ship vulnerability, port state control, flag state ... flag state responsibilities and maritime...

Ponder the Improbable

Ship Vulnerability, Port State

Control, Flag State Responsibilities and Maritime

Security

Dr Sam Bateman


Outline • Maritime Security • Ship Vulnerability • Dealing with Sub-Standard Ships

– Flag State – Vetting Regimes – Port State Control

• Two Case Studies of ship hijacking • Scope for Improvement • Conclusions


New Maritime Security Measures by IMO • International Ship and Port Facility Security

(ISPS) Code; • Other amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life

at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, such as the mandatory fitting of ship-borne Automatic Identification Systems (AIS); and

• Amendments to1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) Convention and its Protocol covering offshore facilities


The Quality of a Merchant Ship • Primarily a Flag State responsibility but

many “open register” flags unable to discharge this responsibility effectively

• Class surveys by Classification Societies but not always reliable

• Port State Control now the most effective means of controlling the quality of merchant shipping.


Ship Vulnerability • the vulnerability of a ship while underway

depends on factors, such as ship’s size, speed, freeboard and size of crew, as well as on whether appropriate measures are taken against attack.

• The flag of registry of a ship and the type of vessel have been found to be significant factors in determining the likelihood of a successful piracy attack


Sub-Standard Ships are more likely to be: • successfully attacked/hijacked by

pirates;

• involved in illegal activities at sea, including trafficking in destabilizing military equipment (including WMD) and narcotics (SIPRI); and

• more frequently involved in accidents at sea leading to loss of life and pollution of the marine environment.

2010 2011 TOTAL

Total Hijackings 51 28 79

Fishing Vessels 9 6 15

Dhows 5 1 6

Yachts 1 3 4

Commercial Vessels of which:

36 18 54

Good Ships 8 5 13

Fair Ships 13 5 18

Poor Ships 15 8 23

Total 51 28 79

Table 3 - Ships Hijacked by Somali Pirates 2010-2011


Sub-Standard Ships • Oil Tanker Bunga

Kelana 3 after collision after collision with sub-standard St. Vincent and Grenadines flag bulk carrier Wally Singapore Strait 2010

• Bulk carrier Rak sinking off Mumbai August 201o


Maritime Transport and Destabilizing Commodity Flows

• MV Light • 33 year old North

Korean flagged general cargo vessel

• Suspected in May 2011 of transferring missile equipment from North Korea

• Dreadful PSC record


Dealing with Sub-standard Ships

• Flag State Responsibilities

• Vetting Regimes

• Port State Control


Flag State Responsibilities • Flag State responsibility for quality of

vessels under UNCLOS Article 94. • Failure of 1986 UN Convention on

Conditions for Registration of Ships to enter into force

• Voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme (VIMSAS) has not been effective

• Prospects of a mandatory audit scheme?


Vetting Regimes • Mandatory inspections by Classification

Societies or Recognized Organizations (RO) on behalf of flag States – But not entirely effective?

• Non-mandatory ones by industry (e.g.

RightShip vetting for tankers and bulk carriers) and Port State Control – But not for general cargo ships


PORT STATE CONTROL (PSC) The inspection of foreign ships in national ports to verify that the condition of the ship and its equipment comply with the requirements of international regulations and that the ship is manned and operated in compliance with these rules


PORT STATE CONTROL • Based on the rule of international law, whereby

a state exercises full jurisdictional powers over its internal waters

• Supplements primary responsibility of the Flag State for ensuring compliance of ships with relevant international conventions.

• The Tokyo MOU, Paris MOU and USCG are the most effective regimes.

• PSC provides an objective test for determining whether a ship will be properly prepared for going in harm’s way


PSC MOUs • Europe and North Atlantic (Paris MOU) • Asia and the Pacific (Tokyo MOU) • Latin America (Acuardo de Vina del Mar) • Caribbean (Caribbean MOU) • West and Central Africa (Abuja MOU) • Black Sea (Black Sea MOU) • Mediterranean (Mediterranean MOU) • Indian Ocean (Indian Ocean MOU) • Arab States of the Gulf (Riyadh MOU) • United States (US Coast Guard


Indian Ocean MOU • Relevant MOU for many

vessels operating within area where Somali pirate attacks occur

• Low inspection rates • Bangladesh, Djibouti,

Myanmar, Pakistan, Oman, Kenya, Sri Lanka and Yemen, are either not members or not fulfilling their obligations

Regime No. of Inspectio

ns

Inspection Rate

% of Inspections

with Deficiencies

% of Inspections leading to Detention

Paris MOU 24058 30.03 55.21 3.28

Tokyo MOU 33212 66.00 49.91 5.48

Indian Ocean MOU

5513 na (note 1)

52.04 8.54

US Coast Guard

9907 12.97 27.95 1.57

Table 4 Comparative Statistics for Major PSC Regimes 2010


News Item from EUNAVFOR 18 Jul 11: “MV JUBBA XX PIRATED IN THE

NORTHERN INDIAN OCEAN”


MV JUBBA XX “Late on the morning of 16 July 2011, it was reported by the owners that the MV JUBBA XX, a laden tanker, had been pirated in the northern Indian Ocean, on her regular route from the UAE to the port of Berbera, Somalia. Little information is available at present but it is reported that 9 suspected Somali pirates are on board MV JUBBA XX. The MV JUBBA XX is a UAE owned and flagged oil tanker, deadweight of 4831 tonnes, with a crew of 16 (1 Sri Lankan, 5 Indian, 3 Bangladesh, 1 Sudanese, 1 Myanmar, 1 Kenyan and 4 Somali). There is no information on the condition of the crew and the vessel was not registered with MSCHOA at the time of the pirating. EUNAVFOR continues to monitor the situation.”


Relevant Factors • The Jubba XX was a highly vulnerable vessel

– small and slow (speed probably < 10kts) – laden with a low freeboard – apparently taken no precautions against attack

(e.g. had not registered with MSCHOA) • The Jubba XX was also a sub-standard ship

– Very old (built in 1979) – No record of any recent PSC inspection

• What does this say about the shipowner sending such a vessel into piracy prone waters?


The Human Cost of Piracy – The Sad Case of Captain Prem Kumar and the Rak Afrikana

• Hijacked 11 April 2010 • Released 9 March 2011

and sank a few hours later • 5992 GRT general cargo

ship • A small, slow vessel more

than 30 years old • No PSC inspection since

2005 and under a “black list” flag

Rak Afrikana (Flag – St. Vincent

& Grenadines)


Captain Prem Kumar of the Rak Afrikana • 49 years old • Suffered physical and

mental torture during extended ransom negotiations

• US$1.2 million ransom eventually paid – much less than for other ships

• Prem Kumar had a stroke in Jan 2011, another in April, and died in May

Crew Members Rak Afrikana


Conclusions • Sub-standard ships pose risks to maritime

security & safety - much depends on the quality of the ship and her crew

• Ships of “good” flags (e.g. Japan and the Scandinavians) are rarely hijacked

• Current measures to deal with sub-standard ships are ineffective

• Industry, governments and the IMO could do more to enhance security by improving flag State performance and the PSC regime – but IMO lacks resources


Some Suggestions • Make PSC more effective

– Stricter adherence to MOU obligations – Improving deficient regional MOUs – A more global approach? – But many port states lack adequate resources

• Promote the Mandatory IMO Audit Scheme

• Improve national arrangements (similar to aviation)

ship vulnerability, port state control, flag state ... flag state responsibilities and maritime...

Documents