1

Section Number S09 / Foreign Policy Analysis

P33 / Foreign Policy Analysis: Identities, Cultures, Representations

GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING, ÉLITES’ PERCEPTIONS AND CAPACITIES,

AND FOREIGN POLICY

Nuno MORGADO1

Institute of Political Studies

Charles University in Prague

Czech Republic

Abstract

The neoclassical realist theory introduced the élites’ perceptions and capacities,

relative material state potential, and systemic constraints as the variables included into a

model that intends to explain how foreign policy, as the dependent variable, is shaped

by them.

Starting from the main assumptions of Ethology and Classical Élites Theory, this

paper aimed to strengthen the argument of élites’ perceptions and élites’ capacities as

key intervening variables influencing the conduct of foreign policy.

This kind of approach has not been fully developed until now. This paper

brought the true innovation of (i) refining neoclassical realist theory, and (ii) including

geopolitical studies into the equation. In doing so, the latter aspect concerned analyzing

how foreign policy is affected by the sense of geographical space (Raumsinn) that élites

disclose, and by élites’ capacities in managing resources.

In order to solidify the main argument that élites’ perceptions and élites’

capacities filter both relative material state potential and international systemic

constraints, while determining the ‘national interest’, an empirical test on Brazilian

foreign policy conduct was accomplished.

Keywords

Geopolitical Studies, Neoclassical Realism, Methodology, State, Foreign Policy

1 The author may be reached at: morgado@fsv.cuni.cz

A.M.D.G.

2

INTRODUCTION

This paper addresses the topic of foreign policy analysis from both the

neoclassical realist and geopolitical studies’ approaches.

Within the positivist sphere and inscribed in the realist theoretical tradition, the

main point is to make an argument in order to sustain élites’ perceptions and élites’

capacities as key intervening variables influencing the foreign policy conduct.

In this context, the milestone shall be decomposed in two main objectives: (1) to

delineate the concept of élites as the power agent, and (2) to refine and to reinforce

neoclassical realism, melding it to the traditional approach of geopolitical studies.

The purpose of the paper is then threefold: (i) conceptual, (ii) theoretical, and

(iii) methodological. It is (i) conceptual because it deals with definition of terms and

their differentiation; (ii) theoretical because the paper intends to improve neoclassical

realist theory and merge it with geopolitical studies trying to forge a joint approach; and

(iii) methodological because it provides methodological guidelines from that new

framework.

The empirical test on Brazil closes the structure of the article, providing an

example on how the theoretical construction can be applied, assessing the essence of the

country’s political reality.

3

I. ÉLITES, NEOCLASSICAL REALISM, AND GEOPOLITICAL STUDIES

1. Delimitation of élites as agent

The literature in the science of Ethology2 sustained an argument that genetics

and instinct matter in the study of Man. Linked to this, the concept of territoriality3 is

another idea that Ethology focused on, which constitutes a benchmark for geopolitical

studies.

So, if on the one hand Ethology demonstrated that (1) like other vertebrates,

Humans are also territorial animals that control and defend their space4, and that (2) in

human societies, like other animal societies, there is a natural necessity for a minority of

individuals that rules over the majority5 (contrary to egalitarianism) then the researcher

has two solid premises for making an argument on the relevance of élites within

geopolitical studies: (1) human societies display a common predisposition to control and

2 Among others sources:

Konrad Lorenz, Civilized Man's Eight Deadly Sins (U.S.A.: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1973).

Niko Tinbergen, The Study of Instinct (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1951).

Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, El Hombre Preprogramado (Madrid: Allianza Editorial, 1977).

Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Human Ethology (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1989).

Desmond Morris, The Naked Ape (London: Corgy Books, 1969).

Humphry Knipe and George Maclay, The Dominant Man (London: Fontana, 1972).

Robert Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative (Oxford: Atheneum, 1966). 3 Territoriality expresses intentions, by an individual or group, of controlling a certain space –

Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.v. ‘Territoriality’, http://www.britannica.com/. Those intentions result,

namely, in establishing boundaries and spheres of influence 4 António Marques Bessa, Ensaio sobre o fim da nossa Idade (Lisboa: Edições do Tempo, 1978), 48-50.

5 These ideas were also developed in the literature in political science. For instance:

Vilfredo Pareto, Trattato Di Sociologia Generale (Charleston: Nabu Press, 2010).

Gaetano Mosca, Elementi di Scienza Politica (Torino: Fratelli Bocca Editori, 1923).

Robert Michels, Para uma Sociologia dos Partidos Políticos na Democracia Moderna, trans. José M.

Justo (Lisboa: Antígona, 2001).

Wright C. Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966).

James Burnham, The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom (Chicago: Henry Regnery Publications,

1987).

Jose Ortega y Gasset, La Rebelion De Las Masas (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1943).

4

to defend their territories, and (2) there is, within human societies, a numerically small

ruling class who lead, and a vast majority who comply.

This ruling class is in charge of the state, which is now understood as the

national territory. Consequently, the responsibility for the supreme administration,

control and defense of the national territory falls upon the ruling class. Although the

vast majority may also contribute to that operation, it must do so obeying the

instructions from above that it cannot directly modify in the short-term.

At this point, to allow further considerations, it is necessary to define two

concepts: who is the ruling class, and what is the state?

The ruling class, whether in a democratic or non-democratic regime, is the

minority that occupies power positions. These power positions are, in general, located in

a certain state’s political structure. Therefore, for geopolitical studies’ purposes, it is

rational to accept Taliaferro’s definition of state:

‘… the top officials and central institutions of

government charged with external defense and the

conduct of diplomacy’6

So, from an instrumental perspective, the state is its élites, i.e. those individuals who

have responsibilities in foreign affairs and external defense. At this level, the ruling

class, the state and the élites are synonymous – the agents who matter for study

purposes. The delimitation that Taliaferro made is also compatible with the expression

‘foreign policy executive’7, another synonym for the ruling class in the framework of

geopolitical studies.

The élites are then a very small group of individuals in every country’s

leadership. Heads of State, Heads of Government, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and

6 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-

Extractive State,’ Security Studies vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 470. 7 Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and

Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 280-281.

5

National Defense are part of that small group, together with their staff and/or teams of

institutions’ technocrats, a cluster of very influential individuals, experts in foreign

affairs, defense, intelligence, who carefully study contexts, situations, scenarios, provide

reports and advices8. These groups will be revisited in the treatment of the variable

élites’ perceptions.

The scholarship in geopolitical studies is more or less consensual on the idea that

Geopolitics does not need to take into account the role of individual decision-makers9.

The main argument of this paper challenges that view, in the sense that ‘state behavior’

is understood as the behavior of blood-and-flesh decision-makers, and that behavior is

dependent on certain perceptions and capacities that, consequently, provide a valuable

contribution to the explanation of geopolitical studies’ object.

2. Neoclassical Realism and Geopolitical Studies

After those considerations on the delimitation of élites – the agent – as a

concept, the paper shall, in this subsection, explain the role of the agent for neoclassical

realism. In that way, the objective of refining that theory will be achieved.

However, a full literature review on neoclassical realism is not pursued, not even

a summary of the theory itself. If fact, the paper assumes that the reader holds sufficient

knowledge on the topic. What is, indeed, pursued is to reinforce the utility of the

variables and to improve the theory, in order to meld it with geopolitical studies.

8 António Marques Bessa, O Olhar de Leviatã – Uma Introdução à Política Externa dos Estados

Modernos (Lisboa: Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 2012), 73-78. 9 For example:

Rodger Baker, ‘Accounting for Inertia in Geopolitical Forecasting,’ last modified November 20, 2015,

STRATFOR,https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/accounting-inertia-geopolitical-

forecasting?utm_source=freelist-

f&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Gweekly&utm_campaign=20150602&utm_content=readmoretext&

mc_cid=7ee6dda5e3&mc_eid=fc781e1ea6

Kissinger called the attention to the inaccuracy of studying mere ‘impersonal forces’ only – Walter

Isaacson, Kissinger: a Biography (New York: Faber & Faber 1992), 13.

6

Following a schematic division of variables, the matters to be analyzed

comprise:

(I) Independent variables:

(1) relative material state potential, and

(2) systemic constraints;

(II) Intervening variables:

(3) élites’ perceptions, and

(4) élites’ capacities.

The first independent and key variable to neoclassical realism is (1) the relative

material state potential or simply state potential.

Strategic studies, with the discipline of strategic potential analysis, have a crucial

role in assisting with detail in the understanding of what this variable is about. In fact,

from that field one can systematize six geopolitical factors10

: (i) state’s geographical

space (e.g. extension, shape, critical areas, borders, ecumene, penetrability); (ii)

geographical position (e.g. predominance of Land or Sea, accessibility of the territory,

geographical instability, regional context); (ii) circulation (e.g. routes, lines of

communication/ information); (iv) resources (e.g. food, water, energy, any strategic

resource and/or raw-materials, characterization of state’s economic structure); (v)

psychosocial projection on the territory (e.g. demography, identity, culture); and (vi)

politico-military structures (e.g. political regime, decision-making processes, quality of

diplomacy; Strategic Concept (Alliances), manpower, quality of command, quality of

weaponry and equipment, international prestige of Armed Forces).

10

This systematization was accomplished by the author in his PhD thesis ‘Towards the New World

Order? A geopolitical study of Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism,’ Institute of Political Studies,

Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague.

7

In respect to the latter aspect of internal political structure, Schweller noted that

it is also important to evaluate the relations between the society and élites – ‘state-

sponsored nationalism’ that creates high-level cohesion is included here11

– since, in

general conditions, when society and élites form a homogeneous mass, the state will

more likely approach the form of an unitary actor (‘coherent actor’), in the manner

proposed by structural realism12

. It is also noteworthy that divergences on foreign policy

conduct, in efficient states, only rarely occur – e.g. Presidential measures taken against

the Government guidelines or vice-versa, divergences within the government (Prime-

Minister vs Minister). In short, all those relations are included in Taliaferro’s

recommendation of looking for not only state-sponsored nationalism, but also for statist

ideology in the élites’ beliefs, assessable through their actions.

Therefore, the characteristics of the structure of both society and government

constitute the basis of relative material potential13

. They are able to assist in explaining

the differences of a state’s behavior on the international chessboard, since they affect

élites’ perceptions and capacities.

At this point, it is crucial to remind that potential is not power.

The so called “national power” would then result from material factors

(geographical setting, population, number of armed forces, economy) combined with

the administration (i.e. «administrative capacity and the political structure of

state…»14

). Lecturing about the U.S.A. Taliaferro asserted that that state is the first

11

Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-

Extractive State,’ Security Studies vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 486. 12

Consequently that means ‘to balance’ – Randall L. Schweller, ‘Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical

Realist Theory of Underbalancing,’ International Security vol. 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 160-161. 13

Randall L. Schweller, ‘Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,’

International Security vol. 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 168. 14

Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 2006), 13.

8

great power in history to be dominant in all factors of national power: military,

economy, technology, geography15

.

So the conversion of potential (tangible means) into power (capacity) is what

Taliaferro defined appropriately as ‘state power’:

‘the relative ability of the state to extract or

mobilize resources as determined by the

institutions of the state’16

.

Ultimately, the key ideas are then that the relative material state potential is the

foundation of foreign policy, and that state’s (i.e. élites’) ambitions ‘to control and to

shape external environment’ depend on relative state potential17

. Nevertheless, a high

state relative material potential per se is not a guarantee of successful foreign policy

outcomes, taking into account the role of intervening variables.

In doing the evaluation of state’s potential, the (2) analysis of the international

system, ranking the state within the hierarchy of powers, arises as a second independent

variable18

.

Coming from the old realist tradition of distribution of power, the systemic

constraints19

have respect to: international anarchy as the ‘permissive condition’ (thus

not a ‘causal force’20

), alliances (political, military), regional integration, the web of

15

WGBHForum, ‘US Foreign Policy: What in the World Should We Do?’ last modified November 2015,

YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jF7xWoZRR6w 16

Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-

Extractive State,’ Security Studies Vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 486. 17

Gideon Rose, ‘Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ World Politics

vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 152. 18

The waltzian perspective of anarchy, in which hierarchy is perennial – Robert Jervis, System Effects:

Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 96. Cf. Kenneth N.

Waltz, Teoria das Relações Internacionais, trans. Maria Luísa Felgueiras Gayo (Lisboa: Gradiva

Publicações, 2002), 159-162. 19

The ‘place of state in the international system’ – Gideon Rose, ‘Review Article – Neoclassical Realism

and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ World Politics vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 146. 20

Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and

Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 7.

9

great powers and their objectives21

, and of course, comparison of capabilities22

. Security

is understood as always relative and a never ending foreign policy finality.

Brill provided an extraordinarily useful assistance at this stage of international

system’s analysis23

. It is then easy to infer how geopolitical studies and neoclassical

realism can find converging points. Geopolitical studies reveal full compatibility with

the international system’s assessment through: spheres of influence, choke points,

borders, circulation, geohistorical nucleus, locations, resources, pan-ideas. Among

many other issues, these form part of the distribution of power. Regional approaches are

then unavoidable.

At the second-level intervening variables, (3) élites’ perceptions are the

innovative topic for geopolitical studies.

But why are the élites so important in the study of foreign policy, and by

extension, of international politics from the geopolitical studies angle?

The previous subsection paved the way for the answer with the help of Ethology,

and the methodological steps in the analysis of empirical reality in geopolitical studies

will provide further help, raising other questions formulated by political science itself:

who wants what? How is the agent pursuing his action, including his means of action24

.

Those questions are too specific to be answered exclusively by impersonal forces or by

abstract structures. Therefore, to trace élites’ actions seems the most accurate procedure

to take25

.

21

António Marques Bessa, O Olhar de Leviatã – Uma Introdução à Política Externa dos Estados

Modernos (Lisboa: Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 2012), 135. 22

Kenneth N. Waltz, Teoria das Relações Internacionais, trans. Maria Luísa Felgueiras Gayo (Lisboa:

Gradiva Publicações, 2002), 138. 23

Heinz Brill, Geopolitik Heute – Deutschlands Chance? (Frankfurt-am-Main: Ullstein, 1994), 179. 24

Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence – From Secrets to Policy (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2015). 25

Olavo de Carvalho, ‘Problemas de método nas ciências humanas,’ Apostilha do Seminário de Filosofia,

in Curso de Filosofia Política, Colonial Heights, VA, 26th

April de 2008: 4.

10

Carvalho sustained his premise in similar terms26

, and they also match entirely

with the perspective put forward by Wohlforth:

‘if power influences the courses of international

politics, it must do so largely through the

perceptions of the people who make decision on

behalf of states’27

.

Consequently, if the relevance of élites is justified, if it is identified

unequivocally who those individuals are, the next point shall be ascertaining the

perceptions of those individuals, i.e. the what.

Certainly the relative material state potential and systemic constraints are

objective, tangible, material components of the essence of the political reality.

Nevertheless, on their own, they cannot impact the international arena except through

those blood-and-flesh élites’ decisions. Therefore, the perceptions and capacities of

those agents continue as key variables. Specifically, the élites’ perceptions on the

relative state potential (that includes domestic constraints) and on systemic constraints

(perceptions about capabilities and intentions among decision-makers: belief systems,

images of adversaries)28

.

Testing élites’ perceptions, Kitchen made those converge into ‘the role of

strategic ideas’, but other possibilities remain29

. Dueck’s research on the U.S. grand

strategy demonstrated that foreign policy decision-making was more influenced by

26

(Translation by the author) “States, nations, governments and continents do not rule. Individuals and

groups are those who rule, since they control them” – Olavo de Carvalho, ‘Quem manda no mundo?’ last

modified November 7, 2012, Diário do Comércio,

http://www.olavodecarvalho.org/semana/121107dc.html 27

William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 1993), 2. 28

Thomas J. Christensen and Jack L. Snyder, ‘Multipolarity, Perceptions, and the Tragedy of 1914,’

International Studies Quarterly vol. 55, no. 2 (May 2011): 306. 29

Nicholas Kitchen, ‘Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand

strategy formation,’ Review of International Studies vol. 36, no. 1 (January 2010): 119.

11

élites’ perceptions of what the national interest was, than by any other ‘domestic

political reasons’30

.

Hence, and in the best traditions of political science, the emphasis is put on élites

as agents, instead of on the masses, although in order to understand élites’ perceptions,

attention must be paid to the nation’s identity – something that fits in Chauprade’s

second stable geopolitical variable31

.

In order to study élites’ perceptions, élites’ identity must be dissected. To do so,

it is necessary to evaluate their ideology. At the same time, élites’ (statist or non-statist)

ideology will also influence élites capacities in extracting resources, i.e. an individual

with a strong belief in the state’s interest will definitely be more capable of extracting

more, better quality resources, with the objective of promoting that state’s interest, than

another individual without that strong belief. In fact, Bessa contended that élites’

“personal and psychological parameters” are essential elements since they impact on

political decisions32

. Even so, these elements are still not enough.

The network of relations is central too, since élites’ perceptions are in general

shaped by consultation with businessmen, the military, parliamentary commissions33

, or

by élites’ attachment to certain organizations34

– and the latter may establish a direct

link with international constraints.

30

Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and

Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 167. Consequently, the public support in

foreign policy goals is lessed in the discussion. 31

Aymeric Chauprade, Géopolitique. Constantes et changements dans l’histoire (Paris: Éllipses, 2007). 32

Bessa extended the scope beyond this paper, giving examples of: sickness, old age, pusillanimity or

cowardice, bravery; for now the paper focuses on misunderstaning of relative material state potential or

misunderstanding of what is really at stake (objectives and systemic constraints) – António Marques

Bessa, O Olhar de Leviatã – Uma Introdução à Política Externa dos Estados Modernos (Lisboa:

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 2012), 118-119. 33

António Marques Bessa, O Olhar de Leviatã – Uma Introdução à Política Externa dos Estados

Modernos (Lisboa: Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 2012), 106. 34

As the next section will analyze, the connections of Brazilian political class to São Paulo Forum is an

example of that (e.g. systemic constraint).

12

Furthermore, a lack of information, false information, misguided predictions,

inaccurate evaluation of potential, among other aspects, also directly affect élites’

perceptions.

In this respect, the staff of the agents and/or teams of institutions’ technocrats – a

cluster of very influential individuals, experts in foreign affairs, defense, intelligence –

not only influence the agents’ perceptions, but without exaggeration, those groups of

senior officials and advisors can plausible be seen as those who actually formulate

decisions most of the time, since politicians as decision-makers are seldom trained to

make those kinds of choices within the short-term (knowledge factor), due to timing

restrictions (time factor). Although decision-makers are restricted not only by

international systemic constraints and relative material state potential, but also by

foreign policy traditions – and, at a lower level, by the country’s public opinion35

– the

fact seems to be that the group of experts/ influential individuals is the one worthy to be

truly put under the spotlight36

. That would be the general rule, from which exceptions

must be emphasized37

.

What else could be added about the concrete study of élites’ perceptions?

A precious contribution comes from Victor Frankl’s ‘intuitive understanding’

approach from the field of psychology38

.

35

In case that foreign policy is not conduct primarily for electoral purposes, a dangerous option that will

create instability. 36

In fact, Bessa alerted for the fact that real protagonists may be far from formal actors who are

publically known – António Marques Bessa, O Olhar de Leviatã – Uma Introdução à Política Externa

dos Estados Modernos (Lisboa: Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 2012), 72.

Carvalho insisted in this matter too, as quoted. 37

Vide, for example: Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing

the Statesman Back In,’ International Security Vol. 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001). 38

For a short resume of Viktor Frankl’s ideas vide: Viktor Frankl, ‘Personality Theories – Viktor Frankl,’

last modified November, 2015, Dr. C. George Boeree, Shippensburg University,

http://webspace.ship.edu/cgboer/frankl.html

The formal constraints of this paper in respect to its size do not allow going deep in this subject, as it

should. So nothing is left but to open a line of research in order to improve techniques (e.g. in

psychology), so that the study of élites’ perceptions in foreign policy analysis may be perfected. Vide:

13

Within neoclassical realism, Taliaferro endeavored to join, in fact, realism with

psychology, focusing on élites’ perceptions, in his ‘balance-of-risk’ theory39

.

As for this article’s purposes, is suggested to look at biographies, self-

biographies, speeches, interviews with élites’, and letters40

, élites’ behavior and foreign

policy outcomes, providing an empirical ground, with the objective to deduce élites’

perceptions.

In this matter, what seems to be important from Schweller’s approach, at the risk

of oversimplifying41

, is that élites’ concrete preferences and perceptions concerning

both the international system and the national interests (connected to relative state

potential) – i.e. ‘willingness’ stated in political discourse, and ‘ability’ i.e. capacities for

action – are able to be deduced from empirical data42

.

National interest and ideology are two essential components in foreign policy

processes. The national interest is deep down linked to élites’ perceptions, since the

national interest is what élites interpret it to be. Thual assisted the researcher to

apprehend, for scientific purposes and from the neoclassical geopolitics’ standpoint, the

Andrew G. Hodges, The Obama Confession: Secret Fear. Secret Fury (Birmingham AL: Village House,

2012).

Andrew M. Lobaczewski, Political Ponerology (Grande Prairie: Red Pill Press, 2012).

Lyle H. Rossiter Jr., The Liberal Mind: The Psychological Causes of Political Madness (St. Charles IL:

Free World Books, 2006).

Robert Langs, Fundamentals of Adaptive Psychotherapy and Counseling (London: Palgrave-Macmillan,

2004). 39

Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks – Great Power Intervention in the Periphery (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 2004). 40

That group of documents may be highly subjective, since it happens frequently that author aims to re-

write history and to defend himself. Therefore, it is always necessary to assure the validity of data,

crossing information. 41

The study disregards ‘élites consensus, cohension and fragmentation’ due to the fact that foreign policy

is designed by a very small group of influential individuals who, is assumed, at the time of foreign policy

formulation is already able to achieve consensus – vide: António Marques Bessa, O Olhar de Leviatã –

Uma Introdução à Política Externa dos Estados Modernos (Lisboa: Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa,

2012), 73 and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the

Resource-Extractive State,’ Security Studies Vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 487.

In this way, that small group of individuals is what this study identifies as élites. 42

Still, Schweller stated four variables instead, vide: Randall L. Schweller, ‘Unanswered Threats: A

Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,’ International Security vol. 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 169 ff.

14

national interest inferred from a series of political objectives43

. As for ideology, if top

officials are not misguided, ideology cannot compel action against the national

interest44

.

In regard to geography (a component of state potential), and while writing about

non-representational theories, Couper stated that ‘places and identities are

experience…’45

. This is another point to élites’ perceptions, an eminently geopolitical

one, since élites’ sense of space was identified as a core of geopolitical studies46

(vide

fig. 1 and fig. 2 on the notion of Raumsinn).

Figure 1

Causal chain between Geography, Élites’ perception of space and their capacities, and

states’ international successes or failures

Geography Élites’ Raumsinn states’ international

and élites’ capacities successes or failures

It is believed that states’ successes or failures are dependent on the awareness or

lack of awareness that élites have in respect to geopolitical studies’ results themselves

(fig. 2).

43

François Thual, Méthodes de la géopolitique – apprendre à déchiffrer l’actualité (Paris: Éllipses,

1996), 20 44

Hitler constitutes an example of misguided leader, to whom the fight against “judeo-bolshevism” was

more important than to maintain the alliance with the Soviet Union, as prescribed by German School of

Geopolitics. In section II, the paper will demonstrate that also Brazilian élites are led by ideological

guidelines against Brazil’s national interests. 45

Pauline Couper, A Student’s Introduction to Geographical Thought – theories, philosophies,

methodologies (London: SAGE, 2015), 98. 46

Nuno Morgado, ‘Geopolitical Design and the ‘Sense of Space’ – methodological cores in Geopolitical

Studies,’ in: 3rd International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences & Arts, SGEM

Vienna Hofburg, Book 2 Political Sciences, Law, Finance, Economics & Tourism, Volume I Political

Science (Sofia: SGEM International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences & Arts).

15

The geopolitical studies’ results are to be achieved through both: (i) the use of

the geohistorical method observing the past of the country47

, and (ii) the identification

of the state’s geopolitical design, which reveals the present and the future scenario.

In this context, using the comparative method between those two instruments,

conclusions concerning the Raumsinn could be inferred, i.e. the measurement of how

much geography’s incentives impact on foreign policy.

While observing empirical foreign policy outcomes over time, their successes or

failures, would assist in the final assessment of the Raumsinn – once again, the élites’

perception of space (fig. 2).

Figure 2

Analyzing the Raumsinn

Geohistorical method Geopolitical design

Comparative method

Geopolitical studies’ conclusions (include the assessment of geographical

setting’s incentives)

State’s successes State’s failures

Accurate – in-between – Geomisguided RAUMSINN

47

Jaume Vicens Vives, Tratado General de Geopolitica. El factor geográfico y el proceso histórico

(Barcelona: editorial vicens-vives, 1972), 56-88.

if not perceived by capable

élites in the foreign policy

conduct

if well perceived by capable

élites in the foreign policy

conduct

16

Although not exclusively, the questions of how and by which means the agents

execute their actions is concerned with the variable (4) élites’ capacities, i.e. élites’

capacities how to manage the country’s resources.

Overall, the researcher should keep in mind that resources allocated to foreign

policy depend on: élites’ perceptions, élites’ proper abilities, and also on state’s

structure48

.

In this way, foreign policy outcomes depend, causally, on élites’ abilities to

manage resources49

. Two notes to make on this level: (i) in respect to the security policy

domain, Christensen contended that the ‘national political power’50

depends on élites’

capacities; (ii) the relation between élites and the nation must be revisited, together with

Taliaferro’s methodological hint to investigate about the existence of state-sponsored

nationalism and the state’s structure itself – in fact, democratic regimes do not allow, in

general, so much freedom to the élites, due to the élites’ democratic accountability to

the people.

48

‘…states’ extractive and mobilization capacity’ affected by: ‘institutions’, ‘ideational factors’ (ideology

and nationalism) – Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical

Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 38.

‘…capabilities shape intentions, but it recognizes that state structure limits the availability of national

power’ – Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role,

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 9.

‘…those leaders and elites do not always have complete freedom to extract and direct national resources

as they might wish…’ – Gideon Rose, ‘Review Article – Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign

Policy,’ World Politics vol. 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 167. 49

Zakaria’s book verses extensively about U.S. government’s ability – that was developped in the end of

19th century – to extract resources – Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of

America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 50

Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-

American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 11.

17

Figure 3

Systematization of variables in neoclassical realist theory from the geopolitical

studies’ standpoint

INDEPENDENT

VARIABLES

INTERVENING

VARIABLES

DEPENDENT

VARIABLE

DOMESTIC

VARIABLES

Relative material

state potential

Élites’ perceptions

Élites’ capacities Foreign policy

outcomes

EXTERNAL

VARIABLE Distribution

of power

Nevertheless, it bears repeating that models do not reflect the entire reality, that

models are nothing but an incomplete technique to assist the scientific method in order

to apprehend reality.

That said, the study may advance towards the empirical test, with the

systematized neoclassical realist model (fig. 3) in mind.

A last note to neoclassical realism: in spite of the range of differences within

neoclassical realism, the body of theory is unified by the common basis of a two-level

approach that is more coherent than is argued by critics51

. This paper also sought to

systematize and refine neoclassical realism, strengthening its merit as an applied theory

in international relations scholarship52

.

51

Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and

Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 280. 52

Example: Mark Purdon, ‘Neoclassical realism and international climate change politics: moral

imperative and political constraint in international climate finance,’ Journal of International Relations

and Development vol. 17, no. 3 (July 2014).

Michiel Foulon, ‘Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and Bridging Identities,’ International Studies

Review vol. 17, no. 4 (December 2015).

18

II. ASSESSING BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY CONDUCT

At the moment – 13th

May 2016 – in Brazil Dilma Rousseff has been

temporarily removed from the Presidential office, through an impeachment procedure,

and replaced by Michel Temer. In spite of that fact, the analysis of Brazilian élites will

fall upon Rousseff’s administration during the second term (2015-2016).

Applying the theoretical considerations formulated in the previous section, the

first step is the identification of the individuals who constitute Brazilian élites.

As the Constitution of Brazil establishes the presidential form of government,

the positions of the head of state and the head of government were held by Dilma

Rousseff a Workers’ Party member.

The National Defense Council’s executive secretary, as well as head of the

Institutional Security Office, was General José Elito Carvalho Siqueira. Both positions

were extinguished by Rousseff, on the 2nd

October 2015, who then created, as a

substitute, the Government Secretariat53

, the leadership of which was given to Ricardo

Berzoini, a Workers’ Party member. Wilson Roberto Trezza has been the Director

General of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency54

, which integrates the Brazilian

Intelligence System that is supervised by Presidential institutions (Chief of Staff and

Government Secretariat), the Senate, the Congress, the Ministry of Defense, and the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, among many other institutions.

Nicholas Kitchen, ‘Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand strategy

formation,’ Review of International Studies vol. 36, no. 1 (January 2010). 53

Presidência da República, Casa Civil, Subchefia para Assuntos Jurídicos, ‘DECRETO Nº 8.579, DE 26

DE NOVEMBRO DE 2015,’ last modified November, 2015, Planalto,

http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2015-2018/2015/Decreto/D8579.htm 54

Trezza resigned on the 17th

May 2016 protesting against Temer’s reforms. He will abandon the post

after the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro.

19

Mauro Vieira, a career diplomat, was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs

and Aldo Rebelo, a member of Brazil’s Communist Party, was chosen as National

Defense Minister.

Knowing the individuals, how did they perceive Brazil’s relative material state

potential and systemic constraints?

To keep this article compact, the relative material potential needs to be reduced

to the geographical and political elements only, thus deferring the other geopolitical

factors for another study.

Elsewhere, the author argued that Brazilian élites have perceived their territory

as a ‘continental power’, a fact that was identified as a partial result of the influence, on

the decision-makers, of Brazilian School of Geopolitics’ misguided idea of

“continentalization strategy”55

. The main political consequence of this influence – also

argued in the paper – has been the regional integration process in South America, which

has been taking place with greater relevance since the foundation of São Paulo Forum in

1990, MERCOSUL one year later, and UNASUL in 2008.

Concerning the state structure, the Workers’ Party, from the moment it seized

power in 2003, has been placing party members and/or supporters into the socio-

political structure of the country, including the public administration, the judiciary

system, public companies, and the Armed Forces56

.

55

Nuno Morgado, ‘Continentalization versus Maritimization – the debate within Brazilian School of

Geopolitics and its political consequences,’ in: 3rd International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference

on Social Sciences & Arts, SGEM Vienna Hofburg, Book 2 Political Sciences, Law, Finance, Economics

& Tourism, Volume I Political Science (Sofia: SGEM International Multidisciplinary Scientific

Conference on Social Sciences & Arts). 56

For example: (i) the mentioned case of Ricardo Berzoini; (ii) when the Supreme Court suspended

Eduardo Cunha from the presidency of the Congress, on the 5th

May 2016, the position was occupied by

Rousseff’s suporter Waldir Maranhão; (iii) Supreme Court judge Teori Albino Zavascki was nominated

by Rousseff, and it was that judge who ordered the suspension of Eduardo Cunha (who started the

impeachment procedure against Rousseff); (iv) the Administrative Council for Economic Defense has

been headed by Workers’ Party member Vinícius Marques de Carvalho; (v) Rousseff was part of the

executive body of Petrobras, Brazil’s national oil company, when the great corruption events were taking

place; (vi) José Antônio Dias Toffoli, a former Workers’ Party lawyer, was appointed as judged of the

20

However, this project of leftist concentration of power has been receiving a

massive rejection from the Brazilian people, with public demonstrations of millions

individuals in the streets all over the country, since March 2015. On December 2015,

that public discontent was inserted inside the political system through the impeachment

procedure, which has resulted to date in the suspension of Rousseff from presidential

power on the 12th

May 2016 for 180 days.

In this context, the leftist-type ideology of Brazilian élites is evidently remote

from any state-sponsored nationalism. On the contrary, the integration of South

America particularly is based on the leftist idea of Pátria Grande, i.e. the Greater

Country, in which the borders among the states should be eliminated, thus the national

sovereignties should disappear. In fact, the total integration of Latin America is the

absolute priority for the São Paulo Forum, as among many other sources Lula da Silva

clearly affirmed57

. Consequently, to Brazilian élites there is no such priority as

“pursuing national interests”.

The São Paulo Forum is then one of the most relevant constraints in South

America. That international network of relations between South American leftist

political parties, state leaders, and criminal organizations58

constrains élites’ perceptions

Supreme Court and he is the president of the Federal Electoral Court too; (vii) the internationalist-

communist Aldo Rebelo was appointed Minister of National Defense, and the cases go on and on. 57

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no ato

político de celebração aos 15 anos do Foro de São Paulo,’ last modified June, 2015, Biblioteca da

Presidência da República, http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-

silva/discursos/1o-mandato/2005/2o-semestre/02-07-2005-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-

inacio-lula-da-silva-na-reuniao-do-conselho-de-cupula-do-mercosul/view

Foro de São Paulo, ‘“É preciso acelerar a integração latino-americana”, diz secretário-executivo do Foro

de São Paulo,’ last modified July, 2013, Foro de São Paulo, http://forodesaopaulo.org/e-preciso-acelerar-

a-integracao-latino-americana-diz-secretario-executivo-do-foro-de-sao-paulo/

Foro de São Paulo, ‘XIX Foro de São Paulo: Ato de Abertura,’ last modified July, 2013, Foro de São

Paulo, http://forodesaopaulo.org/xix-foro-de-sao-paulo-ato-de-abertura/ 58

Foro de São Paulo, ‘Declaração Final do Foro de SP defende luta pelo socialismo,’ last modified

August, 2008, Foro de São Paulo, http://forodesaopaulo.org/declaracao-final-do-foro-de-sp-defende-luta-

pelo-socialismo/

Raúl Reyes, a member of FARC Central High Command killed in 2008, was one of the agents making the

bridge between FARC and Foro de São Paulo, as Foro de São Paulo newspaper America Libre informed

21

and capacities in the region, and thus their decisions at the highest level. In 1990,

together with Cuban Communist Party, Brazilian Workers’ Party officials created São

Paulo Forum. It is now conversely possible to infer, from the foreign policy outcomes’

assessment, that the São Paulo Forum has been shaping Brazil’s politics.

In this way, the regional integration and Brazil’s place within it, i.e. the leftist

web forged among South American political representatives and criminal organizations,

comprises the most relevant aspect in regard to the systemic constraints’ independent

variable, simultaneously affected and that affects Brazilian élites’ perceptions and

capacities.

So, Brazilian élites not only have a clear perception of this reality, but beyond

that they also embodied those conceptions with motivation, since that they helped to

create that same reality. It seems legitimate and logical to conclude that Brazilian élites

themselves – together with fellow élites of Cuba – originally produced their own

constraints on purpose. Although those constraints may be harmful for their country –

once again contrary to the national interests – they are hardly harmful for the

internationalist leftist strategy, or even for the élites themselves, since they have been

growing richer and more powerful, as it is publically known59

. Therefore, the absence of

statist ideology – in the sense of defense of the political structure’s primary interests on

the international chessboard – may be confirmed. Furthermore, the idea of Pátria

Grande reinforces that confirmation, taking into account that international objectives

are pursued instead of national ones.

From these circumstances it becomes clear that the national interest is ignored in

detriment of the ideological guideline added to the “continentalization strategy”. This

means that Brazil’s foreign policy conduct has been following less of a technical

– Claudia Korol, ‘El pueblo en armas, entrevista a Raúl Reyes, miembro del secretariado nacional de las

FARC-EP,’ last modified August, 2015, http://www.nodo50.org/americalibre/anteriores/10/ 59

Vide judicial processes in Brazil, particularly ‘Operação Lava Jato.’

22

approach – namely by ignoring particular geopolitical studies’ results60

– than following

ideological purposes and international solidarities.

Consequently, Brazil has been accumulating state’s failures (fig. 2) – political,

economic, cultural61

.

In the view of this paper that accumulation of state’s failures is due to the

GEOMISGUIDED perceptions of Brazilian élites concerning the geographical setting and

the national interests, together with their incapacity to mobilize resources effectively –

shown in high corruption levels62

– anti-statist perspectives and disassociation from the

population, which does see any accomplishments in regard to Brazil’s national interests.

60

Castro – a high-level analyst in geopolitical studies – sustained that, from a geohistorical point of view,

Brazil’s geographical setting presents incentives towards becoming a maritime power – Therezinha de

Castro, Geopolítica – Princípios, Meios e Fins (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1999). The fact

that Brazilian élites’ ignore such conclusions demonstrates the existence of geomisguidance, a condition

that is not independent from ideological narrow-minded perceptions. 61

For example in 2006, Brazilian President Lula da Silva not only did nothing against Bolivia – which

unilaterally brook up an international agreement invading Brazil’s public company Petrobras facilities

with military forces and nationalizing them – but Lula da Silva himself confessed that he has previously

endorsed Bolivian President Morales personally to do so – Implicante, ‘Lula confessa ter dado aval para

Evo Morales tomar para a Bolívia as refinarias da Petrobras,’ last modified October, 2015,

Implicante,http://www.implicante.org/blog/lula-confessa-ter-dado-aval-para-evo-morales-tomar-para-a-

bolivia-as-refinarias-da-petrobras/

The loss for Brazil was aroung R$ 6 billion in investments. 62

2016 Index of Economic Freedom, ‘Brazil,’ Heritage Foundation, last modified May, 2016,

http://www.heritage.org/index/country/brazil

23

CONCLUSION

The German historian Leopold von Ranke contended that the relative material

state potential is what attributes the state’s position on the international arena63

. It is true

that such accumulation of power affects, and it is affected, by the distribution of power

in international relations. Yet none of those movements are independent from

individuals, i.e. from the foreign policy executive (for geopolitical studies’ purposes an

expression that is equivalent to: the ‘ruling class’, ‘élites’ or ‘state’). In fact, foreign

policy outcomes depend on élites’ perceptions and capacities, which filter relative

material potential and the distribution of power. In this logic, the incentives provided by

the geographical setting to politics are no different, obeying to the same procedure. It

follows logically that possibilism (as geopolitical studies’ theoretical core) may also

concede the possibility for élites’ ignorance or misunderstanding, in regard to the

implications between geography and politics (broadly domestic and foreign policy).

That phenomenon was designated as élites’ GEOMISGUIDANCE and added as an

assumption in the assessment of the Raumsinn as main task in geopolitical studies.

The empirical test devoted to Brazil applied the theoretical considerations and

sustained that Brazil’s foreign policy failures result from Brazilian élites incapacities,

together with GEOMISGUIDED Raumsinn, i.e. élites’ misperceptions about Brazilian

geographical setting’s incentives.

63

Translation by the author: ‘The degree of state’s independence concedes state’s position in the World;

therefore, the necessity of organization of all state’s internal resources in order to guarantee its self-

preservation remains. That is state’s supreme law’ – Leopold von Ranke, ‘Politisches Gespräch,’ kapitel

1, 1836, last modified November 27, 2015, Spiegel, http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/buch/-3012/1

Von Ranke was the precursor of the expression Primat der Außenpolitik [Primacy of Foreign Affairs].