sir harold harding lecture london dix

8/11/2019 Sir Harold Harding Lecture London Dix

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SIR HAROLD HARDING LECTURE

BY ARNOLD DIX

THE

CHALLENGES

OF

SOUND

ENGINEERINGFORUNDERGROUND

CONSTRUCTIONINTHE21ST

CENTURY

Introduction

On Thursday the 17th

of April, 2008 the 7th

Bi-

annual Sir Harold Harding Memorial Lecture waspresented by Professor Arnold Dix at the Institution

of Civil Engineers in London.

Attended by a large audience and watched over by

the names of great engineers such as Arkwright,

Cort, Watt, Bramah, Rumford, Murdock, Rennie,

Brunel, Myddelton, Dudley, Newton, Savery,

Newcomen, Darby, Brindley and Smeaton, in the

Thomas Telford Theatre, a lively address on

contemporary issues facing engineers in the

tunnelling sector proved to be both entertaining and

thought provoking. This is a transcript of thatlecture.

The Presentation

Good evening Ladies and Gentleman!

It is a tremendous honour to be here in this great

city. I apologise in advance for my very strange

accent and thank you for inviting me to present this

prestigious lecture.

For those of you who are wondering, it is true, I am

related to the famous soprano, Helena Dix who

performs here in London. I hope that somehow her

voice helps with my presentation.

Our century, this century the 21stcentury faces

challenges which are immediate and demand our

attention. Our civilisation has to address these

problems now, and we, as the people best able to

respond with respect to the underground

environment, must stand up and respond. Its just

that simple we the technically able are best

placed to provide the actual solutions to the

technical challenges of the 21stcentury.

I believe there are three key areas that we must

focus in on our response.

1.

Truth. I know its a simple thing. Of

course, we all tell the truth? Well, in mypresentation, perhaps during a quiet

moment, Ill talk about some areas where

perhaps we dont. As masters of the factual

world we must be truthful.

2.

Time. I dont think we, as technical people,

communicate our concepts and

understanding of time and what it means

well enough to other professionals.

Although we often share the same words, I

dont think we share the same mind space

when it comes to time.

3.

Professional conduct. If we are to assume

our rightful place in leadership roles (the

rate we are required to take if our

civilisation is going to address the pressing

technical issues of this century) we must

behave as professionals and we must be seen

to behave as professionals.

Combining these three core areas will promote both

understanding and trust. These are essential for our

new leadership role.

The global crises of urbanisation, energy and

environmental degradation that were currently

facing arent unforeseen. These arent things that

have snuck up on us without us having any warning

about them. Weve known they were coming.

Urbanisation and population growth: Weve known

its an issue. Its upon us now.

Energy: The cost and availability of energy. We

knew this was coming as a major issue.

Environmental degradation: There is no surprise

about it. Old news for our professions.

Climate change: Interesting really, climate change.

We were trained on climate change. As soon as we

did quaternary studies; as soon as we looked at

alluvial deposits; as soon as we thought about

glaciations in this part of the world, we were

embracing climate change when it wasnt trendyto

do it. We know about it. We understand it. The


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rates might be different but we are well placed to be

leaders in the engineering response to it.

Cost

Of course, the economic cost of infrastructure - its

getting more expensive and our communities are

asking, What is the value? In times of shorteconomic returns and meteoric politics the value of

major underground infrastructure is easily

miscalculated.

The Harding Context

Sir Harold Harding in his Presidential Address of

November 1963 said:

[The population explosion] may

produce a greater danger than

humanity might find itself being

choked by its own waste products

so in the future, the work to prevent

this may become our major task.

Now, in the 21stcentury, I will suggest to you that

some of the key major tasks that we face, some of

the main challenges that our society is going to look

to us for a response and as Harold Harding spoke

about all those years ago.

When you look at the tunnels here in London and

what the United Kingdom has done as a

community, the way it has allocated its resources,

the way its engineers have stepped up to the

challenge, it has a fire track record of responding to

these issues.

When I have a little look around the history, I see:

1863 - the Metropolitan line, Paddington Kings

Cross, the first underground service and the sewers

being constructed.

1890 - the deep level tube.

Then, when I went to Embankment Station and I

had a look below, I could see the big floodgates too,

of course to stop the flooding down there from the

Thames.

These are issues that have been addressed, by us as

engineers, on behalf of our community long before

they were trendy. Long before they became what

elections were being won or lost on. These are

normal engineering issues that we are trained to

deal with.

In terms of the truth, this is where we must stand

up. No amount of political promises no matter

how sweetly theyre said or with whatever vigour

changes the truth.

Legislative reform (God bless its little heart)

doesnt change the facts. Provisions in contracts

dont change the truth. Pronouncements in

standards dont change anything.

The universal laws of nature, including what

Mother Nature has dished up for us in terms of

ground conditions are the facts. The gravitational

constant will remain the same, no matter what is

said in the legislation or written in the contract.


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Fluid dynamics will be the same. It doesnt matter

how eloquent or powerfully put the contrary

position is the facts are the facts. To suggest

otherwise is not the truth. Our job influences what

the politicians say, what the legislation says, what

the contracts say, what the standards say. We must

endeavour to keep these other important matters

grounded in truth.

Thats all very nice to say but lets have a closerlook at our culture and its impact on truth.

Here I am in the United Kingdom. A lovely place.

Dont we love to just talk down our success? Were

judged by the infrastructure. How late it was. How

much extra it cost. How we (in Australia we call it)

stuffed it up, and thats how were judged. Lets

give an example of that the new Terminal 5 at

Heathrow, T5 and our culture.

T5 clearly shows that an operational failure

undermines absolutely undermines - communityconfidence in the piece of exceptional engineering

that T5 is. Its fantastic engineering! Could the

change of ownership have had something to do with

that? Could the people, who are there now, be

different to the people who were there for the main

substantive part of the project? I think they are

different. I understand, from reading the tabloids, a

couple of key senior people have gone now. No

one is saying publically what a great piece of

engineering it is.

The whole world is celebrating T5s failure aseveryones bags zip on down to Italy! (T5 luggage

was sent to Italy to be sorted following handling

difficulties.) Yet, when I went to T5, I thought it

was gorgeous. Almost as gorgeous as an

underground place. I really enjoyed all these sorts

of things. I could only imagine the castings for the

structural elements.

I thought it was a very impressive place.

So what does it tell us? It tells us in our profession,

as experts in the underground space, we are going

to be judged on how our systems perform. Thats

why tonight Im not just talking about boring our

tunnels, Im not just going to limit it to the code

Im going to talk about the operation as well.

Messages

What are my messages going to be? Ill tell you in

advance so if you go to sleep, you wont have

missed anything.

Generally, we must assume our role as leaders in

developing and operating subterranean

infrastructure. That is our place! We have the best

information. We have the best knowledge and

judgment. We have to stand up and take that place.

Do not assume that others understand, or can

understand some of the complex technical scientific

and philosophical concepts that underlie our

profession. Even if they mimic our words, they

dont share the concepts, and Ill explore that

shortly.

Dont think that because somebody says to you,

Oh, I can put that in the contract. I understand

that whatever it might be. Something about

ground conditions, something about a 1 in 50 yearevent, something about a standard. Dont assume

that they know what youre talking about. Even if

they use the words back at you.

We have a different mindset. We think about things

differently. Engage with these other professionals,

tease out their ideas, talk to them. Dont be afraid

to help them understand our concepts. Theyre

clever people. Other professionals are clever. We

have to help them understand and we have to help

them appreciate what they dont yet understand.


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We should not compromise our intellectual integrity

to pander to bureaucrats. This is actually really

serious. The UK is the home of bureaucracy. God

bless you! It started here. It spread around the

world. Coming from another colony, Im kind of

sensitive to this sort of thing.

Did I mention risk assessments? Ill come to them.

Dont let simplistic risk assessments compromise

our intellectual integrity to do so brings us all intodiscredit.

Consider the operational implications of everything

that we do. I know that its easier, for example,

when building a tunnel through say, soft ground

going into hard ground -

Lets go in steep because its easier and

then we shorten the distance were in the

difficult ground and then well go along the

nice ground and well pop up steep at the

other end.

Something as simple as that, although wonderful in

terms of the immediate construction risk profile,

may damn that piece of infrastructure for the next

100 or 200 years in terms of operational

performance.

If for example over that 100 or 200 years - the

buoyancy of poisonous gases, for example,

becomes an issue. The grade on the steep section

will haunt the users for ever and to protect them

will require advanced systems of ventilation andother technologies which perhaps havent even been

invented yet. The other option was to perhaps be

more sensitive about grade. Its just a simple

example.

Dont be slaves to standards. Truth is a much

better master.

For want of nothing better to do, I sit on a number

of Standards Bodies. For those of you who dont,

youve got to try it. Its a special kind of thing. Its

like a form of therapy. You go along to a meeting.Work out the politics. Eat food thats yucky.

Pretend that people you dont like, you do. Try and

understand all the various personality disorders and

then in the very end, establish a minimum standard

that everyone can agree on and then celebrate it as

if the world has changed. These minimum

standards are dangerous things for us.

The EU Directive, for example, on the Trans

European Road Network for Safety, is a minimum

standard. Just a minimum standard. Yet, its

interpreted to be something special. Its not. So

dont be slaves to it. Truth is a better master.

Develop innovative ways of conducting knowledge

transfer and group problem solving. Endorse new

ways of doing peer review in your intellectual

endeavours. There arent enough of us anymore to

be insular in the way we work. The world is

screaming for the infrastructure we deliver there

arent enough experienced people to do it. We haveto become more clever in the way we share our

expertise and remember, the root cause (as best I

can tell from my analysis of many failures) of

tunnels collapses is administrative, not technical.

Usually administrative errors cause the vast

majority of technical collapses not technical

issues.

I know of only a handful of cases where the

collapses have been what I would call a technical

surprise for technical people. Usually if you

actually had the time or the expertise or even just aquiet moment, the fact that the whole thing is

bending, for example, no matter what clever way

we describe it, should give you an idea that

something is not quite right. So just remembering

the bureaucracy, the way things are structured, the

way engineers are resourced is really important.

Weve actually got the technology really, really,

highly developed now technically there are very

few constraints in 21stcentury tunnelling.

Construction and Risk - Tunnels

Risk taking is part of the process in underground

construction. We are explorers of the unknown.

There is not going to be a, without risk

underground construction project unless, like

Superman, we develop special eyes to see through

the rock itself. Its not going to happen in theforeseeable future.

Calculated risk taking is to be endorsed by us

because thats what we do. We are risk takers.

Engineers do it all the time. We have numbers that

describe it, we know the things that we build will

break. We understand the people who use them

will die. Thats what happens. Thats what we do.

Were practical people. Weve just got to get on


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with it and do the job. The Joint Code of Practice1,

we should and I think YOU should, particularly,

celebrate that as an achievement. It is a significant

step, in my opinion, forward for the world in

managing the technically complex underground

projects.

Operations

In terms of operations, we should carefully consider

the human factors and Ill touch upon this. Its the

people that were building this for. Not

hypothetical people real people. Think about how

real people behave.

We must also consider the long term energy

consumption of our infrastructure. The

environmental implications of this infrastructure

that we build and in the contracts, dont be too

bogged down by what people do elsewhere get acontract that suits your culture. Suits your project.

Often the administration of the contract is much

more important than the words. Of course, the

words are important but its like a marriage. It

doesnt really matter what the vows say if you hate

each other. Its the culture and Ill explore that.

Standards

So lets get to the question about being a

professional. As professional engineers, turn

your expert mind, your profession to the task at

hand. Thats what you have to do. So if you just

follow a standard, its not going to be good enough.

There are a whole range of things that can happen if

you say to someone, Just follow the standard. As

I said, if youve been on a standard body, you knowhow perilous that might be.

So lets have a think about tonight in terms of the

presentation professional conduct in construction,

operation, standards and contracts. In the end, we

have to be trusted and in the end, we have to be

trustworthy.

1A Code of Practice for Risk Management of Tunnel Works;

December 2005; Prepared by the International Tunneling

Insurance Group

Trusted and Trustworthy

So what are our challenges on being trusted and

trustworthy?

Firstly, there is a lack of experienced practitioners

globally.

Secondly, and I think very importantly, there is a

huge brain drain of competence to other

professions.

How many sitcoms have you ever seen on the sex

life of engineers? Hands up the answer is none,

and I dont know if its our brown cardigans, or

what it is, but the world does not portray us as cool,

sexy kind of guys as I know we all are!

We can be a bit functional sometimes, but thats

okay. But this is actually a very serious issuebecause there was a time when the best minds -

without question - would become engineers. That

time has past and its past at a time in the history of

the world where we need them now. I dont want

the cleverest MBA business manager in the world

by my side when things are going technically

wrong. How helpful are they? I would have

preferred it if there was someone useful out there to

help me. We are useful people. Thats what were

trained to be. Our time has come again to be useful.

Okay, we may have to get a bit sexier, but our time

has come again.

Money

Money! Ive called it reward in the presentation.

We are worth more than were paid. That situation

will change rapidly, I think, here and in other

countries as well, as the world recognises if they

want functional projects built and they want thembuilt on time and on budget, it would help if they

paid decent people to do the job and it would help if

they attracted decent people to the profession by

paying them something reasonable to come. This

really upsets me because why should an MBA earn

more than an engineer when the engineers are the

ones who can deliver the infrastructure and the

MBA can sit back and get drunk at lunch time and

tell you what a bad job youve done because your

KPIs are stuffed!!!


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We are the rightful masters. The engineers and the

scientists are the custodians of the fundamental

unalterable truth about the real world. Digging

holes through the ground and keeping people safe in

them is as real a problem as it gets. It demands our

special attention. As Sir Harold Harding said:

The only bore hole that can be relied upon

to describe the ground conditions precisely

would be one the length of the tunnel andseveral feet larger in diameter.

Im thinking, Pretty astute kind of guy.

Information Sharing

Were going to have to develop innovative ways to

cooperatively deliver outcomes, share ourexperience and expertise. Of course we still have to

respect the commercial business models. Our

masters still have to win or lose elections. Our

masters still have to make more money for the

investments than they make. They dont like losing

money. We have to respect those commercial

models but in order to create trust in us; we need to

communicate better the special knowledge that we

have about these risks. As I mentioned, we need

better ways of communicating with each other.

Tunnelling Essentials

So, now to the tunnel essentials. Im going to

quickly go through geology, design and

construction, use, normal, utility use, energy

consumption, pollution and emergencies.

Clichs

Ground Conditions

Now, lets go to the clichs.

Ground conditions are variable.

Well done!

How many people do you talk to who arent

engineers, who arent lawyers (oh, maybe they are

lawyers), but how many people do you talk to who

arent technically trained in what that means, who

nod, Yes, ground conditions are variable. But

what they mean is I put tomatoes in the garden.

There was a clay layer down below. Very variable

or I didnt use the pitchfork, I didnt get down deep

enough. They dont get it! They dont understand

how serious that clich is nor can they.

The contracts should recognise ground condition

uncertainties. The challenge for our colleagues inthe legal area is how to translate what we know to

be a truth and a fact into something which is

workable legally. This is an enormous problem for

them. The risk is that we leave it to them to sort out

without giving it our attention to help them work

out a practical solution.

Fundamental questions require our assistance.

When are there enough boreholes? When is enough

geo-technical data enough? How do you translate

that into the sort of formality and certainty in a

contract thats demanded? Those are real questionsand we have to help them answer them. We have to

become their partners in this problem. We have the

expertise to do so.

Risks

My favourite clich, Risks should be born by the

party best able to manage them oh, get out of it!

Our projects cost so much, why would anyone of us

want to bear the risk of it, even though we are bestplaced to manage the risks? Weve only got modest

houses and wealth accumulating at an hourly labour

rate - a billion pounds is quite a lot of exposure.

This is just a clich. Its mouthing. Its part of what

I spoke to you about.

Understanding

Dont believe that people understand what youresaying just because they use your words. They

dont understand. They havent been trained in the

concepts. They havent got the experience that we

have to deal with these matters, they cant

understand without our help.

Just a quick ground conditions re-visit in the

context of truth of will illustrate this!


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Time

Mother Nature has had about 4.5 billion years to

fiddle with the ground conditions.

London has been here around about 2,000 years. So

we, as human beings, have had about 2,000 years to

put a tunnel over some soil in the ground a bit of

iron, a few sleepers or something.

The operational life of the infrastructure may be

200 years. It might be a bit more; it might be a bit

less. In the scheme of the world, it is barely a

blip. Nothing surer than it wont exist in a billion

years, or so, no matter what the contract says!

Years in Millions to :4500

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

15001000

500

0

Ground

Conditions

Build

London

Constructa

Tunnel

Takea

journey

Havean

emergency

The design and construct period may be 10 years

(just to pick a number).

A journey might take (Ill use a transit example)

10 minutes and an emergency might take 5 minutes.

Ladies and Gentlemen, this breadth of time

highlights why our conceptual models of the world

and risk are fundamentally different to other

professions.

Most people have never thought about 4.5 billion

years and what it means for ground conditions.

Even now when I think about that, Im not sure I

exactly understand what it means other than a very

long time. Ground variability needs this

geological time perspective.

What better to illustrate this than a cross section of

the earth. How funny is this cross section?

We cant even figure out whats a few 100 metres

below the surface here is a cross section right

down to the middle of the earth! So, Im always

staggered by this. I think the good news is that

whatever is going on down in there does cause our

continents to run around and bang into one another,

which is handy (although I wouldnt suggest

waiting for it to happen).

I was reminded of this flying here passing by the

Himalayas and I was saying to someone, You

know, their mountains are actually going up really

quickly (he just had another red wine or something

and went to sleep). Its in there that the magnetic

fields are created which cause the ionosphere which

protects life on earth. I find that just truly

remarkable. It gives us our poles. For me, having

originally trained as a geologist, this is for me, like

my mummy picture. This is mother earth but it is aspecial place and it is different, and our conceptual

understanding of it is different to everybody elses.

Oldest rocks - 4.4 billion years old thats a long

time, as Ive mentioned. Thats what they look like.


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The three people you see arent rocks; although

they are some of the people who wear cardigans and

dont feature in sitcoms. They love 4.5 billion years

of rocks.

Any other profession driving past those rocks would

say, Some rocks. For us, theyre the oldest rocks

on earth. Theyre in Western Australia in part of

the crater there. That is remarkable and of course,

thats why geology is so remarkable - 4.5 billion

years gives you a lot of time to have some

volcanisms, squash some things, have a fewglaciations, run some rivers through it, do some

other things we dont understand, induce concepts

of uniformitarians principles. Do all sorts of things

that are so big I still dont fully understand them,

but thats why its hard to figure out whats going to

happen when you dig a hole.

So, if I was to draw another graph of years to form

ground conditions and that was a bar chart. Thats a

bar chart showing everything in perspective. You

will see building London, and everything else

doesnt even show. There is a pie chart just toconfirm it (for the MBAs amongst you).

Years to form the ground conditions

0

00000000

00000000

00000000

00000000

00000000

Form Ground

Conditions

Build London Construct

Tunnel

Make Journey Respond to

Emergency

Years

Ground

London

construction

Journey

Emergency

So if we now put years to build London, and I havearbitrarily chosen 2,000 years, strangely enough

constructing the tunnel journey, times and

emergency responses dont show. The time scales

are too different.

This is just giving you an idea of the history of

London, 60 years AD60 the first London

Bridge.

This is simply providing an insight into our 2,000

years of history here in London.

Tunnel Construction

Now were down to 10 years. Normal operations

and emergencies dont show. There is a pie chart

just to show you that it doesnt show.

History of London

construction

Journey

Emergency


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0

2

4

6

8

10

construction Journey Emergency

Years

Im doing this just to highlight for your amusementthis time exposure. If you werent professionally

trained, it wouldnt be funny. It would be like, Oh,

thats very interesting mmm. [Laughs].

Tunnel Operations - were now down to .00002 of

a year having started at 4.5 billion and we can see

there is a bit of a difference between journeys and

emergencies. On the pie chart, you can see that. So

thats handy, that must be true!

0

0.000005

0.00001

0.000015

0.00002

Journey Emergency

Ye ars

So what does all that mean? We are the masters of

tunnel time. We actually understand the concepts.

This is uncommon. Most people dont think about

time in this way. You might say, No one elsethinks about time in this way Arnold. Can you

please leave. You are clearly on some substance.

We must communicate the implications of time

more successfully. It is our duty to do so. We

under-sell the intellectual tools that we have for

understanding the world around us and by under-

selling it and poorly communicating it, it doesnt

help our projects or anybody else. It doesnt help

the lawyers. It doesnt help the politicians. It

doesnt help anyone. We fail them because we

dont communicate time correctly.

Risk

Ive got to dim the lights [And the lights are in

fact then dimmed.]

I dont know how to tell you this because you are

all my best friends now, I thought Id just dim the

lights so no one actually can see anyone when I say

this but [whispering] effectively managing risk is

not a function of the number of workshops or thelength of the risk register. [Laughter] I had to dim

the lights because I didnt want anyone to actually

see the MBAs saying, Isnt it? [Laughter]

Scheduling a two hour risk workshop isnt going to

do it Ladies and Gentlemen. We have professional

duties to discharge. The technical term we use in

Australia, in learned circles, for this silliness is

bullshit. The reason we use that term, or I use

that term is because risk as we understand it

demands expert judgment assisted by the various

risk management tools that are available. Availableto us because weve been trained in them.

Available to us because we have the intellectual

models and capability to deal with them.

Take a Bayesian approach to risk. [I am keeping

the lights down because I dont really know how to

pronounce it. I certainly cant spell it.] I have

written it but I am not claiming to be an expert on it.

Ive tried to be, but failed dismally but it provides a

systematic way of combining expert judgment with

empirical evidence. What does it tell us? It tells us

when we use a Bayesian mathematical approach,minor changes in one parameter can dramatically

change the overall result.

Risk Assessments

Risk assessments have become popular but are our

special underground risks understood? We are

trained in tunnel special risk which is essential in

this type of risk analysis. But what is a risk

assessment? Lets use an example?

This is my favourite scam. Lets give several

factors a grade! Lets arbitrarily call them between

1 and 10 and then average them and conclude

whatever the risk is. It is just wrong.

One of the three axioms of probability says that, If

events are independent, their probability is a

product of the probabilities we all know that but

everyday we go out and do these little Mickey

Mouse risk assessment things because the


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bureaucrats are there saying, Well cant you risk

assess that? and then secretly we go, Well, what

answer do we want?, Oh yeah, okay. Yeah, we

can risk assess that. No worries.

What about lack of data? You either have to have

data or expert opinion. If there is not enough data,

dont demand a number. Its probably going to be

wrong and misleading. We know that. Were

trained in that yet we let the bureaucrats say, Iwant a number. Well give them a number. They

wont understand it. We can give it a number. It

means nothing!

Variance: Variance normally isnt spoken about on

calculated probabilities. Without variance the fat in

the answer is hidden by the numerical answer.

Again, extremely misleading.

Ignoring statistical dependencies: Subject matter

experts us understand the inter-dependencies of

risk factors in tunnels. Junior inexperienced riskanalysts dont. They just dont.

Understanding the relationships between factors is

essential for real results.

Risk matrix tables (I love these the best): How can

you multiply two numbers, that dont usually have

the same units, and then compare the results? Its

just wrong. Its our intellectual secret, but its

dangerous because we actually build a matrix and

we calculate a number, a meaningless number, yet

many commonly do it and use these numbers as thebasis for decisions well no one here does it!

(Laughter) I think they do it in other countries.

Wed never do it here? We know that thats not a

correct way of dealing with risk. We know the

answer is not true but we do it. I mean, they do it!

If we are to be leaders, if were to be trusted, we

must reject the Mickey Mouse approach to risk

assessments, hence, substitute sound expert decision

making. Risk assessments are techniques, they are

tools to assist us make expert decisions. They are

not a substitute for expert decisions. If were goingto be trusted, if were going to be professional, we

must stand up and remind the bureaucrats of that.

We cant just abuse the tools that help us make

decisions for bureaucratic purposes.

(Ill have the lights back up now).

I dont know what I just said. Ive completely

forgotten that section on risk analysis. I do

remember something about it only being foreigners

that did it and because Im not from the EU I think I

can say that. If I was from the EU, I think Id go to

jail.

Construction

This picture is of a tunnel in Japan. Its in Tokyo.Its gorgeous.

In fact, if I wasnt already married, Id kind of like

getting married in it, but then thats why I wear

brown cardigans too.

Construction relies on complex machines and

expert judgment. There are always tight

construction timelines and budget restraints

everywhere in the world but things go wrong:

Munich, (of course, somewhere near here), Daegu

Metro (South Korea), Shanghai Metro.

Munich Metro 1994

Daegu Metro 2000


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Heathrow Express 1994

Shanghai Metro 2003

Shanghai was interesting. They were going through

soft ground and the freeze system on the front of the

TBM wasnt freezing so much and they went

basically Oh, its only 30cm to go. Those

engineers went straight to jail. China is direct. Oh,

we can be a bit more relaxed here, we dont get

executed anymore.

Collapses

Collapses do not respect the boundaries of

countries. A short summary from Munich Re

insurance produced an interesting summary.

These collapses respect no country whether its

Germany, Denmark, Taiwan, US, Italy, Turkey,

Korea, France, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland,

Australia, Taiwan. Why could that be? Because

its the universal laws of nature. Were dealing

with the unknown and were dealing with the

problems, the very real, the very practical problems

of digging through something that in the end, islikely to have a few surprises within it and if we

dont have our wits about us, it can happen on other

projects.

So, what about some new trends in construction risk

and project management?

Well, the Joint Code of Practice, (which is based on

the BTS Code), is a great step forward, as I have

mentioned. Im sure you all know the key features

of it so Ill be very quick, but management of risks,

not elimination of them are in my opinion the

essential elements of such a response like:

having a dynamic risk register,

articulating responsibilities for the risks,

insurance not being used as a contingent

single mitigation measure in major

infrastructure works.

Client expertise is mandated by the Code, and the

bit I really loved is including named individuals and

confirmation of availability!

How many of you have had your names on a tender

thats been successful, never to hear again from the

successful tenderer? The insurers are onto it, they

understand this issue thats good for us. Its good

for the experts. Its good for the people who

actually want to do the job properly because the

insurers are saying We think that the people who

are most competent make a difference to the

outcome should be employed. Today, I learnt that


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perhaps the banks are doing the same in relation to

credit ratings on projects.

Factors such as:

sufficient time and budget,

ground reference conditions,

data exchange,

change management,

sharing all available subsurface

information,a coordinated insurance program, and

adequate resources for ground

investigations;

form part of the Codes requirements.

All of these things make the Code and what the

BTS has done, a significant step forward for the

world in terms of project management from a risk

perspective for major underground infrastructure

projects.

I think as you say here, Well done!, Jolly goodshow and all those sorts of things. Now, I say, As

you were and well all be right. But it really is a

great step forward for the world because even if

people dont follow the Code, even if people say,

Were not going to exactly do it youve got the

world thinking about the sorts of issues which

youve identified as important and youve got them

thinking about how they might manage the A job

problems of delay, cost overruns, killing people and

destroying infrastructure. All the normal problems.

Examples

I said before that a collapse today is probably going

to be bureaucratic driven and not technical. Let me

give you an example:

Singapore, March 2004

The first picture shows how the area was shortly

before. Thats what it looked like shortly

afterwards.

Whats particularly interesting is that I was at a

conference before 2004 and heard a paper given on

the concerns that a geotechnical person had on

Singapores reliance on the cheapest bid and

Singapores reliance on construction methods that

caused great big cracks on the surface. This person

was saying, Im a bit worried something bad is

going to happen in Singapore, and no one wanted

to listen. This person was an expert who was tryingto tell those who didnt want to listen, what was

going to happen, inevitably.

And this is how that disaster unfolded:

225 days out before the collapse:

. 150 metres long settlement cracks, deflection

movements were anticipated about 190mm,

actual movements nearly three times as much.

The models werent the same as reality.

(225 days before the people died.)

209 days out:

. In an email from the design engineer:

It seems that the design is being

stretched to the limit. Many

instruments have breached design

allowable values. The situation is

beginning to look precarious.

Singapore March 2004

Singapore 30 April 2004


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(Weve still got 209 days until the fatal

collapse).

198 days from collapse:

. The expertise of the engineer was questioned:

He does not possess the requisite

qualifications. Its difficult to expect that he

will be able to fulfil the very onerousprofessional duties to supervise the very

difficult works.

(Were still 198 days out from the collapse).


. A member of the Independent Expert Panel (the

special engineering advisory panel), advises that

the technique being used to design the works is

underestimating the forces on the walls.

Well done! The actual observations are 300%

of what was anticipated by the models.


. The project team is not prepared to reassess the

design.

. Another independent expert endorses the first

expert stating:

The walls are potentially severely under

designed throughout. The work design hasno justifiable technical basis. In my opinion

it would be irresponsible to continue with

any excavation that has been designed on

what we now know is an incorrect and very

unsafe basis.


. More wall deflections.


. More wall deflections.

. Trigger levels reach surges.


. The design manager borrows a copy of an

engineering program.

Why? Because the design manager doesnt

have budget for one for themselves, but cant

complete the analysis due to lack of full time

engineering resources. He has to return the

software without completing his analysis. They

reallydid have to borrow the software!

. A third independent expert is retained by the

government agency he conducts a

geotechnical analysis which demonstrates wall

failure in each of the three instances modelled.

Well done!

You could be cynical and say the reason for the

indecision was that these matters dealt with

temporary works. If these temporary works had

held, the final works completed quickly, money and

time would have been saved.

Some might say that whats going on here is a

stalling tactic while the construction continues. The

engineering is straight forward. There was no

technical doubt the temporary works would fail.

60 days out from failure:

. Another expert expresses concern about

fundamentally unsound excavations. There

could be the potential for a major failure.


. The government writes to the engineers saying

We think there is a problem with the

predictions. This is of paramount importance

as the excavation is carried out adjacent to amajor thoroughfare, several buildings and

critical utilities.

. More deflections

. More deflections


. The design engineer resigns. Good timing! No

new engineers apply for his job.


. The first independent expert meets with

representatives from the joint venture. The

independent expert says The people using the

model should come to his advanced course so

that they can understand the limitations of the

model that they're using. Of course, he says if

the excavation goes further, it may fail.



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. The government says There should be a design

review. Well done!

The last few days:

. No one does much at all.

The final day:

.

It collapses. Luckily, only four people werekilled. The collapse was during a labour break

and the damages extensive.

\

The day of the collapse.

Consequently legal proceedings were launched

between everyone. Well done!

Lessons?

It was the bureaucracy, not the technology that

caused the failure. It was not a lack of expertise,knowledge of the natural worlds, knowledge of

engineering, knowledge of science. Nothing

untoward it was the bureaucracy that caused the

failure. The way we organised ourselves. The way

it was resourced. The way in which right back at

the tender stage, the lowest bid was selected.

Question: What was the differentiating factor?

Answer: The temporary works.

Question: What failed? Answer: The temporary

works.

If the differentiating factor is the cost of the

temporary works, is it any wonder that they didnt

want to stop these works when thats the whole

basis on which that bid team won?

Contracts

Contracts are the fundamental mechanism for

financial and delivery of risk management in every

country in the world.

New approaches: Well, there are new approaches

and they recognise the inevitability of high risk

nature of underground construction. Tailoring an

approach for local conditions is, I think, absolutely

fundamental.

Dont accept that you should do business here how

someone else does it somewhere else just because

they did it somewhere else well. Whatever you do

the method has to suit here. Our own little socialquirks. The way we deal with one another. The

special way that our professionals deal with one

another. Our labour market. All those sorts of

things mean that you have to tailor the response for

where you are.

There are lots of ways you can contract. The

following picture depicts just some of the vast array

of possible standard form contracts. I find if I look

at the picture I understand them best. I find they're

all different, different approaches, different

contractors different projects, different places.

At the International Tunnelling Association (UN

Affiliate) (where I chair the Contractual Practices

Group), weve been looking at contractual matters

and from around 52 member nations ITA have

produced many propositions for consideration in

contracts but so long as I am the chairman of that

group, I will not and have refused, and despite a lot

of pressure, will not produce a model contract.

Frankly, I think that is a waste of time. There is no

such thing as the perfect contract. There is a

contract which is best suited to your task but I cant

produce one and I resist ITA trying to produce one.

Why? Every country is different. There is no

perfect fit contract.

I'm just going to take you to Japan because what I

found in Japan was really interesting.


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The quality of the infrastructure in Japan is quite

exceptional. The construction industrys based

upon mutual trust and respect in the contract. (It

sounds a bit British doesnt it. Remember then?

Mutual trust and respect!)

There are some downsides. Some corruption, some

bribery and a lot of secret deals but the

infrastructure is good. Now, this raised some very

interesting questions for me because having beentrained in the Westminster system, Id always

thought that transparency was good. Everything

being open. Lets get all the dirty washing and

bring it out and pop it in the tabloids. I thought all

that was good. But you know, maybe there is a

place for corruption, bribes and secret deals if it

delivers good infrastructure. Maybe there is a price

to pay for getting the job done, and, at this stage, of

course, I get thrown out of the country.

Ill give you an example. The basic spirit of

standard Japanese contracts stipulates a whole lot ofthings about the bills of quantities and the works

program but unless otherwise specified, the bill of

quantities and the works program are not binding on

the owner or the contractor.

There are no contractually binding elements except

the achieved result of the contract sum and the

completion period. There is no requirement to

show the process. The parties involved in

construction make the contract based on equal

footing and implement their own duties faithfully

and honestly (well, except for the bribery andcorruption part!).

Thats an extract from Construction Business Law,

clause 18 in Japan.

The basis of a construction contract in Japan is

faithfully conduct and honesty. So, thats a

fundamental difference to how we approach it. The

principle in our contracts is mutual distrust and the

principles in Japan are of mutual confidence. The

infrastructure looks something like this.

This is heading into the new Shinjuku project in

Tokyo. (I was there just a few weeks ago back to

my gorgeous tunnel that makes me feel very nice).

This is looking along the roadway shaft and

following ventilation chamber.

You could eat your rice and noodles off the floor!

It is just gorgeous.


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Let me compare it with a European example, which

shall remain nameless, with all the transparency that

you would maybe expect, that I visited in February.

Here is an example of some of the interesting civil

works in an emergency escape shaft. The high

voltage cables touch my head as I go up the stairs.

In truth, the ten year project in Europe was

completed very quickly, in two years. The

politicians were re-elected. Some of the worst civil

works I have ever seen constructed. And I mean

that absolutely, no joke intended. Critical safety

systems not operational and the public are happy.

They are so happy they got their infrastructure earlyand they go it within budget and they all celebrate

by drinking lots of wine and smoking and having

coffees (and there is a clue as to where it might be

laughs). Well done Europe! Well done

transparency.

Lets now go to the contracts - so what advice do I

bring because there are two very different ways of

delivering infrastructure: one quite unpalatable

because of the outcome; and one quite unpalatable

because of the way you get the outcome.

Well, we know there are weaknesses in geology.

We know there are going to be issues in dispute

management. We know there are going to be issues

in bureaucracy. We know there are going to be

issues with delays. We know there are issues with

funding and there is always going to be politics.

Always, everywhere!

We can look elsewhere for inspiration. Look at

standard contracts and traditional ones and modern

ones and emerging ones. Different models.

Develop your UK approach: You have a range of

UK products here and Id be saying dont shy away

from using them because they are a product of your

society. They are a product of the way business is

conducted here.

Check what you plan to do against what we say or

suggest in the ITA. So check how you deal with

ground conditions, dispute resolution, approvals,

insurance, risk management, project management,etc. Dont be afraid to tailor the approach. Dont

be afraid to tailor the approach when you learn

mistakes and learn from your successes as well.

Operations

Finally Operations -the bit that really matters!

Our tunnels are confined spaces. They are

deceptively more dangerous than they appear. We,as technical people know it but we dont tell anyone

because maybe they wont like the places we create

for them. We know that in some of the systems

perhaps not so far from here, one of the great risks

may just be asphyxiation because of ventilation

issues. We know that there are risks when, for

example, the terrorist attacks occurred here in

London. I was here assisting with that in some

way. We know that these underground places

behave in very different ways when events occur

that cause issues in confined spaces.

So we have to be careful when we design them. We

have to expect, when were operating them, the

extraordinary to occur. We have to remember that

the safety for our citizens, and the people who use

them in these systems (I'm talking, of course, of

transit systems at the moment) are prone to failure

because of their dependence on the engineering, on

the evacuation and the choices people make in

evacuation and the way in which the systems weve

created are controlled in an emergency.

Some of the civil works choices we make, as Imentioned right at the beginning, are so critical: the

slope, the obstructions, the natural ventilation, the

bends, the emergency egress points.

Substandard Engineering

You dont have to go any further than Paris and the

well publicised crash that occurred there with

Princess Diana to get a topical example of tunnel


17/21

safety issues.. You look at that tunnel and you say

Its just a bad design. You shouldnt have pillars

running down the middle of a tunnel with cars

driving down it. Its just such a simple thing to

have a barrier there. A New Jersey barrier or some

other barrier of appropriate engineering design

would fundamentally alter the risk profile for the

hundreds of thousands of people per day that use

that facility. Its just that simple.

Tunnel beneath the Place de lAlma, Paris -

Pillars rather than a continuous crash barrier.

Such pillars should be avoided. Princess Dianas

car crashed into one of the pillars in 1997. (This

tunnel is only 100m long)

Apart from the inherent safety, there are the control

aspects. So emergency control with the engineered

systems is essential if were to change the future.

The problem is when something occurs the

consequences can be very severe and they can be

very severe quickly.

This is a picture of a tunnel fire from obviously here

in Europe and you will see the fire actually moves

hundreds of metres beyond the initial combustion

area.


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This is in a metro system in South Korea. I

investigated this matter.

These are trains that dont burn. Most cities have

got trains that dont burn.

Here is a train that doesnt burn in another city.

Here is a train burning that doesnt burn and these

people all died shortly after this photograph was

taken because they chose not to use the emergency

exits that wed put in there as engineers because,

they chose not to evacuate. The passengers just sat

there and sent pictures off their mobile phones to

their friends about the train thats not to burn, while

they sat in the tunnel thats not meant to burn either

and died.

Question: So what does all that mean? Answer:

Youve got to expect the unexpected.

This graph (from Ingerson 2003) shows that really

large fires in road tunnels can occur in around five

minutes. Maybe five to ten minutes, but Id say

around five minutes quick! So what do we do?

We have really sophisticated systems that we, asengineers, designed. We have powerful ventilation

systems in some of our tunnels, not all of them. We

even have suppression systems in some parts of the

world, such as Madrid Metro, Japan and Australia.

The truth is that the standards dont define what

should be done in these tunnels. Fire suppression

systems have effectively been outlawed in our

tunnels up until, actually, only early 2008. So if its

true that we have to rapidly respond, if its true that

we have to rapidly identify the exact location of an

incident and then we have to correctly use theventilation suppression and all these other systems,

then its not just about the engineering, its about

what are the engineering options that we have

considered? What have we actually got available?

And if the tunnel standards say Dont do it, does

that mean we shouldnt do it?

Now let me show you a movie of a bus fire in a

tunnel. This is what a bus fire looks like. This is a

tunnel in Norway. I hope you are all tunnel

travellers. Thats what a bus looks like when its

catching on fire. Whats so important about that?Well, this next bit of video is of some tests from the

Netherlands and they actually show what happens

in a confined space when something like a bus or a

car is burning.

What I want to remind you of (and this is actually

quite a large bore tunnel with very small or slight

longitudinal airflow and its a road configuration,

not a rail), watch the smoke come down the tunnel

and see it extinguish the lights. That is what those

who survive tunnel incidents talk about. They talk


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about the fact that all of a sudden everything went

black and most people who die who havent been

killed in the initial collisions die in that smoke.

They dont get cooked by the fire. Its because of

the neuro toxins; its because of the other toxins in

that smoke and the fact that they cannot self rescue

that they die.

In 1983, PIARC, probably the peak body for roads,

were recommending against sprinklers because of arange of adverse consequences of their use.

In the 1987 standard, they counselled against using

sprinklers.

In the 1995 standard they again counselled against

using sprinklers.

But in 2005 the standard changed and sprinklers

were more positively raised for fire life safety and

asset protection. My point is that standards are

slow to respond to innovation and change inlearning.

So when I'm talking about standards, I'm on this

saying, Guys, hello, there is some truthful things

weve got to talk about, Oh no, we dont want to

hear about that. But the truth gets there in the end.

So who uses these systems? There is Australia. All

of Australian tunnels. All of the big Japanese

tunnels. A few in the Netherlands and a handful in

the US.

In 2008, released by PIARC in Paris was the new

standard actually acknowledging that fixed fire

suppression systems may have a place.

In America, NFPA-502 (I also sit on this one),

again, 1992, 1998, 2001, 2004 No. We dont

want to put them in unless there is hazardous

cargo. Then, in 2004, in the later parts said Well,

if you do put them in, youd better look after them

then now they're on the table. Now the truth of it is

on the table. Its not saying If you put them in its

safe, but its saying Come on, its on the table, itsin your toolbox, its an option.

The point, when were going through this, dont be

driven by the standards, use your technical skill,

your intellectual power to ask yourself what it is

you are trying to achieve and set your mind at it. So

its an option.

So dont just follow the standard. The standard

says Its an option. What are we trying to

achieve? If were going to use these technologies,

make sure the support technologies work. The

computer control systems work. The location

system works. The characterisation of the incident

all works. Why? Because this infrared camera

showing what happens in an experiment because

if people cant see, even if they're not killed, the

emergency exit that this person is now walking past,

wont be found. Thats why! Its a functional

problem again.

Why is water suppression suddenly on the agenda?

I have a theory on this. Back in Paris in the A86,

its just been installed. So now because in Paris it

has been installed, now I think its okay to talk about

it publicly.

Innovation

Innovation! This is something from Australia.

Its an innovation. Its not in any standard. In fact,

the person who came up with the idea is actually in

the audience, Bob Allen, from the Sydney Harbour

Tunnel who operates it, thought of it. I think, while

at a rock concert, Wouldnt it be good if we could

have a virtual stop sign on a tunnel like a light show

in a rock concert.. Its not in any standard. Its not

anywhere that I know of. So he commissioned a

company to build one and in the last twelve months,


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this image being projected onto a screen of water to

create a virtual stop sign has been used 40 times

successfully. There is a picture of one of the

examples with a large truck trying to get into the

tunnel in the day light.

Innovation! Not in a standard. Whats the

problem? Stopping people in the tunnel. Does it

work? Yes it does.

Innovation from Japan. Air quality: an issue in

Japan. This is around Tokyo.

This is in Tokyo. This is air cleaning technology

for a road tunnel.

They're achieving to 90% to high 90% efficienciesremoving particles and NO2. They are actually

doing it at the moment, despite all the controversy

about it. This is coming. Its innovation. What

does it mean? Just put it on the table. Ive been

there, touched it. It appears to be working.

The vehicles we use whether they are cars or trains

are changing in their energy supply, like hydrogen,

fuel cells. The composite materials and the plastics,

they will behave differently. Whatever we build

today, however we design it today, wont respond,

wont be built for the things that we put in it in 100

years time. Just look at the steam engines we used

to have in the underground here.

Conclusions

Remember these?

Assume our role as leaders and developing

and operating subterranean infrastructure.

Dont assume that others understand or can

understand the complex technical scientific

and philosophical concepts that underlie

our professional judgment, even if they use

our words.

Dont compromise our intellectual

integrity to pander to bureaucrats. To do

so, brings us all into disrepute.

I did mention risk assessments.

Consider the operational implications of

everything we do.

Dont be slave to standards. Truth is a

better master.

Develop innovative ways of conducting

knowledge transfer and group problem

solving.

Endorse new innovations in the peer

review process

Remember the root causes of most tunnel

construction failures are administrative, not

technical.

In construction, risk is part of the process.

Its just part of what we do. Just embrace

it in an intellectual way.

The Joint Code of Practice. Pat yourselveson the back, you did well.

Operationally: Carefully consider human

beings for both the control and the human

response to the threats of harm in the

systems we build.

Energy consumption is an emerging issue.

Dont forget it. Our infrastructure lasts a

long time.


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The consequences on the environment of

our infrastructure are important. New

materials do create new challenges.

Contracts: Use the contractual framework

that best fits your culture. The cultural

aspects of contract administration are often

more important than the words alone. The

attitude you bring to your contracts.

We are the experts of the subterranean

infrastructure world. We must embrace excellence

and truth. That has to be our mantra if we are to

assume our rightful place; our rightful place as the

leaders in tunnel project design, construction and

operation.

As Sir Harold Harding said:

The best engineers are those who treat

the forces of nature with humility until

they are sufficiently sure how they canoutwit them and convert them

unsuspectingly to the use and

convenience of man.

That remains our challenge in the 21stCentury.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you!

sir harold harding lecture london dix

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