six-party stall: are south korea and china part of the problem or part of the solution?

ABSTRACT This Special Report, based on a symposium held at the Wilson Center June 14,2006, examines the positions of two key players, South Korea and China, in the multilater-al 6-party talks attempting to find a peaceful solution to the problem of North Korea’s nuclearweapons program. Sung-Yoon Lee of Harvard University argues forcefully that South Koreanpandering to the “criminal” regime of North Korea is clearly part of the problem in the talks.Kirk W. Larsen of George Washington University, analyzing the views of both Seoul andWashington, concludes that the two governments have different goals and different prioritiesin the negotiations—thus contributing to the difficulties in the talks. Kerry Dumbaugh of theCongressional Research Service states that China may be most comfortable with “strategicambiguity” and the status quo in North Korea, which helps to explain Beijing’s approach tothe 6-party talks. Bojiang Yang of the China Institutes of Contemporary InternationalRelations maintains that China is making a sincere effort to resolve the North Korean nuclearissue, and argues that the U.S. is not above criticism at the talks.

Six-Party Stall: Are South Korea and China Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?

INTRODUCTIONMARK MOHR

These four essays, originally presented at aJune 14, 2006, symposium at the WoodrowWilson International Center for Scholars,

attempt to shed light on the position of the govern-ments of South Korea and China with regard to the6-party talks, the multilateral negotiation first estab-lished in 2003 to seek a peaceful, diplomatic solu-tion to the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weaponsprogram.The participants in the talks are the UnitedStates, South Korea, North Korea, China, Japan andRussia. At the time of the symposium, the 6-partytalks had been at a standstill for over six months.

Much has happened since then. On July 5, theNorth Koreans set off two rounds of missile tests. OnOctober 9, they tested a nuclear device. On October

14, the United Nations Security Council passed, byunanimous vote, a resolution applying specific tradeand financial sanctions against North Korea.Then,onOctober 31, the Chinese announced that NorthKorea had agreed to return to the 6-party talks.Although a specific date was not mentioned, the talksare expected to resume in the next few weeks.Theessays that follow provide some insight into whyprogress in the 6-party talks is so difficult, mainly byexamining the differing goals and objectives of SouthKorea and China for these talks, and how, in turn,such goals differ from those of the United States.

Looking at the historical background whichled to the 6-party talks, it was in the late 1980sthat the United States became seriously con-cerned about the possibility of a clandestineNorth Korean nuclear weapons program. In 1994,the United States and the Democratic People’s

SPECIAL REPORTNo. 134

NOVEMBER 2006

EDITED BY MARK MOHR

Mark Mohr is program associate at the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program.

Asia ProgramSUNG-YOON LEEThe Folly of FabledSentimentality: South Korea’sUnorthodox Courtship of North Korea

PAGE 5

KIRK W. LARSENPart of the Problem or theSolution? The ROK, the UnitedStates, and the 6-Party Talks

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KERRY DUMBAUGHChina and North Korea-The View from Washington

PAGE 18BOJIANG YANGChina and North Korea-The View from Beijing

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Republic of Korea (DPRK—North Korea’s officialname) signed an agreement, known as the AgreedFramework. According to the terms of the agree-ment, the DPRK would freeze and eventually dis-mantle its plutonium production facilities. Inreturn, the United States would arrange for the pro-vision of two light-water nuclear power reactors toNorth Korea and also provide the North with ashipment of 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oilannually until the first light-water reactor came online. Additionally, North Korea was to allow theUnited States to place in canisters the approximate-ly 8,000 spent fuel rods produced by its fivemegawatt nuclear reactor.These fuel rods containedenough plutonium to produce five-six nuclearbombs. The canisters were to be removed fromNorth Korea when the nuclear components for thefirst light water reactor were delivered.

The spent fuel canning project had been essen-tially completed, and the foundation poured for thefirst light-water reactor when, in the fall of 2002, avisiting United States official delegation toPyongyang accused North Korea of secretly enrich-ing uranium, thereby violating the terms of theAgreed Framework. In a bizarre contretemps, NorthKorea initially denied the charges, then admitted theexistence of such a program to the United Statesdelegation. However, a few weeks later, the NorthKoreans publicly denied they were enriching urani-um; they said the United States delegation had been“confused,” and gotten its facts wrong.

When the delivery of heavy fuel oil shipmentsto North Korea was subsequently suspended,North Korea reacted by first expelling theInternational Atomic Energy Agency monitorsfrom the spent fuel canning site, then unsealing thecanisters, removing the spent fuel rods, and repro-cessing them to extract weapons-grade plutonium.The North Koreans also restarted their five

megawatt nuclear reactor, which produces thespent fuel rods containing plutonium.

To deal with this new crisis over the NorthKorean nuclear weapons program, the regionalplayers established the 6-party talks. China is thehost for the talks, which began in 2003.There havebeen five rounds of talks to date.

In September 2005, seeming progress was madein the talks when all members signed a statementagreeing to a general set of principles wherebyNorth Korea would eventually give up its nuclearweapons program in exchange for certain benefits.

However, a few days before the signing of theagreement, the United States declared that a bank inMacau was helping North Korea counterfeitU.S.$100 bills. The United States governmentannounced sanctions against the bank. North Koreainterpreted Washington’s action as a “hostile ges-ture,” and declared that it would not return to the6-party talks until the United States lifted these neweconomic sanctions. That is where things stoodwhen the Asia Program held its June 14 symposiumat the Wilson Center to examine both SouthKorea’s and China’s positions at the 6-party talks.

In the first essay, Song-Yoon Lee, Kim Kooresearch associate at Harvard University, bluntlyblames the government of South Korea, over thelast eight years, for a morally bankrupt policy ofrewarding a “criminal” regime without demandingany accountability or reciprocity. He notes that, byits very existence, South Korea poses a long-termthreat to North Korea. Moreover, North Korea hasnot changed its long-term goal of wanting to “lib-erate” the South. Lee feels that the Kim Jong Ilregime will not agree to a negotiated settlement ofits nuclear program because “the acquisition of acredible nuclear arsenal is an essential component,indeed, perhaps the linchpin, of North Korea’snational survival policy.”

The Wilson Center’s Asia Program is dedicated to the proposition that only those witha sound scholarly grounding can begin to understand contemporary events. One of theCenter’s oldest regional programs, the Asia Program seeks to bring historical and cul-tural sensitivity to the discussion of Asia in the nation’s capital. In seminars, workshops,

briefings, and conferences, prominent scholarsof Asia interact with one another and with pol-icy practitioners to further understanding of thepeoples, traditions, and behaviors of theworld’s most populous continent.

ASIA PROGRAM STAFFRobert M. Hathaway, Program DirectorMark Mohr, Program AssociateBhumika Muchhala, Program AssociateMichael Kugelman, Program Assistant

THE ASIA PROGRAM

3SIX-PARTY STALL

Lee bolsters his argument by noting that calls forthe United States and Japan to adopt a “softer” or“more flexible” position vis-à-vis North Koreaoverlook the very purpose of the 6-party talks—which is not to condone North Korea’s tactic ofnuclear brinkmanship, but to persuade North Koreato dismantle its nuclear weapons programs. Toassume, states Lee, that one can seek denucleariza-tion by dangling a few carrots in front of a hardeneddictatorship whose very survival depends onexporting calculated strategic threat is, unfortunate-ly, a bit like trying to cure pneumonia with vitaminsand cough drops; the intent may be earnest, but theapplication is thoroughly misplaced.

Furthermore, notes Lee, on May 31 of this yearthe South Korean people voiced their opposition tothe present South Korean government by handing itan overwhelming defeat in local elections. He pre-dicts that North Korea, fearing a change in govern-ment in Seoul—the next South Korean presidentialelections are scheduled for late 2007—and a harsh-er policy, will try to wrest as many concessions fromthe present Seoul administration as possible. Lee fur-ther asks why South Korea should “forgive and for-get” the long list of atrocities that Kim Jong Il andhis regime have perpetrated against South Korea.

In the second essay, Kirk W. Larsen, KoreaFoundation assistant professor of history and inter-national relations at George Washington University,analyzes the views of both Seoul and Washington atthe 6-party talks, concluding that their respectivegoals and priorities vary widely. He notes that thereremains a great deal of room for differences ofopinion regarding the degree of urgency withwhich each interested party views North Koreannuclear proliferation as well as the best way toresolve the problem.

For example, the United States views a nuclear-armed North Korea as troubling not only because ofthe possibility that the DPRK might use nuclearweapons in battle, but also because the DPRK mightshare or sell its weapons to terrorist groups whomight use them against American targets. For manyin South Korea, however, the prospect of a nuclear-armed North Korea is not so troubling as the possi-bility of an American-led sanctions regime or mili-tary strike leading to a conventional war on thepeninsula. Such a conflict would likely result in thedestruction of Seoul and the death of hundreds ofthousands (if not more) South Koreans.

South Korea, notes Larsen, has grown muchstronger in recent decades, both economically andpolitically. With the election of Kim Dae Jung aspresident in 1997, there was a sea change in SouthKorea’s view of North Korea, from that of a threat toone more of an estranged and misunderstood broth-er. That change has continued to the present,although political developments in South Koreasuch as the May 31 by-elections and the ensuingbreak-up of the ruling Uri Party point toward thepossibility of South Korea and the United Statesmoving closer together in the near-term.Nonetheless, concludes Larsen, the divergencesbetween Seoul and Washington at the 6-party talkshave contributed in part to the present stalemate.Taking into account the reasons for the divergencesmentioned above, it is not difficult to understandwhy South Korea and the United States, from theirrespective vantage points, view the other as “part ofthe problem” in the current multilateral negotiationson North Korea.

Kerry Dumbaugh, specialist in East Asianaffairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and TradeDivision of the Library of Congress, asserts in thethird essay that North Korea is an enigma, and whatChina says to North Korea is a mystery. She notestwo dramatically different United States viewstoward what China is doing in the 6-party talks.One view is that China is doing a credible job withthe 6-party talks and is being a helpful host andinterlocutor for the United States in the wholeprocess. The other view holds that China is beingduplicitous on the North Korea question, insincerein its statements supporting a freeze or dismember-ment of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program,and consistently supportive of North Korea whilecritical of the United States.

Turning to an analysis of Beijing’s motives,Dumbaugh says that China appears to have threefundamental policy objectives that do not change.These are stability on the Korean peninsula,regional damage limitation, and maximization ofChinese leverage and influence. In this context,explains Dumbaugh, China’s food and energy assis-tance appears to be an insurance premium thatBeijing remits regularly to avoid paying the highereconomic, political, and national security costs of aNorth Korean collapse. Viewed another way,Chinese assistance can be seen as a life preserver,thrown out by an admonishing crew after entice-

4 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

ments and instructions on how to climb into theboat of economic prosperity have been ignored.

Dumbaugh concludes that Beijing’s endgame inthe 6-party process is most likely to preserve“strategic ambiguity,” maintaining maximum flexi-bility and influence for China, while at the sametime preserving the status quo.While the status quoon the Korean peninsula may be frustrating formany current United States foreign policy objec-tives, it is not necessarily frustrating for Beijing’spolicy objectives. For China, the status quo is bet-ter than many of the alternatives. It means having aNorth Korea that is neither collapsing nor aggra-vating regional sensitivities by testing nuclearweapons; it means continuing a negotiating processwhose five other partners look to Beijing as a keyplayer and to which North Korea is at least nomi-nally committed; it means maintaining the non-nuclear weapons status of Japan,Taiwan, and SouthKorea; it means containing, at the least, the U.S.presence and American options in Asia; and itmeans keeping North Korea at least partially eco-nomically beholden to—and perhaps some dayeconomically interdependent with—Beijing.

In the final essay, Bojiang Yang, of the ChinaInstitutes of Contemporary International Relationsin Beijing, states that China’s policy toward NorthKorea must be understood in terms of China’soverall diplomacy. China wants a peaceful interna-tional situation so that it can concentrate on inter-nal economic development.A peaceful internation-al situation starts first with those countries onChina’s periphery. He notes that China’s positionon North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is asfollows: first, there must be denuclearization, andsecond, this must be done in a peaceful manner.These are really two sides of the same coin, heasserts. If neither goal or only one were accom-plished, this would inevitably lead to regional insta-bility, which is anathema to China.

Paralleling Larsen’s comments about Seoul andWashington, Yang states that while Beijing andWashington share the same goals, they differ onhow to deal with the problem. The United States,in his opinion, tends to view the North Korean

nuclear issue mainly from the standpoint of inter-national nonproliferation. China, on the otherhand, views it both as a nonproliferation and aregional stability issue.

Yang acknowledges that some in the UnitedStates feel that China is not doing enough, but hecalls such criticism unfair. China is relatively new atthe practice of international diplomacy; in the earlydecades after the founding of the People’s Republicin 1949, China was opposed to the internationalworld order. For the past few decades, however,China has been gradually integrating itself into theglobal international regime, and is “well on the roadto becoming a responsible stakeholder.” It is doingall it can, as host of the 6-party talks, to move to asuccessful resolution of the North Korean nuclearweapons problem. However,Yang asks if the UnitedStates, which often is critical of China’s actions, isdoing all it can to resolve the issue? He claims thatU.S. policy toward North Korea is inconsistent,with different branches of the executive oftenspeaking with different voices. More harmful is themessage that the administration conveys to NorthKorea of an intent to harm it. He states that thismakes it even more difficult for China to get bothsides to seek common ground.

In conclusion, all four essays point to differentaspects of the complexity of the 6-party talks, andoffer reasons why the talks had been stalled for solong. It is clear that each party views the talks fromits own national perspective, and even among alliessuch as Washington and Seoul, there are clear differ-ences regarding goals and methods. China, as host,has placed itself in the middle of the talks, but itsrelationship to North Korea is not transparent.North Korea has been able to exploit the differencesin the outlook of the other parties.The authors offerno panacea or “quick-fix” that would lead to abreakthrough in the talks. The essays do, however,indicate a need for more communication and under-standing among the five parties other than NorthKorea, for it seems that only by presenting a “unitedfront” will the five be in a position to influenceNorth Korea’s behavior. Unfortunately to date, thefive have been anything but united.

Stripped down to its bare bones, internation-al politics is about

choosing sides. This less-than-sophisticated soundingmaxim may not be immedi-ately apparent in convention-al multilateral diplomacy,where parties without muchado shift positions and

alliances as befit them. However, in times of war, themaxim is irrefutable. And in the case of nucleardiplomacy—international politics played at thehighest level next only to waging war and conduct-ing peace negotiations—the maxim is virtuallyincontestable.

Undoubtedly, the Republic of Korea today ispart of the problem in the stalled 6-party talks.Placing the international politics of Northeast Asiaunder Ockham’s razor, one finds a “strategic bal-ance” emerging in the region, which is glaringlyvisible in the contours of the 6-party talks. Moreplainly and precisely speaking, there are two sepa-rate “camps” in Northeast Asia, consisting of China,Russia, North Korea, and South Korea on onehand, and the United States and Japan, on the other.South Korea is turning away from its sole militaryally and benefactor, which also happens to be theworld’s greatest power—not to mention the UnitedStates-Japan-South Korea security structure that hasushered in the greatest period of growth in 2,000years of recorded Korean history. At the same time,it is devotedly courting its traditional suzerain,China, and the world’s truly exemplary criminal/failed regime, North Korea.These actions are, at thevery least, “noteworthy.” In plain, practical terms,South Korea’s “sunshine policy” of appeasing NorthKorea is myopic and, ultimately, self-defeating.

SOUTH KOREA SHOULD CHOSE ITS SIDE WISELY

Beyond slogans of “autonomous foreign policy” or“self-reliance” lie the lives and livelihoods of an entirenation, an entire people.The Roh Moo Hyun admin-istration, purportedly the sole legitimate governmenton the Korean peninsula, must be held accountableone day by all Koreans for the North Korea policy itpursues. Particularly sensitive to historical grievancesvisited upon them by stronger regional powers, bothNorth Koreans and South Koreans would rather denytheir long and ongoing dependence on external pow-ers.While North Korea—one of the most economi-cally dependent states in the world today—has erect-ed an extreme state ideology called juche (“self-reliance”) out of such denial of reality, South Koreaunder President Roh has also been grappling with“self-reliance fever.” Since its inception in February2003, the Roh Moo Hyun administration has increas-ingly shown signs of an itch to inch away from itspolitical and military ties with the United Statesunder the guise of rhetorical “self-reliant (jaju) foreignpolicy” and in favor of uri minjok (“our ethnicKoreans”).While the public’s ingrained victim men-tality offers fertile grounds for political manipulation,the far more important task for the South Koreangovernment is to channel such powerful potent ener-gies toward constructive cooperation with the UnitedStates, not cater to the North Korean dictatorship andpro-North Korean elements within its own borders.

Pushed aside in the peace negotiations betweenJapan and China during the 16th century Korea-Japan War of 1592–98, unceremoniously dismissed byRussia and Japan as the two nations toyed with theidea of carving up the Korean peninsula at the thirty-ninth parallel in the months leading up to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, consulted neither by the

5SIX-PARTY STALL

THE FOLLY OF FABLED SENTIMENTALITY: SOUTH KOREA’S UNORTHODOX COURTSHIP OF NORTH KOREA

SUNG-YOON LEE

Sung-Yoon Lee is Kim Koo research associate at Harvard University.

Americans nor the Russians in the partition of Koreaat the thirty-eighth parallel in 1945, Koreans havecompelling reasons to feel sensitive to external forcesbeyond their control. However, the path for theRepublic of Korea, as a nominal equal party to theothers in the 6-party talks, is clear. South Korea mustreaffirm its commitment to democracy and the ruleof law, and stand shoulder-to-shoulder with theUnited States and Japan. Even though it was shunnedby the United States and North Korea in the bilater-al talks that produced the Geneva Agreed Frameworkin 1994, South Korea today has an unprecedentedopportunity to play in the 6-party talks a proactiverole in determining the future of the Korean people.

In theory, either camp may be standing on thewrong footing, and perhaps the United States andJapan are to be blamed for the current impasse.Perhaps the two countries should adopt a “softer” or“more flexible” position vis-à-vis North Korea alongsimilar lines taken by China and South Korea. In real-ity, however, such presumptions overlook the verypurpose of the 6-party talks—which is not to con-done North Korea’s tactic of nuclear brinkmanship,or even to produce paper agreements, but to persuadeNorth Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons pro-grams.To assume that one can seek denuclearizationby dangling a few carrots in front of a hardened dic-tatorship whose very survival depends on exportingcalculated strategic threat is, unfortunately, a bit liketrying to cure pneumonia with vitamins and coughdrops; the intent may be earnest, but the applicationis thoroughly misplaced.

THE NORTH KOREAN DICTATORSHIP IS NOTA SIMPLE-MINDED DONKEY

Whether it is a “carrot on a stick,”1 a phantom, unat-tainable incentive dangling before its very nose in

the form of the two light-water reactors courtesy ofthe Agreed Framework, or “all carrots and no stick,”in the form of South Korean and Chinese appease-ment policies, the Kim Jong Il regime will not agreeto a negotiated settlement on its nuclear program.The acquisition of a credible nuclear arsenal is anessential component, indeed, perhaps the linchpin,of North Korea’s national survival policy. It is essen-tial to its most immediate and vital goal of regimepreservation, and secondarily, its goal of competingover the long-term with its neighbor, South Korea,and—as difficult as this may be to imagine for SouthKorean youngsters today—eventually “liberating” it.The North Korean dictatorship has designs and pri-orities of its own, and does not merely react to thehostility coming out of the White House or theunbound generosity bursting forth from the BlueHouse (the South Korean president’s official domi-cile). For a state like North Korea, nuclear weaponsare not something it can bargain away for short-term economic gains.

The 6-party talks should not be a forum forexpressing devout hopes.There is a place for the mis-sionary impulse, or patient diplomacy, and nuclearnegotiations with a failed regime living in persistentfear of absorption by the South—whether or notSouth Korea wills it, but by its sheer existence—is noplace for well-intentioned moral suasion. NorthKorea’s nuclear blackmail might one day render theRepublic of Korea’s military, as formidable a conven-tional fighting force as it is, a paper tiger. It might oneday even persuade United States troops to leave SouthKorea, or to stand by on the sidelines as North Koreaforcibly takes over the South. The North Koreanstate’s pursuit of a credible and threatening nucleararsenal is not an undertaking that began on a whim.It is an all-encompassing national policy that the KimJong Il regime will continue to pursue with relentless


The acquisition of a credible nuclear arsenal is an essentialcomponent, indeed, perhaps the linchpin, of North Korea’snational survival policy. It is essential to its most immediateand vital goal of regime preservation, and secondarily, itsgoal of competing over the long-term with its neighbor, SouthKorea, and—as difficult as this may be to imagine for SouthKorean youngsters today—eventually “liberating” it.

7SIX-PARTY STALL

determination, even at the cost of starvation of anoth-er million or two of its own people.

For the North Korean regime, dangling before theinternational community the possibility of a negotiat-ed settlement of its nuclear weapons program is thevery means to reaping economic dividends and con-tinuing to stay in power. On the North Koreannuclear issue, it is actually Kim Jong Il who is the onedangling the unreachable “carrot on a stick” beforethe very noses of the international community, andnot the other way around. For the economicallymoribund Kim Jong Il regime, carrots from the inter-national community are a necessary condition to itssurvival, while nuclear weapons—short of a war or aregime collapse—are a sufficient condition for itslong-term well-being. In the present political envi-ronment where appeasement reigns over contain-ment, North Korea will certainly continue to be suf-ficiently nourished as long as it does not surrender itsnuclear weapons. This simple fact of life the NorthKorean state knows: whereas carrots are perishable,nuclear weapons carry no expiration date.

In the lexicon of international politics, there are,of course, distinct terms for describing the policiesof the principal actors that make such an unusual situation possible. In the case of North Korea,“nuclear blackmail” or “extortion” fit the bill. In thecase of the international community,“appeasement”is the word. And in the case of the South Koreanstate, which has the most to lose in sustaining such ascene, its propping up of the North Korean regimein the current context may very well be character-ized as “collaboration with the enemy.”

“BY KOREANS OURSELVES”: INTER-KOREANCOLLABORATION AT THE EXCLUSION OF THEUNITED STATES

Today, June 14, 2006, coincidentally marks the sixthanniversary of the North-South Joint Declaration byKim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung.2 The unprecedentedsummit by the leaders of the North and South stirredup sentimental feelings and created mass euphoria inSouth Korea. People blithely came to infuse withfaith their wish that peace and unification lay withintheir grasp. More importantly, the summit pageantryroused up intense ethnocentric nationalism—a ten-dency long dormant in the Korean psyche—the kindof nationalistic impulses that have little to do with“patriotism” or “national interest,” but that favor

“Koreanness” to the exclusion of outsiders, a phe-nomenon frequently found in the fervor of fans atinternational sporting events. With the summit, theKorean spirit was truly given the word: Article I ofthe Joint Declaration calls for making progress oninter-Korean relations “independently” or, more pre-cisely,“by Koreans ourselves”—uri minjok g’iri.3

The Korean phrase carries an unequivocal con-notation of “at the exclusion of the United States.”Stemming from a deeply-rooted worldview of “weversus they,” or “Korea versus the outside world,” theKoreans have a peculiar habit of referring to theircountry, language, territory, school, neighborhood—even mother, father, and, a bit alarmingly, husbandand wife—as “our country,” “our language,” “ourwife,” et cetera. The Korean word for “our” is uri,and this word encapsulates the sense of solidarityand tribal mentality that Koreans espouse and value.

History will show that the phraseology and theterms of the Joint Declaration were largely dictatedby North Korea.The phrase “by Koreans ourselves” isa quasi-official North Korean slogan. It is even thename of a branch of the North Korean propagandamachinery. It also happens to be a popular sloganamong pro-North Korea and anti-United States SouthKoreans, while “615Tongil.org” (615Unification.org)is the official website of “Alliance for Unification,” avirulent pro-North Korea, anti-United States SouthKorean political non-governmental organization.

Earlier today, on June 14, 2006, visiting the SouthKorean city of Kwangju on the occasion of the sixthanniversary of the “6/15 Joint Declaration,” the headof the North Korean delegation, Kim Young Dae, hadthe following to share with his South Korean hosts:

In the spirit of the 5/18 Kwangju Uprising,4

the 6/15 Joint Declaration must be actualizedwithout fail.The 5/18 Uprising was fought onbehalf of anti-Americanism, independence, anddemocracy. We should unite our strength byKoreans ourselves [emphasis added] and repelforeign rule and foreign interference, and con-tinue our fight with courage.

THE EVER-CONVERGING INTERESTS OF ROHMOO HYUN AND KIM JONG IL

There are, of course, political permutations of such uri(our) mentality to be found in South Korea, mostnotably, in the name of the governing Uri Party. Just

two weeks ago, on May 31, 2006, the South Koreanpublic rose up and to the “Our Party” of PresidentRoh Moo Hyun bluntly said:“No, thank you!”

In the aftermath of the South Korean people’sunsentimental “spring cleaning” at the polls on May31, 2006—President Roh’s governing Uri Partyhaving suffered the most lopsided defeat in SouthKorea’s history of democratic elections—can weexpect the Roh administration to shift its NorthKorea policy closer in line with international lawsand norms, or will it, undeterred, stay the course andcontinue to reach out to the criminal regime of KimJong Il? For a man who once said in public,“Even ifwe mess up5 all affairs of the state, we’ll be fine aslong as we make good on North-South relations,”what policy options are President Roh likely to pur-sue in order to salvage his remaining time in officeand his own legacy?

Has South Korea’s “sunshine policy”—reinventedas “Northeast Asia peace and prosperity policy”under Roh Moo Hyun—now run its course, in viewof the crushing blow to the Uri Party in the localelections? The past eight years of rule by two consec-utive leftist governments might be said to be, in theKorean context, a form of han puri ([political] “exor-cism”)—the venting of pent up frustration on thepart of those who had been marginalized or pushedaside in the nation’s lunge toward the accretion ofwealth, social and political privileges.6 Has the tideturned? Will South Korea now tone down its one-sided infatuation with Kim Jong Il, as President Rohenters his lame duck period stripped of political sup-port? Or will President Roh now accelerate his over-tures to Kim Jong Il, exhibiting an “all or nothing”adventurism, and seek to overturn his political stand-ing with a dramatic inter-Korean summitry?

On May 10, 2006, while on a visit to Mongolia,President Roh declared that he was prepared tomake “major concessions” to North Korea and pro-vide it with “systematic material aid.” He went on tosay, “Due to our peculiar relations with the UnitedStates and other nations in the region, there areissues that I cannot address openly. However, if for-mer president Kim Dae Jung opens the door, thereare things that I could do without detection”7 (empha-sis added). Just days later the Minister of Unificationpublicly called for a summit between Roh MooHyun and Kim Jong Il this year, further elaboratingthat he was at liberty to spend all of the $1.2 billionNorth-South cooperation fund if only North Korea

would give a good reason to which the SouthKorean public could agree. For the cash-strappedNorth Korean leader and the legitimacy-shornSouth Korean leader, a well-timed dramatic embracewould be an investment that would bring near-certain short-term gains. The key question is justwhen Kim Jong Il will agree to admit Roh MooHyun into North Korea for maximum influence onthe outcome of the presidential election in theSouth in December 2007.

AN OMNIPRESENT CONTEST FOR PAN-KOREAN LEGITIMACY

Each cheerful summit embrace or high profile meet-ing between North Koreans and South Koreans guar-antees mass euphoria and political gains for any SouthKorean leader. For the North Korean leader, there isthe virtual guarantee of substantial short-term eco-nomic returns. But whether such high drama canbring the two Koreas closer together in any meaning-ful way is an entirely different matter. In any seriousdiscussion of inter-Korean rapprochement one mustask the following question:What do the terms “SouthKorea” and “North Korea” mean, that is, as a nationstate, political system, and ideology?

As a “people,” the two Koreas are the same, a sin-gle minjok (the same ethnic people), as all Koreansreadily accept. For over a thousand years, from 935to 1945, the Korean territory remained undividedand Koreans developed a highly homogeneous cul-ture of shared common history and language.However, over the past sixty years, the two Koreashave become—beginning as by-products of WorldWar II and breathing side-by-side as contestants forpan-Korean legitimacy—entirely different creatures.One is an open, capitalist democracy, while theother a most isolated, communist, hereditary dicta-torship. In short, are genuine peace and reconcilia-tion possible between two antithetical systems, bethey under the guise of “confederation” or “federa-tion,” while each inhabits only half of a single sover-eign arena, namely, the Korean peninsula?

In light of the continued unbearable suffering ofthe North Korean people under the Kim Jong Ildictatorship, how will future generations of Koreans,living under a free and democratic government,judge South Korea’s policy of appeasement of KimJong Il during the Kim Dae Jung-Roh Moo Hyuncontinuum, 1998–2008? How will history judge


9SIX-PARTY STALL

South Korea’s presumptions regarding its NorthKorea policy under Kim and Roh, namely: throughnear-unconditional economic aid, to seek gradualchange in the North, which prevents the collapse ofthe North Korean system and prolongs its regime?Will the pragmatic, moral, intellectual, and legalunderpinnings of South Korea’s unorthodoxcourtship of the North withstand the test of time?Or will the shadow of betrayal and collaborationhover over Korean politics for a long time to come?

KOREANS ARE NOT BENEATH THE LAW

“Collaboration with the enemy” is a euphemism for“treason.”While a state may, for the sake of strategicexpediency, pursue an appeasement policy in theshort-term or even temporarily collaborate with anenemy state or a state that poses a threat to itsnational security, such policies in the end need to beheld accountable on their overall legitimacy andefficacy. Just as the vicissitudes of political fortunedetermine whether a rebel is rewarded as a revolu-tionary hero or punished as a traitor, so, too, willSouth Korea’s leaders be judged one day in the courtof public opinion on their unorthodox policy ofappeasing North Korea. If Kim Jong Il all of a sud-den becomes an apostle of peace and democracy andallows for popular election, shuts down his politicalconcentration camps, dismantles his weapons of massdestruction, and grants his people the most basichuman rights such as the freedom of speech, move-ment, assembly, thought, and religion, then SouthKorea’s appeasement policy over the past eight yearswill be celebrated as a success.

The window of opportunity for all these changesto take place hinges on the presidential election inDecember 2007. If the Roh Moo Myun camp andhis apostles of appeasement can manage to stay inpower beyond December 2007, then they will havesecured another five years to accomplish the enor-mous feat of reforming North Korea. If the presiden-tial candidate from the opposition Grand NationalParty (GNP) is elected, then the odds are that the tenyears of appeasement under Kim Dae Jung and RohMoo Hyun—and the manifold irregularities likestate-directed cash transfers into Kim Jong Il’s per-sonal accounts justified as “investment in peace”—will come under scrutiny by a very different jury andan unforgiving South Korean public. What theNorth Korean people—one day free from fear—will

say about such a policy years from now is a separatetroubling matter.

The political and economic implications of such achanging of the guard are certainly not lost on theNorth Koreans. Just three days before visiting SouthKorea for the “6/15 Joint Declaration” festivities,AhnKyung Ho, director of the Secretariat at theCommittee for the Peaceful Reunification of theFatherland, offered the following remarks at a publicevent in the Central Workers’ Hall in Pyongyang:

If the GNP [South Korea’s Grand NationalParty] comes to power, the June 15 JointDeclaration will be reduced to nothing, withthe roads between Pyongyang and Seoul andthe path to Mt. Geumgang blocked; the con-struction of the Gaesong Industrial Complexwill be completely suspended, and the wholenation will go down in flames of war ignited bythe United States.”8

Further compounding the question of legitimacyand efficacy of South Korea’s appeasement of theNorth is the less politically malleable question oflegality. Legal norms certainly are subject to manip-ulation, and both domestic and international lawscan easily be overlooked, distorted, and evenbrushed aside for the sake of expediency. However,crimes of egregious nature like genocide and terror-ism are more difficult to pardon fully or ignoreindefinitely. Such crimes, at the very least, are rarelyforgotten completely.

What should South Korea’s position be on KimJong Il’s crimes against humanity? South Korea is amodel industrialized nation, based on democracy andthe rule of law.The South Korean people have earnedtheir democracy and their basic rights, protectedunder the rule of law, for which they may rightfullyfeel proud.At the same time, as a functioning democ-racy, the South Korean state has the duty to protectand enforce the rule of law. From a legal standpoint,South Korea does not have the luxury or freedom toturn a blind eye to Kim Jong Il’s many crimes againsthis own people and against South Koreans.

Should South Korea let bygones be bygones andtreat Kim Jong Il as a partner for peace? That is, forthe sake of expediency, should the Republic of Koreaforgive Kim Jong Il for the acts of terrorism, such asthe killing of key South Korean cabinet members inRangoon on October 9, 1983, including the foreign


minister, deputy prime minister, and minister ofcommerce and industry, and eighteen others?9 Whatabout the blowing up of the Korean Airliner 858 onNovember 29, 1987, on its route to Seoul from AbuDhabi via Thailand, which claimed 115 innocentlives? Should South Korea turn a blind eye to KimJong Il’s abductions of hundreds of innocent civiliansfrom South Korea, Japan, and other states, or hiswillful starvation of some ten percent of his ownpeople since the mid-1990s through diversion ofinternational food aid and withholding of foodbased on a repressive class system?

For the South Korean government to take such astance for the sake of political expediency or rhetor-ical “peace” is to imply, to its own constituency andfuture generations, that Koreans are beneath the law.To the international community it would be a mes-sage that Koreans are beneath the standards of thecivilized world.The South Korean state has not onlya moral but also a legal duty to protect and carryout justice.

The Criminal Act of the Republic of Korea andspecial laws such as the Punishment of Violence Act,the Aviation Act, and the Safety of AircraftOperation Act explicitly call for bringing perpetra-tors of terrorism to justice. Beyond its domesticlaws, the Republic of Korea is obliged, under vari-ous international conventions to which it is a stateparty, to take action against terrorist attacks on itsown citizens and aircraft flying its own flag.

Under Article 6 of the United Nations Con-vention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings(which the ROK signed on December 3, 1999), andArticles 3, 6, and 7 of the Convention for theSuppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety ofCivil Aviation (which the ROK joined on August 2,1973), and Article 7 of the International Conventionfor the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism(which the ROK signed on October 9, 2001), theRepublic of Korea is under specific legal obligationsto take action against Kim Jong Il’s acts of terrorismand support of international terrorism.10

In sum, even if South Korea is unable, in theshort-term, to prosecute Kim Jong Il and establishjustice on the Korean peninsula, at the very least itshould at once drop its policy of appeasement andtake up a firmer stance against the criminal regimethat it purportedly seeks to transform. This is thekey to tipping the balance of stalemate in the 6-party talks. By joining the side of the United States

and Japan, South Korea can reaffirm its commit-ment to democracy, the rule of law, and denu-clearization. It may also be laying the groundworkfor genuine peace and reconciliation amongKoreans in the long-term.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to public belief, the first Republic ofKorea president to visit Pyongyang and be wel-comed by its citizens was not Kim Dae Jung butSyngman Rhee, South Korea’s first president.President Rhee visited Pyongyang on October 27,1950, four months into the Korean War, as the com-mander in chief of the Republic of Korea forces.Providence did not bring Rhee and Kim Il Sunginto a cheerful embrace, as by then the NorthKorean leader had fled the city. In a few weeks,Pyongyang would be reclaimed by the NorthKorean forces, with the massive aid of the ChinesePeople’s Volunteer Army.Yet this would be the clos-est that South Korea would ever come to unifyingthe Korean peninsula on its own initiative, that is,under a unified democratic government.

The Republic of Korea eschews war as a meansto achieve reunification, unless militarily provokedor attacked by the North. Article 5 of theConstitution of the Republic of Korea explicitlyrenounces aggressive wars. Instead, the ROK makesit its binding duty to establish a unified, free anddemocratic government on the Korean peninsula.Article 4 of the Constitution reads thus: “TheRepublic of Korea seeks unification and formulatesand carries out a policy of peaceful unificationbased on the principles of freedom and democracy.”The preamble to the Constitution also states theimportance of the “mission of democratic reformand peaceful unification of our homeland” and con-solidating “national unity with justice, humanitari-anism and brotherly love.”

In South Korea’s quest for peace, reconciliation,and reunification, the ultimate task at hand is toestablish a single unified government, as itsConstitution dictates, “based on the principles offreedom and democracy.” South Korea’s ultimatelegal, moral, and practical task is to establish peace-fully a unified government on the Korean peninsulathat is free and democratic.“Peaceful reunification” is apopular refrain that all members of the 6-party talkssubscribe to, if with varying degrees of enthusiasm.

However, to date, no state has come forth calling fora free and democratic reunification. Henceforth,South Korea should take the initiative and pro-claim—as an openly stated policy—its policy ofseeking a “peaceful and democratic reunification.”

Different states are governed by different nation-al interests. It is not necessarily the duty of theUnited States or Japan to establish justice, democra-cy, or even peace on the Korean peninsula.That tasksquarely falls on the shoulders of South Korea’s lead-ers. Neither is it necessarily the duty of the UnitedStates government to accept North Korean refugeesinto its borders, yet is has, and will continue itsefforts to address the plight of the North Koreanpeople. On the compelling problem of NorthKorean human rights, the Republic of Korea shoulddispossess itself of its bizarre muted stance out of fearof offending Kim Jong Il and stand with decency, ifnot entirely dignity, and cast its vote with worldpublic opinion.

Just as it is the duty of the Japanese governmentto account for and protect each Japanese nationalabducted by North Korea, so too, is it the basic dutyof the South Korean government to do the same forits own victims. And just as it is the duty of theinternational community to prevent state-directedproduction and sale of drugs, money-laundering,counterfeiting other nation’s currency and pharma-ceutical products, and proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction, South Korea must stand up toNorth Korea and use its considerable economicleverage by insisting on some semblance of normal-cy in state behavior and reciprocity in inter-Koreanrelations. South Korea should actively participate inthe Proliferation Security Initiative instead of shyingaway from it.

Diplomacy may not take “no” for an answer, buta multilateral nuclear negotiations framework likethe 6-party talks has its inherent problems. It is,however, a most useful forum for gathering infor-mation, ascertaining the other parties’ intent, keep-ing record for the sake of history, and unmistakably,for spreading and sharing responsibility.The UnitedStates should not bear the burden of nuclear diplo-macy with North Korea alone, or with only Japan asits trusted supporter. The North Korean nuclearproblem is a legitimate and pressing internationalissue that affects the peoples of all six nations, noother people more than the Koreans, on both sidesof the thirty-eight parallel.

As a proliferation issue the North Korean nuclearthreat may affect the United States more directlythan other participants in the 6-party talks, but as anissue of both immediate and long-term human secu-rity, South Korea has the most to lose by continuingits policy of appeasing the Kim Jong Il dictatorship.North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and itsstrategy of nuclear blackmail must not be condonedany longer, and it is essential that South Koreabecome a productive player in the 6-party talksinstead of a liability, for the sake of genuine peace,justice, the rule of law, and—if for no other reason—a history that future generations of Koreans, or uriminjok, may proudly look back on and embrace astheir own instead of trampling all over it in shame,anguish, and anger.

ENDNOTES

1. Etymologically speaking, the original metaphor behind theoften-heard phrase “carrots and sticks” appears to be anunreachable “carrot on a stick” dangling before the unco-operative donkey’s nose.The efficacy of such a contraptionin inspiring the donkey to pull his cart over a substantialdistance seems at best dubious.

2.The North-South Joint Declaration was signed by KimJong Il and Kim Dae Jung shortly past 11:00 p.m. on June14, 2000. That the principals, the supporters of theDeclaration, and the unsuspecting South Korean publicsince all have without questioning referred to it as the“6/15 Joint Declaration” (“June 15 Joint Declaration”) orcelebrated the event with epithets like the “6/15 Era” or“6/15 Spirit” is quite a feat in itself. Beyond the Koreansuperstition (aversion to the word “four,” which is a homo-nym of “death”) the expression “6/15”carries an auspiciousconnotation that invokes “8/15,” or August 15. Korea wasliberated from Japanese colonial rule on August 15, 1945,and not coincidentally, on August 15, 1948, the Republic ofKorea was established. And in the two-month intervalbetween June 15 and August 15, various political inter-Korean events have been staged, such as the chaperoned,short, single-shot meetings between separated families. Inshort, the artificial verbal construct “6/15” connotespageantry over content, style over substance.

3.The English translation offered by the ROK governmentfalls flat and short of delivering the full meaning of thephrase in question:“The South and North have agreed toresolve the question of reunification independently andthrough the joint efforts of the Korean people, who arethe masters of the country.” Neither does the NorthKorean version, as carried by the Korean Central NewsAgency, offer much insight:“The North and South agreedto solve the question of the country’s reunification inde-pendently by the concerted efforts of the Korean nationresponsible for it.”

11SIX-PARTY STALL


4.The May 18, 1980, anti-military popular uprising in thesouthwestern city of Kwangju.

5.This is a muted translation of the Korean term Roh MooHyun used, g’aeng pan chi da, which, more faithfully trans-lated, should read “screw up.”

6.The notion of han—long-held agitation and a sense offatalistic injustice—and its ‘exorcism,” might be recogniz-able to readers in the New England area familiar with theangst of the Boston Red Sox fans and their collectiverelief upon the Red Sox finally winning the 2004 WorldSeries.

7.The Korean phrase, seul geu meo ni, means taking action“without detection.”The phrase carries a strong connota-tion of doing something irregular, or even criminal, with-out being caught. In light of Kim Dae Jung’s illegal secretwire transfer of $500 million to Kim Jong Il just daysbefore his summit in June 2000, the implications of themessage are inappropriate, if not unsettling.

8. Dong-A Ilbo, June 12, 2006.9.The North Korean bomb planted at the Martyr’s

Mausoleum in Rangoon was intended for South KoreanPresident Chun Doo Hwan, during an official visit to

Burma.The Republic of Korea earlier in the same yearhad joined the Convention on the Prevention andPunishment of Crimes against Internationally ProtectedPersons, including Diplomatic Agents, on May 25, 1983.

10. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 6 of the InternationalConvention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, onDecember 15, 1997, and entered into force on May 23,2001, specifically call for each state party to the conven-tion to take “such measures as may be necessary to estab-lish jurisdiction over the offenses” committed “on boarda vessel flying the flag of that State” or “against a nation-al of that State,” or against “a State or government facil-ity of that State abroad.”Article 7 of the Convention forthe Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety ofCivil Aviation (entered into force on January 26, 1973)stipulates the following: “The Contracting State in theterritory of which the alleged offender is found shall, ifit does not extradite him, be obliged, without exceptionwhatsoever and whether or not the offense was commit-tee in its territory, to submit its case to competentauthorities for the purpose of prosecution.”

13SIX-PARTY STALL

After five largely fruit-less rounds, the 6-party talks have

ground to a halt and remain inlimbo. The optimism thatemerged from the September2005 joint statement, a docu-ment that appeared to repre-sent a breakthrough in negoti-ations, lasted less than 24 hours

as different parties, in this case the United States andthe Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)made it patently clear that they strongly disagreed asto the proper interpretation of the joint statement.1

If one seeks to explain the causes of this impasse,there is plenty of blame to go around. One majorfactor that helps explain the deadlock is the large andgrowing gap between Republic of Korea (ROK) andU.S. perceptions of the nature of the problem and itspotential solution.

It bears noting that the exact nature of both theproblem and the solution is not a matter of unchal-lenged consensus in either Washington or Seoul. Inboth capitals, well-meaning observers and advocatescan and do disagree over the ultimate goals of the 6-party talks as well as over which tactics are mostlikely to achieve these diverging goals. Moreover,differing frames of reference also make discussion ofa single, unproblematic consensus on either prob-lems or solutions rather difficult. Whatever one’sopinion on goals, tactics, and frame of reference, it isuseful to situate the current stalemate in a muchwider historical context.A variety of significant his-torical transformations have all influenced present-day ROK attitudes and policies toward its neighborto the north.

TALKS INTENDED TO FAIL?

Many observers take the goal of the 6-party talks tobe that which was straightforwardly articulated in

the September 19, 2005, Joint Statement: “The SixParties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the6-party talks is the verifiable denuclearization of theKorean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.”2 However,there are at least two other plausible interpretationsof the underlying rationale for the talks. One is thatthe goal of the 6-party talks, especially from theAmerican administration’s point of view, is to fail.Or, to put it more accurately, given the expectationthat the talks will inevitably fail (the DPRK, intense-ly jealous of its sovereignty and status, is extremelyunlikely to agree to the types of intrusive inspectionand observation that constitute “verifiable denu-clearization” in the eyes of the United States andothers), the purpose of the 6-party talks is to demon-strate to the rest of the world that all reasonableefforts to resolve peacefully and amicably the NorthKorean nuclear weapons issue have been made. Oncethe other major interested powers recognize the ulti-mate futility of talking with North Korea, they willhave little choice but to accede to the demands ofAmerican hard-liners for more forceful measures: acomprehensive sanctions regime or even militarystrikes on DPRK nuclear facilities.3 If this is, indeed,the (unstated) purpose of the 6-party talks, thenSouth Korea can clearly be seen as “part of the prob-lem” due to the fact that the ROK (along with thePeople’s Republic of China) has consistently refusedto place all blame for the failure of the talks at thefeet of the DPRK. Rather, the ROK has taken greatpains to play a balancing role between the greatpowers and has, therefore, doled out blame in equalamounts to both the DPRK and the U.S. (some crit-ics would contend that the ROK is more forceful inits criticism of American policy and negotiatingbehavior than it is of the behavior of the DPRK).This behavior is consistent with the stated intentionsof South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun to shiftaway from sole reliance on the U.S.-ROK securityalliance and toward a future in which South Koreaplays “a role of a balancer in Northeast Asia.”4

PART OF THE PROBLEM OR THE SOLUTION? THE ROK, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE 6-PARTY TALKS

KIRK W. LARSEN

Kirk W. Larsen is Korea Foundation assistant professor of history and international relations at George Washington University.


GOAL IS TO KEEP TALKING?

Another potential interpretation of the rationale forthe 6-party talks is that the talks are intended to nei-ther fail nor succeed. The thinking behind thisinterpretation is that a comprehensive mutuallyagreeable solution is not likely to be achieved.Moreover, in the unlikely event that an agreement isreached, it will run the very probable risk of becom-ing impossibly bogged down in the details of imple-mentation and enforcement. In addition, an agree-ment would, by definition, acknowledge and sup-port the existence of an odious and oppressiveregime as well as grant the DPRK more time androom to engage in clandestine nuclear activitiesregardless of whatever it promises on paper.However, the risks of a complete and irrevocablefailure of the talks (these include a DPRK nucleartest and/or an American-led military strike onNorth Korea) are considerable. Thus, while unpro-ductive and frustrating, continuing the 6-party talksis the least worst of a range of bad options. In thisscenario, South Korea can be said actually to play aproductive and useful “good cop” role vis-à-vis themore hard-line and demanding role played by the “bad cop” in Washington. South Korea’s extensive and growing engagement with the Northallows Seoul to continue to importune Pyongyangto keep returning to the bargaining table, whileWashington’s apparent refusal to accept anything lessthan the “complete verifiable and irreversible disar-mament” (CVID) of North Korea insures that anagreement (one that the DPRK is sure to break) isnever reached.

DIVERGENT VIEWS

Neither of the two strategies enumerated above canbe explicitly endorsed by the major powers involvedin the 6-party talks.To formally articulate these ratio-nales is to insure that the talks do not achieve theirintended purposes. As such, the official line remainsthat the purpose of the 6-party talks is not to fail orto stall, but to succeed in achieving the “verifiabledenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peace-ful manner.” However, even if one stipulates that thisis the universally accepted goal of the 6-party talks,there remains a great deal of room for differences ofopinion regarding the degree of urgency with whicheach interested party views North Korean nuclear

proliferation as well as the best way to resolve theproblem. In these areas, there is considerable disagree-ment between Seoul and Washington.

With the obvious possible exception of theDPRK itself, all of the members of the 6-party talksagree that a North Korea without nuclear weaponsis preferable to a nuclear-armed DPRK. However,there is considerable disagreement over the degree ofurgency with which each party regards the issue. Forthe United States, a nuclear-armed North Korea istroubling not only because of possibility that theDPRK might use nuclear weapons in battle but alsobecause the DPRK might share or sell its weapons toterrorist groups who would use them againstAmerican targets. Moreover, nonproliferation advo-cates fear that “allowing” North Korea to go nuclearwill have a powerful demonstration effect that mightset off a wave of nuclear weapons proliferation acrossthe region and even the world.

For many in South Korea, the prospect of anuclear-armed North Korea is, indeed, troubling, butnot so troubling as is the possibility of an American-led sanctions regime or military strike leading to aconventional war on the peninsula, a conflict that islikely to result in the destruction of Seoul and thedeath of hundreds of thousands (if not more) SouthKoreans. Moreover, many in Seoul fear the conse-quences of a North Korean collapse brought about byinternational pressure; these include the possibilitythat the Kim Jong Il regime might be replaced byleaders even more recalcitrant and dangerous, and thelikelihood that a regime implosion would result inmassive flows of North Korean refugees into SouthKorea (and China), with all the attendant economicand social dislocations they would cause. Thus, theUnited States, a global superpower with a militarypresence and interests in many parts of the world, seesthe North Korean nuclear issue as one with danger-ous ramifications on many levels and, therefore, asone of considerable urgency. South Korea, for its part,applies a primarily regional lens to the issue as itweighs its concerns about North Korean nuclearweapons against fears of a North Korean collapse orconventional war on the peninsula.

In addition to disagreements over the degree ofurgency, there are also differences of opinion on tac-tics. South Korean president Roh Moo Hyun hasconsistently declared his opposition to the use of mil-itary force and even to a comprehensive sanctionsregime, preferring the strategy of using carrots rather

15SIX-PARTY STALL

than sticks. U.S. President George W. Bush hasrepeatedly stated his intention to not “reward badbehavior” by offering inducements before NorthKorea completely submits to American demands fordisarmament. Policy- and opinion-makers in bothSeoul and Washington disagree over whether a solefocus on the nuclear weapons issue (or even morenarrowly, on Pyongyang’s plutonium reprocessing,setting aside for the time being the alleged heavyenriched uranium (HEU) program) or an effort tosecure a comprehensive agreement on a variety ofissues including conventional forces on the peninsu-la, human rights, normalization of diplomatic rela-tions, and aid is more likely to bear fruit.5 Finally,even among those who are in agreement that carrotsare generally preferable to sticks, the precise sequenc-ing of said carrots is still a matter of debate, not tomention an issue about which Pyongyang has itsown strongly held opinions.

In the end, it is apparent that there is significantdisagreement between Seoul and Washington over anumber of issues related to the 6-party talks.Whether this allows one to characterize Seoul (orWashington) as “part of the problem or the solu-tion” depends in large part on which set of goals,priorities, and tactics one prefers. However, regard-less of one’s preferences concerning these issues, it isimportant and useful to consider some of the reasonswhy such a gap has emerged between two allies for-merly thought to be quite close, particularly onsecurity issues.These reasons can be found in trans-formations that have changed both the ROK’s atti-tudes towards its security needs as well as the ROK’scapacity to assert its newfound attitudes.

A MORE CONFIDENT AND CAPABLE ROK

For much of the duration of the U.S.-ROK alliance,Washington has been able essentially to dictate termsto the leadership in Seoul. But a series of transfor-mations has resulted in a much more confident andassertive South Korea. The ROK’s rapid industrial-ization, sometimes termed the South Korean eco-nomic miracle, has catapulted the nation of 48 mil-lion people into the top ranks of the world’s largestand most productive economies (South Korea’sGDP is greater than that of all African nations com-bined; the ROK consistently exports more goodsthan all Latin American nations south of Mexico puttogether).6 This development alone gives Seoul moreconfidence in asserting its own interests in interna-tional affairs. Moreover, the ROK’s rapid andimpressive transition from military dictatorship tovibrant democracy adds to South Korea’s sense thatits voice deserves to be heard.This development alsomeans that ROK leaders must acknowledge the willof the South Korean people in a way rather differentfrom that of dictators such as Park Chung Hee(1961–1979) and Chun Doo Hwan (1980–1987).Gone are the days in which an ROK leader couldforge ahead with highly unpopular policies such aswhen Park approved normalization of relationsbetween the ROK and Japan in 1965.

The will and attitudes of the South Korean peo-ple, which ROK leaders must now represent, havechanged dramatically over the course of the last fewdecades. The end of the Cold War (removing overtsuperpower support for North Korea), South Korea’srise to economic and political prominence, and the

In addition to disagreements over the degree of urgency,there are also differences of opinion on tactics. South Koreanpresident Roh Moo Hyun has consistently declared his opposition to the use of military force and even to a compre-hensive sanctions regime, preferring the strategy of using carrots rather than sticks. U.S. President George W. Bush hasrepeatedly stated his intention to not “reward bad behavior”by offering inducements before North Korea completely sub-mits to American demands for disarmament.


diminishing number of South Koreans who directlyexperienced the horrors of the Korean War have allcombined to contribute to an attitude amongyounger South Koreans that sees North Korea as lessof a threat and more of an estranged and misunder-stood brother. A recent public opinion survey ofSouth Korean youth indicated that nearly half ofthose polled would take North Korea’s side in theevent of an American attack on DPRK nuclear facil-ities.7 And while the slightly older echelon of theupcoming generation generally appears to be adopt-ing less dramatic and perhaps more pragmatic atti-tudes, they, too, are beginning to assess the variousthreats and challenges faced by South Korea in waysdifferent from that of their forbears.

In addition, a combination of more recent eventshave also given impetus to Seoul hewing to a coursethat is increasingly at odds with that of Washington.The rapid unification of Germany and its costlyaftermath have resulted in a dramatic paradigm shiftin South Korean attitudes toward unification. Goneare the hopes for instant and immediate absorptionof a collapsed North by the South. The exorbitantcost of the German unification experience, com-bined with a cold-eyed acknowledgment thatdemographic and economic realities will likely makea rapid unification of the two Koreas even moreexpensive for South Korea, has given many ROKdecision makers pause. Moreover, a growing numberof ROK citizens, having directly experienced inter-actions with their Northern brethren in the form ofDPRK defectors, find themselves increasingly skep-tical about the prospects of a swift, pain-free unifica-tion.8 Thus, while an earlier generation of SouthKoreans might have welcomed a Washington-ledeffort to engineer a North Korean collapse, growingnumbers of South Koreans prefer to keep NorthKorea afloat and keep the millions of hungry NorthKoreans safely on the other side of the DMZ. Inaddition, ROK citizens are fully aware of the factthat first North Korean nuclear crisis of the early1990s almost led to an American military strike onthe North Korean nuclear power plant at Yongbyon.Given that the DPRK promised immediate and fullretaliation to either full sanctions or a military strike(including the memorable threat to turn Seoul intoa “sea of flames”) it is little wonder that present-daySouth Koreans think twice before simply signing onto any American-led effort that might result in thesame disastrous ending.

The election of longtime opposition figure KimDae Jung in 1997 was hailed by many as a milestoneshift in ROK politics. Kim soon articulated whatbecame known as the “sunshine policy,” a policy ofengagement with the North that explicitly down-plays confrontation and emphasizes areas of mutualagreement. Kim was likely spurred on by the after-math of the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis and theattendant need to calm jittery foreign investors byseeking to reduce tensions on the peninsula. He alsolikely acknowledged the imperative to avoid a cost-ly German-style unification. Whatever the case, the“sunshine policy” amounted to a radical shift inSouth Korean attitudes and behavior toward theNorth. The goal of this new policy is to keep theDPRK afloat so as to avoid the instability and socialand economic dislocation threatened by a suddenNorth Korean collapse. The hope is that graduallyincreasing engagement will not only improve theDPRK’s economy so as to lessen the costs of a futureunification but also cause North Korea to adopt aless confrontational and threatening posture towardits neighbors in the region. Although popular sup-port for the “sunshine policy” may have ebbed fromthe euphoric high that followed the 2000 summitmeeting between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il,the Roh Moo Hyun government remains commit-ted to a policy of engagement with the North, anapproach Roh has rechristened the “policy for peaceand prosperity.”

Thus, when one considers the current impasse inthe 6-party talks, it becomes clear that a SouthKorea that has experienced dramatic shifts in atti-tudes at both the popular and elite levels and thatnow enjoys the confidence and capacity to make itsvoice heard is, indeed, part of the reason why Seouland Washington cannot see eye-to-eye on the 6-party talks and, therefore, why the talks have failedto reach any satisfactory resolution.

Is this divergence permanent and irrevocable? Onthe one hand, political developments within theROK such as the May 31 by-elections and the ensu-ing break-up of the ruling Uri Party (not to men-tion the possibility of political re-alignment in theUnited States after the 2006 Congressional elec-tions) point toward the possibility of the ROK andthe United States moving closer together in theirattitudes and policies towards the DPRK in thenear-term future. On the other hand, some of thelong-term trends in South Korea indicate that even

17SIX-PARTY STALL

if the two nations could come to complete agree-ment on North Korea, a fundamental re-shaping ofthe relations between the United States and the twoKoreas is likely to continue for some time to come.

ENDNOTES

1.The 6-party talks refer to negotiations held between theDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), theRepublic of Korea (ROK), the United States, Japan, thePeople’s Republic of China (PRC), and Russia, primari-ly designed to address the North Korean nuclear weaponsprogram. For the text of the September 19, 2005, JointStatement, see “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round ofthe Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005,” athttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/ 2005/53490.htm.The DPRK followed up on the Joint Statement with ademand that light-water reactors (LWRs) be providedbefore North Korea dismantled its nuclear weapons pro-gram: “The U.S. should not even dream of the issue ofthe DPRK’s dismantlement of its nuclear deterrentbefore providing LWRs.” For a discussion of this impasse,see Peter Hayes, David von Hippel, Jungmin Kang,Tadahiro Katsuta, Tatsujiro Suzuki, Richard Tanter, andScott Bruce, “Light Water Reactors at the 6-party talks:The Barrier that Makes the Water Flow,”NAPSNET PolicyForum Online 05-78A: September 21, 2005.Available fromhttp://www.nautilus.org/ fora/security/0578LWR.html.

2. See “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005.” Available fromhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/ 2005/53490.htm.

3.A prominent advocate of one strand of this type of think-ing is Victor Cha, the director for Asian affairs in the Bushadministration’s National Security Council. Writing of“hawk engagement” in 2002, Cha argued that “engage-ment would not only provide insight on the degree ofchange in DPRK intentions, but would also lay thegroundwork for punishment if the regime fails to fulfillits obligations.”Victor D. Cha, “Hawk Engagement and

Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,”International Security 27 (Summer 2002): 40–78.

4. See, for example, Sekai Nippo,“Korea in Crisis: Korea asregional ‘balancer,’” World Peace Herald, January 31, 2006.Available from http://wpherald.com/articles/29/1/Korea-in-Crisis-Korea-as-regional-balancer/Caught-between-China-and-Japan.html.

5. For an example of the belief that the members of the 6-party talks should focus first and foremost only onNorth Korea’s plutonium-based nuclear weapons pro-gram, see Selig S. Harrison, “Did North Korea Cheat?”Foreign Affairs (January-February 2005). For advocates ofa much more sweeping “grand bargain,” see, for exam-ple, Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, Crisis onthe Korean Peninsula: How to Deal With a Nuclear NorthKorea (New York: McGraw Hill, 2003).

6.Yang Sang-hoon, “The Republic of Korea KeepsMoving Forward,” Chosun Ilbo, February 16, 2006.Available from http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/main_view.asp?volume_id=45&cate_code=A&g_cate_code=AB&g_code=100018

7. In the survey of 1,000 youngsters aged between 18 and 23,conducted by The Korea Times and its sister paper TheHankook Ilbo on February 16–19, 2006, nearly 48 percentof respondents said that if the United States attackednuclear facilities in North Korea, Seoul should act onPyongyang’s behalf and demand Washington stop theattack. Park Song-wu, “48% of Youth Would Support N.Korea in Case of US Attack,” The Korea Times, February21, 2006. Available from http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/nation/200602/kt2006022117121711950.htm.

8. For a recent exploration of some of the travails of NorthKorean defectors in South Korea and the ROK govern-ment’s attempts to ease the transition into South Koreansociety, see Norimitsu Omishi,“North Korean DefectorsTake a Crash Course in Coping,” New York Times, June25, 2006. Available from http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/25/world/asia/25korea.html?ex=1308888000&en=f4e1694c7348fa29&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss


In addition to the enigmathat is the North Koreangovernment, one of the

great mysteries to manyAmericans is exactly whatBeijing thinks of and says toNorth Korea.There has been agood deal of factual reportageover the years about PRC-North Korea interaction, but

much of it appears contradictory. On the one hand,Chinese officials often appear to put the lion’s shareof the responsibility on the United States to be“flexible” and “patient” with North Korea in the 6-party talks. On the other, China has sided with theUnited States in favor of an International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) resolution declaring NorthKorea to be in breach of U.N. nuclear safeguards andhas criticized North Korea’s February 2005announcement of a boycott of the talks as “unac-ceptable.”1 Chinese officials stress that a nuclear-freeKorean peninsula is one of their priorities, thenappear to support North Korea’s position of post-poning nuclear dismantlement for ten years orlonger.What is the United States to make of such amixed track record? For years, diametrically opposedopinions about exactly what are China’s real securi-ty concerns and political objectives on the NorthKorea issue have dogged the policy debate in theUnited States.

U.S. SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

The conventional school, espoused by many in theU.S. government, holds that China is doing a crediblejob with the 6-party talks and is being a helpful hostand interlocutor for the United States in the wholeprocess. According to this view, we can count on thesincerity of Chinese leaders when they say thatBeijing’s principal priority is a non-nuclear Korean

peninsula.2 A common feature in this view also is thatlike American officials, Chinese officials have grownboth weary and frustrated with the unpredictabilityand intransigence of their erratic neighbor. Sino-North Korea relations and interests have grownincreasingly incompatible. While North Korea hasremained insular, highly ideological, and committedto what many find to be a virtually suicidal policydirection, China has rejected ideological zeal tobecome a pragmatic, competitive, market-driveneconomy that increasingly is a major economic andpolitical player in the international system.

The chief rival to this viewpoint could be calledthe complicit school, which holds that China isbeing duplicitous on the North Korea question,insincere in its statements supporting a freeze or dis-memberment of North Korea’s nuclear weaponsprogram, and consistently supportive of NorthKorea while critical of the United States.3 Accordingto this view, Beijing actually has substantial leveragewith Pyongyang but elects not to use it in order toensure that the North Korean issue continues tocomplicate United States regional strategy andundermine the United States position in Asia.Therefore, China sides continually with NorthKorea and against the United States in the 6-partytalks. At least one proponent of this viewpoint hassuggested that China’s principal goal is to prolongthe 6-party talks indefinitely in order to buy maxi-mum time for North Korea to expand its nucleararsenal and accustom the international communityto the reality of its nuclear weapons status.4

Furthermore, Beijing and Pyongyang actually maybe coordinating their policies on North Korea’snuclear weapons program, including the timing ofNorth Korea’s more provocative pronouncements.Thus, announcements that North Korea is boy-cotting the 6-party talks and needs to be persuadedto return actually may be tactical moves choreo-graphed by Beijing.

CHINA AND NORTH KOREA—THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

KERRY DUMBAUGH

Kerry Dumbaugh is a specialist in East Asian affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Library ofCongress. The views expressed in this report are her own and not those of the Library of Congress.

19SIX-PARTY STALL

CHINA’S REAL SECURITY INTERESTS

So what are China’s real security interests in NorthKorea? Looking at the mix of conflicting possibili-ties, what are the common features, and what infer-ences can be drawn about the political and strategicmotivations Chinese leaders have in their NorthKorea policy? Determination of Beijing’s policymotivations can be suggested by the likely answersBeijing would give to six basic yes-or-no questionson North Korea—answers that might be summedup as the “three yeses and three noes.” The threequestions to which Chinese leaders are most likelyto have to answer “yes” to are: Do we support NorthKorea? Do we feel strongly about the historical tiesand the human and capital investment we have madethere? Ultimately, are there limits to our support?The three questions to which Chinese leaders aremost likely to have to answer “no” to are: Are wehappy about the policy direction North Korea istaking? Are we happy with the amount of controlwe exert over Pyongyang? Are we willing to aban-don them and sever our security interests there? Thepresumed answers to these questions show a mixedpicture of Chinese policy goals that at times are inconflict with one another. Beijing has to continue torecalculate and re-balance these competing goals asevents unfold on the Korean peninsula. At its verycore, though, Beijing appears to have three funda-mental policy objectives that do not change.

Stability on the Korean peninsula and in NorthKorea itself appears to be the first of these funda-mental policy goals. It easily can be argued that thepolitical, economic, and security consequences toChina of a destabilized North Korea are far too seri-ous to be dismissed as a top priority for policymak-ers in Beijing. However unpredictable and annoyingthe North Korean government may be, its collapsewould severely tax the economic resources andlogistical skills of the Chinese central government,disrupting Beijing’s critical domestic priorities foreconomic growth and social stability. Nor is it like-ly that Chinese officials in pursuing this goal are ascasually tolerant of North Korea’s erratic and unpre-dictable behavior as they outwardly may appear.Since first entering into their 1961 military alliancewith North Korea, Chinese leaders have eschewedthe cult-like aspects of Maoism and instead haveachieved robust economic and technological growthby adopting market mechanisms and a more prag-

matic and consultative policymaking style. It is nothard to imagine that Beijing is more than a littlefrustrated with the kind of destabilizing ideologicalfanaticism that the Pyongyang regime still embraces.

Within this context, Beijing’s continuing econom-ic assistance to North Korea becomes easier to under-stand. Rather than a deliberate attempt to underminean ultimate resolution to the 6-party talks, as somehave suggested, China’s food and energy assistanceappears to be an insurance premium that Beijingremits regularly to avoid paying the higher econom-ic, political, and national security costs of a NorthKorean collapse.Viewed another way, Chinese assis-tance can be seen as a life preserver, thrown out by anadmonishing crew after enticements and instructionson how to climb into the boat of economic prosper-ity have been ignored. But for a series of real andsymbolic reasons—including the economic and polit-ical costs to China, the responsibilities of its militaryalliance, the common communist roots it shares withNorth Korea, and the modern historical ties of thetwo countries—Beijing seems unwilling to let NorthKorea sink. Under the circumstances, the life preserv-er is the best that can be offered.

Another logical fundamental policy goal forBeijing is the search for regional stability—morespecifically, Beijing’s interests in keeping Japan,Taiwan, South Korea, and other regional govern-ments on the non-nuclear side of the ledger. Anunpredictable North Korean regime with demon-strable nuclear weapons capabilities could serve as anexcuse for Asian neighbors and for the United Statesto recalculate their own strategic and security poli-cies in ways ultimately damaging to China’s inter-ests. Leaders in Beijing are aware that an unpre-dictable North Korean regime equipped with veri-fied nuclear weapons very likely would lead to deci-sions by Japan, South Korea, and possibly Taiwan andother Asian neighbors to develop their own nucleardeterrents and ballistic missile capabilities. In keep-ing with Beijing’s own domestic policy priorities, itsemphasis on social stability, and its ambition to bethe supreme power in the region, nothing is more tobe avoided than the proliferation around China’speriphery of nuclear-armed governments morecapable of defending their own national interestswhen those conflict with China’s.

In addition to the real possibility of acquiringmore nuclear neighbors, Beijing probably anticipatesthat the United States response to these enhanced


regional security concerns would be an acceleratedand more robust missile defense program, particularlyfor its regional friends and allies, or a revitalized orenhanced network of regional alliances. Beijing hasno long-term interest in seeing the United Statesregional presence strengthened. Its broader policyinterests, instead, are to “manage” the prominentUnited States presence in the region, and even overtime to erode it. In addition, China’s military allianceswith North Korea, enshrined in the 1961 Treaty ofFriendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, rais-es substantially the stakes for Beijing in the event thatthe international community or United States mili-tary elect to employ more aggressive or even militarymeans to deal with North Korea’s nuclear weaponsprogram. Beijing, in that case, would have an unhap-py choice to make: to abandon an ally or else jeop-ardize domestic priorities by armed conflict on behalfof its annoying neighbor. Chinese leaders very likelydo not want to have to make that choice. Beijing’sdomestic growth priorities and a military force struc-ture that is increasingly focused on Taiwan appear toleave little room for a North Korea contingency.

Beijing’s third overarching policy goal appears tobe a concerted effort to maximize its leverage with allthe relevant parties in the 6-party talks. In the case ofNorth Korea, although observers continually specu-late and there are varying amounts of disagreement,no one knows what kind of leverage Beijing has withPyongyang. It may be that Chinese leaders are uncer-tain as well, given North Korea’s penchant for theunexpected and its demonstrable willingness at timesto reject Chinese overtures, carrot and stick alike. IfChinese leaders are, in fact, unsure of the extent oftheir own leverage, they appear unwilling to be moreassertive in testing what those limits might be.

In the calculation of Chinese leaders, then,Beijing’sfood and energy aid to Pyongyang appears to servemultiple purposes: it not only helps to stabilize the tot-tery regime (Beijing’s first key priority), but also seeksto contain the regime’s more egregious eccentricitiesby raising the costs of misbehavior while suggestingthat rewards are possible for good behavior. In otherbilateral relationships, Chinese leaders have learnedthe value of economic inter-dependence. Beijingappears to have grown more confident in the powerits own giant economy has not only to confer eco-nomic benefits but to narrow the range of policyoptions available to its smaller economic partners. Inaddition to food and energy assistance, Beijing maycalculate that greater investment and economic inter-action across the Sino-North Korean border will like-wise serve to shape North Korean interests more inline with those of China.

China’s interests are also served by trying to max-imize its leverage with the other partners in the 6-party talks, especially with the United States, and forthis Beijing needs the 6-party talks to continue.Continuation of the process allows Beijing to con-tinue its mediating role and offers it the potential,however slight the prospect of a successful conclu-sion to the talks, of being an original crafter of a keyinternational agreement rather than a late-comer.Continuation of the process provides a more neutralforum for regular conversations with Japan thanmight otherwise be possible given Sino-Japanesetensions. Finally, continuation of the process burnish-es Beijing’s credentials with South Korea and givesBeijing leverage with the United States governmentas well as a wealth of opportunities for bilateral dis-cussions and senior-level meetings with UnitedStates policymakers.

While it is impossible not to speculate about what final resolution Chinese policymakers hope to see in NorthKorea, for the moment one might say that Beijing sees itsfundamental policy objectives as being best served by“strategic ambiguity” and maintenance of the “status quo.”Such a broad-brush approach would allow Beijing toreassess constantly its tactics based on whatever unexpectedcircumstance arises in the moment.

21SIX-PARTY STALL

THE END GAME

So what is the end game for Beijing? While it isimpossible not to speculate about what final resolu-tion Chinese policymakers hope to see in NorthKorea, for the moment one might say that Beijingsees its fundamental policy objectives as being bestserved by “strategic ambiguity” and maintenance ofthe “status quo.” Such a broad-brush approach wouldallow Beijing to reassess constantly its tactics based onwhatever unexpected circumstance arises in themoment. Beijing need not even have a specific “reso-lution” to the North Korean issue in mind, other thanthe avoidance of a “bad” resolution. In the meantime,strategic ambiguity assures that no one can be certainof how little or how much leverage Beijing has withPyongyang—an uncertainty that leaves Beijing withmaximum flexibility while allowing it opportunitiesto make the most of whatever leverage it has.

Strategic ambiguity also means that no one becertain of the actual state of North Korea’s nuclearweapons program.5 It may even mean, as one policyanalyst has suggested, that Chinese leaders actuallyare fairly ambivalent about whether or not NorthKorea possesses nuclear weapons, notwithstandingChina’s repeated assurances that it shares UnitedStatesand international priorities on this matter.Instead, China’s more important objective is to keepNorth Korea’s nuclear capabilities (whatever theyare) hidden, explaining why some of Beijing’ssternest warnings to Pyongyang have been on theoccasions when that regime has threatened to“demonstrate” its nuclear weapons capabilities insome way.6 Again, this kind of ambiguity serves mul-tiple Beijing objectives—among them Beijing’s cal-culated efforts to avoid anything that could lead tothe nuclear arming of Japan and other Asian neigh-bors or to pre-emptive military action by the UnitedStates and the international community—and rein-forces Beijing’s key role in the 6-party talks, whichby their very existence give China a certain amountof leverage and influence with the United States.

In addition, while the status quo on the Koreanpeninsula may be frustrating for many current United

States foreign policy objectives, it is not necessarilyfrustrating for Beijing’s policy objectives. For China,the status quo is better than many of the alternatives.It means having a North Korea that is neither collaps-ing nor aggravating regional sensitivities by testingnuclear weapons; it means continuing a negotiatingprocess whose five other partners look to Beijing as akey player and to which North Korea is at least nom-inally committed; it means maintaining the non-nuclear weapons status of Japan, Taiwan, and SouthKorea; it means containing, at the least, the U.S. pres-ence and U.S. options in Asia; and it means keepingNorth Korea at least partially economically beholdento—and perhaps some day economically inter-dependent with—Beijing.

ENDNOTES

1.Attributed to PRC U.N. Ambassador Wang Guangya,“Annan Says 6-Party Talks in North Korea’s Interest,”Voice of America press release, February 15, 2005.

2. China has repeatedly held to its general view on theimportance of denuclearization, although some findmeaningful the varying apparent strengths of its asser-tions. In one press conference, Foreign Ministryspokesperson Kong Quan stressed “the Chinese side’spersistence on the denuclearization of the Korean penin-sula and on maintaining peace and stability on theKorean peninsula is resolute and unwavering.” ForeignBroadcast Information Service (February 17, 2005). Atanother press conference four days later, the samespokesperson described China’s position “that we stick tothe goal of a nuclear free peninsula.” Foreign BroadcastInformation Service (February 21, 2005).

3. John Tkacik, “Does Beijing Approve of North Korea’sNuclear Ambitions?” Backgrounder No. 1832, HeritageFoundation, March 15, 2005.

4. Ibid.5. Even confronted with North Korea’s public announce-

ment of February 10, 2005, that it already had madenuclear weapons, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesmanwas taciturn, saying only “We are still analyzing andstudying the DPRK’s February 10 statement.” ForeignBroadcast Information Service (February 17, 2005).

6.A view expressed by Larry Niksch, specialist in Asianaffairs, Congressional Research Service (CRS) in an asyet unpublished CRS report.


It is quite difficult to con-vince my American col-leagues why China’s cur-

rent attitude toward the DPRKis reasonable, and why Chinahesitates to take a more “hawk-ish” policy, as expected by someAmericans. Indeed, especiallyin regard to North Korea’snuclear weapons program,

while China shares the same goal with the UnitedStates, namely to denuclearize the Korean peninsula,it does not necessarily share the same methodology inresolving the crisis.

One of China’s most important diplomatic rela-tionships is with North Korea. One must understandChina’s comprehensive diplomatic strategy since theend of the Cold War in order to have a deeper under-standing of Chinese policy vis-à-vis the DPRK.

Current Chinese diplomacy is based on China’s“World View” and “Development View.” For China,international relations in the Globalization Era differfrom those in Cold War. The first difference is theprominence of global issues. Common threats forcountries are increasing, and China believes thesechallenges can only be managed through interna-tional cooperation instead of through efforts by anindividual country or the combined efforts of a fewcountries.The second difference is a commonality ofvarious countries’ interests. A common feature ofcurrent relations among countries is a strong mutu-ality of political, economic and security interests,which promotes closer interdependence. The pros-

perity of one state may lead to prosperity for anoth-er state, and the loss of such prosperity may negative-ly impact the economy of the second state.Thereforeit is unrealistic to approach international relations asa “zero-sum game” when a “non-zero-sum game” isclearly the better approach. The third difference isthat there is a higher status and greater appreciationfor international norms, placing a greater burden oninternational organizations in their conduct of inter-national relations. China has basically completed thisprocess by joining the World Trade Organization(WTO), and rather than being a challenger to theworld international regime, as it had been for severaldecades beginning with the 1950s, China has gradu-ally transformed itself, since the late 1970s, into beinga defender of the international world order, well onthe road to becoming a “responsible stakeholder.”

THE CONTEXT OF “PERIPHERY” DIPLOMACY

For China, its Korean peninsula policy is an extreme-ly important and complex one. The general goal ofChina’s diplomacy is to maintain peace and stabilityand build up a benign external environment so thatChina is able to concentrate on its domestic develop-ment.There have been three pillars in China’s diplo-macy in the post-Cold War era: its relationship withsurrounding countries, its relationship with otherpowers in the world and its relationship with thedeveloping countries. Among these three pillars,“periphery diplomacy” has been given more andmore importance in recent years. ConcerningChinese periphery diplomacy, three key terms—

CHINA AND NORTH KOREA—THE VIEW FROM BEIJING BOJIANG YANG

Bojiang Yang is a professor at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing.

Indeed, especially in regard to North Korea’s nuclearweapons program, while China shares the same goal withthe United States, namely to denuclearize the Korean penin-sula, it does not necessarily share the same methodology inresolving the crisis.

23SIX-PARTY STALL

Mulin ( ), to create harmonious relationships withneighbors; Fulin ( ), to benefit neighbors by facil-itating economic cooperation; and Anlin ( ), toreassure neighbors—are crucial to understanding itsessence. The stability of the Korean peninsula, givenits unique geopolitical location and historical tieswith the Chinese mainland, is indispensable in orderfor China to realize its diplomatic goals under theperiphery doctrine. China needs to maintain theregion of northeast Asia as a major internationalresource for developing its domestic economy, whileat the same time preventing it from being a source ofdisruption and instability. Given such a basic goal, anynegative elements perceived as obstacles must beovercome and removed.

Periphery diplomacy is undoubtedly the main fac-tor when China considers its policy toward theDPRK, but not the only one. Another key factor isthat of power diplomacy, namely diplomacy towardthe other powers in the region. This is also of highimportance. Compared to when the first DPRKnuclear crisis broke out in the early 1990s, China hasdefinitely been playing a more significant role inhelping to resolve this second crisis. Basically twomajor factors are involved. One is that Sino-DPRKrelations have recovered from their bottoming-outwhen China established diplomatic relationship withSouth Korea in 1992. Ten Stories of a Diplomat, writ-ten by Qian Qichen, former Chinese vice premier incharge of foreign policy, attests to the difficulties ofSino-DPRK relations when China was establishingformal diplomatic ties with South Korea. Anotherfactor is China’s increasingly cooperative ties with theUnited States following the September 11th tragedy.

Expectations that China be a “responsible stake-holder” in the international community and help todefend the non-proliferation regime have broughtnew but increasingly significant responsibilities toBeijing. Specifically, when China deals with thenuclear issue, what is on its mind is not only tomaintain border security and regional peace innortheast Asia, but also to fulfill its internationalresponsibilities as a rising power. In other words, thenuclear crisis not only takes up China’s tremendousdiplomatic resources and efforts aimed at maintain-ing regional stability that is absolutely needed for itsdomestic development, but also provides China witha sort of internal litmus test to gauge its progress asa “responsible stakeholder” in the eyes of the rest ofthe world.

THE DPRK ON CHINA’S DIPLOMACY CHESSBOARD

Pursuing a denuclearized Korean peninsula andresolving the nuclear issue in a peaceful manner arethe dual principles of China’s Korea policy. Lots ofAmerican colleagues are curious which one really hasthe top priority, but in fact, the two are really indivis-ible, like two sides of the same coin.

The logic on this point is quite simple and clear: onone hand, China attaches great importance to peaceand stability on its periphery.Therefore, a nuclearizedKorean peninsula, in addition to damaging the interna-tional non-proliferation regime, would cause regionalinstability by triggering a regional nuclear or conven-tional arms race.China of course opposes this.Actually,as seen from Chinese President Hu Jintao’s remarkswhen meeting with a senior DPRK delegation on July11th, seven days after the DPRK launched its latestround of missile tests, China opposes not only theDPRK’s nuclear weapons program, but “any behaviorthat causes tension on the Korean peninsula.”

On the other hand, China insists on dealing withthe nuclear issue and any other Korean peninsula-related issue in a peaceful manner. This is because anon-peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue couldalso lead to regional chaos. Based on the aforemen-tioned periphery diplomacy doctrine and given thesensitivity to China of the Korean peninsula, anychaos in that part of the world could have seriousnegative effects on Chinese domestic stability.

Let me spell out these negative effects as I seethem. First of all is the issue of border security. Theland border dividing northeastern China and theDPRK is about 1,400 kilometers, too long to bestrictly controlled. I have visited the DMZ (demilita-rized zone) between the ROK and the DPRK fromboth the southern and northern sides. There is anextremely long, solid concrete wall dividing the samepeople into two separate parts. If a refugee flowoccurred on the northern half of the peninsula, it ismuch more likely to surge first through the land bor-der with China rather than to the DMZ, thus flood-ing the northeastern side of the Chinese border. Inother words, if there is any instability or chaos on theKorean peninsula, China would be the first to suffer.Therefore China, for its own security interest, natu-rally has to try to avoid such a scenario.

Secondly, there is the issue of social and economicproblems in northeast China. For example, there are


many state-owned enterprises in the region.They arecalled “first sons of the Republic” because they wereestablished shortly after the establishment of thePeople’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Againstthe backdrop of China’s profound reform that hasbeen taking place over the past quarter century, notevery one of these state-owned enterprises is in a goodsituation.The consequences for those laid-off are alsonot good. Furthermore, northeastern China is also themajor habitat of Chinese citizens of Korean ancestry.They cross the border and visit their relatives andfriends on the other side of the border frequently.When they get together, it is quite difficult to tell onefrom the other, since they speak the same language.From the North Korean side of the border, nationalscome to China to work or to visit, then often returnhome with extra cash or commodities. In this context,based on the history of the Sino-DPRK relationship,the border is managed in a quite friendly way.

Thirdly, there is the geography of northeasternChina. It is not so far from Beijing, the heart of thecountry.Actually in history, more than once, rebellionresulting in dynastic overthrow originated in thisregion.Therefore, it is no wonder that many in Chinaget nervous at the possibility of instability on this partof our border.

Since the second wave of the North Koreannuclear crisis broke out in late 2002, China has triedits best to help resolve the problem by hosting sev-eral rounds of multilateral talks, and by trying tobridge the gap between the United States and theDPRK so that they would be able to have face-to-face talks. China could not have gone out of its wayany more to treat the issue seriously. Yet China iscriticized for its effort. Such criticism is absolutelygroundless, and is made mostly out of ignoranceabout China’s crucial national security interests instability on the Korean peninsula. In short, in lightof its own and the region’s security interests, Chinawants the crisis to be resolved; but for the sake of itsown and the region’s security interests, China wantsthis resolution to be a peaceful one.

THE IMPORTANCE OF COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

For more than twenty years, China has been focusedon joining the existing international system in whichthe United States is the sole superpower. Such aprocess was successfully completed when China

jointed the WTO. It is obvious that China is aimingnot to challenge the existing international regime,but to cooperate with it on issues like anti-terrorism,non-proliferation, and denuclearization of theKorean peninsula. Actually even with regard to thesensitive Taiwan issue, while insisting on the princi-ple that this is a domestic issue, China has nonethe-less (albeit on a track-two level) been engaged in var-ious discussions with the United States, Japan and theEU respectively for a couple of years.

China has also been dedicated to establishingcooperative relations with other powers in the world,especially with the United States. Observing China’sdiplomacy over the past several years, it is actually theso-called “American factor,” or the “American angle,”which has come to the fore in Beijing, whether it isin dealing with its neighboring countries, energyneeds or many other issues. Namely, when Chinaconsiders its policy toward almost every single cornerin the world, “Sino-U.S. cooperation” has been fac-tored in as a kind of “pivotal framework.”The DPRKnuclear issue can be seen as a typical instance forChina to try to resolve a regional security issue incollaboration with the United States, while at thesame time keeping in mind its own national securityinterests. For the past ten years, China actually hasmade great efforts to do just that. In the 1990s, it wasengaged in the 4-party talks involving the DPRK,South Korea, the United States and China. It alsohosted trilateral talks among DPRK, United Statesand China shortly after the outbreak of the secondnuclear crisis, and hosted four rounds of the 6-partytalks until last September. At that time, those talksachieved a significant accomplishment, the September19 joint statement of principles.

Sino-U.S. cooperation and collaboration on thenuclear issue is significant in that the two countrieshad never worked so closely on a specific regionalsecurity “hot spot” before.This means a lot for Chinain terms of reengaging in the modern internationalcommunity, and remodeling its relationship with theUnited States.Yet the American perception and eval-uation of China’s efforts wax and wane—when thingsare going smoothly China is praised but once thereare difficulties or setbacks, China is criticized. So howshould we judge such a situation, and what should wemake of the differences between the United Statesand China in dealing with the nuclear issue?

First, Beijing and Washington have a differentunderstanding of the nature of the DPRK nuclear

25SIX-PARTY STALL

issue.While the United States tends to view it main-ly from the standpoint of international nonprolifera-tion, China views it both as a nonproliferation and aregional stability issue. Furthermore, for Chinesescholars, the nuclear crisis is deeply rooted in themutual isolation between the DPRK and the UnitedStates. Contributing to this isolation, and playing animportant role in the DPRK’s desire to seek nuclearweapons, is the U.S. policy, over the past half century,of seeking containment and sanctions against theDPRK.That is why China constantly claims that theimprovement of U.S.-DPRK relations is the key forthe success of the 6-party talks. In its perception, theUnited States does not really understand the complexmix of factors among northeast Asian countries thatinfluences the consideration of security issues in theregion, many of which pre-date the 20th century.

Secondly, China needs further to increase its skillsin multilateral diplomacy. China is a country withthousands of years of civilization, but the People’sRepublic of China (PRC) did not join the interna-tional community until its accession to the UnitedNations in 1971. In this respect, China is still a youngcountry without much experience in the post-WorldWar II international system. Since the establishmentof the PRC in 1949, until the outbreak of the EastAsian financial crisis in 1997, China looked mainly tobilateral means to handle diplomatic and especiallyregional security issues. So for China, involved inresolving the DPRK nuclear issue by hosting the 6-party talks, this is not only a means of enhancing itscooperation and improving its ties with the UnitedStates, but also a significant symbol in its shift to adiplomatic paradigm involving more of a multilateralapproach. But given the above mentioned three pil-lars, China needs to walk a line between cooperatingwith the United States as well as with other powers,and maintaining good ties with its neighbors, includ-ing North Korea.This is difficult to do. In addition,

China was accustomed to reacting, but not acting, tothe outside world in the past, but now it is requiredto be proactive in certain circumstances. This reallysignals a change for China’s diplomacy.

Thirdly, there is an issue that puzzles and disturbsChina, distracting it from trying to play a more con-structive role.This is U.S. policy and the U.S. evalua-tion of China’s own role. It is really not encouragingfor China to observe the differences in U.S. bureau-cratic politics in handling the North Korean nuclearissue. Such disagreements are public, at times self-contradictory and do not help resolve the problem.Not only are there differences among differentdepartments, such as the State Department and thePentagon, but even inside the same department—wit-ness remarks from the State Department inWashington and those of the U.S. embassy in Seoul—you seldom hear a united voice. Such a situation con-fuses the other parties in the 6-party talks, for exam-ple, the ROK. Especially for the DPRK, a highly cen-tralized country, it must conclude that such U.S.actions as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)and the financial sanctions against Banco Delta Asiaare all part of a united policy of the “united” Bushadministration to harm the DPRK; this in turn has anegative impact on the 6-party process. In otherwords, it is difficult to convince the DPRK that thegovernment which has aimed sanctions at it is also thegovernment that sincerely wants to conduct diplo-matic discussions with it. For China, such a confusingsituation on the U.S. part makes it extremely difficultto walk the line—not among various internationalplayers—but between the hawkish and the moderateelements in Washington, D.C. When there is animpasse with the 6-party talks, China is always told totry harder to increase pressure on Pyongyang, yetwhen it tries to collaborate with others in the region,its motives are called into question. In light of all ofthe above, how should China behave?

There is an issue that puzzles and disturbs China, distract-ing it from trying to play a more constructive role. This isU.S. policy and the U.S. evaluation of China’s own role. It is really not encouraging for China to observe the differences in U.S. bureaucratic politics in handling theNorth Korean nuclear issue.

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Special Report No. 133—The Avian Flu Challengein Southeast Asia:The Potential of Public-PrivateParnershipTjandra Yoga Aditama, David Reddy,Tracy S. DuVernoy,Peter R. Gourlay, September 2006

Special Report No. 132 - Edging Toward FullEmpowerment? South Korean Women in theWorkplace and the Political ArenaSeungsook Moon, Jean R. Renshaw, Kyung-ae Park,R. Darcy, September 2006

Special Report No. 131— China and Democracy:A Contradiction in Terms?Richard Baum, Merle Goldman, Suisheng Zhao,Yongming Zhou, June 2006

Special Report No. 130— One Year After theTsunami: Policy and Public PerceptionsRoberta Cohen, Bambang Harymurti, MuhammadQodari, Courtland Robinson, May 2006

Education Reform in Pakistan:Building for the FutureShahid Javed Burki, ChristopherCandland, Grace Clark, IshratHusain, International Crisis Group,Jonathan Mitchell, SalmanHumayun, Irfan Muzaffar,TariqRahman, Michelle Riboud,AhsanSaleem, Salman Shah, United StatesAgency for International

Development,World Bank (South Asia HumanDevelopment Department), 2005

Japanese Women: Lineage and LegaciesMargarita Estévez-Abe,Takashi Fujitani, BarbaraMolony, Hitomi Tonomura, Chikako Usui, Merry White,October 2005

Special Report No. 129 — China’s Economy:Retrospect and ProspectFranklin Allen, Loren Brandt, Lee Branstetteer, Donald

Clarke, Chang-tai Hsieh, Jikun Huang,Yasheng Huang,Nicholas Lardy, Peter Murrell, Barry Naughton, JunQian, Meijun Qian,Thomas G. Rawski, Scott Rozelle,Susan Whiting, Xiaodong Zhu, July 2005

Seabed Petroleum in Northeast Asia: Conflict orCooperation? Selig S. Harrison, Zhiguo Gao, Kim Myong Gil, ZhaoLi Guo, Keun Wook Paik, Choon-Ho Park, Zhang HaiQi, Kook-Sun Shin, Jilu Wu, Susumu Yarita, 2005

George W. Bush and East Asia:AFirst Term AssessmentRichard W. Baker, Chan Heng Chee,Catharin E. Dalpino, Evelyn Goh,Harry Harding, Jia Qingguo, James A.Kelly, Ilsu Kim, James A. Leach, KojiMurata, Jonathan D. Pollack, RobertSutter, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, JusufWanandi, 2005

Special Report No. 128 — Japanese ODA at 50:An AssessmentSaori N. Katada, Juichi Inada, David Leheny,YoshioOkubo, February 2005

Special Report No. 127— “An Imperfect Countryof Great Consequence”: Indonesia and theChallenge of Global TerrorismAli Alatas, J. Stapleton Roy, January 2005

Special Report No. 126 — China’s “GoodNeighbor” Diplomacy:A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?John W. Garver, Dennis V. Hickey, Michael R. Chambers,

January 2005

Islamization and the PakistaniEconomyKhurshid Ahmad, Shahid JavedBurki, Isobel Coleman, ParvezHasan,Vali Nasr, Omar Noman,Ishrat Husain, Charles Kennedy,Saeed Shafqat, 2004

A copy of any publication can be obtained free of charge by visiting the Asia Program online athttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/asia.A more complete list of Asia Program publications may also be found online.

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six-party stall: are south korea and china part of the problem or part of the solution?

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