, a belief by me is always followed by another belief
of someone else. Therefore, belief sequences are free of loops, in a precise graph
theoretic sense.
(b) Belief change takes place in small groups (is 7 the magic number?). Small groups
can accept and hence share beief sequences far more quickly and modify them as
well. However, strictly speaking belief sequences are multiple scale, i.e., a
successful belief narrative shares structural properties across various scales of
network size and there is a continuity of narrative as one goes from individual to
community to society to nation.
(c) Within a given context beliefs are generic acts everything else being equal one
always puts the fork on the left. Therefore beliefs encode general properties of the
world in that context.
Having made all these arguments against utilities and decisions, I believe that the best
way to start exploring alternative frameworks is to devise a model that is the simplest
deviation from the classical game theoretic model of belief evolution. The similarities
and differences between the dynamics of a pure game and an augmented game will be
instructive.
5. A Simple Model. Here, I want to outline the simplest model of network dynamics that
incorporates both individual utility functions as well as the inertial force that votes for
stability. According to the definition of beliefs in section 4, the primary quality of beliefs
is that they are shared. Belief dynamics is fundamentally a study of changes in the way
that beliefs are shared which can happen in two ways:
(a) I stop sharing beliefs with you.
(b) I change my beliefs in order to be able to share something with you.
Utility considerations nudge individual agents towards (a) while inertial considerations
bias the system as a whole towards (b). From a modelling point of view, the utility
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constraint is straightforward: each agent has certain desires and aversions, and if the price
is too high, he would rather quit playing the game. The stability constraint should enforce
the fact the system as a whole would rather thatsome game be played rather than none. It
cares less about the content of the game than the fact of its being played. The utilities are
individual while the stability constraint is a collective constraint. Let us now see how to
model these two conflicting demands.
Suppose G is a graph with n nodes, where each node represents an agent and the links
represent a shared belief between the agents. Let Ai be the agents and B
i be the beliefs of
agent Ai. For each shared belief (leading to an edge connecting the two) between agent Ai
and agent Aj, let Gij be a game being played between Ai and Aj with a payoff matrix Mij.
The game is very simple: the two agents either affirm their jointly held belief, or deny
the jointly held belief. The payoffs tell us the cost of affirming or denying the belief. Let
us also make the following constraints on the dynamics:
(a) The price of playing: There is a number, C such that for any two agents Ai and Aj,
if the price of affirming the joint belief is C, they will always deny their joint
belief.
(b) Severance of relations due to repeated denial: There is a number, N such that for
any two agents Ai and Aj, if the joint belief is denied N times, the link between the
two is broken.
(c) Collective Inertia: Let LG be the number of edges in the graph. The total number
of possible edges in the graph is nC2. Then, the inertial constraint says: there is a
number I, 0 I 1, such that LG /nC2 I.
(d) Changing beliefs rather than changing friends: There is a number such that when
(LG /nC2 - I) , that agents Ai and Aj playing a game with cost C will shift to a
new belief with cost C (if available) rather than sever relations.
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6. Summary. In this short note, I have outlined some theoretical reasons for modifying
the classical decision theoretic framework for modelling belief dynamics. Then, I stated a
simple model that incorporates inertial forces along with decision making strategies into a
graph evolution model. The next step in this modelling project is to test the dynamics of
the above model under various initial conditions, for C, N, n etc. The goal is to play the
stability and utility constraints against each other.