self-aspects as social categories: the role of personal importance and valence

Self-aspects as social categories: the roleof personal importance and valence

BERND SIMON* and CLAUDIA HASTEDT

University of MuÈnster, Germany

Abstract

Building on a self-aspect model (SAM) of the individual self and the collective self, theauthors hypothesized that personally important and positive aspects of the self wouldfacilitate the construal of a collective self. Following a self-description task, researchparticipants selected either two positive or two negative self-aspects. One aspect in eachpair had to be of high personal importance and one of low personal importance. Then,measures of self-categorization, perceived ingroup and outgroup homogeneity andintergroup di�erentiation were administered. Our hypothesis received convergent supportfrom all measures. It is concluded that personally important and positive self-aspects arevery likely to function as meaningful social categories. Copyright # 1999 John Wiley &Sons, Ltd.

Self-perception is a dynamic process with variable outcomes. One source of thisdynamic is that self-perception can focus on a variety of di�erent aspects of theself. Self-aspects can be physical features (e.g. tall), roles (e.g. father), abilities(e.g. bilingual), behaviors (e.g. travels a lot), tastes (e.g. preference for strawberry icecream), generalized psychological characteristics or traits (e.g. introverted), attitudes(e.g. against the death penalty), explicit group or category memberships (e.g. memberof the Communist Party), and so forth (Linville, 1985). Depending on which self-aspect or con®guration of self-aspects serves as the basis of self-perception in a givenmoment, di�erent working selves (e.g. as father, introvert, strawberry ice cream lover,etc.) will emerge (Markus & Kunda, 1986; Sherman, Judd, & Park, 1989).

In this article, we are concerned with two variants of the working self that areparticularly relevant to the realm of group processes, namely the individual self(or personal identity) and the collective self (or social identity). As conceptualizedwithin the framework of self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, &Wetherell, 1987), the former represents the self as a unique individual (`me'), while thelatter represents the self as an interchangeable group member (`we').

CCC 0046±2772/99/040479±09$17.50 Received 29 July 1997Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accepted 3 March 1998

European Journal of Social PsychologyEur. J. Soc. Psychol. 29, 479±487 (1999)

*Correspondence to: Bernd Simon, University of Kiel, Olshansenstrasse 62, 24098 Kiel, Germany.e-mail: [email protected]

Elaborating on the distinction between the individual self and the collective self,Simon (1997) has proposed a self-aspect model (SAM). This model addresses severalissues which have not explicitly been dealt with within the framework of self-categorization theory so far. Most important, it complements self-categorizationtheory in that it allows for a more precise conceptualization of the individual self andthe collective self. According to the self-aspect model, the collective self emerges whenself-perception or, more precisely, self-interpretation centres on a single self-aspectthat the person shares with other, but not all other people in the relevant social context(e.g. `First and foremost, I am a Christian'). However, this is not to say that, beyondthe central or focal self-aspect (e.g. Christian), no additional self-aspects could beinvolved in the collective self. On the contrary, `secondary' self-aspects (e.g. pious,honest, virtuous) are typically implied by the focal self-aspect (e.g. Christian). Butthese secondary self-aspects are stereotypically associated or correlated with the focalself-aspect so that, strictly speaking, they are redundant. The individual self, on theother hand, emerges when self-interpretation is based on a more comprehensive setor con®guration of di�erent (i.e. non-redundant) self-aspects (e.g. `I am female,Christian, musical, a lawyer, have brown hair, like French cuisine, etc.').

It is important to note that, according to this conceptualization, self-aspectsunderlying the individual self constitute no special type of `idiosyncratic' self-aspects,nor does the collective self require some special type of social categorical or `groupy'self-aspects. In fact, regardless of content, most, if not all, self-aspects possess a`collective potential' in that they are shared also by some (but not all) other peopleand that under appropriate social conditions their being shared can become explicitand meaningful (Tajfel, 1976; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994; see alsoReid & Deaux, 1996). In short, the distinction between the individual self and thecollective self is not so much a distinction in terms of content, as it is one in terms ofstructure or complexity ( for a detailed discussion, see Simon, 1997).

According to the self-aspect model, the collective self is predicated on focused self-interpretation. It follows that factors which facilitate this focusing or concentrationprocess should also facilitate the collective self. One factor that should play such afacilitating role is personal importance of a self-aspect. To the extent that someoneattaches high personal importance to a particular self-aspect that self-aspect shouldgrab the person's attention and should thus move into the psychological foregroundin the process of self-interpretation (see also Markus, 1977).* Another factor couldbe the valence or attractiveness of a self-aspect. There is wide agreement within thesocial psychology literature that people usually prefer positive self-evaluations tonegative ones (Tesser, 1988; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).Consequently, it can be expected that people are more willing to focus on a positiveself-aspect than on a negative one in their self-interpretation. Taken together, it canbe hypothesized that both high personal importance and positive valence of a self-aspect should facilitate the collective self. In other words, personally important orpositive self-aspects should facilitate self-interpretation as a member of the group of

*As to the distinction between self-aspects (Linville, 1985) and self-schemas (Markus, 1977) it is importantto note that, according to Markus (1977), self-schemas develop only for such self-aspects that a personascribes to the self to an extreme degree and that at the same time are highly important to the person. Inother words, the notion of self-aspect represents the more general concept. With respect to self-categorization, we would therefore expect that self-schemas have e�ects very similar to those of personallyimportant self-aspects.

480 B. Simon and C. Hastedt

Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 29, 479±487 (1999)

people who share that particular self-aspect versus the group of others who don'tshare it.

Given that personally important or positive self-aspects are indeed focused on ashighly informative or diagnostic of the own person, the above hypothesis is alsoconsistent with Tversky's (1977) diagnosticity principle. This predicts that increasedsimilarity is perceived among people who share diagnostic features. Consequently,people should perceive increased similarity between themselves and those otherpeople who share their personally important or positive self-aspects. Construal of acollective self in terms of those self-aspects should thus be facilitated.

To test our hypothesis, we employed measures of self-ingroup assimilation and self-outgroup di�erentiation as well as measures of perceived ingroup and outgrouphomogeneity and intergroup di�erentiation. These measures have successfully beenused as indicators of the collective self in prior self-categorization research (Simon,Pantaleo, & Mummendey, 1995; Simon, Hastedt, & Aufderheide, 1997; Turner et al.,1987).

METHOD

Participants and design

Participants were ninety-eight (male and female) psychology undergraduates (meanage � 23 years, SD � 5.4 years). The design consisted of one between-subjectsvariable, valence of critical self-aspect (negative versus positive), and one within-subject variable, personal importance of critical self-aspect (low versus high).

Procedure

The study was introduced as a study of self-perception. Participants ®rst producedfree-format self-descriptions (`How would you describe yourself? Please write downspontaneously everything about your own person that comes to your mind'). Later,participants were instructed to select from their self-descriptions two di�erentattributes or aspects of themselves according to the following criteria. About halfof the participants had to select two positive self-aspects, whereas the remainingparticipants had to select two negative self-aspects. Participants were randomlyassigned to these conditions. Moreover, one of the two selected (positive or negative)self-aspects had to be important to the participant's self-image, whereas the other self-aspect had to be unimportant to his or her self-image. (In case participants wanted tolist self-aspects not mentioned in their earlier self-descriptions, they were allowed todo so). Next, participants were asked to list the opposite of each of the two selectedself-aspects. Finally, the dependent measures were administered. Care was takenthroughout the experiment that participants worked individually and did notexchange information regarding the selected self-aspects or the dependent measures.

Dependent measures

In line with the self-categorization literature (Simon et al., 1995, 1997; Turner et al.,1987), we measured the following indicators of the collective self.

Self-aspects as social categories 481


Self-categorization: self-ingroup assimilation and self-outgroup di�erentiation

For each of the two selected self-aspects, participants estimated the degree of similar-ities and di�erences between self and other people who share the particular self-aspect (ingroup) and the degree of similarities and di�erences between self and thosepeople who possess the respective opposite aspect (outgroup). The exact wording was:Ìn many respects, I am like/di�erent from most people who possess [selected self-aspect/opposite aspect].' Thus, the own person was the comparison subject and otherpeople were the comparison referent. This was held constant for all comparisons.Similarity and di�erence ratings were made on separate 5-point Likert-type scales. Welater calculated a self-ingroup assimilation index by subtracting, for each participantand each self-aspect, the estimate of self-ingroup di�erences from the estimate ofself-ingroup similarities. We also calculated a self-outgroup di�erentiation indexby subtracting the estimate of self-outgroup similarities from the estimate of self-outgroup di�erences. For all indices, higher scores thus indicate more pronouncedself-categorization as an ingroup member (i.e. more self-ingroup assimilation or moreself-outgroup di�erentiation).

Perceived ingroup and outgroup homogeneity

For each of the two selected self-aspects, participants estimated the degree of similar-ities and di�erences within the ingroup as a whole and the degree of similarities anddi�erences within the outgroup as a whole. The exact wording was: Ìn many respects,people who possess [selected self-aspect/opposite aspect] are similar to/di�erent fromeach other.' Similarity and di�erence ratings were made on separate 5-point Likert-type scales. We calculated an ingroup homogeneity index by subtracting, for eachparticipant and each self-aspect, the estimate of intra-ingroup di�erences from theestimate of intra-ingroup similarities. Similarly, an outgroup homogeneity index wascalculated. For all indices, higher scores indicate more perceived group homogeneity(or less perceived group heterogeneity).

Intergroup di�erentiation

For each of the two selected self-aspects, participants estimated the degree of similar-ities and the degree of di�erences between ingroup and outgroup. In each case, bothingroup and outgroup served once as a comparison subject and once as a comparisonreferent so that, for each self-aspect, participants provided two estimates of inter-group similarities and two estimates of intergroup di�erences which were averagedrespectively. The exact wording of the original items was: Ìn many respects, peoplewho possess [selected self-aspect/opposite aspect] are like/di�erent from people whopossess [opposite aspect/selected self-aspect].' An intergroup di�erentiation index wasthen calculated by subtracting, for each participant and each self-aspect, the averageestimate of intergroup similarities from the average estimate of intergroup di�erences.Higher scores indicate more intergroup di�erentiation.

The order in which similarity and di�erence estimates were requested was random-ized across participants. The same was true also for the estimates concerning ingroup



and outgroup and the estimates concerning the important and unimportant self-aspects.

RESULTS

Self-categorization: self-ingroup assimilation and self-outgroup di�erentiation

We performed a 2� 2� 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with valence (positive versusnegative) as a between-subjects variable and importance (low versus high) andindex (self-ingroup assimilation versus self-outgroup di�erentiation) as within-subject variables. Three signi®cant e�ects were observed. First, self-outgroup di�er-entiation was generally stronger than self-ingroup assimilation �M�OUT-DIFF� �1.2, M�IN-ASS� � 0.0), F(1, 95� � 40.08,* p5 0.001, for the Index main e�ect.More importantly, both valence and importance had the expected e�ects on self-categorization �M�NEG� � 0.2, M�POS� � 0.9; M�LOW� � 0.2, M�HIGH� � 1.0),F(1, 95� � 12.92, p4 0.001, and F(1, 95� � 19.44, p5 0.001, for the Valence andImportance main e�ects, respectively. These e�ects were not quali®ed by interactionswith index (Fs5 1). The critical means, averaged over self-ingroup assimilation andself-outgroup di�erentiation, are depicted in Figure 1. This ®gure also reveals that asubstantial degree of self-categorization was observed only when the critical self-aspects, that de®ned one's group membership, were both positive and important.Though this may suggest that self-categorization was a multiplicative function ofvalence and importance, this observation should be interpreted cautiously. For one,the respective two-way interaction was only marginal, F�1; 95� � 2.93, p � 0.09 ( forall other interactions, Fs5 1). Furthermore, for both valence and importance, allsimple e�ects were signi®cant (one-tailed t-tests, p4 0.05).

Perceived ingroup and outgroup homogeneity

We performed a 2� 2� 2 ANOVA with valence as a between-subjects variable andimportance and target group (ingroup versus outgroup) as within-subject variables.Again, the main e�ects of valence and importance were signi®cant �M�NEG� � ÿ0.6,M�POS� � 0.1; M�LOW� � ÿ0.6, M�HIGH� � ÿ0.1), F(1, 96� � 7.00, p4 0.01,and F(1, 96� � 19.44, p5 0.001, for valence and importance, respectively. TheValence� Importance interaction was not signi®cant, F5 1. In fact, none of theinteraction e�ects approached statistical signi®cance, Fs5 1.58, ns. The critical meansare presented in Figure 2. This ®gure shows that both ingroup and outgroup wereperceived as more homogeneous when a positive as opposed to a negative self-aspector an important as opposed to an unimportant self-aspect served as the groupingvariable. Finally, the main e�ect of target group was marginal, F(1, 96� � 2.78,p � 0.10, indicating that, overall, the outgroup was perceived as somewhat morehomogeneous or less heterogeneous than the ingroup �M�OUT� � ÿ0.2,M�IN� � ÿ0.3�.*Degrees of freedom vary slightly due to missing data.



Intergroup di�erentiation

A Valence� Importance ANOVA on the intergroup di�erentiation index yieldeda marginal main e�ect of valence and a signi®cant main e�ect of importance(M�NEG� � 1.2, M�POS� � 1.7; M�LOW� � 0.6, M�HIGH� � 2.3), F(1, 96)�2.77, p � 0.10, and F(1, 96� � 57.39, p5 0.001, for valence and importance,respectively. The interaction was not signi®cant, F5 1.

DISCUSSION

Our prediction that personal importance and positive valence of a self-aspect fosterthe construal of a collective self in terms of that self-aspect was clearly con®rmed.Convergent evidence was obtained on measures of self-categorization, perceivedingroup and outgroup homogeneity, and intergroup di�erentiation. Put in termsof self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), personally important or positiveself-aspects, as opposed to unimportant or negative self-aspects, were associatedwith large meta-contrast ratios, that is, pronounced intergroup di�erentiationtogether with pronounced intragroup homogenization. It thus appears thatpersonally important or positive aspects of the self are very likely to provide sub-jectively meaningful bases for social categorization.

Figure 1. Self-categorization (averaged over self-ingroup assimilation and self-outgroupdi�erentiation) as a function of personal importance and valence of the selected self-aspect



It is also important to emphasize that in this study quite a diverse set of personallyimportant and positive self-aspects served as the bases for social categorization(e.g. intelligent, open, emotional, ambitious, sporty). The exact numbers of di�erentself-aspects selected were 35, 37, 33 and 31 for the important/positive, unimportant/positive, important/negative and unimportant/negative cells, respectively. This divers-ity was achieved by letting each participant freely choose a self-aspect in line with hisor her own criteria of personal importance and valence. Remember that participants

Figure 2. Perceived ingroup and outgroup homogeneity as a function of personal importanceand valence of the selected self-aspect



did not know that a categorization task would be administered afterwards. Conse-quently, they were not prompted to select particularly `groupy' self-aspects, that is,self-aspects which are traditionally associated with social categorization or groupformation. In fact, only two participants selected such a self-aspect, namely female,and both participants selected it as a positive, but unimportant self-aspect. This studythus strongly suggests that many di�erent self-aspects possess a collective or groupformation potential and that this potential is especially likely to materialize if a self-aspect is of high personal importance or positively evaluated. In short, important orpositive self-aspects are very likely to be construed as social categories.

In addition to con®rming the hypothesized role of personal importance andvalence of self-aspects in self-categorization processes, this study also provided evi-dence for the operation of some other determinants of the self-categorization process.Thus we observed that self-ingroup assimilation was generally less pronounced thanself-outgroup di�erentiation and that the ingroup was generally perceived as lesshomogeneous than the outgroup. It thus appears that people's willingness to self-categorize was somewhat hampered by the motivation to retain some sense ofindividuality or uniqueness (Codol, 1984; Jarymowicz & Codol, 1979; Simon, 1993).That would be in line with much social theorizing and research which suggests that, atleast in modern Western societies, individuality (i.e. the individual self) functions asthe ideological or cultural ideal of self-interpretation (Markus & Kitayama, 1991;Simon, 1997; Triandis, 1989). Nevertheless, without denying such limitations, thepresent study also clearly demonstrates that there is still quite some room for variationin self-categorization and that the personal importance and valence of the critical self-aspect are two important determinants of this variation.

Finally, as all of our measures also involved the perception of others (i.e. otherswho share or do not share the selected self-aspect), the present research also points tothe close interrelation of self-perception and the perception of others. Although inthis study we took self-perception as the starting point to examine the interrelation ofself-perception and the perception of others, we acknowledge that the in¯uence isessentially bi-directional. This must be so because self-aspects, together with theirvalence and the importance attached to them, are fundamentally social productswhich emerge from one's interactions with others (Mead, 1934). The ultimatechallenge, therefore, is to strive towards a more complete understanding of theinteractive relationship between self-perception and the perception of and by others.

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self-aspects as social categories: the role of personal importance and valence

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