seasolas final report - europa

GMV Aerospace and Defence S.A.U. Isaac Newton 11, PTM Tres Cantos, 28760 Madrid Tel. +34 918072100, Fax. +34 918072199, www.gmv.com

SEASOLAS project is funded by the European Commission. The results are the property of the European Commission. No distribution or copy is permitted unless prior authorization is given by the European Commission

© European Commission, 2018

SEASOLAS FINAL REPORT SEASOLAS

Prepared by: SEASOLAS Team (ESSP, GLA, GMV, KSX, VVA)

Approved by: A. Cezón (GMV)

Authorized by: G. Cueto-Felgueroso (GMV)

Code: SEASOLAS-GMV-D030

Version: 1.2

Date: 05/10/2018

Internal code: GMV 21794/18 V5/18

http://www.gmv.com/


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SEASOLAS project European Commission 2018 SEASOLAS Final Report


DOCUMENT STATUS SHEET Version Date Pages Changes

0.1 18/05/2018 26 First version prepared for SEASOLAS internal review. It contains an outline of the document structure and draft content of sections 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6.

0.2 13/06/2018 33 Version prepared after SEASOLAS internal review. Preliminary content of section 9 has been added.

1.0 28/06/2018 44 Version prepared for FR milestone

1.1 14/09/2018 65 Version prepared for FR Close-out including the implementation of FR RIDS.

1.2 05/10/2018 63 Version including comments received on FR Close-out.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 5

DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ......................................................................................... 5 TERMS, DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATED TERMS ........................................................... 5 REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 7

2. INTRODUCTION TO SEASOLAS PROJECT ............................................................................... 9 3. MARITIME DOMAIN ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 10

SEASOLAS WORST-CASE SCENARIOS .......................................................................... 10 SEASOLAS WORST-CASE SCENARIOS REQUIREMENTS .................................................. 10

4. MARITIME ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS .......................................................................... 13 5. INTEGRITY AT USER LEVEL ............................................................................................... 16

INTRODUCTION TO INTEGRITY ................................................................................... 16 SEASOLAS USER INTEGRITY CONCEPT ........................................................................ 16 5.2.1. Integrity Positioning module ........................................................................... 17 5.2.2. Integrity Operational Navigation Module .......................................................... 17

6. EGNOS MARITIME SAFETY SERVICE DEFINITION ................................................................. 20 SBAS RECEIVER WITHIN MSR ..................................................................................... 20 SEASOLAS TECHNICAL SOLUTION ............................................................................... 22 6.2.1. Option 1: SBAS enhanced with FD/FDE solution ................................................ 22 6.2.2. Option 2: SBAS enhanced with autonomous integrity algorithm solution .............. 25 6.2.3. Option 3: SBAS enhanced with Advanced PVT and Autonomous integrity solution . 26

SEASOLAS EXPECTED PERFORMANCE .......................................................................... 26 ARCHITECTURE AND SERVICE DELIVERY CHAIN ........................................................... 28

7. SEASOLAS ROADMAP ....................................................................................................... 29 SEASOLAS ROADMAP ACTIVITIES ............................................................................... 29 CRITICAL PATH ......................................................................................................... 33

8. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS ................................................................................................. 35 SUMMARY AND OVERALL CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................... 35 SUMMARIZED IMPACT PER STAKEHOLDER CATEGORY FOCUSING ON SCENARIO 1 – INTRODUCTION OF IWW RECEIVER FOR SOLAS AND IWW OPERATORS AND PORT/PILOT RECEIVER FOR MARITIME PILOTS ............................................................................... 38

RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................. 39 9. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................. 41 10. ANNEX A: DETAILED SEASOLAS PROJECT INFORMATION ...................................................... 43

PROJECT PARTNERS .................................................................................................. 43 PROJECT TASKS ....................................................................................................... 44 PROJECT ACTIVITIES ................................................................................................ 44

11. ANNEX B: DETAILED SEASOLAS ROADMAP ACTIVITIES ........................................................ 47


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LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES Table 1-1: Acronyms ................................................................................................................ 5 Table 1-2: Reference documents. ............................................................................................... 7 Table 3-1: SEASOLAS user requirements (based on IMO A.915(22) [RD.3]) .................................. 11 Table 3-2: Proposed target requirements for SEASOLAS worst case scenarios ................................ 12 Table 6-1: Summary of SEASOLAS proposed solutions per Worst Case Scenario ............................ 28 Table 8-1: Overview of SEASOLAS technical solutions ................................................................. 35 Table 8-2: Net Present Value of each SEASOLAS Analysis Scenario (in EUR) .................................. 37 Table 8-3: Safety-related impact of EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service ........................................ 38 Table 11-1: Roadmap Action Items summary ............................................................................ 49 Figure 3-1: User requirements vs Target Performance levels ....................................................... 11 Figure 4-1: Non-Line of Sight explanation ................................................................................. 13 Figure 4-2: NLOS examples ..................................................................................................... 14 Figure 5-1: Definition of Protection Level ................................................................................... 17 Figure 5-2. Adaptive safety margin evolution over time example .................................................. 18 Figure 5-3. SEASOLAS proposed adaptive safety margin + traffic lights concept............................. 19 Figure 6-1: Role of SBAS within MSR. ....................................................................................... 21 Figure 6-2. Multipath models estimated in SEASOLAS ................................................................. 23 Figure 6-3: SEASOLAS apportionment of integrity for the baseline receiver model. ......................... 24 Figure 6-4: SEASOLAS apportionment of continuity for the baseline receiver model. ....................... 25 Figure 6-5: Availability performance for IMO A.15(22) requirements for Inland and Restricted Waters

navigation scenarios (HAL = 25 m) ..................................................................................... 28 Figure 6-6: Availability performance for Target Performance Levels for Restricted Waters navigation

scenarios (HAL = 12.5 m) .................................................................................................. 28 Figure 6-7: Availability performance for Target Performance Levels Inland Waters navigation scenarios

(HAL = 7.5 m) .................................................................................................................. 28 Figure 6-8: HPL performance for Port Navigation scenarios (HAL = 2.5 m) .................................... 28 Figure 6-9: EGNOS DFMC Maritime Safety Service Delivery ......................................................... 28 Figure 7-1: SEASOLAS roadmap activities and schedule .............................................................. 30 Figure 7-2: EGNOS v3 System related phases ............................................................................ 31 Figure 7-3: EGNOS v3 Maritime Service related phases ............................................................... 32 Figure 7-4: Critical path (highlighted in blue) ............................................................................. 33 Figure 10-1: SEASOLAS organization ........................................................................................ 44 Figure 10-2: SEASOLAS High-level activities and corresponding main outcomes ............................. 46


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1. INTRODUCTION The objective of this SEASOLAS Final Report document is to provide an executive summary of the activities performed in the context of SEASOLAS project.

DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION The present document has been organized as follows: Chapter 1. Gives an introduction to the document and provides the list of reference documents,

terms, definitions and acronyms used throughout the document. Chapter 2. Provides an introduction and high-level view of SEASOLAS project objectives and

activities, including an overview of the context in which the project was launched. Chapter 3. Contains the main outcomes of the Maritime Domain Analysis activity. Chapter 4. Presents the results of the Maritime Environmental conditions activity. Chapter 5. Presents the Integrity concept at user level. Chapter 6. Presents the EGNOS Maritime Safety service solution. Chapter 7. Summarizes the SEASOLAS roadmap activities. Chapter 8. Presents the outcomes of the CBA analyses. Chapter 9. Contains the conclusions of the project. ANNEX A: Detailed SEASOLAS project information ANNEX B: Detailed SEASOLAS roadmap activities

TERMS, DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATED TERMS Acronyms used in this document and needing a definition are included in the following table:

Table 1-1: Acronyms

Acronym Definition

ABAS Aircraft-Based Augmentation System

AIS Automatic Identification System

AL Alert Limit

AtoN Aid to Navigation

ARAIM Advanced Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring

CAPEX Capital Expenditures

CBA Cost Benefit Analysis

CCB Change Control Board

COG Course Over Ground

DFMC Dual Frequency Multiple Constellation

DGNSS Differential GNSS

DGPS Differential GPS

EC European Commission

ECDIS Electronic Chart Display and Information System

EDAS EGNOS Data Access Service

EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (European SBAS)

EGUS E-GNSS User Support (GSA project)

EMRF European Maritime Radionavigation Forum

ESA European Space Agency

ESSP European Satellite Services Provider

EU European Union


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Acronym Definition

FD Fault Detection

FDE Fault Detection and Exclusion

FR Final Review

FUT Tag for Future activities in SEASOLAS roadmap

GAGAN GPS Aided GEO Augmented Navigation (Indian SBAS)

GBAS Ground-Based Augmentation System

GEO Geostationary Orbit (Geosynchronous Earth Orbit)

GLA General Lighthouse Authorities

GLONASS GLObalnaya NAvigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema

GMV-ITS GMV’s Intelligent Transportation Systems (GMV’s Transport Unit)

GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System

GPS Global Positioning System

GSA European GNSS Agency

HAL Horizontal Alert Limit

HALREG Regulated HAL

HALTEC Technical HAL

HMI Hazardous Misleading Information

HPE Horizontal Protection Error

HPL Horizontal Protection Level

IALA International Association of Lighthouse Authorities

IBPL Isotropy Based Protection Level

ICD Interface Control Document

IEC International Electrotechnical Commission

IMO International Maritime Organization

IR Integrity Risk

ITU International Telecommunication Union

IWG Interoperability Working Group

IWW Inland Waterways

KIPL Kalman Integrated Protection Level

MOPS Minimum Operational Performance Standards

MRD Mission Requirements Document

MSAS Multi-Satellite Augmentation System (Japanese SBAS)

MSC Maritime Safety Committee

MSR Multi-system shipborne receiver

NLOS Non-Light of Sight

NPV Net Present Value

ODTS Orbit Detemination and Time Synchrnonization

OPEX Operating Expense

PL Protection Level

PNT Position Navigation and Timing

PPP Precise Positioning System

PPU Portable Pilot Unit

PRO Tag for Promotion activities in SEASOLAS roadmap

PROSBAS Prototyping and Support to Standardisation of SBAS L1/L5 Multi-Constellation Receiver

PVT Position Velocity Time


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Acronym Definition

RAIM Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring

RAMS Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and Safety

REG Tag for Regulattion activities in SEASOLAS roadmap

RSOE National Association of Radio Distress-Signalling and Infocommunications (Hungarian RIS)

RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics

RTK Real Time Kinematics

SARPS Standards and Recommended Practices

SBAS Satellite Based Augmentation System

SDD Service Definition Document

SIS Signal In Space

SOG Speed Over Ground

SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

SRV Tag for Service Provision activities in SEASOLAS roadmap

STA Tag for Standardisation activities in SEASOLAS roadmap

SUP Tag for Support activities in SEASOLAS roadmap

SVS Service Volume Simulator

TEC Tag for Technical activities in SEASOLAS roadmap

TSS Traffic Separation Schemes

TTA Time To Alarm

VAL Vertical Alarm Limit

VDES VHF Data Exchange System

VHF Very High Frequency

WCS Worst Case Scenario

WRC World Radiocommunication Conference

WSV Wasserstraßen- und Schifffahrtsverwaltung des Bundes, (Waterways and Shipping Administration in Germany)

WWRNS World Wide Radio Navigation System

REFERENCES The following documents, although not part of this document, amplify or clarify its contents. Reference documents are those not applicable and referenced within this document. They are referenced in this document in the form [RD.X]:

Table 1-2: Reference documents.

Ref. Title Code Version Date

[RD.1] IMO Resolution MSC.401(95) Maritime Safety Committee Resolution “Performance Standards for Multi-system shipborne radionavigation receivers”

MSC 95/22/Add.2

N/A -

[RD.2] Guidelines for shipborne position, navigation and timing (PNT) data processing

MSC.1/Circ.1575 N/A 16/06/2017

[RD.3] Resolution A.915(22): Revised Maritime Policy and Requirements for a Future Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS).

N/A N/A 29.11.2001

[RD.4] Resolution A.1046(22): Revised Report on the Study of a Worldwide Radionavigation System

N/A N/A 30.11.2011

[RD.5] “E-GNSS Use for Autonomous Vessels: Value proposition and market aspects” A. Cezón et al. Proceedings of the 29th International Technical Meeting of The Satellite Division of the Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2016)

N/A N/A 2016


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Ref. Title Code Version Date

[RD.6] Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1183 of 17 July 2015 setting out the necessary technical and operational specifications for implementing version 3 of the EGNOS System.

N/A N/A 17 July 2015

[RD.7] “SBAS L1/L5 Enhanced ICD for Aviation: Experimentation Results”. 9. Fidalgo, J., Odriozola, M., Cueto, M., Cezón, A., Rodriguez, C., Brocard, D., Denis, J.C., Chatre, E. ION GNSS 2017 Conference

N/A N/A 2018

[RD.8] “Update on Australia and New Zealand DFMC SBAS and PPP system results”. 10. Barrios, J, Fernández, G., Pericacho, J.G., Esteban, V.M., Fernández, M.A., Bravo, F., Calle, J.D., Carbonell, E., González, A., Romay, M., Caro, J., Rodriguez, I., Laínez, M.D., Jackson, R., Reddan, P., Bunce, D., Soddu, C. ION GNSS 2018 Conference

N/A N/A 2018


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2. INTRODUCTION TO SEASOLAS PROJECT Space-based navigation dates back to the beginning of transport. After initial steps towards a space-based navigation system, the breakthrough in space navigation came with the deployment of the US NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS). In the recent years, there has been a true explosion of the use of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) all over the world as a result of the proliferation of new navigation systems currently in operation or in deployment phase, such as GLONASS, Galileo and BeiDou, the modernisation of the existing ones (GPS L5) and augmentation systems that enhance precision, integrity, availability, and continuity, such as ABAS (RAIM, ARAIM), local systems such as GBAS and regional SBAS systems. Additionally, high-precision techniques such as RTK and PPP are a clear trend in the multimodal sector. GNSS technology is already being used in maritime applications for navigation and positioning purposes. The maritime sector has been traditionally very keen on using the latest technological advances, so since the advent of space-navigation, GNSS receivers have been used by maritime users due to its increased capabilities against traditional maritime devices. The shipping industry is moving towards an e-Navigation concept where a range of electronic and radio navigation technologies will provide harmonized, safe and secure support for navigation by mariners. Augmented GNSS is one of the supporting technologies for e-Navigation. In this context, Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) could be used to ensure better accuracy and a level of integrity to users. To that end, corrections of GPS data are computed by the SBAS ground infrastructure and are broadcast to SBAS-enabled receivers, along with system integrity information. These systems are regional but they are implemented in different regions of the world and they are interoperable: EGNOS in Europe, WAAS in northern America, GAGAN in India or MSAS in Japan. For maritime regulated segments, SBAS, and in particular EGNOS is already present in some receivers. Nevertheless, current situation is that there are neither mature standards nor regulations to define how the vessel has to process SBAS signal and in particular the use of SBAS in SOLAS vessels for integrity purposes. Non-SOLAS mariners are already getting benefit of SBAS SIS but only for accuracy purposes. Note that these non-SOLAS SBAS-enabled receivers are not standardized, and make use of EGNOS open service with no guarantees. SOLAS ships should not be using SBAS messages for either accuracy or integrity until the SBAS inclusion in maritime receivers is properly standardised. The IMO Multi-system Shipborne Receiver (MSR) performance standards from IMO MSC 401(95) [RD.1] enable the full use of relevant data originating from current/future radionavigation system/services; thus IMO MSC 401(95) allows SBAS augmentation data processing. These standards have already being produced in 2015 and in force from December 2017, which implies that IMO recommends governments to ensure that the new equipment installed from 2018 conform to these standards. The associated MSR guidelines to IMO MSC.401(95) have been recently published as an IMO circular [RD.2]. Type-approval of a MSR is mandatory as it is applicable to SOLAS equipment. IEC TC 80 Is expected to develop the test standards based on IMO 401(95) performance standards. In parallel, EC, GSA and ESA plan a strategy for the use of EGNOS in maritime domain in a three-step approach by adding capabilities to the users based on the integration of EGNOS with current maritime infrastructure at different levels. The scope of SEASOLAS is therefore to define a Maritime Safety Service based on new receivers on-board vessels that uses EGNOS DFMC (EGNOS V3 will augment Galileo E1 and E5a and GPS L1 and L5 signals via geostationary satellites in L5) and based on a integrity concept at user level tailored for the maritime community. SEASOLAS project is an 18-month study funded by the European Commission through 534/PP/GRO/RCH/16/9261. It started in January 2017 and finalized in July 2018. SEASOLAS project has been developed by a consortium led by GMV with ESSP, GLA, VVA and Kongsberg as partners.


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3. MARITIME DOMAIN ANALYSIS The purpose of this activity is to analyse the maritime scenarios which would benefit from the provision of an EGNOS Safety Maritime Service using EGNOS V3 (Dual Frequency Multi Constellation (DFMC)) capability by: Defining the operational needs and context to identify the most demanding user requirements in

the Maritime domain focusing on three selected worst-case scenarios. Understanding the maritime context by defining the stakeholders, key players and the key criteria

for the different stakeholders that would motivate the go/no-go decision to use the EGNOS Maritime Safety Service in the three selected worst-case scenarios.

EGNOS can provide significant benefits for maritime navigation for all type of vessels supporting many applications. Nevertheless in view of the SEASOLAS members, SOLAS vessels should be considered as the priority market in the strategy for the EGNOS adoption as SBAS is already considered in the Performance Standards for Multi-System Shipborne Radio Navigation Receivers.

SEASOLAS WORST-CASE SCENARIOS Considering the outline above, the selected worst-case scenarios considered in the framework of SEASOLAS project are: Port navigation: is the most demanding navigation phase in terms of accuracy, with little space

to manoeuvre, and generally many obstacles. A high reliability/integrity in the navigation system is required.

Inland waterways: in this case navigation is constrained to narrow lanes, shared with many other vessels, therefore the reliability in the ship’s positions will be as important as accuracy.

Restricted waters (Traffic Separation Schemes, TSS): In this case, navigation is constrained to defined lanes which usually have to be shared with other ships. Even if TSS does not require the most demanding performances in terms of accuracy, the number of vessels located in a restricted area increases the likelihood of an incident and therefore leads to a greater reliability on the positioning information.

In these three scenarios, not only enough accuracy performance is required but also high integrity and continuity of positioning. The SEASOLAS project characterized these scenarios, identifying the operational phases involved, the main actors and interactions, the identification of Aids to Navigation, GNSS equipment and sensors and the associated user requirements (section 3.2)..

SEASOLAS WORST-CASE SCENARIOS REQUIREMENTS The user requirements of the SEASOLAS worst-case scenarios are based on the current international standards (mainly IMO A.915(22) [RD.3]), which are broadly recognised by the maritime community:


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Table 3-1: SEASOLAS user requirements (based on IMO A.915(22) [RD.3]) System Level Parameters Service Level Parameters Accuracy Integrity

Availability % per 30

days

Continuity % over 15 minutes1

Coverage Fix

interval seconds

Horiz. (m)

Vert. (m)

Horiz.Alert limit (m)

Time to alarm

(s)

Integrity risk per 3

hours

General Navigation Port

navigation 1 N/A 2.5 10 10-5 99.8 99.97 Local 1

Inland waterways 10 N/A 25 10 10-5 99.8 99.97 Regional 1

Restricted waters: TSS navigation

10 N/A 25 10 10-5 99.8 99.97 Regional 1

During the project and the CBA consultation, different IWW stakeholders expressed the need for vertical positioning, whose expected performances are very challenging (in the order of centimeters). SEASOLAS consortium carried out a performance assessment analysis to determine the impact of a small allocation of integrity risk in the performances achieved. As a results, it was seen that this allocation does not lead to significant degradation on horizontal performance. Moreover, vertical performances are expected to be worse than those in the horizontal component. As a final conclusion, it seems that leaving a small allocation of the integrity risk to the vertical component could be discarded since it would not provide a significant added value. For this reason, SEASOLAS has only focused on the horizontal domain. In addition to these user requirements, the SEASOLAS project has proposed a set of target performance levels which enabled the project to investigate whether a future EGNOS service could fulfil more stringent requirements than the figures currently determined by regulations. These target performance levels should then represent the level of performance that could address future needs for specific applications within the selected worst-case scenarios. It should be noted that these target levels are simply proposals with no strict requirement or any indication that they could become a requirement in the future. The previous approach is also in line with the IMO MSR Guidelines [RD.2], in which two types of requirements were specified: the operational accuracy levels (linked to regulations) and the technical accuracy levels which are linked to the technology.

The selection of the target performance values was based on: What may be feasible for a

future EGNOS V3 maritime service based on the available technology;

And the expected benefit EGNOS V3 may provide to maritime users.

The proposed target performance values are based on the best available knowledge of the SEASOLAS team members and feedback from the Advisory Board.

Figure 3-1: User requirements vs Target Performance

levels

The proposed target performance levels for the three worst-case scenarios is presented below:

1 Continuity requirement comes from IMO Resolution A.1046 [RD.4].


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Table 3-2: Proposed target requirements for SEASOLAS worst case scenarios

Worst-case scenario IMO A.915(22) requirements Target Performance

HPE 95% (m) HALREG (m) HPE 95% (m) HALTEC (m)

Port navigation 1 2.5 1 2.5

Inland waterways 10 25 3 7.5

Restricted waters: TSS navigation 10 25 5 12.5

Where:

• Horizontal Position Error (HPE) represents the typical accuracy value of the position error expressed in statistical terms (e.g. percentile 95)

• Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL) represents the error tolerance not to be exceeded without issuing an alert. In line with MSR guidelines, it is distinguished between HALREG for operational levels (aligned with regulations) and HALTEC for technical levels.

Details about the justification of these target performance values are presented below: For port navigation, the SEASOLAS consortium considers that there is no reason to explore

further requirements than the ones already contained in IMO A.915(22) since these requirements are already conservative for the distances involved in port navigation operations and the vessel’s dimensions.

For inland navigation: the operational needs from some IWW stakeholders (GMV-ITS, Seville Port Authority and RSOE) was considered, which were consistent with outcomes of previous projects (i.e. MARUSE project outcomes2). Seville Port Authority, for example, provided the following requirement:

When two vessels navigate on the channel following opposite directions:

When one single vessel enters in the lock:

For TSS: Future requirements were considered in line with emerging autonomous vessels user

requirements as representative of potential future needs. The proposed target performance values for restricted waters/TSS are the proposed user requirements for autonomous vessels in coastal navigation from EGUS SC4 project (see more information in [RD.5]), assuming that these values are the best knowledge that we have up to date on this issue.

2 See details at https://www.gsa.europa.eu/maritime-user-segment

https://www.gsa.europa.eu/maritime-user-segment


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4. MARITIME ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS The goal of this task of the project is to analyse the main environmental conditions related with satellite navigation, to characterize the specific conditions under which the SBAS receiver would be expected operate when installed on-board a vessel. This analysis focused on the SEASOLAS worst-case scenarios presented in chapter 3. Global GNSS error sources that affect the overall system performances could be minimised or even suppressed by correction techniques or modelled with a physical-mathematical model. SBAS such as EGNOS provide corrections for most of the error components: satellite orbits and clocks corrections, together with ionosphere in SBAS Single-Frequency Systems. The effects not related with the system (as troposphere, multipath, noise, etc.) are represented by overbounding error models implemented at the receiver. Up to date, the most relevant standardized models found in the literature are the ones contained in aviation MOPS document (RTCA-DO-229). In maritime domain there are local effects which can significantly degrade GNSS performances and which imply that the existing local error models may not be valid to safely represent these error contributions: these local effects are mainly multipath, noise and interferences phenomena. Regarding multipath, at local level GNSS signals may be reflected by buildings, vessels structures and even the sea surface:

Multipath occurs when these reflected signals can interfere with signals directly received from the GNSS satellites

In the case of Non-Line of Sight

(NLOS), the direct signal is blocked and only a reflected signal is received

Figure 4-1: Non-Line of Sight explanation Regarding interferences, the presence of these local effects in maritime domain are real threats in GNSS and may imply the use of countermeasures within the MSR. (See chapter 6.1). One of the main objectives of the maritime environmental characterization activity is to analyse whether the multipath error in maritime scenarios can be safely represented by an overbounding mathematical model. If this assumption is not satisfied, additional techniques at receiver level shall be considered in order to be protected against local effects. Additionally, the presence of NLOS shall also be considered as a potential threat to the use of multipath error models. Several theoretical analysis were made in the SEASOLAS project to find the most suitable technique to characterise the observed multipath errors in order to propose a safe navigation system. The conclusions were: Two different approaches to estimate the multipath model have been found in the literature:

- The approach describing reality more precisely is the model that simulates the signal propagation taking into account reflections, diffractions and similar effects.

- Other methods assume that multipath errors follow a normal distribution and forecasts the multipath standard deviation for a given elevation through a simple prearranged formula.

The main conclusion from SEASOLAS is that methods based on modelling GNSS signal propagation imply a high mathematical complexity, therefore simple models that depend on few parameters are more suitable from a receiver manufacturer perspective, and also, from a standardization point of view.

Multipath error is influenced by many parameters (Vessel structure and dynamics, weather, receiver type, antenna location, etc.), which are difficult to isolate, complicating the generation of a single and consolidated multipath error model.


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As the multipath error distributions are not Gaussian, statistical parameters as the mean or the standard deviation do not fully characterise the multipath error distribution. Therefore, multipath error overbounding techniques are required to provide safety.

Based on the previous conclusions, a preliminary overbounding model based on a pre-arranged Brenner and Jahn formula was developed by the SEASOLAS project partners based on real data recorded from a number of trials: 3 months of data were recorded from a medium sized cruise vessel (“Polarlys”) navigating through

northern Norwegian fiords.

Ad-hoc trials made on board a Patrol vessel in London, along the Thames River, and on board a cargo vessel from Seville to Canary Islands.

A more extensive data set including multipath measurements than the one collected within the SEASOLAS project is necessary to analyse the feasibility of overbounding models, based on widely varying situations: different ships, weather conditions, stage of voyage, etc. In addition, a devoted analysis of extreme multipath events such as Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) was carried out with the same data sets used for the multipath model assessment. In this analysis, some NLOS were found. In the following images two examples are represented:

Pseudorange residual

Local geometrical configuration

Satellite polar view

Figure 4-2: NLOS example in Polarlys vessel navigating the Norwegian fiords

Figure 4-3: NLOS example in London trial along the Thames river on-board a patrol vessel

The outcomes of this environmental characterization activity led to the following conclusions:


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The use of overbounding techniques for the multipath error is essential to ensure that the non-Gaussian multipath error is safely overbounded and then provide the integrity required for a maritime safety service.

These overbounding techniques make multipath models very sensitive to the influence of every parameter analysed (e.g. type of vessel, receiver, antenna location, etc.), and the models do not show a clear behaviour with them, since they are commonly difficult to isolate. Moreover, the chosen multipath model not only affects the capacity of the service to meet the integrity requirements but also impacts the service continuity (e.g. if the model is so conservative that the service is often unavailable). Furthermore, the presence of NLOS events would require additional fault detection mechanisms. Therefore, the SEASOLAS consortium recommends to refine, validate and standardise the SEASOLAS multipath model, by performing around 3 months data collection (for an Integrity Risk of 1∙10-7) campaigns for each analysed parameter. Future studies (e.g. MARGOT) are expected to define and test a candidate multipath model that takes into account the main environmental conditions (vessel type and size, antenna position, etc.).

Because of the aforementioned sensitivity, there would be a need for some kind of installation standard and assessment to ensure the model used is appropriate. This may lead to the need for manufactures/installers/users to prove every time that any parameter changes that their receivers’ multipath error fulfils the model. In order to ease this process it is recommended to standardise and monitor the installed receiver and the antenna location within the vessel and the multipath test for a SoL navigation service. This need has been agree with the stakeholders as detailed in section 8. They indicated that this process is necessary and it is also feasible if the commissioning process is made by a navigation data processing using a remote access.

Potential NLOS events have been found in every operational phase, from Inland Navigation to Open Sea’s environment. The observed events caused a wide range of navigation errors during short periods of time. Furthermore, their occurrence is more probable when navigating busy built up environments such as inland waters.

As a consequence of the previous point, any overbounding multipath model may be exceeded by these NLOS events. Therefore, other methods in addition to the multipath model are needed to ensure integrity at user level. Two different approaches are recommended: - to evaluate Fault Detection (FD) and/or Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE) techniques in

order to ensure that only valid measurements are used, warning the user or excluding measurements affected by local effects such as NLOS events;

- to consider additional user integrity algorithms that are able to compute protection levels taking into account these NLOS and other local events.

Both methods should be assessed in a complete safety case based on Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) analysis as part of the standardisation (e.g. IEC) framework at receiver level in order to ensure that the proposed solution would meet the maritime requirements and provide a safe navigation system.

Multipath models such as the one from RTCA-DO-229 specifies that satellite usage is not standardised until it reaches the steady-state operation, so the models provided by this regulation are only applicable to such state. Before steady-state operations, the multipath model and any other error model are not specified. It is recommended to assess the most suitable time to the steady-state operations, because longer periods before a satellite is used would: - Lead to more frequent long line-of-sight interruptions making the system unavailable - Reduce the multipath error model and make NLOS events more improbable.


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5. INTEGRITY AT USER LEVEL This chapter presents the SEASOLAS user integrity concept. It provides a brief introduction to integrity to ensure common understanding before expanding this to explain the SEASOLAS project findings.

INTRODUCTION TO INTEGRITY GNSS Signal in Space performances can be expressed in terms of: Accuracy: difference between the real position and the one provided by the navigation system Integrity: measures the confidence in the correctness of the information supplied by the system Continuity: probability that the specified system performance will not be interrupted for the

duration of a phase of operation, assuming that the system was available at the beginning of that phase of operation

Availability: ability of the system to provide the required function and performance within the specified coverage area

GNSS provides a valuable input into the navigation decision making process on vessels. However, many applications need reliable position information since large and undetected positioning errors may lead to unsafe situations (i.e. in Safety-of-Life applications) or may have significant legal or economic consequences (i.e. in liability-critical applications such as reliable tracking of dangerous goods). These applications depend not only on accurate positioning but strongly on the integrity/reliability of the position. The need for reliable position information led to the definition of the concept of integrity:

Integrity is a measure of the trust in the correctness of the information supplied by a navigation system.

This integrity definition is in line with the definition of integrity in IMO A.915(22) [RD.3]: “The ability to provide users with warnings within a specified time when the system should not be used for navigation.” GNSS integrity is defined through the following concepts: Alert limit (AL): is the error tolerance not to be exceeded without issuing an alert. Alert limits in

horizontal (HAL) and vertical (VAL) domains are usually defined per operation/phase of navigation. - Note: in maritime, VAL is only defined for some port operations, hydrography, marine

engineering, etc. SEASOLAS only focuses on horizontal domain as explained in section 3.2. Integrity risk (IR): is the probability (how many times per time interval) that, at any moment,

the position error exceeds the out of tolerance condition without issuing an alert

Time-to-alarm (TTA): is the maximum allowable time elapsed from the onset of the navigation system being out of tolerance until the equipment raises the alert.

In general, the integrity concept used in maritime is linked to the integrity of the system as defined in IMO´s resolution A.1046 (27) or as it is understood in DGNSS. It means, the system provides alerts to the user in case it is detected that the system information should not be trusted. The use of this system integrity (that could be potentially provided for maritime by EGNOS) is being currently under study in the scope of EGNOS V2. On the other hand IMO resolution A.915 (22), focused on user application needs, considers the user environment through the implementation of user position error bounds with a certain integrity risk, which also aims to cover user local errors. This user integrity concept could be achieved with SBAS or integrity algorithms at receiver level such as RAIM.

SEASOLAS USER INTEGRITY CONCEPT The idea of this concept is to conceptually split the integrity concept between two functions that combined, could build a modular and powerful Maritime Safety concept in line with the integrity concepts handled in IMO (MSR guidelines) and PNT working groups:


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Integrity positioning module/function: the goal of this module is to obtain a positional error bound that guarantees, with a certain probability, that the ship is within specific boundaries. Therefore it measures the integrity of the positioning at user level.

Safety Integrity Operational Navigation module/function: Integrity Operational navigation: this module refers to how the position error bound from the previous module (the protection level) is used from an operational perspective.

5.2.1. INTEGRITY POSITIONING MODULE Integrity monitoring techniques check that the expected errors in the calculated position are within the integrity requirements, generally this is achieved by calculating statistical confidence bounds of the position error: the so-called protection levels (PL). It is assumed that the Protection Level is a safe boundary of the positioning error covering all the error sources (satellite orbit/clock, ionosphere, troposphere, multipath, local effects, etc.). Therefore, protection levels are conservative boundaries of the positioning error so that the probability of the position error exceeding the protection level is smaller than or equal to the integrity risk. The SEASOLAS project has proposed Protection Levels for the horizontal component only: the Horizontal Protection Level (HPL) as it was indicated in section 3.2.

Protection levels are not exceeded with a confidence (e.g. 10-5/3h probability) so that the true position is within an area/region around the computed position

Figure 5-1: Definition of Protection Level3 The use of protection levels then represents integrity at user level, since the integrity monitoring is done at user receiver level in comparison to system level integrity (e.g. DGNSS), in which the user would not be warned of potential performance degradations due to local error sources. This integrity at user level is specified in IMO A.915(22) [RD.3] resolution, given that the integrity requirements are expressed in terms of alert limit, integrity risk and time-to-alarm. The mechanism of using SBAS protection levels to protect users from excessive accuracy errors is in line with the definition of integrity from IMO Circ. 1575 (MSR Guidelines) [RD.2]. In particular, with the “Integrity evaluation based on estimated accuracy”. The way this protection level is computed is detailed in chapter 6.

5.2.2. INTEGRITY OPERATIONAL NAVIGATION MODULE The objective of this subsection is to define an Operational User Integrity Concept based on the Protection Levels (Integrity Positioning module), assuming that this position error bound has been computed. It is proposed a concept that is able to accommodate: On one side the flexibility of the protection level that is enlarged or reduced depending on the

specific error sources at user receiver level. This is more related to an adaptive safety margin that defines a safety region around the vessel.

On the other side, guaranteed safety conditions according to specific thresholds and alert in case a problem occur. This is related to a navigation traffic light concept.

The proposed user integrity concept englobes the use in parallel of both adaptive safety margins and the navigation traffic lights concepts. Taking into account this, the proposed model is based on the 3 Ship icon : Created by Adrien Coquet from Noun Project


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following two considerations that are provided simultaneously by the protection level computed in the previous module:

Protection levels are calculated over time (per second), thus the vessel position (unknown true position) is located in area/region with a certain confidence (Integrity risk). This safety region (based on Protection levels) could provide key support information to the captain to do safer operations. Since this error bound evolves over time, it can be seen as an adaptive safety margin concept.

Next figure shows a schematic view of the safety adaptive margin proposed (based on PLs).

Figure 5-2. Adaptive safety margin evolution over time example

Additionally the system could raise an alarm when the navigation system is providing a solution

whose position error bound exceeds certain thresholds (the alert limits) and compromise the safety of the operations. This is like a traffic light concept. The idea of this is that certain alarms/warnings could be raised in relation with different Alert Limits or Service Levels. This concept is in line with the MSR guidelines because:

It moves forward to multiple devices integration in order to provide a single, enhanced and more reliable PNT data.

The threshold or Alert Limit then could be settled in line with the IMO A.915(22) (operational accuracy levels) or the future technical accuracy levels in the aforementioned guideline s.

For doing this it is proposed to use different types of Alert Limits:

Horizontal Alert Limits that are defined in relation with regulations (HALREG). These alert limits are linked with IMO A.915(22) requirements and are related with the user requirements from SEASOLAS Worst Case Scenarios (Table 3-1).

Horizontal Alert Limits that are defined in relation with technical performance levels (HALTEC). These Alert Limits or Service Levels could be linked to the technology (target performance levels), or for instance could be used to increase awareness of special conditions within a specific area:

• Configurable by the captain to increase awareness during a specific stage due to for instance, the meteorological conditions, bad visibility (e.g. fog) or the presence of obstacles at sea (e.g. icebergs) in areas that any maritime authority would not set a HALTEC. However, it shall be ensured that this HALTEC does never exceed the mandatory HALREG in order to be compliant with regulations.

• Set by a specific maritime authority and sent to the user by external aids (e.g. AIS, VDES etc.) in the same previous cases, or for instance, to regulate the maritime traffic.

Let us remark that the specific setting of this HALTEC value has not been fixed as part of SEASOLAS solution, since these values could evolve in the future and a premature decision on this topic may prevent the final usage of SEASOLAS user integrity concept. However, according to the feedback of some stakeholders consulted during the project, the flexibility of this HALTEC intermediate threshold is appreciated and seen as a promising topic to be further developed.

Depending on the PL and Alert limit values, the following situations could occur:


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HPL = N/A or HPL>HALREG (RED Light): it is assumed that the error could exceed the tolerable values and an ALARM should be raised and the operation is not permitted. These alarms indicate to mariners the operation is not allowed under the given conditions. This alarm would also be raised in case the protection level could not be computed.

If HPL< HALREG, there are two possibilities: • HPL>HALTEC (YELLOW light): the error is under tolerable thresholds (according to the

regulations) and therefore permitted, but there is a risk that the system is not available for certain operations/conditions => a WARNING is raised. It should be noted that the yellow light concept needs to be further matured. In this case the warning does not imply a safety risk. In line with the MSR guidelines, warnings would be raised when performances would exceed the technical accuracy levels defined in these guidelines or other thresholds that could come for example from the authorities. These warnings indicate to mariners that an operation is allowed under their own responsibility.

• HPL<HALTEC (GREEN light): the errors are below the alert limits and the position solution is considered safe

Next figure summarizes this Integrity Operational Module:

Figure 5-3. SEASOLAS proposed adaptive safety margin + traffic lights concept

These Protection Levels would be provided to the MSR application that manages the integrity information and settled by ECDIS environment, which would use the estimated location in order to provide the Alert Limit correspondent to that location or operational phase. SEASOLAS is not entering into how this information is going to be displayed, how to provide the information to mariners, raising alarms or displaying the Protection Levels, which will be managed by the MSR application. All these aspects are not mature enough and SEASOLAS highly recommends the need to perform a deep and complete analysis.


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6. EGNOS MARITIME SAFETY SERVICE DEFINITION This section provides a high level view of the proposed SEASOLAS solution for the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service possibly complemented with other technologies. This solution aims: To be able to meet the required performances at user level, with focus on the worst case scenarios

selected in section 3.

To be based on the provision of an Integrity at user level (see section 5. ).

To take into account the Maritime Environmental conditions (see section 4. ).

The definition of this EGNOS Maritime Safety Service has been done through the execution of the following activities: First of all, analysis of the role of EGNOS V3 within the MSR concept (see section 6.1). During

SEASOLAS it has been taken into account the hypothesis of a non-isolated receiver, which interacts with other modules such as an interference detector o other PNT sources.

Under this consideration three different solutions have been proposed and their main features are detailed in section 6.2.

Finally, the recommended option for each level of performances is specified in section 6.3.

SBAS RECEIVER WITHIN MSR All the technical solution options are based on DFMC SBAS (EGNOS V3), augmenting Galileo E1/E5a and GPS L1/L5. Additionally, the SBAS receiver in SEASOLAS is understood as a component within the MSR, as shown in Figure 6-1. The apportionment model has a wider scope, to obtain the derivation of the top-level receiver requirements (associated to the MSR) down to the SBAS receiver component within the MSR (which are considered in this section). However, the technical solution options explained below are focused on the SBAS receiver component. The purpose of this apportionment activity was twofold: First, to define an apportionment model, i.e. how the user requirements could be split and

allocated to the user sensors and data processing algorithms.

Second and finally, to apply the defined apportionment model for the allocation of the most stringent user requirements to the GNSS/SBAS part within the MSR.

These two first activities allowed to identify various inputs to the apportionment model that were further elaborated: Worst case user requirements. Three Worst Case Scenarios and their IMO and Target Performance

Levels were identified Correlation times. It was assumed a measurement correlation time of 150 seconds, similarly to

aviation. Translation between maritime and aviation integrity/continuity requirements. Maritime

requirements were transformed to a probability per 150 seconds. Horizontal and vertical apportionment. The full integrity risk budget was allocated to the horizontal

dimension. Local multipath. It was identified that the multipath error overbounding requires a RAIM (FD/FDE

technique or autonomous integrity algorithm) that detects errors exceeding the model. RAIM algorithm. Two alternatives were identified:

- FD/FDE RAIM: Redundant information used to detect and/or exclude faults. - Autonomous integrity algorithm (PL RAIM): Redundant information used to calculate protection

level and quality of the position fix. Local interference. An interference detector was therefore identified as part of the MSR. Need for authentication. It is recommended for future activities to consider and perform a

cost/benefit analysis of SBAS authentication in EGNOS V3 since it is expected to provide a significant added value for the maritime sector.


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Additional PNT sources. They would be used as a backup when the SBAS component is unavailable preventing service outages. They should be not influenced by the same fear event as GNSS, so they have to be other sensors of the MSR.

Continuity prediction. It is not required, but it could be useful in specific operations. In SEASOLAS availability and continuity analyses, it was assumed that prediction is not made.

Fault scenarios to consider for the apportionment model. The apportionment model distinguishes between fault free case and fault scenarios, and is composed of: missed detection of system faults and/or local faults (multipath and other errors), missed detection of interference and hardware or software failure

Figure 6-1: Role of SBAS within MSR.4

It is noted that as part of the MSR, but independently of the SBAS component, SEASOLAS considers the existence of the following elements which are needed because the safety and performances of the system could not be achieved without them:

An interference detector, which would provide protection against jamming, spoofing and other types of interference, intentional or accidental.

Other PNT sources, which would be used as a backup when the SBAS component is unavailable or presents discontinuity events, preventing service outages. The additional PNT sources should be not influenced by the same fear event as GNSS, so they have to be other sensors of the MSR.

These additional MSR components have not been explored in this document, which just focuses on the SBAS component.

4 See acronyms in Table 1-1. SOG (Speed over Ground), COG (Course over Ground)


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SEASOLAS TECHNICAL SOLUTION Particularizing for the SBAS component within the MSR, three main technical solutions have been considered in SEASOLAS for a potential EGNOS V3 maritime safety service. These three options are proposed as potential ways to overcome limitations and reach enhanced performance, aiming at complying with the user requirements from IMO, and also with the target performance levels defined in SEASOLAS, in the worst-case scenarios. Two main key important aspects have driven the definition of the potential options: Maritime environment conditions. Difficulties to provide a multipath overbounding model

valid for all vessels and for all scenarios are high. Additionally the presence of multipath outliers as NLOS events put in risk the safety while using an overbounding multipath model for SBAS processing. Therefore, other methods in addition to the multipath model are needed to ensure integrity at user level.

Stringent requirements mainly coming on the identification of future trends in the maritime needs (target performance levels) and for the ambitious requirements for Port navigation.

Therefore, the following three technical solution options are considered in SEASOLAS:

Option 1: SBAS enhanced with FD/FDE

Option 2: SBAS enhanced with autonomous integrity algorithm

Option 3: SBAS enhanced with advanced PVT and autonomous integrity The different technical solutions options are briefly described first, and then the expected performance is analysed in section 6.3.

6.2.1. OPTION 1: SBAS ENHANCED WITH FD/FDE SOLUTION The study in SEASOLAS concludes that FD/FDE techniques could be used in order to provide robustness against local effects, such as NLOS. This is what this technical solution option considers. This solution uses the satellite corrections and integrity information provided by SBAS in order to compute a PL, in a similar way an aviation SBAS receiver does. However, a different multipath overbounding model is used (to obtain a suitable sigma to construct the PL). Two preliminary multipath models have been estimated valid for all the navigation phases: SEASOLAS Nominal Multipath model. Is the lowest model (i.e. less conservative) obtained with

the SEASOLAS data available able to overbound the multipath error. It is recommended to comply with the TSS target performance level (HAL=12.5m).

SEASOLAS Maximum Affordable Multipath model. It is the highest model (i.e. more conservative) obtained with the data available that overbounds the multipath error and that is able to fulfil the requirements. It is recommended to comply with the TSS and IWW IMO requirements (HAL=25m). The compliance with this model would be easier than with the previous one.

Receivers must be cautiously analysed in a commissioning process to assess the compliance with each of the models. Additionally a FD/FDE technique is used in order to detect and potentially exclude hazardous local effects such as NLOS.


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Figure 6-2. Multipath models estimated in SEASOLAS

With the inputs listed in the section 6.1, the apportionment model was set up assuming several design constraints for the various system components and the performance allocation between them. One choice was that the vertical dimension was not to be considered, and hence a full integrity allocation was made to the horizontal dimension. This lead to a Maritime KH = 5.74. On basis of this work, we elaborated a set of requirements that would need to be satisfied by a MSR and its SBAS component in order to meet the most stringent user requirements. This included requirements to SBAS system level as well as SBAS user receiver level. The work performed on the apportionment model and the user requirements identified some areas where further work is needed in order to fully specify the DFMC SBAS service. This has been documented in form of a set of recommendations for further work.

The continuity and integrity risk allocation trees defined in SEASOLAS for option 1 are presented in Figure 6-3 and Figure 6-4.


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Figure 6-3: SEASOLAS apportionment of integrity for the baseline receiver model.


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Figure 6-4: SEASOLAS apportionment of continuity for the baseline receiver model.

6.2.2. OPTION 2: SBAS ENHANCED WITH AUTONOMOUS INTEGRITY ALGORITHM SOLUTION

An alternative way to deal with local errors, as just an overbounding multipath model cannot be safely defined, is to rely more on autonomous integrity algorithms at the receiver as a way to enhance SBAS processing. This solution depends on the specific autonomous integrity algorithm to be used, but from a generic perspective it would use the SBAS corrections and potentially the integrity information (sigma values), in order to construct a PL. The purpose of this SEASOLAS analysis is to evaluate the feasibility of having a SBAS service that could be used for Maritime Safety Service. In this option 2 case an autonomous integrity algorithm to cover local effect is proposed. Preliminary requirements for such algorithm were firstly identified, and then an example of this type of algorithms was considered to test its feasibility in terms of performance. As part of SEASOLAS the identification of a specific autonomous integrity algorithm was not intended. However, some preliminary considerations and recommendations are presented below highlighting important points to be considered for the autonomous integrity selection. The following preliminary requirements for these algorithms are considered:

The algorithm shall be robust against hazardous local events, such as NLOS, providing an output protection level with the required integrity risk.

The algorithm shall be able to consider that these events could happen simultaneously (not only one event affecting only one satellite per epoch) up to meet the integrity risk requirement. The algorithm shall consider n failures up to the probability of having such as these failures is lower than the integrity risk probability:

(PHMIfaliure·PNotReact)n < PIntegrity risk


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Furthermore, the following recommendations to select the autonomous integrity algorithm are provided:

Ideally the algorithm should not rely only on a priori error variances (e.g. multipath error models) for the local effect. If it relied on a priori error variances only, local effects such as NLOS may not be detected, and therefore FD/FDE would be needed as part of the autonomous integrity algorithm.

Ideally the algorithm should have no limit in the number of simultaneous events to be considered. If the algorithm considered a limited number of simultaneous events, it should be assessed and demonstrated that the probability of having more events is significantly lower than the integrity risk.

The algorithm considered in the performance assessment is the IBPL, because it is readily available and it can potentially fulfil the user requirements and the proposed target performance levels. This algorithm does not rely on FD or a-priori error models, instead it is based on residual errors and the isotropy assumption. It is a fairly simple algorithm, easy to implement and not costly in terms of receiver computing power. It is a protection level computation method that uses all satellites being tracked (except those that might have been independently rejected by some other routine, e.g. due to low signal-to-noise ratio). It is sensitive to least-squares positioning residuals, so in the presence of faulty measurements it can react inflating the protection level to preserve integrity. Additionally, it is expected that different autonomous integrity algorithm options would provide similar performance levels to the IBPL.

6.2.3. OPTION 3: SBAS ENHANCED WITH ADVANCED PVT AND AUTONOMOUS INTEGRITY SOLUTION

The last option is presented as a potential way to fulfil the most demanding requirements for general navigation in IMO 915: port navigation. The previous two solutions may comply with the requirements for TSS and IWW, but their expected performance is far from reaching port navigation. On top of that expectation, the harsh port navigation environment is also an issue in terms of integrity due to local effects, so that the challenge of providing robustness also applies to this solution, similarly to the previous ones. For this kind of ‘advanced PVT’ and ‘autonomous integrity’ solution, a combination of PPP and KIPL is considered for the performance assessment, as part of the processing of the DFMC SBAS solution at receiver level. This solution uses the SBAS corrections to enable a PPP processing at the receiver. The DFMC SBAS ICD provides enough bit coding resolution for the satellite orbit and clock correction messages, so that the DFMC SBAS GEO link can deliver all needed information. No changes are strictly required in the DFMC SBAS ICD for this solution, meaning that it can be used as it is in its current version, although changes could be proposed to improve performance but these changes are not currently proposed in SEASOLAS. Regarding integrity, an autonomous integrity algorithm needs to be used, but from a generic perspective it would use the SBAS corrections and potentially the integrity information (sigma values), in order to construct a PL. This integrity algorithm needs to be suitable for the PVT solution algorithm, in this case PPP. PPP is a filter-based navigation solution, unlike in the previous two solutions which are based on least-squares, and therefore the integrity algorithm cannot be the same. The KIPL algorithm is proposed since it was designed specifically for Kalman filter based solutions. KIPL algorithm is based on the same hypothesis and assumptions than the IBPL but is adapted to be hybridised with a PPP solution through a Kalman filter. As IBPL in the presence of a faulty measurement the algorithm reacts inflating the Protection Level to preserve the integrity required.

SEASOLAS EXPECTED PERFORMANCE The solutions proposed by SEASOLAS are very powerful and different options are proposed that may solve the problems identified (gaps analysis) for the user of EGNOS V3 in a Maritime Safety Service. The solutions could not only comply with user requirements (IMO regulation) of the 3 scenarios proposed (worst case scenarios) but also with the expected evolution (target performance level).


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It is noted that regardless the solution, in order to identify a specific algorithm to implement, further and deeper analysis of the algorithm performance, hypotheses and assumptions, integrity, computing cost and feasibility, shall be performed, using specific tools, prototypes and testbeds. In addition, it has been identified the need to assess the performances of each option in a commissioning process after the installation phase. For this performance assessment task, PROSBAS Prototype [RD.7] was adapted to emulate the SBAS+FD/FDE techniques and the SBAS + Autonomous Integrity solutions. PROSBAS tool is an SBAS demonstrator prototype implementing the DFMC SBAS L1/L5 standard developed under a European Commission project. This Service Volume Simulator (SVS) tool is valid for solutions based on least squares and it provides a sensible performance estimation. Figure 6-5 presents the expected availability for the different IMO and Target Performance levels considered for the Inland Waterways and Traffic Separation Scheme scenarios respectively. SBAS+FD/FDE solution is the one proposed for the IMO requirement (HAL = 25 m) and the one used in Figure 6-5 (left). The DFMC SBAS enhanced with autonomous integrity is the solution proposed for IWW and TSS target performance levels (see Figure 6-5 centre). In the latter one, the results presented in Figure 6-5 right were the ones obtained in case precise Orbit Determination and Time Synchronization capability is considered. Let us also remark that these performance figures present the availability performance. Continuity aspects for each scenario will need to be carefully assessed and were not considered in this analysis.

Figure 6-5: Availability compliance for IWW and TSS scenarios (HALLeft = 25m; HALCentre= 12.5 m; HALRight = 7.5 m)

For the most ambitious scenario, the approach was different since for solutions based on filters, the use of SVS tools is not straightforward. For this reason, the analysis performed in the project was based on real data from the “Polarlys” vessel processed with the SBAS+PPP+KIPL technology tested in an Australian SBAS test-bed [RD.8]. Figure 6-6 presents the performance figures (in terms of HPL) based on real data obtained on-board a vessel.


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Figure 6-6: HPL performance for Port Navigation scenarios (HAL = 2.5 m)

Next table shows a summary of the proposed solutions for each Worst Case scenario considered in SEASOLAS. It is noted that option 3 (SBAS enhanced with advanced techniques) is expected to comply with all Worst Case Scenario service levels, but it is only recommended for WCS1 (port navigation) since for the other scenarios there are simpler solutions available.

Table 6-1: Summary of SEASOLAS proposed solutions per Worst Case Scenario

SEASOLAS WORST CASE SCENARIO

PROPOSED SOLUTION

IMO A.915(22) requirements Target Performance LEVELS

WCS1: Port navigation

DFMC SBAS Enhanced with advanced techniques (SBAS+PPP+Integrity)

WCS2: Inland waterways

DFMC SBAS enhanced with FD/FDE.

DFMC SBAS Enhanced with autonomous integrity


WCS3: Restricted waters: TSS navigation






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7. SEASOLAS ROADMAP SEASOLAS project defined the roadmaps (both for the service validation and for the user receiver standardization) needed to have an EGNOS V3 maritime safety service. The defined roadmaps consider: On the one hand, the definition of a standardization roadmap defining the activities needed to

standardise the SOLAS EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service user receiver.

On the other hand, the Service Validation process required for the operational introduction of the service.

Additionally, a general ‘SEASOLAS roadmap’ that considers the previous aspects as well as other high level key activities that need to be performed split in:

Standardization activities (STA) covering all the activities aimed at the elaboration of the needed standards for the use of SBAS in maritime.

Regulation activities (REG) covering all the tasks related to the existing maritime regulation and potential gaps that could be closed.

Promotion activities (PRO) to improve awareness and the knowledge of the different stakeholders about the future SBAS safety service, and in particular, the EGNOS V3 maritime service.

Technical (TEC): all those activities aimed at consolidating and developing the technical aspects involving Safety-of-Life SBAS concept for maritime. These activities cover all the aspects related to the open points identified in the proposed solution, and provide support for other activities such as standard definition and validation.

Service provision (SRV): specific actions that need to be carried out within EGNOS V3 to provide the future maritime safety service.

Support activities (SUP): under this category we include all those activities aimed at provide support by the actioner to specific tasks in order to encourage the EGNOS V3 maritime safety service implementation

Future activities (FUT): needed for future evolutions or new services, beyond the scope of SEASOLAS, but that seem reasonable next steps that should be considered.

SEASOLAS ROADMAP ACTIVITIES Figure 7-1 presents the SEASOLAS roadmap including the activities to be performed. Please refer to ANNEX B: Detailed SEASOLAS roadmap activities in which the roadmap activities are described in detail, including the scope of the activities, the actors involved, etc. In addition, please refer to Figure 7-2 and Figure 7-3 in which the roadmap related to the Service Validation process is presented. Let us remark that the Service Validation roadmap is split in two parts: EGNOS v3 System related phases (Figure 7-2)

EGNOS V2 Maritime Safety Service related phases (Figure 7-3)


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Figure 7-1: SEASOLAS roadmap activities and schedule


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Figure 7-2: EGNOS v3 System related phases


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Figure 7-3: EGNOS v3 Maritime Service related phases


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SEASOLAS project European Commission 2018; SEASOLAS Final Report

SEASOLAS is funded by the European Commission. The results are the property of the European Commission. No distribution or copy is permitted unless prior authorization is given by the European Commission

CRITICAL PATH The last stage of the roadmap analysis is the identification of the critical path. Based on the actions from ANNEX B: Detailed SEASOLAS roadmap activities and the timeline from Figure 7-1, the critical path for the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service is identified in the next figure and explained hereafter:

Figure 7-4: Critical path (highlighted in blue)

The critical path activities for the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service are: Maritime environmental characterization: the need to properly characterize the environment

is crucial for a safety service, since it is critical to characterize the threats that the technical solution shall cover. This aspect is needed since it drives the alternatives to consider for the technical solution definition.

Consolidation of the technical solution: once the environment is characterized, the technical approach for the system needs to be identified, ensuring that is valid for the environmental characterization from the previous step and also satisfies user needs (expressed in terms of performance requirements) including safety aspects. Once this approach is fixed, it needs to be implemented in EGNOS V3 system. Let us remark, SEASOLAS is proposing a testbed as part of the consolidation of the technical solution.

User receiver type approval: as it has been repeated through this document, in the frame of a safety service it shall be somehow ensured that the user receiver fulfils a minimum set of requirements. This is done though the IEC test specifications. Therefore, appropriate IEC test specifications are critical to be able to set up an EGNOS Maritime Safety Service. Without these IEC standards, the service could never be put in place.

EGNOS V3 user receiver development: This aspect is linked not only to have a feasible technical solution but also to the willingness of receiver manufactures to develop these receivers. If EGNOS V3 maritime safety service user receivers do not exist, then, it would never be used. To avoid this, a set of different promotion activities have been proposed as part of the roadmap.

In addition, from the critical path analysis it is detected that the end of 2021 represents a critical checkpoint for the timely and feasible likelihood to have an EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service. At this point, most of the technical activities shall have finalized, in particular, the consolidation of the technical solution. On the other hand, end of 2024 represents also a major checkpoint, since in 2025,


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user receivers shall be available in the market, and also, the Service Qualification phase should finalize.


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8. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

SUMMARY AND OVERALL CONCLUSIONS The CBA investigated both the cost and benefit streams associated with foreseen launch of an EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service and the market introduction of the associated and required Dual-Frequency, Multi-Constellation (DFMC) SBAS receivers. Throughout the technical assessment of the SEASOLAS study, three technically distinct DFMC SBAS receivers were considered by the Consortium targeting different technological requirements so to satisfy the requirements of three stringent environments, being: Traffic Separation Schemes;

Inland Waterways;

Port Navigation.

Whereas the first type of receiver would match the least stringent requirements of the Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS), the second type would achieve the necessary requirements of the Inland Waterway environment as well as the requirements in the TSS and finally, the third type would fulfil the most stringent needs as identified in the Port environment, as well as those of the TSS and IWW environments. A high-level overview of these receivers and the associated technical features are presented in the table below. The third column focuses on the intended users, whilst the fourth column provides an overview of the estimated market price for the end users.

Table 8-1: Overview of SEASOLAS technical solutions

Type of receiver Technical description Intended users Target market price5

Traffic Separation Scheme receiver

DFMC SBAS receiver with Fault Detection/Fault Detection and Execution techniques to detect and/or exclude hazardous local effects i.e. receiver optimized for TSS environments (Option 1, see $6.2.1)

SOLAS vessels Estimated at 1,850 EUR

Inland Waterway receiver

DFMC SBAS receiver extended with autonomous integrity monitoring algorithms to compute integrity which is robust against hazardous local effects i.e. receiver optimized for IWW environments (Option 2, see $6.2.2)

Both SOLAS and IWW vessels Estimated at 1,950 EUR

Pilot Navigation receiver

DFMC SBAS receiver extended with advanced PNT techniques (such as PPP) and autonomous integrity techniques to provide high accuracy and the required integrity which is robust against hazardous local effects i.e. receiver optimized for Port environments (Option 3, see $6.2.3)

Maritime pilots (Portable Pilot Units,

PPU) Estimated at 2,500 EUR

5 The target market price includes all required elements of hardware (incl. the antenna with an estimated price of 100 EUR) and software needed to deliver the performances of the respective receivers as explain under Chapter 6. To benefit from the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service, the end user would need to purchase, install and commission one of the above-mentioned receivers, no additional antennas would be required.


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Based on the above-mentioned information, a CBA was carried out in two steps. One the one hand a thorough CBA strategy was created, including the development of a

methodology, an identification of the affected stakeholders and a prioritization of those most likely to be directly impacted (i.e. receiver manufacturers, maritime users, maritime authorities and society), the complete preliminary mapping of both the costs and the benefits of this solution and finally the creation of a CBA model.

On the other hand, a stakeholders’ consultation was carried out over a one-month timeframe with the aim to involve as many representatives as possible following the initial identification. The first consultation phase covered 21 unique interviews with almost 30 stakeholders across receiver manufacturers, vessel operators (both SOLAS and IWW), and authorities (i.e. maritime, IWW and ports).

Following this stakeholders’ consultation focused on the proposed EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service and the differences associated SEASOLAS DFMC SBAS receivers, it can be concluded that the maritime stakeholders would welcome the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service and especially the provision of integrity at the user level. Stakeholders across different authorities (i.e. maritime, IWW and ports) as well as the mariner and the inland waterway skipper unanimously agreed that this service, when installed properly and fully integrated on-board the vessels bridge system, would contribute to the overall improvement of the situational awareness for the vessel operators and therefore increase the safety of navigation. However, almost all of these stakeholders also stated that under no circumstances, vessel operators should rely on a single source of information and stressed the need for combining the information provided by the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service with traditional Aid to Navigation sources such as the radar, AIS, visual sight of operators and crew as well as the use of pilots in those environments requiring them. This argument is exactly part of the Consortium’s strategy of promoting the SEASOLAS receivers as a solution within the ongoing Multi-System Shipborne radio navigation receivers (MSR) approach adopted by the IMO. The stakeholders saw the monetizable added value of the provision of integrity at user level, through the potential improvements in safety this feature could bring to the mariners and skippers. Especially, it is believed that this user-level integrity would be the critical component needed to improve the situational awareness of the maritime users and eventually contribute to an overall reduction of maritime accidents, fatalities and injuries. In contrast, the improved horizontal accuracy performances as offered by the different proposed SEASOLAS receivers, were appreciated, but were not considered by the stakeholders to contribute to monetizable benefits over the proposed timeframe. This conclusion became especially apparent when stakeholders explained how they are never solely relying on GNSS positioning when for example passing other vessels or navigation in confined waters. In the specific environment of Inland Waterways, stakeholders again welcomed the improved horizontal accuracy, but as this was not a necessity for them, they used the discussion on improved horizontal accuracy performances to stress the importance of vertical accuracy in their environment. However, amongst both the authorities as well as the mariners and skippers, several stakeholders stated that the importance of accuracy will increase overtime with the rise of autonomous vessels and automated navigation of vessels. Throughout the initial phases of the project and due to the lack of maturity in this market and the unconsolidated GNSS User Requirements, the expected performances and requirements of autonomous vessels were taking into account through the technical performances (target SEASOLAS performance values, see Table 3-2) of the TSS receivers as it is currently believed that a horizontal accuracy of 5 meters, and an integrity alert level of 12.5 meters would be enough for autonomous vessels. The only stakeholders stressing the importance of accuracy in the solutions they use were the pilots. Maritime pilots stated that a solution reaching the level of accuracies of 30 centimeters would be required to conduct their daily activities6.

6 Some of the DGNSS-enabled Port Pilot Units (PPUs) already used in ports can reach 30 centimeters accuracy. With the envisaged SEASOLAS Port Receiver being the most advanced technical solution (i.e. SBAS+PPP+KPIL), the necessary level of accuracy as well as the level of integrity beyond the target performances of 1m Horizontal Accuracy and 2.5m HAL would be achieved. Currently, the expected performances of this solution are between 10cm and 50cm Horizontal Accuracy and between 1m and 2.5m HPL.


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Besides the fact that the vast majority of the stakeholders capable of providing insights in the foreseen uptake of these solutions amongst receiver shipments agreed that this be in line with the uptake of SBAS in maritime receivers, none was able to foresee a difference in uptake across these different technical solutions. Seeing that none of the stakeholders were able to identify any difference in uptake of the different proposed technical solutions, the Consortium applied the assumption that the three different technical solutions would follow the same uptake rate amongst the receiver shipments. This being said, the basic logical conclusion that users would opt for the cheapest option would only hold true in case that cheapest option would be available. Following the interaction with receiver manufacturers, who under normal market conditions decide which options are made available and which ones are not, it was made clear that the manufacturers would be more interested in developing the most technologically advanced receiver. Two apparent reasons where given for this decision: Technologically: manufacturers deem it more satisfying to develop the most technologically

advanced solution, especially when this solution would only require a minor upgrade compared to the least technologically advanced solution. It was confirmed that this would be the case amongst the three proposed solutions. This reasoning was shared by the end users (i.e. SOLAS and IWW vessels operators);

Price: under the currently estimated and proposed prices, the 2,500 EUR for the Pilot receiver would mean, on average, a delta price of 700 EUR for the end users. A delta, which was considered fair for its technological advances compared to the available solutions by both the receiver manufacturers as well as the end users.

The overall positive feedback received by the stakeholders is also reflected in the outcomes of the Cost-Benefit Analysis which indicates a positive impact for almost all different stakeholders. The introduction of the Pilot receiver under the third scenario is estimated to lead to the largest economic impact across the different stakeholders and is projected to generate a Net Present Value of 83.9 million EUR over the timeframe 2018-20407. With an estimated NPV of almost 58.7 million EUR, SOLAS operators are expected to benefit the most from the SEASOLAS solution. Besides the revenue streams associated to the sale of the Pilot receivers, which generates a benefit for the Receiver Manufacturers, the overall majority of the benefits associated to the introduction of the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service can be found in the potential role this service can play in the reduction of maritime accidents occurring in the above-mentioned three environments. Despite only affecting up to 1% of the total number of maritime accidents due to navigational errors, stakeholders argued that up to 40% of accidents caused by groundings could be reduced, followed by close to 5% of accidents caused by contact and around 2% of the accidents caused by collision amongst vessels. A complete overview across the three different Analysis Scenarios and for all stakeholders is presented in the table below.

Table 8-2: Net Present Value of each SEASOLAS Analysis Scenario (in EUR)

NPV SC3 – Restricted Waters: TSS Navigation

SC2 – Inland Waterways Navigation

SC1 – Port Navigation

Receiver Manufacturer 185,000 EUR 610,000 EUR 1.5 million EUR

Authorities 2.2 million EUR 2.4 million EUR 23.6 million EUR

SOLAS 6.8 million EUR 4.4 million EUR 58.7 million EUR

7 The timeframe in which benefits and costs have been considered spans 15 years following the foreseen introduction of the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service (e.g. 2025 to 2040). With the Service becoming only available from 2025 onwards, no benefits can be generated prior to 2025. When it comes to the costs, following the feedback from the stakeholders, the baseline scenario assumed that no receivers would be sold prior to 2025, therefore no delta costs associated to the new receivers have been considered prior to 2025. Following the same reasoning, the costs linked to the authorities (e.g. setting up of a helpdesk and training of personnel) has been considered to start from 2025 onwards, in the baseline scenario. Finally, as we are currently 2018, the year of the decision, the net benefit streams have been discounted to 2018 leading to an overall CBA timeframe spanning from 2018 to 2040.


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NPV SC3 – Restricted Waters: TSS Navigation

SC2 – Inland Waterways Navigation

SC1 – Port Navigation

Operators

IWW Operators Not considered in SC3 - 883,000 EUR - 883,000 EUR

Society 207,000 EUR 213,000 EUR 801,000 EUR

TOTAL 9.5 million EUR 6.7 million EUR 83.8 million EUR

With the safety-related benefits being the largest driver of the economic impact in this Cost-Benefit Analysis, the major difference between Analysis Scenarios 2 and 3 (with less than 10 million EUR impact) and Analysis Scenario 1 (with 83.9 million EUR) can almost exclusively be explained by looking to the safety impact across the different environments. From Table 8-3 below, it is evident that the largest impact can be found in the Port environment. This environment is characterized by very dense traffic of vessels and according to the official European Maritime Safety Agency data used for the Cost-Benefit Analysis this is the area with the largest number of maritime accidents.

Table 8-3: Safety-related impact of EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service

Impact over the 2025-2040 timeframe

Traffic Separation Schemes

Inland Waterways

Port Environment Total

Number of accidents 9 1 20 30

Number of fatalities < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1

Number of injuries < 3 < 1 6 < 10

To summarize the CBA strategy: Safety-related benefits under Analysis Scenario TSS: reduction of accidents, fatalities and injuries

in TSS;

Safety-related benefits under Analysis Scenario IWW: reduction of accidents, fatalities and injuries in TSS + IWW;

Safety-related benefits under Analysis Scenario Port: reduction of accidents, fatalities and injuries in TSS + IWW + Port environment.

To conclude, even with such minor chances of affecting a maritime accident (1%), the associated cost reductions (with the overall costs of a maritime accident estimated at 15 million EUR) are considerable. With the vast majority of accidents considered for this analysis involving SOLAS vessels in TSS and Port environments and SOLAS vessels expected to see a rapid uptake of the SEASOLAS solution, especially compared to IWW vessels, it is evident that the SOLAS operators would benefit most of the improved overall safety of navigation. Under the alternative scenario in which a slower uptake of the solution compared to the used baseline in the model would be more used, it is estimated that the total NPV would drop by 56% down to 37.2 million EUR from 83.9 million EUR and that, apart from IWW operators, all stakeholders would be worse off.

SUMMARIZED IMPACT PER STAKEHOLDER CATEGORY FOCUSING ON SCENARIO 1 – INTRODUCTION OF IWW RECEIVER FOR SOLAS AND IWW OPERATORS AND PORT/PILOT RECEIVER FOR MARITIME PILOTS

The benefit and cost streams (i.e. 10.2 million EUR and 8.7 million EUR) for the receiver manufacturer are straightforward and are all related to the development, production and sale of the


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new DFMC SBAS receivers. As it has been concluded that the receiver manufacturers will pass through 100% of the delta cost as well as their profit margin through the market price, they will be able to recover these costs and generate a net benefit (1.5 million EUR) over the 2018-2040 timeframe. With the end users purchasing the DFMC SBAS receivers, they will indirectly pay for the development and production costs of these receivers by paying a delta price per receiver. On top of this delta price, it is also understood that these receivers need to be properly installed and commissioned before they can be actively used in the maritime environment. Under the current assumption that it will be very unlikely that these end users will be able to pass through any share of these additional costs, no costs can be recovered and the end users will absorb the full price for the receiver and the commissioning process (i.e. cost stream of 16.0 million EUR8). Looking at the benefit stream (i.e. 73.8 million EUR), the safety-related benefits linked to the use of the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service, and in particular the integrity at user-level, the potential reduction of maritime accidents will generate a reduction in material costs that otherwise need to be paid by the operators. This reduction in costs contributes to a positive benefit stream over the period 2018-2040 for both the SOLAS and the IWW operators. Overall, the end users (i.e. SOLAS and IWW operators) generate a net benefit (57.8 million EUR) over the 2018-2040 timeframe, with SOLAS operators seeing the largest net benefit of 58.7 million EUR. However, in the case of the IWW operators and as thoroughly explained in Chapter 8.3.2.3 of the CBA report, the benefits generated due to the accident reduction in the Inland Waterways are not sufficient to cancel out the encountered upfront costs of purchasing and commissioning the receiver. Therefore, the IWW operators face a negative economic impact (i.e. minus 883,000 EUR). As a third key stakeholder within the maritime environment, the authorities are estimated to generate a net benefit (i.e. 23.6 million EUR) over the period between 2018 and 2040. Upon the introduction of the DFMC SBAS receivers, if and only if, the solution fulfils the required accuracy performances for the maritime pilots, these actors will consider purchasing the SEASOLAS solution which is significantly lower than the currently available Portable Pilot Units. This will generate a first benefit stream (i.e. 8.8 million EUR). On top of this, as some of the accident costs would be absorbed by the authorities in situations where no operator can be held liable for the damage, a share of the safety-related benefits (i.e. 18.5 million EUR) is also attributed to the authorities. Finally, once the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service performs as intended and required, and once the DFMC SBAS receivers are widespread amongst the maritime vessels, a partial decommissioning of existing Aid to Navigation infrastructures such as the IALA DGPS beacon network could commence. This decommissioning would generate savings (i.e. 3.5 million EUR) on both CAPEX and OPEX. On the cost stream’s side, the need to commission the SEASOLAS solution for the maritime pilots is one element that will be absorbed by the authorities (i.e. 1.1 million EUR). On top of that, it is also considered that the maritime authorities across the 30 countries providing the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service need to send personnel for a training course as well as the fact that these authorities will set up a national help and support desk (i.e. 6.0 million EUR). This help and support desk would be available for any user in case questions or assistance is required regarding the use of the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service. Finally, when also accounting for the potential reduction of fatalities and injuries associated to the reduction of accidents, the societal benefits are positive over the overall timeframe (i.e. 801,000 EUR). With no costs passed through by the maritime users to their clients, no costs (i.e. 0 EUR) are currently attributed to the society. The combination of these elements results in a net benefit (i.e. 801,000 EUR) over the investigated timeframe for the society.

RECOMMENDATIONS To finish this chapter, a couple of recommendations can be suggested based on the outcomes of the CBA and the stakeholders’ consultation.

1. By supporting receiver manufacturers with large datasets (i.e. up to 3 months of data, depending on the file format and type of data collected, ranging between 100Mb to 450Mb per day) to run their simulations, the development of the DFMC SBAS can be accelerated,

8 Over the 2018-2040 timeframe, SOLAS operators face a combined discounted 3.7 million EUR in purchasing costs and a discounted 10.9 million EUR in commissioning and installation costs. The IWW operators face a combined discounted 357,000 EUR in purchasing costs and a discounted 1 million EUR in commissioning and installation costs.


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improved and done at a lower cost than currently foreseen. This would result in cheaper solutions with greater performances which would positively impact the uptake of this type of receiver and accelerate the benefit generation of the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service across all stakeholders.

2. Seeing the low positive impact for the IWW operators combined with high upfront costs

including the purchase and the commissioning of the DFMC SBAS receiver which cancels out any positive impact, it could be considered to financially support this stakeholder category. Similar to the mandatory introduction of AIS receivers, a subsidy programme, with a well-defined timeframe, could be designed and supported by the European Union or the individual Member States so to financially support the skippers and IWW operators so to ensure and potentially boost the uptake of the solution.

3. Whereas the purchase of a DFMC SBAS receiver has a delta price of 50 to 150 EUR for the

SOLAS and IWW operators, this additional price is minor compared to the required commissioning fee of 440 EUR per installed receiver. This commissioning fee leads to a significant cost stream for both operator categories and in case of the IWW operators contributes to the overall negative impact of SEASOLAS. To mitigate this negative impact on both operators as well as the pilots that need to commission their receivers and therefore generate an additional cost stream for the port authorities, the European Union could consider subsidising this commissioning fee for every receiver installed over a well-defined timeframe. This decision would not only ensure, but for sure also boost the uptake of the DFMC SBAS receivers across all end users.


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9. CONCLUSIONS As a conclusion, several key points for the SEASOLAS EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service implementation were raised during this project. SEASOLAS project focused only on the analysis of a SBAS receiver for maritime, but seen as one of the elements in the MSR concept developed by IMO. The project focused on the analysis of three worst-case scenarios in which EGNOS V3 could imply a benefit to the users: Port Navigation, Inland Waterways and Traffic Separation schemes. IMO requirements for these scenarios were considered as a baseline, and additionally ‘target performance levels’ were proposed in SEASOLAS to better represent current and future user needs. In this sense, a clear recommendation was identified in SEASOLAS: to push for the definition of new IMO navigation requirements that fit better the users’ necessities including a clearer and more concise definition than the current requirements in IMO A.915. Maritime environmental characterization analysis studied the conditions in which an SBAS receiver is expected to operate. It concluded that the maritime local features are much more demanding than aviation ones: NLOS, higher multipath error or more frequent signal outages make that current SBAS approach (initially designed for aviation users) cannot be straightforwardly applied to maritime users, since no multipath model can safely represent this error budget by its own. Therefore, SEASOLAS concluded that additional elements shall be considered at receiver level to address the aforementioned events. Also, the antenna installation aspects should be carefully controlled. Based on the multipath assessment and the requirements to be fulfilled, three main technical solutions were considered for the SBAS component within the MSR: SBAS enhanced with FD/FDE (Option 1), SBAS enhanced with autonomous integrity algorithm (Option 2) and SBAS enhanced with advanced PVT and autonomous integrity (Option 3). These solutions are able to provide horizontal error bounds for the user position (the Horizontal Protection Level, HPL). However, there are some aspects of these solutions that require further analyses outside SEASOLAS linked to the elements or algorithms at user level and/or its impact at architecture level. The protection levels are able to adapt and react to the local conditions raising alarms to the crew if safety is not guaranteed. Consequently, the application of protection levels was considered as part of the user integrity concept focusing on the applicability to adaptive safety margins or navigation traffic light concepts. However, this user integrity concept needs to be matured, mainly taking into account the human factors perspective to understand how the protection level could be managed by the MSR application and how the alarms raised (e.g. yellow light concept linked to warnings) would also be handled. This would also allow quantifying the benefits linked to the integrity at user level. Finally, a CBA analysis was performed, including a devoted analysis from the perspective of different stakeholders: users, device manufacturers and maritime authorities. From the outcomes of SEASOLAS it is seen that a potential EGNOS Maritime Safety Service definition is feasible from a technical point of view and also in terms of being cost-effective. Moreover, the solution considered within SEASOLAS is aligned with maritime standardisation and framework perspective, and also based on maritime technology equipment. This potential service could be based in any of the proposed technical solutions depending on the desired level of performance and/or impact at EGNOS V3 system. All the proposed solutions require considerable engineering effort to consolidate some technical aspects; some aspects are common to the three solutions, but some of them depend on the specific approach considered:

• The DFMC SBAS enhanced with FD/FDE solution is the proposed solution to fulfil the IWW and TSS IMO requirements. This solution requires performing an exhaustive maritime environmental characterisation during the consolidation of the technical solution in order to standardise the error models to be used by the user receiver. Let us note that the DFMC SBAS Enhanced with autonomous integrity algorithm solution is also able to comply with these requirements.

• The DFMC SBAS Enhanced with autonomous integrity is the proposed solution able to comply the IWW and TSS Target Performances Levels, if precise ODTS is considered.


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This solution implies a deep analysis of the algorithm integrity to be used. In addition, EGNOS V3 shall incorporate further evolutions than the ones expected nowadays (e.g. precise ODTS) in order to fulfil the most stringent requirements.

• The DFMC SBAS Enhanced with advanced techniques (SBAS+PPP+Autonomous Integrity Algorithm) solution is the only feasible solution able to fulfil the Port Navigation IMO requirements. This solution requires, as the previous solution, a deep analysis of the algorithms that provide the advance PVT and the integrity performance. Furthermore, EGNOS V3 shall evolve to broadcast the precise orbit and clocks corrections needed for the advanced PVT service.

Based on the outcomes of all the project activities, a general roadmap of the work to be done after SEASOLAS was proposed. These activities would allow to develop technically the desired EGNOS V3 maritime safety service. However, independently of the technical solution, there are many aspects that still need to be solved before this Maritime Safety Service based on SBAS becomes a reality. In particular, the following main aspects are critically necessary to provide the EGNOS Maritime Safety Service so we recommend efforts in solving the following aspects:

• Consolidation of the technical solution: as it has been aforementioned, many aspects are required to be done in order to propose a technical solution for EGNOS V3, which are detailed for each solution in previous paragraphs. Special effort has to be done to work on these technical aspects as soon as possible in order to not delay the definition of the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service and its corresponding adoption to the users.

• IEC test specifications for the MSR: having appropriate IEC test specifications for EGNOS V3 maritime safety service is a crucial aspect which may even delay the timely implementation of the Service.

• Antenna installation: the controlled antenna installation needs to be properly analysed to define the procedures the roles of the actors involved in this commissioning phase.

• Maturity of user integrity concept based on human factors, including operational perspective: this activity is needed to be able and to show the quantified benefits that the user integrity concept can bring to the maritime operations, e.g. sharing information between vessels in the same area.

It is also necessary to ensure reciprocal education between maritime users and the GNSS community. Finally, there are some not strictly necessary to put in operation the EGNOS Maritime Safety Service, but are important aspects because they could benefit and facilitate the timely adoption of the EGNOS Maritime Safety Service. Therefore we also recommend working on:

• Interoperability among SBAS systems: global solutions are preferred by maritime users, so the interoperability between SBAS systems could facilitate the adoption of maritime safety service based on SBAS.

• New IMO requirements: In SEASOLAS, it was identified the need to perform a complete fault-tree analysis and that IMO shall not be so open to different interpretations.

• IMO recognition of SBAS: recognition of SBAS as a component of the WWRNS is a key aspect that, despite not being strictly necessary to implement the use of SBAS in SOLAS vessels, it would be very beneficial to foster its adoption and thus, help to accelerate the process of SBAS adoption.


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10. ANNEX A: DETAILED SEASOLAS PROJECT INFORMATION This section presents detailed information about SEASOLAS project, in particular, presenting the partners involved, the project tasks and activities performed.

PROJECT PARTNERS The partners involved in this project are:

GMV, the prime contractor, is a privately-owned company established in Spain, devoted to consultancy, engineering, software development and turn-key systems integration for the aerospace and defence sector. GMV is a key company in GNSS development covering all disciplines and technologies, and has become a key provider of operational and critical GNSS systems as well as a leading provider of GNSS applications and services in the transportation market. Over its many years of involvement in the field, GMV has gained wide-ranging experience in SBAS systems (e.g.; EGNOS), Galileo, Ground Based Augmentations Systems (GBAS), GNSS applications and receivers, among others.

Valdani Vicari & Associati Brussels (VVA) VVA Brussels, focuses on the analysis, development and assessment of public policy, on market evaluations and economic studies in the fields of telecommunications, aerospace and innovation. VVA in general and VVA Brussels in particular have built a track-record in GNSS-related projects. The core of VVA Brussels’ expertise in the GNSS market segments is focused on Maritime, Road, Agriculture, Surveying and LBS.

The General Lighthouse Authorities of the United Kingdom and Ireland (GLA) are three not-for-profit public authorities that provide marine Aids-to-Navigation (AtoN) services throughout the British Isles. The GLA Research and Radionavigation (R&RNAV) Directorate has extensive experience working within and leading European funded projects. R&RNAV has a strong international reputation in the maritime community, collaborating widely with industry, academia, European agencies and other national maritime authorities in Europe and beyond.

European Satellite Services Provider (ESSP). ESSP is a dynamic company specialized in the operations and service provision of safety-critical navigation satellite systems. ESSP, as the EGNOS Services Provider, is currently performing, in close coordination with the European GNSS agency (GSA), an ambitious set of activities devoted to develop, implement, promote and adopt the use of EGNOS services in the maritime domain.

Kongsberg Seatex (KSX) is a leading international marine electronics manufacturer specialising in the development and production of precision positioning and motion sensing systems. The company is also involved in standardisation processes for maritime navigation equipment, being represented in various standardisation groups.

In addition to the previous organization, SEASOLAS project created an Advisory Board group composed by maritime users, manufacturers, authorities, institutions and whoever was interested in participating and supporting the introduction of EGNOS in maritime domain:

GLA (UK) and KSX (Norway) are also part of the Advisory Board Puertos del Estado (Spain): Spanish Port Authority Puertos de Sevilla (Spain): Seville Port Authority RSOE (Hungary): official service provider on the Danube in Hungary for AIS and DGNSS WSV (Germany): Waterways and Shipping Administration in Germany CEREMA (France): Centre for expertise and engineering on Risks, Environment, Mobility and urban

and country Planning

Next figure presents the SEASOLAS partners:


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Figure 10-1: SEASOLAS organization

PROJECT TASKS The following bullets identify the SEASOLAS project tasks: Define the maritime context relevant to SEASOLAS. Clarify technical requirements and in particular the apportionment between user requirements

and the SBAS component for each phase of maritime navigation Perform design of new enhanced EGNOS Maritime Safety Service and receiver equipment.

This includes the proposal of the changes to be made to EGNOS V3 System to be able to provide a safety service to mariners.

Determine to which extend users would benefit from the provision of integrity at user level Determine technical service validation for the operational introduction of the services Determine what receiver standardization activities are required Support an implementation decision based on cost-benefit analysis at different levels

focused on three levels of stakeholders: maritime service providers, manufacturers and end users.

PROJECT ACTIVITIES In order to fulfil the project tasks identified in section 10.2, the following activities were carried out in the context of SEASOLAS project. At the first stage of the project, the maritime context relevant to SEASOLAS was identified, including a regulatory, standardization and overview of the trends in the maritime navigation with specific focus on the user requirements to be addressed for the future EGNOS V3 Maritime Service. Besides it is relevant to highlight the identification of key players and the key criteria for the different stakeholders that may determine the decision of using the EGNOS maritime service. This step also included a technology survey analysis. One of the main outcomes of this activity was the identification of the three worst case scenarios in which SEASOLAS analysis focused: port navigation, inland waterways and restricted waters (traffic separation schemes). As part of the maritime domain analysis, a specific activity was performed to define the maritime environmental conditions in which a SBAS receiver would be expected to operate when installed on-board a vessel. This analysis focused on characterizing mathematically the multipath effects, to check whether a multipath model that adequately overbounds the real-world experienced multipath levels could be safely developed. Let us remark that the impact of interferences, as other critical local threat to GNSS, was covered in the analysis of the role of the SBAS within the MSR presented in the next paragraphs. One of the most relevant advantages offered by EGNOS V3, apart from the improved performance due to the Dual Frequency Multi-Constellation capability (DFMC), is the provision of integrity at user


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level. SEASOLAS analysed how integrity at user level could be obtained and used from an operational perspective (adaptive safety concept or navigation traffic lights). At this point, it is remarked that this concept was shared with maritime stakeholders from the Advisory Board and European Maritime Radionavigation Forum (EMRF) and their feedback was very valuable for SEASOLAS. SEASOLAS aims to be aligned with maritime standards, and in particular, any new developments should be implemented as part of the Multi-system shipborne receiver (MSR) compliant with IMO MSC 401(95) [RD.1], given that this resolution and its corresponding guidelines [RD.2] allow the use of SBAS augmentation data in maritime receivers for vessels under SOLAS regulation. A devoted activity was carried out to define the role of the SBAS receiver within the MSR, including a review of the apportionment model that derives the requirements for the SBAS component within the MSR. Once all the previous steps were clarified, then the EGNOS maritime safety service and corresponding receiver element could be defined. This activity included the following tasks: Identification of the possible technical solutions and compliance assessment of these technical

approaches with the requirements of the three SEASOLAS worst-case scenarios. To define the EGNOS system architecture required to enable the technical solutions from the

previous step. To perform an overview analysis of potential dissemination mechanisms (delivery chain

implementation) complementary to the baseline EGNOS GEO broadcast. Once the technical aspects of the SEASOLAS solution were defined, the next stage of the project analysed different aspects related to the service, mainly the activities to be done after SEASOLAS and to perform a cost-benefit analysis of the solution. For the first task, the main work was to propose a roadmap of the activities in a wide range of

fields which required to put in service a Maritime Safety Service including: - Technical/engineering activities linked to prototyping the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety System

and investigation in user algorithms. - Standardization roadmap linked to the reporting of the open points at user receiver

standardization level which need to be completed to support the MSR and therefore SBAS use across the maritime sector.

- Analysis of the service provision schemes and service validation activities required for the introduction of the operational service were identified.

- Awareness and promotion activities Finally, SEASOLAS team carried out a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) for the development and

implementation of this EGNOS Maritime Safety service focused on three levels of stakeholders: users, device manufacturers and service providers / maritime authorities.

The next figure summarizes the main activities performed in the context of the project:


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Figure 10-2: SEASOLAS High-level activities and corresponding main outcomes


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11. ANNEX B: DETAILED SEASOLAS ROADMAP ACTIVITIES This section aims to provide the detailed SEASOLAS roadmap activities from Figure 7-1. A series of high level Action Items (AI) are defined and listed in Table 11-1, detailing for each one of them: Action ID. Identifying code for each action item

Action name. Indicates the name of each action item.

Objective. Summarizes the goal of each action item.

Action type. In order to organize and better present all the different activities considered in the roadmap, they were classified into different groups of items, depending on the nature of activities they involve. These different aspects of the roadmap, or ‘planes’, may run in parallel and have interrelations, which were also identified. In this sense, the following types of high level activities were identified:

Technical/engineering activities (TEC): under this category we include all those activities aimed at consolidating and developing the technical aspects involving safety of life SBAS concept for maritime. These activities cover all the aspects related to the open points previously identified in the solution, and provide support for other activities such as standard definition and validation.

Standardization activities (STA): covering all the activities aimed at the elaboration of the needed standards for the use of SBAS in the maritime domain.

Regulation activities (REG): covering activities related to the existing maritime regulation and potential gaps that could be closed.

Promotion activities (PRO): to improve awareness and the knowledge of the different stakeholders about the future SBAS safety service, and in particular the EGNOS V3 maritime service.

Service provision (SRV): specific actions that need to be performed within EGNOS V3 to provide the future maritime safety service.

Support activities (SUP): under this category we include all those activities aimed at provide support by the actioner to specific tasks in order to encourage the EGNOS V3 maritime safety service implementation

Future evolution activities (FUT): Needed for future evolutions or new services, beyond the scope of SEASOLAS, but that seem reasonable next steps that should be considered.

Actioner. Identifies the actor or actors that should be involved in the execution of each action item.

Constrains. Covers the time constrains and dependencies linked to each action item.

Inputs and outputs. It is noted that the most relevant elements were highlighted as Key Inputs/Outputs (KIO), which would be further used to determine the key relationships between the actions.

Remarks.

Mitigated Risk. This cell indicates the risks that are mitigated with each action item.

Criticality: The criticality of the activities was divided in three categories:

High: Here it was gathered the activities that are critically necessary to provide the EGNOS Maritime Safety Service, since the outcomes of these activities significantly impacts the design of the service or they can imply a delay on the service.

Medium: Here it was gathered the activities that are necessary to provide the EGNOS Maritime Safety Service, but they are not critical.

Low: Here it was gathered the activities that, despite not being strictly necessary, would be useful because they could benefit and facilitate the timely adoption to provide the EGNOS Maritime Safety Service.


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Estimated duration: In addition to the estimated activity duration, it also provides which are the starting and end dates and the hypothesis and considerations taken about the duration.


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Table 11-1: Roadmap Action Items summary

Ac. ID Action Name Action Objective Ac.

Type Actioner Constrains Inputs Outputs Action remarks Mitigated Risk/Gaps

Critic. Estimated Duration

AI-1 Push for new IMO integrity requirement

Push IMO to define a new user integrity requirement to be consistent with the continuity requirement (to be specified over a 15 minute period instead of 3 hours).

REG Maritime authorities

IMO Regulation is developed in 4-year cycles High impact in AI-6 (technical solution consolidation)

IMO 915 Outputs from SEASOLAS

KIO-1: Updated IMO Integrity requirement.

The most critical update is to specify the integrity requirement be over 15 minutes (instead of 3 hours), similarly to the continuity requirement, while leaving the same risk value. This is expected to be achievable in the short term if EC and other maritime stakeholders push for it in IMO.

Stringent maritime conditions IMO 915 requirements update

Medium

4 years (Q1 2019 - Q4 2022) IMO Regulation is developed in 4 years cycles but the agreement of this new requirement should take less than a year.

AI-2

Push for IMO full safety requirements definition

Push for IMO to provide a full safety requirements definition (based on a Target Level of Safety).

REG / FUT

Maritime authorities

Maritime community lack of proactivity


KIO-2: Comprehensive IMO safety requirements.

It should be clearly and unambiguously defined at IMO level what risks should be covered by the integrity and continuity risks. Note this action would supersede IMO 915. In the long term, a full integrity and continuity allocation tree based on a Target Level of Safety could be pursued. Note that there is a high risk of this process being stalled indefinitely, and the goal may never be achieved.

Stringent maritime conditions Identification of maritime user needs IMO 915 requirements update

Low

Long term (From Q1 2022) Maritime community agreement could be delayed


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AI-3

AI-3.A: Definition of future user needs

Consolidate current user needs and define future user needs (service levels)

REG / FUT

Maritime authorities

Needed for the formalization of the requirements (AI-3.B).


KIO-3: Future user needs and service levels.

Recognition of new user needs that lead to the definition of new service levels. SEASOLAS ‘target performance values’ could be considered as potential new service levels (e.g. autonomous vessels).

Identification of maritime user needs

Low

1 year (Q1 2022 – Q4 2022) High level agreements on this topic shall not be a very time consuming task.

AI-3.B: Regulation of future user needs

Regulate user needs defined in the previous activity

REG / FUT IMO/IALA

Requires inputs from AI-3.A. IMO Regulation is developed in 4 years cycles

KIO-3: Future user needs and service levels.

KIO-4: Regulated user needs and service levels.

Regulation of the recognised new levels of user needs that lead to the definition of new service levels.

Timely development of the standards Current EGNOS V3 specifications

Low

4 years (Q1 2023 – Q4 2026) IMO Regulation is developed in 4 years cycles

AI-4 AI-4.A: Protection Levels in MSR

Consolidate ‘high integrity’ level (equivalent to PLs) definition within MSR guidelines. Test specifications to provide a coherent safety service, as in SBAS.

TEC ESA/EC/ GSA N/A

SBAS standards MSR guidelines MSC.1575

KIO-5: Definition of ‘high integrity’ level in MSR aligned with SBAS

Provide feedback to consolidate MSR guidelines and test specifications to provide a coherent ‘high integrity’ (equivalent to PLs) safety service, as in SBAS.

Existence of multiple approaches in the market SBAS designed for aviation Maritime user receiver DFMC SBAS Processing

Medium

0.5 years (Q1 2019 – Q2 2019) Technical project that may last around half a year


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AI-4.B: Interfaces definition in MSR

To identify modifications needed in maritime standards to include the interfaces to the use of user-level integrity, in line with the MSR guidelines.

STA / TEC

ESA/EC/ GSA

Will be affected by the required inputs of the MSR alarm management application.

Maritime standards MSR guidelines MSC.1575

KIO-6: Recommended standards for update the interfaces to the use of user-level integrity

Impact on interfaces, screens, the procedure of delivering alarms, etc. should be reviewed. This could be related to MSC.1575.

Existence of multiple approaches in the market Identification of maritime user needs

Medium

1 year (Q1 2019 – Q4 2019) Technical project that may last around a year

AI-4.C: Consolidate the Target Performance Levels concept in MSR

To update MSR guidelines to include the target performance level concept.

STA / TEC

IMO ESA/EC/ GSA

PL concept in MSR needs to be consolidated prior to this activity (AI-4.A)

Outputs from SEASOLAS MSR guidelines MSC.1575 KIO-5: Definition of ‘high integrity’ level in MSR aligned with SBAS

KIO-7: Recommended standards for update Target Performance Levels concept

To consolidate the technical and operational accuracy levels from MSR Guidelines and evolve them to be aligned with the target performance level. To consolidate values of the technical and operational accuracy levels, currently given as examples.

Existence of multiple approaches in the market Identification of maritime user needs

Low

1 year (Q3 2019 – Q2 2020) Technical project that may last around a year

AI-5

AI-5.A: Maritime environmental characterization

Resolve technical unknowns in maritime environment: consolidate multipath model, risk of jamming/high interference, etc.

TEC EC/GSA/ ESA

May require input data gathered before this activity starts. Requires data from different vessels and conditions.

Open points from SEASOLAS

KIO-8: Consolidated maritime environment characterization

Determine the risks (fault probability) in the operational environment. This will be key for the consolidation of the role of SBAS within the MSR, the consolidation of the technical solution, and for the type approval. An extensive data campaign is needed. ESA projects could be of Key relevance and similar to the work covered in this action: MARGOT (multipath)

SBAS designed for aviation Stringent maritime conditions

High

1.5 years (Q3 2018 – Q4 2019) Duration of a technical project of this magnitude may last 1.5 years.


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AI-5.B: Maritime environmental errors model standardisation

Standardise the error models defined in the previous activity

STA Maritime authorities

Requires inputs from next column to start. NOTE: An overlap period of 6 months with AI-5.A is assumed to pave the way for this action.

KIO-8: Consolidated maritime environment characterization

KIO-9: Maritime environment error models standardisation.

Standardise the error models to be use in the operational environment. These models should be assessed for a safety service by an antenna commissioning procedure.

SBAS designed for aviation High

1.5 years (Q3 2019 – Q4 2020) Standardisation process could last 1.5 years.

AI-6

Consolidation of SBAS technical solution within MSR

Consolidate the SBAS technical solution and its role within the MSR

STA / TEC

ESA/EC/ GSA

Requires inputs from next column to start NOTE: the tasks overlapped with AI.5A do not depend on the environmental characterization. Coordination with IEC is recommended to pave the way for AI-8 (SBAS type approval in IEC)

KIO-1: Updated IMO Integrity requirement KIO-8: Consolidated maritime environment characterization MSR guidelines MSC.1575

KIO-10: Consolidated SBAS technical solution. Identification, specification and definition of other relevant components within MSR

The requirements for the SBAS component within the MSR should be consolidated. To consolidate the SBAS technical solution definition, closing all the open points identified in SEASOLAS. To ensure that the requirements can be met.

SBAS designed for aviation Stringent maritime conditions Standardisation costs and safety trade-off

High

3.5 years (Q3 2018 – Q4 2021) General activity that contains several technical projects


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AI-7

DFMC SBAS processing guidelines for receiver manufacturers

To provide guidelines to process DFMC SBAS data to compute the receiver’s position and the associated Protection Levels.

STA

ESA/EC/ GSA Receiver manufacturers

Requires inputs from next column to start. Coordination with IEC is recommended.

KIO-10: Consolidated SBAS technical solution

KIO-11: DFMC SBAS processing guidelines

These guidelines should be similar to the MOPS in aviation, but adapted to the maritime service (e.g. multipath sigma values, smoothing time, steady-state, etc.). They are not strictly required for the SBAS IEC type approval but they will facilitate that receiver manufacturers can obtain SBAS IEC type approval. The same applies to the EGNOS V3 receiver development. NOTE: SARPS-like document is covered in AI-9.

SBAS design for aviation Gaps in DFMC SBAS processing for maritime at user level EGNOS V2 adoption Standardisation costs and safety trade-off. Timely development of the standards.

Medium

2 years (Q1 2022 - Q4 2023) Technical project that may last around 2 years.

AI-8

DFMC SBAS maritime receiver type approval definition

Define the approach to type approve the SOLAS receivers, ensure safety in the frame of IEC.

STA IEC (SBAS annex in MSR)

Requires inputs from next column to start. NOTE: IEC work could take in parallel to AI-7 but with strong coordination between activities.


KIO-12: DFMC SBAS maritime receiver type approval (within MSR).

SBAS as a component of the MSR, and therefore related to MSC.401(95). The roadmap assumed that for 2019/2020, IEC specifications will cover SBAS L1, In case they are timely available, then the work to be done shall focus in ensure user integrity aspects are properly covered in these specifications. In case they are not available, SBAS L1 and DFMC SBAS work shall be done from the beginning to do the work in an efficient use of time.

SBAS design for aviation. Existence of multiple approaches in the market. Gap in DFMC SBAS maritime receiver certification.

High

2 years (Q1 2022 - Q4 2023) IEC has a strict 2-year deadline for the completion of the work.


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AI-9 Interoperability with other SBAS

Assess potential interoperability issues among different SBAS providers. Encourage other SBAS providers to provide a maritime safety service.

STA / PRO

EC/GSA/ ESA IALA/IMO SBAS Service Providers (IWG)

Economic and political interests of the different regions of the world. NOTE: SBAS technical solution is needed for a common approach for a SBAS maritime safety service.

Outputs from SEASOLAS Outputs from other relevant projects KIO-10: Consolidated SBAS technical solution

Feedback on interoperability with other SBAS Promotion of SBAS maritime service to be provided in other regions KIO-13: Standards and recommended practices (similar to SARPS in aviation).

Assess potential interoperability issues among different SBAS providers To produce standards and recommended practices (similar to aviation SARPS) If SBAS receivers can be used world-wide (not only in Europe) the international regulation, standardisation process and the final adoption by the users will be easier.

Partial international coverage. Partial use of WWRNS.

Low

Long term (From Q3 2018) Requires involvement of different types of users. Work in SBAS interoperability is already in place.


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AI-10

Develop operational concept taking into account human factors

Develop and consolidate the operational aspects of a maritime safety service providing protection levels.

TEC / PRO

EC/GSA/ ESA Maritime equipment industry Maritime authorities

Requires inputs from next column. NOTE: there is overlap with the update of interfaces at MSR. Promotion and awareness from AI-11 will pave the way for this action.

KIO-6: Recommended standards for update the interfaces to the use of user-level integrity Outputs from SEASOLAS (integrity concept) Outputs from other relevant projects

KIO-14: Improved operational concept for a maritime safety service

Based on SEASOLAS user integrity concept. Explore data representation for the captain, and how other operational aspects (speed, rate of turn) can interrelate with the protection levels. Some projects have already started or are about to explore this field. Consolidate a user integrity concept from an operational point of view, taking into account PL and traffic light concept and how this can be used for different applications (e.g. yellow light). Include pilot project and demonstrations to increase awareness and identify the benefits of an integrity scheme (based on SBAS projection levels) for the mariners. Note: ESA projects could be of Key relevance: MAGS (user integrity concept)

Educational gap (understanding benefits of EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service). Identification of maritime user needs.

High

3 years (Q1 2019 – Q4 2021) Requires involvement of different types of users. This duration also covers the typical duration of EC/GSA/ ESA projects.


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AI-11

Promotion and awareness of maritime integrity concept

Close the educational gap: Improve the understanding of the stakeholders of what a PL represents, why it provides safety, and its differences with respect to accuracy. Improve the perceived value of a maritime safety service.

PRO

EC/GSA/ ESA Maritime authorities

Success on this action will foster AI-10 which is a critical activity.

Outputs from SEASOLAS (integrity concept) Outputs from other relevant projects

Maritime integrity awareness plan

Improve the awareness in the maritime community of the benefits of a maritime safety service, and the associated integrity. Improve the awareness from the SBAS community to understand maritime community needs.

Educational gap (understanding benefits of EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service) Identification of maritime user needs.

Low

Long term (From Q3 2018) Results from educational gap may not be appreciated in the short term.

AI-12

AI-12.A EGNOS V3 Rx development

Promote EGNOS V3 Rx development as part of the MSR.

TEC/ PRO

EC/GSA/ ESA Receiver manufacturers

Needed inputs to start the activity. NOTE: DFMC SBAS maritime guidelines (AI-7) will pave the way for this task but are not strictly necessary.

KIO-12: DFMC SBAS maritime receiver type approval (within MSR)

KIO-15:EGNOS V3 maritime user receiver

To encourage receiver manufacturers to develop an EGNOS V3 maritime receiver to be included as part of the MSR based on the consolidated SBAS technical solution proposed for the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety service user receiver. Grant mechanism could be launched to encourage receiver manufacturers to invest in this product.

Existence of multiple approaches in the market. Timely development of standards.

Medium

1.5 years (Q1 2024 – Q3 2025)


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AI-12.B Foster EGNOS V3 Rx adoption

Promote EGNOS V3 Rx adoption as part of the MSR.

PRO EC/GSA/ ESA

Needed inputs to start the activity.

KIO-15:EGNOS V3 maritime user receiver

Promotion plan to foster EGNOS V3 Rx adoption

To define a promotion strategy to foster the adoption of EGNOS V3 maritime receivers To prepare awareness material (papers, leaflets, presentations…) to emphasize EGNOS V3 maritime benefits for maritime applications. This material should be published, not only for Rx manufacturers but also for other relevant maritime stakeholders (shipping companies, captains, etc.). In the case of IWW, a subsidy program to financially support skippers and IWWs to purchase and do the commissioning of the receivers could be envisaged to facilitate the uptake among IWW users (see CBA recommendations).

Existence of multiple approaches in the market. Non-mandatory carriage of MSR. EGNOS V2 adoption

Low

Long term (From Q1 2025) Promotion shall be emphasized during the first years of the service.

AI-13

SBAS maritime safety services prototypes demonstration

To launch projects to perform demonstrations, pilots or trials to promote the use of a SBAS maritime safety service

PRO

EC/GSA/ ESA Maritime authorities

Needed inputs to start the activity.


Demonstrations to promote SBAS maritime safety services

To launch projects to perform demonstrations, pilots, or trials based on prototypes to promote the use of a SBAS maritime safety service

Understanding of the benefits of the EGNOS Maritime Safety Service

Low

2 years (Q1 2022 – Q4 2023) Prototype development and demonstrations may has a duration similar to technical projects


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AI-14

Autonomous vessels

Assess the benefits of a SBAS maritime safety service for autonomous vessels

REG/FUT

EC/GSA/ ESA GNSS industry Maritime equipment industry Maritime authorities

Autonomous vessels navigation requirement and operational procedures are needed.

Outputs from SEASOLAS KIO-3: Future user needs and service levels KIO-10: Consolidated SBAS technical solution

Maritime safety service suitability and potential evolutions for autonomous vessels.

Analyse the benefits of a SBAS maritime safety service for autonomous vessels, which may not be able to rely on the vessel captain and therefore very high integrity would be required. Evolutions of the SBAS maritime safety service can be identified to suit autonomous vessel’s needs. Liability aspects and service provision should also be considered. Involvement of autonomous vessels manufacturers’ is desirable.

Understanding of the benefits of the EGNOS Maritime Safety Service

Low

2 years (Q1 2023 – Q4 2024) Technical project that may last two years.

AI-15

EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service Qualification process

Evolve/develop EGNOS V3 to provide a maritime service and definition of the service concept, service provision aspects and service validation process.

SRV

EC/GSA/ ESA EGNOS Service Provider

Requires inputs to perform the activity. Note: DFMC SBAS processing guidelines and MRD document would be available during the period.

KIO-11: DFMC SBAS processing guidelines KIO-20: EV3 Mission Requirements Definition (MRD).

KIO-16: EV3 Service Provision Validation Package (including Maritime Service Definition Document (SDD)).

Covers: • System and service

operational readiness validation.

• Initial operations.

Late E-GNSS deployment Medium

8 years (Q1 2018 – Q4 2025) 78 months for the System operational readiness validation and 18 months for the Initial Operations.


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AI-16

EGNOS maritime safety service declaration validation process

To perform a validation process of the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service to formally authorise the use of EGNOS for safety navigation by the European countries/administrations.

SRV

EC/GSA EGNOS Service Provider

Needed inputs to start the activity

KIO-16: EV3 Service Provision Validation Package (including Maritime Service Definition Document (SDD) KIO-11: DFMC SBAS processing guidelines

N/A

Maritime safety service declaration validation process. From this point, the EGNOS Maritime Safety Service provision phase can take place.

Coverage Medium

1.5 years (Q1 2026 – Q2 2027)

AI-17

EGNOS Maritime Safety Service test bed

Assess performance and requirements compliance

TEC EC/GSA/ ESA

Test-bed is required to ensure that the technical solution complies with the requirements. This activity overlaps with the last stages of AI-6.



Tests that requirements of the preliminary technical solution are met before considering this solution as consolidated. In particular integrity and continuity requirements are expected to be challenging. Prototypes of the system (e.g. ODTS) and user algorithms included. The preliminary high-level requirements for this test-bed would be to work in real time with data gathered in maritime environments including an existing dissemination mechanism (e.g. SIS).

Standardization costs and safety trade-off

High



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AI-18

Additional alternative dissemination means

Study potential alternatives dissemination means for the broadcast of the DFMC SBAS messages

SRV / TEC

EC/GSA/ ESA

Depends on the availability and suitability of other alternative technologies.

Outputs from SEASOLAS (VDES Service Provision aspects)

Potential external interfaces for EGNOS.

Study a potential alternative dissemination means (potentially other satellite configurations or technologies such as VDES) to the EGNOS V3 SIS GEO dissemination. In case VDES is considered, it shall be analysed the potential feasibility after WRC 2019 in which VDES-SAT aspects will be defined and link them to the VDES Service Provision aspect already proposed in SEASOLAS. Let us note that VDES is expected to be approved at ITU/IEC level by the end of 2020

Coverage Low


AI-19

Provision of support for the antenna commissioning process

To provide support (or a service within EGNOS program) for the antenna commissioning process.

TEC / SUP

EC/GSA/ ESA Industry

Needed inputs to start the activity

KIO-19: Antenna commissioning procedure

Tools needed to facilitate the antenna commissioning process.

To provide support to the entity responsible for the antenna commissioning process. This support could be materialized by subsidizing the entities to take of this responsibility or facilitating tools to perform it. In addition, as recommendation from the CBA, subsidising the commissioning fee during a well-defined timeframe will boost the uptake of the receivers.


Low

Long term (From Q1 2024) Support shall be emphasized during the first years of the service.


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AI-20

Support type approval testing

To provide support (e.g. data set generation, set up configuration) to ease type approval test implementation.

TEC/ SUP

EC/GSA/ ESA IEC (SBAS annex in MSR)

Needed inputs to start the activity Slight overlap with type approval definition to pave the way of the type approval.

KIO-12: DFMC SBAS maritime receiver type approval (within MSR)

Tools needed to facilitate the type approval process.

To provide support (e.g. data set generation, set up definition) to type approval test implementation. This could reduce risk of delaying time to market for the receivers, and also to reduce the effort and cost of develop the products, which can also accelerate the uptake of the receivers (see CBA recommendations).


Low

Long term (From Q1 2024) Support shall be emphasized during the first years of the service.

AI-21

Standardisation strategy for non-SOLAS vessels

To provide a light-certification scheme applicable for non-SOLAS vessels which are not mandated to comply with the IEC test specifications.

STA EC/GSA/ ESA

Needed inputs to start the activity. May experience rejection from non-SOLAS users.

KIO-10: Consolidated SBAS technical solution KIO-18: DFMC SBAS maritime antenna installation guideline

KIO-17: Certification scheme for non-SOLAS vessels

Develop a light certification scheme (EGNOS labelling so device manufacturers achieve a technological distinction maintaining a minimum level of service). Should be based on a risk analysis and a CBA. In line for IWW and Pilots equipment. Should also consider the commissioning needed depending on the technical solution.

Existence of multiple approaches in the market

Low

2 years (Q1 2023-Q4 2024) Technical project that may last two years.


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AI-22

Antenna installation commissioning process

To define the commissioning that ensures GNSS antenna is correctly installed

STA IEC (SBAS annex in MSR)

Needed inputs to start the activity. NOTE: first activities for the commissioning procedure definition can overlap with multipath model definition. Commissioning may experience operational constraints and rejection from users.

KIO-8: Consolidated maritime environment characterization KIO-9: Maritime environment error models standardisation.

KIO-18: DFMC SBAS maritime antenna installation guidelines KIO-19: Antenna commissioning procedure

Develop the DFMC SBAS antenna installation guidelines that ease the antenna commissioning phase. Develop and assess the most suitable process to ensure a correct antenna installation on a vessel through a commissioning process, including procedures, roles and responsibilities. NOTE: the commissioning will be based in a remote access to the vessel navigation data to test the multipath error model.

Stringent maritime conditions

High

2 years (Q3 2019-Q2 2021) Technical project that may last two years.

AI-23

EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service Mission Requirements Document (MRD)

To define the mission requirements of the EGNOS V3 Maritime Safety Service.

SRV MRD CCB N/A

EC Implementing Decision on EGNOS V3 [RD.6] Outputs from SEASOLAS

KIO-20: EV3 Mission Requirements Definition (MRD).

To update the EC Implementing Decision on EGNOS V3 to include port navigation requirements. To update the EC Implementing Decision on EGNOS V3 according to the outcomes of SEASOLAS.

Identification of maritime user needs. Current EGNOS V3 specifications.

Medium

0.5 years (Q1 2022 – Q2 2022) Update of this document is not a time-consuming task.


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END OF DOCUMENT

seasolas final report - europa

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