shifter-shifting landscape of latin american regionalism

8/3/2019 Shifter-Shifting Landscape of Latin American Regionalism

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Brazils rise, coupled with the diminished influence of the United States andthe increasingly salient global role of China, has reshuffled the kaleidoscope ofregional organizations. . . .

The Shifting Landscape ofLatin American Regionalism

MICHAEL SHIFTER

Celso Amorim is understandably proud ofhis eight-year tenure as foreign ministerduring Brazils notable ascent in regional

and global arenas. Amorim, who managed foreignpolicy under the two highly successful adminis-trations of Luis Incio Lula da Silva (and current-

ly serves as defense ministerfor Lulas successor, DilmaRousseff), points less to anyspecific accomplishmentsthan to Brazils growing self-

confidence and prominence in global affairs. Hecredits the boost to the Lula governments abilityto ride a favorable wave derived largely from thecountrys economic dynamism, social progress,

and democratic advance in recent years.Brazils rise, coupled with the diminished influ-ence of the United States and the increasingly sa-lient global role of China, has reshuffled the kalei-doscope of regional organizations in the Americas.The Organization of American States (OAS), estab-lished in 1948 in Bogot, Colombia, is the worldsoldest regional organization. Yet for a number ofyears it has been buffeted by profound politicalchanges that have upset the traditional, more clear-cut asymmetrical power axis between the UnitedStates and Latin American and Caribbean nations.

Today new and competing asymmetries, shift-ing fault lines, and emerging counterweights influx throughout the Americas are manifest in adizzying array of regional groupings. Some ofthese groupings bear an ideological stripe, suchas the leftist Latin American Bolivarian Alterna-tive (ALBA) that Venezuela started in 2004. Most,

however, are products of divergent national inter-ests and strategic priorities and as such reflect eco-nomic agendas and geographical positions. Theseinclude the 12-member Union of South AmericanNations (UNASUR), created by Brazil in 2008.

It is tempting to be skeptical about the prolifer-ation of these crosscutting and often overlappingmechanisms. So far, most have developed little in-stitutional solidity and have even produced a mea-sure of fatigue among regional leaders. It is hardto know whether they will be able to sustain andstrengthen their efforts, or will, with time, simplyfade into the background.

Even so, it would be a mistake to ignore or dis-miss the rich institutional experimentation under

way and the new regional architecture that is tak-ing shape. At the least, this changing architectureoffers an optic through which to view and fathomthe regions political dynamics and the impact ofglobal trends in the hemisphere. It also illuminatesthe changing expressions of regionalisma seri-ous current that enjoys a long and enduring his-tory in the Americas.

MEMBERSONLYThe founding of the Community of Latin Amer-

ican and Caribbean Nations, or CELAC, in Caracas,

Venezuela, in December 2011, revealed how muchthe regions politics has changed in recent years.However vague its purposes and weak its institu-tional underpinnings, CELAC, which pointedly ex-cludes the United States and Canada, encompassesall of the other countries of the Americas, includ-ing Cuba. It exemplifies the accelerated politicaldistancing and increased independence of the re-gion, especially from the United States. Tellingly,the December meeting was barely noticed by anotherwise preoccupied Washington.

MICHAEL SHIFTER, a Current History contributing editor, ispresident of the Inter-American Dialogue and an adjunct pro-fessor of Latin American studies at Georgetown University.

Reckoningwith Regions

Fourth in a series


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Perhaps it was inevitable that the CELAC launch-ing in Caracas would be widely portrayed as yetanother diplomatic coup for Venezuelas president,Hugo Chvez, who has been doggedly intent oncurtailing the influence of the United States in re-gional and global affairs since he came to powerin early 1999. Not surprisingly, Chvez, whose

health has been the source of much speculationsince he was diagnosed with cancer in June 2011,touted the gathering as a triumphant fulfillment ofthe dream of regional solidarity and integration es-poused by South Americas independence heroand Chvezs inspirationSimn Bolvar nearly200 years ago.

But Chvezs penchant for hyperbole and flairfor symbolism aside, the formation of CELACshould not be interpreted as an expression of anti-Americanism or even a political move to supplantthe OAS. Rather, it should be understood as an at-tempt to narrow political chasms and reconciledisparate actors within the region itself. The his-tory behind the creation of CELAC in part high-lights the contrasting visions and competing aimsdisplayed by the regions twoprincipal economic and po-litical powerhouses: Braziland Mexico. Indeed, one ofthe most significant strategicfault lines in the Americaslies between South America

and North America, whichextends above Panama and includes Mexico aswell as the United States and Canada.

In a number of fundamental respectseco-nomically, demographically, and culturallyMex-ico, along with the nations of Central America, isclosely connected with the United States. Alongthese dimensions the links are, if anything, deep-ening. Geography, of course, also matters a greatdeal. More than 80 percent of Mexicos trade iswith the United States. In 1993, the signing of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

that encompassed Mexico, the United States, andCanada, helped cement commercial bonds amongthe three partners. And in 2005, the Central Amer-ican Free Trade Agreement (or CAFTA, which alsoincluded the Dominican Republic) was adopted,reducing tariffs and helping to facilitate tradeflows with the United States. Mexicans and Cen-tral Americans also constitute a disproportionateshare of the dramatically increasing Latino popu-lation in the United States, thus intensifying cul-tural ties.

At the same time, Mexico is quite clearly a LatinAmerican nation in all key respects and is widelyviewed as such by others. Its relations with therest of the region have been integral to its foreignpolicy agendain part to balance the tradition-ally overwhelming clout exercised by the UnitedStates. Mexico, for example, helped found and

played an important leadership role in the RioGroup. A bloc that emerged in the context of theCentral American civil wars of the 1980s, the RioGroup sought to challenge hard-line US cold warpolicies and foster peace efforts. For Mexico it hasalso been important to have a presence in someSouth American regional groupings, typically ledby Brazil. A prominent example is Mexicos specialagreement with the Common Market of the South(Mercosur), a trading bloc established in 1991.

BRAZILSTEPSUPWhile Mexico has long been regarded as a Latin

American nation, such an identity was historicallymore ambiguous for Brazil. The notion of LatinAmerica, which developed among Colombian

and Argentine writers andFrench intellectuals in themid-nineteenth century, hadscant resonance in Brazil,which tended to be more in-ward-looking and separatedivided by history, culture,

language, and politics fromits continental neighbors.For such a significant regional power and emerg-

ing global playertoday it has the worlds sixthlargest economyBrazil was notably delayed inpromoting regional organizations in South Amer-ica. Although Mercosur was set up in the early1990s, it was not until 2000 that then-PresidentFernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil convenedthe first meeting of South American leaders. ButBrazils sheer size and economic and political pow-er made such a turn toward greater engagement

with the region highly plausible.Over the past dozen years Brazils approach to-ward its neighbors has been substantially shapedby two connected objectives: the desire to keepthings under control in its immediate sphere ofinfluence, and its pursuit of global aspirations.One of Brazils main priorities has been to securea permanent seat on the United Nations SecurityCouncil. It was that aimmore than any regionalgoalsthat led Brazil to play a leading role in theUN peacekeeping mission in Haiti starting in 2004.

The Shifting Landscape of Latin American Regionalism 57

Despite its dominant role, Brazil

has no discernible agenda for

regional governance.


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58 CURRENT HISTORY February 2012

The country has also sought a significant voice inother global arenas. It has actively participated inthe World Trade Organization, and has been a se-rious, respected player in the Group of 20 in thecontext of the recent economic crisis.

Moreover, Brazil has emphasized alliances withother emerging powers more than with other Latin

American countries. As one of the so-called BRICS(along with Russia, India, China, and South Afri-ca), Brazil has strengthened relationships that areaimed at enhancing its leverage with traditionalpowers, particularly the United States. Brazil hasfor the most part preferred to deal with the UnitedStates bilaterally, and has been wary of any hemi-sphere-wideand presumably US-ledarrange-ments, such as the Free Trade Area of the Ameri-cas (FTAA), a proposal that emerged from the firstSummit of the Americas in Miami in 1994.

During the Lula eraand particularly its fi-nal years, when the country witnessed remark-able economic vitality and growing influence inglobal affairsBrazil became increasingly activein social development efforts in Africa, and alsotried its hand in Middle Eastern diplomacy. Itsboldest move came in 2010 with a joint proposaldeveloped with Turkey to deal with Irans nuclearprogram. Brazils accommodating approach dif-fered sharply from Washingtons more hard-lineposture, reflecting mutual irritation that has beenalleviated somewhat during the current Rousseff

administration.At the same time, Brazil has developed more ex-pansive economic and political roles within the re-gion. The Lula government devoted considerableattention to building the Union of South AmericanNations (UNASUR), which evolved from a fairlyloose, amorphous grouping. Today UNASUR hasa formally organized structure with a permanentsecretariat that was initially headed by the formerArgentine president Nstor Kirchner. Althoughother leaders responded to the Brazilian initiativewith varying degrees of enthusiasmPeruvian

President Alan Garca showed little interest andColombian President lvaro Uribe was notably re-sistantthe exclusively South American organiza-tion appears to have taken hold.

Such a development hardly went unnoticed inMexico, which coincidentally at that time was incharge of the Rio Group. Mexicos response wasinstructive. Until 2008, the Rio Group was madeup of all Latin American nationswith the excep-tion of Cuba. But at a meeting of foreign ministers,Mexico proposed that Cuba be admitted as a mem-

ber. Even though the establishment of democracyhad been a condition for Rio Group membershipfrom the outset, Mexicos proposal was adopted.(Cubas presence has been a distinguishing featureof the Ibero-American Summit, which includesSpain and Portugal along with the rest of the re-gion, since it began in 1991.) With Mexicos en-

couragement, the Rio Group then invited all of theAnglophone Caribbean nations to join as well.

Against that backdrop, in late 2008 the Lula gov-ernment took advantage of an already scheduledUNASUR meeting to convene a mega-summit inCosta do Sauipe, Bahia. All regional governmentsembraced Brazils initiative, albeit for differentreasons. Mexico quickly offered to host the nextsuch gathering of Latin American and Caribbeanleaders, in Cancun, Mexico, in February 2010. Itwas there that the idea of CELAC was conceived,though it was essentially a renamed and more for-malized Rio Group. (Regional organizations maybe proliferating, but at least one, the Rio Group,has ceased to exist.)

Although Chvez and much of the media de-picted the December 2011 CELAC meeting as arejection of the United States and the realizationof Bolvars vision, it rather was a product of therebalancing of political positions in the Ameri-cas. The series of steps that culminated in CELACsfounding can be attributed more to the dynamicsin Latin American relationsparticularly between

Brazil and Mexicothan to any regional stance to-ward the United States.Yet, unless a regional leader decides to give it

a high priority and more structure, it is doubtfulthat CELAC will be transformed into a formal in-stitution. There will be periodic meetings of headsof statethe next ones are scheduled to take placein Chile, followed by Cubabut without a secre-tariat or any political decisions with teeth. Mexicois content to be part of the grouping, which re-connects it to South American political affairs, butat the same time enables it to focus on its NAFTA

partners. Brazils priority in the Americas is clearlycentered on UNASUR, which is seen as an instru-ment for maintaining social peace and order in thewider region.

AMBIVALENTNEIGHBORSUNASUR proponents point to such political

achievements as its role in helping to defuse ten-sions that flared between Colombia and Venezuelain 2008, along with responses to internal politicalcrises in Bolivia (2008) and Ecuador (2010). Nev-


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ertheless, some observers are still dubious about theorganizations efficacy. UNASURs interventions inboth national situations backed the current govern-ment, so its potential role in settling domestic dis-putes remains untested. There are, moreover, ques-tions about the groups financing and its ability toestablish an adequate organizational infrastructure.

After Nstor Kirchners death, UNASUR mem-bers decided on a rotating executive secretaryfirst with former Colombian foreign ministerMara Emma Meja, followed by Venezuelas for-mer foreign minister Al Rodrguez (who will as-sume the position in May 2012). Some projectsare under way aimed at upgrading infrastructureand communications in the continent; such proj-ects are commensurate with Brazils regional andglobal interests. In addition, the affiliated SouthAmerican Defense Council seems prepared to per-form a valuable function in amassing informationand sharing policy ideas about security-relatedquestions in the continent. These kinds of effortsmay end up being more feasible and realistic thana genuine scheme of political integration, whichremains problematic.

Indeed, relations betweenBrazil and its South Americanneighbors are complicated. Tobe sure, other South Ameri-can nations have benefitedfrom Brazils role as an engine

of economic growth and de-velopment. Within the continent, trade and in-vestment flows have grown dramatically (in thecontext of a surge in overall trade), and Brazil hasbeen an important driving force.

But it is not hard to discern spreading resent-ment among some of Brazils South Americanneighborsa natural product of increasinglymarked power asymmetries in the continent. AsThe New York Times noted in a November 2011report, some of the misgivings voiced by Brazilsneighbors have echoes of longstanding grievanc-

es leveled at the United States, including heavy-handed tactics, and dictating rather than negotiat-ing as equal partners.

Other common complaints include Brazils fail-ure to consult adequately with its neighbors beforeit takes stands at global meetings. Also, other SouthAmerican nations tend to identify more closely withLatin America than Brazil does, and are thereforeuneasy with what they view as Brazilians focus onSouth America at times to the exclusion of the restof the region, including Spanish-speaking Mexico.

Brazil, acutely aware of such sentiments, seeksto mollify its neighbors concerns, often resortingto multilateral instruments. Regional mechanismslike UNASUR are in part designed to smooth therough edges that inevitably accompany the dif-ferentials in power on many crucial dimensionsbetween Brazil and its neighbors. Despite its

dominant role, however, Brazil has no discernibleagenda for regional governance. And it is probablya stretch to refer to what is taking place as in-tegration in any strict sense of the term. Rather,there is a move toward increased cooperation andpolitical dialogue, which constitute the spirit andtenor of regionalism, but without any serious at-tempt to cede sovereignty, which is the essence ofintegration.

In fact, careful examination of the performanceand record of subregional groupings to date raisesquestions about the potential effectiveness of morefar-reaching regional arrangements. Mercosur,which was to serve as a customs union involvingBrazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, witnesseda jump in trade in the 1990s, but over time its func-

tioning has become problemat-ic. Protectionist practices haveintroduced considerable strainwithin the bloc.

In addition, Mercosurs in-ability to resolve a rancorousdispute between Argentina

and Uruguay over the opera-tion of a paper mill on their border exposed seri-ous limitations in its effectiveness. Yet, for all ofits shortcomings, Mercosur is generally regarded asless troubled than other subregional groupings inLatin America. For example, the Andean Commu-nity of Nations, which has existed since 1969, hasbeen riven by political differences and high levelsof mistrust. Other subregional arrangements facesimilar obstacles.

In this context, some Latin American countrieshave intensified bilateral ties with economic pow-

erhouses like Brazilbut have simultaneously pur-sued options to offset any one nations excessive in-fluence. The case of Colombia is particularly telling.From the start of his presidency in August 2010,

Juan Manuel Santos has assigned a high priority toreengaging with South America, from which Co-lombia had become relatively isolated during theUribe administration. Uribe had concentrated onhis countrys battle against domestic insurgentsand had, as a result, invested heavily in cultivating

Washington to ensure continued support.

The OAS desperately needs

modernization and

institutional reform.


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60 CURRENT HISTORY February 2012

In seeking to rebalance and realign Colombiasforeign relations, Santos has not only reducedpreviously high tensions with Venezuela and Ec-uador; he has also deepened economic and politi-cal ties with Brazil and has sought to play a moreactive role in regional affairs. For the time being,Meja, Colombias former foreign minister, heads

UNASUR. And Colombia has happily joined andparticipates in CELAC.

At the same time, however, Colombia is care-fully crafting its foreign policy to cultivate an al-ternative to Brazilian influence and to enhance itsown bargaining position on the global stage. In2011, Colombia, together with Mexico, Peru, andChile, forged Latin Americas Pacific Alliance, anincipient and potentially vital bloc that seeks topromote economic integration and free trade. ForColombia, increased commerce and investmentwith China in particular, but also the rest of Asia,is especially important.

The Pacific focus is also an effective way to sus-tain Colombias alliance with the United States,which regards the Pacific Alliance as highly prom-ising. The US-Colombia freetrade agreement, finally ap-proved in 2011, is entirelyconsistent with Colombiassophisticated, multifacetedstrategy.

THEANTI-EMPIRECLUBAs a clear measure of how swiftly the regions in-

stitutional landscape has been transformed, just afew years ago there were signs that ALBA, a notablymore defiant bloc of countries, had considerablemomentum. ALBA, launched in 2004, was con-ceived, and has been mainly financed, by Chvez.It sought to offer a radical alternative to the US-backed FTAA and to promote solidarity among acoalition of nations that stand up to Washington.Venezuela is the unmistakable leader; other mem-bers include Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador,

and several Caribbean nations. Honduras was alsoan ALBA member before that countrys June 2009military coup, but has since withdrawn from thebloc.

ALBA may have reached its zenith at a Summitof the Americas gathering in Mar del Plata, Argen-tina, in 2005, where an acrimonious atmosphereprevailed. That US president George W. Bush was sodisliked in the region, and the Iraq War was so uni-versally opposed, only helped fuel the Chvez-ledcoalition. The organization seemed poised to ex-

pand in a region that offered fertile ground for moreleftist recipes to social and economic problems.

But ALBA began losing much of its energy, chief-ly because of mounting problems in Venezuela,but also in other ALBA member states (for exam-ple, Bolivia). After 13 years in office, Chvez be-gan to confront more serious challenges, including

a very bad economy, a sharply deteriorating secu-rity situation, and, finally, the cancer diagnosis.Such weaknesses have significantly undercut hisability to play a more energetic regional role. Theyhave also made it even more difficult to undertakesome of Chvezs more grandiose schemes, suchas the Bank of the South, a proposed alternativeto traditional multilateral lending institutions. Atthe same time, Brazils riseunder Lula and now,especially, Rousseffhas mitigated Chvezs moredisruptive impact, as has Colombias rapproche-ment with Venezuela. In 2009 Chvez lost his fa-vorite foil in George Bush, and in 2010, Uribe, hisother main antagonist.

Although Chvez hosted the December 2011CELAC meeting, it was striking that his proposal

to replace the OAS got littletraction and in the end wasroundly rejected. A fieryspeech by Ecuadorian Pres-ident Rafael Correa attack-ing the OAS and, especially,its work on press freedom

and human rights issueselicited virtually no support among other CELACparticipants. As Santos noted, CELAC isnt beingborn to be against anyone.

Still, though Chvezs regional projects seemmoribund, he remains resourceful and, as thepresident of a major oil-producing nation, contin-ues to have money to spend. His popular Petro-caribe scheme, which provides oil at preferentialprices to some 19 member nations, is still a wayChvez can exercise soft power. Even the cur-rent Honduran government, long the object of

Chvezs wrath, is, for practical reasons, seeking torejoin Petrocaribe.

THEREGIONALISMTESTFrom Washingtons standpoint, the plethora of

regional groupings in its so-called backyard pos-es a test. Although the United States often dealswith countries in the region bilaterally, it is mostfamiliar with the OAS and regards it as the mainhemispheric political body. The OAS, however, hasa mixed record, and has recently gone through

The formation of CELAC should not

be interpreted as an expression

of anti-Americanism.


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a particularly rough period, during which it hasbeen the center of much controversy. The OAShas been criticized from both sides of the politi-cal spectrum, and both in Washington and muchof Latin America, for the way it has handled chal-lenging political situations in Honduras, Nicara-gua, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Haiti.

Meanwhile, more exclusively regional organi-zations focused on finance and development havebecome increasingly relevant. These present achallenge for more traditional institutions, such asthe Inter-American Development Bank, where theUnited States remains influential. In the region,the CAF Development Bank of Latin America hasexpanded and become a significant player. In ad-dition, the Brazilian Development Bank is rapidlyextending its reach and range of operations in theregion, chiefly to support foreign investments byBrazilian companies.

The expansion of access to private capital alsohas had key implications for the international fi-nancial institutions. China, now the principaltrading partner of Brazil, Chile, and Peru (and thesecond in a number of other countries) is a majorsource of capital and finance throughout the re-gion. In coming years it is unlikely that such ten-dencies will be reversed.

Nonetheless, though Washington faces a re-gional configuration that bears scant resemblanceto the one it faced just a few years ago, opportu-

nities for more productive relations are emerg-ing. In some respects, the outlook is more favor-able than it has been. The confrontational politicsrepresented by Chvez is in sharp decline acrossthe region. And some signs of pushback againstBeijings growing influence can be discerned, inpart because Chinas economic relationships maybe putting manufacturing sectors in the region atrisk. (There is also growing concern, among someSouth American nations especially, about exces-sive dependence on trade in commodities.)

More significantly, recent developments make it

clear that Brazil and Mexicowhich account for

more than two-thirds of the regions population,territory, and economyare interested in engag-ing more deeply with the United States, albeit ontheir own terms. For Washington, which claims acommitment to multilateralism, establishing bet-ter ties with both countries is crucial to any strat-egy of serious cooperation on issues ranging from

security, trade, democracy, and the environment toenergy, immigration, and human rights.

To its credit, Washington has not lamented itsexclusion from CELAC and other regional group-ings. But the United States could pursue more en-ergetic approaches toward regional mechanisms inwhich it does take part. These include the Summitof the Americas, which involves all elected headsof state in the hemisphere (and will convene inCartagena, Colombia, in April 2012), as well asthe weakened OAS.

THEOASENDURESIt is striking that, for all of the severe criticisms

of the OAS and continuing threats from some gov-ernments to withdraw from the organization, it isunlikely to disappear any time soon. The OAS isstill equipped to take on critical issuesincludinghuman rights, press freedom, and democracythat other, newer multilateral mechanisms seemyears away from being able to handle adequately.In these areas the OASs normative frameworks,developed over time, are impressive. The inter-

American human rights system, for instance, hasan admirable record of shining a light on abusescommitted during the period of authoritarian rule,including under Argentinas military junta.

The obstacles to greater effectiveness are fun-damentally political. The OAS desperately needsmodernization and thoroughgoing institutionalreform. In the current regional context of redefi-nitions and realignments, the United States hasan opportunity to marshal greater diplomatic re-sources and forge a more effective approach to-ward regional cooperation, one consonant with its

own interests and rhetoric. I

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