G.R. No. L-15824             May 30, 1961

RICARDO M. GUTIERREZ, petitioner, vs.HON. ARSENIO SANTOS, ETC. ET AL., respondents.

Mariano G. Bustos and Agripino S. Bustos for petitioner.Quiambao, Galang & Beltran for respondent Benigno Musni.Antonio R. Abagon for respondent Rogelio de la Rosa.Office of the Solicitor General for respondent Secretary of Public Works and Communication.

DIZON, J.:

On August 15, 1958 Benigno Musni and others filed a complaint with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications against Ricardo M. Gutierrez alleging therein, enter alia, that the latter had illegally constructed dams, dikes and other obstructions across navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal fishing grounds located in Barrio San Esteban, Macabebe, Pampanga. They prayed that, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056, the said obstructions be ordered removed or destroyed. The original complaint was subsequently amended by adding six more to the streams or waterways mentioned therein.

On December 13, 1958 Gutierrez filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the proceedings to be held before Julian C. Cargullo, the investigator appointed by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, would be void because Republic Act 2056 was unconstitutional as it conferred judicial powers to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. This motion was denied and the investigator set the case for hearing on December 19 and 20, 1958.

On December 15, 1958 Gutierrez filed with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a petition for prohibition — which was subsequently amended twice — against the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Florencio Moreno, the Department investigator, Julian C. Cargullo, Senator Rogelio de la Rosa, Benigno Musni and his complainants, to prevent the carrying out of the investigation referred to above. Main contentions of petitioner were: firstly, that Act 2506 was unconstitutional because it granted judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and secondly, that the nature and character of the streams and waterways subject of the complaint lodged with the Department of Public Works and Communications was already res judicata, having been the subject of an agreement between the Zobel Family — former owners of petitioner's fishponds — and the Municipality of Macabebe. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1520 and was assigned by lottery to Branch I of said court, presided by the Hon. Arsenio Santos.

The Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the Department Investigator filed their answer to the petition for prohibition alleging therein several affirmative defenses. Respondent Rogelio de la Rosa adopted said answer in toto as his own, while the other respondents filed a separate pleading invoking virtually the same defenses pleaded by their co-parties.

On February 25, 1959 respondent de la Rosa filed a motion to disqualify the Hon. Arsenio Santos from trying and deciding the case, upon the ground that sometime in 1948 he had acted as counsel for fishpond owners, like the petitioner Gutierrez, in an administrative investigation in involving the same or at least similar issues and properties, and had expressed views in the course of said investigation prejudicial or adverse to the contention of the respondents in the pending case. Petitioner Gutierrez objected to the motion aforesaid upon the ground that there was no legal ground

upon which Judge Santos could be disqualified under the provisions of Rule 125 of the Rules of Court.

After the hearing on the matter, the respondent Judge issued an order dated April 16, 1959 disqualifying himself and endorsing the case to the Second Branch of the court, for reasons stated as follows:

Meanwhile, the new respondent, in his motion dated February 24, 1959, is seeking the disqualification of the presiding judge from sitting in the instant case on the ground that, before his appointment to the bench, he has been counsel for some fishpond owners, "like petitioner herein", as evidenced by photostatic copies of two (2) communications, annex A and annex B (par 2 of the motion); and that under section 1, Rule 125 of the Rules of Court, "no judge shall sit in a case in which he has been a counsel" (par. 4, some motion).

The motion is being objected to by the petitioner for reasons stated in his written opposition dated March 14, 1959. A perusal of the legal provisions, invoked by said respondent, does not show that the presiding judge is included in any of their prohibitions, because he is not pecuniarily interested in the case; he is not related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity; he has not been an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or counsel; neither has he presided in any inferior court, whose ruling or decision being the subject of review (sec. 1, Rule 126, supra).

It is true that while in the practice of law as a member of a law firm, the presiding judge, in behalf of Roman Santos, Manuel Borja and heirs of Proceso de Guzman, wrote the then Secretary of the Interior a letter dated June 1, 1948, annex A of the motion, requesting that the proposed lease, in public bidding, of certain streams listed in resolution No. 26, series of 1948 of the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga be held in abeyance until after the Committee on Rivers and Streams, created under Administrative Order No. 32 issued by the President of the Philippines, would have determined their nature whether private or public.

But, nowhere in the letters, annex A and annex B, could be found any showing that the presiding judge has ever appeared as counsel for Ricardo Gutierrez, the herein petitioner; contrary to the contention of the respondent, Senator Rogelio de la Rosa. Had he been his counsel, the presiding judge should have disqualified himself from sitting in the present case even without motion, as he did in a case pending in the second branch of this court, wherein Manuel Borja is the petitioner.

On the other hand, in the petition, annex 1 of the reamended petition, filed by Benigno Musni and others on August 15, 1958, they stated that the respondents named therein, one if them being Ricardo Gutierrez, "constructed dams, dikes and other works in public navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal fishing grounds in the Municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga"; and that such navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal fishing grounds are those specified in the list, annex A of the and petition, annex 1 of the re-amended petition.

A reading of this list shows that some of the streams mentioned in resolution No. 26, series of 1948 of the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga, included in the fishponds of Roman Santos, Manuel Borja and heirs of Proceso de Guzman, were the ones, which the presiding judge, then law practitioner, contended in his letter, annex A of the motion, to be private and not public; and that the said streams, as shown by the plan, Exhibit A - De la Rosa, were more or less similar to those included in the fishpond or fishponds of the

petitioner, Ricardo Gutierrez, which were being investigated by Mr. Julian C. Cargullo, upon order of the respondent Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

Such being the case, the presiding judge is inclined to grant the motion, by disqualifying himself to sit in this case, not because he has been a counsel for the above-named petitioner, which is entirely false, neither because of "extremada delicadeza", but because his opinion given in the aforesaid letter might, some way or another, influence on his decision in the case at bar. While this would be a too remote possibility, yet it is the duty of the court to administer justice without any suspicion of bias and prejudice, otherwise a party-litigant might lose confidence in the judiciary that must be avoided as much as possible for the purpose of preserving its dignity.

Petitioner Gutierrez filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order mentioned above, but the respondent Judge denied said motion in his order of August 11, 1959 where the following is stated:

While it is true that presiding judge was not counsel for the petitioner, yet in his letter dated June 1, 1949, attached to the record, as then a private law practitioner and as counsel for Manuel Borja, Roman Santos and the heirs of Proceso de Guzman, he informed the then Secretary of Interior that the streams and rivers, intended to be leased at public caution by the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga, in its Resolution No. 26. were private and not public.

In his same letter, the presiding judge even stated that copies of Resolution No. 26 were furnished the persons mentioned therein, one of them being Ricardo Gutierrez, the herein petitioner, because the streams and rivers subject of the instant petition were among those to be leased. In other words, the interests of Manuel Borja, Roman Santos and the heirs of Proceso de Guzman were identical to the interests of the herein petitioner Ricardo Gutierrez, so much so that whatever may be the resolution of the Secretary of the Interior then would benefit the interests of the said petitioner.

Under these circumstances, the presiding judge believes that he has no other recourse but to disqualify himself from sitting in this case.

On August 22, 1959 Gutierrez commenced the present action for mandamus against the Hon. Arsenio Santos, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Department Investigator and the parties who filed the complaint against him, for the purpose of compelling the aforesaid Judge "to proceed, continue with the hearing and take cognizance of Civil Case No. 1520 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga."

Petitioner invoking the provisions of section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, argues that the case of the respondent judge does not fall under any one of the grounds for the disqualification of judicial officers stated therein. Assuming arguendo that a literal interpretation of the legal provision relied upon justifies petitioner's contention to a certain degree, it should not be forgotten that, in construing and applying said legal provision, we cannot disregard its true intention nor the real ground for the disqualification of a judge or judicial officer, which is the impossibility of rendering an impartial judgment upon the matter before him. It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge (30 Am. Jur. p. 767). Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the Judge. Consequently, we take it to be the true intention of the law — stated in general terms — that no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent (30 Am. Jur. Supra) because —

. . . However upright the judge, and however free from the slightest inclination but to do justice, there is peril of his unconscious bias or prejudice, or lest any former opinion formed ex parte may still linger to affect unconsciously his present judgment, or lest he may be moved or swayed unconsciously by his knowledge of the facts which may not be revealed or stated at the trial, or cannot under the rules of evidence. No effort of the will can shut out memory; there is no art of forgetting. We cannot be certain that the human mind will deliberate and determine unaffected by that which it knows, but which it should forget in that process. . . . (Ann. Cas. 1917A, p. 1235) .

In the present case the respondent judge himself has candidly stated that the opinion expressed by him in a letter dated June 1, 1948 addressed by him as counsel for Manuel Borja and others to the then Secretary of the Interior, attached to the motion for disqualification as Annex A, "might, some way or another, influence (on) his decision in the case at bar" (order of April 13, 1959). The fear he has thus expressed — of not being able to render a truly impartial judgment — does not appear to be capricious and whimsical, having in mind particularly that in his order of August 11, 1959 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, His Honor reiterated that in the aforesaid letter he informed the Secretary of the Interior that the streams and rivers to be auctioned, for lease purposes, by the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga, were private and not public streams and rivers; that the streams and rivers subject of the petition for prohibition filed by herein petitioner were among those that he considered as private in nature; that, therefore, the interests of Borja and his other clients "were identical to the interest of the herein petitioner etc." In view of these circumstances, we are constrained to agree with His Honor that the opinion thus expressed by him years ago "might, some way or another, influence his decision" in the case before him.

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus under consideration is hereby denied, without costs

In re impeachment of Honorable TOMAS FLORDELIZA, Judge of First Instance of the Sixteenth Judicial District.

MALCOLM, J.:

Six members of the bar of Sorsogon who, together, make claim to at least 50 per cent of the law practice of that province, have filed a verified petition in this court praying for the removal from office of the Honorable Tomas Flordeliza, Judge of First Instance of the Sixteenth Judicial District. The charges laid against the respondent Judge are, in general: (1) That on different occasions the respondent certified falsely as to the status of the cases pending decision before him, in violation of section 129 of the Administrative Code; (2) that the respondent is guilty of delay and lack of diligence in the disposition of the cases pending before him, in violation of section 165 of the Administrative Code, and generally accepted principles which determine judicial standards; and (3) that the respondents is guilty of partiality in the performance of his official duties.

A copy of the above-mentioned complaint was, by order of the court, furnished the respondent Judge, with instructions to answer the same. In response to this order, Judge Flordeliza has filed a verified answer, denying each and every charge, and suggesting the disbarment of the complainants. Certificates from the provincial commander of the Philippine Constabulary, the provincial governor of Sorsogon, and Attorney Robert E. Manly, as to the moral conduct, social standing, and integrity of the respondent have been furnished. The records of the cases in question have also been forwarded by the respondent.

We feel that we have before us all of the facts which are necessary for the disposition of this matter. For this reason, therefore, we forego referring the charges to the Attorney-General for investigation and proceed to dispose of them as justice requires. For purposes of convenience, the order of the charges as found in the complaint will be departed from.

One charge is that the respondent Judge has proceeded in many cases with manifest and evident partiality. It is alleged that the Judge has deferred unduly to the accused Father Casiano de Vera, the accused Fermin Barranechea, the justice of the peace Gillego de Vera, the justice of the peace Felix Gallego, and Amado Gimenez, municipal president of Bacu, Sorsogon. It is further alleged that the Judge has acted with discourtesy toward the complainants, while showing a spirit of condescension to attorneys Francisco Arellano and Federico Jimenez. The respondent, on the other hand, proferred satisfactory explanation of these matters, mentioned in the complaint. At best a charged of partiality is difficult to prove and is one which is to be expected from disgruntled lawyers.

Under the subject of negligent performance of the duties of his office to the grave prejudice of the public interest, complainants allege that there are to many cases placed on the calendar for one day. Even without taking into consideration the expected explanation of respondent, this, obviously, is a question which must rest in the discretion of the presiding Judge.

Under the same subject, it is further alleged that court sessions are held only for three hours and a half each day, while section 165 of the Administrative Code calls for not less than five-hour sessions of courts of first instance except on Saturdays. The respondent answers that he has held court for five hours each day as prescribed by the law. We accept the statement of his Honor.

Under the same subject, attention is invited to the fact that only 11 civil cases and 107 criminal cases, making a total of 118 cases were decided by Judge Flordeliza during the year 1921. The respondent Judge, on the contrary, states that 66 civil cases, 190 criminal cases, and 9 complaints against justices of the peace, or a total of 265 cases were disposed of. The annual report of the clerk of court of Sorsogon for the year 1921 shows that 11 ordinary civil cases, 4 probate cases, 3 land registration cases, 9 administrative investigations, and 81 criminal cases were decided during the year. The same report shows that 256 ordinary civil cases, 104 probate cases, 11 land registration cases, 1 administrative investigation, and 266 criminal cases, or a total of 638 cases were pending on December 31, 1921. As of September 30, 1922, according to data furnished by the office of the Attorney-General, 236 criminal cases, 262 civil cases, 108 probate cases, and 8 land registration cases, making 614 cases in all were pending decision in Sorsogon.

Under the same subject of negligence, the serious charge is made that there has been great delay in the disposition of criminal cases in which the accused is without bail. The time which has elapsed between the arrest of the defendant and the trial in these cases is between four months and nine months. In response, the Judge contends: (1) That he is not responsible for the accused before the complaint or information is filed; (2) that the postponements have been due to the failure of Government witnesses to appear; and (3) that where the complaint or information is filed in March or April, he may set the case for trial when court reopens in July or August.

We postpone our comment on the last two phases of the complaint until we reach an analysis of the case later on in the opinion.

The last and most serious charge presented, having a close relationship with the congestion of cases on the docket of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, the delay in the disposition of these cases, especially criminal cases, and the lack of diligence in catching up with the court work, concerns the alleged false certification of the respondent under section 129 of the Administrative Code, in order to secure the payment of his salary. Attention is invited to a number of cases which

were decided beyond the ninety-day period mentioned in the law, and, with certain qualifications, these facts are admitted by the respondent. The latter, however, offers four reasons or, more accurately speaking, excuses, for this state of affairs. He says in the first place that the time taken by stenographers in transcribing their notes should not be counted in the computation of the ninety-day period. He contends in the next place that the vacation period should be excluded. He asserts in the next place that the period should begin to run from the date the clerk reported the case for decision. And, lastly, his construction of the law is, that an oral decision is sufficient.

The admitted facts required of us an interpretation and construction of section 129 of the Administrative Code, not alone to set right the respondent Judge, but in order to lay down a definite ruling for the benefit of all the members of the judiciary to whom the law applies. Said section 129, derived from Act No. 1552, reads as follows:

Judges and auxiliary judges of first instance, judges of municipal courts, and justices of the peace shall certify on their applications for leave, and upon salary vouchers presented by them for payment, or upon the pay rolls upon which their salaries are paid, that all special proceedings, applications, petitions, demurrers, motions, and all civil and criminal cases which have been under submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or before the date of making the certificate, and no leave shall be granted and no salary shall be paid without such certificate.

In the case any special proceeding, application, petition, demurrer, motion, civil or criminal case is resubmitted upon the voluntarily application or consent in writing of all the parties to the case, cause, or proceeding, and not otherwise, the ninety days herein prescribed within which a decision should be made shall begin to run from the date of such resubmission.

The law requires that before leave shall be granted or salary shall be paid to any judge or auxiliary judge of first instance, he shall make a certificate that all cases and proceedings which have been under submission for determination or decision for a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or before the date of making the certificate. The key words, needing construction, are "determined and decided."

The word "determined" is hardly the equivalent of "decided" and does not have quite as far-reaching a meaning. "Determine," it has been said, does not mean more than tried. (Goddard vs. Fullam [1865], 38 Vt., 75.) "Decided" or "decide," according to the lexicographers, is defined as "to form a definite opinion," "to render judgment." (In reMilford & M. R. R. [1895], 68 N. H., 570.) In this jurisdiction, upon the trial of a question of fact, the decision of the court must be given in writing and filed with the clerk. (C. C. P., sec. 133.)

The meaning given to section 129 of the Administrative Code by the respondent Judge would result in qualifying the law where no such qualifications were intended. With special reference to the answer of the respondent Judge, we state that the vacation months should not be excluded in the computation of the ninety-day period prescribed by law, that the time should begin to run from the submission of the case, without awaiting notification from the clerk of court, and that an oral decision is not sufficient. As to the point that the time taken by a stenographer to transcribe his notes should not be taken into consideration, no hard and fast rule can be laid down. The general rule would be to conform with the intent of the law and thus not to permit decisions to be delayed for this reason, but conceivably special circumstances may arise, which cannot now be imagined, which would force the trial judge to await the transcription of the stenographer's notes for long periods of time; when they do the judge should so state.

Sometimes, in the United States, judges are prohibited from drawing their salaries so long as cases that have been submitted to them for decision for ninety days remain undecided. California is an instance of a jurisdiction with such a provision appearing in its Constitution. The law there is, however, somewhat more extensive and explicit than in the Philippines, because applying to members of the Supreme Court as well as to members of inferior courts, and because of this further provisions: "In the determination of causes, all decisions of the Supreme Court and of the district courts of appeal shall be given in writing and the grounds of the decision shall be stated." (23 Cyc., 528; 5 Henning, General Laws of California, lxxxv; Meyers vs. Kenfield [1881], 62 Cal., 512.)

The purpose of the Philippine Legislature in placing section 129 of the Administrative Code and related provisions on the statute books is evident. With the judicial facts before it, the Legislature must have had in mind a forceful method reaching the pockets of the judges by which to spur them on to greater activity. This wise and salutary legislation it is now for this Tribunal to vitalize by equally wise and salutary interpretation and enforcement.

Much of the popular criticism of the courts which, it must be frankly admitted, is all too often justified, is based on the laws' delay. Congested conditions of court dockets is deplorable and intolerable. It can have no other result than the loss of evidence, the abandonment of cases, and the denial and frequent defeat of justice. It lowers the standards of the courts, and brings them into disrepute.

The statistics relating to the unsatisfactory condition of judicial business in the Philippines are a matter of public knowledge. Said the report of the Special Mission to the Philippines: "The judges in too many courts do not realize the necessity of reaching early and prompt decisions and are too ready to postpone hearings and trials." It is known, also, that His Excellency, the Governor-General, and the Secretary of Justice, have given their attention to the subject, and have endeavored by all legitimate means to aid in cleaning up the court dockets. The members of the Supreme Court in an effort to do their part have cheerfully foregone vacations in order to catch up with accumulated legal business. But for the best results to attain, there must be judicial teamwork reaching from the capital to the most remote district, and from the highest to the lowest judicial officer.

One of the proposed canons for a decalogue for the judiciary is this: "The judge must cultivate a capacity for quick decision. Habits of indecision must be sedulously overcome. He must not deny by slothfulness of mind or body the judgment to which a party is entitled." We write down our conformity.

The provision of law which is authority for this decision is section 173 of the Administrative Code, relating to the removal and suspension of Judges of First Instance. The grounds for removal of a judge of first instance therein provided are two: (1) Serious misconduct, and (2) inefficiency. In a recent decision on the general subject of impeachment of judges of fist instance, it was said that for serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. Again, it was said that impeachment proceedings are in their nature highly penal in character, and are governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases. The charges must therefore be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re Impeachment of Honorable Antonio Horrilleno [1922], 43 Phil., 212.)

At common law there was an offense known as extortion in office, which was the taking by color of office, of money or other thing of value that is not due, before it is due, or more than is due. It has been held that a judge is removable from office for demanding and receiving compensation to which he is not entitled, and this is so notwithstanding he acts in good faith and in an honest belief that he is entitled to such compensation. The strict doctrine of these cases is: Here is one bad act; you ought not to have an opportunity to commit another. (15 R. C. L., 551; Commonwealth vs. Chambers

[1829], 1 J. J. Marsh., 108; State ex rel. Rowe vs. District Court [1911], 44 Mont., 318; 27 Ann, Cas., 396, and note; Brackenridge vs. State [1889], 27 Tex. App., 513; 4 L. R. A., 360.)

That we do not adopt the rather harsh doctrines of these American cases is because the statutes there in question differ from ours and because we are not prepared to say that a judge should be separated from office where he apparently is acting in good faith, under a misconception of the law.

In conclusion, therefore, we have decided to pay no particular attention to the general charges of partiality and negligence which have been filed against Judge Flordeliza. We do find, however, that he has not displayed that interest in his office which stops not at the minimum of the day's labors fixed by law, and which ceases not at the expiration of official sessions, but which proceeds diligently on holidays and by artificial light and even into vacation periods. Only thus can he do his part in the great work of speeding up the administration of justice and of rehabilitating the judiciary in the estimation of the people. The mountain of six or seven hundred pending cases in Sorsogon could be removed by a judge of first instance of alert mind and quick decision, not afraid of work, with the aid of a helpful bar and a sympathetic government.

As willful and intentional wrongdoing in receiving compensation has not been demonstrated, we are not prepared to find that sufficient cause exists in our judgment involving serious misconduct or inefficiency as warrants us in recommending the removal of the respondent Judge to the Governor-General. We will take such a step if future derelictions of duty of this character recur.

Correcting, therefore, Judge of First Instance Tomas Flordeliza in his wrong construction of section 129 of the Administrative Code, and admonishing him to proceed more assiduously in the performance of his judicial labors, it is our order that these proceedings he filed without further action. Copies of this decision shall be furnished the complainants, the respondent, and His Excellency, the Governor-General.

JUVELYN D. KILAT vs JUDGE MARIANO S. MACIAS, TINGA, J.: This is an administrative complaint charging respondent Judge Mariano S. Macias, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, with immorality, conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer, rape, and violation of the Anti-Child Abuse Law.[1] According to complainant, she was a sixteen (16) year-old working high school student in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur when she met respondent in November 1999. One time, respondent fetched her from her school and had dinner with her in a local restaurant. After dinner, respondent brought her to his vehicle where he kissed and fondled her, assuring her that he will take care of her, her studies, her expenses and her future. Later, she was brought to a hotel. Despite her plea to be driven home, respondent refused, telling her that he just wanted her company while he was resting. Complainant tried to go out of the room but respondent caught up with her and threatened her with a gun. Respondent removed her clothes and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. Respondent asked

complainant to be his live-in partner, but she did not reply. Respondent threw at complainant P1,500.00 worth of bills and warned her not to tell any person what had transpired.[2] Because of the incident, complainant was forced to quit her job and stop with her schooling. She went back to the house of her parents in Salug, Zamboanga del Norte. Respondent still managed to find out her whereabouts and offered her a job in Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, which she accepted. However, while in Sindangan, respondent brought her to his house where he again succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards, he gave her money and threatened to have her killed should she tell anyone what happened. From that time onwards, complainant became respondent’s kept woman, spending Saturday nights with him and he gave her money every time they had sexual intercourse. Complainant claims that she left respondent when she found out that he was having another affair. She went back to her parents and told them what respondent did to her. They sought the help of Salug officials to seek justice for what respondent had done.[3] For his part, respondent claims that complainant was just being used by his ex-wife, Margie Corpus Macias, and several other personalities who he believed had “selfish and personal axes to grind”[4] against him. He denies the accusation of raping and having illicit relations with complainant whom he knew only as a passing acquaintance. He claims that he had been in contact with complainant only once, when he bought her cellular phone, and only because he pitied her. Respondent asserts that complainant informed him that she was kidnapped and merely forced to sign the documents used in the instant administrative complaint. To find out the veracity of complainant’s story, respondent and his counsel asked her to narrate her plight in the presence of a pastor of the Adventist Church, a lawyer, and a public prosecutor—all respected members of the community.[5] In support of his defense, respondent annexed the following documents: (i) letter addressed to the Chief Justice signed by complainant withdrawing the instant administrative complaint; (ii) letter to Ombudsman Aniano Desierto signed by complainant, filing administrative charges against those who conspired to kidnap her; (iii) Sinumpaang Pamamahayag[6] executed by complainant dated 21 August 2001; (iv) Apas-Sumpay Nga Pamamahayag,[7] dated 23 August 2001among others. Complainant confessed[8] that she was approached by Vice Mayor Edgar Saldia and Mayor Jesus “Siote” Lim of Salug, Zamboanga del Norte and offered to help her prepare a case for rape against respondent. She refused because respondent did not do anything wrong to her. Later that day, Mrs. Margie Macias talked to complainant, telling her that she was “heaven-sent,” because Mrs. Macias wanted respondent to be dismissed from his work. Two days later, Vice Mayor Saldia promised her mother that he will give complainant’s father a job in the municipal hall if they agree to the filing of a rape case against respondent. When complainant’s mother refused, Vice Mayor Saldia threatened her with a lawsuit. Reluctantly, complainant was left in the vice mayor’s house where she was locked in one of the rooms. After two or three days, she was brought to the house of Atty. Selda, where she was forced to sign the affidavit-complaint against respondent. Afterwards, accompanied by the vice mayor’s daughter known to her as “Blanca,” they had the affidavit

notarized by a public prosecutor. Complainant claims that she attempted to tell the public prosecutor about the untruthfulness of the affidavit, but she was afraid of Blanca who was then glowering at her.[9] After a few days, complainant was brought to Manila and made to stay in the house of Atty. Reynaldo Llego in Cubao, Quezon City. She was locked up in the house for almost three weeks and was provided with a guard. However, she was able to escape through the help of her cousin, Carmen Manlangit, who was then working in Quezon City.[10] On 5 August 2002, respondent filed a Manifestation[11] informing the Court of the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao which dismissed the criminal complaint for rape filed by the complainant. Meanwhile, complainant filed charges against those accused of kidnapping her, which complaint was endorsed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte. The Provincial Prosecutor initially suspended the resolution of the complaint, but the Department of Justice reversed the resolution and ordered the filing of informations for grave coercion and serious illegal detention against Mayor Jesus Lim, Vice Mayor Edgar Saldia, Atty. Alanixon Selda, Margie Corpus-Macias, Ma. Blanca Urongan, Sidney Sy, Dolbert Panangitan, Victonie Panangitan, Salque Bulado, Robert Abella, Atty. Reynaldo Llego, Tony Gallara, Rick “Doe”, and Gingging Enriquez.[12] On 1 December 2003, the Provincial Prosecutor filed the corresponding information and the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. L-00727, raffled to RTC Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte presided by respondent judge. On 2 December 2003, respondent issued an order for the arrest of the persons named in the information.[13] The next day, accused moved for the inhibition of respondent from the criminal case on the ground that respondent is directly involved in the said case. Respondent thus issued an order inhibiting himself from the criminal proceedings and recommended to the Court that another judge be designated in his place.[14] The accused in Criminal Case No. L-00727 filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 80984) with the Court of Appeals, questioning: (i) the DOJ resolution ordering the filing of informations against them; (ii) the information filed; and (iii) the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge. The Court of Appeals granted the petition, nullifying the information and quashing the warrant of arrest earlier issued. It also recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a separate investigation into respondent judge’s administrative culpability for his acts of coercion and harassment and in precipitously issuing the arrest warrant despite being intimately involved in the criminal case.[15] Meanwhile, on 8 March 2004, this Court granted respondent’s application for disability retirement under Republic Act No. 910, as amended. However, payment of disability benefits was held in abeyance pending resolution of the administrative complaints against him.[16]

The OCA required respondent to file his comment on the matter,[17] and on 20 April 2004, respondent complied with the directive, denying any administrative culpability or guilt for acts of coercion, harassment, or unlawful detention of complainant.[18] He claimed that he was merely performing a ministerial function when he issued the subject arrest warrants. Besides, said warrant had not been implemented and accused could still resort to procedural remedies.[19] On 14 May, 2004, the OCA submitted its findings and recommendation, to wit: 1. This matter be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative complaint against respondent Judge;2. The charge of immorality, conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer, rape and violation of the Anti-Child Abuse Law against the respondent be DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence;3. Respondent Judge be found GUILTY of bias and abuse of authority for issuing the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. L-00727 and that he be meted with the penalty of FINE in the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.000) pesos to be deducted from his disability retirement benefits. [20] The case was referred to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose Mendoza for investigation, report and recommendation. However, Justice Mendoza prayed to be excused from conducting the investigation since he was a member of the division which decided CA-G.R. SP No. 80984. The case was then referred to Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando, likewise asked that she be allowed to recuse herself since she was the ponente in a case related to CA-G.R. SP No. 80984. The case was thus referred to Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. In his Report and Recommendation[21] dated 4 August 2005, Justice Villarama found that complainant’s Sinumpaang Pamamahayag and Apas-Sumpay Nga Pamamahayag created serious doubts as to whether respondent committed the acts complained of. There was no evidence of compulsion or duress in the execution of her affidavits of recantation. Her affidavits of retraction were executed in the presence of respected members of the community, with corroborating sworn statements from other persons. On the other hand, complainant’s counsel of record failed to present any satisfactory explanation to support the charges. He was also unable to comment on complainant’s affidavits of retraction. There being no substantial evidence to establish the commission of the acts complained of, the Investigating Justice recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint for immorality.[22] On the charge of abuse of authority, the Investigating Justice opined that respondent should be held administratively liable for issuing the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. L-00727. According to him, respondent should have voluntarily inhibited himself from the case, as per Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, his wife being one of the accused therein. Moreover, the rest of the accused were the very same persons implicated by herein complainant as those who instigated the present administrative complaint. His belated

inhibition, after he had issued the arrest warrant, is indicative of the propensity to use his office to get back at those responsible for filing the administrative charges against him. The Investigating Justice recommended the penalty of fine in the amount of P20,000.00 in accordance with Secs. 9 and 11 (B), Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.[23] We express our concurrence with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Justice. Administrative charges against members of the judiciary must be supported at least by substantial evidence,[24] or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the present case, save for the Affidavit-Complaint dated 24 July 2001, no other document or evidence was submitted to substantiate the charges of immorality, conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer, rape, and violation of the Anti-Child Abuse Law against respondent judge. More importantly, complainant herself executed sworn statements recanting her charges against respondent. As observed by the Investigating Justice, while the Complaint-Affidavit may have been executed with great detail, the affidavits of retraction are equally detailed and impressed with greater coherence and spontaneity, and supported by affidavits from people who had knowledge of the events which actually transpired. Interestingly also, even as complainant had already retracted her charges, her counsel of record, Atty. Alexander Versoza, merely stated that “when there is smoke, there is fire.”[25] Considering these, the complaint for immorality has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. Now on the issue of abuse of authority. Rule 137 of the Rules of Court mandatorily disqualifies a judge or judicial officer to sit in any case in which: (a) he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise; (b) he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law; (c) he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel; or (d) he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.[26] There is no dispute that Mrs. Margie Corpus-Macias, accused in Criminal Case No. L-00727, is the estranged wife of respondent judge. This circumstance makes it mandatory for respondent to inhibit himself from the case, but this he unfortunately did not do. He cannot exercise his discretion whether to inhibit himself or not. It was a clear case of violation of the Rules of Court. As properly observed both by the OCA and the Investigating Justice, the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not ministerial in nature, but rather requires the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate.[27] The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the judge’s personal evaluation of the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information. Only when he finds probable cause should he issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order.[28] In Criminal Case No. L-00727, however, respondent judge issued the warrant of arrest a mere day after the filing of the information charging accused therein

with grave coercion and serious illegal detention. Such undue alacrity casts doubt on the motive of respondent, especially since the accused were known to him to be the same people who instigated the present administrative case against him, and against whom he filed a civil suit for damages. Moreover, these were the same people whom respondent claims to have “axes to grind” against him. Respondent’s swift issuance of the arrest warrant suspiciously smells of vengeance and vindication. He might have been prejudiced by the malicious acts of the accused, but he should not use his position in the

judiciary for his personal concerns. In order to avoid suspicions of wrongdoing, a respect for traditional and prevailing rules must be observed and kept constantly in mind. A judge should, in fine, administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the judicial system. He must not be perceived as being a repository of arbitrary power but as one dispensing justice under the sanction of the rule of law.[29] That he inhibited himself after they moved for his inhibition cannot extenuate his culpability. At the outset, he should have inhibited himself from the case if only to avoid any doubt or suspicion of bias and partiality against the accused. Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court[30] provides that a violation of Supreme Court rules, directives or circulars is a less serious charge which

merits the penalty of either suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month not more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.[31] Because of the clear violation by respondent of the rule on mandatory inhibition, as well as the bias and abuse of authority, the recommended fine of P20,000.00 is proper. WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for immorality against respondent Judge Mariano Joaquin S. Macias is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. However, he is hereby held administratively liable for abuse of authority in issuing the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. L-00727 and for violation of Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, and FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), to be deducted from his disability benefits. SO ORDERED.

RUBEN N. SALCEDO vs JUDGE GIL G. BOLLOZOS,

R E S O L U T I O N BRION, J.:

We pass upon the verified Letter-Complaint, dated August 29, 2008, filed by Ruben N. Salcedo (complainant), charging Judge Gil G. Bollozos (respondent judge), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, with Grave Misconduct and Ignorance of the Law in the handling of SPEC. PROC. No. 2008-009, entitled “Jose Tanmalack, Jr., represented by Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan v. Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan De Oro City, and Insp. Wylen Rojo.” THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND The complaint arose from a verified handwritten petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Writ of Amparo (the petition) filed by Jose Tanmalack, Jr. against the Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, and Inspector Wylen Rojo. The complainant alleged that he is a co-owner of a parcel of land (disputed property) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. O-740 and registered in the name of Patricio Salcedo. The disputed property is about 126,112 square meters wide and is situated in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. On January 23, 2008 at around 2:30 p.m., while the complainant (together with his niece Rebecca R. Lumbay and his nephew Alan Jose P. Roa) was supervising an on-going construction over the disputed property, Tanmalack and heavily armed men arrived and forced themselves inside the fenced premises of the disputed property. The complainant averred that Tanmalack and his companions harassed and threatened to kill and to harm him and his workers; that Tanmalack uttered defamatory statements and accused him of land-grabbing; and that Tanmalack and his companions occupied the property and destroyed building materials such as G.I. sheets, lumber and other construction materials. The complainant forthwith reported the incident to the nearby police station. The police promptly responded and arrested Tanmalack and brought him in for questioning. That same afternoon at around 4:45 p.m., Tanmalack, represented by his sister, Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan, filed the petition[1] on his behalf while Tanmalack was detained by the police for employing “self-help in preventing squatters from putting up improvements in their titled property.” Clerk of Court Atty. Herlie Luis-Requerme narrated the circumstances surrounding the filing of the petition and how it came to be referred to the respondent judge’s sala, as follows: 1. In the late afternoon of January 23, 2008, a query was received by the Office regarding the procedure in filing a petition for a Writ of Amparo. We gave the information that the established procedure is to assign cases to the different branches by raffling or in urgent cases, by a special raffle upon proper motions. But since the office has not received any case of that nature yet, and as the schedule of raffling will still be in the afternoon of the

next day, it will be referred to the Executive Judge for instruction and or appropriate action;2. That since the Executive Judge was on leave, I went to consult the 1st Vice Executive Judge Evelyn Gamotin Nery. Since Judge Nery was busy at that time, I went to see 2nd Vice Executive Judge Ma. Anita Esguerra-Lucagbo;3. That I clarified from Judge Lucagbo the procedure to be adopted under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC);4. That the issue if any judge can immediately act on the petition was not clearly stated in the Rule but if the case will be referred to her as the 2nd Vice Executive Judge, she will be willing to look at the petition;5. That when I went back at the Office at a little past 5:00 P.M. already, direct from the chamber of Judge Lucagbo, I found out that a Petition for Writ of Amparo was filed at around 4:45 P.M. as stamped in the petition;6. That since I was out of the office, the Docket Clerk in charge, Mr. Rudy Exclamador, referred the case to the Administrative Officer Mary Lyn Charisse Lagamon;7. That thinking I was no longer around as the personnel to whom I left the information that I was going to the sala of 1st Vice Executive Judge Nery was not able to inform the Admin. Officer of my whereabouts, Mr. Exclamador was instructed by her to refer the case to you [referring to the respondent judge];8. That upon learning of the fact, I immediately called Mr. Exclamador and Ms. Lagamon to explain why they referred the case to your sala without any instruction from me;9. That they said that they are of the honest belief that I was no longer around; that the lawyer was insisting to refer the case immediately to a judge since it is already 5:00 P.M. and considering the novelty, urgency and importance of the case, and fearing that no judge will be left to act on the petition if they still discuss what to do, Mr. Exclamador, with the concurrence of Admin. Officer Lagamon, referred the case to you since your sala was the nearest to our office, it being adjacent to your court;10. That there is nobody from this Office who brought the handwritten petition to Judge Lucagbo nor was there any instruction from her to any of the personnel to have the petition conform to a form acceptable to the court, such fact was confirmed by Judge Lucagbo;11. That the office only acted what it deemed best under the circumstances and was not motivated by any ill motive or malice.[2] Based on the petition and answers to the clarificatory questions propounded to Tanmalack’s representative and counsel, the respondent judge immediately issued a Writ of Amparo dated January 23, 2008, directing “the police officers of Agora Police Station 3 or Insp. Wylen Rojo x x x to release immediately upon receipt of [the] writ but not later than 6:00 P.M. today, petitioner Jose Tanmalack, Jr., to the custody of Atty. Francis V. Ku.” The respondent judge also directed the police officers to file their verified return to the petition within five (5) working days, together with supporting affidavits, in conformity with Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

Around 5:30 p.m., the Writ of Amparo was served upon SPO3 Aener O. Adajar, PNP Chief Investigator. At six o’clock in the evening of that same day, the police released Tanmalack to the custody of Atty. Francis Ku. In his complaint, the complainant questions the issuance of the Writ of Amparo which he claims had been unusually issued with haste. The complainant claims that the handwritten petition did not give any ground to warrant the issuance of the Writ of Amparo; that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion, bias, and obvious partiality, and in grave disregard of the Rules and the rule of law when he acted upon and granted the letter-petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The complainant also alleges that the respondent judge “accommodated” the issuance of the Writ of Amparo because he and Atty. Francis Ku (Tanmalack’s counsel) are members of the Masonic fraternity. The respondent judge filed his Comment dated March 30, 2009, in compliance with the directive of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In his defense, he alleged: (a) [W]hen he received the petition from the Office of the Clerk of Court, he had no option but to exercise his judicial duty without any bias or partiality, nor did he consider that the petitioner’s counsel is a fraternal brother (Mason); (b) [A]lthough the petition is for the issuance of both writ of amparo and writ of habeas corpus, he deemed it more in consonance with the [Rule on the Writ of Amparo]; (c) [I]t was not improper even if the x x x petition was not raffled, and was immediately assigned to his sala by the Office of the Clerk of Court, since Par. 2, Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC states that any judge of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) can issue a writ and the said Sec. 3 further states that it can be filed on any day and at any time; (d) [T]he person who filed the petition is the sister of Mr. Tanmalack who was detained at the Agora Police Station, Cagayan de Oro City; that the issuance of the writ was a matter of great urgency because the alleged illegal deprivation of liberty was made in the late afternoon of January 23, 2008, which was a Friday, and that if the Court would not act on the petition, the detainee would certainly spend the night in jail; (e) [T]he petition, although in handwritten form, is not improper because Section 5 of the SC Circular (on the Writ of Amparo) only requires that the same be signed and verified; that he found the petition sufficient in form and in substance; (f) [A]lthough the Amparo rules mandate that a judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue, he propounded clarificatory questions on the petitioner’s representative and their counsel, thus, the following information were elicited:

1) That the property of petitioner’s family, which is under their possession and Tanmalack registered under TCT No. T-1627491, was intruded by some persons who wanted to fence the area and put up improvements by constructing “shanties” thereon; 2) That when petitioner Mr. Tanmalack prevented the intrusion it resulted to heated arguments and altercations which prompted him to go to the police station to report the incident and be blottered; 3) That when Mr. Tanmalack arrived at the police station in the late afternoon of January 23, 2008 in order to air his complaint, the intruders came and introduced themselves as the owners of the property; 4) That when Police Officer Rojo (Rojo) heard the version of these intruders and despite the protestations of petitioner and his relatives, the police did not anymore allow Mr. Tanmalack to leave the police station; and, 5) That petitioner’s counsel called up Rojo to secure the immediate release of his client from police custody but to no avail; (g) [A]fter he assiduously evaluated the aforestated facts, as well as the allegations in the petition, respondent Judge, in the exercise of his judicial function, found that the same warranted the issuance of the writ; the arrest of Mr. Tanmalack was unlawful because Rojo was not present in the area where the alleged incident happened, so that the statements of the complainants (Salcedo, Lumbay and Roa) would be hearsay; (h) [I]n the Writ of Amparo the respondents were directed to file a verified return pursuant to the rules; during the summary hearing of the petition on 25 January 2008, it was only Rojo who appeared, the alleged complainants (Salcedo, Lumbay and Roa) who caused the detention of the petitioner were absent; P/Insp. Rojo, when asked by the Court, gave the following answers: 1) That he would no longer file his Answer (which should be a verified return) on the complaint considering that the petitioner was already released; 2) That he confirmed that it was the petitioner who came first to the police station to complain, followed by the person who wanted to fence the property; the conflict between the petitioner and the other persons is on a property dispute, of which it was petitioner who is in possession; and 3) That he denied that he had arrested the petitioner and neither did he detain him but only he could not release the petitioner because of the complaint and for further evaluation. (i) [H]e noted that the police blotter did not state that petitioner brought heavily armed men with him when he allegedly harassed the complainant.

[(j) That in the summary hearing on January 25, 2008, the petitioner as well as the respondent Rojo have arrived into an agreement that the writ be considered permanent.] THE REPORT OF THE OCA The OCA informed the Court that the case was already ripe for resolution in a Report dated April 8, 2010, signed by Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez and Deputy Court Administrator Raul Bautista Villanueva. The Report likewise presented a brief factual background of the case. The OCA recommended that the administrative complaint against the respondent judge be dismissed for lack of merit. The recommendation was based on an evaluation which reads: EVALUATION: The complaint is bereft of merit. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, as in the instant case, or of a private individual or entity. Whereas in other jurisdictions the writ covers only actual violations, the Philippine version is more protective of the right to life, liberty and security because it covers both actual and threatened violations of such rights. Nowhere in the records of the instant complaint that the issuance of the writ of amparo was attended by irregularities. The detainee’s sister who filed the petition is allowed under Section 2(b) of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (SC A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC). Also, the petition was properly filed with the Regional Trial Court “where the act or omission was committed or where any of its elements occurred.” Respondent Judge, in whose sala the said petition was assigned is deemed to have complied with his oath and judicial duty when he ordered the issuance of the writ of amparo upon determination that the right to liberty of Mr. Tanmalack was being violated or threatened to be violated. These is no showing that respondent Judge, in granting the petition for a writ of amparo was motivated by bad faith, ignominy or ill will, thus, herein complainant’s allegation that respondent Judge’s act was tainted with grave abuse of discretion and authority, bias and partiality, and grave disregard of the rules, deserves scant consideration. This Office agrees with respondent Judge’s observation that “Rojo’s declaration not anymore to contest the petition and that he (Rojo) did not arrest nor detain petitioner, but admitted that he could not release the latter for further evaluation because of the complaint is an admission that he deprived [or threatened to deprive] Jose [Dy Tanmalack] of his liberty.”

OUR RULING We concur with the OCA’s recommendation that the administrative complaint against the respondent judge be dismissed for lack of merit. At the outset, we agree with the complainant that the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo in Tanmalack’s favor. Had he read Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more closely, the respondent judge would have realized that the writ, in its present form, only applies to “extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.”[3] The present case involves concerns that are purely property and commercial in nature – concerns that we have previously ruled are not covered by the Writ of Amparo.[4] In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[5] we held:

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands – requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit: “(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner; (b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation; (c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits; (d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and (f) The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.” The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. In the present case, the Writ of Amparo ought not to have been issued by the respondent judge since Tanmalack’s petition is fatally defective in substance and content, as it does not allege that he is a victim of “extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or the threats thereof.” The petition merely states that he is “under threat of deprivation of liberty with the police stating that he is not arrested but merely ‘in custody.’”[6] Whether the respondent judge could be held administratively liable for the error he committed in the present case, is, however, a question we must answer in the negative. Plainly, the errors attributed to respondent judge pertain to the exercise of his adjudicative functions. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, and corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability – civil, criminal, or administrative – for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. Settled is the rule that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies.[7] In the present case, the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo cannot be raised as an issue in the present administrative case. The proper recourse for the complainant should have been to file an appeal, from the final judgment or order of the respondent judge, to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In Bello III v. Diaz,[8] we reiterated that disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement, or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary; an inquiry into their administrative liability arising from judicial acts may be made only after other available remedies have been settled. We laid down the rationale for the rule in Flores v. Abesamis,[9] viz:

As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are, inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be. Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed. Flores resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review provided by law from court judgments or orders, on the theory that the Judges’ orders had caused him “undue injury.” This is impermissible, as this Court has already more than once ruled. Law and logic decree that “administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof.” Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of the judge can be had only if “there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and ** also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order” or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code.[10] We note, too, that although the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo, we find, as the OCA did, that there is no evidence on record that supports the complainant’s allegation that the issuance was tainted with manifest bias and partiality, bad faith, or gross ignorance of the law. The fact that the respondent judge and Atty. Francis Ku are members of the Masonic fraternity does not justify or prove that the former acted with bias and partiality. Bias and partiality can never be presumed and must be proved with clear and

convincing evidence. While palpable error may be inferred from respondent judge’s issuance of the Writ of Amparo, there is no evidence on record that would justify a finding of partiality or bias. The complainant’s allegation of partiality will not suffice in the absence of a clear and convincing proof that will overcome the presumption that the respondent judge dispensed justice according to law and evidence, without fear or favor.[11] Likewise, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a party. To hold a judge administratively accountable simply because he erred in his judgment has never been the intent of the law; reasonable competence and good faith judgments, not complete infallibility, are what the law requires. The more significant issue in this case is the complainant’s charge of gross ignorance of the law against the respondent judge. A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with laws and procedural rules. They must know the law and apply it properly in good faith. They are likewise expected to keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence. For, a judge who is plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble office and great privilege vested in him.[12] We find that the respondent judge’s error does not rise to the level of gross ignorance of the law that is defined by jurisprudence. We take judicial notice of the fact that at the time he issued the Writ of Amparo on January 23, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been effective for barely three months (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo became effective on October 24, 2007). At that time, the respondent judge cannot be said to have been fully educated and informed on the novel aspects of the Writ of Amparo. Simply stated, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo at that time cannot be said to be a simple, elementary, and well-known rule that its patent disregard would constitute gross ignorance of the law. More importantly, for full liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous; it must be established that he was motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive.[13] In the present case, the complainant failed to prove by substantial evidence that the respondent judge was motivated by bad faith and bias or partiality in the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. We take this occasion, however, to remind the respondent judge that under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge must be "the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence." A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He owes to the public and

to this Court the duty to be proficient in the law. He is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges must not only render just, correct, and impartial decisions, resolutions, and orders, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality, and integrity, for good judges are men who have mastery of the principles of law and who discharge their duties in accordance with law.[14] We mentioned all these to emphasize to the respondent judge the need to be more judicious and circumspect in the issuance of extraordinary writs such as the Writ of Amparo. We also reiterate that in an administrative proceeding, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint by substantial evidence.[15] We cannot give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his claim, as in this case, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit.[16] WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the administrative complaint against Judge Gil G. Bollozos, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, for lack of merit.

MICHAEL B. BELEN vs JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN The Case This is an administrative complaint for grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a judge filed by Michael B. Belen against Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba City, Branch 36. The Facts Complainant Michael B. Belen filed a Verified Complaint dated 7 March 2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court, charging Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen with grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a judge. According to complainant,[1] sometime in March 2004, respondent judge filed a case for Estafa against complainant’s father, Nezer D. Belen, but the same was dismissed for lack of probable cause by Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Sunega-Lagman in a Resolution dated 28 July 2004. Respondent judge filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration and Disqualif[ication]) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City, alleging, inter alia, that Sunega-Lagman was always absent during the hearings in the preliminary investigation in the estafa case. Respondent judge likewise filed a complaint for disciplinary action against Sunega-Lagman before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline, docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1700. To refute the allegations of respondent judge against Sunega-Lagman, complainant executed an Affidavit dated 19 May 2006, which was submitted by Sunega-Lagman as evidence in the CBD case. Complainant’s Affidavit stated that the allegations of respondent judge against Sunega-

Lagman were “false”; that Sunega-Lagman was present during the preliminary investigation hearings dated 14, 21 and 29 April 2004, and that she was absent only once, on 6 May 2004, when she was already on maternity leave; and that it was respondent judge who was absent during the hearings.[2] Thereafter, respondent judge allegedly started harassing and threatening complainant with the filing of several cases against the latter. On 11 January 2007, at 10:00 in the morning, complainant received a mobile phone text message from the caretaker of his piggery, informing him that respondent judge arrived and was taking pictures of the piggery. Complainant rushed to the area and saw respondent judge, accompanied by the Municipal Agriculturist and Sanitary Inspector and the Barangay Chairman, inspecting complainant’s piggery. Respondent judge also wrote several letters addressed to certain local government authorities and employees, requesting information on complainant’s piggery and poultry business; advising them of the alleged violations by the complainant of the National Building Code and certain environmental laws; and reminding the local government authorities of their duty to forestall the issuance of municipal clearance and license to complainant’s business establishment. We enumerate these letters below.[3] 1. Letter dated 15 January 2007, addressed to the Municipal Engineer of Alaminos, Laguna, requesting confirmation of the issuance by said office of construction, building and occupancy permits to “Michael B. Belen’s Piggery and Poultry in Brgy. IV and House in Sta. Rosa,” and stating that non-compliance with, or violation of the National Building Code is a criminal offense;[4] 2. A follow-up letter dated 23 January 2007, addressed to the Municipal Engineer of Alaminos, Laguna, referring to respondent judge’s previous letter dated 15 January 2007; citing provisions of the National Building Code on Building Use Affecting Health and Safety (Sec. 1.01.05), Building Permits (Sec. 1.02.03), and Inspection and Certificates of Occupancy (Sec. 1.02.05); and stating: “These statutory provisions are mandatory and any violation thereof is subject to appropriate legal sanctions. Thus, in accordance with the National Building Code and Code of Conduct of Public Officers that mandates action and reply to any complaint within 15 days from receipt, may I know your official action and reply on the matter”;[5] 3. Letter dated 15 January 2007, addressed to Mayor Samuel Bueser of Alaminos, Laguna, expressing his appreciation of the “immediate action” taken by the mayor in relation to the inspection of the piggery and poultry business establishment of complainant; enumerating the environmental laws violated by the complainant, i.e., Sec. 8 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 984, Section 3 of PD 953, Section 48 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9003, Section 49 of PD 1152, and Section 27 of Resolution No. 33, Series of 1996; stating that “With the violations of the owner and his farm workers, appropriate criminal actions shall be instituted against them;” and reminding the mayor that municipal officers are mandated by environmental laws not to issue municipal clearance and permits, and to

close business enterprises within its jurisdiction, specifically complainant’s piggery and poultry, violating environmental laws;[6] 4. A follow-up letter dated 23 January 2007, addressed to Mayor Samuel Bueser of Alaminos, Laguna, inquiring on the official action taken by the mayor in relation to respondent judge’s earlier letters and complainant’s alleged violation of environmental laws, and emphasizing the responsibility of the mayor to withhold clearances and permits from business establishments violating environmental laws;[7] 5. Letter dated 13 February 2007, addressed to Ms. Gladys D. Apostol, the Municipal Agriculturist of Alaminos, Laguna, requesting a copy of the Inspection report dated 11 January 2007;[8] and 6. Letter dated 13 February 2007, addressed to the Municipal Engineer of Alaminos, Laguna, requesting for prompt action on respondent judge’s previous letters dated 15 and 23 January 2007, with a warning that the failure of the said office to reply to respondent judge’s inquiries will compel the latter to file administrative and criminal complaints before the Office of the Ombudsman pursuant to Section 5 of RA 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.[9] All of the letters enumerated above bore a letterhead indicating respondent judge’s official government position, viz: From the Chamber of: Medel Arnaldo B. BelenPresiding Judge, RTC-Branch 364th Judicial region, Calamba City Respondent judge also filed a criminal case against complainant for violations of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 953, docketed as I.S. No. 07-246/07-247, before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna.[10] In his Comment,[11] respondent judge alleged that he never neglected his duties as a judge; that as a landowner and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines, he had the right to file criminal complaints against violators of environmental laws to protect the environment; and that he had the right, under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6173, to secure public information from government offices, especially about the complainant who was violating numerous laws. Respondent judge also claimed that he did not use the court’s official stationery or letterhead in his correspondence with government authorities and employees of Alaminos, Laguna. He emphasized that the court’s official letterhead should appear as:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESREGIONAL TRIAL COURT4TH JUDICIAL REGIONBRANCH 36CALAMBA CITY Respondent judge claimed that he used his personal stationery or letterhead, and signed the same in his private, not judicial, capacity. The OCA’s Report and Recommendation On 11 March 2008, the OCA submitted its Report[12] finding respondent judge guilty of violating Section 4, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The OCA stated that while respondent judge did not actually use the court’s official letterhead but his own personal stationery, his letters indicated that he is the presiding judge of an RTC in Calamba City, and even stated that his letters were “from the chambers of” the presiding judge. It is apparent from the acts of respondent judge that he intended to use the prestige of his judicial position to promote his personal interest. The OCA recommended that (a) the administrative case against respondent judge be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (b) that respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen be fined in the amount of P11,000 for violation of Section 4, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.[13] In a Resolution dated 13 August 2008, the Supreme Court resolved, among others, to re-docket the administrative complaint against respondent judge as a regular administrative matter.[14] Subsequently, the OCA, in compliance with the Court’s Resolution,[15] designated Court of Appeals Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia as the investigating justice of the administrative case. The Findings and Recommendationof the Investigating Justice Investigating Justice Ramon R. Garcia found respondent judge to have violated Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary when he used a letterhead indicating his position as the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36. According to Justice Garcia, while the computer-printed letterhead of respondent judge is not the official letterhead of the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, the use of the same reflects respondent judge’s designation and

position in the judiciary, and indicates that the letters came from the “chambers” of the presiding judge of Branch 36. Undoubtedly, respondent judge was trying to use the prestige of his judicial office for his own personal interest. Justice Garcia agreed with the OCA in recommending the imposition of the administrative penalty of fine in the amount of P11,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. The Court’s Ruling The findings and recommendations of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA are well-taken. Respondent judge wrote letters to government authorities and employees to secure public information regarding complainant’s piggery and poultry business; to inform addressees of the laws allegedly being violated by complainant; and to remind the addressees of their duties as government officials or employees and warn them of the possible legal effects of neglect of public duties. In writing these letters, respondent judge’s use of his personal stationery with letterhead indicating that he is the Presiding Judge of RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, and stating that the letter was “from [his] chambers,” clearly manifests that respondent judge was trying to use the prestige of his office to influence said government officials and employees, and to achieve with prompt and ease the purpose for which those letters were written. In other words, respondent judge used said letterhead to promote his personal interest. This is violative of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. We quote these sections below: CANON 1INDEPENDENCE x x x SECTION. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. CANON 4PROPRIETY Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

x x x In Oktubre v. Velasco,[16] this Court held that respondent judge’s act of sending several letters bearing his sala’s letterhead, in connection with an apparent dispute in the administration of the estates of his relatives, clearly showed the judge’s intent to use the prestige of his judicial office, and hence, violative of Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[17] The Court considered respondent Judge Velasco’s excuse for using his sala’s letterhead, i.e., that he wanted to protect the interest of his maternal co-heirs in the subject properties, as flimsy, and emphasized that respondent judge had no business using his sala’s letterhead for private matters, as the same should be used only for official correspondence.[18] Similarly, in Rosauro v. Kallos,[19] it was held that respondent judge’s use of his sala’s official stationery in his private correspondence with complainant and his counsel constitutes violation of Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court concluded that: “By using his sala’s stationery other than for official purposes, respondent Judge evidently used the prestige of his office to benefit Guerrero (and himself) in violation of Rule 2.03 of the Code.”[20] In Ladignon v. Garong,[21] respondent judge’s act of using the official letterhead of his court and signing the same using the word “judge” in his letter-complaint to the First United Methodist Church in Michigan, USA, was held to be violative of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics and Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court held, thus:We agree with the Report that what is involved here is the rule that “Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities”. (Canon 4, Section 1, New Code of Judicial Conduct) Indeed, members of the Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their official duties as well as in their personal behavior and everyday life. No position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness on the individual than a seat in the Judiciary. x x x x x x x x x As the Report stated, [repondent judge’s] use of the letterhead and his designation as a Judge in a situation of potential dispute gave “the appearance that there is an implied or assured consent of the court to his cause.” This circumstance, to our mind, was what marked the respondent Judge’s use of his letterhead and title as improper. In other words, the respondent Judge’s transgression was not per se in the use of the letterhead, but in not being very careful and discerning in considering the circumstances surrounding the use of his letterhead and his title.

x x x x x x the use of a letterhead should not be considered independently of the surrounding circumstances of the use - the underlying reason that marks the use with the element of

“impropriety” or “appearance of impropriety”. In the present case, the respondent Judge crossed the line of propriety when he used his letterhead to report a complaint involving an alleged violation of church rules and, possibly, of Philippine laws. Coming from a judge with the letter addressed to a foreign reader, such report could indeed have conveyed the impression of official recognition or notice of the reported violation.

The same problem that the use of letterhead poses, occurs in the use of the title of “Judge” or “Justice” in the correspondence of a member of the Judiciary. While the use of the title is an official designation as well as an honor that an incumbent has earned, a line still has to be drawn based on the circumstances of the use of the appellation. While the title can be used for social and other identification purposes, it cannot be used with the intent to use the prestige of his judicial office to gainfully advance his personal, family or other pecuniary interests. Nor can the prestige of a judicial office be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, or to convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. (Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct) To do any of these is to cross into the prohibited field of impropriety.[22]

In view of the foregoing, we find respondent judge guilty of violation of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. Section 11(B), in relation to Section 9(4) of Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,[23] provides that violation of Supreme Court rules constitutes a less-serious charge punishable by any of the following sanctions:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. We agree with the recommendation of the investigating justice and the OCA that respondent judge, for his transgression, be meted a penalty of fine amounting to P11,000, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, we find Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Branch 36, GUILTY of violation of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, and

FINE him P11,000, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO vs HON. ERASTO D. SALCEDO PER CURIAM: These are consolidated administrative cases filed against Judge Erasto D. Salcedo (respondent judge), Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Tagum City, charging him with violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics.[1] Administrative Matter No. RTJ-03-1781 In a series of letters-complaints dated January 2, 2001,[2] July 16, 2001,[3] August 28, 2001[4] and November 23, 2001[5] filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), George P. Mercado (complainant) charged respondent judge as summarized below. In the letter dated January 2, 2001, the respondent judge was accused of bias and gross partiality in handling the investigation of the administrative case filed against Judge Napy Agayan (Judge Agayan) of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kapalong-Talaingod, Davao del Norte. The complainant alleged that the respondent judge mishandled the investigation and based his “findings of facts” on “gossip and rumors”[6] to aid a fellow judge. On January 16, 2001, the complainant formally charged the respondent judge of committing these unethical infractions: (1) Mishandling of, or rendering a false report to the Supreme Court on, his investigation of Judge Agayan; (2) Grave misconduct and impropriety in possessing and using a stolen Pajero vehicle with knowledge, actually and constructively, that it was a subject of an Anti-Fencing Law case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11728, which he had earlier dismissed; and (3) Serious irregularities, dishonesty or grave misconduct relating to the handling and improper execution of the final decision in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99, entitled Soriano Fruits Corporation and Others versus Department of Agrarian Reform and/or Land Bank of the Philippines, where the respondent judge modified the final judgment on the amount of just compensation from which the respondent judge benefited in the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00). The letter-complaint dated August 28, 2001 was filed by the complainant to supplement his earlier allegations. The complainant alleged that in connection with the stolen Pajero, the respondent judge was one of the respondents in a criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6539) and/or the Anti-Fencing Law of 1973 (Presidential Decree [P.D.] 1612) filed by the Philippine National Police. In Agrarian Case

Nos. 31-99 to 51-99, the respondent judge showed partiality in hastily resolving the motions filed by the plaintiff, but not the motions filed by the defendant. Finally, the letter-complaint dated November 23, 2001 was a reinforcement of the allegations in the earlier letters-complaints. The complainant additionally related that the use by the respondent judge of the stolen Pajero became a subject of media coverage. The Office of the Chief Justice referred the letters-complaints dated January 2, 2001 and July 16, 2001 to Hon. Zenaida N. Elepaño as Acting Court Administrator.[7] Subsequently, then Court Administrator (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., in an Indorsement dated January 21, 2002, required the respondent judge to file his comment on the letter-complaint dated November 23, 2001.[8] The respondent judge duly filed his Comment (dated February 22, 2002[9]), which the OCA received on February 27, 2002. The OCA summarized the respondent judge’s position as follows: Re: Investigation of Judge Napy Agayan. Judge Salcedo contends that he has already submitted his recommendation to this Office and Mr. Mercado, through his complaint, would like to interfere and dictate what his recommendation would be. x x x Re: Stolen Pajero found in his possession. Judge Salcedo contends that Criminal Case No. 11728 against Leopoldo Gonzaga was dismissed in 1999 on motion of the prosecution because during the reinvestigation, the witness of the prosecution did not appear. He adds that from this dismissal the Traffic Management Group did not file any motion for reconsideration. Worse, the TMG authorized the change of color of the vehicle and allowed the buyer to use it for years. Judge Salcedo avers that in June 2001, the owner lent him the vehicle and he did not know that it was the same vehicle subject of Criminal Case No. 11728, otherwise, he would not have used it for reason of delicadeza. According to him, there was no way of identifying the vehicle because the TMG authorized the change of color. The vehicle was green during the pendency of the criminal case while it was dirty white. Re: Irregularities in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99. Judge Salcedo claims that he was designated as Acting Presiding Judge of the Special Agrarian Court in July 2000. He maintains that when he took over the said cases, the decision therein were already final and executory. Judge Salcedo asserts that he issued an order for the execution of the judgment which function is purely ministerial. He adds that if there was something wrong with the valuation of the land then the counsel for Land Bank should have questioned the same. As for the accusation that he received P3,000,000.00 for which he was able to construct a house in Tagum City, Judge Salcedo contends that the said

house was constructed through a bank loan and the proceeds from the sale of a prime lot in Cagayan de Oro City.[10] The complainant filed a Reply dated March 12, 2002.[11] He argued that the handling of the reinvestigation of the Anti-Fencing case against Leopoldo Gonzaga was hastily concluded and resolved by Prosecutor Matias Aquiatan, who conducted the reinvestigation merely two days after the order to reinvestigate was issued by the respondent judge. The complainant further advanced the view that the respondent judge merely relied on the prosecutor’s findings and dismissed the case with undue haste. According to the complainant, Leopoldo Gonzaga also had three (3) pending cases in the respondent judge’s sala at that time. The complainant also pointed out that two (2) checks for P800,000.00 were drawn from the payments made by Land Bank in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99. The proceeds of one of these checks were given to the wife of the respondent judge. Administrative Case No. RTJ-03-1782 On December 18, 2001, State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (State Prosecutor Velasco) brought to the attention of then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. the indictment of the respondent judge for violation of P.D. No. 1612 and recommended that appropriate administrative charges be initiated by the Supreme Court against him for violations of the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.[12] State Prosecutor Velasco stated: …undersigned finds no cogent reason why Respondent JUDGE SALCEDO chose to use a vehicle which was the subject of a criminal case before his very own sala. There is no proof or evidence whatsoever that the Respondent Judge forgot that the alleged owner of the subject vehicle (Respondent LEOPOLDO GONZAGA) previously appeared before him as respondent in a criminal case. He could never forget it because the authorities apprehended him, Respondent JUDGE SALCEDO even showed them a copy of his very own July 7, 1999 Decision “exonerating” GONZAGA from the crime of Anti-Fencing. His contention that he did not know that he was using the very same vehicle (subject of the previous criminal complaint before his court) because its color has been changed is fallacious x x x Respondent JUDGE SALCEDO to be more cautious, out of delicadeza, in his dealing with GONZAGA, assuming for the sake of argument that he acted in good faith.[13] In a Resolution dated April 10, 2002, we referred this administrative matter to the OCA and the respondent judge filed his Answer on August 30, 2002.[14] In addition to the arguments he had already raised, the respondent judge posited that the whole incident was a smear campaign engineered against him by a carnapping syndicate operating in Manila-Mindanao. The respondent judge also posited that there was no impropriety in using the subject vehicle since it was no longer in custodia legis as Criminal Case No. 11728 had already been dismissed.

Thereafter, we referred the administrative cases to Justice Noel G. Tijam[15] (Justice Tijam) of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation. The referred cases involved: (a) The respondent judge’s investigation of Judge Agayan, his possession of a stolen Pajero and the alleged irregularities he committed in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99; (b) The suspension of Judge Salcedo pending the outcome of the instant case; (c) The dismissal of the complaint of George Mercado dated April 22, 2002 for grave abuse of authority for being subjudice;[16] and (d) The referral of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 11728 to the Department of Justice for it’s appropriate action on the possible administrative liability of Prosecutor Matias Aquitan. Pending investigation of these administrative cases before the CA, several significant developments took place. First, the respondent judge retired from the Judiciary on November 25, 2003. Second, the complainant was killed by unidentified men on April 14, 2004 and was substituted in the case by his wife and children.[17] Lastly, the respondent judge himself was killed on July 26, 2009. CA Report and Recommendation Justice Tijam found the respondent judge guilty of dishonesty, inefficiency, incompetency and violation of Rules 1.01, 2.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Justice Tijam reported: FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION[18] IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY RESPONDENT JUDGE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST THE LATE MTC JUDGE NAPY AGAYAN AND HIS COURT PERSONNEL The 1st Indorsement dated June 6, 2000 referring the complaint against Judge Agayan and his staff to the Respondent Judge expressly directed the Respondent Judge to investigate therein respondents’ irregular attendance in court. Hence, even if Minda Amar was not specifically named by Complainant Mercado in his first letter-complaint, the fact that the charges involved the alleged repeated absence not only of Judge Agayan, but also of the personnel assigned in Judge Agayan’s court, Respondent Judge’s investigation should have also included the court attendance of Minda Amar, the Clerk of Court. x x x

. . . In the course of his investigation, the Respondent Judge would have discovered the fact of Minda Amar’s prolonged absences. However, Respondent Judge failed to make any findings in this regard. Neither was there a statement that Clerk of Court Minda Amar was absent during said period of investigation and/or that her absences were authorized and approved by Judge Agayan. Instead, the Respondent Judge made a sweeping declaration that Complainant Mercado’s charges of absenteeism against Judge Agayan’s court personnel were unfounded. There is no evidence that Respondent Judge examined the Court personnel’s daily time records . . . Indubitably, Respondent Judge was negligent and inefficient, if not dishonest, in his investigation of the administrative complaint filed against Judge Agayan and his court personnel. For this reason, the Respondent Judge must be held liable. x x x SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE MATTER OF THE STOLEN PAJERO VEHICLE[19] x x x . . . although the criminal case against the Respondent Judge for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law was dismissed, the Respondent Judge could still be held liable for his improper conduct pursuant to Rules 1.01[20] and 2.01[21] of the Code Judicial Conduct . . . and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics[22] [Emphasis theirs] x x x In this case, Respondent Judge displayed conduct that fell short of the standards expected of a magistrate of the law. Respondent Judge failed to be more circumspect in his dealings with Leopoldo Gonzaga.Leopoldo Gonzaga was once an accused before Respondent Judge’s sala in a criminal case for violation of the anti-fencing law which was later dismissed by the Respondent Judge. From this fact alone, any association which Respondent Judge may have with Leopoldo Gonzaga would be a cause for suspicion. When Respondent Judge borrowed the subject vehicle from the accused, he already displayed improper and reproachable conduct. The fact that the vehicle lent to Respondent Judge was the same Pajero vehicle which was the subject of the dismissed criminal case makes the act more unethical. Respondent tried to justify that it was only after Gonzaga assured him that the Pajero was not a carnapped vehicle that he allowed himself to use it. This is inexcusable. Respondent Judge was wrong when he borrowed from the accused the same vehicle subject matter of the criminal case which was dismissed and decided in the accused’s favor.

Respondent Judge failed to comport himself in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public. x x x x x x THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION[23] IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSOLIDATED AGRARIAN CASES x x x Complainant Mercado suggested that the Respondent Judge benefited from the awarded commissioner’s fee. Complainant Mercado presented copies of the 3 cashier’s checks and the deposit purportedly showing how Respondent Judge profited from said fees. However, this claim is completely without factual basis. The complainant failed to adduce any substantial, direct and convincing evidence to substantiate his allegation that Respondent Judge materially benefited from the transaction. At most, such allegation is a mere suspicion or conjecture. x x x . . . unless there is direct and convincing evidence which will prove Respondent Judge materially benefited from the transaction, the Respondent judge cannot be held guilty of said charge. However, . . . Respondent Judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law in according and/or modifying a final and executory decision. As settled, when the judge’s inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds, or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. x x x Respondent Judge had clearly exhibited gross ignorance of the law when he amended the already final decision… He is therefore guilty of violating Rule 3.01[24] of the Code of Judicial Ethics. Justice Tijam recommended the imposition of the following penalties: (a) First cause of action – a fine of P40,000.00;(b) Second cause of action – a fine of P20,000.00;(c) Third cause of action – a fine in the amount of P20,000.00.

The Court’s Ruling After considering the CA Report and the entire records, we find the Report to be substantially supported by the evidence on record, and by applicable law and jurisprudence. We therefore adopt the findings and recommendations of the CA Report, subject to the modifications indicated below. Administrative cases against judges stem from the time-honored constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust. This principle requires a judge, like any other public servant and more so because of the sensitivity of his position, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty and integrity;[25] his high and exalted position in the Judiciary requires him to observe exacting standards of morality, decency and competence. As the visible representation of the law and given his task of dispensing justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and confidence of the people.[26] He must conduct himself in a manner characterized by propriety and decorum; like Ceasar’s wife, he must be above suspicion.[27] As we held in Padua v. Paz:[28] Court personnel charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, bear a heavy responsibility in insuring that their conduct is always beyond reproach. The preservation of the integrity of the judicial process is of paramount importance. All those occupying offices in the judiciary should at all times be aware that they are accountable to the people. They must serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives. The records show that respondent judge failed to live up to these exacting standards. Investigation of Judge Agayan and his court personnel In his report dated August 2, 2002 (in compliance with the OCA directive to investigate Judge Agayan), the respondent judge stated that the complaint against Judge Agayan and his court staff for absenteeism and irregular attendance had no merit. The respondent judge related that he went twice to the office of Judge Agayan to ascertain the veracity of the complaint and found that Judge Agayan was really sickly because of a heart condition that compelled him to take leaves of absence.[29] The respondent judge claimed that since the complainant failed to specify the particular dates when Judge Agayan failed to report to work, he could not ascertain whether his absences had been authorized. The respondent judge also stated that he personally inquired from other offices in the Municipality of Kapalong, Davao del Norte, from lawyers, and from party-litigants with pending cases in the sala of Judge Agayan; he found that no complaint from party-litigants in the Municipality of Kapalong had been made involving the failure to attend to official transactions due to the absence of Court personnel. Neither was there any complaint from lawyers about proceedings “grinding to a halt.” Like party-litigants, local officials are more concerned in the speedy disposition of cases when their constituents are involved. Yet, not a single local official made a complaint.[30]

The respondent judge, in his Comment dated February 22, 2002, emphasized that the present complaint was simply an undue interference by the complainant in his recommendation in Judge Agayan’s case. In its investigation, the CA found evidence refuting the statements made by the respondent judge in his report to the OCA. One of these was the Certification dated February 6, 2003 issued by Jaime Mondejar, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Kapalong-Talaingod, Davao del Norte, attesting that one Minda Amar, the Clerk of Court in Judge Agayan’s sala, had not reported for work prior to and during the dates the respondent judge reportedly conducted his investigation.[31] The CA investigation also found no evidence that the respondent judge ever examined the daily time records of Minda Amar and the court personnel assigned to Judge Agayan’s sala. Justice Tijam noted that since the act complained of was absenteeism, the investigator’s first course of action should have been to check and verify the daily time records of the concerned personnel; from such examination the respondent judge would have known of the prolonged absences of Minda Amar and others. Likewise, the respondent judge would have noticed Minda Amar’s absence when he went to the sala of Judge Agayan on two occasions. These incidents, however, were not mentioned in the respondent judge’s report. In addition to these findings, we note that the respondent judge was similarly remiss in ascertaining Judge Agayan’s absences. The respondent judge merely relied on the leave of absence filed by Judge Agayan for October 8, 1997, and did not at all consider the latter’s absences, subject of the complaint, and the fact that the respondent judge conducted his investigation only in February 2000. At the very least, the gap of more than two (2) years between the leave of absence on record and the investigation of Judge Agayan’s absences should have alerted the respondent judge to examine the former’s records in the intervening period, particularly the period immediately prior to the complaint. The respondent judge failed to do this. We observe, too, that in the “course of his investigation,” he did not appear to have asked Judge Agayan about his absences in any formal inquiry or, at the very least, in an interview. No record appears in the respondent judge’s report on Judge Agayan’s position on the matter under investigation. A close scrutiny of the report in fact shows that the respondent judge, instead of making an objective report on the results of his investigation, tried to downplay and deflect the issue of absenteeism and irregular attendance by stating that nobody complained of the delay in the disposition of cases due to the absence and irregular attendance of Judge Agayan and his staff.[32] From all these, what appears clear to us is that the respondent judge conducted a very superficial investigation, if what he did can be labelled as an investigation at all. Based on this shallow effort, he prepared a slanted report that could not but lead to the exoneration of Judge Agayan. These actions tell us that the respondent judge deliberately covered up Judge Agayan’s absences and irregular attendance. The motivation for all these is not hard to discern as it can be read between the lines in the respondent judge’s report, considered in light of the attendant facts. He did all these under the mistaken notion of aiding a fellow judge, who was allegedly too sickly to fully perform his judicial duties. In rendering this

assistance, the respondent judge also overlooked the absences and irregular attendance of the court staff of Judge Agayan. The respondent judge apparently forgot that his first and foremost duty was to conduct a thorough and objective investigation and to make a complete report of his findings regardless of his personal sentiments and beliefs. The task assigned to him was an assignment involving trust and the exercise of his functions as a judge. An administrative investigation is an essential component in the judicial machinery for the administrative supervision of courts and court personnel; it is a key process in determining violations of the norms of conduct and standards of service in the judiciary. The respondent judge, therefore, not only failed to do his duty, but violated as well the trust reposed in him as a judge. The absenteeism of judges or court employees and/or their irregular attendance at work is a serious charge that, if proven, may warrant the imposition of the penalty of dismissal or suspension from service.[33] Unauthorized absence and irregular attendance are detrimental to the dispensation of justice and, more often than not, result in undue delay in the disposition of cases; they also translate to waste of public funds when the absent officials and employees are nevertheless paid despite their absence. As heretofore mentioned, the Supreme Court regulates the conduct of court officials and employees and it acts through its subordinates, among them in this case, the respondent judge. His responsibility in this administrative supervision is direct by virtue of the delegation made by this Court. By conducting a superficial investigation and by his slanted findings that caused the OCA to recommend the dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge Agayan and his court personnel, the Court’s administrative machinery failed; the respondent judge’s intent to shield another judge, resulting in the lack of objectivity of his report, deprived the Court of the opportunity to act properly on the reported violations of the norms of conduct of judges and court employees. For failing to faithfully perform the tasks assigned to him, the respondent committed dishonesty, inefficiency, and serious misconduct in violation of Canon 3 and Rule 3.08 of Canon 3, both of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which state: Canon 3. A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE. Rule 3.08 – A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel. We also find that the respondent judge violated Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states that “[a] judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,” in relation to Canon 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which requires that a judge’s conduct be above reproach and that he administer justice according to law. This means that a judge, in dispensing justice,

“should apply the law impartially, independently, honestly, and in a manner perceived by the public to be impartial, independent and honest.”[34] Serious misconduct, as defined, refers to weighty and serious transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.[35] It warrants dismissal from the service when the judicial act is corrupt and inspired by an intention to violate the law, and when it translates to wrongful intention rather than mere error of judgment.[36] In this case, by giving premium to personal relations and personal feelings rather than to the faithful discharge of his duty as investigating judge, the respondent judge acted dishonestly and inefficiently, coupled with a deliberate and wrongful intent to perform his duties unfaithfully. This is no less a serious misconduct than a corrupt act undertaken for monetary gains; one as well as the other eroded public confidence in a judge’s ability to render justice.[37] The Possession and Use of a Stolen Vehicle In his defense on this issue, the respondent judge claimed that the case was filed by the complainant merely to harass him. He also claimed good faith and lack of knowledge that the vehicle he had borrowed from Leopoldo Gonzaga was the same vehicle involved in the Anti-Fencing case that he dismissed in 1999. The act of borrowing a vehicle by a judge or any court employee is not per se a violation of judicial norms and standards established for court personnel, as borrowing is a legitimate and neutral act that can happen in everyday life. However, judges and court employees – by the nature of their functions and of the norms and standards peculiar to their positions – live their lives under restrictions not otherwise imposed on others; specifically, they cannot simply borrow in situations when this act may or can affect the performance of their duties because of the nature of the thing borrowed or the identity of the borrower, or in situations when borrowing would involve ethical questions under express rules. In this case, the complaint alleged that what the respondent judge borrowed was in fact a vehicle that was the subject of a previous litigation before his sala; the respondent judge borrowed, too, from a lender who still had cases before his sala. We hold, based on our examination and analysis of the records, that the respondent judge went over the dividing line that separates permissible from impermissible borrowing. First, during his cross-examination before the CA, the respondent judge admitted that he knew that the vehicle he borrowed was owned by Leopoldo Gonzaga, who was the accused in the Anti-Fencing case previously before him.[38] The respondent judge could not have avoided this admission given the surrounding circumstances of the case; the vehicle in the Anti-Fencing case was a Pajero, while the vehicle he borrowed from Leopoldo Gonzaga was also a Pajero;[39] while the color of the vehicle had been changed from green to dirty white, it was shown that the vehicle consistently carried the same plate number – “UTN

571”;[40] the respondent judge could not have missed the identity of the vehicle considering his admission that the Pajero was under the court’s custody for several months.[41] Second, the records show that the respondent judge’s initial claim of lack of knowledge is not true. In the preliminary investigation conducted by State Prosecutor Velasco in the Anti-Fencing case involving the Pajero, the respondent judge, when apprehended by policemen, exhibited a court decision he penned in 1999 dismissing the Anti-Fencing case against Leopoldo Gonzaga for the same vehicle.[42] This incident, which the respondent judge never refuted, clearly indicated that he knew that the vehicle he possessed and used, despite its change of color, was the same vehicle involved in the 1999 Anti-Fencing case that came before him. Third, the unrefuted statement of the complainant in his Affidavit (Direct Examination)[43] filed before the CA states: I know for a fact that Mr. Leopoldo Gonzaga had several cases pending in the two (2) salas presided by Executive Judge Salcedo . . . Also, I know for a fact that before the Criminal Case No. 11728 . . . was dismissed by Executive Judge Erasto D. Salcedo, several cases of Mr. Leopoldo Gonzaga had been pending in the sala of Judge Salcedo. I also know for a fact that Executive Judge Erasto D. Salcedo inhibited himself from the cases of Mr. Leopoldo Gonzaga when there was a question raised on the propriety of his borrowing the Pajero from Mr. Gonzaga, a court litigant in his sala, during the pendency of this Administrative case. [Emphasis theirs] Thus, the respondent judge not only borrowed a vehicle that was the subject of an Anti-Fencing case before him; he also borrowed it from a lender who had other pending cases before him. In fact, he had to inhibit himself from hearing these cases because of the pendency of the present administrative cases. Under the circumstances, the respondent judge is liable for serious misconduct, given his repeated and deliberate intention to disregard and violate the legal norms of conduct governing his behavior and action as a judge. He committed serious misconduct, first, in using and possessing a vehicle with the knowledge that it was the subject of an anti-fencing case previously before him; and second, he borrowed this vehicle from a litigant who had pending cases before his sala. Both the character of the vehicle borrowed and the identity of the lender precluded him from borrowing and using Leopoldo Gonzaga’s Pajero. While the criminal case filed against the respondent judge by State Prosecutor Velasco was dismissed by the Department of Justice, we agree with Justice Tijam that the respondent judge’s acts at least constitute irresponsible and improper conduct whose effect is to erode public confidence in the judiciary.[44] As aptly stated by Justice Tijam, the respondent judge’s act compromised the image, integrity and uprightness of the courts of law;[45] it cast suspicion not only in his own impartiality, but also in the impartiality and integrity of his judicial office, thereby impairing public trust in the exercise of his judicial functions.

In several cases of the same import, the Court penalized a judge for highly improper conduct. In Cabreana v. Avelino,[46] the Court castigated the respondent judge who hitched a ride in the car of a party-litigant in going to and from the place of the ocular inspection. We ruled that the respondent judge’s act exposed him and his office to suspicion and impaired the trust and faith of the people in the administration of justice. In Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana,[47] we admonished the judge to be circumspect in his conduct and dealings with lawyers who had pending cases before him. It was established that the judge displayed before the public his close familiarity with one of the lawyers who appeared before him and whose car the judge sometimes borrowed. We explained in Yu-Asensi v. Villanueva that the duty to avoid improper conduct or the appearance of impropriety becomes more crucial when one is a trial judge who has constant dealings with the public:[48] …[W]ithin the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an important and visible symbol of government especially considering that as opposed to appellate courts, trial judges are those directly in contact with the parties, their counsel and the communities which the judiciary is bound to serve. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, a judge must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. x x x it is essential that judges, like Caesar's wife, should be above suspicion.The evidence adduced in this charge showed that the respondent judge violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 2.01, Canon 2, both of the Code of Judicial Conduct, in failing to maintain the appearance of integrity and in failing to engage in conduct to promote public confidence in the judiciary. Likewise, he violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics relating to the avoidance of impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all the judge’s activities, official or otherwise. The Execution of a Final Judgment inthe Consolidated Agrarian Cases The pertinent portion of the joint decision dated February 7, 2000 rendered by the Special Agrarian Court in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99 reads: WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises duly considered, the Court hereby renders its judgment fixing, as it has judiciously determined, the just compensation for the landholdings and the improvements of all the herein petitioners in all these above-captioned docketed agrarian cases, as follows: First – Hereby fixing, as determined, the just compensation of herein petitioners’ aggregate landholdings of 123.4629 hectares hereby fixed and determined at

P25,405,553.55, plus the fixed and determined just compensation for the existing improvements thereon of P32,800,000.00, or a total of P58,205,553.55; and proper-computed adjustment to make such valuation at par with current true value of the Philippine Peso vis-à-vis the US Dollar, said upgraded amount in its upgraded value totals P89,547,005.46; and further adding thereto the computed interests pegged at 6% per annum, which amounted to P21,986,680.68, the total amount of just compensation which Respondent-DAR through LBP must pay, jointly and severally, to petitioners for their landholdings and improvements would be, as it is hereby fixed in the aggregate amount of P111,533,686.14; x x x The respondent judge contends that he merely acted on the motion filed by the landowners who requested adjustments in enforcing the final judgment considering the statement in the dispositive portion of the judgment that allowed adjustments based on the current true value of the Philippine Peso vis-à-vis the US Dollar. In his findings, Justice Tijam observed that the adjustment contemplated in the joint decision was already included in the dispositive portion, making it unnecessary for the respondent judge to make any additional adjustment. We also note that this joint decision, after having become final and executory, was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment of the Special Agrarian Court on May 3, 2000.[49] It was not until October 26, 2000 that the respondent judge made further “adjustment” of the judgment amount when he acted on the motion filed by the landowners.[50] The respondent judge ought to have known that the joint decision was already final and executory and could no longer be disturbed when he made his adjustments. This legal reality, known as the rule of immutability of judgment, is an elementary principle of law and procedure. Once a judgment becomes final, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the Highest Court of the land.[51] The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors, or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries, which cause no prejudice to any party, and where the judgment is void.[52] To be sure, the respondent judge’s ground for modifying the joint decision is not among these recognized exceptions. For modifying a final and executory decision in the course of its execution, we find the respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Where the law is straightforward and its application to the facts plainly evident, not to know the law or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[53] The respondent judge violated Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates professional competence on the part of a judge. A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence;[54] otherwise,

he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts.[55] Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.[56] The Penalty The retirement of the respondent judge and death of both the complainant and the respondent judge pending the investigation of these administrative cases are not deterrents to the resolution on the merits of the complaints and to the imposition of the sanctions demanded by the circumstances. Jurisprudence holds that the death of the complainant does not warrant the withdrawal of the charges against the respondent nor does this development render the complaint moot; the complainant is treated only as a witness in this type of proceedings.[57] On the other hand, the death of the respondent in an administrative case, as a rule, does not preclude a finding of administrative liability. The recognized exceptions to this rule are: first, when the respondent has not been heard and continuation of the proceedings would deny him of his right to due process; second, where exceptional circumstances exist in the case leading to equitable and humanitarian considerations; and third, when the kind of penalty imposed or imposable would render the proceedings useless.[58] None of these exceptional circumstances are present in the case. Thus, despite the above supervening events, we can still impose the penalty of fine against the respondent judge deductible from his retirement benefits. In this case, we find that the infractions he committed all constitute serious charges warranting the imposition of fine in the amount of P20,000.00 to P40,000.00 range.[59] Considering the several violations he committed and the gravity and circumstances of these infractions, we find that the maximum amount of fine should be imposed on each charge. In so ruling, we note that this is not the first administrative infraction committed by the respondent judge; he had previously been fined P10,000.00 for undue delay in rendering decisions or orders.[60] On the first charge (false investigation report on Judge Agayan), we find the respondent judge guilty of dishonesty, inefficiency, and serious misconduct. He violated the provisions of Rule 2.01 of Canon 2, Canon 3 and Rule 3.08 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; and Canons 3 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, classifies dishonesty and gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as serious charges. We impose a fine of P40,000.00 on the respondent judge on this charge.[61] On the second charge (use and possession of the vehicle of a litigant before his sala), the respondent judge is guilty of serious misconduct and impropriety as provided in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 2 and Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Considering the compounded administrative offenses, he is meted the maximum fine of P40,000.00.[62] For violation of Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (in the execution of the decision of an agrarian case), the respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law for which the maximum fine of P40,000.00 is imposed. Gross ignorance of law is considered

a serious charge that warrants the imposition of the penalties provided under Section 11 (A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.[63] WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Judge Erasto D. Salcedo GUILTY of the following administrative offenses: 1. Dishonesty, inefficiency and serious misconduct and violation of Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 and Rule 3.08 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; and Canons 3 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. We impose a FINE of P40,000.00. 2. Serious misconduct and impropriety in violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 2.01of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as well as Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He is meted a FINE of P40,000.00.

3. Gross ignorance of the law under Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, for which a FINE of P40,000.00 is imposed. The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby ordered to deduct the amount of One Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P120,000.00) from the retirement benefits due to Judge Erasto D. Salcedo, and to proceed with the processing and release of these benefits, unless there are other lawful causes for withholding them. Finally, we refer to the Department of Justice for appropriate action the possible administrative liability of Prosecutor Matias Aquiatan arising from the imputations made by the complainant that he committed a hasty reinvestigation of Leopoldo Gonzaga in Criminal Case No. 11728.

MARGIE CORPUS MACIAS vs MARIANO JOAQUIN S. MACIAS This involves an administrative complaint[1] filed by complainant Margie C. Macias charging her husband, Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Judge Macias), with immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint was filed on March 7, 2001, when respondent was still sitting as the presiding judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte. Complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, respondent engaged in an illicit liaison and immoral relationship with a certain Judilyn Seranillos (Seranillos), single and in her early 20s. The relationship continued until the time of the filing of the complaint. Complainant enumerated some of the abuses committed by respondent, to wit: (a) [Respondent] has been using court personnel, namely, Emmanuel “Botiong” Tenefrancia, process server, as constant escort of his paramour in going to their appointed trysts or in escorting back said woman to the place where she is staying, and as errand boy seeing to their needs when respondent and his mistress are together;

(b) Respondent has been using another court employee in the person of Camilo Bandivas, court sheriff, as contact person to his young lover and in summoning and bringing complainant’s witnesses to respondent to be harassed and threatened; (c) Said Judilyn Seranillos, respondent’s lover, has been brought many times by respondent to his court in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, thereby scandalizing court personnel and lawyers, who sometimes must wait for the session to start because respondent and his mistress are not yet through with each other; That the scandalous relations of respondent with his mistress is an open secret among lawyers, court personnel and litigants [in] Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte; (d) Respondent has not been calendaring (sic) cases nor holding court sessions nor court hearings on Mondays and Fridays so that he can have an extended date with his paramour, to the great prejudice of public service; (e) Respondent and his paramour had often met at the house of Zoosima (sic) Ojano Carangan, aunt of respondent’s paramour, [in] Taway, Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur, and the people of Taway know that respondent judge, who usually arrives in his car, has been shamelessly and immorally carrying on an illicit affair with said Judilyn Seranillos. Some inquisitive people usually go out of their houses upon seeing respondent’s car parked at the house of the aunt of respondent’s young mistress, and these barrio folks often watch respondent come and go; [and] (f) Respondent has one or two other women lovers whom he shamelessly cavorts even in the presence of court personnel.[2] Complainant attached the affidavits of Shem Tabotabo,[3] Zacarias Cordova,[4] Zosima Carangan,[5] Danny Layogue and Consolacion S. Layogue,[6] her son Marictibert Corpus Macias,[7] Ruben Perater,[8] Roel Mutia,[9] and Aniceto Zozobrado.[10] However, five of them – Tabotabo,[11] Cordova,[12] Carangan,[13] Danny Layogue,[14] and Marictibert Macias[15] – later recanted their affidavits. On August 20, 2001, this Court issued a Resolution[16] referring the complaint to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. for investigation, report and recommendation. On October 29, 2001, Justice Rosario issued an Order[17] setting the initial hearing on November 27, 28 and 29, 2001 and requiring the parties to submit a list of their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. The hearing was, however, reset to January 28, 29, 30, and 31, 2002 upon motion of complainant. On January 28, 2002, the parties informed the Investigating Justice that they were exerting all efforts for a possible reconciliation. Upon motion by both parties, the hearing was again reset to March 11, 12, 13, and 14, 2002. On March 11, 2002, the parties again informed the Investigating Justice of their desire to confer in a last effort to settle. The request was again granted with an order that both

parties should be ready the following day if no settlement was reached. The following day, March 12, 2002, the scheduled hearing proceeded after the parties failed to reach any amicable settlement. From a list of seven (7) witnesses, complainant manifested that only four (4) witnesses shall be presented. The first witness, Roel Mutia, testified that he was hired by complainant’s son, Marquinjo Macias, to tail Judge Macias after suspecting that his father was having an illicit affair. In summary, Mutia testified that he saw Judge Macias and Seranillos enter a house in Dipolog City on the afternoon of October 17, 1999, and that both dined and spent the night there together inside one bedroom.[18] He said that he accompanied Marquinjo and complainant the next day to the said house and that he saw complainant pull Seranillos outside the house creating a commotion within the neighborhood.[19] On cross-examination, Mutia admitted that he was not sure if Seranillos did spend the night inside the said house, or whether she left that night and just returned the following morning. Counsel for respondent also pointed to Mutia that the spot where he positioned himself, while observing Judge Macias, was blocked by leaves and tall trees.[20] The next witness for complainant was Aniceto Zozobrado. He testified that he was hired by Seranillos to drive a motorcycle which, according to her, was a gift from Judge Macias. He said that he saw Judge Macias visit Seranillos on three (3) occasions; that he ran errands for both Judge Macias and Seranillos; and that he was slapped once by Judge Macias for allegedly peeping at Seranillos.[21] On cross-examination, Zozobrado admitted that he was not really sure if the motorcycle he saw was actually owned by Seranillos, and that his statement was based merely on presumption.[22] He also admitted that he had been residing with complainant’s counsel since the date he executed his affidavit against Judge Macias.[23] The third witness, Engracio Dialo, Jr., was not allowed to testify after respondent’s counsel objected because the intended testimony would cover an event that took place after the filing of the complaint, and Dialo’s affidavit narrated matters that were not covered by the allegations in the complaint.[24] Complainant manifested her intention to file a motion to amend the complaint.[25] The Investigating Justice ordered the direct examination of the fourth witness, complainant Margie Macias, without prejudice to her presenting Dialo after the motion to amend the complaint shall have been resolved. Complainant, however, refused, saying that she would testify only after Dialo had testified.[26] The Investigating Justice warned complainant that her refusal to testify shall be taken as a waiver of her right to present further witnesses and evidence.[27] Despite the warning, complainant refused to proceed with her direct testimony. The Investigating Justice ordered complainant to rest her case, but she again refused. The witness for respondent was Judge Macias himself. He denied the allegations of Mutia and Zozobrado. He said that complainant also filed a complaint for concubinage against him, but the same was dismissed by the Regional State Prosecutor for lack of sufficient evidence. He believed that complainant’s accusations were brought about by her psychiatric condition characterized as severe paranoia.[28]

On April 25, 2002, the Investigating Justice submitted his Report and Recommendation[29] to this Court. He recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Macias. The Investigating Justice reasoned that complainant failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that respondent committed acts of immorality, or that his conduct was prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Investigating Justice, however, recommended that Judge Macias be reprimanded for failing to exercise great care and circumspection in his actions.[30] The case now comes before this Court for final resolution. There are two basic questions that must be resolved. First, considering the finding of the Investigating Justice, we ask: is it really necessary that administrative complaints against members of the judiciary be disposed of only after adducing evidence that will prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt? And second, do the acts complained of warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction on respondent judge? I. In several cases,[31] this Court has ruled that if what is imputed to a respondent judge connotes a misconduct that, if proven, would result in dismissal from the bench, then the quantum of proof necessary to support the administrative charges or to establish grounds for the removal of a judicial officer should be more than substantial. The first case involving an administrative complaint filed against a judge in this jurisdiction was decided in 1922 in In re Impeachment of Horrilleno.[32] There, Justice Malcolm explained: The procedure for the impeachment of judges of first instance has heretofore not been well defined. The Supreme Court has not yet adopted rules of procedure, as it is authorized to do by law. In practice, it is usual for the court to require that charges made against a judge of first instance shall be presented in due form and sworn to; thereafter, to give the respondent judge an opportunity to answer; thereafter, if the explanation of the respondent be deemed satisfactory, to file (sic) the charges without further annoyance for the judge; while if the charges establish a prima facie case, they are referred to the Attorney-General who acts for the court in conducting an inquiry into the conduct of the respondent judge. On the conclusion of the Attorney-General’s investigation, a hearing is had before the court en banc and it sits in judgment to determine if sufficient cause exists involving the serious misconduct or inefficiency of the respondent judge as warrants the court in recommending his removal to the Governor-General. Impeachment proceedings before courts have been said, in other jurisdictions, to be in their nature highly penal in character and to be governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases. The charges must, therefore, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.[33]

With Horilleno, it became necessary for every complainant to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite the fact that the case will only involve an administrative, and not a criminal, complaint. The reason is explained, albeit scarcely, in Alcuizar v. Carpio:[34] While substantial evidence would ordinarily suffice to support a finding of guilt, the rule is a bit different where the proceedings involve judges charged with grave offense. Administrative proceedings against judges are, by nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases.[35] In more recent rulings, however, the Court applied substantial evidence as the normative quantum of proof necessary in resolving administrative complaints against judges. In order to diffuse confusion, a clarification has to be made. First, the pronouncements in Horilleno and Alcuizar may be said to have been superseded by the Court’s recent rulings in Gutierrez v. Belen,[36] Reyes v. Paderanga,[37] and Naval v. Panday.[38] Second, members of the judiciary are not a class of their own, sui generis, in the field of public service as to require a higher degree of proof for the administrative cases filed against them other than, perhaps, the fact that because of the nature of the responsibility judges have, they are required to live up to a higher standard of integrity, probity and morality. When we dismiss a public officer or employee from his position or office for the commission of a grave offense in connection with his office, we merely require that the complainant prove substantial evidence. When we disbar a disgraceful lawyer, we require that complainant merely prove a clear preponderance of evidence to establish liability.[39] There appears no compelling reason to require a higher degree of proof when we deal with cases filed against judges. Judges play a vital role in the dispensation of justice. In this jurisdiction, the integrity demanded of a judge does not commence only when he dons the habiliments of a magistrate or ends when he sheds off his judicial robe. The nature of the position requires nothing less than a 24-hour daily obeisance to this mandate of integrity. Any judge who cannot live up to this exacting requirement has no business sitting on the bench. Considering the proliferation of complaints of abuses and immorality committed by judges, it is only proper that the Court be ever vigilant in requiring impeccable conduct from the members of its bench. II. However, in this case, we are not convinced that complainant was able to prove, by substantial evidence, that respondent committed the acts complained of. Basic is the rule that in administrative proceedings, complainant bears the onus of establishing the averments of her complaint.[40] If complainant fails to discharge this burden, respondent cannot be held liable for the charge.[41]

Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a judge found guilty of immorality can be dismissed from the service, if still in the active service, or may forfeit all or part of his retirement benefits, if already retired, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.[42] We have already ruled that if a judge is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge.[43] This quantum of evidence, complainant failed to satisfy. The testimonies of Mutia and Zozobrado are specious and insufficient to convincingly prove that respondent committed disreputable conduct. This considered, complainant should not have refused to testify during the hearing. More than anyone else, it was complainant who had a direct interest in making sure that the evidence adduced met the necessary burden of proof, considering that the allegations in her complaint involved charges that cannot be lightly dealt with. She should have been more zealous in prosecuting her complaint. Nevertheless, we agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice that although the charges of immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service were not satisfactorily proven by complainant, respondent cannot be completely exonerated.[44] Mutia’s testimony that he saw Judge Macias having dinner with Seranillos and entering a bedroom with her may not satisfactorily prove the charge of immorality, but this act certainly suggested an appearance of impropriety, Judge Macias being a married man. Such behavior undeniably constituted unbecoming conduct, a light offense punishable by a fine not less than P1,000.00 but not more than P10,000.00.[45] In light of the circumstances affecting not only the reputation of Judge Macias himself but the image and reputation of the whole judiciary as well, we find it reasonable to impose upon him the maximum fine of P10,000.00. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative complaint for immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against respondent Judge Mariano Joaquin S. Macias of RTC, Branch 28, of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. However, respondent is held administratively liable for UNBECOMING CONDUCT and FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

PERLA BURIAS vs JUDGE MIRAFE B. VALENCIA

In a verified complaint dated 19 August 2005, Perla Burias (complainant) charged Judge Mirafe B. Valencia (respondent), then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Irosin, Sorsogon, of gross misconduct. The undisputed facts follow.

On 4 and 25 August 2005, respondent borrowed money from complainant in the amounts of P5,000.00 and P2,500.00, respectively. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes.[1] On 25 August 2005, complainant filed a verified complaint[2] for forcible entry and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before the MTC of Bulan, Sorsogon, presided by Judge Marie Louise A. Guan-Aragon (Judge Guan-Aragon). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 590 entitled Perla Burias vs. Celima Morata. On 7 November 2005, Judge Guan-Aragon inhibited herself from the civil case.[3] On 16 June 2006, respondent took over Civil Case No. 590 and, as the new presiding judge in the case, issued a pre-trial conference order.[4] On 15 and 29 September 2006, the parties to the civil case submitted their position papers in compliance with the order of respondent. On 6 December 2006, respondent issued an order requiring the defendant in the civil case to submit other documents to support her claim of prior physical possession.[5] On 4 and 24 January 2007, respondent again borrowed from complainant the amounts of P15,000.00 and P3,000.00, as evidenced by two (2) handwritten notes.[6] On 23 March 2007, complainant filed an urgent motion for respondent’s inhibition on the ground of delay in the resolution of the civil case and apparent bias against complainant based on the Order of 6 December 2006. Respondent denied the motion on 18 April 2007, citing the demise of her son as cause for the delay.[7] Complainant moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by respondent on 8 January 2008.[8]

In her administrative complaint, complainant alleged that on 12 October 2005, respondent endorsed a check and thereafter exchanged the same for cash in the sum of P5,000.00 that complainant provided. Said check however was dishonored when presented for payment by complainant. She also averred that sometime in March 2007, respondent verbally demanded from her the sum of P50,000.00 and that her P30,500.000 indebtedness be written off in exchange for a favorable decision in Civil Case No. 590. According to complainant, she refused to accede to the demands of respondent. In April

2007, respondent reportedly called her up and threatened that she would release any of the two (2) draft decisions she allegedly prepared favoring respondent in the civil case. Complainant claimed that by reason of these threats, she was constrained to file the instant administrative case.[9] In a 1st Indorsement dated 21 May 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required respondent to comment on the administrative complaint.[10] On 21 June 2007, respondent submitted her comment. Anent the dishonored check, respondent explained that she signed on the dorsal side of the check to accommodate a troubled friend who issued said check in favor of complainant.[11] Respondent admitted that she entered into several transactions with complainant involving copra products from her plantation to complainant’s buying station. She was even allowed to take small credits with the assurance of payment whenever the next copra produce is delivered to complainant’s store.[12] Respondent denied that she had demanded P50,000.00 from complainant and that the P30,500.00 indebtedness be written off for being malicious, baseless and simply intended to destroy her standing as a member of the bench.[13] She also denied flaunting the two (2) draft decisions. While she admitted that the first eight (8) pages of the purported decisions are similar to her draft, the rest of their pages differ.[14] She justified the 6 December 2006 Order as it was issued consistently with the provision of Section 11, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which allows the issuance of an order for the purpose of clarifying certain material facts. In a Resolution dated 8 October 2007, the Court resolved to re-docket the case as a regular administrative case and required the parties to manifest whether they are willing submit the matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed.[15] On 13 March 2008, respondent prayed that the administrative complaint be submitted for resolution[16] while on 2 April 2008, complainant manifested the submission of the case for resolution.[17] In its Report dated 28 August 2007, the OCA recommended that respondent be found guilty of misconduct and be meted a fine of P21,000.00 with a warning that the commission of a similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely.[18] The OCA held respondent accountable for contracting loans of money from persons with whom her office has official relations. It ruled that it was improper for respondent to take a loan from a party-litigant. However, the OCA considered the proof inadequate to support the allegation that the loan was extended on a promised favorable decision. With respect to the charge of delay in the resolution of Civil Case No. 590, the OCA sustained respondent’s Order dated 6 December 2006. It found nothing in the records which show that clarificatory procedure was resorted to gain time for the rendition of the judgment. Neither did OCA find any irregularity in the issuance of the Order denying the motion for inhibition found by complainant.[19]

Complainant’s allegations were categorized by OCA into two issues–the first relates to the charge of borrowing money and the second deals with the apparent delay in the resolution of Civil Case No. 590. This Court shall proceed to resolve the issues in this order. With respect to the charge of borrowing money in exchange for a favorable judgment, Rule 5.02, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification. Under Rule 5.04 of Canon 5, a judge may obtain a loan if no law prohibits such loan. However, the law prohibits a judge from engaging in financial transactions with a party-litigant. Respondent admitted borrowing money from complainant during the pendency of the case. This act alone is patently inappropriate.[20] The impression that respondent would rule in favor of complainant because the former is indebted to the latter is what the Court seeks to avoid. A judge’s conduct should always be beyond reproach. This Court has time and again emphasized that no government position is more demanding of moral righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the judiciary. Judges as models of law and justice are mandated to avoid not only impropriety, but also the appearance of impropriety, because their conduct affects the people’s faith and confidence in the entire judicial system.[21] Complainant also cites intentional delay on the part of respondent as a ground in her motion for inhibition, which motion was denied by respondent. The OCA however correctly disposed this issue as a judicial matter which should not be treated as administrative in character, thus: x x x hence, the party who alleges to be aggrieved may apply for the appropriate legal remedy. In the absence of such a proceeding, the order either for or against inhibition stands.[22] However, we do not completely agree with OCA’s finding on the propriety of the issuance of 6 December 2006 order. Section 10 Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides:Sec. 10. Rendition of judgment.—Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.

However should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits, or the expiration of the period for filing the same.The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time for the rendition of the judgment. The above-quoted rule explicitly mandates that should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it shall issue a clarificatory order during said period, which is construed as “within 30 days after receipt of the last affidavits or position papers, or the expiration of the periods for filing the same.” The last position paper was filed by respondent in the civil case on 29 September 2006. Respondent should have issued the assailed order within 30 days counted from the receipt of the position paper. Be that as it may, all orders relating to a motion for inhibition should not be treated as administrative in character. Under Section 8 in relation to Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court constitutes a serious charge punishable by any of the following sanctions: SEC. 11. Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00

Since respondent retired from service last 22 February 2008, the penalty of fine is imposed.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Judge Mirafe B. Valencia of the MTC of Irosin, Sorsogon is meted with a FINE of P20,000.00.

SO ORDERED.