solvay secure application layer v2015 seba
TRANSCRIPT
Secure the Application Layer
Sebastien Deleersnyder
OWASP Foundation
March 2015
1
Overview
2
Sebastien Deleersnyder?
– 5 years developer experience
– 15+ years information security experience
– Consultant & managing partner Toreon
– Belgian OWASP chapter founder
– OWASP volunteer
– www.owasp.org
– Co-organizer www.BruCON.org
OWASP World
OWASP is a worldwide free and open community focused on improving the security of application software.
Our mission is to make application security visible so that people and organizations can make informed decisions about application security risks.
Everyone is free to participate in OWASP and all of our materials are available under a free and open software license.
The OWASP Foundation is a 501c3 not-for-profit charitable organization that ensures the ongoing availability and support for our work.
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Agenda
• Why application security matters
• OWASP top 10 v2013
• Mobile, Cloud, IoT Security
• Software Assurance Maturity Model
• Application security resources
Why application security matters?
Web Application Security Problem
• 75% of attacks are aimed straight at the application layer (GARTNER)
• 92% are application vulnerabilities instead of network vulnerabilities (NIST)
• Recent examples (2011-2012):
Citibank breached using simple URL manipulation. 200,000 customer accounts compromised.
Rabobank knocked offline by DDOS attackCaused outage of Dutch central payment system
Elantis held to ransom over hacked customer data Target Shares Tumble As Retailer
Reveals Cost Of Data Breach (148M $) – 70 M customer data leaked
Hacktivism
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e-Crime Inc
• Online Extortion
• Phishing
• Denial of Service
• Credit Card Stealing
• Bot Infection
• Bot-net pharming
• Sell phishing tools
• ...
See the Web Hacking Incidents Database on
http://www.webappsec.org/projects/whid/
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State actors
• Track users
• Drive-by downloads
• Social engineering
• Tapping Telcos
• Hacking Telcos (BICS)
• Crypto backdoors
• Industrial espionage
"Electronic devices are increasingly embedded in everything from vehicles to guided missiles, and are often integrated into systems which are difficult and costly to update or upgrade as new threats or vulnerabilities are identified with increasing speed and widely ranging tempo," he explained. "These factors represent malefactors impacting our warfighting systems.“ …Army.mil/News - Lt. Gen. Edward C. Cardon
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Myth
Myth: we are secure because we have a firewall
75% of Internet Vulnerabilities are at Web Application Layer *
*Gartner Group (2002 report)
|12Source: Jeremiah Grossman, BlackHat 2001
last century technology
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• Myth 2 - we are secure because we use SSL
– only secures data in transit
– does not solve vulnerabilities on:
• Web server
• Browser
Myth
|15Firew
all
Hardened OS
Web Server
App Server
Firewall
Dat
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Hu
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Bill
ingCustom Developed
Application CodeAPPLICATION
ATTACK
You can’t use network layer protection (firewall, SSL, IDS, hardening) to stop or detect application layer attacks
Ne
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Your security “perimeter” has huge holes at the application layer
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Trends
• Business demands more bells and whistles
• Internal applications get ‘web-enabled’ and are exposed to Intranet or Internet
• Increasing complexity of software
• Rush software out without adequate testing
• Poor security training and awareness
OWASP Top 10
OWASP Top 10
• OWASP Top 10 Web Application Security Risks
• 2013 Release
• A great start, but not a standard
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OWASP Top Ten (2013 Edition)
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OWASP Top 10 Risk Rating Methodology
ThreatAgent
AttackVector
Weakness PrevalenceWeakness
DetectabilityTechnical Impact Business Impact
?Easy Widespread Easy Severe
?Average Common Average Moderate
Difficult Uncommon Difficult Minor
2 1 1 2
1.3 * 2
2.6 weighted risk rating
XSS Example
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A1 – Injection
•Tricking an application into including unintended commands in the data sent to an interpreter
Injection means…
•Take strings and interpret them as commands
•SQL, OS Shell, LDAP, XPath, Hibernate, etc…
Interpreters…
•Many applications still susceptible (really don’t know why)
•Even though it’s usually very simple to avoid
SQL injection is still quite common
•Usually severe. Entire database can usually be read or modified
•May also allow full database schema, or account access, or even OS level access
Typical Impact
example : SQL-injection attack
Select user_informationfrom user_tablewhere username=’input username’ and password=’input password’
Web Server Application Server
User DatabaseUser
https
Select user_informationfrom user_tablewhere username=’’ or 1=1 -- ‘ and password=’abc’
DEMO
Go shopping …
• … A federal grand jury on Monday indicted Albert Gonzalez and two unidentified Russian accomplices on charges related to data intrusions at Heartland, Hannaford Bros., 7-Eleven and three other retailers. Gonzalez is alleged to have masterminded an international operation that stole a staggering 130 million credit and debit card numbers from those companies.
• … Court documents filed in connection with Monday's indictment spelled out how Gonzalez and his accomplices used SQL injection attacks to break into Heartland's systems and those of the other companies.
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2527185/security0/sql-injection-attacks-led-to-heartland--hannaford-breaches.html
A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management
•Means credentials have to go with every request
•Should use SSL for everything requiring authentication
HTTP is a “stateless” protocol
•SESSION ID used to track state since HTTP doesn’t
•and it is just as good as credentials to an attacker
•SESSION ID is typically exposed on the network, in browser, in logs, …
Session management flaws
•Change my password, remember my password, forgot my password, secret question, logout, email address, etc…
Beware the side-doors
•User accounts compromised or user sessions hijacked
Typical Impact
Session Fixation Attack
DEMO
A3 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
• Raw data from attacker is sent to an innocent user’s browser
Occurs any time…
• Stored in database
• Reflected from web input (form field, hidden field, URL, etc…)
• Sent directly into rich JavaScript client
Raw data…
• Try this in your browser – javascript:alert(document.cookie)
Virtually every web application has this problem
• Steal user’s session, steal sensitive data, rewrite web page, redirect user to phishing or malware site
• Most Severe: Install XSS proxy which allows attacker to observe and direct all user’s behavior on vulnerable site and force user to other sites
Typical Impact
XSS Definition
• XSS = Cross-site Scripting
• Web application vulnerability
• Injection of code into web pages viewed by others
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)Example:User input is retrieved from the “name” parameter
http://myserver.com/XSS.jsp?name=Pieter
Result (HTML returned to the browser):
...
<h1>Hello Pieter</h1>
...
Input is embedded inside the HTML response:
..
Out.print(“<h1>”+request.getParameter(“name”)+”</h1>”);
..
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)Abused by the attacker:Attacker inserts javascript code at the “username” parameter
http://myserver.com/XSS.jsp?name=<script>code</script>
Result (HTML returned to the browser):
...
<h1>Hello <script>code</script></h1>
...
Input is embedded inside the HTML response:
..
Out.print(“<h1>”+request.getParameter(“name”)+”</h1>”);
..
DEMO
XSSED.ORG
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Browser Exploitation Framework
A4 – Insecure Direct Object References
• This is part of enforcing proper “Authorization”, along with A7 – Failure to Restrict URL Access
How do you protect access to your data?
• Only listing the ‘authorized’ objects for the current user, or
• Hiding the object references in hidden fields
• … and then not enforcing these restrictions on the server side
• This is called presentation layer access control, and doesn’t work
• Attacker simply tampers with parameter value
A common mistake …
• Users are able to access unauthorized files or data
Typical Impact
Insecure Direct Object References Illustrated
• Attacker notices his acct parameter is 6065
?acct=6065
• He modifies it to a nearby number
?acct=6066
• Attacker views the victim’s account information
https://www.onlinebank.com/user?acct=6065
A5 – Security Misconfiguration
• All through the network and platform
• Don’t forget the development environment
Web applications rely on a secure foundation
• Think of all the places your source code goes
• Security should not require secret source code
Is your source code a secret?
• All credentials should change in production
Configuration Management must extend to all parts of the application
• Install backdoor through missing network or server patch
• XSS flaw exploits due to missing application framework patches
• Unauthorized access to default accounts, application functionality or data, or unused but accessible functionality due to poor server configuration
Typical Impact
Hardened OS
Web Server
App Server
Framework
Security Misconfiguration Illustrated
App Configuration
Custom Code
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Test Servers
QA Servers
Source Control
Development
Database
Insider
Serving up malware
A quick Google Safe Browsing search of TechCrunch Europe's site shows suspicious activity twice over the last 90 days. "Of the 128 pages we tested on the site over the past 90 days, 58 page(s) resulted in malicious software being downloaded and installed without user consent.”(sep 2010)
Reason: unpatched WordPress
A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure
•Failure to identify all sensitive data
•Failure to identify all the places that this sensitive data gets stored
•Databases, files, directories, log files, backups, etc.
•Failure to identify all the places that this sensitive data is sent
•On the web, to backend databases, to business partners, internal communications
•Failure to properly protect this data in every location
Storing and transmitting sensitive data insecurely
•Attackers access or modify confidential or private information
•e.g, credit cards, health care records, financial data (yours or your customers)
•Attackers extract secrets to use in additional attacks
•Company embarrassment, customer dissatisfaction, and loss of trust
•Expense of cleaning up the incident, such as forensics, sending apology letters, reissuing thousands of credit cards, providing identity theft insurance
•Business gets sued and/or fined
Typical Impact
Insecure Cryptographic Storage Illustrated
Custom Code
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1Victim enters credit card number in form
2Error handler logs CC details because merchant gateway
is unavailable
4 Malicious insider steals 4 million credit card numbers
Log files
3Logs are accessible to all members of IT staff for
debugging purposes
Leaking customer data?
• customer data, 77 Million compromised.(potentially CCs as well)
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Ook in België!
http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datalek
A7 – Missing Function Level Access Control
• This is part of enforcing proper “authorization”, along with A4 – Insecure Direct Object References
How do you protect access to URLs (pages)?
• Displaying only authorized links and menu choices
• This is called presentation layer access control, and doesn’t work
• Attacker simply forges direct access to ‘unauthorized’ pages
A common mistake …
• Attackers invoke functions and services they’re not authorized for
• Access other user’s accounts and data
• Perform privileged actions
Typical Impact
Failure to Restrict URL Access Illustrated
• Attacker notices the URL indicates his role
/user/getAccounts
• He modifies it to another directory (role)
/admin/getAccounts, or
/manager/getAccounts
• Attacker views more accounts than just their own
https://www.onlinebank.com/user/getAccountshttps://www.onlinebank.com/user/getAccounts
A8 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
• An attack where the victim’s browser is tricked into issuing a command to a vulnerable web application
• Vulnerability is caused by browsers automatically including user authentication data (session ID, IP address, Windows domain credentials, …) with each request
Cross Site Request Forgery
• What if a hacker could steer your mouse and get you to click on links in your online banking application?
• What could they make you do?
Imagine…
• Initiate transactions (transfer funds, logout user, close account)
• Access sensitive data
• Change account details
Typical Impact
CSRF Illustrated
page 44
Browser
example.bank.com bad.site.com<img src=“…”>
<img src=
"https://example.bank.com/transfer?
account=Pieter&amount=1000000&for=Attacker">
1
4 3
2
$$$
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CSRF Illustrated
DEMO
SAMY XSS Worm
A9 – Using Known Vulnerable Components
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• Some vulnerable components (e.g., framework libraries) can be identified and exploited with automated tools
• This expands the threat agent pool beyond targeted attackers to include chaotic actors
Vulnerable Components Are Common
• Virtually every application has these issues because most development teams don’t focus on ensuring their components/libraries are up to date
• In many cases, the developers don’t even know all the components they are using, never mind their versions. Component dependencies make things even worse
Widespread
• Full range of weaknesses is possible, including injection, broken access control, XSS ...
• The impact could range from minimal to complete host takeover and data compromise
Typical Impact
1
10
100
1,000
10,000
100,000
1,000,000
10,000,000
100,000,000
Everyone Uses Vulnerable Libraries29 MILLION vulnerable
downloads in 2011
Libraries 31
Library
Versions
1,261
Organizations 61,807
Downloads 113,939,358
Vulnerable Download
26%Safe
Download
74%
https://www.aspectsecurity.com/news/press/the-unfortunate-reality-of-insecure-libraries
Automation Example for Java – Use Maven ‘Versions’ Plugin
Output from the Maven Versions Plugin – Automated Analysis of Libraries’ Status against Central repository
Most out of Date! Details Developer Needs
This can automatically be run EVERY TIME software is built!! 49
A10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
• And frequently include user supplied parameters in the destination URL
• If they aren’t validated, attacker can send victim to a site of their choice
Web application redirects are very common
• They internally send the request to a new page in the same application
• Sometimes parameters define the target page
• If not validated, attacker may be able to use unvalidated forward to bypass authentication or authorization checks
Forwards (aka Transfer in .NET) are common too
• Redirect victim to phishing or malware site
• Attacker’s request is forwarded past security checks, allowing unauthorized function or data access
Typical Impact
Unvalidated Redirect Illustrated
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2
Attacker sends attack to victim via email or webpageFrom: Internal Revenue ServiceSubject: Your Unclaimed Tax RefundOur records show you have an unclaimed federal tax refund. Please click here to initiate your claim.
1 Application redirects victim to attacker’s site
Request sent to vulnerable site, including attacker’s destination site as parameter. Redirect sends victim to attacker site
Custom Code
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4 Evil site installs malware on victim, or phish’s for private information
Victim clicks link containing unvalidated parameter
Evil Site
http://www.irs.gov/taxrefund/claim.jsp?year=2006&… &dest=www.evilsite.com
Jobs by CNN?
• http://ads.cnn.com/event.ng/Type=click&Redirect=http:/bit.ly/cP–XW
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Mobile, Cloud, IoT Security
Mobile Threat Model
• Platforms vary with mileage
• Very different from traditional web app model due to other use cases and usage patterns
• Must consider more than the ‘apps’
• Remote web services
• Platform integration (iCloud, C2DM)
• Device (in)security considerations
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Mobile Attack Surface
Mobile Threat Model
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Mobile top 10 risks
Only 1% of consumers feel safe using mobile payments
* http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=17767
work in progress
• OWASP Mobile Security Project
• Roadmap:– Threat Model
– Top 10 Mobile Risks
– Top 10 Mobile Controls
– Platform-Specific Guidance
– Training (goat droid)
– Cheat Sheets
– Security Testing Methodologies
Critical threats to cloud security:1. Data Breaches 2. Data Loss 3. Account Hijacking 4. Insecure APIs 5. Denial of Service 6. Malicious Insiders 7. Abuse of Cloud Services 8. Insufficient Due Diligence 9. Shared Technology Issues* The Notorious Nine 2013 - CSA
Cloud hacks / incidents
Considering cloud storage / services?
Mandatory reading:
• Security Guidance 3.0
• Cloud Control Matrix (CCM) 3.0
by Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) cloudsecurityalliance.org
Internet of Things Top 10 - Complete IoT Review
• Review all aspects of Internet of Things
• Top Ten Categories
• Covers the entire device
• Without comprehensive coverage like this it would be like getting your physical but only checking one arm
• We must cover all surface area to get a good assessment of overall security
Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)
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“Build in” software assurance
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Design Build Test Production
vulnerability
scanning -
WAF
security testing
dynamic test
tools
coding guidelines
code reviews
static test tools
security
requirements /
threat modeling
reactiveproactive
Secure Development Lifecycle
(SAMM)
We need a Maturity ModelAn organization’s
behavior changes slowly
over time
Changes must be iterative while
working toward long-term goals
There is no single recipe that
works for all organizations
A solution must enable risk-basedchoices tailored to the organization
Guidance related to security
activities must be prescriptive
A solution must provide enough details for non-security-people
Overall, must be simple, well-defined, and measurable
OWASP Software Assurance
Maturity Model (SAMM)
SAMM Security Practices
• From each of the Business Functions, 3 Security Practices are defined
• The Security Practices cover all areas relevant to software security assurance
• Each one is a ‘silo’ for improvement
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Under each Security Practice• Three successive Objectives under each Practice define how it can be
improved over time
• This establishes a notion of a Level at which an organization fulfills a given Practice
• The three Levels for a Practice generally correspond to:
• (0: Implicit starting point with the Practice unfulfilled)
• 1: Initial understanding and ad hoc provision of the Practice
• 2: Increase efficiency and/or effectiveness of the Practice
• 3: Comprehensive mastery of the Practice at scale
Per Level, SAMM defines...
• Objective
• Activities
• Results
• Success Metrics
• Costs
• Personnel
• Related Levels
Three successive Objectives under each Practice
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Education & Guidance
Resources:
• OWASP Top 10
• OWASP Education
• WebGoat
Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day;
Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.
Chinese proverb
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Secure Coding Practices Quick Reference Guide
• Technology agnostic coding practices
• What to do, not how to do it
• Compact, but comprehensive checklist format
• Focuses on secure coding requirements, rather
then on vulnerabilities and exploits
• Includes a cross referenced glossary to get developers and security folks talking the same language
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Secure_Coding_Practices_-_Quick_Reference_Guide
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Code Review
Resources:
• OWASP Code Review Guide
SDL Integration:
• Multiple reviews defined as deliverables in your SDLC
• Structured, repeatable process with management support
• Reviews are exit criteria for the development and test phases
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OWASP Cheat Sheets
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cheat_Sheets
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Code review tooling
Code review tools:
• OWASP LAPSE (Security scanner for Java EE Applications)
• MS FxCop / CAT.NET (Code Analysis Tool for .NET)
• Agnitio (open source Manual source code review support tool)
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Security Testing
Resources:
• OWASP ASVS
• OWASP Testing Guide
SDL Integration:
• Integrate dynamic security testing as part of you
test cycles
• Derive test cases from the security requirements
that apply
• Check business logic soundness as well as
common vulnerabilities
• Review results with stakeholders prior to release
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Security Testing
• Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)• Automated & manual scanner to find
vulnerabilities
Features:• Intercepting proxy• Automated scanner• Passive scanner• Brute force scanner• Spider• Fuzzer• Port scanner• Dynamic SSL Certificates• API• Beanshell integration
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Web Application Firewalls
Network
Firewall
Web
Application
Firewall
Web
Server
Web client
(browser)
Malicious web traffic
Legitimate web traffic
Port 80
– ModSecurity: Worlds No 1 open source Web Application Firewall
– www.modsecurity.org• HTTP Traffic Logging• Real-Time Monitoring and Attack Detection• Attack Prevention and Just-in-time Patching• Flexible Rule Engine• Embedded Deployment (Apache, IIS7 and Nginx)• Network-Based Deployment (reverse proxy)
– OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set Project, generic, plug-n-play set of WAF rules
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https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_ModSecurity_Core_Rule_Set_Project
The OWASP Enterprise Security API
Custom Enterprise Web Application
Enterprise Security API
Au
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Use
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Acc
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Co
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Acc
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Ref
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Map
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Secu
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Existing Enterprise Security Services/Libraries
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Enterprise_Security_API
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SAMM Quick Start
ASSES
questionnaire
GOALgap analysis
PLAN roadmap
IMPLEMENT
OWASP resources
Asses
• SAMM includes assessment worksheets for each Security Practice
Goal
• Gap analysis
• Capturing scores from detailed assessments versus expected performance levels
• Demonstrating improvement
• Capturing scores from before and after an iteration of assurance program build-out
• Ongoing measurement
• Capturing scores over consistent time frames for an assurance program that is already in place
Plan
• Roadmaps: to make the “building blocks” usable.
• Roadmaps templates for typical kinds of organizations
• Independent Software Vendors
• Online Service Providers
• Financial Services Organizations
• Government Organizations
• Tune these to your own targets / speed
150+ OWASP Projects
PROTECT
Tools: AntiSamy Java/:NET, Enterprise Security API (ESAPI), ModSecurity Core Rule Set Project
Docs: Development Guide, .NET, Ruby on Rails Security Guide, Secure Coding Practices - Quick Reference Guide
DETECT
Tools: JBroFuzz, Lice CD, WebScarab, Zed Attack Proxy
Docs: Application Security Verification Standard, Code Review Guide, Testing Guide, Top Ten Project
LIFE CYCLE
SAMM, WebGoat, Legal Project
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Application security resources
Hard Copy
Hard Copy• The Web Application Hacker's Handbook: Finding and Exploiting Security Flaws -
Dafydd Stuttard• Secure Programming with Static Analysis – Brian Chess, Jacob West• The Art of Software Security Assessment – Mark Dowd, John McDonald , Justin Schuh• The Security Development Lifecycle – Michael Howard• Threat Modeling – Frank Swiderski, Window Snyder• Securing Web Services with WS-Security – Rosenberg & Remy• Core Security Patterns – Steel, Nagappan & Ray Lai• Security Metrics – Andrew Jaquith• Secure Programming with Static Analysis – Brian Chess, Jacob West• The Art of Software Security Assessment – Mark Dowd, John McDonald , Justin Schuh• The Security Development Lifecycle – Michael Howard• Threat Modeling, designing for security – Adam Shostack• Securing Web Services with WS-Security – Rosenberg & Remy• Core Security Patterns – Steel, Nagappan & Ray Lai• Security Metrics – Andrew Jaquith
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www.owasp.org
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Other web sites
• www.webappsec.org• www.cgisecurity.com• buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov• www.cert.org• www.sans.org• samate.nist.gov
• Tools– www.owasp.org/index.php/Phoenix/Tools
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Mailing Lists
• OWASP Project Mailing lists
• Secure Coding List
• [email protected] (WASC)
• SANS NewsBites
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AppSec RSS Feed
feeds.feedblitz.com/OWASP
Twitter• @owasp_be• @ivanristic• @johnwilander• @briankrebs• @psiinon• @krvw• @0x6D6172696F• @mikko• @jeremiahg• @DinisCruz• @w3af• @owasp• @pdp• @vanderaj
OWASP 24/7
https://soundcloud.com/owasp-podcast
OWASP Video
www.youtube.com/owaspglobal
SAMM Roadmap
Friday – User Day
• Talks
• Training
• Topic roundtables
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Saturday – Project Day
•Publish SAMM v1.1
•Workshops
•Road map
owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_SAMM_Summit_2015
Key notes:
• Troy Hunt
• Simon Bennets
• Frank Breedijk
• Joshua Corman
• Tobias Gondrom
• Jim Manico
• Steve Lord
• Matt Tesauro
Belgium Chapter
• Meetings
• Local Mailing List
• Presentations & Groups
• Open forum for discussion
• Meet fellow InfoSec professionals
• Create (Web)AppSec awareness
• Local projects?
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Belgium
Get involved
• Use and donate (feed)back!
• Attend chapter meetings
• Contribute to projects
• Donate resources
• Sponsor chapters / projects
• Become Member
