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CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 4 5/12/2023 10:41 PM
Chapter 4
Who are the critical citizens?
Concern about trust and confidence in governing institutions has risen and fallen over time in
periodic cyclical waves, with theories in social sciences reflecting contemporary events. After
summarizing the main conclusions derived from the previous body of research we compare societies
cross-nationally in 1995-2005. To focus upon the phenomenon of critical citizens, democratic aspirations
are compared with public evaluations of democratic practices. We can also examine trends from the
early-1980s until the 2005 in the sub-set of eleven societies contained in all waves of the WVS to see if
support has eroded significantly and consistently across these countries. We can also explore the
meaning of democracy and whether people in many countries are merely expressing lip-service to
democratic notions, representing relatively superficial and uninformed expressions of opinion, or
whether attitudes are more deeply grounded in a cognitive understanding which reflects the standard
principles and values outlined in democratic theory.
Concern about citizen’s orientations towards government
During the late-1950s and early-1960s, the theoretical impetus for Almond and Verba’s Civic
Culture reflected contemporary concern to understand the underlying causes of regime instability. This
interest was generated by real-world events associated with what Huntington identified as the second
great reverse wave of democracy.1 This included the historic rise of Nazi Germany and Italian fascism
and the global disruption of the Second World War, as well as the collapse of fledgling parliamentary
democracies in many newly independent African states emerging from colonial rule, and the checkered
political experience of Latin America in the 1960s, due to military coups, populist dictators, and
Communist revolution.2 The central message emerging from The Civic Culture emphasized that political
stability required congruence between culture and structure. It was believed that the democratic public
needed to be finely balanced in equilibrium between the dangers of either an excessively deferential,
apathetic and disengaged citizenry, on the one hand, or an overly-agitated, disenchanted, and heated
engagement, on the other. There was thus assumed to be an optimal level of political trust in stable
democratic states, where active and watchful citizens checked the powerful, without succumbing to the
destabilizing forces of either excessive loyalty and deference, at one pole, or else excessive disaffection
and alienation, at the other extreme.
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The idea that societies differed in their political culture was hardly novel; indeed it had been the
subject of philosophical speculation for centuries, in classic works from Montesquieu to de Tocqueville.
But one of the more radical aspects of the civic culture study was the way that support for the theory
was derived from a path-breaking cross-national opinion survey, demonstrating that citizen’s
orientations could be examined empirically. The study analyzed the mass publics in Mexico, the United
States, Italy, Britain, and Germany during the late-1950s. Almond and Verba concluded that the United
States (and to a lesser extent, Britain) exemplified the civic culture: “Respondents in the United States,
compared with those in the other four nations, are very frequently exposed to politics. They report
political discussion and involvement in political affairs, a sense of obligation to take an active part in the
community, and a sense of competence to influence the government. They are frequently active
members of voluntary associations. Furthermore, they tend to be affectively involved in the political
system: they report emotional involvement during election campaigns, and they have a high degree of
pride in the political system. And their attachment to the political system includes both generalized
system affect as well as satisfaction with specific government performance.” 3 By contrast, Italy (and to a
lesser extent, Mexico) exemplified an alienated political culture: “The picture of Italian political culture
that has emerged from our data is one of relatively unrelieved political alienation and distrust. The
Italians are particularly low in national pride, in moderate and open partisanship, in the
acknowledgment of the obligation to take an active part in local community affairs, in the sense of
competence to join with others in situations of political stress, in their choice of social forms of leisure
activity, and in their confidence in the social environment.”4 The question arising from contemporary
developments is whether many political cultures have gradually edged closer to the Italian model during
the half century since the original study was conducted, or whether civic orientations remain alive and
well in many parts of the world.
During the 1960s and early-1970s, many other American and European commentators also
raised questions about the capacity of democratic institutions to serve as an outlet to contain public
dissent. Indicators in the American National Election Study (NES) (see Figure 4.2) suggested that U.S.
trust in the federal government in Washington DC plummeted steadily every election year from the late-
1950s to the late-1970s.5 These findings seemed to reflect a broader civic malaise in the tumultuous
protest politics the United States, with urban riots symbolizing a breakdown of social control, and
deepening radical sentiments over issues such as Viet Nam, welfare, race, and gender, triggering new
interest in the causes of protest activism.6 Nevertheless interpretations of the meaning of the standard
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ANES political trust indicators differed, sparking a long-standing debate. As discussed in chapter 2, the
standard American National Election Study questions about political trust emphasize the ethical
standards, efficiency, and integrity of elected officials, for example by asking whether the ‘government
in Washington’, or ‘people running the government’ can be trusted to do what is right, whether they
waste taxes, whether government is run for a few big interests, or whether public officials are crooked.
For Citrin, these signs indicated an expression of public dissatisfaction with the performance of
particular incumbent political leaders, representing part of the regular cycle of normal electoral politics. 7
In this view, views about the ethics, honesty and integrity of specific office-holders, including members
of congress and specific presidents, can be expected to ebb and flow over time. For Miller, however, the
roots of public dissatisfaction extended more deeply to indicate a crisis of legitimacy in American
democracy, representing a loss of faith that U.S. political institutions were the most appropriate ones for
American society.8 The gloomier sentiments received their strongest expression in a major influential
report written during the mid-1970s for the Trilateral Commission by Crosier, Huntington and Watakuki,
which diagnosed a ‘crisis’ of democratic authority afflicting not just America but also many similar post-
industrial societies.9
This wave of concern ebbed somewhat during the 1980s, reflecting the more quiescent
Thatcher-Reagan era. A sharp revival of American trust in the federal government registered in the
standard National Election Study series in the early-1980s, despite the deep economic recession during
these years. The gloomier prognostication about the health and vitality of democracy in the United
States and Western Europe was increasingly regarded as overly-alarmist during this era. This
interpretation was typified by Lipset and Schneider, who conducted a detailed study of a wide range of
American public opinion polls towards government, business, and labor. 10 The study noted that mass
support for many types of political institutions in the United States had indeed eroded over time, but the
authors concluded that most criticisms were leveled at the behavior and performance of specific power-
holders, not doubts about the underlying structure and function of American institutions. This positive
perspective was strongly reinforced by a multivolume comparison examining broader trends in Western
Europe from the early-1970s until the mid or late-1990s, the Beliefs in Government project. This
thorough and detailed collaborative study dismissed talk of a ‘crisis of democracy’ as exaggerated, and
arrived at relatively sanguine conclusions. In particular, chapters in these volumes examining
institutional confidence and trust in politicians concluded that there was little evidence of a steady
secular erosion of systems support in Europe during these three decades. Instead the authors
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emphasized the existence of persistent cross-national differences in systems support across different
European member states, and a pattern of trendless fluctuations over the years.11
The 1990s saw a renewed wave of interest in the causes of civic disengagement, exemplified in
the United States by a catalogue of concern about low or falling voting turnout (Teixiera), declining
support for political parties (Aldrich), eroding social capital (Putnam), lack of trust in government (Nye,
Zelikow and King), and plummeting popular support for Congress (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse). 12 The
original Critical Citizens volume, published in 1999, extended the time-series analysis by another decade
and widened the cross-national coverage by considering a global perspective, including developments in
many third wave democracies. The general diagnosis emerging from the team of contributors in this
volume confirmed that a serious and significant long-term erosion of public support for some of the core
institutions of state had indeed occurred during the late-twentieth century, as popular commentators
often suggested. In particular, a global comparison by Klingemann, based on analyzing data from the
second and third waves of the World Values Survey conducted in the early to mid-1990s, demonstrated
substantial cross-national variations and relatively low evaluations of the performance of representative
institutions in many third-wave democracies, especially in post-Communist Europe and in Latin
America.13
In comparisons across established democracies and post-industrial societies, Russell Dalton
demonstrated that citizens had become more distant from political parties, more critical of political
elites and institutions, and less positive towards government during the period from the 1960s until the
early-1990s, weakening the links connecting citizens and the state.14 Subsequent research by Dalton
confirmed the persistence of these trends in these established democracies, and yet he found no
evidence of any erosion of support for democratic principles and values, or any weakening of
identification with the nation-state. 15 Analysis of the fifth wave of the World Values Study, conducted in
2005, allows this book to update the analysis and also to broaden the comparisons to compare public
opinion in emerging economies and developing societies in many parts of the world. We can examine
whether the trends documented earlier in Critical Citizens have continued to persist and even deepen
over time, or alternatively whether criticism of democratic institutions and processes has gradually
eroded general faith in democratic ideals.
Other recent studies have commonly echoed these conclusions, whether focused on trends
within specific established democracies, or based on a broader comparison across global regions. 16
Hence Catterberg and Moreno compared institutional confidence in 37 nations where comparisons were
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available over at least two points of time from 1981 to 2001, using the World Values Survey. They
focused on analyzing trends in confidence towards parliaments and the civil service. The study
concluded that confidence in these institutions declined in most of the established and third wave
democracies under comparison, with some of the sharpest falls registered in Latin America and post-
Communist Europe.17 Nevertheless although there is commonly an erosion of confidence, the exact
timing of these shifts is often country-specific. There is also considerable volatility over time in many
survey measures, like a jagged fall, rather than steady secular erosion. For example the trends in trust in
federal government in the American National Election surveys in Figure 4.2 show an overall decline from
the high point registered at the start of the series in 1958 until the end point fifty years later. But there
are periods where trust in the federal government has fluctuated, reviving in the early-1980s, for
example, as well as sharply during the mid-to-late 1990s, before peaking around the dramatic events of
9/11.
At the same time, however, building on Easton’s original insights, Critical Citizens emphasized
that the concept of systems support was not all of one piece, so that considerable care is needed in
disentangling the most appropriate components and measures.18 In contrast to the survey data showing
rising skepticism about democratic institutions, little systematic evidence suggested a long-term ‘crisis’
in support for democratic principles over these decades, indeed rather the reverse; at the end of the
twentieth century, these values commanded almost universal acceptance as an ideal; as Klingemann
concluded, “I can find no evidence of growing dissatisfaction with democracy as a form of
government.”19 Nor was this pattern confined to Western societies; according to the burgeoning range
of cross-national surveys, widespread public support for democratic ideals was apparent in many parts
of the world, even in many states governed by autocratic regimes.20 Surveys, including the series of
global-barometers covering major world regions, suggest that many citizens around the globe have
come to adhere to democratic principles and aspirations as the best system of government.21
Evidence for mass support for democratic principles has now accumulated in a broad swath of
countries, as well as among different types of cultural areas, notably from the regional Barometers
conducted in post-Communist Europe, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Arab states. The
consensus which has emerged in the previous research literature, on the basis of survey evidence until
the late-1990s, suggests that support for democratic ideals, at least in the abstract, has become
pervasive among the majorities of publics around the world. Support for democracy is far from simply a
Western cultural artifact, as the ‘Asian values’ debate once claimed.22 Even in the Middle East, which
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lags behind the globe in democratic reforms, 2006 Arab Barometer surveys in Jordan, Algeria, Morocco
and Kuwait report that eight or nine out of ten respondents believe that ‘democracy is the best form of
government’ and that ‘having a democratic system of government would be good for our country’. 23 As
Diamond summarizes a recent review of the survey evidence: “Strikingly, the belief that democracy is (in
principle at least) the best system is overwhelming and universal. While there is a slightly higher
preference for the Western industrialized countries, in every region – even the former Soviet Union and
the Muslim Middle East – an average of at least 80 percent of people polled say that democracy is
best.”24
Evidence for worldwide democratic aspirations
In the light of the debates in the literature, we need to reexamine the cross-national evidence
for democratic aspirations, understood throughout this study as expressions of support for the
principles, normative ideals, and values underpinning democratic regimes. This concept can be
measured through surveys by gauging agreement with the idea of democracy, including citizen’s
approval of democracy as the 'best form of government' and as 'a good way of governing' for their own
country, as well as by monitoring the value and importance of democracy, and also comparing
preferences for democratic governance over types of regimes. Cross-national surveys have accumulated
considerable evidence concerning mass support for democratic principles in a wide range of nations, as
well as among the mass public living under different types of regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 25
The previous literature which has examined public opinion concludes that, at least by the mid-1990s or
early 2000, support for democratic ideals had become widespread around the world. Even in countries
with little or no experience of this form of government, such as Azerbaijan, Iran and Vietnam, the
majority of the public say that they support democracy as the best form of government. 26
To examine the survey data, the proportion of ordinary people who express support for
democracy as the best of government for their own country can be compared in 95 societies contained
in the World Values Survey from 1995 to 2005. The survey asked the following “ I'm going to describe
various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country.
For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this
country? Having a democratic political system.” Figure 4.1 shows the proportion who responded in each
society with the strongest approval (‘very good’). The graph illustrates the wide range of replies, with
the strongest support expressed in Ghana, Greece and Morocco, where eight out of ten people thought
that a democratic system was a very good form of government. Far from being a Western phenomenon,
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a glance down the ranking suggests no particular obvious pattern; approval was widespread among the
majorities of the populations in more than fifty societies. Approval was expressed in a wide range of
democratic and autocratic states, and among all cultural regions, as well as among developing countries,
emerging economies, and post-industrial economies from around the world. Popular support was
weaker in the remaining 48 societies, with the lowest levels of popular support expressed in Ukraine,
Latvia, Russia and Hong Kong, but again there is no obvious single factor which these countries share.
[Figure 4.1 about here]
This pattern confirms previous studies based on the World Values Survey and the regional
Barometer surveys which also found that by the end of the twentieth century, support for democracy as
a form of government had become widespread among the publics in many societies worldwide. The
analysis needs updating, however, to see whether democratic aspirations have further strengthened
during the last decade, or whether public opinion has become increasingly skeptical, reflecting the
general slowdown in further democratization which has occurred around the world. 27 The association
of democracy promotion under the Bush administration with unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
may also have depressed support for this type of regime, especially in the Middle East and in Muslim-
majority states. Table 4.1 shows approval of democracy in the twenty-one countries which carried this
item in both the 1995 and 2005 World Values Surveys.
Understanding the meaning of democracy
Therefore democratic aspirations appear to be widespread, according to this evidence, even in
unlikely cases. It remains unclear, however, what ordinary people understand by the idea of democracy.
The skeptical view suggests that attitudes towards democracy are relatively shallow, superficial and
malleable. Democracy is a complex idea open to alternative meanings, including variants such as
‘liberal’, ‘participatory’, and ‘deliberative’, debated in political philosophy.28 Not surprisingly, there is
considerable lassitude for different understandings of the term in ordinary language. Moreover cross-
national surveys may capture responses towards democracy which are culturally-specific in their
meanings. Schaffer conducted in-depth interviews in Senegal, for example, a mostly Islamic and agrarian
country with a long history of electoral politics. He discovered that ideas of “demokaraasi” held by
Wolof-speakers often reflect concerns about collective security, rather than the standard liberal
concepts of free and fair elections, accountable executives, and respect for human rights. 29
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In a broader comparison, Welzel and Inglehart found that most people around the world pay lip
service to the idea of democracy, but they argue that this does not necessarily indicate strong
motivations or deep-rooted coherent orientations.30 They reason that a marked disjuncture is evident in
many societies between overt public support for democracy and the actual type of regime in power. By
contrast, they argue, the presence of more deeply-rooted ‘emancipative’ values in society, exemplified
by feelings of social trust, tolerance, and participation, proves a more accurate predictor of ‘effective’
democratic regimes. Yet debate continues and other scholars have challenged the evidence for the
Welzel and Inglehart argument, and dismissed the more general claim that democratic development is
affected either by emancipative values or by overt expressions of approval for democratic values.31 It
may be naïve to assume, however, that democratic aspirations, by themselves, have the power to
overthrow repressive regimes and long-established autocracies, where states are willing to use
techniques of imprisoning opponents and suppressing opposition reform movements. Even in more
liberal regimes, institutional structures and levels of socioeconomic development may prove more
powerful drivers of democratization than cultural values alone.32 In this context, the expression of
cultural values in each society, while genuine, would probably prove a poor predictor of contemporary
patterns of democratic governance.
Democracy is a complex idea open to multiple interpretations – along with the related concepts
of self-government, human rights, freedom, equality, participation, rule of law, accountability, and
representation. The cultural meaning of support for democracy deserves closer scrutiny, in particular,
among publics in long-standing autocracies, such as in China, Vietnam and Saudi Arabia, where the free
flow of political information is restricted and ordinary people have never had any direct experience of
living under this form of governance. We need to establish whether ordinary people are merely
expressing lip-service to the abstract notion of democracy, representing relatively superficial and
uninformed expressions of opinion, or whether attitudes are more deeply grounded in a coherent
cognitive understanding which reflects the standard principles, structures and values embedded in
democratic theory.
The heart of this debate concerns the need to interpret what ordinary people understand when
they express support for democratic values. Poor people living in Accra, Cairo and Sichuan may regard
the image of democracy favorably today, as the political system associated historically with rich and
powerful nations and with modern post-industrial societies. But positive approval does not imply that
they know much in any detail about the complex principles, practices, and abstract ideas underlying this
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form of governance. Alternatively, when they express approval of democracy, Nigerians, Egyptians and
the Chinese may be expressing more deep-seated aspirations for self-governance, and they may share
an understanding of basic democratic values, structures, and processes which is similar to citizens living
in long-established democracies. After the fall of the Berlin wall, Hofferbert and Klingemann found that
Western and Eastern Germans shared common notions of what defines democracy in terms of values
and processes, such as the association of this form of governance with freedom of speech and
competitive elections, although citizens differed in their understanding of the social and economic
features of democracy.33 Similarly Dalton, Shin and Jou analyzed open ended responses when ordinary
people were asked about the meaning of democracy in surveys conducted in roughly fifty countries. 34
They found that in most places, democracy is broadly identified with freedom and civil liberties. This
response was far more common that understanding the meaning of democracy in terms of institutions
and procedures, such as elections or rule of law, or in terms of social benefits, such as peace and
equality. At the same time, roughly one fifth of the public could not offer any substantive definition,
even in long established democracies.
To consider the meaning of democracy, the WVS asked
Comparing evaluations of state institutions
If there is any ‘crisis’ of democracy, many commentators argue that the heart of the problem
lies in an erosion of trust and confidence in the core institutions of state, including the legislature,
executive and judicial branches of government, as well as other public sector agencies, such as the
police, military and civil service. Nevertheless previous research examining institutional confidence in
America and Western Europe has emphasized the need to distinguish among both public and private
sector agencies, as well as among different branches of government. 35
The distribution of critical citizens
To build upon the conceptual foundation, the heart of this study seeks to focus upon the
contrast and tensions between positive approval of democratic values, on the one hand, and negative
evaluations of the performance of democratic institutions, on the other. The aim is not to look at all
types of support for the nation state but rather to understand the syndrome of ‘critical citizens’ in more
depth. 36 The matrix in Figure 4.X illustrates the framework and how this is measured. Any selection of
suitable variables for indicators needs to balance the desirability of using composite measures derived
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from the factor analysis, with the potential advantage of the greater reliability derived from multi-item
scales, against the problems arising from missing data and more limited cross-national and time-series
coverage which arise from this process.
The horizontal dimension concerns democratic values. This reflects the aspirations which
citizens express towards the ideal type of principles for governing their state, irrespective of the type of
democratic or autocratic regime actually in power. Democratic values involve the normative
underpinnings which are involved in approval or disapproval of this type of state. This concept is gauged
using a single item from the pooled World Values Survey 1995-2005 in terms of strong agreement ( ‘very
good’) with the statement ‘I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you
think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly
good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system?’ It
should be noted that this item does not seek to define any particular type of democracy in terms of
principles or structural institutions, so it open to multiple meanings within each culture.
The vertical dimension concerns citizen’s confidence in state agencies in their own country,
understood to reflect approval of their performance in practice. This is also measured using four items
selected from the pooled WVS from 1981-2005 by the question: “I am going to name a number of
organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal
of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? Parliament, the civil
service, the police, and the armed forces.” Each of these are an integral part of any effective nation-
state, whether democratic or not, and as the factor analysis demonstrated, attitudes towards these
agencies are also strongly correlated with confidence in the national government, the courts, and
political parties, where the pooled WVS contained a more abbreviated time series (1990-2005). The
confidence in state institutions scale is constructed by summing the four components as a standardized
100 point scale and then the scale is dichotomized around the mean into high and low categories.
[Figure 4.X about here]
Combining these components in the matrix generates four ideal types. The critical democrats,
representing those located in the lower right quadrant, referring to citizens who simultaneously aspire
to democracy as the ideal form of government yet who remain skeptical about the way that state
institutions work in practice. The top right quadrant contains the satisfied democrats, where there is
congruence between support for democratic values and confidence in state agencies. Alternatively, the
matrix also identifies the critical non-democrats, a group which does not adhere to democratic values 10
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and which is also skeptical about state institutions. Lastly, the satisfied non-democrats do not subscribe
to democratic values and they are satisfied with institutional performance. When operationalized using
the measures in the pooled World Values Survey 1995-2005 the distribution in Figure 4.X shows that
critical democrats proved to be the largest category, with 43% of respondents. The next largest category
contained the satisfied democrats, representing roughly one third (35.1%) of all respondents. Critical
non-democrats represented 13.6% of respondents, while the satisfied non-democrats were the smallest
group (8.4%).
Therefore the growing tensions between support for democratic values and practices have been
observed in many previous studies in the literature, but nevertheless these components are most
commonly analyzed separately, rather than being integrated.37 Systematic research has not clearly
established the social background and political characteristics of critical citizens, and the distribution of
these groups across different types of societies, cultural regions, and regimes. We also need to describe
trends over time within the same set of countries to establish whether and where there has been any
significant growth in the proportion of critical democrats. Lastly, we also need to examine the behavioral
consequences of these particular attitudinal profiles for civic engagement, governance, and regime
stability. Subsequent chapters explore all these issues in greater depth to understand how we can best
explain the phenomenon of critical citizens in any society, and also why this matters.
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Figure 4.1: Trends in nationalism
Note: The nationalism scale is constructed from two items: (V75) Willingness to fight for one’s country in a war and (V209) Feelings of national pride. These items are summed and standardized to a 100-point scale.
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Figure 4.2: Approval of democracy as best form of government for own country (% ‘Very good’) 2005
Hong KongLatvia
PolandKyrgyzstanEl SalvadorPhilippines
MexicoEstoniaTaiwan
MoldovaArmenia
ChileBulgaria
AzerbaijanGeorgia
Czech RepublicPortugal
East GermanyNetherlands
AndalusiaPeru
AndorraSouth Africa
UruguayIndia
IrelandNorth Ireland
IranGreat Britain
ZimbabweRomania
IndonesiaPakistan
VenezuelaNew Zealand
MaliWest Germany
Trinidad and TobagoAustriaCroatia
EgyptNorwaySweden
Dominican RepublicCyprus
DenmarkEthiopia
MoroccoGhana
.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0% 90.0%
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Figure 4.2: Institutional confidence
Note: Institutional confidence scale (8) 1981-2005
Source: Pooled WVS 1981-2005
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Figure 4.3: Confidence in parliament
Note: Confidence in parliament, 1981-2005
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Figure 4.4: American trust in federal government, 1958-2008
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
7376
6561
53 53
3633
2925
33
44
3840
28 29
21
33
4044
56
47
35.6
R² = 0.287994123440628
% Trusting most of the time/just about always
Note: The standard ANES question is: “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right -- just about always, most of the time or only some of the time?”
Source: The American National Election Surveys, 1958-2008
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Figure 4.5: The dimensions and distribution of critical citizens
Non-democratic values Pro-democratic values
High confidence in state
agencies
Satisfied non-democrats
(8.4%)
Satisfied democrats
(35.1%)
Low confidence in state
agencies
Critical non-democrats
(13.6%)
Critical democrats
(42.9%)
Notes:
Democratic values are measured in the WVS from 1995-2005 by the question (V151) “‘I'm going to
describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this
country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of
governing this country? Having a democratic political system?’” Pro-democratic values are classified
from those who responded ‘very good’ or fairly good’, with the remainder classified as holding non-
democratic values.
Confidence in state agencies is measured in the WVS from 1981-2005 by the question: “I am going to
name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in
them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?
Parliament, the civil service, the courts, the police, and the armed forces .” The scale is constructed by
summing these five components as a standardized 100 point scale and then the scale is dichotomized
around the mean into high and low categories.
Source: World Values Survey 1995-2005
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Figure 4.X Perceived characteristics o democracy by years experience of living in a democratic state
Table 4.1: Approval of democracy as the best form of government for own country (% very good)
Nation 1995 2005 Change 1995-2005Russian Federation 6 24 18Ukraine 20 36 16Moldova, 26 41 15Sweden 63 76 13Chile 30 42 12Uruguay 45 55 10Finland 31 39 8Taiwan 25 33 8Australia 52 59 7
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Germany 58 65 7Slovenia 41 47 5Brazil 27 30 3India 49 52 3Argentina 51 52 2Mexico 28 28 -1United States 55 52 -3Bulgaria 37 33 -5Colombia 35 27 -8Japan 43 35 -8Romania 66 54 -13Serbia 50 35 -15Republic of Korea (South) 45 24 -21Total 40 43 2
Note: Question “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system.” Percentage ‘very good’.
Source: World Values Survey 1995-2005
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Table 4:2 Perceived characteristics of democracy.
Survey items Political rights Strong
government
V157. Civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression. .706
V154. People choose their leaders in free elections. .699
V161. Women have the same rights as men. .682
V160. People can change the laws in referendums. .660
V158. The economy is prospering. .630
V159. Criminals are severely punished. .541
V155. People receive state aid for unemployment. .519
V153. Religious authorities interpret the laws. .787
V156. The army takes over when government is
incompetent.
.723
V152. Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. .491
% of variance 29.8 16.9
Note: Q “Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy.
Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of
democracy. Use this scale where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy” and 10
means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy”” The table presents the results of
Principle Components factor analysis using Varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization.
Source: World Values Survey 2005
23
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 4 5/12/2023 10:41 PM
Table 4.2: Perceived essential characteristics of democracy
Region Women
equal
Free
elections
Civil
liberties
Referend
a
Economy
prospers
Punish
crime
State aid for
unemploymen
t
Tax rich Army
takes
over in
need
Religious
leaders
define
law
Africa 8.22 8.36 7.34 8.03 7.71 7.81 6.86 6.03 4.87 4.84
Asia-Pacific 8.49 8.51 8.11 7.72 8.24 8.13 7.00 7.40 4.62 4.59
Central & Eastern
Europe
8.92 8.67 8.39 8.14 8.53 8.07 7.84 6.53 4.43 3.86
North America 8.68 8.41 7.69 6.91 6.92 6.51 6.53 5.59 4.28 3.49
South America 8.76 8.63 7.77 7.98 7.49 6.82 7.19 5.69 4.03 4.03
Scandinavia 9.50 9.20 8.72 7.94 6.17 6.15 7.35 6.71 2.81 2.16
Western Europe 8.98 8.62 8.25 7.90 7.46 7.58 7.43 6.43 3.00 2.82
Total 8.69 8.56 8.00 7.82 7.80 7.60 7.19 6.46 4.21 3.95
Note: For the exact questions, see Table 3.X
Source: World Values Survey 2005
24
CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 4 5/12/2023 10:41 PM
Table 4.3
Region Importance of living in
a democracy
Evaluation of
democracy in own
country
Respect for human
rights in own country
Scandinavia 9.13 7.45 1.83
Western Europe 8.86 6.28 2.20
North America 8.81 6.62 2.17
Africa 8.64 6.45 2.37
Asia-Pacific 8.46 6.89 2.09
South America 8.35 6.57 2.60
Central &Eastern Europe 8.05 5.13 2.82
Total 8.51 6.34 2.46
Notes:
V162.”How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale
where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you
choose?”
V163: “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10,
where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what
position would you choose?”
V164” “How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays in this coun try? Do you feel
there is 1 A great deal of respect for individual human right, 2 ‘Some respect”, 3 Not much respect, 4 No
respect at all.”
Source: World Values Survey 2005
25
1 Samuel P. Huntington. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman:
The University of Oklahoma Press.
2 For the intellectual history of the origins of the civic culture study, see Gabriel Almond’s (1996) ‘The civic
culture: Prehistory, retrospect, and prospect’ (http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/96-01) and Gerardo L.
Munck and Richard Snyder. 2007. Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics.
3 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 314.
4 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p.308.
5 See the ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior.
http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/graphs/g5a_1_2.htm
6 Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase. 1979. Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies.
Beverley Hills, CA: Sage.
7 Jack Citrin. 1974. ‘Comment: The political relevance of trust in government.’ American Political Science
Review 68:973-88; Jack Citrin and Donald Philip Green. 1986. ‘Presidential leadership and the resurgence of
trust in government.’ British Journal of Political Science 16: 431-53.
8 Arthur H. Miller. 1974. ‘Political issues and trust in government, 1964-1970.’ American Political Science
Review 68: 951-72; Arthur H. Miller. 1974. ‘Rejoinder to 'Comment' by Jack Citrin: Political discontent or
ritualism?’ American Political Science Review 68:989-1001; Arthur H. Miller and Stephen A. Borrelli. 1991.
‘Confidence in government during the 1980s.’ American Politics Quarterly 19: 147-73.
9 Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki. 1975. The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the
Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission. New York: New York University Press. See also
Samuel P. Huntington. 1981. American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
10 Seymour Martin Lipset and William C. Schneider. 1983. The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and
Government in the Public Mind. New York: Free Press. P.6. See also Joseph S. Nye, Philip D. Zelikow, and
David C. King. Eds. 1997. Why People Don't Trust Government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
11 See, in particular, Ola Listhaug and Matti Wiberg. 1995. ‘Confidence in political and private institutions.’
In Citizens and the State, eds. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press;
Ola Listhaug. 1995. ‘The dynamics of trust in politicians.’ In Citizens and the State, eds. Hans-Dieter
Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
12 This concern generated an extensive American literature during the early to mid-1990s. See, for example,
Ruy A. Teixeira. 1992. The Disappearing American Voter. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution; John R.
Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 1995. Congress as Public Enemy. New York: Cambridge University
Press; John H. Aldrich. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Susan J. Tolchin. 1996. The Angry American: How Voter Rage Is
Changing the Nation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Joseph S. Nye, Philip D. Zelikow, and David C. King. Eds.
1997. Why People Don't Trust Government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Robert D. Putnam.
2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. NY: Simon and Schuster; John R.
Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2001. What Is It About Government That Americans Dislike?
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13 Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1999. ‘Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis.’ In Critical
Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Ed. Pippa Norris. New York: Oxford University Press.
14 Russell J. Dalton. 1999. ‘Political support in advanced industrialized democracies.’ In Critical
Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Ed. Pippa Norris. New York: Oxford University Press.
15 Russell J. Dalton. 2004. Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political
Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. New York: Oxford University Press.
16 See, for example, Neil Nevitte and M. Kanji. 2002. ‘Authority orientations and citizen support: A cross-
national analysis of satisfaction with governments and democracy.’ Comparative Sociology 3-4: 387-412;
Mattei Dogan. Ed. 2005. Political Mistrust and the Discrediting of Politicians. The Netherlands: Brill; Colin
Hay. 2007. Why We Hate Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.
17 Gabriela Catterberg and Alejandro Moreno. 2006. ‘The individual bases of political trust: Trends in new
and established democracies.’ International Journal of Public Opinion Research 18(1): 31-48.
18 David Easton. 1965. A framework for political analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall; David Easton.
1975. ‘Reassessment of the concept of political support.’ British Journal of Political Science 5(OCT): 435-457.
19 Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1999. ‘Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis.’ In Critical
Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Ed. Pippa Norris. New York: Oxford University Press.
20
21 Larry Diamond. 2008. ‘Introduction’. In How People View Democracy. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner
(eds). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. P.xi.
22 Russell Dalton and Doh Chull Shin, eds. 2006. Citizens, Democracy and Markets around the
Pacific Rim Oxford: Oxford University Press.
23 Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler. 2008. ‘The Arab Aspiration for Democracy.’ Table 1. In Larry
Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). How People View Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press.
24 Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). 2008. ‘Introduction’. In How People View Democracy.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
25 Michael Bratton, Michael, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi. 2004. Public Opinion, Democracy, and
Market Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Roderic Camp. ed. 2001. Citizen Views of Democracy in
Latin America Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; Russell J. Dalton and Doh Chull Shin, eds., 2006.
Citizens, Democracy and Markets around the Pacific Rim Oxford: Oxford University Press.
26 Ronald Inglehart. 2003. ‘How solid is mass support for democracy: and how do we measure it?’ PS:
Political Science and Politics 36:51-57; Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. 2003. ‘Political culture and
democracy: Analyzing cross-level linkages’. Comparative Politics. 36(1): p. 61-+; Larry Diamond and Marc F.
Plattner (eds). 2008. ‘Introduction’. In How People View Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press.
27 Larry Diamond. 2008. The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World.
New York: Times Books; Arch Puddington. 2009. ‘Freedom in the world 2009: setbacks and resilience. ’
Freedom in the World, 2009. Washington, DC: Freedom House.
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/FIW09_OverviewEssay_Final.pdf
28 David Held. 2006. Models of Democracy. 3rd ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
29 Frederic G. Schaffer. 1998. Democracy in Translation: understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press
30 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. 2003. ‘Political culture and democracy: Analyzing cross-level
linkages’. Comparative Politics. 36(1): p. 61-+; Christian Welzel. 2007. ‘Are levels of democracy affected by
mass attitudes? Testing attainment and sustainment effects on democracy.’ International Political Science
Review 28(4): 397-424; Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart. 2008. ‘The role of ordinary people in
democratization.’ In Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). In How People View Democracy. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press.
31 See Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell. 2005. ‘Cultural and economic prerequisites of democracy: Reassessing
recent evidence.’ Studies In Comparative International Development 39 (4): 87-106; Christian Welzel and
Ronald Inglehart. 2006. ‘Emancipative values and democracy: Response to Hadenius and Teorell.’ Studies In
Comparative International Development 41 ( 3): 74-94; Jan Teorell and Axel Hadenius. 2006. ‘Democracy
without democratic values: A rejoinder to Welzel and Inglehart.’ Studies In Comparative International
Development 41(3): 95-111.
32 Pippa Norris. 2008. Driving Democracy: Do Power-sharing Institutions Work? Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
33 Richard I. Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2001. ‘Democracy and Its Discontents in Post-Wall
Germany.’ International Political Science Review 22(4): 363-378. See also Dieter Fuchs. 1999. ‘The
Democratic Culture of Unified Germany.’ In Pippa Norris. Ed. Critical Citizens: Global Support for
Democratic Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
34 Russell J. Dalton, Doh C. Shin and Willy Jou. 2008. ‘How people understand democracy.’ In Larry Diamond
and Marc F. Plattner (eds). 2008. How People View Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press.
35 See Seymour Martin Lipset, and William C. Schneider. 1983. The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and
Government in the Public Mind. New York: Free Press; Ola Listhaug and Matti Wiberg. 1995. ‘Confidence in
political and private institutions.’ In Citizens and the State, eds. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs.
Oxford: Oxford University Press
36 For alternative conceptualizations and studies about this phenomenon, see also Susan Pharr and Robert
Putnam. (Eds.) 2000. Disaffected Democracies: what's troubling the trilateral countries? Princeton:
Princeton University Press; Mariano Torcal and José R. Montero . 2006. Political Disaffection in
Contemporary Democracies: Social Capital, Institutions, and Politics. London: Routledge; Richard I.
Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2001. ‘Democracy and Its Discontents in Post-Wall Germany.’
International Political Science Review 22(4): 363-378.
37 The main exception is the study presented by Richard I. Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2001.
‘Democracy and Its Discontents in Post-Wall Germany.’ International Political Science Review 22(4): 363-
378.